ML20034C788
| ML20034C788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000045, 05000031, 05000046 |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1990 |
| From: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-51FR47025, RULE-PRM-52-46 NUDOCS 9005100076 | |
| Download: ML20034C788 (39) | |
Text
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DOCKET NUMBER
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PETITION RULE PRd gpg q 7oe-5)-
[7590-01pfgtgttu
% FEB 22 P4 :23 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 50 and 70 QFOCE OF SECRfRAAV u0CK[hNG 4 'ifWIC[
BRANCH
[ Docket Hos. PRM-50-31, PRM-50-45, and PRM-50-46]
Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants; Denial of Petitions for Ru)emaking AGENCY:
Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
ACTION:
Denial of petitions for rulemaking.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Comission is denying three petitions for rulemaking concerning emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. :These-petitions were submitted by the Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, North Carolina; the Department of Attorney General, State of Maine; and an individual, Kenneth G. Sexton, Ph.D.
The Citizens Task Force petition (PRM-50-31) requested that (1) the emergency planning-zone radius around nuclear power plants be extended from 10 miles-to 20 miles,'(2) independent radiological monitoring systems operated by local communities be established, and (3) mandatory utility funding of the emergency preparedness efforts of local comunities be required. The petition submitted by Mr. Sexton (PRM-50-a5) requested that the. size of the plume exposure pathway-EPZ be-determined on a site-specific basis, using the most up-to-date methodologies and that the size of the EPZ be reevaluated at least every five years.
The petition submitted by the State of Maine-(PRM-50-46) requested 1) expansion of
~ i the emergeni:y' plannisp zone for both"p1'me exposure pathway and for the
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u ingestion pathway; 2) requiring that emergency planning be done before any 1
construction of a nuclear facility is permitted and that' the governor-or
sed to allow comparisions with earlier studies (e.g., NUREG-0396 because Gey serve as surrogates for the early fatality and injury thresholds, respectively.
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[759001].
New technical information from the plants analyzed in draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987) shows that for these plants the probability of a core damage accident is small (in the neighborhood of 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 100,000 reactor years of operation) and that the risks and potential consequences associated with such accidents are no higher than those predicted in the Reactor Safety Study and may oe substantially lower.
However, there is still uncertainty associated with these estimates.
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Some insights obtained from this analysis are summarized below:
i 1.
Time of containment f ailure significantly affects the magnitude of the release and resulting consequences.
The consequences of an early i
containment tailure at a given distance are significantly higher than those for a late containment failure.
I 2.
While there are calculated dose differences among the plants, these appear to be secondary compared to the differences seen between early and late containment failure.
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For. late containment failure and no offsite protective action: (a) persons beyond about I to 2 miles have a low probability of receiving a dose in excess of 200 rems, and (b) persons beyond about 5 miles have a low probability of receiving a dose in excess of_50 rems.
l While thus far the effectiveness of protective actions has been completely
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investigated only for the Surry plant and no generic conclusions for other' plants can be drawn, some preliminary insights that can be gleaned from draft NUREG-1150 (February 1987) are:
1.
With regard to protective actions, the principal dose savings benefits.are obtained from evacuation first followed by sheltering within the~ first few miles of the plant.
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[7590-01].
2.
Wi-hin the first few miles, evacuation appears to be more effective than sheltering in achieving dose savings. At distances beyone about 5 miles, these differences are less notable.
3.
For late containment failure accidents, any'of the protective actions analyzed would result in essentially zero probability of a person being exposed to doses in excess of 200 rems at distances beyond 1 mile and to coses in excess of 50 rems at distances beyond 2 miles.
In conclusion, the Comission agrees that the size of the 10 mile EPZ was determinee using the methodologies available in 1980 and th.at tocay there exists more sophisticated techniques and computer models to estimate radiation releases anc costs to the public. Nonetheless, the most sophisticated and up to date methodologies were used in the development of NUREG-1150 (February 1987) which, as trentioned above, does not provide evidence that the size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ should now be increased.
Issue 9:
Extend the Ep2 from 10 miles to 20 miles because any rydiation can be harmful therefore the public should be able to take protective actions to assure that they receive ne radiation in the event of an accident Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition and some comenters in support of this change, gave the reason that any amount of radiation can be harmful.
They stated.
It is agreed that a radiation dose low enough to. produce no effect.has
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not been identified. 'In other words, all levels of radiation may produce _
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some effects on cell...
Some experts state, however, that one could sit on the fence of a normally operating nuclear power plant for a year and absorb no more rtdiation than that released by a chest x-ray. This group stresses the fact that people have lived with varying levels of background radiation with ne demonstrable negative results...
Others, also well informed, argue that eur scientific understanding of the long-range effects of low-level radiar.len continuously emitted-into our environment is inadequate at this time' to measure the dangers with any degree of certainty. They are concerned that the various effects we get from radiation, pollution, chemical carcinogens, and so forth may lead to a yet undocumented multiplier effect. They see the precipitous rise of cancer rates during the last couple of decades as strong support for this 24
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[7590-01).
conclusion. They further argue that some radioactive elements released into the air or dumped into the water -even if not intneciately dangerous j
in small accounts.-can in some fonn enter the food chain. Through a process termed " biological amplification," these radioactive elements may be concentrated through the chain of lesser plants and animals until they l
reach human beings througn the fooo they eat.
By this time the radioactive materials may be heavily concentrated. They cite the well i
documenteo rise of radiation levels in milk in the United States after i
weapons testing in China as evidence of this process.... And although the level of harm which may result'is not agreed upon, it is certain that our i
bodies take up radioactive e,lements and use them in the matrix of the Dones and in tissue; that these elements emit radiation for periods i
ranging from a few days to half a century; that fetuses and children under j
ten are much more vulnerable to radiation effects; and that cell damage from whatever cause is a medical concern of great importance.
Comission Response:
I The statements above representing the petitioner's interpretation of various I
views of the hazards of radiation need clarification. The statement that "a radiation dose low enough to produce no effect has not been identified" demonstrates an overestimation of what scientific experiments can accomplish.
I Experiments on the effects of toxic substances generally do not allow experimenters to draw a Rnclusion of no effect.
If no effect is observed, the experimenter cannot conclude that there was no effect'because there may have been an effect that was too small to be observed. There are a number of experimerts on low doses of radiation.that show no observab'le 'effect. From such experiments one can never conclude that there is no effect. Only an upper
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limit of the size of the effect can be estimated.
That has been done for radiation, and there is general agreement among scientists on the approximate upper limitr
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Likewise, the statement that "others, also well informed, argue that our scientific understanding of the long-range ef fects of low-level radiation continuously emitted into our environment is inadec;uate at this time to measure the damages with any decree of certainty," misrepresents prevailing scientific viewpoints. Scientists are in general agreement that the effects of doses of a few rems are too small to t,e measured.
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The petitioner's statement that, the precipitous rise in cancer rates during the last couple of decades is support for the possible existence of "a yet 25 i
[7590-01).
undorumented multiplier effect" between environmental pollutants seems to be based on an incorrect premise.
According to the American Cancer Society, the death rate from all cancers except lung cancers has dropped slightly for males and dropped sharply for females during the last couple of decades (shown, for example, in Figure 19, page 38 of NUREG/BR-0024II). The lung cancer death rates have climbeo sharply for males and females, but this is attributed almost entirely to cigarette smoking.
The petitioner's statements that some racioactive elements"..can in some form enter the food chain and may be concentrated through the chain" is a long-known and well-documentea fact. The concentration effect was predictable from knowledge of biology and was first observed almost 40 years ago before " weapons testing in China." Since this effect was known long before the start of large-scale nuclear electric generation, the radioactivity in the environment and foods near nuclear power plants is and has always been carefully measured both before and during nuclear power plant operation. Radioactivity in foods and water due to nuclear power plants is and has always been kept at low levels.
The petitioner's statement that " cell damage from whatever cause is a medical concern of great important" is misleading.
Scientifically, the importance will depend on how many cells are damaged, the nature of the damage, the type of cell damagec, and the probability of the damage to that cell leading to any further consequences. For example, if a large group of people are exposed to a
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radiation dose of I rem each, the EPA's lower protective action guide, about 5
- out of -10,000 people would be expected to get cancer ~ as'a" result. And, becaisse not all cancer is fatal, about 2 out of 10,000 would be expected to die from this radiation induced cancer.
(About 2,000 out of 10,000 people will eventually die of cancer, but those cancers are mainly unrelated to radiation exposure.) Of the 9,995 out of 10,000 who did not get cancer caused by the 1-rem radistion dose, based on current knowledge, their health would be unaffected by their radiation exposure. On the basis of the epidemiological 15 NUREG/BR-0024, Working Safely in Gansna Radiography, September 1982.
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[7590-01).
evidence, they would live as long and be as healthy as if they had not received the radiation dose.
Issue 10: Extend the EPZ from 10 miles to 20 miles because of the evacuation shadow phenomenon Comenters in favor of the recomenced changes gave as a reason the belief that if an accident occurred many people outside the 10-mile EPZ would evacuate even though they were not aavised to do so. They said, in this " evacuation shadow,"
masses of people would be fleeing in panic, would congest roads making evacuation of those within the EPZ slower or even impossible. As a way to,'an for this effect these commenters suggested extending the EPZ zone radius fre 10 to 20 miles.
Comenters opposing the petition said this was not a problem, because
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evaluation of nonraciological incidents which have required mass evacuation has also demonstrated that, even without advance planning, an orderly, safe, and prompt evacuation can be undertaken.
Comission Response:
In CL1-87-12, the Comission noted that:
...we think it is entirely reasonable and appropriate for the Commission to hold that arguments for " adjusting" a 10-mile EPZ to improve safety, especially arguments that entail complex analysis and lengthy litigation are an impermissible challenge to the rule...
Accordingly, we think~ the better 1'nterpretation is tiat the rule precludes
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adjustments on safety grounds to the size of an EPZ that is "about 10 miles in radius" and that Contention 22.C (whether the EPZ should be expanded by a few miles to minimize the occurrence and effects of spontaneous evacuation from outside the EPZ) should en this ground be deemed impermissible challengec to the rule.
In our view, the proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact site of the EPZ only on the oasis of such straightforward administrative considerations as avoiding EPZ boundaries that run through the middle of schools-or hospitals, or that arbitrarily carve out small portions of governmental jurisdictions. The goal is merely planning simplicity and avoidance of ambiguity as to the location of the boundaries. With such clarity, plans :an be implemented with an understandin being directed to take particular protective actions. g as to who is 26 NRC at 395 (bracLats not in the original).
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[759001),
As noted above, the Commission determined, based on information available at the time that it promulgated the emergency planning regulations, that a plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (plume EPZ) of about 10 miles in radius was the proper and appropriate area for detailed planniag for protective actions in the event of a raciological emergency. At that time, the Commission specifically recognized that cetailed planning in that zone would tore readil.y pemit the development and implementation of ad hoc actions beyond the 10 mile plume EPZ should the need aris). See SURtbO386, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"(December 1978); NUREG-0654,
" Criteria for Preparation Oud r
,o qion of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of N.iear Power Plants," (November 1980), p.12; Shoreham, 26 NRC, at 392-93, Southerr California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LEP 82-39,15 NRC 1163,1171-73 (1983). In effect, the Commission accounted for the possibility of spontaneous evacuation outside the plume EPZ when it established the size of that EPZ in the first instance. The petitions provide no justification for expansion of the plume EPZ to further account for the possiblity of spontaneous evacuations.
Issue 11: Extend the EpZ to include any towns bordering on or partially within the EPZ The citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition requested the NRC t amend its regulations to state that any towns bordering on or partially within the EPZ be included within the EPZ in their entirely.
Comenters in favor of this request said that if, for example, some suburbs of a city were included in the emergency planning, but the city were not, then fragmented authority would result.
Commission Response:
As discussed in the Commission response to Issue 1, NUREG-0396 provides that
" judgement...will be used in determinging the precise size and shap: of the-EPZs considering local conditions such as... local jurisdictional boundaries..,"
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[7590-01].
Thn, Comission practice already allows for adjustment of the EPZ to accomodate ju, Nittional boundaries where appropriate to enhance the planning basis.
Issue 12: That a utility fund and install indeoendent monitorino eouioment to be used by local comunities around nuclear power plants The Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition requested that the communities within the EPZ should be provided, with utility funoing to purchase, install, and operate their own radiological monitoring equipment.
The petitioner said such independent monitoring will permit detection of radioactive materials such as iodine-131 in a short enough time to be useful in making cecisions on emergency actions.
As a reason for requiring independent monitoring, the petitioner claimed there is a lack in both quality and quantity of radiation monitoring equipment around nuclear power plants.
Since the petitioner believes the utilities ao not have adequate equipment, the petitioner believes local comunities should provide it for themselves. The petitioner cited as evidence a March 30, 1979 Genaral Accounting Office report, Areas Around Nuclear Facilities Should be Better Prepared for Radiological Emergencies. The section of the report quoted by the petitioner referred to " deficiencies in... preparedness." The petitioner also cited a Jure 1980 FEMA report, State Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. FEMA wrote:
...the preparedness of state and local governments with respect to
... monitoring instruments...is generally inadequate to meet the
. requirements of _the.new [ post-TM1]. evaluation criteria.
Commenters opposing the petition said that adequate monitoring equipment is now available, that the evidence cited by the petitioners is outdated and no longat valid, and that such equipment would be too difficult for local communities to use properly. For example, Barry G. Whalig, nuclear engineer, wrote:-
Petitioners show a lack of appreciation for the difficulty of making accurate estimates of airborne and groundplane contamination in the post-accident environment. This is especially difficult using the sort of survey meters which the petitioners seem to want supplied in the tens or hundreds to individuals in the nearby communities.
Examples of the 29
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[759001L problems are: a) prevention of instrument contamination during the event; b) ensuring) uniformity of instrument calibration and of measurement protocol; c differentiation of plume and grouneplane contributions without sampling; and d) precise reporting of the location where measurements are made. Experience show that even technically competent people are subject to these errors.
The Citizens Task Force petition also said that there is a need for independent monitoring because there is a credibility gap between what the utility and NRC would say during the course of anr acettent and what the public would believe.
The petitioner quoted a May 12, 1979 statement by Dayne H. Broun, Director of Radiation Protection Section of the North Carolina Department of Human Resources, and an April 29, 1979 statement by North Carolina Governor James B.
Hunt, Jr., as evidence of lack of credibility. The petitioner wrote:
The largely spontaneous and tinorganized evacuation of several hundred thousana people from the ares around the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident reflects a serious problem: the lack of public confidence in the utilities' comitment and ability to provide timely and, accurate warnings regarcing leakages of radioactivity and/or reactor problems. The resultant uncertainty contributed to very real psychological stress experience by citizens living in communities around the reactor.
The Sorghum Alliance wrote:
Independent radiation monitoring is necessary because of the history of utilities' and the NRC's reluctance to let the public know of danger and also because of problems in utility-managed monitoring equipment.
The NRC officials played down the gravity of the accident at Th'ree Mile Island, as they were more concerned with tha public relations impact of their statements than with. technical accuracy..
Comenters opposing the Citizens Task Force petition saw little evidence of a problem with a credibility gap. The law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge wrote:
Aside from two newspaper accounts of statements made more than three years ago by the North Carolina Governor and the State Director for Radiation Protection, petitioner offers no support for its broad-based claim of a
' credibility gap'.
Barry G. Wahlig, a nuclear engineer, wrote:
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Whether or not they suffer a ' credibility gap' as alleged by the petitioners, the existing monitoring organizations are answerable to responsible bocies. The diffuse group of independent monitors suggestea by petitioners would be answerable to no one but themselves for the accuracy of their measurements, the method of their reporting, or the consequences of poor values. This lack of responsibility would make their measurements less reliable, not more so.
Comission Rest;onse:
The Comission agrees that as of March 30, 1979, there was a need to be better prepared for emergencies around nuclear power plants. This need prompted the Comission to publish in the Federal Register (45 FR 55402; August 19,1980)an upgraded emergency preparecness regulation.
The regulation required, among other things, the establishment of emergency planning zones, the development of emergency action levels, the installation of prompt public warning systems, and adequate offsite monitoring capabilities.
Implementation of these upgraded regulatinns has been completed.
Equipment capability is continually checked by NRC and FEMA. The Commission does not believe there is a lack of monitoring equipment and therefore does not see lack of equipment as a reason to amend its regulations to require that monitoring equipment be given to and operated by local comunities.
The Comission also finds no basis to assume there is a credibility gap that would cause a danger to public health and safety. There is no evidence that
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the majority of the public would not respond to protective actions ordered by responsible, government auth_orities.. At Three Mile Island, although people evacuated to a far greater extent than officially recommended and without a written plan, the evacuation was quite orderly.
The Comission also finds no basis for the claim that "NRC officials played down the gravity of the accident at Three Mile Island.'
In fact, quite the contrary occurred. Admittedly, there were confusing and contradictory statements which alarmed the public.
But, if anything, the actual danger may have been exaggerated rather than downplayed.
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Furthermore, the proliferation of independent radiation monitoring could result in conflicting and confusing information during the course of an accident.
Confusion can be minimized if information from all sources flows to a single ocerations center where it can be analyzed by experts. Expert opinion could then be presented to the state and local governments chargea with the responsibility to order protective actions.
Moreover, even if the reason advanced ty the petitioner and commenters were valid, independent monitoring would not be a solution. Offsite monitoring is not intended and cannot be used properly by itself to make initial decisions on protective actions.
Elevated radiation levels offsite are among the very last indicators of an serious accident and tend to occur at a time when protective action decisions should already have been made.
The earliest indication of a serious accident would be seen in the nuclear power plant control room.
Numerous indicators and alarms would tell the operators that there is a problem ano should enabit them to assess the problem.
By NRC regulation, each plant has a set of emergency action levels based on specific plant conditions which can be used to project potential offsite doses.
Projected dose information allows protective actions to be taken or at least considered prior to the arrival of the radioactive plume. For example, if a core-melt were to occur causing a large release of radioactivity, there would necessarily be some time between the start of the accident and the release of the radioactivity from the fuel to the containment because it takes time for the heat being generated to evaporate the available water and heat the fuel
- its melting point. During this time, projected doses can be calculated and protective actions can be decided upon, recommended to the state and loca1' governments,'~and ordered
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before any appreciable amount of radioactivity has been released to the environment.
During the Three Mile Island accident, the radioactivity actually released came from auxiliary plant systems. The amount of radioactivity in these systems was relatively small and no protective actions would have been indicated based on those releases because the radiation dose, actual or projected, was small. The 4
main threat perceived by the NRC staff was the potential threat from a hydrogen gas explosion in the reactor that could conceivably result in added core damage and in-turn present added threat to the containment integrity. While the fears i
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over an explosion of the hydrogen gas were not technically well-founded and, of course, the situation did not materialize, it was the central basis for the evacuation recommendation that was made. The recommendation was not based on elevated radiation readings offsite because none of the offsite readings were high enough to justify ordering evacuation as a protective action.
Issue 13: Current plannino is inadequate The Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC, petition as a reason for the recommended rule change, stated that " Emergency planning and preparedness in support of nuclear power plants is presently inadequate and incapable of providing an acceptable level'of radiological emergency preparedness." Since utilities are seen as not providing adeouate emergency preparedness, comunities are seen as having to provide it for themselves. The petitioner believes that this situation requires them to have their own monitoring equipment to detect radioactive materials in a short enough time to allow them to make their own decisions on emergency actions.
The Citizens Task Force petition quoted a FEMA report which said that, for some of the 12 nuclear power plant sites with the highest population density within the'10-mile EPI, "the current alert and notification systems are judged to be totally inadequate..." (FEMA, Dynamic Evacuation Analyses, p. 5, February, 1981).
A number of comenters expressed little confidence in current emergency plans saying _they.should.be more site-specific..taking into account -the population
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density, large population centers just outside the 10-mile EPZ, a lack of sufficient roads or the presence of bottlenecks on the roads, geography, and meteorology of each specific site.
Commenters opposing the petition said that present emergency preparedness is adequate, that the petitioner based its conclusions ca outdated information, and that the upgrade in emergency preparedness by utilities since the Three Mile Island accident should be recognizsd and given credit.
For example, KMC, Inc. wrote:
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Beginning in early 1981, each operating nuclear facility's emergency plan was appraised by the NRC using NUREG-0654 as the basis of the appraisal i
and each facility exercised their plan in conjunction with the State and local governments with both NRC and FEMA as judges as to the adequacy of the exercise.
Utilities were given 120 days to correct deficiencies which could have an aaverse impact on the ability of the utility to promptly and effectively respond to an emergency.
Further, ruclear f acilities are required to annually have an indepenoent audit of their program and to have an exercise in conjunction with State and local jurisdictions.
In addition, the NRC will perform an annual appraisal of each utility's emergency plan to assure that the. utility's emergency capability does not-degrade.
it is inappropriat'e to compare performance of emergency planning capability and implementation in 1979 with what has been required and demonstrated in 1981 and 1982 by the utilities.
Comission Response:
The Comission coes not agree with the petitioner's claim that emergency preparedness is presently inadequate.
Emergency preparecness has been considerably increased since the Three Mile Island accident. The FEMA report cited was written to evaluate the alerting system existing at that time against draft criteria that had just been issued for coment and interim use. Since the FEMA report was written, final criteria have been published and systems have since been improved to meet the criteria. FEMA and NRC now periodically e
evaluate the emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants and have generally found the preparenness adequate.
Where improvements were thought necessary, they have been orcered.
The Comission does agree that site-specific factors, such as those mentioned by some commenters, should be taken into account in emergency plans, in fact,
~NRC regulations [10 CFR i 50.47(i)(2)] a1 ready require emergency p1ans to
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considar site specific factors, lasue 14: Utility Funding of Emergency Preparedness Another change recommended by the Citizens Task Force of Chapel Hill, NC petition is that utilities be required to finance the emergency planning and preparedness efforts of the municipalities around nuclear power plants. The Citizens Task Force wrote:
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[7590-01].
1.ack of funding is the single. largest impediment to the establishment of an adequate level of emergency preparedness around nuclear reactors....
Many states clearly have been unable to achieve effective legal steps to insure that utilities finance adequate emergency preparedness around.
nuclear plants.
The role of the federal government in regard to emergency preparations should be to insure that the communities in those states which have'not, or will not soon, enact preparedness-financing legislation do recetve adequate funding.
Consenters in support of the recommended change to require utility funding said that utilities should pay the full cost of choosing to build 'a nuclear plant instead of some other type of generating plant. They said this should be e
considered part of the cost of doing business and that in some cases funding.of emergency preparedness is a real hardship for the municipalities or counties involved. They said it is unfair to expect local governments to finance these plans since some of the areas under obligation to plan for_ nuclear power plant accidents do not receive any tax revenues from the plant. One commenter said:
...considering the unique and deadly dangers of radiation, it is insane to reduce the already inadequate methods of protection and regulations. The utilities and the government owe it to us.to pay for our safety. They'are putting our lives in jeopardy, not the other way around.
j Connenters opposing the petition generally stated that there was no need for such a funding requirement. They said that FEMA has not found. state.and local plans inadequate due to lack of funding and that voluntary utility assistance j
together with state and local programs to assess costs,for radiological emergency preparedness have been. successful. All seven of the state and local emergency preparedness agencies that cnamented'on~ the petition iay there~ is no
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p need for such a funding requirement.
Commenters said that states should-have L
jurisdiction over this area of utility funding and that the Federal Government' does^ not have the expertise or the legal right to mandate utility rate structure changes.
f Some commenters thought utilities should not be fon:ed. to fund al1~ local emergency preparedness efforts because many of the emergency preparedness improvements also improve governinental abilities to cope with natural disasters and other types of man-made emergencies. The utilities should not have to bear 35
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[7590-01].
the fu'l costs of these improvements in plans and facilities which overlap with other functions normally required of the governments.
Some commenters said utilities had a strong incentive to fund local preoaredness efforts.
The State of Iowa Office of Disaster Services said that lowa alreaoy receives funaing assistance from four nuclear facilities and added:
Obviously the utilities do n'ot, by law, have to provide this funding, but
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practically speaking, it is being done.
The onus of FEMA critique and NRC censure with operating license ramifications serves as a pragmatic inducement for all utilities to provide the radiological emergency response planning and exercise funding.
To include this in a petition for rulemaking and potential legalization may do no more than to create an intensely acrimonious relationship between state government anc utilities.
Why legalize what I know to already be the case in to in and other i
surrouncing states, on a cooperative basis.
1 Several law firms said NRC did not have authority to recuire such funding.The law firm of Shaw, Pittmar., Potts, and Trowbridge wrote:
The simple answer to this request is that Commission 1 arts the legal authority to impose such a tax...
This is because the provision pursuant to which the Commission collects fees from Utilities. 31 U.S.C i 483 a-(
(1976), has been authoritatively construed '" the U'.1ted States Supreme 4
Court to authorize the imposition of fees only to cover services rendered by a federal agency and then only 1. those services confer a special benefit on the fee-paying entity and not a general benefit on the puolic at-large...
This clearly would exclude the tay suggested by petitioner wnich would cover costs not incurred by the Commission and would result in general public benefits rather than specifically. identified benefits of the utilities.
Some commenters pointed out that utilities already pay considerable taxes and deserve some services in return.
They said, typically, that nuclear power plants tend to be the largest single tax paying organization in their political subdivision and, as a result, the residents of an area generally benefit from higher than average tax revenues, even though the tax burden on the individual
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is usually lower than average. Thus, municipalities around nuclear power
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plants already derive sufficient funds from the operation of the plant to finance their emergency planning efforts.
Commission Response:
Funding arrangements are essentially a matter of state and local government 36 a
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[7590-01]
interest, therefore, the Commission finds no factual basis to conclude that the proposed funoing is necessary to enable state or local governments to establish adequate emergency preparedness plans.. Accordingly..we do not reach the question of our legal authority to require licensee funding-in the manner requested by the petitioner.
k issue 15: That Emergency Preparedness Requirements be Established for low Power Operations The State cf Maine petition requested that the NRC require that offsite.
emergency preparedness findings be made before any fuel-loading and/or low power operations are permitted.
I Commission Response:
l In a final rule published in the Federal Register on September 23,1988(53FR h
36955,36960) the Comission addressed this specific matter and for the reasons i
stated therein revised 10 CFR 50.47 (d) to read...
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... no NRC or FEMA review, findings, or determinations concerning the' state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy.of and capability to implement State and local or utility.offsite emergency plans are recuired prior _ to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel loadin power)g or low power testing and_ training (up to 5 percent of the rated Insofar as emergency _ planning and preparedness requirements are.
concerned, a license authorizing fuel loading and/or low power testing and training may be issued after a finding is made by the NRC that the state of onsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that
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adequate protect 1ye. measures can_and will be taken -in event of a -
radiological emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment-of the applicant's onsite emergency plans against' the. pertinent stancards in paragraph (b) of this section and Appendix E. - Review of applicant's emergency plans will include the following standards'with offsite aspects:
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(1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite assistance on site have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local-staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have s
been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned i
onsite response have been identified.
(2) Procedures have been established for licensee communications with State and local. response organizations, including initial notification of the declaration of emergency end periodic provision of plant and response status reports.
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(3) Provisions exist for prompt comunications among principal: response i
organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be responding.
l onsite.
(4) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.:
(5) Adequate methods,- systeras, and equipment for assessing and monitoring
.1 actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition tre in use onsite, (6)
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Arrangements are made for medical services for. contaminated and injured onsite individuals.
(7) Radiological emergency response training has been made available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an emergency onsite, i
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Issue 16: Emergency Plans Should be Completed and Approved by the Governor of 3
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the Affected State as a Pre-condition to Construction.
The State of Maine petition requested:that.the Comission amend 10 CFR 550.47
to require that emergency planning be done before any construction of a nuclear
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facility is permitted and that the Governor or Governors of any affected State approve the emergency-plans as a precondition te construction.
Comission Response:
The intent of the State of Maine's petition was-granted in part in a' final rule published in the Federa) Register on April 18,.1989 (54 FR 15372,15393)' where the Connission added new regulations to provide for issuance of early site
_. permits, standard design. certifi. cations, and combined construction permits -and operating licenses for nuclear power reactors. The aim of this rulemaking was to provide procedures for the standardization of nuclear power plants and.
3 the early resolution of ;ish.ty :.nd environmental issues in licensing proceedings.-
The new rule requires in 10 CFR Part 52, 952.79(d) that applications for a
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combined construction permit and operating license must contain emergency plans which provide reasonable assurance that-adequate protective measures can and will be-taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.
(1) If the application references an early site permit the application may incorporate by reference emergency plans, or ma,jor features of i.
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[7590-01]_
.j emergency plans, approved -in connection With the issuance of the permit.
(2)
If the application does not' reference an early site. permit, or if no emergency plans were approved in connection with the issuance of the permit, the applicant shall make good faith efforts to obtain certifications from the local.and State emergency planning responsibilities (i) governmental agencies with that the proposed emergency plans are practicabie, (ii) that these agencies are counttted to participating in any further development of the plans, including any.
required field demonstrations, and (iii) that these agencies are committed to executing thefr responsibilities undtr the plans in the event of are emergency.
The application must contain any certifications that have been obtained.
If these certifications cannot be obtained, the application must contain information, including 'a utility plan, sufficient to show that the proposed plans-nonetheless provide-reasonable assurance that adeounte protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.
These provisions provide that to the maximum feasible extent emergency plans will be approved by the NRC before it issues the. construction permit for a new nuclear power plant, i
THE PETITION (S) ARE DENIED i
i In conclusion, the Comission finds that an insufficient basis exists for =
j amending its-regulations on emergency preparedness in any of-the ways q
recommended by the petitioners. The petitions of the Citizens' Task Force of Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Mr. K. Sexton; and the Attorney General of the State of Maine tre hereby cenied.
._ Dated at Rockville, Marylana this. _Hth day _of Februarv-
, 1989. -
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For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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//ohnC.HoyIe' AssistaWt Secretary to the Commission y
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