ML22048A484
| ML22048A484 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/18/2022 |
| From: | Dan Dorman NRC/EDO |
| To: | Mirela Gavrilas, Higgs T, Mark Lombard, John Lubinski, Andrea Veil Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, NRC/OE, NRC/OI |
| References | |
| Download: ML22048A484 (3) | |
Text
February 18, 2022 MEMORANDUM TO: Andrea Veil, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation John Lubinski, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Mirela Gavrilas, Director Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Mark Lombard, Director Office of Enforcement Tracy Higgs, Director Office of Investigations Signed by Dorman, Dan FROM: Daniel H. Dorman on 02/18/22 Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
TASKING IN RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INQUIRY INTO COUNTERFEIT, FRAUDULENT, AND SUSPECT ITEMS IN OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS This tasking is in response to the special inquiry by of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Special Inquiry into Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items (CSFI) in Operating Nuclear Power Plants (Case No.20-022). Concurrently with this inquiry, the OIG completed an audit (OIG-22-A-06), Audit of the Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Oversight of Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items at Nuclear Power Reactors, that assessed whether the NRCs oversight activities reasonably assure nuclear power reactor licensees programs can mitigate the risk of CFSI in operating reactors, those under construction, and those completed but not yet online. The audit found the NRC should improve its oversight of CFSI by clarifying and communicating how the agency collects, assesses, and disseminates information regarding CFSI, and by improving staff awareness of CFSI and its applicability to inspections. The special inquiry further stated that there are earlier identified potential gaps in the NRCs regulatory framework that are yet to be resolved.
CONTACT: Caty Nolan, OEDO 301-415-1535
A.Veil, et al 2 The offices should work together to review the information in the special inquiry and audit to assess the information in both reports. These actions include the following:
- 1. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation should conduct a LIC-504 review, Integrated Risk-Informed Decisionmaking Process for Emergent Issues, to assess whether there are any immediate safety concerns for reactor facilities.
- 2. The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards should conduct an evaluation to assess if there are any immediate safety concerns or items of risk significance for facilities within its programs.
- 3. Collectively, the offices should assess the risk posed by CFSI and provide recommendations, that may be warranted, on the current oversight program or related agency processes for CFSI. The review should be informed by that latest status of agency actions described in SECY-15-0003, Staff Activities Related to Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items, as appropriate. Please include a basis for any recommendations or decisions on whether changes are needed.
- 4. The Office of Enforcement should review the allegations cited in the special inquiry to verify proper handling of the cases and determine if any revisions to the Allegation Process are necessary.
The offices should provide the results of items 1 and 2 above to OEDO management two weeks after the date of issuance of this tasking. Staff should provide a mid-project status briefing to the EDO. The final report is to be provided to the EDO by April 4, 2022, to support the staffs response to the OIG due April 11, 2022.
cc: A. Vietti-Cook, SECY M. Zobler, OGC R. Feitel, OIG
ML22048A484 OFFICE OEDO OEDO OEDO NAME C. Nolan KMB for K. Morgan-Butler DDorman DATE 2/17/2022 02/17/22 2/18/2022