ML23156A373
| ML23156A373 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/20/1997 |
| From: | Hoyle J NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| PR-073, 62FR07721 | |
| Download: ML23156A373 (1) | |
Text
ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 02/20/1997 TITLE: PR-073 - 62FR07721 - CHANGES TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CASE
REFERENCE:
PR-073 62FR07721 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete
STATUS OF RULEMAKING PROPOSED RULE: PR-073 OPEN ITEM (Y/N) N RULE NAME: CHANGES TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 62FR07721 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 02/20 / 97 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: 9 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 05 / 06 / 97 EXTENSION DATE: I I FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: 62FR63640 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 12 / 02 / 97 NOTES ON: FINAL RULE DELETES CERTAIN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS AN INTERNAL THREAT. ACTION WILL REDUCE REGULATORY BURDEN ON LICEN F RULE: SEES W/ O PHYSICAL PROT. FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY. FILE ON Pl.
HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-073 RULE TITLE: CHANGES TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED RULE PROPOSED RULE DATE PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER: 96-248 SRM DATE: 01/29 / 97 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 02 / 14 / 97 FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: 97-228 SRM DATE: 11/05 / 97 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 12 / 09 / 97 STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE CONTACTl: SANDRA FRATTALI MAIL STOP: T-9F31 PHONE: 415-6261 CONTACT2: MAIL STOP: PHONE:
DOCKET NO. PR-073 (62FR07721)
In the Matter of CHANGES TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 2/26/97 02/14/97 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - PROPOSED RULE 05/05/97 05/02/97 COMMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY (GARY J. TAYLOR) ( 1) 05/06/97 05/06/97 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (JAMES W. DAVIS) ( 2) 05/07/97 05/06/97 COMMENT OF NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY (ROGER 0. ANDERSON) ( 3) 05/08/97 05/02/97 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY (E. SCOTT MEDLING) ( 4) 05/09/97 05/06/97 COMMENT OF BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (CHARLES H. CRUSE, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 5) 5/12/97 05/05/97 COMMENT OF CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (T. D. WALT) ( 6) 05/13/97 05/07/97 COMMENT OF ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
(JERROLD G. DEWEASE, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 7) 05/14/97 05/06/97 COMMENT OF OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT (S. K. GAMBHIR) ( 8) 05/14/97 05/07/97 COMMENT OF WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM (R. L. WEBRING, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 9) 11/26/97 11/24/97 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE
DOCKET tU.tBER PROPOSED RULE PR 13
( (p~ Ft< '11 :;11)
'97 NOV 26 P2 :53 NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 RIN: 3150 - AF53 Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is revising its regulations to delete certain security requirements associated with an internal threat. This action follows the NRC's reconsideration of nuclear power plant physical security requirements to identify those requirements that are marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer effective. This action will reduce the regulatory burden on licensees without compromising physical protection against radiological sabotage required for public health and safety.
~ l'- 1 I 9 9r EFFECTIVE DATE: (45 elays frem date of publicc!ltiefl iA tAe Feeleral Re~ister} .
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Sandra Frattali, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001 , telephone (301) 415-6261 , e-mail sdf@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On February 20, 1997, the NRC published a proposed rule in the Federal Register (62 FR 7721) that would revise the NRC's regulations associated with an internal threat to nuclear power plants that are contained in 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." The five changes, which provide significant relief to licensees without compromising the physical security of the plants, involve changes to -
- 1. Search requirements for on-duty guards,§ 73.55(d)(1 );
- 2. Requirements for vehicle escort, § 73.55(d)(4);
- 3. Control of contractor employee badges,§ 73.SS(d)(S);
- 4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area,
§ 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A); and
- 5. Key controls for vital areas, § 73.55(d)(8).
The Commission received 9 letters commenting on the proposed rule. Eight were from utilities and one was from an industry group. Copies of the letters are available for public inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
Discussion The public comments supported the proposed rulemaking in general. Seven of the nine commenters recommended additional relief from the vehicle escort provisions. One commenter I
)
t recommended a.dditional relief from the search requirements for armed guards. Two commenters recommended changes to the regulations without support that were outside the scope of this rulemaking.
For three of the changes in the proposed rule, only the language that had been changed was provided in the proposed rule language. The language that did not change in those paragraphs was inadvertently omitted. This language has been put back in the final rule. The three paragraphs affected are: search requirements for on-duty guards, § 73.55(d)(1);
requirements for vehicle escort,§ 73.55(d)(4); and maintenance of access lists for each vital
- area, § 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A).
The comments are discussed below.
Comment Resolution
- 1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (§ 73.55(d}(1 )}.
Under the current regulations, armed security guards who leave the protected area as part of their duties must be searched for fireanns, explosives, and incendiary devices upon re-entry into the protected area. Requiring a guard to go through an explosives detector or searching packages carried by the guard protects against the introduction of contraband.
Because an armed guard carries a weapon onsite, passage of the guard through the metal detector, the principal purpose of which is to detect firearms, serves little purpose. The guard has to either remove the weapon while passing through the detector or be subject to a hands on secilrch. Either approach makes little sense for the guard who is authorized to cany a weapon onsite. Further, removing and handling the guard's weapon could present a safety risk to the guard and other personnel. This rule will allow armed security guards who are on duty and .have exited the protected area to reenter the protected area without being searched for l firearms (by a metal detector).
Qomment. All commenters supported this action. One commenter recommended that r
the words "on official business" be removed.
Response. The term "on official business" has been replaced by the term "on duty."
The rationale given in the proposed rule to eliminate the searches would also apply when the guard reenters the protected area at other times, for example, after lunch where the lunch area is outside the protected area, as is the case at some facilities. The meaning of "on duty" is not meant to extend to "on call" or to personal activities.
The amended rule allows armed security guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area to reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms (by a metal detector). Note that the rule says "reenter." This means that the guards have been searched
- I on their initial entry. into the protected area. Unarmed guards and watchpersons will continue to meet all search requirements. All guards will continue to be searched for explosives and incendiary devices because they* are not permitted to carry these devices into the plant.
- 2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort C§ 73,55(d)(4)).
The present requirement that a searched, licensee-owned vehicle within the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security organization, even when the driver is badged for unescorted access, d9f!S not contribute significantly to the security of the plant Under the current regulations, all vehicles must be searched prior to entry into the protected area except u11der emergency conditions. Also under the current regulations, all vehicles must be escorted by a member of the security organization while inside the protected area except.for "designated licensee vehicles." "Designated licensee vehicles" are those vehicles that are limited in their use to onsite plant functions and remain in the protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security, and emergency purposes. Under the current requirement, all other vehicles that are not "designated licensee vehicles" must be escorted at all times while in the protected area even when they are driven by personnel with unescorted access.
Comment. Seven commenters were concerned that the proposed rule would only allow a vehicle to be unescorted when being operated by licensee employees having unescorted access. These commenters wanted this extended to contractor employees who are cleared for unescorted access as well.
Response. This change has been made. Since both licensee employees and contractor employees are subject to equivalent access authorization programs, the level of trustworJhiness is deemed to be equivalent. There is no compelling reason to distinguish between the two. The amended rule eliminates the requirement for escort of licensee-owned or leased vehicles entering the protected area for work-related purposes provided these vehicles are driven by personnel who have *unescorted access. This change provides burden relief to licensees without significantly increasing the level of risk to the plant.
Comment. Five comments were made that limiting unescorted vehicles to those that were licensee-owned was unduly restrictive, and wanted this extended to licensee owned- or leased vehicles. One commenter wanted it further extended to contractor or vendor owned or leased vehicles.
Response. The rule language was changed to allow for licensee-leased vehicles to be unescorted when driven by personnel who have unescorted access. The NRC staff recognizes that licensees may lease rather than buy vehicles. Ho'Never, the staff believes that this provision should not be extended indiscriminately to contractor or vendor vehicles because 7
licensees have no knowledge or control over how contractor or vendor vehicles may be used for purposes other than those for which the licensee has ~ntracted.,
- 3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges <§ 73,55(d)(5)}.
Contractor employees with unescorted access are required to return their badges when leaving the protected area. Current regulatory practice allows licensee employees to leave the protected area with their badges if adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the proper use of the badge is not compromised or that a system such as. bjometrics is in place to ensure
/
that only the proper person uses the badge for gaining access to the protected area. Because
(
contractors and licensees are subject to the same programs required for unescorted access, there is no reason to employ more stringent badge control requirements for contractor employees.
This amended rulemaking allows contractor employees to take their badges offsite under the same conditions as licensee employees.
Comment. All commenters supported this provision.
Response. The final rule will be published as proposed, with a sentence added to ensure that the integrity of the access controls are not adversely affected.
Comment. One commenter wanted the physical differentiation between contractor and employee badges eliminated.
Response. This comment proyided no reason for changing the current requi~ment .of having employee and contractor badges distinguishable. Further the staff has no reason to make such a change. Because of this and the fact that this comment is outside the scope of this rulemaking this change is not being made.
- 4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area <§ 73.SS<d}CT}(i}<A.
Maintaining separate access lists for each vital area and reapproval of these lists on a monthly basis is of marginal value. At many sites, persons granted access to one vital area also have access to most or all vital areas. Licensees presently derive little additional benefit from maintaining discrete lists of individuals allowed access to each separate vital area in the facility. Also, licensee managers or supervisors are required to update the access lists at least once every 31 days to add or delete individuals from these lists as appropriate. There is also a requirement to reapprove the list every 31 days. However, reapproval of all individuals on the lists at least every 31 days, to validate that the lists have been maintained accurately is unnecessarHy burdensome. This rulemaking replaces separate access authorization lists for each vital area of the facility with a single list of all persons who have access to any vital area. It also changes the requirement to reap prove the list at least once every 31 days to quarterly. Reapproval consists of a review to ensure that the list is current and tf:lat only those individuals requiring routine access to a vital area are included. Because a manager or supervisor must update the list, conducting this comprehensive reapprova! every 31 days is of marginal value.
/
Comment. All commenters supported these provisions. Response. The final rule will be published as proposed. The Commission desires to remind licensees that they are responsible for properly controlling access, and that the changes to§ 73.55(d)(7)0)(A) do not remove their responsibility to establish procedures to ensure that persons no longer needing unescorted access are not granted such access. I
- 5. Key Controls for Vital Areas(§ 73,55(d)(8)).
Under the current regulations, licensees must change or rotate all keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices at least once every twelve months. The rule also requires that these be changed whenever there is a possibility they have been compromised, or when an individual with access to the keys, locks, or combinations has been terminated for reasons of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance. Additionally requiring such change every 12 months has been determined by the NRC to be only marginal to security. This amended rule removes the requirement for changing access control devices at least every 12 months while retaining the requirement to make changes for cause, and when an access control device has been, or there is a suspicion that it may have been, compromised. Comment. One commenter requested that the words "inadequate work performance" in the rule language be removed or defined. Response. The NRC sees no need to define "inadequate work performance" because the term characterizes many factors and judgements involving removal for cause. Further, the comment is outside the scope of this rulemaking.
- 8
Regulatory Action The final rule will be promu_lgated with the changes made to the proposed rule in response to the public comments. Two of the public co111ments were not accommodated because they requested changes to the regulations that were not put forward in the proposed rule. Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion T_he Commission has determined that this final rule is the type of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this final rule. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0002. Because the rule will reduce existing information collection requirements, the public burden for this collection of information is expected to be decreased by 100 hours per licensee. This reduction includes the time required for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments on any aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for further reducing the burden, to the Information and Records
*1 I
I I
/,.
Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to BJS1@NRC.Gov; and to the Desk Officer, Office of information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0002), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid 0MB control number. Regulatory Analysis A discussion of each of the five changes in this final rule is provided above in the supplementary information section. The costs and benefits for each of the changes in this ruiemaking are as follows.
- 1. Search Regujrements for On-duty Guards (§ 73.55(d)(1 )).
The regulatory burden on licensees will be reduced by eliminating unnecessary weapon searches of guards who are already allowed to carry a weapon on site, which will resu~ in better utilization of licensee resources. There will be no reduction in plant security, and there is no reduction in the total size of the security force. Further, the potential safety risk,to personnel caused by removing and handling a guard's weapon will be eliminated.
- 2. Regujrements for Vehicle Escort U3.55(d)(4)).
The regulatory burden on licensees will be reduced by requiring fewer vehicle escorts, which will allow personnel to be utilized more effectively or for other purposes. Resources
\
- ' could be redirected to areas in which they will be more cost effective. The decrease ir security will be marginal, because unescorted access will be restricted to vehicles owned or leased by the licensee being driven by personnel with unescorted access.
Assuming the number of such entries of licensee owned or leased vehicles driven by personnel having unescorted access is 10 per day per site, the average time needed for escort is 3 hours, and the cost per hour for security personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $330,000 (10 escorts/day/site x 365 days/year x 3 hrs/escort x $30/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year will be approximately
$24,000,000.
- 3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges(§ 73,55(d)(5)).
The regulatory burden on licensees will be reduced by a more effective use of security personnel, who will no longer need to handle badges for contractor personnel who have unescorted access. There will be no reduction in plant security because adequate safeguards will be in place to ensure that badges are properly used and not compromised, and a system such as biometrics is in place to ensure that only the proper person uses the badge to gain - access to the protected area. Assuming that two security persons per working shift change, 5 shifts per day, one hour per shift are relieved from the duties of controlling contractor employee badges during an outage lasting 3 months. Further, assuming that the cost per hour for security personnel is $30 {loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $27,000 (10 hours/day x 90 days/year x $30 hr). Wrth 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year will be approximately $2,000,000.
- 4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vrtal Area(§ 73.55(d)C7}(i)(A}).
The regulatory burden on licensees will be reduced because licensees will have to keep only one access list for all vital areas and reapprove it quarterly, rather than keep individual access lists for each vital area that must be reapproved monthly. Assuming that the time to reapprove each of the individual lists is 1 hour per month, that a combined list will take 1.5 hours per month, that the average number of vital areas per site is 10, and that the cost of a clerk including overhead is $30 per hour (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $3,400 [(1x10 vital areas/month x 12 months/yr-1.5x1 combined vital area/quarter x 4 quarters/yr) x $30/hr]. With 75 sites, the savings to the - industry per year will be approximately $260,000.
- 5. Key Controls for Vital Areas l§ 73,55(d)(8)).
The regulatory burden on the licensees will be reduced because fewer resources will be n~ed to maintain the system. Assuming that, of approximately 60 locks that are changed each year under the current requirement, half of them were changed because an individual was removed for cause or the lock may have been compromised, 30 locks remain in need of change. Assuming that it takes a locksmith 10 hours to change all 30 locks at a cost (loaded) of $45 per hour, a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $450 (10 hrs/year x $45/hr). Wrth 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year will be approximately $34,000. L Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act as amended, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this final rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule will affect only licensees authorized to operate nudear power reactors. These licensees do not fall within the scope of the definition of "small entitiesn set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration Act, 13 CFR Part 121. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget Backfit Analysis The Commission has determined that the back.fit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this final amendment because this amendment will not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The changes to physical security are voluntary and should the licensee decide to implement this amendment, will be a reduction in burden to the licensee. Therefore, a back.fit analysis has not been prepared for this amendment. J* I'
)
I I List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materiaJs transportation, Export, Import, Nudear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553; the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73. PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
- 1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stal 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106.Stal 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f). Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L 97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stal 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
- 2. Section 73.55 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)'(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(7)(ij(A),
and (d)(8) to read as follows: .\ § 73,55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities m nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage. (df....,. (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be
- made and authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee
( shall subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry into a protected area. Armed security guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area may reenter the protected area without being searched f~r firearms. When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into protected areas, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of that individual. Whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment at a portal is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to equipment searches. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) must be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance. I r {4~ All vehicles. except under emergency conditions, must be searched for items which *
- could be used for sabotage purposes prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched must include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All vehicles, except as indicated below, requiring entry into the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the,protected area and, to the extent practicable, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific designated materials receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital area. Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or licensee-own*ed or leased vehicles entering the protected area and driven by personnel having unescorted access. Designated licensee vehicles shall be limited in their use -
)
to onsite plant functions and shall r~main in the ' protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security and emergency purposes. The licensee s.hall exercise positive control over all such designated vehicles to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authonzed purposes. (5)(i) A numbered picture badge identification system must be used for all individuals who are authorized a~cess to protected areas without escort. An individual not employed by t~e h~nsee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he or she displays a licensee-issued picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which indicates: (A) Non-employee no escort required; (8) areas to which access is authorized; and (C) the period for which access has been authorized. (ii) Badges shall be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Badges may be removed from the protected area when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and authorization for access of the badge holder upon entry into the protected area. 16 -
I * * * * * (7) ..... rn ..... (A) Establish a current authorization access list for all vital areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be reapproved at least quarterly. The licensee shall include on the access list only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions. (8) All keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices used to control
..(_~ ~J)hQ
. ' ~ - *--~
nd vital areas must be controlled to reduce the probability of
',.... , , ,re is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or
*
- es may have been compromised, it must be changed or rotated.
s, locks, combinations and other access control devices to protected areas and vital areas only to persons granted unescorted facility access. Whenever an individual's unescort3d access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices to which that person had access, must be changed or rotated.
<II.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this ;l <f - day of November, 1997. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. of the Commission. WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DOCKETED lJSHRC P.O. Box 968
- Richland, Washington 99352-0968 May 7, 1997 "97 MAY 14 P3 :20 GO2-97-089 OFF ICE OF SE_CRETAR f DOCK ETl:~G & -~[R' :CE.
Docket No. 50-397 BRAHCH Secretary DOCKET Nt.MBER U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 PROPOSED RULE Pff 13 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch ( fo~ FR,1~1) Gentlemen:
Subject:
PROPOSED RULE, "CHANGES TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS," 62 FEDERAL REGISTER 7721 FEBRUARY 20, 1997 The following is submitted in response to the federal register notice regarding the subject proposed rule. We support the proposed changes with one comment as follows: We would propose to change the last sentence of 10 CPR 73.55(d)(4) to read, "Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area and driven by employees having unescorted access." Our proposed change deletes the requirement for the driver to be a licensee employee and would allow anyone with unescorted access to drive a designated licensee vehicle or licensee-owned vehicle and not require an escort. A significant number of the drivers of such vehicles at our site are contractor employees with unescorted access who should also be included in the population of drivers not requiring escort. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule. If you have any questions or require any clarification please call me or Fred Dehart at (509) 377-8287. Respectfully, f~ RL Wehring (Mail Drop PE08) Vice President, Operations Support/PIO cc: RE Enkeboll, NEI
J.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS~IOtt DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date 5/ i /71 Copies Received I ,\dd'I Copie~ Reproduced _ _ 3/,____ Special Distribution_ Fr---a.ffo.-! ..._ G a!l~9li er;. 'P'Dif; TI05
(j)
-,,o -. DOCKETED USNRC Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall "97 MAY 14 Pl2 :28 Omaha NE 68102-2247 OFF ICE OF SECRETARY DOCKETI NG & SE R\' IC r BRANCH May 6. 1997 LIC-97-074 Secretary DOCKET NtltBER U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PROf>OSEo RULe1fl__ 13 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch ((pQFR *~
Washington. D.C. 20555-0001
References:
- 1. Docket No. 50-285
- 2. Federal Register Volume 62 dated February 20. 1997 (62 FR 7721)
Subject : Comments on Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements The Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) has reviewed the subject proposed rulemaking. OPPD generally supports these changes. with the exception of overly restrictive proposed changes to the requirements for vehicle escort. Section 73.55(d)(4). The proposed rule states "Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area and driven by licensee employees having unescorted access. . OPPD proposes that this section be revised to read "Escort is not required for licensee-designated. licensee-owned. or contractor/vendor vehicles entering the protected area for work related purposes. provided that these vehicles are authorized for protected area entry, properly searched. and driven by personnel having unescorted access." Contractors. vendors. and licensee employees are all subject to the same program requirements for unescorted access. and receive the same general training on security requirements including protected area vehicle access. Like licensee-owned vehicles. licensee-designated and contractor/vendor vehicles are not limited in their use to ans i te pl ant funct i ans and do not have to remain in the protected area except for operations. maintenance. repair. security, and emergency response. These vehicles can be used or parked anywhere outside of the protected area. The qualifications of the vehicle operators and the control of the vehicles are the same for all classes of vehicles described above. For these reasons. the rule change should not be limited to designated licensee vehicles or licensee-owned vehicles. 45.5124 Employment with Equal Opportunity
1,S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1S::;~ DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date ~ -;-/q:.+./,. ..,_1_ ___ Copies Received / ,\dd'I Copie~ Reproduced --,-.,.,.1...,._ __ Special DistributionJ ra.# tt % - _ G NI16,ff her, ?D,(, :I<ID,5
Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LIC-97-074 Page 2 Please contact me if you have any questions. Sincerely, ~ S. K. Gambhir Division Manager Engineering &Operations Support TCM/tcm c: Winston &Strawn E.W. Merschoff. NRC Regional Administrator. Region IV L. R. Wharton. NRC Project Manager W. C. Walker. NRC Senior Resident Inspector Document Control Desk
From: SECY To: ud 1. internet3("1englan@entergy.com") Date: 5/15/97 8:08am
Subject:
Entergy Comments on 62FR7721 -Reply Thank you for your comment. Please* be advised that your comment has been placed in the official docket and will be considered by the Commission with respect to this matter. Adria T. Byrdsong Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff (formerly Docketing and Service Branch) Office of the Secretary
@) *-===- ENTERGY DOCKETED USNRC ,40 Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Tel 601 368 5760 Fax 601 368 5768 "97 tfflY ~ P2 :,a-6 Jerro(d G. Dewease. Vice President Operatons Support OFFICE OF SECRETARY OOCKET HIG &. , [HVICE BRAH JJ May 7, 1997 DOCKET NlMBERPB Secretary of the Commission PROPOSED RULE t. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( (p:2 F~ 71 "I) Washington, DC. 20555-0001
- ATTN.:
Subject:
Docketing and Service Branch Entergy Operations, Inc. Comments on Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements
Reference:
Federal Register Volume 62, Page 7721, dated February 20, 1997 CNRO-97/00011 Gentlemen: The NRC is proposing to revise its regulations (62FR7721) to delete certain security requirements associated with an internal threat. This action follows reconsideration by the NRC of nuclear power plant physical security requirements to identify those requirements that are marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer effective. This action would reduce the regulatory burden on licensees without compromising physical protection against radiological sabotage required for public health and safety. The proposed rule addresses five changes:
- 1. Search requirements for on-duty guards, Sec. 73.55(d)(l): allow armed security guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area on official business to reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms (by a metal detector).
Entergy Operations, Incorporated concurs with the proposed rule change.
1.5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS~!Ott DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Da!e 5/g/91j ~ {/rJa.:J. 11ri 6/7/q1 Copies Rcceived _ _ ~ -r---- .\dd'I Copie~ Rer*oduced ---:-:--;---- Special D1slribution Fira.fta.f ii: _ ==-- G~ ll a her ? Dt 1 1<1 OS
- -- -- - --- ---- . ~
Secretary of the Commission May 7, 1997 CNRO-97/00011 Page 2 of 3
- 2. Requirements for vehicle escort, Sec. 73.55(d)(4): eliminate the requirement for escort of licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area for work-related purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees who have unescorted access.
Entergy Operations, Incorporated concurs with the proposed rule change.
- 3. Control of contractor employee badges, Sec. 73.55(d)(5): allow contractor employees to take their badges offsite under the same conditions that apply to licensee employees.
Entergy Operations, Incorporated concurs with the proposed rule change.
- 4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area, Sec. 73.SS(d)(7)(i)(A): replace separate access authorization lists for each vital area of the facility by a single listing of all persons who have access to any vital area.
Entergy Operations, Incorporated concurs with the proposed rule change.
- 5. Key controls for vital areas, Sec. 73.55(d)(8): this option of leaving a vital area unlocked is no longer being considered due to the tampering events of last July and August.
Entergy Operations, Incorporated has no comment on the proposed rule change. Very truly yours, JGD/LAE/baa Attachment cc: (See Next Page)
Secretary of the Commission May 7, 1997 CNRO-97/00011 Page 3 of 3 cc: Mr. J. L. Blount Mr. J. F. Colvin Mr. J. G. Dewease Mr. J. N. Donohew Mr. C. M. Dugger Ms. J. Dixon-Herrity Mr. J. J. Hagan Mr. C. R. Hutchinson Mr. G. Kalman Ms. J. J. Kenney Mr. K. M. Kennedy Mr. L.A. Keller Mr. J. R. McGaha Mr. E.W. Merschoff Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. Jager Smith Mr. W. F. Smith Mr. D. L. Wigginton Mr. J. W. Yelverton Central File (GGNS) Corporate File [ ] DCC(ANO) NDC(RBS) Records Center (W-3)
Secretary of the Commission May 7, 1997 CNRO-97/00011 bee: Mr. Skip Cooper (ECH} Mr. Early Ewing (W-3) Mr. Rick King (RBS) Mr. Kenneth Hughey (GGNS) Mr. Dwight Mims (ANO) Mr. Steve Bethay (ECH}
From: <lenglan@entergy.com> To: WND1 .WNP2(secy) Date: Sll/97 7:12pm
Subject:
Entergy Comments on 62FR7721 Attached please find Entergy Operations, Inc. comments in support of the proposed changes. The attached file is WPS format. A hard copy is in the mail. Les England lengland@entergy.com The following is an attached File item from cc:Mail. It contains information that had to be encoded to ensure successful transmission through various mail systems. To decode the file use the UUDECODE program.
- - - - - - - - - Cut H e r e - - - - - - - - - -
DOCKETED CP&L US RC Carolina Power & Light Company "97 MAY 12 Al 1 :13 PO Box 155 1 411 Fayetteville Street Mall Raleigh NC 27 602 May 5, 1997 OFFICE OF SECRETAR Y OOCKE TIN1.> & SERVICE BRM'CH Mr. John C. Hoyle PE&RAS-97-045 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555-0001 DOCKET NlMBER PffiR)SEORUlE PR 73 ( /o:l Fl< 77 ~1)
SUBJECT:
Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements (Proposed Rule)
Dear Mr. Hoyle:
The purpose of this letter is to provide Carolina Power & Light Company' s (CP&L) comments on the NRC' s proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 73 [Federal Register: February 20, 1997 01 olume 62, Number 34)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 7721-7725] . CP&L concurs with the proposed rule changes as written, but requests consideration of an additional modification to the proposed rule change. Proposed Rule Change: Item 2 in the Discussion section of the proposed rule change, Requirements for Vehicle Escort, Sec., (73.55 (d)(4)), would eliminate the requirement for an escort of licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area for work related purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees. Additional Modification to Proposed Rule'Change: At CP&L nuclear fal:ilities, licensee-owned vehicles and non-licensee-owned vehicles undergo the same search process prior to protected area entry. Thus, non-licensee-owned vehicles present no greater security risk than licensee-owned vehicles when properly searched prior to protected area entry. In addition, non-licensee plant workers are screened for unescorted protected area access using the same background reviews and other clearance requirements as licensee workers. Since the same screening requirements are used, there would be no increased security risk in allowing properly screened non-licensee employees with unescorted protected area access to drive appropriately searched vehicles into the protected area (regardless of ownership) without a security escort.
~,uWJ&iOQea by cara ~v 1 s 1997
,._, 11 I II I llc*tlrwrw' ,._'
"-5* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMl:5~100 DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date .5/'1 /q1 Copies Received ' /
,\dcfl Copie$*9eproduced __,..,,_1/....,__ _ Special Distrib~tion__FraJf ~I& _ _ Galla_gher; '?Dt, 'RI ns
PE&RAS-97-045 Page2 Based on this reasoning, CP&L recommends the following wording for 10 CFR 73.55, (d), (4), last sentence: Escort is not requiredfor vehicles under non-emergency conditions entering the protected area and driven by personnel having unescorted access. If you have additional questions, please feel free to call me at (919) 546-6901. Sincerely, T.D. Walt Director Operations & Environmental Support PNM/pnm c: Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator - Region II Mr. J. B. Brady, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - SHNPP, Unit 1 Mr. B. B. Desai, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - HBRSEP, Unit 2 Mr. N. B. Le, NRR Project Manager - SHNPP, Unit 1 Ms. B. L. Mozafari, NRR Project Manager - HBRSEP, Unit 2 Mr. C. A. Patterson, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - BSEP, Units 1 and 2 Mr. D. C. Trimble, Jr., NRR Project Manager - BSEP, Units 1 and 2 Mr. R. Enkeboll (NEI)
CHARLES H. CRUSE DOCKETED Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Vice President USNRC Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Nuclear Energy Lusby, Maryland 20657 4 10 495-4455 "97 MAY -9 P3 :Q9 OFFI CE OF $['.:PETA.RY DOCKETI ... " SElri!C: RANCI May 6, 1997 Secretary DOCKET NUMBER p U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P~ED RULE 13 Washington, DC 20555 ( (p~ F/f. 71;2I) ATTENTION: Docketing and Services Branch
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Comments on Proposed Rule: Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements
REFERENCE:
(a) Federal Register Notice 62FR7721, dated February 20, 1997, Proposed Rule, Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements; Request for Public Comments - The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company is pleased to provide comments on the subject proposed rule changes. The proposed rule would eliminate the requirement for security personnel to escort licensee-owned vehicles entering the Protected Area for work-related purposes, provided they are driven by licensee employees who have unescorted access. We propose the following minor changes:
- 1. Change the vehicle from "licensee owned" to "licensee owned or leased." To state only licensee-owned vehicles are exempt could be misinterpreted when a great number of licensees routinely lease their fleet of vehicles as a normal business practice.
- 2. Change the driver requirements from "licensee employees" to "persons granted unescorted facility access." To limit vehicle operators to licensee employees only is too restrictive. Both company and contract employees must satisfy the same access authorization requirements as stated under JO CFR 73.56 for unescorted access. All employees with unescorted access are also covered under the licensees ' fitness for duty/continual observation programs.
- .-,. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1S~10n DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISS!ON Document Statist:cs Postmark Date sjrf;1 Copies Received _ _ _..._1 _---,-_ __
.\dd'I Copie~-9eproduced _ ___._ f-,--__ Special Distribution _ f~~tf Ga_ I la ~her, :PPl1/2- 1<11 Ps cd~ _ =,__.
Document Control Desk May 6, 1997 Page2 Title 10 CFR 73.55 currently recognizes unescorted facility access as an indication of trustworthiness and reliability. Title 10 CFR 73.55(d)(8) states, "The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations, and other access control devices to protected and vital areas only to persons granted unescorted facility access." If the Code recognizes unescorted access as a condition to obtain keys to vital and protected areas, it should be the standard to operate a vehicle in protected and vital areas. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule changes and look forward to their issuance. Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you. Very truly yours,
;27:::c.~f C.H. Cruse Vice President - Nuclear Energy CHC/SJR/dlm cc: Document Control Desk, NRC H.J. Miller, NRC R. S. Fleishman, Esquire Resident Inspector, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. I. McLean, DNR Director, Project Directorate 1-1, NRC J. H. Walter, PSC A. W. Dromerick, NRC
DOCKETED USNRC Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 128 "97 MAY -8 A11 :58 SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92674-0128 E. SCOTT MEDLING MANAGER, REGULATORY PROJECTS May 2, 1997 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission DOCKET NUMBER Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 PROPOSED RULE PB 13 ( ~~ FI< 17/J;:;-;- 1} r ------
Subject:
Southern California Edison (Edison) Comments on Proposed Changes to 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," (62 Fed. Reg. 34, pg. 7721-7725, February 20, 1997) Gentlemen: In the subject Federal Register Notice, NRC solicited comments on proposed rulemaking regarding nuclear power plants physical security requirements. These changes were identified by NRC as marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer effective, and as reducing the regulatory burden on licensees without compromising physical protection. This proposed rule would eliminate the requirement for escort of licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area (PA) for work-re l ated purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees who have unescorted access. - At San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), and many other nuclear power plants, most vehicles entering the PA are driven by contract employees who undergo the same security screening as licensee employees. Consequently, the proposed change, as written, would not provide the reduction in regulatory burden intended by the proposed change. Edison recommends that the last sentence of 10CFR73.55(d)(4) be revised as follows:
"Escort is not required for licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area driven by site workers having unescorted access."
Since contract employees are subjected to the same security requirements as regular employees, this change would not cause any reduction in security effectiveness as compared to the origina l proposed change.
~- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMl~KM DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date __5....../-g/_1,_....
1 _ __ Copies Received._ _..;_ / ---,,------ ,\dd'I Ccpies,9eproduced _ ¥....__,,____ Special Distribution _ 'Fr~ a i _ t4-llu l,eir 'PD~, RIDS
Docketing and Service Branch Shou l d you have any questions, please contact Marty Speer at 714-368-6251. Sincerely, cc: E.W. Merschoff, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC Region IV J. A. Sloan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 &3 M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 M. K. Webb, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Unit 1 L. C. Carson, Regional Project Inspector, San Onofre Unit 1 S.S. Bajwa, Section Chief, Decommissioning Section
IJfl p DOCKETED USNRC Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401-1927 "97 MAY - 7 P3 :39 Telephone (612) 330-5500 OFFICE Of. SEC:RL Ti RY OOCKE Tl I[; ~ _'"' 'v'ICE May 6, 1997 BKANCH DOCKET NUMBER Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PROPOSED RULE PR 73 Washington D.C. 20555-0001 ( ~~ F~ 71 :l I) MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket No. 50-282 License No. DPR-42 Docket No. 50-306 License No. DPR-60
Subject:
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 7721 - February 20, 1997, 10 CFR Part 73 Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment Attention: Docketing And Service Branch
Dear Mr. Secretary,
Northern States Power company (NSP) has reviewed the NRC's proposed revisions to 1O - CFR Part 73 (Physical Protection of Plants and Materials). We concur with the comments submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on behalf of the nuclear power industry. These comments endorse the recommended changes but would modify one item to avoid unnecessary restrictions on drivers and vehicles in restricted areas. Sincerely, C!~ o r O. Anderson Licensing and Management Issues c: Rich Enkeboll, Nuclear Energy Institute
,.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS::,10rt DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date 5 / & /q 1 Copies Received, _ ____./.__,_ __
,\dd'I Ccpies-9eproduced ____ 4~ - - Special Distribution Fra.ttA/i , -=-- Ga, II aj hev-1f D~ > 'RI D,5...
I K*TED SNRC NUCL EA R ENERG Y I N STIT UTE
*97 MAY -6 P2 :QO James W. Davis DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION OF FICE Of- S SRE. TAR Y OOCK ET WG & ~.Env1r,E BRAN CH May 6, 1997 DOCKET NUMBER " 't Mr. John C. Hoyle PROPOSED RULE PR 13-~
Secretary ( VJ~ Ft<. 71~I ) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch
SUBJECT:
Proposed Rule -- Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements 62FR7721 -- February 20, 1997
Dear Mr. Hoyle:
These comments are submitted on behalf of the nuclear power industry by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)1 in response to the Federal Register notice concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proposed rule, Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements (62 FR 7721 -- February 20, 1997). We support the proposed changes but recommend two modifications. We believe it is important for regulations to not require a distinction among persons badged for unescorted access, whether licensee employees or contractor/vendor employees. Specific recommendations are under items 2 a nd 3 below. Item 1. Search requirements for on-duty guards, § 73.55(d)(l): Armed security guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area on official business may reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms. Recommendation: None 1 NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.
~CMow,ect9ed by card ~'!..AY O9 1997 II p l -..~_nu 1776 I STREET, NW SUITE 400 WASHINGTON, DC 20006-3708 PHONE 202 739 8000 FAX 202 785 40 I 9
hS. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlti~IOn DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics PostmarkDa!e Hand delivered ()n ~/"/11 Copies Received._ ___._ / _,,___ _ ,\dd'I Copie~*9eprod~ced __,...,.....,
¥,-,--__
SP-ecial istribution H a. c,. / ' Ga.I i:t 1-ie - ~=i--'-"'-l.4ICl!oll...-
* - - -.-.ci::a::::::=a ..
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 6, 1997 Page 2 Item 2. Requirements for vehicle escort,§ 73.55(d)(4): All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be searched for items which could be used for sabotage purposes prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched must include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All vehicles, except as indicated in this paragraph, requiring entry into the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the protected area and, to the extent practicable, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific designated materials receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital area. Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area and driven by licensee employees having unescorted access. Recommendations: As stated by the NRC in the Discussion section: 'The present requirement for a searched, licensee-owned vehicle within the protected area to be escorted by a member of the security organization, even when the driver is badged for unescorted access, does not contribute significantly to the security of the plant." We agree and additionally recommend eliminating the requirement that such vehicles necessarily be licensee-owned. Specifically,
- a. Change the phrase: "licensee employees having unescorted access" to
')>ersonnel who have been badged for unescorted access"to avoid unnecessary restrictions, and
- b. Change the phrase: designated licensee vehicles entering"to "any searched, licensee designated vehicle entering or in" to ensure clarity.
The final rule last sentence would read: (4) "Escort is not required for any searched, licensee designated vehicle entering or in the protected area when driven by personnel who have been badged for unescorted access." Rationale: This proposed modification would not decrease the overall level of security performance needed to protect the plant with the objective of high assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in §73. l(a). There is no need to specify restrictions relative to a vehicle driver beyond the already significant unescorted access requirements. Also, vehicle ownership should not be the criteria that determines the escort requirement.
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 6, 1997 Page 3 In particular:
- The expressed purpose of modifying this specific requirement is to
".. .provide burden relief... without significantly increasing the level of risk to the plant." For several years there has been a concerted effort to minimize differences in treatment of contractor/vendor employees versus licensee employees. Even the proposed handling of contractor badges (Item 3 in this rulemaking) removes badge handling differences for workers-because each must satisfactorily complete the same requirements for unescorted access to the protected area. No escort should be required for a vehicle to be driven into the protected area if the driver has been badged for unescorted access.
- The fact that a person is operating a vehicle in no way degrades his/her reliability or trustworthiness-no escort would be needed for this person if no vehicle were involved. Since vehicle escort requirements are "resource intensive," this unnecessary burden can and should be removed pursuant to this rule change. Industry security resources will be better focused if we are not required to escort the very people we trust and rely upon.
There is no obvious value added to safety or security in escorting a driver certified to meet all requirements for unescorted access. This observation should not distract from the additional flexibility being provided to extend escort relief to licensee-owned vehicles not typically inside the protected area.
- The de facto two-man rule is being eliminated "... for licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area for work-related purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees who have unescorted access."
Vehicle ownership should not be the specific criterion. Nonlicensee-owned vehicles, with the exception of delivery trucks, should not be excluded without specifying the offending basis. Independent of ownership, some vehicles may be more difficult to search than others and if appropriate the vehicle will be escorted. The fact remains that each vehicle will be searched per the rule and this fact provides a significant deterrent to the concealment of contraband useable for sabotage. The regulated presence of a security officer escort for nonlicensee-owned vehicles with a badged driver achieves little since the escort would not search the vehicle further once it is within the protected area.
- Knowledgeable vehicle authorization, identification of purpose or use of vehicle, and conscientious searching practices, supported by reliable personal access authorization screening, provide the means for
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 6, 1997 Page 4 maintaining responsible vehicle controls. Licensees exercise full control of all vehicles entering the protected area regardless of origin.
- The rule uses the term "designated licensee vehicle" while "licensee designated vehicle" is the term used in the still applicable NRC Review Guideline #5 Revision Three, dated November 1, 1978. The latter term includes "... those vehicles owned by the licensee or owned by a contractor of the licensee." Vehicle search, per § 73.55(d)(4) and as specified in site procedures is accomplished independent of whether the vehicle is owned, leased, or rented by the licensee or by a contractor/vendor of the licensee.
Unless all searched vehicles are acceptable under this rule, the defining regulatory term should be the one in the 1978 Review Guide, "Licensee Designated Vehicles (LDV)." However, there should be a relaxation of the time period for a temporary LDV. A period of not less than 24 hours is too restrictive. Our rationale has shown that it should make no difference whether non-licensee vehicles or badged drivers are included. Rule wording that excludes this amounts to unnecessary discrimination. With the rule wording as recommended above, phraseology differences and the resultant burden would be rendered moot. Item 3. Control of contractor employee badges, § 73.55(d)(5). An individual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he or she displays a licensee-issued picture badge upon
- entrance into the protected area which indicates:
(i) Non-employee-no escort required; (ii) areas to which access is authorized; and (iii) the period for which access has been authorized. Badges must be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Recommendation: As stated by the NRC in the Discussion section: Because contractors and licensees are subject to the same programs required for unescorted access, there is no reason to employ more stringent badge control requirements for contractor employees." Continuing with this philosophy, there is no obvious reason to require the specified non-employee status on the badge. Therefore, in consonance with this rulemaking, we recommend deleting the subsections (i)-(iii) and end the previous sentence after the word "area." Access limitations, i.e. , areas of access and period of authorization, are accomplished administratively in badging systems whether the individual is employed directly by the licensee or through a contractor.
Mr. John C. Hoyle May 6, 1997 Page 5 Item 4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area, § 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A).
Establish a current authorization access list for all vital areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be reapproved at least quarterly."
Recommendation: None. Item 5. Key controls for vital areas, § 73.55(d)(8): Whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related access control devices may have been compromised, it must be changed or rotated.... Whenever an individual's unescorted access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness, reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices to which that person had
- access must be changed or rotated.
Recommendation: None We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule and would welcome the opportunity to discuss industry considerations further with appropriate NRC personnel. For questions concerning these comments, please call Rich Enke boll (202-739-8102) of the NEI staff. Sincerely,
~~. . 6JP.~
James W. Davis REE/rs
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company Gary J. Taylor CD 6 P.O. Box 88 Vice President Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Nucle't)'efe f'f EQ (803) 345-4344 USHRC SCE&G May 2, 1997 RC-97-0096 *97 MAY -5 P\2 :59 Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention : Docketing and Services Branch Gentlemen : DOCKET NUMBER
Subject:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION PROPOsEo RULE PB 13 DOCKET NO. 50/395 . ( (p:; F~ 77:J-1) OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE CHANGES TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) hereby provides comments on a proposed rule to change nuclear power plant security requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4) as discussed in the Federal Register, February 20, 1997 (Volume 62, Number 34) . Attached are comments on three of the five changes being addressed in this proposed rulemaking. The areas discussed are :
- 1. Search requirements for on-duty guards, Section 73 .55(d)(1)
- 2. Requirements for vehicle escort, Section 73.55 (d)(4)
- 3. Key controls for vital areas, Section 73.55(d)(8)
Should you have any questions, please call me or have a member of your staff call Mr. Ricky Myers at (803) 345-4384, at your convenience. Very truly yours, RAM attachment c: J. L. Skolds W .F. Conway NSRC .
- R.R. Mahan R. J. White RTS (~R--970003)
H. L. O'Quinn L.A. Reyes OMS*** NRC Resident Inspector J. B. Knotts Jr. File (81 1.02)
/'
NUCLEAR EXCELLENCE - A_SUMMER TRADITION! / MAY O9 19 -
~iu1ow,ea9ed by card *-* ................:.:,..,, ,~ ,
~S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISl:>O't DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date _ _ _ !5_/:i.. .,/_tJ.1_~
Copies Received _ _ _ _..../_ __ .\dd'I Ccpie~*9eproduced -,-__._'-I-_ __ Special Distribution _ f t~tta Ii, Ga I C< her 1>Df?., 'Ri PS
Attachment to Comments on Part 73 Proposed Rule Page 1 of2 Section 73.55(d)(1) At Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) weapons are issued to armed security guards reporting for duty outside the protected area. The proposed rule is limited to "reentry" and would still require these guards to remove their weapon to pass through the detector or be subject to a hand search for entry into the protected area. Further, at VCSNS, the lunch room is outside the protected area. The proposed rule is limited to guards "on official business." Again an armed guard would be required to remove their weapon to pass through the Detector or be subject to a hand search for entry into the protected area upon returning from the lunch room. As recognized in the discussion of your proposal , "Because an armed guard carries a weapon on site, passage of the guard through the metal detector. ..serves little purpose." Potential for personnel safety risk by the unnecessary removing and handling the guard's weapon still exists within the proposed change. SCE&G suggests the final rule be worded as follows: (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for the detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel and armed security guards who are on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry into a protected area. Section 73.55(d){4) Certain elements contained in this proposal remain too prescriptive, have a small effect on safety, are costly to implement, and restrict operational flexibility. The proposed rule could become even more restrictive then the current 10 CFR 73.55(d){4) which states:
" ... All vehicles, except designated licensee vehicles, requmng entry into the protected area shall be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the protected area ... " and " ... The licensee shall exercise positive control over all such vehicles to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes ... "
We can currently allow contract personnel authorized unescorted access to operate designated vehicles. Please change the rule to allow any searched vehicle requiring entry into the protected area be either driven by an individual who has been granted
Attachment to Comments on Part 73 Proposed Rule Page2of 2 unescorted access while within the PA or be escorted by a member of the security organization. SCE&G suggests the final rule be worded as follows: (4) All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be searched for items which could be used for sabotage purposes prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All vehicles must be driven by an individual authorized unescorted access inside the protected area or be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the protected area and, to the extent practical, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific designated material receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital area. The proposed change will allow the utility to shift resources from activities that have a - small effect on safety to those that more significantly enhance safety. The conduct of a vehicle search and the establishment of driver/escort reliability and trustworthiness are the key elements to provide a high assurance against radiological sabotage. The conduct of a vehicle search will remain in effect and is not altered by this request. Reliability and trustworthiness has been established for an individual granted unescorted access to the PA through the successful completion of a background investigation, criminal history check, psychological assessment, and pre-access drug and alcohol tests. Reliability and trustworthiness are maintained through a behavioral observation program as well as random drug and alcohol tests per the utility's Fitness for Duty Program in accordance with 10 CFR Part 26. Section 73.55(d)(9) Please remove or define the words "inadequate work performance". This term is used to specify an event where an individual's unescorted access is revoked and requires keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices to which that person had access must be changed. Nothing about the quality of an employee's work suggests the individual would conduct an act of mischievous conduct or vandalism. The requirement to change out keys and locks would only assist the station if the individual was to illegally gain access to the protected area. CONCLUSION SCE&G request the NRC incorporate these comments which will not result in a decrease in the utility's ability to protect the health and safety of the public with a high degree of assurance against the threat of radiological sabotage.
DOCKETED US NRC [7590-01-P]
"97 FEB 26 AlO :49 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 RIN: 3150-AF53 Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission.
DOCKET NU,~BER PROPOSED RULE PR 13 -- ACTION: Proposed rule. (",a F~ 11J!.,)
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations to delete certain security requirements associated with an internal threat. This action follows reconsideration by the NRC of nuclear power plant physical security requirements to identify those requirements that are marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer effective. This action would reduce the regulatory burden on licensees without compromising physical protection against radiological sabotage required for public health and safety.
~ ~, IC/91 DATES: Submit corrments by (in~ert date 75 days after publieatioA in the Federal ~e~iste, r. Corrments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so. but the Corrrnission is able to assure consideration only for COfJIJlents received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Coornents may be sent to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrnnission, Washington. DC 20555-0001. Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville, Maryland. between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays. For information on submitting comments electronically, see the discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Section. Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including cooments received. may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also be viewed and dOVJnloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board established by NRC for this rulemaking as discussed under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Section. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Sandra Frattali, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6261, e-mail sdf@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In a memorandum dated September 3, 1991 (COMFR-91-005), the C011JTiission requested the NRC staff to re-examine the security requirements associated with an internal threat to nuclear pOW'er plants that are contained in 10 CFR Part 73. "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." *The NRC staff 2
completed its re-examination and recoomended some changes in 10 CFR Part 73 to the Comnission (SECY-92-272, August 4. 1992). In a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated November 5, 1992. the Conmission directed the NRG staff to work with the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) now known as the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). Following three public meetings with NUMARC. the NRC staff reconmended to the Corrmission (SECY-93-326, December 2. 1993) additional changes to Part 73 that would provide significant relief to licensees without compromising the physical security of the plants. In a Staff Requirements Memorandun dated February 18, 1994, the Corrmission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking. Discussion Seven areas in Part 73 were identified as candidates for modification through rulemaking. One of the recommended changes. relating to access of personnel and materials into reactor containments during periods of high traffic, has been addressed by a separate rulemaking. This recommended change was adopted in a final rule published on September 7, 1995 (60 FR 46497). Six other changes originally considered for this rulemaking v,.iere the subject of Generic Letter 96-02 issued February 13, 1996. This generic letter identified certain areas in which licensees might choose to revise their physical security plans without having to wait for issuance of the rule plan. One of these (discussed in detail later). an option to leave vital area doors unlocked provided certain compensatory measures are taken, has been reconsidered in light of recent tampering events. Consequently, that change is not being proposed in this rulemaking. 3
The five remaining changes being addressed in this proposed rulemaking are as follows:
- 1. Search requirements for on-duty guards, § 73.55(d)(l);
- 2. Requirements for vehicle escort, § 73.55(d)(4):
- 3. Control of contractor employee badges, § 73:55(d)(5):
- 4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area,
§ 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A); and
- 5. Key controls for vital areas.§ 73.55(d)(8).
- 1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (§ 73.55(d)(l)).
Under current regulations. armed security guards who leave the protected area as part of their duties must be searched for firearms. explosives, and incendiary devices upon re-entry into the protected area. Requiring a guard to go through an explosives detector or searching packages carried by the guard protects against the introduction of contraband. Because an armed guard carries a weapon on site. passage of the guard through the metal detector, the principal purpose of which is to detect firearms. serves little purpose. The
- guard has to either remove the weapon while passing through the detector or be subject to a hand search. Either approach makes little sense for the guard who is authorized to carry a weapon on site. Further, rerooving and handling the guard's weapon could present a personnel safety risk.
This proposed rule would allo.v armed security guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area on official business to reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms (by a metal detector). Unarmed guards and watchpersons would continue to meet all search requirements. All 4
guards would continue to be searched for explosives and incendiary devices because they are not permitted to carry these devices into the plant.
- 2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort§ (73.55Cd)(4)).
The present requirement for a searched, licensee-owned vehicle within the protected area to be escorted by a member of the security organization, even when the driver is badged for unescorted access, does not contribute significantly to the security of the plant. Under the current regulations. all vehicles must be searched prior to entry into the protected area except under emergency conditions. Further. all vehicles must be escorted by a member of the security organization upon entry into the protected area except for "designated licensee vehicles." Designated lice~see vehicles are trose vehicles that are limited in their use to onsite pljnt functions and remain in the protected area except for operational, maintenance. repair. security, and emergency purposes. Under this requirement. those *1icensee-owned vehicles that are not "designated licensee vehicles" must be escorted at all times while in the protected area even when they are driven by personnel with unescorted access. This proposed rule would eliminate the requirement for escort of licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area for work-related purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees who have unescorted access. (This amendment would still preclude periodic entry of a delivery truck without an escort.) This change would provide burden relief to licensees without significantly increasing the level of risk to the plant. 5
- 3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges C§ 73.55(d)(5)).
Contractor employees with unescorted access are required to return their badges when leaving the protected area. Current regulatory practice allows licensee employees to leave the protected area with their badges if adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the security of the badge is not jeopardized. Because contractors and licensees are subject to the same programs required for unescorted access, there is no reason to employ more stringent badge control requirements for contractor employees. This proposed rule would allow contractor employees to take their badges offsite under the same conditions that apply to licensee employees.
- 4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area (§ 73.55(d)(7)Ci)(A)).
Maintaining separate access lists for each vital area and reapproval of these lists on a monthly basis is of marginal value. At many sites, persons granted access to one vital area also have access to most or all vital areas. Therefore, licensees presently derive little additional benefit from maintaining discrete lists of individuals allawed access to each separate vital area in the facility. Also, licensee managers or supervisors are required to update the access lists at least once every 31 days to add or delete individuals from these lists when appropriate. There is also a requirement to reapprove the list every 31 days. However, reapproval of all individuals on the lists at least every 31 days, to validate that the lists have been maintained 1n an accurate manner is unnecessarily burdensome. This rulemaking w"Ould replace separate access authorization lists for each vital area of the facility by a .single listing of all persons who have access to any vital area. 6
The proposed rulemaking would also change the requirement that the list must be reapproved at least once every 31 days to quarterly. The reapproval consists of a review to ensure that the list is current and that only those individuals requiring routine access to a vital area are included. Because of the requirement for a manager or supervisor to update the list at least every 31 days, conducting this comprehensive reapproval every 31 days is of marginal value. Corrments from the public are requested on the question of the benefits of separating the update and reapproval requirements.
- 5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (§ 73.55(d)(8)).
Under current regulations, licensees change or rotate all keys, locks, combinations. and related access control devices at least once every twelve months. Because the rule also requires that these be changed whenever there is a possibility of their being compromised, requiring change at least every 12 months has been determined by the NRC to be only marginal to security. This proposed rule would reroove the requirement for change every 12 months while retaining the requirement for changing for cause, when an access control device has been compromised or there is a suspicion that it may be compromised. Locking of Vital Areas As noted earlier, Generic Letter 96-02, described, among other things, conditions under which licensees could leave vital areas unlocked. Specifically, to leave a vital area unlocked, the licensee would have had to ensure that the area is equipped with an alarmed access control system that 7
will alarm on unauthorized entry; ensure that the doors to the area can be locked remotely; continue to maintain a record of personnel access: to examine for explosives. with equipment specifically designed for that purpose. all hand-carried packages entering any protected area within which there is an unlocked vital area; and to demonstrate a capability to protect against an external adversary. 1 This change was considered for inclusion in this rulemaking but as a result of recent events, it has been rejected. If vital areas are unlocked but alarmed, the response to an entry by an unauthorized individual could require a considerable time and level of effort to assure that important equipment was not damaged. Maintaining VA doors locked li~its the number of people who have access to the area and ensures that personnel who enter are identified. In July and August of this year. tampering events were discovered within vital areas of a reactor. The first search missed significant tampering with safety related switches. If vital areas are unlocked but alarmed, an entry by an unauthorized individual. deliberate or inadvertent. could require a considerable level of effort to assure that important equipment was not damaged. It is also uncertain that such alarms v-JOuld always initiate the level of response needed to evaluate the safety systems within the impacted vital area. In addition, most safety equipment is automatic and rapid access to vital areas is generally not required. Thus. this option of leaving a vital area unlocked is no longer being considered. Generic Letter 96-02 (February 13. 1996) identified those areas in which licensees might choose to revise their security plans without having to wait for the issuance of the rule changes. One change would have provided the option of not locking the doors to a vital area provided that the security of the plant would not be compromised. 8
Electronic Access Comments may be sut:xnitted electronically, in either ASCII text or WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be accessed using a personal computer. a modem. and one of the coomonly available c0111Tiunications software packages, or directly via Internet. Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as practical. for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board. If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set as follaws: parity to none. data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N.8,1). Using ANSI or VT-100 te~minal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem can then be accessed by selecting the "Rules Menu" option frcxn the "NRC Main Menu." Users will find the "FedWorld Online User's Guides" particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also have a "Help/Information Center" option that is tailored to the particular subsystem. The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial phone number for the main FedWorld BBS. (703) 321-3339, or by using Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed frcxn the main Fed~;orld menu by selecting the "Regulatory, Government Administration and State Systems," then selecting "Regulatory Information Mall." At that point, a menu will be displayed that has an option "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission" that will take you to the NRC Online main menu. The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by 9
typing "/go nrc" at a FedWorl d comnand ~-.j ne.. 1~r ..YJilU :acr:ess NRC from FedWorld's main menu, you may return to FedWorld .by 'Se1ecting the "Return to FedWorld" option from the NRC Online Main Menu. 'H01Never., if you access NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have *full access to all NRC systems but you will not have access to the main FedWorld system. If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and menus. including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write cooments or upload files (corrments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP. all files can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look). An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with descriptions. is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP access. Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web, like FTP. that mode only provides access for downloading files and does not display the NRC Rules Menu. For more information on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis. Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC. Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD3@nrc.gov. Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion The Conmission has determined that this proposed rule is the type of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i). Therefore. neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed rule. 10
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of the paperwork requirements. Because the rule will reduce existing information collection requirements. the public burden for this collection of information is expected to be decreased by 102 hours per licensee. This reduction includes the time required for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. The NRC is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the collection of information contained in the proposed rule and on the following issues:
- 1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the NRC. including whether the information will have practical utility?
- 2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
- 3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected?
- 4. How can the burden of the collection of information be minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques?
Send corrrnents on any aspect of this proposed collection of information, including suggestions for further reducing the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coornission. 11
Washington. DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electrorr:i:c:n@il,.at BJSl@NRC.GOV: and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Reg1:flat01:J :Affairs. NEOB-10202, (3150 0002). Office of Management and Budget, Washington. DC 20503. Cooments to O,,B on the collections of information or on the above issues should be submitted by (insert date 30 days after publication in the Federal Register). Cooments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to corrments received after this date. Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid 0MB control number. Regulatory Analysis - A discussion of each of the five changes proposed in this rule is provided in the supplementary information section. The costs and benefits for each of the changes proposed in this rulemaking are as follows:
- 1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards(§ 73.55Cd)(l)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by eliminating unnecessary weapon searches of guards who are already allowed to carry a weapon, which would result in better utilization of licensee resources. There would be 110 reduction in plant security because the potential for reduction in 12
security personnel hours does not impact the total size of the security force. Further. the potential safety risk to personnel caused by removing and handling a guard's weapon would be eliminated.
- 2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort (73,55(d)(4)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by requiring fewer vehicle escorts which w0uld allo,.., personnel to be utilized more effectively. Resources could be redirected to areas in which they v-10uld be more cost effective. The decrease in security would be marginal because unescorted access 1t10uld be restricted to vehicles CMJ1ed by the licensee and driven by licensee employees with unescorted access. Assuming the number of entries by licensee-owned vehicles driven by personnel having unescorted access is 10-per-day pe: -site. the average time needed for escort is 3 hours, and the cost per hour for security personnel is
$30 (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $330,000 (10 escorts/day/site x 365 days/year x 3 hrs/escort x $30/hr).
With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year v-10uld be approximately
$24,000,000.
- 3. Control of Contractor Emplovee Badges(§ 73,55(d)(5)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by more effective use of security personnel. who v-10uld no longer be needed to handle badges for contractor personnel who have unescorted access. There w0uld be no reduction in plant security because adequate safeguards would be in place to ensure that the security of the badge is not jeopardized. 13
Assuming that one security person per working day (8 hours) is relieved from the duties of controlling contractor employees badges and that the cost per hour for security personnel is $30 (loaded). a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $88,000 (8 hours/day x 365 days/year x $30 hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year vJOuld be approximately $6,600,000.
- 4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area(§ 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced because licensees would have to keep only one access list for all vital areas and reapprove it_ quarterly, rather than keep individual access lists for each vital area that must be reapproved monthly. Assuming that the time to reapprove each of the individual lists is 1 hour per month, that a combined 11st would take 1.5 hours per month. that the average number of vital areas per site is 10, and that the cost of a clerk including overhead is $30 per hour (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $3,420 [(1 x 10 vital areas/month x 12 months/yr - 1.5 x 1 combined vital area/quarter x 4 quarters/yr) x $30/hrJ. With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year would be approximately $256,500.
- 5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (§ 73.55(d)(8)).
The regulatory burden on the licensees would be reduced because fewer resources v.{)Uld be needed to maintain the system. Assuming that of the approximately 60 locks per year, half of them had been changed for cause. leaving 30 locks unchanged which would take a 14
locksmith one day to change at a cost(including overhead) of $45 per hour. A rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $360 (8 hrs/year x $45/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year would be approximately $27,000. Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act as amended. 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rule, if adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rule would affect only licensees authorized to operate nuclear power reactors. These licensees do not fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act. or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration Act, 13 CFR Part 121. Backfit Analysis The Corrmission has determined that the backfit rule. 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this proposed amendment because this amendment would not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The proposed changes to physical security are voluntary and should the licensee decide to implement this amendment, will be a reduction in burden to the licensee. Therefore, a backfit analysis has not been prepared for this amendment. 15
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties. Hazardous materials transportation. Export. Import. Nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73. PART 73 -- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
- 1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930. 948. as amended. sec. 147. 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201): sec. 201, as amended. 204, 88 Stat. 1242. as amended, 1245 sec. 1701. 106 Stat. 2951. 2952 (42 U.S.C. 5841. 5844, 2297f). Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425. 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155. 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295. 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606. Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
- 2. Section 73.55 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)(l), (d)(4).
(d)(5). (d)(?)(i)(A), (d)(?)(i)(D) and (d)(8) to read as follows: 16
§ 73.55 Reguirements for *physical protect10A :of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radi*ological sabotage.
(d) *** (1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State. and local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry into a protected area. Armed security guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area on official business may reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms. (4) All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be searched for items which could be used for sabotage purposes prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched must include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All vehicles, except as indicated below. requiring entry into the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security organization while within the p1-otected area and, to the extent practicable, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific designated materials receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital area. Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area and driven by licensee employees having unescorted access. 17
(5) A numbered picture badge identification system must be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort. An 1ndividual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he or she displays a licensee-issued picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which indicates: (W Non-employee-no escort required; (ii) areas to which access is authorized; and (iii) the period for which access has been authorized. Badges must be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. (7) *** (i) *** CA) Establish a current author1zat1on access list for all vital areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be reapproved at least quarterly. The licensee shall include on the access list only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions. (d)(B) All keys, locks. combinations, and related access control devices used to control access to protected areas and vital areas must be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related access 18
control devices may have been compromised, it must be changed or rotated. The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations and other access control devices to protected areas and vital areas only to persons granted unescorted facility access. Whenever an individual's unescorted access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness. reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations. and related access control devices to which that person had access must be changed or rotated.
~
Dated at Rockville, Maryland. this/</ - day of February, 1997. For the Nuclear Regulatory Cormnssion. e Commission. 19
From: Carol Gallagher To: ELJ Date: 3/5/97 4:43pm
Subject:
PROPOSED RULE Emile, A proposed ru.le on Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements (10 CFR Part 73) was noted in the Federal Register on February 20. Please send me a copy of any comment letters you may receive.
- Thanks, Carol Gallagher}}