ML24099A146
| ML24099A146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/2024 |
| From: | Curran D Beyond Nuclear, Harmon, Curran, Harmon, Curran, Spielberg & Eisenberg, LLP, Sierra Club |
| To: | NRC/SECY |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 56985, 50-338-SLR-2, 50-339-SLR-2 | |
| Download: ML24099A146 (0) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY
)
In the Matter of )
Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50 -338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2 ) March 28, 2024
___________________________________ _ ) Corrected April 8, 2024
HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND THE SIERRA CLUB
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309, and the hearing notice published at 8 9 Fed. Reg. 960 (Jan.
8, 2024 ), Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear) and the Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra
Club) hereby request the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) to
grant a hearing on new information discussed in the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (Draft SEIS) prepared by the NRC to inform its review of an application by Virginia
Electric Power Co. ( VE PCO ) f or subsequent license renewal (SLR) of the operating license for the North Anna Units 1 and 2 nuclear power station (NAPS).1 If VEPCO s application is
granted, it will be allowed to operate North Anna Units 1 and 2 for an additional twenty years
beyond its current renewed operating license term, or until 205 8 (Unit 1 ) and 20 60 (Unit 2 ), for
an aggregate of 80 years.2
1 The Draft North Anna EIS is entitled: Site -Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 7a, Subsequent License Renewal for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Draft Report for Comment (NUREG - 1437, Supplemen t 7a, Dec. 2023).
2 The NRC issued original operating licenses for North Anna in 1978 and 1980, with expiration dates of 2018 (Unit 1) and 2020 (Unit 2). In 2003, the NRC renewed both licenses for 20 years, with new expiration dates of 2038 and 2040. If renewed again, the No rth Anna licenses would expire in 2058 and 2060.
Petitioners contend that the NRC should not approve subsequent renewal of VEPCO s
operating license because the Draft SEIS fails to support its conclusion that the environmental
impacts of accidents are SMALL or insignificant. In particular, the Draft SEIS fails to address
environmental significance of 2011 M ineral E arthquake ; provides incomplete, inadequate,
incorrect or misleading data and analyses in support of its general conclusion that severe accident
impacts are small ; and fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk. Each of
these categories of deficiencies is significant in its own right. Taken together, they show a level
of inadequacy that is grossly unacceptable.
Petitioners contentions are supported by the expert declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman, a nuclear engineer with a significant level of expertise in risk analysis. 3
Th e remainder of this Hearing Request is organized as follows: Section II contains a
demonstration that Petitioners Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club each ha s organizational
standing to participate in this proceeding.Section III presents the legal framework for
Petitioners Hearing Request.Section IV presents Petitioners Contention s.Section V contains
Petitioners Conclusion.
II. PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO REQUEST A HEARING.
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d), a request for a hearing must address: (1) the nature of
the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, (2) the
nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceed ing, and
(3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners
3 Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman (March 27, 2024) (Mitman Declaration). Mr. Mitmans Declaration is attached as Attachment 1.
2
interest. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) has summarized these standing
requirements as follows:
In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. C ontemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury -in -fact within the zone of interest arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969); (2) the injury can fairly be traced to the challenged actions; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity by demonstrating harm to its members. To intervene in a representational capacity, an organization must show not only that at least one of its members would fulfill the standing requirements, but also that he or she has authorized the organization to represent his or her interests. 4
As demonstrated below, each of the Petitioners has standing by virtue of organizational
interests that fall within the zone of interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA ). By intervening in this proceeding, Petitioners
seek to protect their members health and safety, as well as protection of the environment. They
wish to ensure that VEPCO s operating license is not approved for a second renewal term unless
and until VEPCO demonstrates full compliance with NEPAs requirements for protection of
public health and the environment.
In addition, as also demonstrated below, each Petitioner organization ha s members and /or
staff who live and/or work within 50 miles of North Anna Units 1 and 2, whose interests in
protecting their own health and the health of the environment would be adversely affected by
extended operation of North Anna Units 1 and 2 under an additional SLR term, and who have
authorize d Petitioners to represent their interests in this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioners have
4 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP -02 -23, 56 N.R.C. 413, 426 (2002) (petition for review denied, CLI -03 -12, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003) ).
3
presumptive standing by virtue of the location of their members residences and property within 50 miles of the North Anna reactors. 5
A. Standing of Beyond Nuclear
Beyond Nuclear is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that aims to educate
and activate the public about the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and
the need to abolish both to protect public health and safety, prevent enviro nmental harms, and
safeguard our future. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an end to the production of nuclear waste
and for securing the existing reactor waste in hardened on -site storage until it can be permanently
disposed of in a safe, sound, and suitable u nderground repository. For more than fifteen years,
Beyond Nuclear has worked toward its mission by regularly intervening in NRC licensing,
relicensing, and other proceedings related to nuclear safety matters.
Beyond Nuclears representational standing to participate in this proceeding is
demonstrated by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Declaration of Glen
Besa (March 23, 2024) (Attachment 2 A); Declaration of Erica Gray (March 23, 2024 )
(Attachment 2 B ); and Declaration of Jerry Rosenthal (March 24, 2024); (Attachment 2 C).
B. Standing of the Sierra Club
Founded in 1892, t he Sierra Club is a national environmental organization with more than 3.8
million members across the United States. The purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy,
and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earths
ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the
n atural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.
5 Diablo Canyon, 56 N.R.C. at 426 -27 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP -01 -06, 53 N.R.C. 138, 146, affd, CLI -01 -17, 54 N.R.C. 3 (2001)).
4
The Sierra Clubs representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated
by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Barbara Crui ckshank ( March 23,
2024 ) (Attachment 2 D ); Declaration of John Crui c kshank ( March 22, 2024) (Attachment 2 E );
Declaration of Dian a Johnson (March 23, 2024) (Attachment 2 F); Declaration of William J.
Johnson ( March 23, 2024 ) (Attachment 2G).
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND NEPA
The NRCs regulation and licensing of reactors is governed by two statutes: the A tomic
Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq. ; and NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 -4370h. While the
substantive concerns of these statutes overlap, Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291,
1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975), they impose independent procedural obligations. Limerick Ecology Action
- v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 729 -3 1 (3rd Cir. 1989). Even where the NRC purports to have resolved
safety issues through its Atomic Energy Act -based regulatory process, it must nevertheless
comply with NEPAs procedural obligations for addressing those issues in its decision -making processes.6
A. Atomic Energy Act and NRC Safety Regulations
Under § 103(d) of the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC may not issue an operating license
for a nuclear plant if it would be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health
and safety of the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (d). Section 161 of t he Atomic Energy Act also
empowers the NRC to set standards to protect health or to minimize danger to life or property,
inter alia. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b).
6 Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 729 -31. See also State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 47 8 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (a finding that reasonable assurance exists that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be available when necessary... does not describe a probability of failure so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a failure.).
5
A mong the many regulatory standards promulgated by the NRC for the safe construction
and operation of nuclear power reactors, the General Design Criteria (GDCs) in Appendix A to
10 C.F.R. Part 50 are fundamentally important, because they establish minimum requirements
for the principal design criteria for water -cooled nuclear power plants. Id., Introduction. These
principal design criteria, in turn, establish:
the necessary design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components important to safety; that is, structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be oper ated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Id. General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, Design Bases for Protection Against Natural
Phenomena) requires that [s]tructures, systems, and components important to safety shall be
designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes,
hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perf orm their safety
functions. As the NRCs ASLB has recognized, SSCs must be able to withstand an earthquake
and other natural disasters within the design basis of the plant. 7 Design -basis s tructures that
must remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake are referred to as Category I
structures. 8 Category I safety structures and components (SSCs) encompass a broad array of
equipment and structures, including the pressure vessel internals, the reactor coolant pressure
boundary, the steam generators, and the emergency core cooling system.9
7 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP -17 -07, 86 N.R.C. 59, 79 (2017) (citing 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. A, GDC 2).
8 Regulatory Guide, 1.29, Rev. 5, Seismic Design Classification for Nuclear Power Plants at 5 (July 2016) (ML16118A148) (Reg. Guide 1.29).
9 Id. at 5 -6.
6
B. NEPA General Requirements
NEPA implements a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting environmental
quality. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI -98 -3, 47 N.R.C.
77, 87 (1998) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989)
and citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331). NEPA has two key purposes: to ensure that the agency will have
available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental
impacts before it makes a decision; and to gua rantee that the relevant information will be made
available to the larger audience that may also play a role in the decision -making process and
implementation of that decision. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349. In fulfilling NEPAs second
purpose of public participation, the agencys environmental analysis must be published for
public comment to permit the public a role in the agencys decision -making process.
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349 -50; Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman, 81 F.3d 437,
443 (4th Cir. 1996).
In fulfilling NEPAs first purpose of evaluating the environmental impacts of its
decisions, NEPA requires a federal agency to take a hard look at potential environmental
consequences by preparing an EIS prior to any major Federal action [] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The
hallmarks of a hard look are thorough investigation into environmental impacts and forthright
acknowledgment of potential environmental harms. National Audubon Society v. Dept of Navy,
422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005). The requirement to analyze environmental impacts in a draft
EIS is codified in NRC regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71 (requiring that a draft EIS must include a
preliminary ana lysis that considers and weighs the environmental effects, including any
cumulative effects, of the proposed action; the environmental impacts of alternatives to the
7
proposed action; and alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental
effects.).
C. Reasonably Foreseeable Harms Covered by NEPA Include Clima te Change
A NEPA analysis must address harms that are reasonably foreseeable, even if they are
indirect or unlikely. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476, 482. The analysis must address both
the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the consequences if those events come to
pass. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 482 (rejecting environmental analysis of spent fuel pool
fire risks because it did not consider consequences as well as probability of fires in spent fuel
storage pools ).
The Presidents Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has concluded that climate
change is a fundamental environmental issue, and its effects fall squarely within NEPAs purview. 10 Among the climate -related environmental impacts that CEQ advises agencies to
consider are the reasonably foreseeable effects of climate change on infrastructure investments. 11 As stated by the CEQ:
The effects of climate change observed to date and projected to occur in the future include more frequent and intense heat waves, longer fire seasons and more severe wildfires, degraded air quality, increased drought, greater sea -level rise, an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, harm to water resources, harm to agriculture, ocean acidification, and harm to wildlife and ecosystems. The IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] Assessment Report reinforces these findings by providing scientific evidence of the impacts of climate change driven by human -induced GHG emissions, on our ecosystems, infrastructure, human health, and socioeconomic makeup. 12
10 National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change, 88 Fe3d. Reg. 1,196, 1,197 (Jan. 9, 2023).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1,200 (emphasis added).
8
Consistent with this policy, multiple federal agencies have established programs for
assessing the effects of climate change on critical infrastructure such as power plants,
transmission systems, and dams. For instance, the Department of Defense has init iated a
Climate Risk Analysis to address the implications for U.S. national security and defense of
[i]ncreasing temperatures; changing precipitation patterns; and more frequent, intense, and
unpredictable extreme weather conditions caused by climate change. 13 The Federal Emergency
Management Agency has declared that the Changing Climate is a Priority for Emergency
Managers because the changing climate is a force multiplier - increasing the number of
storms, floods, fires, and extreme temperatures that threa ten the well -being of people across our nation. 14 The Critical Infrastructure Security Agency analyzes extreme weather and its impacts
to critical infrastructure to develop strategies for resilience. 15
IV. CONTENTIONS
Contention 1: Draft SEIS Fails to Address Environmental Significance of the 2011 Mineral Earthquake
A. Statement of Contention
The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51. 71
because it does not address the environmental significance of the 2011 Mineral Earthquake,
whose epicenter was a short distance from the two reactors and whose ground motion exceeded
the design basis levels for both reactors. By exceeding the reactors design basis, the earthquake
13 See https://www.defense.gov/spotlights/tackling -the -climate -crisis/. (last visited 3/27/24).
14 See https://www.fema.gov/fact -sheet/fema -and -changing -
climate#:~:text=The%20Changing%20Climate%20is%20a%20Priority%20for%20Emergency
%20Managers&text=When%20emergency%20managers%20plan%20for,recovery%20starts%2 0sooner%20for%20survivors. (last visited 3/27/24).
15 See https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical -infrastructure -security -and -resilience/extreme -
weather -and -climate -change. (last visited 3/27/24).
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disproved the assumption underlying the NRCs issuance of operating licenses in 1978 (for Unit
- 1) and 1980 (for Unit 2) and renewal of those licenses 2003, that the reactors could be operated
safely and without significant adverse environmental impacts bec ause their SSCs were built to a
design basis of sufficient rigor to protect against likely earthquakes. This assumption can also be
found in the 2013 License Renewal GEIS and the Draft SEIS for the North Anna SLR
application. 16
Because that assumption has been proven wrong, the NRC must explicitly address the
question of whether the environmental impacts of operating North Anna Units 1 and 2 in non -
compliance with its design basis for an additional twenty years will have significant impacts. As
discussed in the attached Mitman Declaration, the NRC fails to acknowledge it or explain the
fundamental difference between a finding of no significant or small impact that is based on a
deterministic analysis and a finding of no significan t impact that is based on a probabilistic
analysis. In Mr. Mitmans expert opinion, the deterministic analysis is more conservative
because it requires a robust design that provides reasonable assurance that an external event like
an earthquake will not ha rm necessary safety systems. A probabilistic analysis, in comparison,
does not assume safety related equipment will perform as designed and then calculates the
likelihood of an accident occurring. The NRC should explain the difference and how its
assessmen t of risk has changed as a result of the Mineral Earthquake. 17 As asserted by Mr.
Mitman, the NRC should also explain what it has done to evaluate the potential that safety
16 Mitman Declaration, ¶ 25 and Draft SEIS as cited therein.
17 See Mitman Declaration, ¶ 27.
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systems, which are assumed to survive a beyond -design -basis earthquake only once will be able to perform their safety functions when the next earthquake occurs. 18
Further, the Draft SEIS does not address, let alone reconcile, the significant disparity
between the results of the seismic risk analyses for Unit 3 and Units 1 and 2. In both cases, the
NRC and VEPCO were responding to the very same earthquake. Yet, while the NRC required
seismic upgrades for Unit 3, it required no seismic upgrades for Units 1 and 2 which required
only a set of nonpedigree commercial -grade FLEX components with significantly lower
reliability. The NRC should explain the reason for this disparate result. If the NRC consid ered
significant safety grade improvements necessary for adequate protection of Unit 3, the obvious
conclusion is that it thought the safety and environmental impacts of an earthquake were
significant. Why did it make a different finding for Units 1 and 2? 19
B. Basis Statement
Petitioners rely for this C ontention on Sections B and C.1 of Mr. Mitmans Declaration.
Petitioners also rely on the legal authorities cited above in Section III. In particular, Petitioners
rely on Citizens for Safe Power, 524 F.2d at 1299 (substantive concerns of Atomic Energy Act
and NEPA overlap); Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 729 -31 (despite overlap, the Atomic
Energy Act and NEPA impose independent procedural obligations); and State of New York v.
NRC, 681 F.3d at 478 (reasonable assurance findi ngs do not excuse NEPA compliance unless
probability of impacts is so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a failure.).
Even where the NRC purports to have resolved safety issues through its Atomic Energy Act -
18 Id.
19 See Mitman Declaration, ¶ 28.
11
based regulatory process, it must nevertheless comply with NEPAs procedural obligations for
addressing those issues in its decision -making processes.
C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding
T his C ontention is within the scope of the SLR proceeding for North Anna Units 1 and 2
because it seeks compliance by the NRCs environmental review with NEPA and NRCs
implementing regulations. The subject matter of the Contention fall s within the scope of new information as described in the hearing notice 20 because it concerns a new reactor -specific
accident analysis in the Draft SEIS that takes the place of a previous environmental analysis for
which the NRC had unlawfully relied on the 2013 Licens e Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). 21
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the F indings NRC Must Make to R enew VEPCO s O perating L icense
T his C ontention is material to the findings NRC must make regarding the environmental
impacts of re -licensing North Anna Units 1 and 2 for a second renewed license term, because it
challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS to support the NRCs proposed findings that the
environmental impacts of re -licensing NAPS are SMALL.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials
The fact s support ing Petitioners Contention are stated in the Contention itself and in the
attached Mitman Declaration.
20 89 Fed. Reg. at 962.
21 See Duke Energy Carolinas, L.L.C. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and e), CLI -22 -3, 95 N.R.C. 40 (2022) (CLI -22 -03). See also Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), LBP -24 -03, slip op. at 13 -16 (March 7, 2024) (LBP -24 -03)
(allowing petitioners to submit arguments that pre -date the draft SEIS for Turkey Point if they were based on the draft SEIS).
12
CONTENTION 2: Draft SEIS does not contain a complete or adequately rigorous evaluation of accident risks.
A. Statement of Contention
The Draft SEIS does not contain a complete or adequately rigorous evaluation of accident
risks because essential data are missing and important analytical assertions are erroneous or
misleading. Therefore, the NRC lacks an adequate basis for concluding that the environmental impa cts of accidents during a license renewal term are SMALL. 22 In particular, and as set forth
in detail in Section C.2 of Mr. Mitmans Declaration :
- T he Draft SEIS is inadequate as a general matter for making broad generalizations about
external event core damage frequency ( CDF ) based on extrapolations from internal
event CDF values and limited actual plant -specific values for external event CDF.
- In finding that the environmental impacts of severe accidents are SMALL, the NRC
ignores its own data regarding seismic and fire core damage frequency (CDF) that
indicate these impacts are significant. The NRC also disregards the fact that the
occurrence of the 2011 Mineral Earthquake, by itself, increased the risk of an earthquake
severe enough to damage safety equipment.
- The Draft SEIS assertion at page F -26 that there has been a substantial decrease in
internal event CDF is erroneous. This error affects other estimates such as the estimate
of population dose risk.
- T he Draft SEIS fails to demonstrate consideration of external flooding risk with
subsequent ingress of water into the turbine building. As demonstrated by Mr. Mitmans
22 Id. at 3 -169 - 3 -170.
13
Declaration, flooding poses a significant accident risk that has not bee n addressed in the
Draft SEIS.
- The Draft SEIS makes misleading statements about the NRCs review of Fukushima -
related information relevant to North Anna and risk improvements obtained by NRC and
license efforts after September 20 01.
- The Draft SEIS takes inappropriate credit for reductions in environmental risk that are
not reflected in the PRA for NAPS.
- The Draft SEIS fails to demonstrate consideration of uncertainties with respect to the
conclusion that severe accident impacts are SMALL.
- The Draft SEIS does not address the environmental impacts of concurrent multi -unit
accidents.
in multiple respects, including failure to consider SAMAs that meet criteria for
consideration, and failure to provide documentation of an NRC audit relied on to
conclude that VEPCOs approach to its SAMA analysis was methodical and reasonable.
B. Basis Statement
Petitioners rely for this Contention on Section C.2 of Mr. Mitmans Declaration. Petitioners
also rely on the legal authorities cited above in Section III. In particular, Petitioners rely on
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349 (requiring hard look at potential environmental consequences) and
National Audubon Society, 422 F.3d at 185 (hallmarks of a hard look are thorough
investigation into environmental impacts and forthright acknowledgment of potential
14
environmental harms.). In addition, Petitioners rely on the NRC guidance for preparation and use of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) in both safety and environmental documents. 23
C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding
This Contention is within the scope of the SLR proceeding for North Anna Units 1 and 2
because it seeks compliance by the NRCs environmental review with NEPA and NRCs
implementing regulations. The subject matter of the Contention falls within the scope o f new information as described in the hearing notice 24 because it concerns a new reactor -specific
accident analysis in the Draft SEIS that takes the place of a previous environmental analysis for
which the NRC had unlawfully relied on the 2013 License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). 25
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew VEPCOs Operating License
This Contention is material to the findings NRC must make regarding the environmental
impacts of re -licensing North Anna Units 1 and 2 for a second renewed license term, because it
challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS to support the NRCs proposed fin dings that the
environmental impacts of re -licensing NAPS are SMALL.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials
The facts supporting Petitioners Contention are stated in the Contention itself and in the
attached Mitman Declaration.
23 See Mitman Declaration, § C.2, pars. 43 - 44 and notes 43 -49.
24 89 Fed. Reg. at 962.
25 See CLI -22 -03; LBP -24 -03.
15
CONTENTION 3: Draft SEIS fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk.
A. Statement of Contention
The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71
because it does not address the effects of climate change on accident risk. No such discussion
can be found in Section 3.11.6.9 or Appendix F. To the contrary, the NRC asserts that the effects of climate change are outside the scope of the NRC staffs SLR review. 26 In support of
this assertion, the NRC claims to consider climate -related information in its licensing reviews
and ongoing oversight. 27 But this is exactly the kind of blindered reasoning that was rejected in
State of New York. The fact that NRC plans to address climate change risks in the future does not
excuse the agency from addressing the risks as they are understood at this time. Only if the NRC
can say that the effects of climate change are so small as to be remote and speculative can it
avoid addressing those effects in its environmental review. 28 And the Executive Branch of the
U.S. government, including CEQ and other federal agencies, ha s stated in no uncertain terms that
climate change poses a current and future threat to critical infrastructure that should be addressed
now in NEPA reviews and all other decision -making processes.29
Further, as set forth in Mr. Mitmans Declaration, the Draft SEIS failure to address climate
change impacts on accident risk constitutes a significant deficiency because climate change
demonstrably affects the frequency and intensity of some external events and therefore has the
26 Id. at 3 -194.
27 Id.
28 681 F.3d at 478.
29 See discussion above in Section III.C.
16
potential to significantly increase accident risks. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of climate change effects are increasing over time. 30
Mr. Mitman also presents an illustration of how the reasonably foreseeable increase in the
frequency and volume of flooding could significantly increase the risk of a serious accident at NAPS. 31 This is just one example of the increased accident risk that can be reasonably expected
due to climate change and that should be addressed in the Draft SEIS.
B. Basis Statement
Petitioners rely for this contention on Mr. Mitmans Declaration and the legal authorities
cited above in Section III. In particular, Petitioners rely on State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at
478 (reasonable assurance findings do not excuse NEPA compliance unless probability of
impacts is so low as to dismiss the potential consequences of such a failure.). In addition,
Petitioners rely on the CEQ guidance discussed above in Section III.C. While this guidance is
not binding on the NRC, it should be given substantial deference. State of New York v. NRC, 681
F.3d at 476 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) ).
C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding
This Contention is within the scope of the SLR proceeding for North Anna Units 1 and 2
because it seeks compliance by the NRCs environmental review with NEPA and NRCs
implementing regulations. The subject matter of the Contention falls within the scope of new information as described in the hearing notice 32 because it concerns a new reactor -specific
accident analysis in the Draft SEIS that takes the place of a previous environmental analysis for
30 Mitman Declaration, ¶ 48.
31 Mitman Declaration, ¶ 51.
32 89 Fed. Reg. at 962.
17
which the NRC had unlawfully relied on the 2013 License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS). 33
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew VEPCOs Operating License
This Contention is material to the findings NRC must make regarding the environmental
impacts of re -licensing North Anna Units 1 and 2 for a second renewed license term, because it
challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS to support the NRCs proposed fin dings that the
environmental impacts of re -licensing NAPS are SMALL.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials
The facts supporting Petitioners Contention are stated in the Contention itself and in the
attached Mitman Declaration.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Hearing Request should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
__/signed electronically by/___
Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240 -393 -9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com
March 28, 2024 Correct ed April 8, 2024
33 See CLI -22 -03; LBP -24 -03.
18
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
Virginia Electric Power Co. ) Docket Nos. 50 -338/339 SLR North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 )
___________________________________ )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on April 8, 2024, I posted a corrected HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND THE SIERRA CLUB, not including Attachment 1 and Attachments 2 A -2G, on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange.
___/signed electronically by/__
Paul Gunter
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