ML20078P628

Forwards Revised FSAR Pages Demonstrating Compliance to Offsite Power Sys Design & Operating Criteria W/Sys of Three 345 Kv Transmission Lines.Info Will Be Incorporated Into Next FSAR Rev

ML20078P628
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	11/03/1983
From:	Koester G KANSAS GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
KMLNRC-83-142, NUDOCS 8311080129
Download: ML20078P628 (19)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:l 6 KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY THI-E LE CTFhG COMPAN f GLENN L KOfSTER VW E Patsiorm ? Nurtsan November 3, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 KMLNRC 83-142 Re: Docket No. STN 50-482 Ref: Letter KMLNRC 83-081 dated./30/83 from GLKoester, KG&E, to IIRDenton, NRC Subj: Wolf Creek Offsite Power System

Dear Mr. Denton:

The Reference provided the NRC with information concerning the Kansas Corporation Commission's (KCC) denial of a siting permit for one of the offsite 345 KV transmicsion lines serving Wolf Creek which connects to the Kansas City Power & Light Ccmpany's (KCPL) system. The KCC decision was appealed by KCPL to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas. On October 27, 1983, the Appellate Court reversed the KCC decision and directed the KCC to review the application considering only the reasonableness of the location of the proposed transmission line. The timing of reviews and approvals necessary to allow construction of the KCPL line is still uncertain at this time. KCPL intends to pursue the approval for construction of the line. The NRC will be advised of the final disposition of the required State approvals in this matter. Because of the uncertainty in the timeliness of the State approvals for the transmission line and as a contingency, the Wolf Creek applicants reevaluated and reanalyzed the offsite power system to determine if all the commitments in Chapter 8.0 of the Wolf Creek FSAR could be met if only three of the planned four 345 KV transmission lines were in place. Preliminary information was relayed to your staff in a meeting on August 31, 1983, which indicated that FSAR commitments could be met with three 345 KV lines. Final studies are now complete and confirm the information presented in the August 31 meeting. Attached are revised FSAR pages which demonstrate compliance to offsite power system design and operating criteria considering the Wolf Creek off-site power system to consist of just three 345 Kv transmission lines. 8311080129 831103 i PDR ADOCK 05000482 g\\ A PDR i i\\ 201 N. Market ~ Wictuta, Kansas - Mail Address: PO. Box 208 I Wichita, Kansas 67201 - Telephone: Area Code (316) 261-6451

O Mr. liarold R. Denton KMLt1RC 83-142 November 3, 1983 The attached information will be formally incorporated into the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit tio. 1, Final Safety Analysis Report in the next revision. The information is hereby incorporated into the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit flo.1, Operating License Application. l Yours very truly, pf Glenn L. Koester Vice President - riiclear GLK:bb Attach cc: Jilolonich (2) WSchum/Asmith l

CAT 11 OF AFFIP11ATIO!! STATE OF YAt;SAS ) ) SS: COU'1TY OF SEDGWICK ) I, Kent R. Brown, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath, do depose, state and af firm that I am Group Vice President - Technical Services of Kansan Gas and Electric Company, Wichita, Kansas, that I have sioned the foregoing letter of transmittal for Glenn L. Koestcr, Vice President - !!uclear of Kansas Gas and Electric Company, know the contents thereof, and that all statements contained therein are true. KA!!SAS GAS A!!D ELECTRIC COMPANY ATTEST: Kent R. Brown __ ( / Group Vice President - Technical Service E.D. Prothro, Asst. Secretary i STATE OF KANSAS ) ) SS: COUNTY OF SED 7 DICK ) BE IT REMEMBERED, that on this 3rd day of November, 1983, be fore me, Eyd_vn L. Fry , a Notary, personally appeared Kent R. Brown, Group Vice President - Technical Services of Kansas Gas and Electric Company, Wichita, Kansas, who is personally known to me and who executed the foregoing instrument, and he duly acknowledged the execution of the for and on behalf of and as thc act and deed of said Corporation. same o'q"'(("T((l?'WITNESSWIfEPEOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal the s ,,,s .*i. gd year above written. [7Y,^.8N.h $A [ A ' S g g g,),C,

• II:g61yn /' Fry, N ary

' 'y, ....;,9. I ~'jty C$mmission expires _ Auoust 15, 1984

SNUPPS-WC 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.

2.1 DESCRIPTION

8.2.1.1 Transmission Network The KG&E and KCPL transmission systems serve as the main outlet and source of offsite power for WCGS. Connection of the station output to the system is achieved via a 345-kV overhead line from the plant yard to the Wolf Creek'345-kV switchyard. A rather extensive 345-kV network forms the backbone of the KG&E-KCPL and neighboring

systems, as can be seen from Figure 8.2-1.

This transmission system provides a highly reliable source of continuous power for plant shutdown. KCPL and KG&E maintains voltage between a maximum and mini-mum range of + 5% of nominal. The frequency range is 60 + .002 Hertz. There are three 345-kV lines connecting the Wolf Creek 345-kV Substation to the area transmission system. The three lines are as follows: a. Wolf Creek-LaCygne 345-kV Line: 58 miles long, connecting to KG&E and KCPL's jointly owned LaCygne Steam Electric Station which has three additional 345-kV lines. I b. Wolf Creek-Rose Hill 345-kV Line: l 98 miles long, connecting to KG&E's Rose Hill Substation southeast of Wichita. Rose Hill Substation has two additional 345-kV connec-tions. I A fourth 345-kV line is planned between Wolf Creek and KCPL's West Gardner Substation. Cur-

rently, construction of this line is awaiting approval by the Kansas Corporation Commission.

Rev. 12 8.2-1

SNUPPS-UC l All line designs are such as to minimize the possibility of I conductor vibration and/or galloping. The design of these overhead lines meets or exceeds the requirements of the National Electric Safety Code (4) for heavy loading dis-trict, Grade B construction, and is based on a lightning performance of less than one outage per 100 miles per year. 8.2.1.2 Switchyard and Connection to the Onsite Distribution System Figure 8.2-3 shows the physical orientation and separation of the 345-kV and 69-kV switchyards; the main, startup, l 345/69-kV and 69/13.8-kV transformers; and the transmission I line routing. Figure 8.2-4 provides a one-line diagram of the electrical distribution on the site. The electrical one-line diagram of the installation showing connections to offsite substations is shown in Figure 8.2-5. The 345-kV switchyard design includes a breaker-and-a-half l arrangement. A 69-kV line and transformers connected to KG&E's local transmission system are provided. l l I l i Rev. 12 8.2-2a

SNUPPS-WC c. Wolf Creek-Benton 345-kV Line: l 90 miles long, connecting to KG&E's Benton Substation northeast of Wichita. Benton Substation has two additional 345-kV lines, one of which is to KG&E's Wichita 345-kV Substation, near the Gordon Evans Steam Elen-l tric Station. The above 345-kV lines do not share common rights-of-way, do l not have any crossovers, and are not in close proximity of one another, except in the immediate vicinity of the switch-yard. In those areas, the design is such as to maintain clearances as required by the National Electric Safety Code (4). In addition, a 27-mile long 69-kV line connects the Wolf Creek 345-kV switchyard to KG&E's Athens Switching Station located south of the Wolf Creek Plant site. The Wolf Creek-Rose Hill 345-kV line crosses over this 69-kV line once approximately 7 miles from the Wolf Creek Plant site. The physical separation of the two lines meets or exceeds the requirements of the National Electric Safety Code (4). l If one of the three 345-hV lines faulted, the breakers located at Wolf Creek Substation (Figure 8.2-5) would trip, de-energizing the line. Any one of the two remaining in-coming 345-kV transmission lines at Wolf Creek Substation can carry the total ESF load required for safe shutdown should it become necessary to do so, see Section 8.2.2. The Phillips 69-kV line, Figure 8.2-5, is owned and main-tained by the Cof fey County REC. It is not a supply line for the 69-kV system. Should a fault occur on this line, a 69-kV breaker located in the Wolf Creek Substation would l trip, de-energizing the line -- not adversely affecting the 345-kV offsite source. l i I Rev. 12 8.2-2 j

SNUPPS-WC 1 The unit startup and the 345/69-kV transformers (with two 69/13.8-kV transformers) are physically independent and redundant sources of offsite power which are available on an immediate basis for safe shutdown of the unit. These two sources do not have common protective equipment. Each of these two sources normally serves one of the two class IE buses. Figure 8.2-3 shows the routing of the overhead line from the west bus of the 345-kV switchyard to the startup transformer which serves one of the load groups. The other class IE load group is supplied electrical power from the 345/69-kV transformer to the 69-kV switchyard. Then from l the 69-kV switchyard via an underground circuit encased in concrete to the ESF transformer as shown on Figure 8.2-3. Voltage studies have been performed and cables have been sized to assure that the offsite sources are capable of supplying the entire class IE loads if it should become necessary. The 13.8-kV side of both 69/13.8-kV transformers is connect-ed to three underground circuits through metal clad switch-gear with drawout type breakers and a transfer bus. This serves the ESF number one transformer, one switchyard sta-tion power transformer, and is connected to the site distri-bution system. Three single-phase, one-third

size, step-up transformers provided for the unit raise the generator voltage to 345-kV prior to transmission, via an overhead line, to the 345-kV switchyard located approximately 700 feet due north of the turbine building. This overhead line is not carried on the same supporting structures as the line to the unit startup transformer.

The design of these overhead lines meets or exceeds the requirements of the National Electric Safety Code (4) for heavy loading district, Grade B construction. The generating unit is to be synchronized to the system across the generator circuit breakers located in the 345-kV switchyard. Control of these synchronizing breakers and the 13.8-kV breakers is administered from the plant main control room. Indication of all 345-kV and 69-kV breaker positions is provided in the Control Room. Control of all other transmission breakers in the Wolf Creek switchyard is via supervisory control from KG&E's System Control Center in Wichita. In addition to breaker status indication of all 345-kV breakers, the 69-kV feeder breaker and the 13.8-kV breakers; seven main control board annunciator windows are provided Rev. 12 8.2-3 l

to alert the operator to any failure which could result in loss of availability of either preferred offsite sourca to perform its intended function. These alarms include the following: 345-kV General Trouble 345-kV Supervisory Trouble 345-kV Battery Trouble 345-kV STBY STA PWR 13-40 Trip 69-kV General Trouble 69/13.8-kV Transformers not Parallel 13.8-kV Brkr 13-4/6/8 Trip A partial breakdown of many of these alarms is provided on the balance-of-plant computer alarm listing with a further breakdown on the local annunciator panel in the switchyard buildings and equipment cabinets. A voltmeter is provided on the main control board for monitoring the voltage on the 13.8-kV busses SL7 and SL8. No failur a causing a loss of function of one offsite source can occur without alarming on the Main Control Board in some manner. The main switchyard bus and interconnections be-tween various switchyard components are comprised of rigid aluminun bus. 8.2.1.3 Compliance with Design Criteria and Standards The offsite power systems are capable of providing reliable l sources of power to the Class IE systems in compliance with GDC 17 and 18 of 10 CFR Part 50 and Regulatory Guide 1.32. Design of the of fsite power systems for Wolf Creek exceeds the minimum requirements cited in the above documents as demonstrated by the following analysis. Rev. 5 8.2-3a 8/81

l SNUPPS-ITC Criterion 17 - Electric Power Systems In addition to the features detailed in Sections 8.2.1.1 and 8.2.1.2, compliance with Criterion 17 is further demonstrated by the following: a. In the event any one of the overhead 345-kV transmission lines were to be interrupted, either one of the remaining two lines is capable of carrying the total ESF load re-quired for safe shutdown. b. The two 345-kV transmission lines from the plant yard to the switching station will be supported on their own individual structures. Structural design and circuit separation are such as to eliminate the possibility of a structural collapse causing an outage of both 345-kV transmission lines. c. The 345-kV system is protected from light-l ning and switching surges by lightning pro-tective equipment and by overhead static

lines, d.

The design of all overhead lines meets or exceeds the requirements of the National Electric Safety Code (4) for heavy loading district, Grade B construction, and is based on a lightning performance of less than one outage per 100 miles per year. Design of switchyard components is in accordance with the latest standards of the IEEE, ANSI and NEMA. I e. The design of the 125-V de system for the i 345-kV portion of the switchyard consists of two independent dc systems. Each of the two systems consists of a separate 125-V de bat-tery, battery charger, and distribution sys-tem. Cable separation is maintained between the two systems. A single failure caused by a malfunction of either of the two 125-v de systems will not affect the f Rev. 12 8.2-4

r SNUPPS-WC performance of the other system. The ability of the switchyard to supply offsite power to the plant will not be affected by the loss of one of the two 125-V de systems. The surveil-lance of battery charger operation and bat-tery voltage for each battery system is provided by individual alarms monitored in the switchyard control building. Alarms are also monitored in the plant control room. The 69-kV portion of the switchyard has its own 125-Vdc battery for relaying. There is no dc tie between the switchyard batteries and those in the power block. f. Two isolated 13.8-kV supplies from separate l sources are provided to the switchyard. One supply is from the offsite 13.8-kV bus and the other is from a site 13.8-kV bus. Each supply serves a station power transformer which is capable of supplying the total ac load of the station. Loss of one source will initiate automatic throwover of all load to the remaining transformer. g. For reliability and operating flexibility, l the 345-kV switchyard design includes a breaker-and-a-half arrangement for each circuit. Along with breaker failure backup protection. Each 345-kV breaker has two trip coils on separate isolated dc control cir-cuits. The above provisions permit the following: 1. Any transmission line can be clear-ed under normal or fault conditions without affecting any cther trans-mission line. 2. Any 345-kV circuit breaker can be isolated for mairitenance without interrupting the power or protec-tion to any circuit. 3. Short circuits on a section of bus can be isolated without interrupt-ing service to any circuit other than that connected to the faulted bus section. h. Both offsite sources from the 345-kV switch-yard are separate and independent. The fail-ure or structural collapse of one will not affect the other. Rev. 12 8.2-5

SNUPPS-WC i. The offsite sources from the startup and l 69/13.8-kV transformers to the ESF transform-ers and switchgear are independently and separately routed. l j. Two physically independent circuits are provided to supply offsite power to the onsite distribution system. The offsite sources from the 345-kV switchyard are each l normally connected to their own individual ESF transformers, and are both immediately available following a LOCA to supply compo-nents important to safety. Criterion 18 - Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems The 345-kV and 69-kV circuit breakers are inspect-ed, r.aintained and tested on a routine basis. This can be accomplished without removing the generators, trans forme rs or transmission lines from service. Transmission line protective relays are tested on a routine basis. This can be accomplished without removing the transmission lines from service. l Generator, main, startup and standby transformer relays are tested on a routine basis when the generator is off line. Regulatory Guide 1.32 As described in the paragraph above, the two offsite sources are immediate access circuits from the transmission network. This design conforms to the preferred design as outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.32. Industry Standards The design complies with the following industry standards and recommendations: 1. Institute of Electrical Electronics Engin-eers, Inc (IEEE) 2. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Rev. 12 8.2-6

4 - --_ \\ a j SNUPPS-WC i 3. National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) 4. American Institute Steel Construction (AISC) 5. American Concrete Institute (ACI) 6. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 7. American Welding Society (AWS) 8. Steel Structures Painting Council (SSPC) 9. National Environmental Systems Contractors (NESC) 10. National Electrical Code (NEC) 11. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 12. Underwriters Laboratory, Inc (UL) 13. Local Building Codes 14. American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) 15. Metal Building Manufacturers Association (MBMA) 16. Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA) 17. National Power Codes by ASME (NPC) 18. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 8.2.2 ANALYSIS The 345-kV system to which the WCGS is connected is quite extensive with several major interconnections to other regions. One major benefit to be derived from such a system is that, through proper design, the system continues to function properly on loss of a generating unit, loss of a heavily loaded circuit, or various other contingency condi-tions. 8.2-7

SMUPPS-WC Analysis of conditions during plant operation demonstrate the following regarding the Wolf Creek 345-kV Substation and its associated lines: 1. The system can successfully withstand loss of the Wolf Creek unit when fully loaded. 2. With all 345-kV lines in service and the Wolf Creek unit fully

loaded, the system can successfully withstand loss of any one 345-kV line from Wolf Creek Substation under three-phase fault conditions with the fault cleared in normal clearing sequence.

3. With all 345-kV lines in service and the Wolf Creek unit fully

loaded, the system can successfully withstand loss of any tw 1 ele-ments caused by a single phase fault being cleared by back-up breaker operation in back-up clearing sequences.

4. Any one 345-kV line, when energized from the remote end, can successfully carry the total ESP load required fo r safe shutdown should I it become necessary to do so. I 5. All of the above comments apply on both a l transient stability and a steady state basis. The analyses of the WCGS demonstrate that the transmission system is fully capable of delivering the output from WCGS and of providing adequate power for safe operation of WCGS. A transmission s), tem analysis has shown the frequency decay rate to be below 5.0 Hz/sec, therefore, the reactor coolant pump motor breakers are not required to be safety grade. Transmission grid availability of the KG&E and KCPL systems has historically been very high with no recorded incidents of system islanding within the last twenty year period. During the period 1942 to the mid-sixties, KG&E and KCPL established multiple 138 and 161-kV interconnections with their neighboring utilities, significantly strengthening the reliability of the bulk power systems. Grid availability has been further strengthened by multiple 345-kV lines constructed in this and surrounding areas since 1966. Rev. 12 8.2-8 )

{ SNUPPS-WC i The area's historical outage rate for 345-kV circuits is below 1.0 per 100 circuit miles / year for outages of over 15 minutes duration and less than 2.0 per 100 circuit miles / year for all outages including momentary interruptions. This compares favorably with the historical performance of other 345-kV transmission systems. These outages are caused primarily by lightning, wind and ice. I In view of,the applied system design, and based on past performance of the transmission system, uninterrupted trans-mission grid availability to meet all requirements is pro-jected over the life of UCGS. 1 l I i l 4 s i i h a i Rev. 12 8.2-9

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