ML20246F856
| ML20246F856 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/30/1989 |
| From: | Israel S NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Rosenthal J NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246F861 | List: |
| References | |
| AEOD-T912, NUDOCS 8907140074 | |
| Download: ML20246F856 (2) | |
Text
- _ _ - - _ .
, gft 4 d ift f i
- +$ [E; UNITED STATES
.; g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$[ j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\.../
+
JUN 3 01989 ,
NEMORANDUM FOR: Jack E. Rosenthal, Chief Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data THRU: Peter Lam, Chief < M Reactor Systems Section W and B&W Reactor Operations Analyiis Branch Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data FROM: Sanford Israel Reactor Systems Section W and B&W Reactor Operations Analyiis Branch Division of Safety Programs Office for Analysis and Evak. ion of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
SELECTED MAINTENANCE REWORK Enclosed is a Technical Review Report on maintenance rework that covers about 80 selected events for 1986, 1987, and 1988. This study was initiated because of a concern that maintenance rework was a significant factor in plant operations.
This study limited itself to random events, rather than situations involved with chronic problems, such as those observed in MOV limitorque switches and solenoid valves.
About 38 percent the events reviewed involved simple personnel errors such as disassembly following maintenance. These events had minimal safety signifi-cance because they involved one component, were of short duration, or were easily detectable by current procedures for inspection or post maintenance testing.
Misdiagnosis of the root cause of component / system failure accounted for another 25 percent of the events. The data suggest that the component / system designs involved may be too sensitive. Improvisations by maintenance personnel accounted for about 8 percent of the events and are covered by existing requirements to follow approved procedures. The remainder of the events were caused by admini-strative, procedural, and vendor problems which art also covered by existing requirements.
8907140074 890630 PDR ORG NEXD -
- d. 6
[)[O3 n
/0)F ,+
/
NRC FILE CENTEli CDPY &u
' Jack E. Rosenthal Although ma4ntenance rework poses a safety concern because of potential common
! couse f ail'ivs, the events reviewed were not considered overly significant.
The events generally involved only a single component, were identified in a short time frame, involved degradations rather than failures, or involved a second liue system. In summary, these events illustrate the benefits of workino from app.oved procedures,-inspection and post maintenance testing.
pligmat sigwd b)
Sanford Israel Reactor Systems Section W and B&W Reactor Operations AnalyIis Cranch Division of Saf ety Programs Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
T. Gody, NRR G. Lanik Distribution:
PDR ROAB R/F DSP R/F Sisrael PLcn KBlack MWilliams '
JRosentbel VBenor cya i CHeltemes EJordan BBrady )
FLanring i MTaylor, EDO j l
i l
l ROAB:DSP:AEOD ROAB:DSP:A OD R 18:DSP:AE00 SIsrael:si:a,s Plam ([,m t es er.tt al 6/lb/09 SL 6/g/E9 6/7p/89
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _