ML20137Y761
| ML20137Y761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1997 |
| From: | Maynard O WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| WM-97-0049, WM-97-49, NUDOCS 9704230216 | |
| Download: ML20137Y761 (4) | |
Text
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W$LF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION 1
Otto L. Maynard
)
President and Chief Executive Officer April 18, 1997 WM 97-0049 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk i
Mail Station F1-137 Washington, D. C.
20555
Reference:
Letter dated March 14, 1997, from Kenneth E. Brockman, NRC, to Otto L. Maynard, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC)
{
Subject:
Docket No. 50-482:
Response to Weakness
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50-482/9702-01 j
1 Gentlemen:
This letter transmits Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation's (WCNOC) response to-Weakness 50-482/9702-01.
The weakness was identified for ineffective internal and external communications in the technical support center.
WCNOC's response to this weakness is in the attachment.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact me at (316) 364-8831, extension 4000, or Mr. Richard D.
Flannigan, at extension 4500.
Very truly yours, 0
/VS i
i Otto L. Maynard OLM/jad Attachment cc:
E. W.
Merschoff (NRC), w/a W.
D.
Johnson (NRC), w/a J
F. Ringwald (NRC), w/a D}i J. C. Stone (NRC), w/a 9704230216 970418 ADOCK 050004 2
[glgg lgg ggg gDR PO. Box 411/ Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (316) 364-8831 An Equa! Opportunity Emplovar M FJHCVET
1 i Attachment to WM 97-0049 Page 1 of 3 Reply to Weakness 50-482/9702-01 Weakness 50-482/9702-01:
Ineffective internal and external communications in the technical support center.
l "A.
Some internal and external technical support center communications were ineffective and had a negative impact on the efficiency of the response effort."
Admission of Weakness:
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) acknowledges and agrees that l
a weakness in the Emergency Preparedness exercise occurred on February 25, l
1997, when communications were ineffective and created a negative impact on the efficiency of the response effort. Five (5) examples were given in l
Inspection Report 97-02, each of which contributed to the weakness.
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Specifically, the failure to communicate Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) to the l
Duty Emergency Director (DED) in a timely manner, led to an untimely (delayed) i site area emergency (SAE) declaration.
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l Reason for Weakness:
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Root Cause:
Generic contributing causal factors include not using questioning attitudes sufficiently, not asking clarifying questions, and not being aware of available methods of obtaining information on plant equipment. A further root cause factor was determined to be the breakdown of the basic communications l
processes of motivation to communicate, motivation to receive, encoding and decoding information, and feedback.
Specific to th'e communications in the TSC, a contributing factor to the root l
I cause was determined to be a lack of procedural guidance to ensure that the l
DEI information was communicated to the DED in a timely manner.
This I
communications path was not established in training, procedures, or experience l
during previous drills.
The pre-exercise brief, also, did not communicate essential plant status information to the players on the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).
However, if the controllers had not interjected the PASS data, that information would still have come to the Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC) and the Nuclear Engineer from the PASS team, but still may not have reached the DED in a timely manner.
Discussion:
One of the results of the communication breakdown occurred when the DED did not communicate to the Technical Support Center (TSC) the items which were critical for escalating the Emergency Action Level (EAL) to an SAE.
The need for the DEI information was not communicated to all personnel in the TSC.
The DED believed the necessary information would be available through other individual communications.
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' Attachment to WM 97-0049 Page 2 of 3
.Follosing review of the participants' and controllers' logs, interviews were held with the key individuals involved with the communications issues.
Failure to use clear, concise communications is the major causal factor in all of the examples cited in Weakness 9702-01.
Two differences existed between this exercise and previous drills.
Several individuals who were interviewed stated that they had never provided DEI values to the DED in the past.
Also, in the two drills prior to the February 25 exercise, instructions to the players were to assume actual plant conditions unless otherwise instructed.
This included an inoperable PASS.
Contrary to previous drills and exercises which instructed players to assume actual plant conditions, for the February 25 exercise, the PASS was to be considered operable, and players were to simulate obtaining sample results, this information was not provided to all players.
DEI is not normally a part of PASS results.
The Chemistry Technicians expected the DEI values to be specifically requested.
This did not happen initially because the DED believed that the PASS was to be treated as inoperable.
The information that the PASS was operable was available to the Chemistry Technician in the control room.
However, the TSC Controller prompted only the Chemistry Technician and the Nuclear Engineer to treat the PASS as operable.
The remainder of the TSC staff was not made aware of this condition. At 1ater time the TSC lead controller told the DED that for the purpose of the drill PASS was operable.
The DED then mtde a request of the REC for a PASS sample. Further communication inadequacies occurred at this point, as the Controller provided information to the DAC and the Nuclear Engineer; however, the request path for the DEI was from the DED to the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC) to the MEC to the Chemistry Technician.
During the initial evaluation of the EAL decision trees, the DED did not attempt to obtain the del values, since his initial understanding was that the PASS was inoperable.
The DED looked for other logic trees to reach the higher classification, but no other logic path existed. After about 30 minutes, the DED was informed that the PASS was, indeed, to be considered' operable, and the DEI value was requested.
After the DEI information was obtained, the DED was able to declare the SAE.
Communication between the DAC and REC was not successful in conveying that PASS data was actually available.
The DAC indicated to the REC that PASS data was available.
However, the REC did not readily accept this because it conflicted with his knowledge that the PASS was inoperable, and further, that the team had not had time to obtain PASS results.
Feedback and clarifying questions were not used to gain a full understanding of information being communicated.
Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved:
EP 01-1,1-23, "TSC Engineering Team's Task List," was revised March 5,
- 1997, to include directions for the Nuclear Engineer to coordinate for a PASS sample and request DEI determination.
Upon receiving the results the Nuclear Engineer is to ensure the DAC receives the PASS information and that the DED is informed of the DEI results.
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I Attachment to WM 97-0049 Page 3 of 3 l
l Corrective Steps That Will Be Taken And The Date When Full Compliance Will Be j
l Achieved:
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The first two corrective actions apply specifically to the TSC communications l
which caused the untimely classification.
The remaining corrective actions q
apply to generic communications concerns within the ERO.
EP 01-1.1-3, "DED Task List,"
will be revised to have the DED provide information to the TSC staff on the likely items that could escalate the j
classification in order to maintain staff awareness of critical information.
Emergency Preparedness personnel will coordinate with the DEDs to determine what information should be provided on the priority boards and determine an appropriate individual to be assigned the responsibility of maintaining the priority board up-to-date by communicating with the DED.
Priorities may include likely items that could escalate the emergency classification as well as plant damage mitigation.
j Lesson plaa GE0135640, "E-Plan Players Briefing," will be revised to have personnel review PIR 97-0656 or similar information prior to drills and exercises to emphasize the importance of and the process for effective i
communications.
Information dealing with the initial plant conditions applicable to the drill wil] be covered to ensure each player has the same information. General expectations dealing with communications and player 1
response will also bo covered.
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i The abote actions will be completed by May 28, 1997, in time for incorporation into the June, 1997, Emergency Preparedness drill.
De elements of good communication techniques will be covered during the 1997 continuing training for the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Teams and j
for the controller training.
This will be completed by December 15, 1997.
The use of good communications techniques will be reinforced during the 1997 drills.
Designated ERO team members will serve as coaches during drills to reinforce to other ERO team members the proper performance of their tasks and the use of proper communication techniques.
Controllers will also receive training in communication techniques.
The use of " time-outs" as a tool to j
reinforce and cla ufy communications will ne encouraged during drills. This will be completed by December 15, 1997.
A self assessment on the use of effective communicati on techniques and the effectiveness of the communications with the ERO Teams will be performed during the first quarter of 1998.
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