ML20155G016
| ML20155G016 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/26/1988 |
| From: | Jordan E NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Davis A, Grace J, Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155G021 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-580 NUDOCS 8810140048 | |
| Download: ML20155G016 (6) | |
Text
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- 4 UNITED STATES
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J September 26, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR:
William T. Russell, Regional Administrator, Region I J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III ~
Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region IV John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V !
FROM: Edward L. Jordan, Director ~
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data ,
SUBJECT:
POSSIBLE NRC REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE REENTRY OF COSMOS 1900 4
COSMOS 1900, a nuclear reactor powered Soviet satellite, is expected to reenter the earth's atmosphere in early October. Although it is expected that the reactor will separate from the satellite prior to reentry and completely burn-up in the the upper atmosphere, there is a small probability that debris from the reactor could reach the earth's surface. Under the direction of the d
National Security Council, the Federal agencies, along with State representatives, have been developing plans for how the government would
" respond if radioactive debris landed in the United States. Copies of the procedures to supplement the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) in such an event have beeri provided to your staff and are included as
- Enclosure 1. ,
r As provided in FRERP, DOE has the lead for thi Federal radiological monitoring l effort and establishing a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). 00E has designated Terry Vaeth, Assistant Manager, of the San '
Francisco Operations Office (SAN) to be the FRMAC Director (formerly called 1 0STD) in tha event a FRMAC is established in the U.S. SAN has been developing detailed plans for establishing a FRMAC. These preliminary plans ;7tovide for field support from the NRC. 00E is aware of NRC health physics capabilities i i
and would like to utilize them, if necessary. The E00 has agreed that NRC *
'j should provide support, if requested, in accordance with our responsibilities in the FRERP.
t It is expected that most of the support that NRC would provide would be from the regional offices. Consequently, this is to provide you with some genet 41 guidance in preparing for this unlikely, but important role. Enclosure 2 is the preliminary organization chart which SAN developed which shows how they envision NRC resources and personnel fitting into the FRMAC organization.
i It is not expected that any special modifications be made to the regional [
mobile vans or that t, heir use be restricted during the period when the reentry i i
of COSMOS 1900 ,is pr,edicted. If your mobile van, however, is not available '
because of repairs, maintenance, or other reasons, please let this of fice know.
The only actions we would expect the regions to take would be to: '
yP 0 01 P ;
Regional Administrators '
1.
Develop a list of the regional staff who have expertise in radiological field monitoring or analytical operations; 2.
Inform the those FRMAC; individuals of the small potential for being assigned to.
3.
Assure that the regional mobile van is operational and ready to be. '
deployed within a few hours of notification; ~
4.
Assure that during off-duty hours, the Regional Outy Officer can -
contact the above individuals and those who operate the regional mobile van; and ,
- 5. ;
Assure that regional field instruments have a current calibration and are operable.
L In the event that COSMOS 1900 debris lands in the U.S. , NRC/HQs will determine how and which regional offices will respond. Most likely, the closest regional i office will be requested to dispatch the Radiation Safety and Safeguards Branch Chief, along with the regional mobile van and appropriate laboratory and field monitoring staff, to the FRMAC. Any additional NRC support will then be based on discussions with 00E, the NRC staff in the field and the Regional ,
r Administrators.
Because of the small probability of the event and the great uncertainty of what any of the debnis will look like, physically and radiologically, there will be no detailed training offered to the potential responders until they arrive at the FRMAC. Therefore, it is important that tie individuals selected be !
experienced and knowledgeable individuals who will be able to work effectively in such a situation.
' As this situation develops further, we will keep you and your staff informed.
.If NRC is called upon in this situation, I am confident that you and your staff
'can provide the support that is needed.
E d . Dir tor 0 e for Analy is and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosures:
- 1. Procedures in Support of'the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) for Reentry of COSMOS 1900 , a
- 2. C00405-1900, FRMAC Organization -
Chart ,
cc w/o encis: See Page 3 ,
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' Regional Administrators -l t
cc w/o encis: ,
V. Stello, E00 .
J. Taylor, DE00 L T. Murley, NRR E. Beckjord, RES "
H. Thompson,NMSS !
H. Denton, GPA l h
DISTRIBUTION (w/ encl 1, w/o enci 2)
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GENERAL C0FNENTS ON COSMO $ 1900 SUPPLEMENT -
A limited number of Federal agencies took the responsibility to develop a Federal plan for responding to a possible impact from the Cosmos 1900 satellite reentry. To meet this responsibility a number of documents _
were pulled together from previous experiences s,everal years ago. These documents should have been reviewed more carefully before they were sent out to the other Federal agencies for review. For example, in three different places, there are three warning and alert mess 3ges (all differ- -
ent) covering somewhat the same information going to the same audience. -
In addition, there is a significant amount of repetition which is not always consistent.
This compilation of documents does not reflect all the lessons learned over the time that the previous Russian satellites reentered the atmosphere.
These lessons learned were significant and should not have to be relcarned. There was a significant learning experience from:
Developing the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP)
Three Mile Island Accident Chernoby1 Accident FFE-1 and FFE-2 Relocation Tabletop Exercise The FRERP should be the operative document for this activity. Althou the current FRERP does not specifically address satellite reentries, gh the roles and responsibilities of the Federal agencies spelled out in the FRERP are appropriate to this situation. In addition, many of the con-cepts and processes are directly applicable. A supplement to the FRERP T -- which essentially rewrites major portions of the plan is not needed.
Rather, there should be a short document (possibly 2-3 pages) which states u- that the FRERP is the operative docucent and because satellite reentry is not covered, here is a list of additional responsibilities or modifica-tions that are needed to assure that the major potential Federal respon-sibilities are covered.
If it is necessary to write up procedures, then a document delineating unique interagency procedures that differ from those procedures that are -
currently in place should be developed and clearly marked as procedures and not FRERP slan changes. It is not necessary for internal agenc procedures to De a part of any interagency work group discussions. y -
The information that is presented in theso documents displays what we believe to be an incomplete understanding of the technical problem and the situation that would occur. The procedures appear to treat thic situation like a facility accident. For example, there is reference to an !
onsite area. Such a situation is highly unlikely. There is no signif-
' Icant recognition of the most important part of any Federal response in W this country if there is a significant deposition of radioactive material from thi.' satellite. There will be a great need for radiation criteria, identification or contamination or contaminated materials, mobilization, training, equipping, '.ransporting, decontamination, all the HPs that would be n cessary to clean up the mess, etc..
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Portions of these documents make this event sound like it could be a catastrophe. There is an extremely small probability that it could cause a big problem. This document implies that a catastrophic situation is expected. For example, the documents should not reference the need for -
the NSC to activate the NSEC. All mention or implication of a catastrophic situation should be avoided. . .
Expecting the States to make a number of preparatory measures for a highly improbable event is ludicrous. The Federal governnent should be in a position to tell the States what they would do if this ever impact the -
U. S. Any State actions they would be required to take are not very different from any other radiological contaminatic, event. The Federal government should take a leadership role with the States. The Federal e government should: 1) tell the Governors in the initial letter; and, 2) be .
ready to provide them with, advice on radiation criteria and food product recommendations so that there could be some national uniformity on re- '
sponse actions. If there is any impact from this reentry, even if it does not directly affect this country, there will be cc,cern about radiation contamination in food. The concerns will be healt.1 related and HHS is
.e - NOT even a entioned. The Federal igencies should be in a position to provide leadership so that unreasonable actions by individual States can be deflected and the U.S. can also provide some werldwide leadership, rather than embarrassing itself.
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