ML20210J626
| ML20210J626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/31/1997 |
| From: | Ayres D NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-1601, NUDOCS 9708180186 | |
| Download: ML20210J626 (26) | |
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a
NUREG-1601 8 't P Chemical Process Safety at Fuel Cycle Facilities M:nuscript Completed: July 1997 Date Published: August 1997 D. A Ayres DivElon of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wcshington, DC 20555-000I t I c,
ABSTRACT This NUREG provides broad guidance on chemical safety issues relevant to fuel cycle facilities, it describes an approach acceptable to the NRC staff, with examples that are not exhaustive, for addressing chemical process safety in the safe storage, handling, and processing of licensed nuclear material, it expounds to license holders and applicants a general philosophy of the role of chemical process safety with respect to NRC-licensed materials; sets forth the basic information needed to properly evaluate chemical process safety; and describes plausible methods of identifying and evaluating chemical hazards and assessing the adequacy of the chemical safety of the proposed equipment and facilities. Examples of equipment and methods commonly used to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of chemicalincidents are discussed in this document. P iii NUREG-1601
CONTENTS Eage ABST RACT . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lil PREFACE ...... ......................................................vil
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................ix
- 1. I N TR ODU CTI ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- 2. D I SC U S S I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1 Chemical Process information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1.1 Process Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1.2 - Auxiliary Systems ............. ............................. 4 2.1.3 - Specialty Chemical Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
- 2. 2 H az a rd Aud it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
. 2.2.1 Sy ste m R eview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3 Identification of the Hazards ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 3.1 Potential Accident Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
- 2.3.2 instruments and Control Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4 Desig n B a sis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....8 l 2.4.1 Physical Ba rriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4.2 Mitigative Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5 Hazard Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.5.1- Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ... ......... ........... 10 2.5.2 Re s ult s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2.6 Continuing Assurance of Chemical Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6.1 Management Structure and Concepts . .......................... 11 2.6.2 Proced ure s , , , , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,....... .. 11 2.6.3 Training , , , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........,...... .., ... 12 2.6.4 Maintenance . . . ~
.......... ....... .............. . .... 12 2.6.5 Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , . . . . ... .. 13 2.6.6 Emergency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.6.7 incident Investigations and Corrective Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 14 2.6.8 Audits and Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.6.9 _ Q uality Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.6.10 Human Factors Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
- 3. R E F E R E N C E S , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4 -
v- NUREG-1601 r
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PREFACE
- NUREG-1601 is being issued to provide broad guidance on chemical safety, it describes an approach acceptable to NRC staff, although the examples offered are not exhaustive.
NUREG-1601 is not a substitute for the regulations, and compliance is not a requirement. This guidance document describes a general philosophy of the role of chemical process safety with respect to NRC-licensed material. f-e l 4 N i 4 1 vii NUREG-1601 w .. _ + , _.-.y. . . . , .,, 3 , - ,,%., . ..--.,,, .,.,,, . . _ _ . . , , _ , , , . .
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author acknowledges and appreciates the contributions to this document from Dr. Lidia Roche, Barry Mendelsohn, Robert Pierson, Donald Stout, Leslie Fields, William Troskoski, Garrett Smith, Dr. Richard Milstein, Dr. Tin Mo, Richard Cassano, Thomas Cox, and Michael Weber, all from the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards at NRC Headquarters. ix NUREG-1601
_ _ . -. _ - . _. __ . . . ._ . _ _ _ _ - ~ . . . _ . . _ - . _
- 1. INTRODUCTION The issuance and continuance of specific responsibility of NRC. Also,10 CFR 76.87 licenses for activities involving source and requires gaseous diffusion enrichment
- special nuclear materials require that the plants to establish procedures and/or applicant's proposed procedures, equipment to address chemical safety.
equipment, and facilities be adequate to protect health and minimize danger to life or Performing an adequate analysis of property in accordance with chemical safety in processing licensed 10 CFR 40.32(c) and 70.23(a)(3) and (4). material at fuel cycle facilities decreases the To protect health and minimize danger, the potential for radiological and nonradiological applicant should address all hazards of exposures to workers and the public and - nuclear material, including chemical minimizes releases to the environment. hazards posed by radioactive materials. This report highlights the importance of chemicals, and plant conditions which may chemical process safety at facilities where
- directly or indirectly affect the licensed licensees handle, process, and store nuclear materialin an adverse manner. nuclear materials._ lt provides broad According to the October 21,1988, guidance on . chemical process safety Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) issues at such facilities and discusses 1- between NRC and the Occupational Safety methods of preventing or mitigating the and Health Administration (OSHA), the consequences of chemicalincidents.
! regulation of these hazards is the 4 4. 1 NUREG-1601
i I
- 2. DISCUSSION Most NRC fuel cycle liceasees possess public and worker safety, but also with their ,
materials that are chemically hazardous effect on safe operations, regardless of the and/or pose some sort of nonradiological total amount of the chemicals ensite. The risk. Chemical and radiological risks have VOU between NRC and OSHA on chemical been known to compound orm another, and safety issues makes provision for the NRC in many cases, radioactive materials are to assume responsibility for the control of ; also chemically hazardous. A chemical risks which may auct radioactive materials. explosion in a fin! cycle facihty could Paragraph 3 of the MOU states- i disperse radioaWe material, just as the radiation environinent could make it more There are four kinds of hazards l difficutt to respond to a hazardous chemical that may be associated with NRC-spill. Thus, chemical process safety plays a licansed nuclear facilities. major role in the proper operation of nuclear ; fuel cycle facilities. Virtually all processes a. Radiation risk produced by of source and special nuclear materials use radioactive materials; chemicals which can be considered hazardous or pote1. ally hazerdous under b. Chemical risk produced by certain conditions. radioactive mSterial; ; For the purpose of this document, c. Plant conditicns which affect hazardous chemicals are substances which the safety of radioactive j are toxic, explosive, flammable, corrosive, materials and thus present an or reactive to the extent that they can cause increased radiation risk to signliicant damage to property or endanger workers. For example, these life if not adequately controlled. Some of might produce a fire or an the more common hazardous chemicals explosion, and thereby cause used in nuclear fuel cycle facilities are a release of radioactive uranium hexaflur (llF.), strong acids, materials or an unsafe reactor ammonia, and h) en. Additionally, condition; and systems containing .bstances which are : not normally consideied hazardous under d. Plant conditions which result ambient conditions may, under extreme in an occupational risk, but do conditions or in combination with other not affect the safety of chemicals, produce hazardous situations. licensed radioactive materials. These substances include hot water, steam For example, there might be and cryogenic or compressed gases such exposure to tcxic as air, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide, nonradioactive materials and other industrial hazards in the Many hazardous chemicals are also . workplace. regulated by other agencies, but mainly in the prevention of catastrophic events or Generally, NRC deals with the first three major releases to the environment. This hazards listed in paragraph 3 (a, b, and c), ! regulation of hazardous chemicals is based and OSHA deals with the fourth hazard (d). on threshold limits. The NRC's concern is The risks covered by NRC include those not only with the effect of the chemicals on posed directly by radioactive chemicals, NUREG 1601 2 I I
such as with UF., and any other condition 2.1.1.2 Material Form which may directly or indirectly affect radiation risk to workers or the environment. The process description should include the Thus the NRC does not regulate chemicals chemical and physical form (s) of the per so; rather, the NRC vnrifies that the licensed material at each process step. It i interactions of chemicals with NRC licensed should include inputs, outputs, and any nuclear materials and/or with equipment intermediart transformations occurring at which processes, transports, of stores each step. these licensed materials have been considered in the design of the equipment 2.1.1.3 Process Chemicals and facilities and in the operating and maintenance procedures. Such interactions The process description should include a may cause degradation of equipment, loss list of all chemicals input tu each process of confinement, and misdirection of licensed step, specifying which ones are to be in materials resulting in potential danger to contact with the licensed materials and workers, the public, and the env!conment. which chemicals could potentially contact licensed materials in casts of le@s or 2.1 Chemical Process Information human error. Safety of chemical processing of nuclear 2.1.1.4 Process Variables materials depends largely on the information available about the process and The process description should include the about the chemicals used in the process approximate ranges of temperatures, (including chemical intermediates, process pressures, and mass flow rates for each of parameter limits, etc ). The following t* e process chemicals and the licensed information should be documented and materials. These ranges should be made available to persons responsible for included for inputs, outputs, and materials verifying and maintaining chemical process and chemicals in process. safety throughout the facility. 2.1.1.5 Procesa Control 2.1.1 Process Description The piocess description should generally A description of the proposed chemical and cover the process equipment and mechanical process steps for the licensed engineering design features used for material aids the reviewer in understanding process control in each procesa step, the design basis. A complete description of including setpoint ranges for safety controls. the processes should contain the following Any special administrative or procedural elements. controls should also be described. 2.1.1.1 Purpose 2.1.1.6 Materials of Construction The proccss description should state the The process description should provide a purpose or objective of each process step, list or description of the materials of including tne operation (s) to be performed, construction used in the processing, the equipment to be used, and destinations of outputs and effluents. 3 NUREG 1601
storage, and in process transport of 2.1.2.1 Bulk Chemicals licensed material when that information is necessary for understanding the potential Attentioil ohould tA given to systems which degradation, or the effect of radiation on the contain toxic and hazardous substances strength and properties, of the construction under NRC jurisdiction as defined by the rnaterial. MOU between OSHA and NRC. These include hazardous substances identified in 2.1.1.7 Safety Features 29 CFR Part 1910, Subparts H and Z, regardless of quantity. The process description should include the structures, systems, equipment, 2.1,2.2 Utilities compona as, engineered design controls, and human actions and administrative A description of utilities near licensed-controls relied on for chemical process material processing should be part of or safety. Such features may include not only referenced by the process safety the engineered design controls and information. Steam, water, vacuum materials of construction mentioned above, systems, compresseJ gases, and electrical but also items such as chemical power supplies could, if interrupted or confinement, barriers, leak suppression uncontrolled cause a hazardous condition equipment, emergency shutdown or to develop with the licensed materials. . response procedures, and passive engineered controls such as rupture disks. 2.1.2.3 Ventilation Where special nuclear material (SNM) I might accumulate, as in dikes or bags to The operation of the ventilation system may contain leaks, criticality safe geometries be the single most important protection may need to be considered, against radiologicalexposure. Design information of the ventilation system 2.1.2 Auxiliary Systems ducting, scrubbers, filters, and controls should be included or referenced in the The process safety information should process safety information. include a description of other systems (including safety features) in the licensed. 2.1.2.4 Chemical Traps and Filters material process areas, transport areas, or storage areas, such as plant utilkies, bulk These systems may be considered a subset chemical syr,tems, and ventilation. There of the other process or auxiliary systems, systems are not necessarily part of the but are important enough to be mentioned licensed-material processing system but, separately. The design of chemical traps under off normal' conditions, could affect and filters should be part of the process licensed material processing. safety information. Trap design, filter media, operating temperatures and pressures, cleanout or filter change procedures, and automated controls should be described.
'Off normal condmons refers to conditions that are in some respect outside d the range for routine operations but have not resulted in an accident NUREG-1601 4 t
t 2.1.2.5 Emergency Systems system review should include the following elements. . Systems which provide mitigative services (e.g., fire suppression equipment) or 2.2.1.1 Process Chemistry backup for main systems (e g., emergency power supply) should be included or Observe the chemical components added referenced in the process safety to each process step, Identify all chemical information. Descriptions of their locations, process hazards " here chemical reactions operations, and testing methode may be could produce hazardous materials which important with regard to chemmi precuu were not previously present (e g., the safety, evolution of hydrogen when metals are dissolved in acids). 2.1.3 Specialty Chemical Data 2.2.1.2 Effects of Variable Chemical The process safety information should Additions provide the generalinformation included on the Material Safety Data Sheets' for any At each process step, analyze the effect specialty chemical used in the that adding variable amounts of chemicals licensed material process areas, transport has on generating hazardous materials and areas, or storage areas. on the chemical and physical forms of the licensed material. Evaluate the possibility and effects of adding the wrong chemicals 2.2 Hazard Audit to a process step or adding them in the in order to minimize the preSability of wrong sequence. Also evaluate the accidents8 and their impact un the licensed potentially unwanted dissolution or material, potential chemical process safety precipitation of the licensed material, hazards should be identified through a especially if the licensed material could thereby be released into a waste stream. hazard audit. 2.2.1.3 Energy Sources 2.2.1 System Review Evaluate the potential energy sources of the The first step is to thoroughly review the pr cess components, such as source facility to identify potential chemical e evated temperatures and pressures, hazards
- of radioactive materials and electrostatic forces, exothermic reactions, radiation hazards caused by chemicals. The erosion caused by abrasive materials, and flammable and explosive materials. The potentialeffects of these sources of energy
' Pursuant to 2e cra ieto troog. osha requires on equipment and personnel should be Matergl Sj y ,Data Sheets , to be tupplied by U.S chemical Considered as part of any hazard audit.
*An accent is an unplanned event or sequence of 2.2.1.4 Materials of Construction events that results in undesstable consequences; or an meident uth specific safety consequences or impacts. Determine whether the materials of
'A hazaro is an inherent physicat. radioiogical or chem cat charactenste that has the potentini for causing MnWn&mbudaemMa harm to humans or to the environment. Catastrophic failure resulting in a release of 5 NUREG 1601 .
...m.,.. ...,---n , -w.-e e , n
hazardous materials is unlikely. A 2.6) should be reviewed during each catastrophic failure could be caused by iteration of the hazard audit. chemical incompatibility, thermal cycling, or excessive heat and pressure. 2.2.1.8 Human Factors 2.2.1.5 Process Control and Safety Potential human errors in the operation and Devices maintenance of the process should be guarded against. The review of chemical Determine whether adequate safety devicos systems should consider ergonomics and or systems are in place to minimize worker fatigue as a potential cause of potential hazards from process chemicals hazards. The design and location of the or chemical reactions; for example whether equipment, the layout of the process, and ventilation, pressure relief valves, the clanty and sequence of instructions in combustible gas detectors, double walled procedures should all be reviewed with pipe, etc., are available to prevent, mitigate, human factors in mind. or warn of a hazardous condition. Determine whether process controls are 2.3 Identification of the Hazards - adequate to prevent avoidable chemical hazards (e g., controls for temperature, 2.3.1 Potential Accident Scenarlos pressure, level, interface, pH, conductivity). If the system review reveals, potential 2.2.1.6 Other Chemical Systems in the chemical hazards of radioactive materials Licensed Material Process Areas and radiation hazards caused by chemicals, the hazards should be identified, Chemical systems which are not directly documented, and analyzed to determine involved in the processing of licensed their effects. Whenever possible, a materials but are in the same general area licensee's own experience should be used can interact with the licensed materials to supplement the identification of potential and/or associated equipment. Therefore. chemical hazards. Chemical accidents that review the controls that are in place to have occurred in the past show the more prevent these systems from leaking into common hazards, but reliance on past and onto equipment containing licensed experiencos alone may cause many material. A review of whether potential hazards to be overlooked. The lack of releases from other chemical systems chemical accident occurrences in a could affect the access to or operability of particular area does not mean that chemical equipment containing licensed materials hazards do not exist there. should also be considered. There are many different methods of 2.2.1.7 Management Controls identifying potential chemical hazards. Some of the more common methods The administrative controls placed on involve developing interaction matrices or chemical systems and the requirements using specific hazard evaluation techniques, placed on workers can have an overriding However, any method which sufficiently effect on the operation of the facility. The identifies potentialinteractions of the . management control systems needed to process area chemicals with the licensed maintain chemical process safety (Section material and its associated confinement, process equipment, and workers would be NUREG 1601 6
acceptable. Regardless of the method licensed material and potentially have a , chosen for identifying hazards, the human or environmentalimpact. consequences to people and the etevironment must be considered in 2.3.2 Instruments and Control determining which conditions are hazards. Functions 2.3.1.1 Effects on Public and Workers Instrumentation and control systems, as identified by the integrated safety analysis' The most commonly faced situation at fuel (ISA), should be provided to monitor cycle facilities is the exposure of workers to variables and operating systems important chemicals containing the licensed material, to safety during normal and off normal Such situations could adversely affect the operations, accidents, and shutdown health of workers and/or members of the conditions. In addition, the overall general public and should be identified as confinement system, the confinement potential chemical hazards. Chemicals bar i3rs, and the other systems which affect which do not contain licensed materials plant safety should be monitored. Controls should also be identified as potential should maintain variables within prescribed chemical hazards because, even in the operating ranges under all normal absence of workers, release of such conditions, and control systems should be , chemicals may affect the process by designed to fail to a safe state. Protection releasing the licensed material or may systems whose primary functions are to affect the confinement of the licensed prevent releases , facilitate process materialin a favorable geometry, shutdowns, or protect worker and public 2.3.1.2 Effects on the Environment
- a. Initiate actions to ensure that design Chemicals which can cause a release of limits are not exceeded, licensed material to the environment above NRC-prescribed limits should be identified b sense potentially hazardous conditions, as potential chemical hazards. Such releases include onsite and offsite c. have reliability and testability, contamination of air, water, and soil.
- d. maintain function with loss of a single 2.3.1.3 Effects on the Facility active component, The impact of chemicals on facility systems, e. maintain function with removal from structures, equipment, and components service of any component', and (i.e., process equipment) is an integral part of any chemical hazard analysis. Chemical effects causing degradation of process $ integrated safety anavsis means an anavsis to .
safety equipment (equipment for identh hamd* and th*ir potential for inaiahns event preventing, mitigating, and annunciating a [",q"['nj,$'g"d[i,[",,y,,"d',h'#, , , process hazard), process control equipment, compon.nts, and acinnties of personnei, that are relied on for safety as stated in the Draft NuREG 1513. equipment, and confinement vessels and structures should be identified as chemical , hazards if the degradation could affect the backup u nt t$ssu a ity aYd abIty oE ltems releod on for safety or remove hazard from system. 7 NUREG-1601
l
- f. fail to a safe state in loss of pcwer. licensed material or its confinement. They are not normally recommended for SNM-Thus, the identification of hazards should bearing solutions unless adequate consider accident scenarios where provisions are made in the enticality control instrumentation and control systems can fail calculations.
in the performance of one or more of these safety functions. 2.4.1.2 Liquid Confinement Dikes 2.4 Design Basis These barriers are widely used in bulk chemical storage areas for confinement of Assurance of chemical safety within a large spills. Dikes should also be used to facility begins with a good design basis. contain smaller amounts of spilled Adequately designed chemical systerns, corrosives to prevent potential interaction including the controls used to prevent with licensed material process equipment. accidents, will have few safety problems Dikes used to contain SNM bearing through most of their operating life. Properly solutions should not exceed criticality specified features such as materials of design constraints on volume, construction, equipment sizing, and system concentration, and enrichment. f abrication techniques will prevent many chemical accidents from occurring. The 2.4.1.3 Glove Boxes system's engineered-design process control schemes enhance these features to provide In licensed-material handling areas where an even higher margin for safety. When the chemicals are present, glove boxes should risk involving the licensed materialis high, be used to contain the licensed material and additional measures should be taken to protect it from undesired chemical ensure the chemical safety of the process, interactions. If other barriers are not in place, glove boxes should be constructed 2.4.1 Physical Barriers from materials that are resistant to the chemicals in the area. The establishment of physical barriers is an effective method to prevent releases of 2.4.1.4 Splash Shields licensed materials to unwanted locations. Physical barriers can be used to prevent Splash shields can be used to direct spills auxiliary systems which do not contain of hazardous liquids away from licensed licensed material from interacting with the material storage and process areas and licensed-material systems. Commonly used should also be used to protect workers from physical barriers are described below. potential spills of solutions containing licensed material. Splash shields should be 2.4.1.1 Double Walled Piping and Tanks transparent when possible so that a dripping solution can be identified and These physical barriers capture liquid leaks corrected quickly. and (when properly installed) alert personnel to the occurrence. They should 2.4.1.5 Fire Walls normally be used on piping and storage vessels containing highly corrosive Fire walls can be used to protect licensed-materials (such as hydrogen fluoride) in material storage and process systems from areas where a leak could easily affect the potential fires and explosions. They should NUREG 1601 8
be used as a barrier between licensed overflow vesselif all of the associated material and large quantities of flammable solutions are chemically compatible with or explosive chemicals which, when ignited, each other and with the overflow vessel could disrupt the integrity of confinement constructio,n materials. systems. Fire walls should a'so be used as a barrier for high pressure systems located 2.4.1.9 Chemical Traps and Filters near licensed materials. These are typically used for collecting 2.4.1.6 Protective Cages vapors, aerosols, and particulates from air and gas streams. Chemical traps capture These barricts are used to protect chemical vapors and aerosols by absorption or and licensed-matenal systems from impacts adsorption onto a collection medium. An with moving objects They are particularly example is the use of alumina to collect usefulin protecting poiymer or glass small quantities of UF, vapors from an air components of chemical piping systems. stream. Filters are widely used to remove Protective cages should be utilized where radioactive particulates from air flows, but such components are exposed tc major can be used in other situations. traffic areas. 2.4.2 Mitigative Features 2.4.1.7 Backflow Preventers and Siphon Breaks Mitigative features help reduce the impact of chemical accidents. Chemical systems These devices can be used in piping which tend to have an associated high risk systems to prevent chemicals or licensed level should include mitigative features in material solutions from flowing into the equipment design. Multiple mitigative undesirable locations and creating features may need to be combined to truly hazardous conditions. They should only be minimize the hazard. Some of the more necessary where the process design common mitigative features in fuel cycle requires interconnection of two or more facilities are described below. potentially incompatible systems Good process design practices should be used to 2.4.2.1 Driving Force Controls minimize such connections. These controls help stop the driving force of 2.4.1.8 Overflow Vessels the hazard. They are typically devices which cut power to heating elements or There should be an overflow strategy for other electrically driven equipment. They each process vessel containing licensed also include cutoffs for air-driven materials and/or hazardous chemicals equipment, pressure relief devices, and associated with it. In most i.1 stances, a emergency cooling systems. These separate vessel can be provided to controls should be in place on any system accommodate possible overflow of the which contains licensed materials or primary vessel. Such an overflow vessel hazardous substances at elevated should contain an alarm system so that the temperatures or pressures, overflow condition can be recognized. Automatic cutoff systems on the process vessel feed lines can also be used. Multiple process vessels can be piped into the same 9 NUREG 1601
i 2.4.2.2 Solenoid and Control chemical release. These systems can be Valves run continuously or on demand when a release occurs. Since these systems These valves help stop the flow of typically have a limited capacity, they hazardous substances from their should be used in conjunction with other confinements in cases of pipe breakage or mitigative features They are particularly downstream equipment failure. To be usefulin areas where spray systems are effective, they should be used in not feasible. conjunction with inline pressure or flow-monitoring equipment. They should be 2.4.2.5 Alarm systems used on any system containing highly hazardous chemicals or explosive gases Alarm systems can be used as a mitigative which does not have a secondary feature by alerting workers to the situation confinement system (e g., double walled and enabling them to act quickly to reduce piping). For fuel cycle facilities, highly the effects of a chemical release. These haraldous chemicals' would typically actions could include measures to stop the include ammonia and ammonia solutions release and/or evacuate the area. Alarm (>44Wi%), fluorine, hydrogen chloride and systems should be used in all high risk concentrated hydrochloric acid, hydrogen chemical process areas. fluoride and concentrated hydrofluoric acid, hydrogen peroxide (>52wt%), concentrated 2.5 Hazard Evaluation nitric acid (>94.5wt%), and uranium hexafluoride. The potential chemical hazards, once identified, should be evaluated for their 2.4.2.3 Spray Systems impact on humans and the environment. The evaluation of chemical hazards should Spray systems can be used to lessen the be performed as part of an integrated effort, effects of a chemical accident by scrubbing along with other safety and safeguards chemicah from the air, diluting chemicals measures, including fire protection, on the ground, or providing a quick cooling radiation safety, criticality safety, and mechanism. The most common spray physical security measures. Electrical and medium is water, but spray media can industrial safety concerns may also be part include dilute solutions which react with tho of the integrated safety analysis if their hazardous chemical and render it effects on workers can have a subsequent nonhazardous. Carbon dioxide is a typical effect on the confinement of the licensed cooling medium. Equipment containing material. licensed material should use spray systems only after thorough consideration of their 2.5.1 Methods effect on criticality control. The methods used for performing the 2.4.2.4 Auxiliary Ventilation hazard evaluation can vary ftom a simple
"" " *e hecklist to a complex Auxiliary ventilation systems can be located " " "
in high-risk areas to reduce the effects of a Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document (Draft NUREG 1513) and other
%gmy hamdous chemica4 n lis>d in 29 CFR documents referenced therein describes 1910119. Appenda A most of the techniques used by the NUREG 1601 10
chemical industry for hazards evaluation. associated with the input parameters for the The method chosen should be consistent hazard analysis can affect the accuracy of I with the apparent risk associated with the the results. Therefore, the elements facility, the level of detail desired from the discussed below may affect chemical results, the amount of process safety processes at the facility and should be information available, and th6 current stage considered in the analysis. These elements of the process life cycle. should be reviewed iteratively with
< subsequent hazards analyses as new 2.5.2 Results knowledge is gained. This periodic review should reduce the uncertainties and provide The results of the hazard evaluation should assurance of chemical safety at the facility.
undergo internal peer review for reasonableness by personnel not involved 2,6,1 Management Structure and in the original evaluation. The peer review Concepts team must be knowledgeable of the process facihty operations. Management The management structure at a fuel cycle should then scrutinize the results and facility can vary widely according to the - decide how to address each potential licensee's mission and capabilities. The l chemical hazard. It is important to update important aspects of management structure and revalidate the evaluation periodically and functions have been assembled in and when a significant change to the NUREG/CR-6287, ' Management Concepts process la made. Radiological and and Safety Applications for Nuclear Fuel chemical accidents which already have Facihties." It is recommended that each adequate preventive and mitigative controls licensee and license applicant designate and those involving very low risks (low one person to have overall responsibility
- probability and low consequence) may not and authonty for chemical process safety in 3 require any further action. Other chemical each facility, as is done for other disciplines hazards may need to be addressed by such as criticality end radiological safety.
establishing additional engineered-design i controls; by installing protective barriers; 2,6.2 Procedures and by implementing administrative controls l (e.g., revised procedures, a preventive Clear and comprehensive procedures are maintenance schedule, or an inspection- necessary to assure the safe operation of a and/or test based predictive maintenance fuel cycle facihty. Without such procedures, , system). A risk matrix can be used to measures taken to assure chemical safety provide guidelines for accepting or not would quickly lose their usefulness. accepting the analyzed frequency and Chemical safety issues identified by the consequence of the potential chemical hazard evaluation as having potentially hazard. significant impacts' on people or the environment should be addressed within the 2.6 Continuing Assurance of licensee's procedures. Procedures for fuel
. Chemical Safety cycle facilities are generally of two types, i
Effective implementation of chemical safety demands management involvement and control. The inherent uncertainties
- irnp.ca er, cons.o reo synrricant it they could involve i-violatons of Federal statutes l
11 NUREG 1601 l l
operating procedures and management More intensive chemical safety training control procedures. should be provided to qualify personnel as chemical process operators. 2.6.2.1 Operating Procedures 2,6.4 Maintenance Operating procedures directly control process operations and should include Effective maintenance and surveillance of instructions on handling chemical safety facility equipment ensure that equipment concerns during normal and off normal used to process, store, or handle hazardous conditions. These procedures should materialu is constructed, installed, and provide specific direction regarding maintained to minimize the risk of administrative controls to ensure procens accidental releases because of equipment chemical safety. Procedures for process failure. The mechanicalintegrity of all operations which can affect chemical safety structures, systems, components, and should include process operating limits and detection and monitoring equipment controls and the required actions for normal important for ensuring chemical safety and off norma *l conditions of operation. should be included in the maintenance Off normal conditior.s are conditions activities. These activities should include created by human failure or failure of any corrective maintenance, scheduled system, titructure, or component. preventive maintenance, instrumentation calibration and testing, and scheduled 2.6.2.2 Management Control Procedures surveillance and inspections for venfying the integrity of the chemical safety of the Management control procedures should be facility Maintenance and surveillance used to manage activities such as activities on chemical safety systems should configuration management, maintenance. include: plant-wide safe work practices, training, audits, and incident investigations. There a. pre maintenance reviews of the work to should be an overoll chemical safety be performed; element describing the methods, activities, and implementation of the overall safety b. confirmed notification to pertinent program. operators and supervisors of the maintenance to be performed and its 2.6.3 Training potential effects of maintenance on ongoing operations, and notification of Effective chemical safety training helps the completion of the planned employees understand the nature and maintenance and the restoration of the causes of problems that could arise from affected equipment; process operations and increases awareness of the particular hazards of a c. comprehensive procedures which process. The training programs desenbed address qualification of personnel ~ in a licensee's safety program description authorized to perform the maintenance should include provisions for chemical or surveillance, controls on and safety training of all personnel who routinely specification of any replacement access licensed-material areas, including components or materials to be used, contractor personnel, and visitors who are post maintenance testing to venfy allowed unescorted access to those areas. operability of the equipment, and NUREG 1601 12
b documentation of the results of the organization. A specific group should be f maintenance or surveillance activity, assigned the responsibility for maintaining the design and licensing bases and the 2.6.6 Configuration Management design requirements. Configuration management (CM) ensures 2.6.5.3 Document Control ] oversight and control of all design bases cnd modifications (both temporary and The control of documents within the CM permanent) to equipment, procedures, and system should be established to include processing conditions important to chemical cataloging the document data base and safety. Configuration management is one maintaining and distributing the documents. of the measures that should be integrated Such documents should include items from into a single safety program that the process safety information (design mcorporates chemical safety systems. A requirements, chemical hazards analysis, j Configuration Management system should as bul't drawings, specifications, operating include the following elements, and non-operating procedures pertinent to chemical safety, etc.), emergency response , 2.6.5.1 Implementation Plan plans, system modification documents, assessment reports, and any other , The implementation of a CM system should documents deemed necessary. Original or determine the scope of the safety elements master copies of documents should be to be considered, a description of each CM stored under quality assurance (QA) Cctivity and its objectives, and prescribe the requirements, functional interfaces with quality assurance, rnaintenance, and training. All chemical 2.6.5.4 Change Control safety hazards identified as significant should be considered. The CM system The CM system should maintain strict l consistency among the design should also have formalized configuration . management procedures and provide a requirements, the physical configuration, method for initiating immec,iate corrective and the facility documentation. Methods cctions to problems found with the CM should be develope.! for identifying changes system. in the configurations relied on for chemical safety, ensuring technical and managerial review of proposed changes, and tracking 2.6.6.2 Design Requirements arid implementing those changes by placing Design requirements and associated design documentation in a document control center bases should be established and and disseminating information to the - maints:ined by an appropriate organizational training, engineering, operations, '. unit. These design requirements should be maintenance, and QA functions. kept current and suitable hazard analysis methods should be used to evaluate 2.6.5.5 Assessments , chemical safety aspects of proposed changes to the process. The design basis Assessments of the CM system should be should be a set of facts about the chemical conducted to determine its effectiveness safety elements covered by the CM system and to correct deficiencies. Periodic and should be reviewed and approved by physical assessments (walkdowns) of the , cn appropriate authority within the chemical safety systems should be , 13 NUREG 1601 __- __ _____ . _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ ~
performed to confirm the program's responsibilities. The audits and accuracy and adequacy. assessments should be conducted by qualified personnel who are not responsible 2.6.6 Emergency Planning for chemical safety controls, and the results should be reviewed and acted upon by the The emergency plan, presenbes a licensee's management. comprehensive response to chemical-related accidents and plant emergencies to 2.6.9 Quality Assuranco protect the pubiic, the workers, and the environment. The portion of the emergency Quality assurance (OA) provides confidence plan relating to chemical process safety that the structures, systems, equipment, concerns should describe the significant components, and human actions relied on chemical hazards identified in the hazard for chemical safety are of acceptable evaluation process and methods to be used quality. Items relied on for chemical safety to detect and mitigate the corresponding should be subject in the quality assurance chemical accidents. criteria describN below. 2.6.7 incidcntinvestigations and 2.6.9.1 Det.lgn Control Correctivo Actions Systems, structures, and components relied upon for chemical safety should be incident investigation activities identify the designed with well defined objectives and root cauces of and responses to chemical functions. The dosign should be controlled safety incidents that affect the licensed to adhere to its defined function and should material and that have or could have be venfied by knowledgeable personnel not significant health and safety implications. directly involved in the original design, Such investigations should identify corrective actions to be taken to minimize the incident or prevent it from recurring. A 2.6.9.2 Procurement Document Control system should be developed with an Applicable design bases and other organizational structure and procedures for requirements necessary to ensure establishing investigation teams, adequate quality should be included or determining root causes, tracking and referenced in documents for procurement of, comp!cting corrective actions, and items or services related to chemical safety. documenting and applying the " lessons If Possible, suppliers should have a OA learned" to other operations. program consistent with the quality level of the item to be procured. 2.6.8 Safety Program Audits 2.6.9.3 Control of Purchasd Matedal, Audits and assessments provide assurance 9 " E * " ' "" " that the safety program is functioning as intended and should be used to determine Purchased material, equipment, and the effectiveness of chemical process services should be controlled to ensure safety controls. Audits and assessments conformance with specified requirements, should be conducted according to written Materials should be inspected upon receipt procedures and checklists that ensure the for accuracy and quality, and critical documentation of findings, the distribution measurements should be verified. of reports, and the assignment of follow up NUREG 1601 14
~
i i Equipment should be tested for operational compliance with all aspects of the QA ! acceptance before being relied upon for program and to determine its effectiveness. chemical safety. Purchased services which are relied upon for chemical safety should 2.6.10 Human Factors , be monitored frequently for assurance of l adequacy and completeness. Human factors are a potential cause of ! accidents involving hazardous chemicals 4 2.6.9.4 Identification and Control of and should be evaluated when humans Unacceptable Materials, Parts, interface with structures, systems, and Components components, or functions that are ; considered important to chemical safety. Provisions should be made to identify and Such human actions should be supported , control those items which were to have by information such as data, alarms,
, been relied on for chemical safety and are directions or management policies, training !
discovered to have incorrect or defective programs, and control displays so that they malertals, parts, and components, can be performed properly. A human i Unacceptable items should be physically factors program should contribute to segregated from acceptable or untested reducing the probability of significant i items when possible, and clearly marked or chemical safety related human errors, 7 tagged as unacceptable so that they cannot provide for the detection and correction of I be mistaken for acceptable items. the human errors that do occur, and integrate with other programs to provide 2.6.9.5 Measurement and Test Controls reasonable hssurance that system performance will degrade in a safe manner, , Provisions should be made to ensure that despite failures to prevent, detect, or correct tools, gauges, instruments, and other human errors. measuring and testing devices used on items relied upon for chemical safety are properly identified, controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified intervals. Testing requirements for chemical safety systems should be specified in wntten procedures. ] 2.6.9.6 Corrective Actions, Record keeping, and Audits Provisiens should be made to ensure that conditions adverse to the quality of chemical safety systems are promptly identified and corrected and measures taken to preclude repetition. Provisions should also be made for the identification, retention, retrieval, and maintenance of records that furnish evidence of the control of quality for activities important to chemical safety. Audits should be performed to verify 15 NUREG 1601
h 3 REFERENCES American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedutos, (2d edition with worked examples), New York,1992. American Society of Mechanical Engineers,"ASME Code for Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping," ASME B31.3, New York,1993. U.S. Codo of Fodotal Regulations, " Domestic Licensing of Source Material," 10 CFR Part 40. U S. Codo of Federal Rogulations," Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," 10 CFR Par 170. U.S. Codo of Foderal Rogulations, " Occupational Safety and Health Standards," 29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart H, " Hazardous Materials." U.S. Codo of Fodotal Regulations, " Occupational Safety and Health Standards," 29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart Z, " Toxic and Hazardous Substances " U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss!cn," Guidance on Management Controls / Quality Assurance, Requirements For Operation, Chemical Safety, and Fire Protection for Fuel Cycle Facilities," Fodotal Registor, Vol. 54, No. 53, March 21,1989, pp.11590-11598. U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," Integrated Safety Analysis Guidance Document,"(Draft Repor1 for Comment) NUREG 1513, February 1995. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," Management Concepts and Safety Applications for Nuclear Fuel Facilities," NUREG/CR 0287, May 1995. NUREG 1601 16 i
NRc 70 pied oss UA NuCLsAR RsGULATORY Ccatetessa00N 1.REPORf DAAetER pao laaeessed O assic, Am ved, tupp., P sv.
" " "'*'* * ' "'8 "g'" g SIBUOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET rsee e .e-o ., e. w NUREO-1601 3.TnLEANDSveTMLE Chemical Process Safety at Fuel Cycle Facilities 3 [ ATE REPORT PuollsHED warme vtAn l
August 1997 4 FIN OR ORANT NUMatR
- s. TYPE OF REPORT
- 6. AUTHON(s)
D. A Ayres Technical F.PERIODOOVERED endwrotessel e PEnromMedo OnoAtwAtson . MaaaE ANo AcoREse a sec ,s.m tw.= cm.,me m u a s*== as,mwr co wn.e= ew ne*e emew re-*wer own none enn we oneseei Divis6on of FuelCycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U S Nuclea ' Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 e sPOwsoReeo oRoAtazAtioN . haddE AND Af0REss pmcAee haw w e6avet aseewar pwm sec them the e Asym U a Mwww hymuy C.*w ed =**e ed8**8 ) Same as 8 above. M sVPPLE04.NY AFtY NOTES
- 11. A&sTRACT (aup o we e ases; This NUREG provides broad guidance on chemical safety issues televant to fuel cycle facilities. It describes an approach accordable to the NRC staff, with examples that are not exhaustive, for addressing chemical process safety in the safe storage, handl.ng, and processing oflicensed nuclear material. It a pounds to license holdats and applicants a general philosophy of the role of chem 6 cal process safety with respect to NRC-hconsed materials; sets forth the bas 60 information needed to properly evaluate chemical process safety; and desenbos plausible methods of identifying and evaluating chemical hazards and assessing the adequacy of the chemical safety of the proposed equipment and facilities. Examples of equipment and methods comrnonly used to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of chemical incidents are discussed in this document t3 AvAumtry aiATLENT
- 13. KEY WORDSOE sCRIPTOMs Amt wwwe e pc. mes pet es meet seseneses ei awebe av reest) unkm W Chemical Process Safety, Chemical Hazards, Chemical Safety, Fuel Cycle Facilities, Nuclear Material
*C8**^"
Hazards, Chemical Risks, Fuel Cycle Safety, Hazard Evaluat6on, Process Hazards, integrated Safety Arietysis ""**"M (a unclassified (Tiw aws unclassified
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