ML24151A238

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NCP-2024-004 Case File - Public
ML24151A238
Person / Time
Site: Waterford, Grand Gulf, River Bend  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/30/2024
From: Thomas Wengert
NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL4
To:
Shared Package
ML24151A236 List:
References
EPID L 2022 LLR-0054 EN-RR-22-001, CODE CASE N-752
Download: ML24151A238 (1)


Text

Section A: Attachment

SECTION A: NON-CONCURRENCE OF SAFETY EVALUATION FOR

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE EN-RR-22-0 01 FOR

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.

NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS TRACKING NUMBER XXXXX

Summary:

The non- concurring staff (NC staff) provide the following basis for our position on the Division of Operating Licensing (DORL) proposed safety evaluation (ML24060A219) that was developed in response by Entergy to implement ASME Code Case (CC) N-752 fleet- wide (applicable to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, River Bend Station, Unit 1, and Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3). The NC staffs concerns are that approval of the alternative request per the draft safety evaluation would:

(1) Via 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1), allow a licensee to exempt 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B quality assurance (QA) requirements for safety-related (SR) components with a Low Safety Significant (LSS) pressure boundary function, and (2) Allow an unacceptable level of quality and safety in repair/replacement activities for those components because the licensee does not provide specific nationally approved codes or standards to be used in the proposed alternative.

The NC staff requests that the NRR staff have further correspondence with Entergy to address the above concerns and update the SE accordingly or process a denial of the proposed alternative request. The enclosures to the previous NCP-2023- 005 (Duke Energy Oconee N-752 Alternative Request) include details regarding these concerns.

Further, in order to address differences in opinion regarding legal and policy requirements, the NC staff requests that the SE be reviewed by the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) as set forth in LIC-102, Review of Relief Requests, Proposed Alternatives, and Requests to Use Later Code Editions and Addenda.

Additional information on NC staff concerns:

Issue 1

The licensee has requested authorization to use ASME Code Case N-752 without exception or deviation. This wording is only accurate if 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, does not apply to the equipment in question. This is because CC N- 752 states in a footnote that If compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B or NQA-1 is required at the Owners facility, IWA-1400(o) is not exempt. IWA-1400(n) [and (o) depending on Code edition] requires Owners to maintain documentation of a QA program in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 or ASME Standard NQA-1.

Therefore, the NC st aff position is that the draft DORL safety evaluation, the licensees submittals, and perhaps the precedent actions should be reviewed by OGC. For the draft SE as currently written, OGC should be asked to focus on these questions:

1. Do the draft SE and the submittals clearly articulate that Appendix B continues to apply to the safety related components that are categorized as LSS under CC N- 752? This question assumes that the Appendix B requirements derive from the licensing basis, not from the ASME Code, and therefore can only be eliminated via the license amendment or exemption processes. 50.55a cannot alter how the Appendix B requirements are implemented. If this assumption is incorrect, please provide the correct position.
2. Is the process of categorizing components as LSS for pressure boundary and changing repair/replacement activities to maintain reasonable confidence, without a license amendment process as would be required when performing the categorization method used for 50.69 (which considers both active and passive functions) and without other aspects of the 50.69 process, contrary to the Commission policy on 50.69?
3. Confirm that the previous plant-specific authorization under 10 CFR 50.55a(z) to use ASME Code Case N-752 for ANO does not constitute a past precedent that would legally require the evaluation of backfit issues for the use of ASME Code Case N-752 at the subject plants.

For additional basis and background on these questions, please see Enclosure III of the initial plant-specific NC, NCP-2023- 005, for the 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) application of ASME Code Case N-752 (ML23331A921) .

Section C: Summary of Issues

Summary of Issues (SOI)

Issue 1 This issue concerns matters associated with compliance with Appendix B. The NC staff take issue with the clarity of the licensees RCI response and requests the staff to issue an additional RCI that more directly resolves the issue of whether Appendix B applies to safety related LSS components.

Issue 2

The issue concerns: (a) The licensees use of the term reasonable confidence in its application, and (b) suggests that the licensee, like other similar submittals, blurs the line between what can be done under 10 CFR 50.55a and what can be done under 10 CFR 50.69.

Specifically, the NC staff assert that the licensee is using a different categorization process from that used for 50.69 and, as a result, a given component can be classified as LSS under CC N-752 but might be high safety significant (HSS) under 50.69. In addition, the NC staff cite a specific example that suggests CC N-752 represents a possible back door work-around to circumvent the 10 CFR 50.69 categorization and treatment requirements without NRC staff review of a license amendment request.

Issue 3 This issue concerns the quality of the proposed repair/replacement activities, which stem from the unspecified use (i.e., allows cherry-picking) of codes and standards, or wholesale replacement of codes and standards with licensee- identified methods. The NC staff believe that the licensee should establish minimum requirements or identify specific codes and standards for repair/replacement activities.

Issue 4

This issue involves policy and legal matters. The NC staff believe that OGC should review the safety evaluation with consideration of 3 specific questions, as follows:

1. Do the draft SE and the submittals clearly articulate that Appendix B continues to apply to the safety related components that are categorized as LSS under CC N-752? This question assumes that the Appendix B requirements derive from the licensing basis, not from the ASME Code, and therefore can only be eliminated via the license amendment or exemption processes. 50.55a cannot alter how the Appendix B requirements are implemented. If this assumption is incorrect, please provide the correct position.
2. Is the process of categorizing components as LSS for pressure boundary and changing repair/replacement activities to maintain reasonable confidence, without a license amendment process as would be required when performing the categorization method used for 50.69 (which considers both active and passive functions) and without other aspects of the 50.69 process, contrary to the Commission policy on 50.69?
3. Confirm that the previous plant-specific authorization under 10 CFR 50.55a(z) to use ASME Code Case N-752 for ANO does not constitute a past precedent that would legally require the evaluation of backfit issues for the use of ASME Code Case N-752 at the subject plants.

Section C: Evaluation of Non-Concurrence Issue 1 This issue is similar to Issue 1 raised on NCP-2023- 005, but expands on perceived deficiencies in the RCI response provided by Entergy. The aspects of this concern are addressed in Section C, Issue 1, of NCP-2023-005. Additionally, the NRC understands with Entergys response to the RCI, that the Entergy Fleet QAP processes and procedures fall under the jurisdiction of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B for safety-related LSS components.

Issue 2

The concern raised in the first portion of th is issue is similar to issue raised in Issue 1 on NCP -

2023- 005. The aspects of this concern are addressed in Section C, Issue 1, of NCP-2023-005.

With regard to the use of the term reasonable confidence, the non -concurring (NC) staff are concerned that this application of this term, used in 50.69, indicates an assumed exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. Federal Register Notice 69 FR 68008 Section III.3.2 describes reasonable confidence in the context of RISC -3 treatment in 50.69 as a somewhat reduced level of confidence as compared with the relatively high level of confidence provided by the current special treatment requirements. This flexibility is in recognition of the lower safety significance of the SSCs. The assessment of whether a LSS SSC would perform its safety-related functions under design basis conditions is not dependent on the term reasonable assurance vs. reasonable confidence, but rather in the controls that the licensee will put in place for the Class 2 and Class 3 components designated as LSS per N-752.

The second concern raised within this Issue, is similar to the Issue 3, Question 1, in NCP -2023-005 and Issue 4, Question 2, in this NCP. See Issue 4, Question 2 , below for the evaluation of this concern.

Issue 3

This issue is similar to NCP -2023- 005, Issue 2, and the evaluation of the concern focused on the issue that the licensee did not identify specific codes and standards and will be using nationally recognized codes and standards, as described in N -752. The aspects of this concern are addressed in Section C, Issue 2 , of NCP-2023- 005.

In this NCP, the NC staff stated that  : The staff pursued this issue via audit and request for additional information (RAI) questions, but the NC staff finds that Entergys responses lead to further uncertainty in assessing the safety margins and effectiveness of the repair/replacement activities.

As a point of clarification, an audit was not conducted for the Entergy fleet review. However, we understand the NC staffs concerns on this issue based on the NRC staffs review associated with NCP-2023- 005.

Issue 4 The legal questions raised in this NCP are similar to the legal questions raised in Issue 3 of NCP-2023- 005.

Question 1:

This question is a ddressed in NCP-2023- 005, Issue 3, Question 2.

We do not intend to bring this question to OGC for review.

Question 2:

This question is addressed in NCP- 2023- 005, Issue 3, Question 1. W e do not intend to bring this question to OGC for review. The intent of 10 CFR 50.69 is to provide a voluntary alternative framework for licensees to risk-inform their categorizing of SSCs according to their safety significance. This shouldnt be misunderstood to mean that any and all risk-informed approaches be done via a 50.69 LAR submittal. Entergy is proposing to use an alternative to the ASME Code requirements for treatment of LSS passive components, including the use of aspects of methodology defined under 50.69 to arrive at the HSS/LSS categorization. The staff should not overextend that adoption of methodology to be equivalent to a request under 50.69.

Question 3:

This question is addressed in NCP- 2023- 005, Issue 3, Question 3. We do not intend to bring this question to OGC for review. However, as specified in Section C, Issue 3, Question 3 of NC- 2023- 005, and as consulted with the backfit community of practice, t he past approval of Code Case N-752 for ANO would not require a backfit analysis for a decision on Entergy fleet.

However, deviation from precedent and change in Agency position should be approached cautiously as the staff should have a clear safety basis for arriving at a different decision for similar requests.