ML20054A852
| ML20054A852 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/08/1982 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Glenn J SENATE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054A853 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204160204 | |
| Download: ML20054A852 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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4 E WASHINGTON, D. C. PCE55
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9 March 8, 1982 s
CHAIRMAN s
FlECiliVED 9
T MAR 2 219826
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ilDC p, l The Honorable John Glenn g
s United States Senate Washington, DC 20510
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Dear Senator Glenn:
We are pleased to respond to your January 25 request for additional comments on the executive oversight provisions of S.
1080, The Regulatory Reform Act.
We would like to express our continued support for the amendment you introduced regarding the independence of regulatory agencies and the provisions of S.
1080 for executive oversight.
Our responses to your specific requests for information are provided in the enclosed comments.
If we can be of any further assistance, please contact us.
Sincerely,
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Nunzio J.
Palladino
Enclosure:
Comments 8204160204 820308 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPOtOENCE PDR
F NRC COMENTS ON S. 1080 At the outset we reerphasize our belief, as expressed in our letter of September 14, 1981 to Chairman Roth, that allowing the President or his designee to interpose themselves directly into the agency's regulatory procedures can only weaken, and perhaps ultimately destroy, the independence that Congress intended for the NRC.
While cooperation between Executive Branch officials and independent agencies is to be encouraged, the executive oversight provisions in S.1080 go beyond simply fostering cooperation.
Indeed, by granting the President the authority to establish procedures for agency compliance and "to monitor, review, and ensure agency implementation of such procedures,"_ S.1080 provides the opportunity for direct intervention in, and partial control of, an important aspect of agency rulemaking.
The framework established by Congress to guarantee that the decisionmaking processes of independent agencies are free from undue influence by Executive Branch officials and entities, as well as the unique relationship between Congress and the independent agencies, cculd be eroded by this provisien.
We believe that the potential exists for any rule, especially one of high visibility, controversy or cost, to be adversely affected by the executive oversight provisions of S. 1080. The following three rules, although not specifically determined to be " major" as defined in S.
1080, could be cited as examples where the oversight provisions could have resulted in executive intervention in the agency's rulemaking proceedings: (1) the Interim Requirements Related to Hydrogen Control, which were intended to provide specific design and other requirements to mitigate the consequences of accidents resulting in a degraded reactor core. 46 Fed. Reo. 58484 (December 2,1981) (final rule); (2) the Environmental Vu'aTifications of Electrical Equipment Rule, which was u
designed to assure that safety-related electrical equipment is capable of performing its functions under postulated accident conditions, 47 Fed. R_eg. 2876 (Jan. 20,1982) (proposed rule); and (3) the Fire e
Protection Rule, which was designed to upgrade the level of fire protection at nuclear plants.
45 Fed. Reg. 76602 (November 19,1980)
(final rule).
Each of these rules--all of which have the aim of improvement of the safety of nuclear reactors--has developed a high degree of visibility because of the controversy surrounding it, a controversy due in part to the relatively large costs to the industry associated with these rules.
The executive oversight provisions of S.
1080 would create in euh of these cases the possibility for executive branch intervention.
We do.not believe that the addition of Section 8, " Presidential Authority," affects our analysis.
That section provides that nothing in this Act shall limit (1) the authority of the President over regulatory policies or (2) the rulemeking authority of an agency to conduct or complete a rulemaking proceeding.
It does not appear that this general provision will in any way limit the executive oversight provisions contained in S. 1080. This section contains no express limitations on
2 exercise of the oversight provisions, and full exercise of executive oversight would not be inconsistent with subsection (2) of this section.
The Commission does, however, support the purposes and objectives of the bill's requirement for preparation of a regulatory analysis for major rules. To this end the agency currently has procedures for preparation of a value-impact analysis for rulemaking actions.
This analysis is essentially a cost-benefit study designed to help the agency make more informed judgments. The Commission also has established an interoffice Regulations Coordinating Committee to coordinate a systematic review of all NRC regulations. This review is designed to evaluate all existing regulations for need, benefit, cost, content, quality, clarity and structure.
The Commission further intends to determine what other particular changes, consistent with law, might bring current agency procedures more into line with President Reagan's Executive Order 12291 on this general subject.
In the event that it is considered necessary to provide for Executive Branch oversight, we would again state our belief that the following clarifications and additions should be considered.
First, the Executive Branch review should generally be confined to the period after the notice of proposed rulemaking is published.
Prenotice submission of an independent agency's proposed regulation or corresponding regulatory analysis unnecessarily risks undue Executive Branch influence of the agency's decisionmaking.
Second, it should be made clear that the authority of the President or his designee is limited to a determination of whether the agency correctly decided that a rule is, or is not,
" major" and has followed the procedural requirements imposed in developing its regulatory analysis.
The substantive conclusion reached in any cost-benefit analysis should not be a proper subject for Executive Branch review.
. Subsequent to receipt of your letter we received an inquiry from a member of your staff regarding testimony by James C. Miller, III, which indicated that the HRC has voluntarily submitted a rule to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for substantive review under Executive Order 12291.
Although the NRC submits regulations to 0MB for review under the Paperwork Reduction Act, it has never submitted a rule to 0MB for substantive review.
OMB, in response to our inquiry as to which rule Mr. Miller was referring to, stated it could not find anything regarding Mr. Miller's statement.
Our best guess is that Mr. Miller was referring to our submission to 0MB, for review of the paperwork requirements, of 10 CFR Part 50, " Domestic Licensing of Nuclear Production and' Utilization Facilities." These regulations were cited by Vice President Bush as needing thorough review.
The only review requested by OMB,
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however, and the only review for which these regulations were submitted, involved their reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
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