ML20339A666

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NRC Response to NEI Letter NRC Evaluated Force-on-Force (FOF) Program During the Public Health Emergency
ML20339A666
Person / Time
Issue date: 12/11/2020
From: Brian Holian
NRC/NSIR/DPCP
To: True D
Nuclear Energy Institute
Atack, S Stone, R
References
Download: ML20339A666 (4)


Text

December 11, 2020 Mr. Douglas True Senior Vice President, Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TO THE NUCLEAR ENERY INSTITUTE LETTER , "NRC EVALUATED FORCE-ON-FORCE PROGRAM DURING THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

Dear Mr. True:

Thank you for your December 1, 2020, letter, and your continued engagement regarding how to balance the circumstances related to the COVID-19 public health emergency (PHE) with implementation of force-on-force (FOF) oversight activities. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognizes and appreciates the need to take measures that help ensure personnel safety in light of the PHE and has taken a measured approach to ensure that we have been able to prudently carry out our oversight activities in a safe manner. This approach has been effective in helping the U.S. nuclear power plants to minimize the potential for infection of essential nuclear workers onsite as well as NRC inspection teams while ensuring that public health and safety continues to be adequately protected. We understand your request to use Inspection Procedure (IP) 92707, Security Inspection of Facilities Impacted by a Local, State, or Federal Emergency where the NRCs Ability to Conduct Triennial Force-on-Force Exercises is Limited, in 2021, as a continued means to provide a margin of safety against COVID-19 transmission. While COVID conditions are currently in a surge status, the NRC is planning ahead to make available a better assessment tool that can improve our oversight when conditions accommodate in 2021. This proactive approach will provide flexibility to engage in risk-informed oversight activities as site-specific conditions evolve.

With respect to NRC-conducted FOF exercises, the NRC developed IP 92707 to allow NRC inspectors to evaluate licensee security capabilities through evolutions such as tabletop exercises and limited scope tactical response drills. The NRC staff appreciates industrys feedback during the development of this IP and acknowledges your support for inspection activities conducted under IP 92707 in calendar year 2020. During a period of great uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 PHE, IP 92707 presented a risk-informed methodology for assessing readiness to defend against the design-basis threat. The implementation of IP 92707 has proven useful by providing new insights into a plants contingency response capabilities through the ability to evaluate response positions that are not always employed during traditional FOF exercises. The IP has also cultivated more open dialogue and engagement between the staff and the licensee through the focus on lessons learned.

D. True Notwithstanding its benefits, IP 92707s independent, segmented, and limited-scope tactical response drills limit NRC inspectors abilities to provide a thorough assessment of the licensees performance. While key elements and individual performance may be evaluated, this approach does not support the assessment of the overall strategy and effectiveness of the contingency response as designed in the physical security plan. As a result, inspectors have been faced with uncertainty when assessing the potential for deficiencies in the licensees protective strategy or performance of the security force using IP 92707. These challenges limit the ability to obtain significant learnings that are typically associated with NRC-led FOF inspections. For example, at a recent inspection, multiple limited-scope exercises showed weaknesses in the implementation of the sites strategy (albeit, the limited scope drills have increased artificialities whereby not all potential site resources are tested in an integrated manner). It is because of such lessons learned, which the staff has been closely tracking, that the staff developed a temporary instruction (TI) to improve the quality of the assessment while providing necessary flexibility to manage the continuing uncertainty in COVID-19 trends at regulated sites and the Nation as a whole. The TI provides a framework to conduct a holistic assessment of the protective strategy, including the use of a well-trained adversary force, NRC engagement systems, increased planning, and a mature exercise control structure. The TI also leverages notable benefits from the IP 92707 inspections, such as a focus on licensee-driven lessons learned and utilization of responder positions within the protected area. We received a letter from Mr. Bill Gross of the Nuclear Energy Institute, dated December 3, 2020, providing comments on the TI, and will hold a public meeting on December 15, 2020, to discuss feedback from cleared stakeholders. We note your concerns regarding the risks associated with exercises conducted in the power block and will remain vigilant about mitigating any such risks in inspection planning so as not to create a potential safety concern. This has been achieved successfully over the course of the FOF program and is a facet we must retain regardless of whether we apply an IP 92707 approach, a TI, or the IP 71130.03 framework.

Given the limitations associated with assessment under IP 92707 and the lessons learned from its implementation, we believe the most appropriate path forward is to implement the TI or return to the IP 71130.03 framework at an appropriate time (IP 92707 will be retained as an oversight tool in the event that the TI or IP 71130.03 inspection cannot be conducted). We recognize that recent COVID trends at some sites could preclude implementation of this framework in the near future. However, it is important that we are prepared to implement an improved procedure for NRC-conducted FOF inspections as site-specific conditions permit. While we have discussed March 2021, as a potential timeframe for implementation across the industry, we will continue to monitor COVID conditions while trying to accommodate the scheduling preferences of each site.

We recognize and appreciate your focus on protecting nuclear sector employees from potential exposure to COVID-19 in the conduct of their work duties. We echo the importance of prioritizing the safety of all involved as we proceed in fulfilling our oversight responsibilities. We plan to do this by assessing site-specific conditions to ensure they are appropriate for undertaking inspection activities and by using protection measures such as those noted during our November 2020, public meeting on FOF inspections (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML20308A706). These measures include screenings, facial coverings, social distancing, and virtual interfaces, among others. We look forward to continued dialogue on this subject with you and other stakeholders as we refine plans for calendar year 2021 oversight activities.

D. True Please feel free to contact me or have your staff contact Sabrina Atack, Director of the Division of Security Operations (Sabrina.Atack@nrc.gov, or 301-415-7241), if you have any questions or need additional information.

Sincerely,

/RA Brian E. Holian, Director Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

ML20339A666 OFFICE NSIR/DSO NSIR/DSO NSIR NAME S Ruffin S. Atack B. Holian DATE 12/08/2020 12/08/2020 12/11 /2020