ML20091M350

From kanterella
Revision as of 12:04, 13 December 2024 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept 107 Re Lack of Traceability for 1-inch & 2-inch Carbon Steel Pipe/Fittings in ASME Section Iii,Class III installations.Forty-one Items W/Indeterminate Traceability Replaced W/Traceable Matls
ML20091M350
Person / Time
Site: Waterford 
Issue date: 05/30/1984
From: Gerrets T
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Jay Collins
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
107, W3K84-1298, NUDOCS 8406110251
Download: ML20091M350 (3)


Text

"

.r 142 DELARONDE STREET POWER & L1GHT P O BOX 6008

  • NEW ORLEANS. LOul51ANA 70174 * (504) 366-2345 UiluTIES SYSTEM May 30, 1984 W3K84-1298 Q-3-A35.07.107 Mr. John T. Collins Regional Administrator, Region IV I

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JN - 51984 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

,U, j

RP.FERENCE: LP&L Letter W3K84-0927 dated April 24, 1984 t

Dear Mr. Collins:

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 107

" Schedule 80, 1" and 2" Carbon Steel Pipe Fittings 'P3'"

Final Report In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 107, " Schedule 80, 1" and 2" Carbon Steel Pipe Fite'v e

'rJ'".

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, 62@

T. F. Gerrets Corporate Quality Assurance Manager TFG CNH:SSTG cc: Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 (15 copies) 8406110251 840530 PDR ADOCK 05000302 iJh[

S PDR l

/

a

. ~.

~

9 Mr. John T. Collius May 30,'1984 W3K84-1298 Page 2 cc: Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 r

l Mr. E. L. Blake l

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

t Washington, D.C.

20036 Mr. W. M. Stevenson Monroo & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations i

1100 circle 75 Parkt ay, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. W. A. Cross 7910 Woodsont Avenue Suite 1200 l

Bethesda, Maryland 20814 i

l i

I l

l

3 FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 107

" SCHEDULE 80, 1" AND 2" CARBON STEEL PIPE / FITTINGS 'P3'"

INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).

It describes 1" and 2" carbon steel pipe / fittings in ASME Section III Class III installations which lack material traceability.

1 i

To the best of our knowledge, this deficiency has not been reported to the USNRC pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION l

Documentation review of installation packages identified the lack of traceability for 1" carbon steel (C.S.) SCH 80 pipe and 1" and 2" carbon steel 3000# fittings on three level stations (AC system) for Chilled Water Expansion i

Tanks A, B, and A/B and on one level station (CC system) of the Component Cooling Surge Tank. The items identified as lacking material heat numbers in the documentation review were inspected to determine if heat numbers were present on the material.

Forty-four items have been identified as having indeterminate traceability.

l t

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS l^

j The piping and fittings in question connect CCW surge tank level monitoring

[

equipment which automatically actuates makeup from the Domineralized Water System, automatically bypasses the dry cooling towers and isolates the l

respective CCW train on low level in the. respective tank side. The piping and fittings associated with Chilled Water Expansion Tanks A B, and A/B connect I

(

level switches which automatically control makeup water supplied from the CCW makeup pumps. Portions of the CCW System and the Essential Services Chilled Water System are required to function following a design basen accident.

i Therefore, if lef t uncorrected, the safe operation of the plant could be -

adversely affected.-

CORRECTIVE ACTION l

Forty-one items with indeterminate traceability have been removed, scrapped, and replaced with traceable materials. During the specified rework, the three remaining items (Component Cooling Surge Tank stations) were found to have heat numbers. As supports were being removed, heat numbers were found in areas previously inaccessible for the visus 1 inspection resulting from the documentation review.-

Corrective action and the supporting documentation reviews.are completed.

l t

This.fo submitted as the Final Report.

L

.