ML20210L502

From kanterella
Revision as of 02:14, 6 December 2024 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Requests Addl Info Re NRC Proposed Reassessment of long-term Safety of B&W Designed Reactors,Including Analysis of Thermal Hydraulic Design & Instrumentation.Concerns Fueled by Repeated Unusual Incidents at Facility
ML20210L502
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco, 05000000, Crane
Issue date: 01/29/1986
From: Matsui R
HOUSE OF REP.
To: Palladino N
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML19302A059 List:
References
NUDOCS 8604290358
Download: ML20210L502 (4)


Text

a WC$mhGTOg 0FFCI ROBERT 7. MATSUI 23 CANNON House or, ice suitoiNG Jo Distemt. Cautoauto WASHINGTON, DC 20515 (202)2254 103 WAYS AND MEAN, Oestect orFcs Congregg of tIje hitch 6tated io;;pggy;gao SACRAMENTO. CA 95014 house of Representatibeg is m u>ma Masfjington,3BC 20515 January 29, 1986 The Honorable Nunzio Palladino Chairman United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently proposed a reassessment of the long-term safety of nuclear reactors designed by Babcock & Wilcox Co.

One of these plants, Rancho Seco, is in my congressional district.

According to an NRC statement, this assessment is to include an analysis of " thermal hydraulic design, instrumentation, controls and power supplies along with a review of operating experience and operator training and responses."

However, a review of the NRC's own reports to Congress over the past five years indicates that such assessments have been conducted before.

NRC documents reveal that the NRC has been concerned about design problems peculiar to B&W reactors since the early 1970s and that the incident at Three Mile Island intensified that concern.

Task Forces have been formed, meetings with the B&W Owners Group have been initiated, and recommendations have been made.

But despite the NRC's efforts to date, unusual events have continued to take place at B&W plants.

The pattern of NRC actions regarding B&W plants seems to correspond to the public furor generated by each successive incident.

When public concern is highest, there is a flurry of activity at the NRC.

But when the furor subsides, NFC activity seems to subside as well.

In light of that concern, I am requesting answers to the following preliminary questions:

1.

If the NRC believes that the succession of repeated incidents at B&W plants is serious enough to require a year-long safety review, what is the Commission's position as to the impact of unresolved safety questions on the continued operation of those plants?

s e tccq270Y H qq-THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS

a f

i The Honorable Nunzio Palladino I

PAGE TWO 2.-

What specific events triggered the public announcement of the current reassessment and how do these events differ from past events?

3.

To what extent has the NRC known of problems at B&W reactors in I

i the past and what efforts has the NRC taken specifically and generically to correct those problems?

4.

How effective have the NRC's efforts to correct problems at some l

B&W plants been in preventing similar incidents at other B&W plants?

l 5.

Are B&W reactors more susceptible to repeated thermal shocks from unusual events than other reactors and is the risk of serious accident l

compounded by the designs of B&W control systems?.Are B&W control systems inherently unsafe or can they be modified for~ safe operation?

a 6.

What are the NRC's specific plans'regarding the current reassessment of B&W plants?

How do they differ from past i

assessments?

Is it possible to complete the reassessment in less than one year?

i 7.

To what extent is Babcock & Wilcox Co. liable for a licensee's I

t monetary losses due to design flaws?

i These concerns have been fueled by the repeated occurrences of unusual incidents at the Rancho Seco nuclear plant-in my congressional district.

In light of your present investigation of B&W-designed j

nuclear plants and your specific investigation of the control system at Rancho Seco, please advise me as to when the NRC believes that Rancho Seco can be safely brought back on line.

Very truly yours, i

ROBERT T. MATSUI Member of Congress RTM/ma Rep. John Dingell Rep. Morris Udall Rep. Dennis Eckart Rep. Marcy Kaptur i

Rep. John Hammerschmidt Rep. Buddy MacKay Rep. Delbert Latta Rep. Carroll Campbell Rep. George Gekas Rep. Don Ritter

,-r-

,-,n-,

i wasamoiom on.ct ROBERT T.1 ATSUI 33 rdsvact csoa=a 23 CANNON HOUSE 08FICE SUILDING

^

COMMITTEE ON 202 225-63 WAYS AND MEANS pastact onct (Ongitsg of tIJe Enitell Otated a;;;<aigaylgaa SACRAMENTO. CA 95014 house of Representatibes m a>3u3 Riasfjington, DC 20515 January 29, 1986 Honorable Morris K. Udall Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment 1327 Longworth Building Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to request an inquiry by the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's recent proposal to reassess the long-term safety of nuclear reactors designed by Babcock & Wilcox Co.

According to an NRC statement, this assessment is to include an analysis of " thermal hydraulic design, instrumentation, controls and power supplies along with a review of operating experience and operator training and responses."

However, a review of the NRC's own reports to Congress over the past five years indicates that such assessments have been conducted before.

NRC documents reveal that the NRC has been concerned about design problems peculiar to B&W reactors since the early 1970s and that the incident at Three Mile Island intensified that concern.

Task Forces have been formed, meetings with the B&W Owners Group have been initiated, and recommendations have been made.

But despite the NRC's efforts to date, unusual events have continued to take place at B&W plants.

The pattern of NRC actions regarding B&W plants seems to correspond to the public furor generated by each successive incident.

When public concern is highest, there is a flurry of activity at the NRC.

But when the furor subsides, NRC activity seems to subside as well.

The present reassessment teems to fit into that scenario.

I am concerned that the NRC's action may just be a smokescreen that obscures the lack of a comprehensive effort now and in the past to guarantee the safety of B&W plants.

In light of that concern, I am requesting that the Subcommittee j

help me obtain answers to the following preliminary questions.

1 i

i I

l THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS

4

~4 4

s 1

't.

1.

If the NRC believes that.the succession of, repeated incidents at B&W plants is serious enough to. require a year-long safety review, what is the Commission's position as to the impact of unresolved safety questions on the. continued operation of those plants?

2.

To what extent has the~NRC know the operation of B&W plants be.

suspended until safety questions are. resolved?

Are B&W plants more susceptible to repeated-thermal shocks from. unusual events and.is the risk of gr. eater accident compounded by the design of B&W control systems?

To what extent has the NRC known of problems at B&W reactors in 3.the past and what efforts has the NRC taken to correct.those problems?

j 4.

How effective have the NRC's efforts to correct problems at some B&W plants been in preventing similar incidents at other B&W plants?

5.

What are the NRC's specific plans regarding the current i

reassessment?

How do they differ from past assessments?

Why.will the assessment take one year to complete in light of previous analyses?

L 6.

To what extent is Babcock & Wilcox Co. liable for a licensee's monetary losses due to design flaws?

These concerns have been fueled by the repeated occurrences of unusual incidents at the Rancho Seco nuclear plant in my congressional j

l district.

If the NRC had past knowledge that could have prevented those incidents, it should have acted.

If present knowledge can.

prevent similar incidents in the future, the NRC should act now.

i In light of the present investigation of B&W-designed nuclear plants, I have requested that the NRC not bring. Rancho Seco on line until I am absolutely assured of its safety.

Any assistance you can offer in this matter would be appreciated.

l.

Very truly yours, ROBERT T. MATSUI l

Member of Congress 1

cc: Chairman Nunzio Palladino, NRC 4

Rep.. Dennis Eckart.

l Rep. Marcy Kaptur Rep. John. Hammerschmidt i

Rep. Buddy MacKay Rep. Delbert Latta Rep. Carroll Campbell Rep. George Gekas Rep. Don Ritter w

t-w w--

er

'r T*'w--*'**-*v~wW e w e w 7 ww- %t 4 ww'#7*-T**vv'"W-T'r7-***v'Pv'--'"'Tvv=-

-- ru p r P - wrwpy P e 'T * ** Dr *y ov Tv 917'e 3 N ve v v

.-r'=w-d's*'ta---W r