ML20024C689
| ML20024C689 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1979 |
| From: | Rogers L BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-02, TASK-07, TASK-2, TASK-7, TASK-GB GPU-0335, GPU-335, NUDOCS 8307130014 | |
| Download: ML20024C689 (34) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, e. 1 THE *1900CK.& WILCOX COMPANY t P0w'ER GENERATION GROUP To ~l 'f a O Dist:1butien a F rott. e t.C. Revers, Site Deeretions Manater s.. ..t.,.
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or Ref. ~. ~,, ' Me t-Id /Jers e, ce-t al ?ever red ifehr ~ Su Dj. Date .[,, Statement of 3/28/79 Unit TT ??ansient Juhe 12. love T 3... A:: ached is.a description of my perscani state en: ". ~. relating to my contribu: ion towards re-establishmen: of stable plan: conditions following :he ::1p and subseques:
- a=sies experienced at TM1 Nucles: Statie. Unit 11, beginning vi:h the turbine / reactor : rip a; 0400 hours 3/.NE/79.
The majority of the infor=atics and co:clusf.ons expressed in this package are a result of my personal recollec: ion. post
- 1p review of collected plant data information, and the resu*.:
of tapes of in:erviews and ::anscripts of in:erviews of other personnel involved with contributions towards plan: stability ch tha: date. Because of use of the above listed resources, 1 consider the times and events to be most accura:e of any c:he-ti=e and eve:: i= formation 1 =ay have per,sonally eithar vri:te er verbally described. If you have any questions regardi:s this subj ect, please do not hesi:a:e :o contact me. LCR/dj: cc: John MacMilla Byron Nelson Andy Olds Ji= Phinney Bill Spangle; y news j ' /*i
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~, 1 9 i s j ~. q i 4' L. .=. + .i ..s. ,\\ j -.~ 1 i a 4 i STATEMENT OF THE POST TRIP INVOLVEENT: IN THE TMI 3/28/79-I' PLANT TRANSIENT i 4 e 1 4 I 4 1 I 1 v I 4 by Leland Curtis Rogers j - 4 ) Site Operations Manager 1 I Babcock & Wilcox Company J.' g i 3 l e a l B issa P m. J t e f ... ~. -'. .m -- ,w ,-wr*~,r---m . ~,...,,,,. -,. -,,,, -,, -. ,,-,-----m-w,,., ,c ,,c.,,p. ,-,,,r.,-.,w.gwy--
s e, w I" ~.. - My name is Leland Curtis Rogers; and at the time of the TMI-2 plant transient, I was assigned at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station as the ..- 5.. Site Operations Manager for the Babcock ar.d Wilcox Company. My primary functicnwas completion of the Unit Startup Testing Program, as described by the Nuclear Steam System Contract. I also held a collateral responsibi,11ty ,I as Manager supervising five Field Service Enginers that performed various .5 ~ service tasks requested by the Management c'f Metropolitan Edison and L'- ' General Public Utilities Service Corporation, under separate Service "b contract agreements. I report *a W. H. Spangler, Manager Startup Services, Nuclear Services Depar=nent, in Lynchburg Virginia, NPGD office for all of the N.S.S.S. Startup responsibilities at Three Mile Island. I also report to Mr. J. D. Phinney, Manager Operating Plant Se-vices, Nuclear Service Depart:nent, in Lynchburg Virginia, for the various service task assistance to Unit I during the refueling operations. 'The Unit I plant startup to beg'in Cycle 5 operations would also have had S&W Engineers providing assistance to Metropolitan Edison, thus, repor*ing to me. NUCLEAR BACKGRDUND EXPERIENCE I.am a Registered Professional Engineer in the state of Calife-nia. My nuclear exoerience is as follows: I. Naval Nuclear Power Procram a. July 1955 - June 1957 Nuclear Operations SIW ;rototype, Idaho Falls Idaho. Operatiens. testing and ove-naul. Instructor - Shift Senior Chief Reactor Operator. . B 1264 l e em-- ,,4 -.~ r ~~ ~ .,r-+ w -e-
T. August 1957 - March 1959 [ b U.S.S.SwertfishSS(N)579 .. g,. y-Preconmissioning testing, cperations, and overhaul. c. August 1959 - October 1962 ti U.S.S. Sculpin SS (N) 590 Preconcissioning, testing, operations and overhaul 3
- d. ~ December 1962 - February 1566
,i USNT3 Bainbridge, Maryland, Naval Nuclear Power School Instructor, Basic Training Courses e. February 1966 - June 1969 U.S.S. Tinosa SS (N) 606 Operations and overhaul - Training Coordinator f. July 1969 - February 1970 Engiretring Repair Department, U.S. Naval Submarine Base, , New London, Connecticut Repair assistance to the operating submarine fleet. ~ g. During the 15 years,1955 through 1970, I also attended Special Training courses relating to design, theory, operations. and performance of Naval Nuclear Power Flants. II. Conmercial Nuclear Program a. February 1970 - September 1972 .Westingneuse Electric ' Corporation, Pittsburgh, Penr.sylvania, Field Service Engineer. Performec tasks such as Test Program \\ Procedures Preparation, Refueling Restart Physics Test Engineer, ~' Construction Functional Test Service; Hot Functional Test ~ Engineer, Critical and Power Escalation Service Engineer B 1265. O e ---,,w w --er-.-- 9w
s' . ~s ,q for the Westinghouse System Plants Yankee Rowe Connecticut Yankee Rochester G&E (Ginna) ,,,,.j CPE (Robinson) FPE (Turkey Point) S VEPCO (Surrey).
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Con Edison (Indian Point II) j. WMP(PointBeach) NSP (Prairie Island) WEP(Kewanee) b. October 1972 - Pnsent Three Mile Island Nuclear Station October 1972, Site Operations Engineer, Startup Supper: Unit I. ~ ~ June 1974, Manager Site Services, Service Tasks for Me:mpolitan Edison Coc:pany Unit I and GPUSC Unit II. January 1977, Site Operations Manager Unit II startup, and Manager, Site' Services for both units. ~ IV statement is a deliberate effort on my par to identify, as best I can recall for the' record, if requirect my personal contributien towards ne post trip Uni: II operations on March 25, 1979, at Three Mile Island Station and the following two days. disc,Ishallattemot
- o identify any supporting contribution, during :ne stated operations, 3
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i t M any other B&W personnel that I was aware of at the time or have learned about since that were sources of information that was directed - - 5*'. ~~ ' to me as a support function. Because of the period of time since the plant transient, ry observctions may be affected by the loss of time / 3f- ', f.- fact relationship or conversely because of knowledge developed.about the transient and their effects since that time may be influenced ,,P and indicate contrast to statements or data'from other sources. '~ March 28, 1977 ' Approximately 0600 on March 28, 1979, I was awakened by the telephone and was asked to please stand-by for a conference call with I Mr. Miller. (This is not an unusual occurrence since my role as B13 Manager of Services at TMI Site, by agreement with Metropolitan Edison..usually results in a notification of abnormal or unusual ~ cperations of either Unit; so I. may be better prepared to provide wantever B&W support may be identified on an individual basis at a later time.) Within a few c:inutes, the conference call connections were made and the persons on the line identified themselves as Jack Herbein (Metropolitan Edison, Vice-President of Generation), Gary Miller (Metropolitan Edison, Station Manager), George Kunder (Technical Superintendent Unit II), and myself. George had been netified about the pl. ant trip earlier and had gone into the plant. (He lives about one mile from the site and arrived at approximately 0450 hours.) l George identified that Unit II had experienced some (not clearly identified at that time) upset condition in the feedwater system that causee a prctec-ive interiock system to initiate both feeewater :u=c 4 B 1267
I
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~.. ~ trfp. This condit!cn causes a generator / turbine sequential trip action which did occur, about 0400 hours. George continued with a .- l,. scenario which described the following events (may not be in the . - {. same order as George presented them): "y) a. approximately S seconds after turbine tripped, the reactor tripped on high pressure. 1 b. the electromatic relief valve, R0.RY-2, opened prier to the
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reactor trip, as expected. 'c. shortly (no time estimate) the rupture diaphragm on the reactor coolart drain tank failed (high pressure in the tank). d. pressurint level recovered quickly at start of transient, and the operators have had trouble keeping within indication range at top since. Approximately 300" at time of call. believe George Eeld us of suspected loss of many of pressuricer e. heaters because of high moisture from drain tank; insulation ~ on heater cables known to be vulnerable to high reac'ter building humidity in past. f. samples had revealed possible primary to secondary leak on "B" 075G therefore it was "bettled up" at that time. g. nactor coolant system pressure was 800 to 1,000 psi and temperatures in the reactor coolant system still high. h. suspected to have violated the fuel pin comoression curve limits. i. "B" loep reactor coolant pu=:s were secured 0512 hou-s because of pressure temperature limits. j. "A" loop reactor coolant pumps were secured about 25 =inutes later. .r.. B 1268'
.2-k. "A" loop reactor coolant pumps were secured about 25 minutes 2 later because reactor coolant flow indicators were erratic . 5, and reactor coolant pump setor current readings were erratic.
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t[ A general discussion followed ainong all the people on the call. . '{r I was attempting to become nere clei.r on what had occurred to lead to ]1 the complicated reactor coolant system conditions. I asked George
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if the electromatic relief valve isolation block valve, RC-V2 was shut. George did not know,'but dispatched an operator from the Shift Supervisors ~f ~ office to find out. I heard a reply come back to George that RC-V2 was shut. It is here that I believed that RC-V2 must have been shut since right after the drain tank rupture disc had failed (which of course the valve had not been shut and according to the data was closed at 0622 hours). This infomation may have misled all of the conference call people away from making a key decision at that time. My thoughts were to insure that the cause of the reactor coolant drain tank diaphrag-failure was absolutely shut off. I suspected that the electromatic relief valve may not haye closed as it should have after nomal operation, which obviously led to drain tank failure. I believe that George also said the operators had reported increase above normal reactor building pressure and temperature. (These indications would de considered correct because of the reactor coolant drain tank condition.) The group discussien concluded that innediate action would be to ~ ' restore system pressure and attempt to regain reactor coolant systn flow by starting a reaccor coolant pumo. Herbein suggested that Miller l ) . i II 1269 \\ l l f l I 1
j i sdr in to the site, and Gary agreed. Miller asked me if I was also on my way in to the site, and I acknowledged that I would be there 1. as soon as I could. (Note, George did not mention any problem with radionuclide activity problems during the call; and in fact, they did y;,i not t is at the start of the call.) The call endet somewhere around ~.[ 0625. ,9~ I quickly got rea$and left for'the site. I arrived at the North Gate of the site at approximately 0705 hours and noted that the gates were closed, and the security forces were directing traffic to go to the Me:-Id Visitors Center down Route 141. I pulled up to a guard and asked why the gate was closed, and he informed me that a " Site Emergency" had been declared. I told him that I would be needed in the Unit II area, and about that time another guard that knew me came out of the guard house with my 002 red badge and instructed the other guard to open the gate for me. (I do not know if someone had previously instructed the guard to clear me when I showed up or not.7 I went to :rTy nor.a1 work office location (in the temporary green steel building directly opposite the Unit II Reactor Building). 'I took my briefcase into my office, picked up cy hardhat, left a note for my secretary, and went l across the street to the turbine building entrance - inner security i gate entrance. Guard Drabick was enforcing the " Site Emergency" turning back towares the South " Brass" Gate a lot of walking craft workers and a bus lead of workers. He informed me that I could net g: in, and I asked him to use his radio and ca11the control room for per=ission. Fe get a message to send me in. I noted tnat an atmospheric duma valve ' ' ~ was blowing steam. I entered the turbine building and pressed the m e B 1270 ,,r,- n--
~ i ~ d.evator call button. I noted that a good share of the turoine building lighting was out; and when the elevator did not arrive in 5. wnat I considered a reasonable time, I concluded that the loss of power ciay have affected the elevator. I went uo the suirwell by 'r the elevator. I walked across the operating floor of the turbine building and I ..~ .~ (- passed through the fire doors to the Control Tower Building and entered the Control Room by the left-hand door. I noticed Gary Hiller [ and several Met-Ed shift and Engineering Staff Supervision personnel. I let Miller know that I was available to help in whatever way I could. I atte=pted to deter =ine the status of Plant Parameters as best I could without interfering with the designated operators. Most i significant piece of infor:7.a-ion was the Flant Radiation Monitors. I was not able to get close, net wanting to interfere with the operators' duties, and obtain actual readings.' I could see many channels in " alarm" and ainest all of the rest in " alert." ' Conversation ~ revealed that some were reading in the " Hundreds of R" levels. I inquired of Bill Zewe (shift supervisor) if the reactor coolant pu=p runs had been attem::ted. ' Bill said that all four pumps were tried..hree would not start, one pumo had run fairly normal for a couple of minutes then showed minimum current and no flow indications, thentfore, was secured again. Bill also said that because of " lost" pressuri:er heaters, tne operators were unable to get a bubble in i the pressuri:er and keep it; occasionally they got level indication, t but it was not controllable most of the time because it was staying ~ at a very high level. I checked that all of the control rods were .~ inserted in the core, reacter coolant system Th's were pegged at 520 oegrees F. TC's were bottomed out on narrow range, TC wide ranges were + B 1271 = .p. y ._,7m_g 9_..
~ o ~.. ~ ~ between 200 F and 300 F, the reactor coolant pump seals were staged I* but the trace of several previous hours had shown significant pressure excursions, apparently following the reactor coolant system pressure. , $.f* by9 Quick glance appeared that the seals had performed well during the . ~ ' - system pressure cycles and on and off pump opcrations. 4 The time was 0730 hours and I decided to attempt to call Lynchourg ... ~ ~ (Spangler). I had to use the I&C shop phones outside the Control .T. '*. Room due to the Control Room phones being tied up at the time because -** 7 Miller had initiated a " General Emergency" condition based on the high and increasing radiation levels in the Reactor Building. My attemet to reach anyone at Old Forest Road BW Office was not fruitful in that I got the Security Gua're at the building front entrance,and he informed me that the switchboard was not yet in operation and probably could not locate anyone in the Nuclear Service Section at that time. I went back to the Control Room and stayed out of the way. Met-Ed personnel we-e pefor=ing operating tasks as directed by the shift supervisor and also perfor=ing tasks as directed by tiiller relating to the procedure requirerent for the " General Emergency" condition. All phones were occupied in notifying all of the organizations and agencies required. Met-Ed Rad Survey Teams were reporting levels from the specific locations as directed by Dick Dubiel. I talked to chemis ry supervisors regarding the secendary samples on "A&E" CTSG's and agreed with their conclusions that the "A" generator was not currently contam-inated and that the "B" generator was.' cont'a'minaled and should be kaot
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isolated from the steam. system. I believe the first reporis of highly contaminated water being present in the (see next page) l 9 B12E2
r 4 ~.. - Auxiliary Building were received in the control area around this time E frame. '.- l,. I returned to the I&C office at 0745 hours and again placed a call . i. to Bill Spanglerin Lynchburg. Bill answered the phone, and I briefed 'ff him on what I knew at that time relating a re-cap of events from 0400 0
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hours to 0745 hours of the information that I possessed at that point. ,4, I informed him that the site was closed and a " General Emergency" had 3' ... = - been declared because of the very high radiation alarms in the Reactor .~ Building. I am not sure but I may have informed him of the activity iri the Auxiliary Building also during that call. As I recall, Bill asked me some questions about how events may have occurred, such as, what started the Feed System Transient.' At that time, it was suspected that the condensate polisher valve control air supply system was full of water,'which could have started a cascade securing of the condensate polishers leading to a loss of feedwater event. I believe,I related this information to Bill. (Post trip review reveals a loss of condensate pu=p as the initiating event and this can give the same results.) Bill ~ may well have asked additional cuestions, but I do not have recall as to what they were at this time. I know that I said, "Someone will be getting - back to you later to keep you updated." During this time the operators under the shift supervisor and with assistance from tiike Ross, the Unit I Operations Supervisor, were attempting to regain full knowledge and control by using their normal indications of the reactor systems and Balance of Plant. I was not directly advising anyone and because of physically being in the rear area of the Cont-o1 Room, I was not fully know)edgeable of neir actions. .:o. B 1273 j
I t Gary Miller, Bill Zewe, Mike Ross, George Kunder and I held a short caucus about inrnediate action to attempt with the plant. An agreement ,,' i. - was reached to attempt to run a reactor coolant pump in the "A" loop, . y. since the last pump run was in the "B", loop, to see if the same effects .4 :.x-would be apparent in the "A" loop. System pressure was approximately '1-1500 psi. The 1A pump was started and showed no flow indication and minimum current on the motor. I was then convinced that Dy some .. 2 = method the plant had converted both Th legs volumes to steam and it was as large a void as to extend essentially to the pump suctions. I suggested that further pump runs at that, time would de nothing for the system and possibly destroy a shaft seal assembly. Miller asked all of the supervisory and assistance people to retire to the Shift Supervisors Office in the rear of the Control Room. HDTE: The Control Room area was a calm operating. station with reports of plant systems and component information being consnunicated in an efficient fashion. Chemistry, Rad Monitoring, Maintenance, and 5*aff Engineering were all being dispatched on tasks supporting the operators. There is no question in my mind that all individuals in and around Unit II that day understood the seriousness of the pitnt condition and there was a genuine concentrated effort to do whatever was necessary to bring all plant situations under control. In the face of adversity, all participants resconded much finer that one may expect from such a large, diversified, individual interest. ecliection of personnel. i U ~' 4 . B 1274 .c 4-.---. -yO -.
.a. I' ,, In the meeting, Gary started with a statement that all persons involved needed to regard that our collective first responsibilit.y ." j,. was to protect the public from harm by insuring all actions could not aggravate the release of radiation. At that time, it was known that . ~p we had high radiation levels in the reactor containment (it was' agreed. that the reactor building was isolated and we should not have any 4 , additional movement of radioactive water or gasses from that source). It was also identified that the Auxiliary Building had serious I. contaminated water and gas and was " buttoned up" as best as known at the time. Gary went on to say that protectier. of the personnel required to be on site was the second priority objective,'and would be considered as an overrriding factor in support of the third objective and that was *J recover the plant by making it stable and attempting to prevent further damage to the plant components. The meeting progressed along the line of identifying what we (collectively) knew about plant conditions. Everyone agreed that we had some damage to the clauding of fuel in the core which led to the fission prcduct released to containment and elsewhere. There was a strong feeling at that time, because of radioacthe sample analysis results that fuel assembly damage was probably not very extensive, beyond cladding failure. Several Ge 1.1 analyses were perfehned on the Auxiliary B'uilding water, and the majority of the spectrum ef activity was fission procuct passes and the decay daughter products cf those gasses. The flow path of activity from the reactor coolant system was through the pressurizer and electromatic relief valve to the reactor coolant drain tank and to containment. !* was also agreed that tne loops were in a steam phase and that the off-scale panel Th readings were 4 possibly an uncalibrated ter.cerature. Ivan Porter had connec ed a ~ B 1275 -M-g
i i ~ i ~ m6tveit bridge to one of the RPS TH RTD's, and this instrtenent indicated that the detector was showing a resistance slightly beyond ," j. - the vender supplied calibration curves, which as I rerrenber, is apprcximately 720 F. Also, a multi-point recorder which showed both .7 the Th temperatures from thermocouples was approxia=tely 720 - 740 F.
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No one was sure if the locp RTD would respond correctly in a steam .-g phase, and also no one was sure if 'the multi-point recorder TC's were calibrated for temperatures in the indicated range. (The Th indicated ta=ceratures were such that confidence of tne indication was questioned.) It is significant to point out that with no reactor coolant pump flow and no natural convection flow in the loops, one must assume the loop KTD's could not be representative of the te=perature cf water in the core area. The TC's on both locps had been going down steadily in temperature indicating positively that HP injection flow was. going into,the system. (Miller emphasized that SPI should always be on and not be secured withouthisagreement.) Reactor coolant system pressure was approximately 1300 - 1400 psi and the pressurizer'was nearly solid with heater controls, essentially ineff,ectual. Also discussed was the fact that RC-RV-2 was most likely failed in.the full open positio9 and the only venting of the reactor coolant system could be controlled by R:-V-2 cperation. Even though po one felt that it was a good icea to start a reactor coolant pump, a concern was expressed whether we really were removing enough heat from the reactor coolant by steaming through the at=cspheric dump valve. Steaming to the condenser was stooped because no auxiliary s eam was available for gland seel d -u-B 1276 ,r-.- .y-,
8 systems and the Uni 11 vacuum was broken (Note: Since Unit I was in het standby in preparation for a plant startup, Unit II was supplying
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the Unit I auxiliary steam requirements and the station auxiliary boilers were not and had not been operating recently). The station "[- . -=- " auxiliary boilers were prepared for startup to eventually supply .'I Unit II auxiliary steam needs. Also the '3" OT5G was isolated. .~ Consensus in the meeting at that time was that the TC temperatures showed ' 1? ~ ~ that HPI' was being injected and the core must be receiving a
- 2 flow of water by keeping it covered and cool. (I believe abeut this
~ ti:ne the infomation was being delivered that the core T/C' were, reading a random indication from relathely low temocratures to 700 to 2400 or not reading at all. Corsensus here was that confidence in these detectors was ve y cuestionable without some additional answen. 0bviously, tne core had overheated, but I do not think anyone in the room had appreciation of just h* high that may have been nor ~ that the core water level had ever been low enough to have steam volds and dry out the fuel cladding. Note: With no flow in the reactor coolant loops either pg=;s or natural flow (this'cejd),u,siois based'on RTD indications)', the group impresssion was that HPI flow must be keeping the core cool; we cannot operate any of the reactor coolant normal systems until we collapse the steam voics in the het legs and restore forced flow or natural circulation that can be monitored on the installed instrumentation. A
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suggestion was made.o raise the "A" steam generator level to approxima ely Sgt on the operate range in order to remove some of the primary steam d B 1277 1 -~
energy and possibly promote better natural circulation when the,"A" loop was restored to water phase. .'- l,. Somewhere in this time frame (shortly after 0g00 hours) i .a Mr. John Flint. BW Field Service Engineer, arrived in the Uni II -- g Control Room. I suggested to John that he get up to speed with the 0
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current plant conditions; and after I briefed him on p-evious events. ,f, help in evaluating the information that could be obtained from the b ... = - 1 plant computer. Also that I would be needing to stay in close touch with him until the unit was again stable. A group decision was made to increase primary system pressure by keeping the RC-V-2 block valve shut and increasing HPI flow. It was decided to use RC-V-2 as a maximum pressure control device and have the operator control primary pressure at or about 2100 psi. The general feeling was that we might be able to drive the locps int.o a water phase; once again, having the system at fairly high pressure and removing some of the steam energy by utili:ing the "A" secondary \\ atmospheric steam relief to lower the primary temperatures in the "A" loop (again accepting that the "B" steam generator was bottled up-notsteaming). Since the heat transfer across the steam generator ~ tubes was known to be inefficient (backed up by the fact of low steam generator cressure indication), c:ncern was raised that maybe we were not stea=ing to atmosphere at a high rate. I went out to the roof of the tureine building to visually verify that the relief va,v. w.s,1 _in,.t.,,gh,.t...nd it w.s doing s.. - d pe _ e, 4 ' B 1278
t 4 j were also stationed near the discharge with radiation monitoring I*- detectors to insure that the unit was not releasing activity to the atmosphere through this flow path. All indications were negative and the plant personnel were confident that no hazard to the public existed through this path. Approximately Og15 hours the controlled pressure increase was started and the reactor coolant system pressure reached the nominal .T.,: ~ 2100 psi at approximately 1140 hours. Pressurizer water temperature remained around 350 F with all of the hetters turr.ed on that could be I utili ed. During this time frame the reactor coolant system TH's remained pegged high on the contro1 panel, the digital iroltmeter did not show any significant variations, and loop TC's were steadily indicating lower temperatures. This latter fact again reinforced the point that we were delivering cold water to the core area with the Hp! system. The panel operators were also using the 1" vent line (remote operated valve RC-V-137) as a vent path, along with RC-V-2 assisting in the control of system pressure. (This allowed the f operator to cycle open/ shut RC-V-2 less often. Continued operating capability of this valve was a major control room concern. The ~ pressurizer lerel was pegged at the too all during this period. All of the instrumentation in the plan' v.? thmughly monitored during .nis period. Somewhere around 1000 h....s 6*.,ersonnei arrived in the Unit II Control Room area. From this time on, no planning discussions were held without at least one (1) HRC representative sitting in on the . B 1273 wm w -. ---3 g 4
r ~.. - ~ ' c'ofference and offering coments as he may have felt appropriate ~- at that time. .- 5. In the 0900 - 1030 time frame. I was informed that Mr. Greg Schaedel . - [- (B&W Site Operations Er.gineer) was standing by at Met-Ed's Visitor "I.[. . - = - Center. Through intemediaries (phone lines were in a maximum 5 utilization stage) we passed several messages to each other. I asked .I Greg to mester the B&W people and have eve yone go hene but stand by for 3.~ 1 l a call to come in and assist on the station as may be required. I also briefed Greg on the plant status on what we were trying to accomplish. We also discussed the fact that I had already notified B&W Lynchburg on the transient and the subsequent events up to the 0745 time frame,. 'Greg later passed on to me that he was going home and that he would ) call back to the Control Room after he got to this home. Greg and I also decided to use Greg as the court:unication link, from his 'home, f with Lynchburg since long distance calls from the Control Rcom and the site were extremely difficult to complete; and he would probably find it easier to ac:omplish this from his home. Shortly after Greg arrived heme he received a call from Lynchburg informing him that a charter plane with three (3) engineers was on its way to the Harrisburg Airport. 'Mr. Kelly, Mr. Winks, and Mr. Twilley were tne engineers; and they were dheted to go to Mr. Schaedel's home l and stand by until they could come on the site. They were expected to reduce plant instrumentation data and evaluate that data to identify what had actually occurred during the plant transient. They also could .s_,- d B 1280
~ ) b'e# utilized by me to assist in initial activities towards bringing ~ *- the plant to a stable condition. Greg and I talked to each other several .- 5.. times and I updated him on plant conditions. On one of our conversations. .-[. .t..* I asked Greg to have a highly trained Radio-Chemist and also a Water Chemist dispatched to the site to assist Met-Ed Chemistry Department, a.s, .I I saw a need to establish the composition of the reactor coolant system ~.~ water, reactor building sump water, and secondary plant water condition very quickly in order to be able to quantify our actual plant conditions. ~~.7 It was my intention at tha't time to be able to analyze any water samples and be able to identify the extent of cladding damage to the fuel and possibly aid in the cleanup operations that would be required (as I felt then within a reasonably short time period). I was aware of having injected sodium hydroxide into the reactor coolant system during the first few hours of the transient and was concerned about the overall effect of chemistry in the reactor coolant system ~ . ~ possibly aggravating the fuel cladding condition. Also cf significant concern was the quality of the secondary system water since several modes of feedwater injection had been utili:ed and therefore the chemistry specifications had most likely been exceeded. Greg notified me in a later call that Mr. Dale Uh1 (Radio-Chemist) and Mr. Eric Yochheim (Water Specialist Chemist) were being chartered to our area to assist as necessary. Lynchburg also notified us,
- ntougn Greg, that any type of assistance that we thought that we may neec could be dispatched as soon as requested.
\\ -:s-B 1281 l ? u __. - _ _... _ - -. l
~ - - ~ r Y Shortly after, approximately 1115 hours, Mr. Miller again held ~.. - ~~ ' ? a conference in the Shift Supervisors Office. The intent here was ~~ to discuss what all of us thought about our existing plan for operation and to introduce any new suggestions towards getting the -.; f-=, unit stable once more. Through out the day, the tone in any and all
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l~ conferences was to review what the plant status was, as we knew it, ,i to present new ideas potentially to be carried out, what may go wrong -[,? if a specific action was taken, what should the operators see (on the f-{ instrumentation) if the action was successful or unsuccessful, and also what would be the follow-up action, if the discussed action proved i successful, or conversely, if the action accomplished nothing. The general agreement was that staying at normal full' pressure had not indicated any change in the loop instrument,ation, during the approximately 13: hours and that continuing in this fashion was using BWST inventory which was merely ending up on the reactor building floor. Someone raised $e question whether or not we might'be injecting HPI water into the system, and by some, unidentified flow path. actually bypassing the core and therefort allowing the core to be uncovered causing additional physical damage to the cladding. After a detailed discussion and planning session, the plan was to continue Hpl flow but cpen the pressuricer vent line valve, and RC-V-2 relief valve block valve to deliberately lower system pressure to approximaaly 600 psi, where the core flood tanks would provide a volume of water directly to the core and the both tanks would act as a pressuricer on the core volume in the reactor vessel insuring that the core was covered. HPI would continue to be used throughout the entire evolution. 4 . ~ 3 1282 f& =n
~ 9 Lowering pressu e to approximately 550 - 600 psi was considered a prudent nove since the loop TC RTD's had continued to show that cool
- f. g.
water was in the system and should be cooling in the core. If the - W- ~ .., :.= operators observed a large core flood tank level decrease, then ' "' y: that would indicate that the core was partially uncovered anu the r,,, CFT's were reflooding the core area. All participants in this .N, discussion were agreeable that going to lower pressure was a step E in the proper sequence since, at a later time, wnen the loops were ~. " again filled with water we would be lir.ing up to use the Decay Heat System. We all were agreeable and well aware that in the present plant condition we could not use the Decay Heat System. Another thought was that if we found the core flood tanks to discharge a large volume of water, then a follow-up step would be to line up and use the " piggy-back system." -(Low pressure injection pumps, decay heat pumos, in-line with the HFI 'pu=es,' recirculating the water from the reactor building sump after the BWST was emptied.) I further suggested to liiller. at this point, that he should make preparations for getting the BWST inventory from Unit I lined up to supply that water to the Unit II SWST, as a contingency in case the LPI-HPI system would not function properly. This action (temporary line up from #1 BWST *a !2 BL'ST) was fully planned, but never carried out, merely keet coen as an o; tion. Approximately 1130 hours, the reactor coolant system pressure decretse was begun (controlled carefully), and about 1230 hours, system pressure equalizedwith CF tank pressu-e, and it was noted with much relief that a very small volume of water actually injected. In I r.cs: people's minds (pecole in the control roe: area) this action 4 -to-B 1283
i t' .,ified that the core was flooded and most likely we had not been ver 5*- in a voided condition prior to this time. It was thought tha* core ..- n. cladding damage must have occurred early in the day when the system .. ;.. ~, .N was at low pressures and residual high temperatures existed. Somewhere in this time period,I asked Greg Schaedel to requestthat Lynchburg provide us with a calculated Decay Heat Generation rate for the core . -. ~ ~ ~.. (approximately 100 days of operaticins and 9 to 10 hours after the lf reactor trip). I was looking forward to the sequence where we would 7.* ~ ~: be going to the decay heat system and neecing to know what heat removal load capacity we would be required to have for continued plant cocidown. Throughout most of the morning since breaking vacuum in Unit II, the station auxiliary boilers were being " fired up" ar.d brought on line. Several difficulties were encountered by ne boiler operators and the steam to draw a Unit II vacuum was not available, therefore, throughout most of the norning, the only heat sink available was steaming through the "A" atmospheric, dump system. Approximately 1230 hours an order was' received in the Control Room from a Pennsylvania State Agency (reported then t: betheGovernor),toterminatesteaming radioactive casses to the ainesphere. As I pointed out earlier, this steam was non-radioactive secondary system inventory and at that time our only heat sink. The stop steaming order allowed no cotions and the atmospheric dump system was shut down. To me this was a serious roadblock to our recovering (refilling) the reactor coolant loops to a water phase condition because we were loosing our only heat sink available at that time. . s_,- ~ _n_ E 1284
o t' .c. Plant conditions were: pressure approximately 500f t core flood tanks " floating" on the core; HPI flow (as I remember 300 ppm to "A" loop and 150 gpm to "S" loop); TH RTD's still off scale high and 1 1 special bridge readouts in excess of 720 F; TC RTD's "A" loop beginning 1.". to show an increase with "S" loop pretty steady at a low temperature ,I .v. (this probably caused by having to stop steaming to atmosphere on ..I the "A" generator); pressurizer level still pegged at the top; and y, pressurizer temperature approximately 350 F. C 1 l l In anticipation of eventual need, the decay heat pu=ps were run l 1 l in a recirculation mode for approximately 14 hours. Somewhere 1 l around 1250 hours, a deep, thump noise was heard by the majority of, '~ people in the Control Room area. At first, in response to questions about the noise, it was suspected that some ventilation dampers had been repositioned'which caesed the noise. After fully checking the entire plant coriditions, it was noted that both reactor building spray pumps had started, two of the reactor coolant pumps indicated high temperature air cooling systems, and sour e range instrumentation showed a noise spike., The transient conditions were a result of a rapid reaction between the H2 and 02 in the containment and occurred coincident with a continued long period of system venting to the containment. The operator shut off the building spray pu=ps after approximately six minutes of operation. Monitoring teams reported no new high level activities, therefore, it was concluded tha- *.he containment had not been breached by the pressure transier. -(=2S psig). Shortly after 1400 hours, the RTD special bridge connection on Loop "A" showed a decreasing temperature trend, and at accroximately 1420 hours, the control panei indications showed Th.o be detreasing. " A" looo Th indication came as low as 560 F befo-e swinging back uo to a Degged B 1285 en e A ---m___________.__m
~ coh'di tion. It was felt at that time that the reason we lost water phase again was due to operators readjusting HPI flow to each loop. ..- 5.. Also at this time, the pressurizer temperature started to increase
- f.
at a rapid rate. All individuals in the Control Room believed that the indications we had seen were that the "A" loop had gone to essentially * ) 1 ,.[~ a water phase and back to a steam phase. By readjus-ing the HPI flow back to put a heavier fitw rate into the "A" loop legs, the Th indications L.( soon (approximately 10 minutes) came back into the indication range. i.*I It was agreed that if water were back in the "A" loop then we should indeed see the pressuri:er temperature increase because we would be forcing "A" loop water through the surge line into the pressurizer instead of bypassing the loop as we had been prior to returning to water phase. By 1500 hours, pressuri:er level was indicating the formation of a bubble in the pressurizer and loop "A" Tn was down to approximately 530 F with the "A" loop TC's increasing to nearly 400 F. "A" loop ~ temperatures continued to indicate on scale the remainder of the day. (Note: Tnere was no steam removal from the steam generator in progress during this period, as pointed out above'.) If the plant were allowed v dump steam at this time, I feel sure that natural' circulation would have stabili:ed plant ;.arameters. Shortly after the "A" loop indication returned, Mr. Miller was required to leave the site to provide a briefing with Mr. Herbein and Mr. Kunder to the Lt. Governor, in the Capitol Building, Harrisburg. Gary left explicit instructions to, if possible, contain any radiation for public protection, keep HpI flow operation, do net steam to atmosphere, at*empt to get the station auxiliary boilers operable, 23-e B 1286 e 4
ev -m 7- - --
w- --m--,- e yw -e--- s<--,--
e 3 l o ~ tropble-shoot the icst electrical buses, and do not make any plant
- lineup or operation changes until he returned, unless required to de
~~ ~ [.! ' so because of emergency requirements. Gary and group did not return to the site until approximately 1700 hours. Is During the latter part of the morning and throughout the afternoon ~~ and evening, I had stayed in touch with Grep Schaedel; and he in turn 1- '3-was talking to the Lynchburg office. Lynchburg', by the middle of the afternoon, had set up a comand center, where the managers and key personnel, from B&W systems, could be kept informed of plant condi* ions and thereby develop suggestions and recomendations to be passed on' to the site. One of the recomendations that I recall receiving that afternoon was that the operators must insure at'least 400 gpm total HPI flow to the core. I believe that this recomendation was the result of one of my earlier questions, pertaining to the decay heat ~ generation rate, although I. did not recognize this statement as an answer to my question. I also recall talking to Mr. Bob Arnold during the time Gary was gone from the plant. I answered some of Bob's questions and filled him in on the plant condition. As I recall, Bob strongly recomended restart of the reactor coolant pumes. I believe I answered that with "We will asn a pump after we are convinced that we have water in the loops and Miller returns to the site." Bcb also may have inquired wny we did not return to a high system pressure and collapse the steam voids. I believe that I adecuately answered Bob's questions with respect to the plant condition. m, - 2 !.. B 1287 O
~ ~ 'f When Miller returned, somewhere around 1700 hours, another short I*- confennce was held to plar. full plant stability. Plant conditions 5,. were "A" loop Th was approximately 530 F. "A" TC was near 490 F "B" 1 cop -. ~, Th was still full scale and the digital indicated near 720 F. "B" TC 150 F, system pressure near 650 psi and the pressurizer level had gone as low as 180" indicating a good bubble, but had in:reased I again to the full indication for about h hour. Approximately 1700 . ?." we again showed indication of a small pressurizer bubble, but level ~;*7 was near the top. Approximately 1700 hours Unit II condenser vacuum was able to be drawn since the station auxiliary boilers were stable and furnishing gland sealing steam. Shortly after the condenser began to show a vacuum, the control room operator began steaming the "A" steam generator by use of turbine bypass control valve. About 1700 hours when Hiller and Herbein returned from.he Capitol (Herbein in Visitors Center and Miller in the Control Room) a lengthly phone conversation between Gary and Jack, and ocEasionally myself resulted in a management directive that the Control Room operators must raise system pressure to nonnal pressures. Most of the personnel in the Control Roo= did not agree with again raising pressure, since we had not been successful in collapsing any steam void.s wnen we tried to de this action earlier in the day. (The major ~ scal of our collective actions at that time, as I remember, was to achieve water phase condition in the "B" loop.) Approximately 1720 hours, system pressure started being raised, control cy HPI flow and pressurizer venting (when necessary). I began a campaign about that time to run a reactor coolant pumo in the "A" loep since we were all very confident that th'e "A" loop was water phase. ' B 1288 e ~ -a -e
- -+ = - - - -- - - ~
evy-i-~we-- -h+- eem
s' Miller and I agreed that I should attempt to get Jack's concurrence with starting a pump. I talked with Jack again and approximately ..- 3. 1E30 hours, Jack agreed with a pump start, as long as I got Lynchburg's . f. concurrence. Miller coernenced an effort to check out the needed -g power supplies, systems, and interlocks to start a reactor coolant ,7 ..I,. pump in the "A" loop. Our preference, of course, was the 2A pump since that would give the maxinaan pressuriting spray system flow. 1[' I made direct phone connections with Lynchburg, B&W Control ' ~,1' Center, and explained plant conditions, requesting agreement to start the 2A reactor coolant pump. By that time the operators were aware that the A-C electrical buses that supply power to the nomal reactor coolant pump motor oil lift system and the backstop cil system (anti-rotation device) were deenergized anc troubleshooting was impractical since the switchboards were located.in a high radiation zone. The D-C backup lube oil system was checked out and found to be operable. B&W agreed that we could make a pump start effort with only the D-C lube oil system operating for the motor asse=bly. After ~ all of the other concerns of the B&W people were answered, a general agreement was made that we would just run a 10 second bump on the reactor coolant pump and see what effects could be monitored. By the time all par.ies were satisfied to allow an attempted ou=o start, the reactor coolant system pressure was a nominal 2200 psi. The coerators tried the 2A pz:p but it cid not respond to the control operations. The operator then atte=oted to start the 1A pump unit, the time was approximately 1g30 hours. The pump assembly 'u. did run and was allowed to run for the agreed 10 second bumo. Dramatic l 1 1 . B 1280
1 o. ~ indications on the instrumentation was noted, reactor coolant presstire-4 . went as low as 1600 psi and recovered to normal after the pump bump, "B" loep Th came on scale after pump bump. "B" loop Tc went down from -- 7, j. - 220 F and slowly came back up to approximately 250 F, pressurizer ~ ~ [.g level indicated " full" throughout the cycle. The control room '~ operator had increased HPI flow prior to pump start and this action 1 lessened the pressure transient. I reported system performance to Lynchburg and imediately (also requested by Miller) requested concurrence on, making another start, s s soon as 15 minutes (recomended time between motor starts) wai' me was up. As it developed Lynenburg was still discussing the f* bu=p results with 'me when the 15 mi.nute wait time was up, and tiiller directed that the'1A pu=p be started. The pressure transient this time was to 1450 psi, again the operators had increased HpI flow and the loop temperatures all came together at.approximately 330 F. The forced flow of the pump did sweep tne steam voids from the "B" 1000 and the extra HPI flow made up for the volumetric change. All plant instrumentation could now be utili;ed by the operators as correct indicatient of plant parameters in their respective sections of the plant. , Miller and I had another planning discussion and it was generally agreed that the reactor coolant system should continue to be cooled down to the pressure and temperature that would allow the operators to bring the decay heat system into cperation. I also pointed out to Gary that Unit II was significantly low in BWsi level, and that he should insure that the line-up to get Unit I's BWST inventory over to Unit II could be used rapidly in the unlikely event snat tne reactor B 1290
co$ ant pumping ability may again be lost and he would require a ~- significant volume of BWST water as alternate cooling. .- g,. Throughout the day, the eventual line-up of reactor building sump to decay heat pumps to HFI pumps to reactor coolant loops t[#. -r recirculation was an option available for cooling in the plant design,, but I personally was not anxious to go to that option unless it was the on1v one left available. 3* ~.; - Gary, other Met-Ed supervisory people, and I continued a rehash ~ discussion of our actions throughout the day and the effects of certain operations attempted. We also discussed what could be done through the night to further stabilize the Unit towards a cold shutdown condition. The general agreement was to cob 1 down and depressurize the reactor coolant system and go on to the decay heat system. I asked what the approximate time would be that the operators expected to shift over to decay heating cooling, and the best estimate was ~ approximately 0400 hours on March 29,1979. I again called Greg Schaedel and brought him up to speed with the changes in plant conditient since I had last talked to him (this report was a significant change of plant). I told him that I had been in direct courtunication with B&W during and shortly after the pump runs. I suggested that Greg notify Jon Putnam to come to the site at Da00 hours on March 29, 1979, to renove the mag-tace record from the B&W reactimeter (data acquisition system) that had recorded the day's events tad to begin a delegging process of the transient and subsequent information that was recorded. Greg was also instructed to send in 4 B 1291 l
s. ~ r - ~ two ef the Lynchburg Engineers at 0800 hours on March 29, 1979, to begin a data reduction phase of the information Putnam would be obtaining. I remember telling Greg that our normal office was still . _. ~. classified as a radiation :ene and therefore they should set up 3 operations in one of the Met-Ed offices in the Unit I area. I
- 1 -
suggested that Greg also go in around 0B00 hours and coordinate the ' '. ~.,,. whole operation and assist the Control Room operators providing advice and consultation as they may require. I told Gres that I J.,' - probably would be a little later than 0800 hours, but that I would see him during the morning. I then left the Unit I processing building. My car was down the middle of the site by my office and I walked down there, went into my office locked it up and let the site. The time was approximately 2300 hours. March 29, 1979 I came back to the site, needing to go through a security processing at the visi*.or center, somewhere around 0945 hours. Greg had contacted me at home and informed that he had set up a temporary B&W office in the security processing center conference room for our B&W effort of data delegging and transient evaluation. I went to our normal office and picked up a telecopy machine and supplies that I felt we would need in our temporary office and move the equipment to our new quarters. I established a line to Lynchburg and told them to keep tne line open for continuous usage. ~ I also toic them that I had a manual telecepy machine and they should make a similar set-up in their comand center in ~. i 4, 4 B 1292
~ ~ t ,e Lynchburg so we could send data, procedures, conments, etc., back and ' ~ - forth with relative ease. The tsmainder of the day as I remember it was talking to Lynchburg about the data we were reducing and making . q ~. contingency plans for other operations the plant may need to exercise. '.1.*. .y This contingency planning request had come from a meeting held with T. Miller and his task group in the Control Room during that morning where
- I all potential, contingencies had been brought up.
h? ~~.T. ~ I remember questioning why the plant was not on a decay heat ~ as anticipated and informed that there were some serious difficulties with p'ressure control and that some hesitation was now being expressed as to further contamination of the auxiliary building if decay heat system was brought into operation. B&W Lynchburg and one of my B&W Engineers (sometimes it was me) also opened a phone tie between the control room and the Lynchburg C: mand Center. I worked out a schedule with Greg and utilized all of the B&W Engineers in the area to provide around the clock coverage in da*a reduction, newer data collection, and relaying to Lynchburg, and provide advice and consultation to the plant operators. All of the Engineers were working 12 hours shifts, but I had staggered the turnovers so that we changed some at 0400/1600; some at 0800/2000; and the others 1200/2400 hours. I felt this way we would never have a brand new full group in a changeover status at any time at:d the continuity of B&W coverage would be much smoother. B&W continued with this type of coverage for approximately E cays bringing more pecple in from Lyncnburg as our need grew for data and assistance. Around 5 days int: tne operation we atte pted to get enough personnel ~' on site to allow the majority of the Engineers to be on S hour i s -5 B 1293 l l m
a W n. 1 1 ^ shifts and also attempted to rotate personnel to get a day.". ~. 9 off occassionally. The remainder of the day and inte :he nish: was devoted to providing as much assistance to the . l. - Met-Ed Staff on site, providing advice and consultation with ,2 .,. ~ many communications be:veen Lynchburg and the Sik e Support Team being u:111:ed to insure plant and envirement safety.
- 1
~,,.. 3/30/79 I came to the site approximately 1030 hours, again needing to clear admittance through the processing center, set up at the main visitors center. We B&W personnel were again performing data processing and evaluation of the ::ansient data collected. Addi:ionally, since there had been some airborn's radioactivity released early that morning, the con:rol room Met-Id Staff were seeking and receiving our di ect assis:ance for any changes in plant condition, using Lynchburg again, as our backup engineering inf,ormation source. The ability to sa=ple reactor coolant and' s e condary water qu'ality became identified as a maj or problem. 1 asked 3&W through Dale Uh1 to send to the site a complete Water Chemistry 1 Laboratory temporary setup, complete with analytical personnel to man the facili:y. 1 felt we needed an ability to perfern analyses away from the normal plant designed capabili:1es and te provide the personnel to run the sn.*ysis. since the Me:-Ed Staff were all tied up in radioac:ive survey require =en:s and were to: ally com:i!:ed. I also requested a " Eo: Lab Coun:ing yacili:ias " vi:h analytical persennel also te be 4 -r-B 1294 1
,g supplied to the site. Both of the labs and personnel were dispatched [ ** and available for use at the site by late 3/31/79. This support was a 5. major accomplishment in the time requested and delivered. . t [. By Friday evening, B&W was. operating a significant support effort to c Het-Ed and this support continued to expand for the rest of the cHtical. { '1-i period until the Unit was on natural circulation, later in April. i l .' y CONCLUSION Beginning at approximately 0600 hours, 3/28/79 with the conference call identifying problems at TMI-2, until approximately 4/13/79, B&W -personnel were pressed into a service function that was far beyond nor:nal expectations. My personal contribution has been an effort that affected my home and family far beyond that expected from usual work /home relationships. My personal contribution, I believe, significantly assiste'd Met-Ed'and TMI with the very best support I could provide. My B&W E'ngineers assigned to the site team have given a large personal and I am also sure, family effort towards full support of Met-Ed and the TMI Station. Those Engineers j and Technicians brought in from other B&W Uniu and sections to support l the site work during extreme working conditions have all been the very finest group of people perfor=ing a wide variety of special and new tasks working successfully towards a common goal. I extend my topreciation to any and all S&W contributors for the ~ ' initial emergency support and the continuing long-term effort. B 1295 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _}}