ML20202J123

Final Rule 10CFR73, Changes to NPP Security Requirements. Rule Revises Regulations to Delete Certain Security Requirements Associated W/Internal Threat

ML20202J123
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/24/1997
From:	Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
To:
References
FRN-62FR7721, RULE-PR-73 NUDOCS 9712110049
Download: ML20202J123 (18)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 O g (y,j;,, _

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RIN: 3150- AF53 Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Secuniy Requirements AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

- ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is revising its regulations to delete certain security requirements associated with an intemal threat. This action follows the NRC's reconsideration of nuclear power plant physical security requirements to identify those requirements that are marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer effective. This action will reduce the regulatory burden on licensees without compromising physical protection against radiological sabotage required for public health and safety, hm.u-nuy / 4, - l9 RV EFFECTIVE DATE: (25 d fe 'r:- . tt: :' pdm::S :- t T:d: :: C;.;,:::::).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Sandra Frattali, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-:001, telephone (301)

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SUPPLEMENTARY 'NFOPMATIOF

Background

On February 20,1997, the NRC published a proposed rule in the Federal Reoister (62 FR 7721) that would revise the NRC's regulations associated with an intemal threat to nuclear power plants that are contained in 10 CFR F' art 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." The five changes, which provide significant relief to licensees without compromising the physical security of the plants, involve changes to -

1. Search requirements fc.' on-duty guards, S 73.55(d)(1);

2. Requirements for vehicle escort, S 73.55(d)(4);

3. Control of contractor emoloyee badges, S 73.55(d)(5);

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4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area, S 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A); and

5. Key controls for vital areas, 73.55(d)(8).

The Commission received 9 letters commenting on the proposed rule. Eight were from utilities and one was from an industry group. Copies of the letters are available for public inspection ar.d copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Discussion The public comments supported the proposed rulemaking in general. Seven of the nine commenters recommended additional relief from the vehicie escort provisions. One commenter 2

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recommended additional relief from the search requirements for armed guards. Two commenters recommended changes to the regulations withe *Jt support that were outside the scope of this rulemaking.

For the of the changes in the proposed rule, onty the language that had been changed was provided in the proposed rule language. The language that did not change in those paragraphs was inadvertently omitted. This language has been put back in the final rule. The three paragraphs affected are: search requirements for on-duty guards,9 73.55(d)(1);

requirements for vehicle escort, S 73.55(d)(4); and maintenance of access lists for each vital area, S 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A).

The comments are discussed below.

Comment Resolution

1. Sparch Recuirements for On-duty Guards (6 73.55(d)(1)).

Under the current regulations, armed security guards who leave the protected area as part of their duties must be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices upon re-entry into the protected area. Requiring a guard to go through an explosives detector or searching packages carried by the guard protects against the introduction of contraband.

Because an anned guard carries a weapon onsite, passage of the guard through the metal detec'or, the principal purpose of which is to detect firearms, serves little purpose. The guard has to either remove the weapon while passing through the detector or be subject to a hands on search. Either approach makes little sense for the guard who is authorized to carry a weapon onsite. Further, removing and handling the guard's weapon could present a safety risk to the guard and other personnel. This rule will allow armed security guards who are on duty

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s and have exited the protected area to reenter the protected area without being searched for fireamis (by a metal detector).

Comment. All commenters supported thi: action. One commenter recommended that the words "on official business" be removed.

Etsponse The term "on official business" has bet.n replaced by the term "on duty."

The rationale given in the proposed rule to eliminate the searches would also apply when the guard reenters the protected am at other times, for example after lunch where the lunch area is ott aide the protected area, as is the caso at some facilitbs. The moaning of "on duty"is not i meant to extend to "on call" or to personal act!vities.

The amended rule allows armed secunty guards who are on duty and have exited the i

protected area tu reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms (by a metal 4

detector). Note that the rule says " reenter." This means that the guards have been searched on their initial entry into the p%Iected area. Unarmed guards and watchpersons will continue to meet all seaich requirements. All guards will continue to be searched tor explosives and incendiary deirices because they are not permitted to carry these devices into the plant.

2. Reauirements for Vehicle Escort (G 73 55(d)(4)).

The present requirement that 1 searched, licensee-owned vehicle within the protected area must be escorted by a member of the secunty organization, even when the driver is badged for unescorted access, does not contribute significar.tly to the secunty of the plant.

Under the current regulations, all vehicles must be searched pnor to entry in'e "'a protected area except unoer emorgency conditions. Also under the current ra, # all vehicles must be escorted by a niember of the secunty organization while inside the c' ded area except for

" designated licensee vehicles." " Des;gnated licensee vehicles" are 15~ o vehicles that are 4

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limited in their use to onsite plant functions and remain in the protected area except for operational, rr.sintenance, repair, security, and emergency purposes. Under the current requirement, all other vehicles that are not " designated licensee vehides" mest be escorted at all times while in the protected area even wnen they are driven by personnel with unescorted access.

Comment. Seven commenters were concemed that the proposed rule would only allow a vehicle to be unescorted when being operated by licensee employees having unescorted access. These commenters wanted this extended to contractor employees who are cleared for unescorted access as well.

Resoonse. This change has been made. Since both licensee employees and contractor employees are subject to equivalent access authorization programs, the level of trustworthiness is deemed to be equivalent. There is no compelling reason to distinguish between the two. The amended rule eliminates the requirement for escort of licensee-owned or h leased vehicles entering the protected area for work-related purposes provided these vehides are driven by personnel who have' unescorted access. This change provides burden relief to licer. sees without significantly increasing the level of risk to the plant.

Comment. Five comments were made that limiting unescorted vehicles to those that were licsnsee-owned was unduty restrictive, and wanted this extended to Incensee owned- or leased vehicles. One commenter wanted it further extended to contractor or vendor owned or leased vehicles.

Responta. The rule language was changed to aliow for licensee-leased vehicles to be unescorted when driven by personnel who have unescorted access. The NRC staff recognizes that licensees may lease rather than buy vehicles. However, the staff believes that this provision should not be extended indiscriminately to contractor or vendor vehicles because

s licensees have no knowledge er control over how contractor or vendor vehicles may be used for purposes other than those for which the licensee has contracted.

3. Control of Contractor Emolovee dadoes (6 73 55(d)(5)).

Contractor employees with unescorted access are required to retum their badges wnen leaving the protected area. Current regulatory practhe a' lows licensee employees to leave the protected area with their badges if adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the proper use of the badge is not compromised or that a system such as biometrics is in place to ensure that only the proper person uses the badge for gaining access to the protected area. Because contractors and licensees are subject to the same programs required for unescorted access, there is no reason to employ more sinngent badge control requirements for contractor employees.

This amended rulemaking allows contractor employees to take their badges offsite ,

under the same conditions as licensee employees.

Comment. All commenters supported this provision.

Resoonse. The final rule voll be published as proposed, with a sentence added to ensure that the integrity of the access controls are not adversely affected.

Comment. One commenter wanted the physical differentiation between contractor and employee badges eliminated.

Response. This comment provided no reason for changing the current requirement of having employee and contractor badges distinguishable. Further the staff has no reason to ma e such a change. Because of this and the fact that this comment is outside the scope of this rulemaking this change is not being made.

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4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area (4 73 SS(dif7)(iifA)).

Maintaining separate access lists for each vital area and reapproval of these lists on a monthly basis is of marginal value. At many sites, persons granted access to one vital area also have access to most or all vital areas. Licensees presently derive little additional benefit from maintaining discrete lists of individuals allowed access to each separate vital area in the facility. Also, licensee managers or supervisors are required to update the access lists at least once every 31 days to add or delete individuals from these lists as appropriate. %ere is also a requirement to reapprove the list every 31 days. However, reapproval of allindividuals on the

• lists at least every 31 days, to validate that the lists have been maintained accurately is C unnecessarity burdensome.

This rulemakii,g replaces separate access authorization lists for each vital area of the facility with a single list of all persons who have access to any vital area. It also changes the requirement to reapprove the list at least once every 31 days to quarteriy. Reapproval consists of a review to ensure that the list is current and tiat only those individuals requiring routine uccess to a vital area are included. Because a manag0r or supervisor must update the list, conducting this comprehensive reappmval every 31 days is of raarginal value.

Comment. All commenters supported these provisions..

i Ensoonse The final rule will be published as proposed.

The Commission desires to remind licensees that they are responsible for property controlling access, and that the changes to S 73.So(d)(7)(i)(A) do not remove their responsibility to establish procedures to ensure that persons no longer needing unescorted access are not granted such access.

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5. Eiv Controls for Vital Areas (6 73 55(d)(81).

Under the current regulations, licensees must change or rotate all keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices at least once every twelve months. The rule also requires that these be changed whenever there is a possibility they have been compromised, or when an individual with access to the keys, locks, or combinations has been terminated for reasons of trustworth; ness, reliability, or inadequate work performance.

Additionally requinng such change every 12 months has been determined by the NRC to be only marginal to secunty.

This amended rule removes the requirement for changing access control devices at least every 12 months whi% retaining the requirement to make changes for cause, and when an access control device has been, or there is a suspicion that it may have been, compromised.

Comment. One commenter requested that the words "inaderuate work performance"in the rule language be removed or defined.

Responts. The NRC sees no need to define " inadequate work performance" because the term characterizes many factors and judgements involving removal for cause. Further, the comment is outside the scope of this rulemaking.

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Regulatory Action The final rule will be promulgated with the changes made to the proposed rule in response to the public comments. Two of the public comments were not accommodated because they requested changes to the reguir. lions that were not put forward in the proposed rule.

Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion The Commission has determined that this final rule is the type of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i). Therefore, neither an environmentalimpact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this final rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0002. ,

Because the rule will reduce existing information collection requirements, the public burden for this collection of information is expected to be decreased by 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> per W:ensee.

This reduction includes the time required for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments on any aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for further reducing th'e burden, to the Information and Records 9

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Management Branch ('-6 F33), U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to BJS1@NRC Gov _ and to the Desk Officer, Office of information and Regulatory Affairs NEOB 10202, (3150-0002). Office of Management and Budget. Wasber,gton, DC 20503 Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently vahd OMB control number Regulatory Analysis A discussion of each of the five changes in this final rule is provided above in the supplementary information section. The costs and benefits for each of the changes in this rwemaking are as follows.

1. Search Reauirements for On-duty Guards (G 73.55(djL1.1).

The regulatory burden on licensees will be reduced by eliminating unnecessary weapon search 63 of guards who are already allowed to carry a weapon on site, which will result in better utilization of licensee resources. There will be no reduction in plant secunty, and there is no reduction in the total size of the secunty force. Further, the potential safety nsk to personnel caused by removing and handling a guard's weapon will be eliminated.

2. Reouirements for Vehicle Escort (73.55(d)(4)).

The regulatory burden on licensees will be reduced by requiring fewer vehicle escorts, which will allow personnel to be utilized more effectively or for other purposes Resources 10 -

could be redirected to areas in which they will be more eost effective. The oecrease ir security will be marginal, because unescorted access will be restricted to vehicles owned or leased by the licensee being driven by personnel with unescorted access.

Assuming the number of such entries of licensee owned or leased vehicles driven by personnel having unescorted access is 10 per day per site, the average time needed for escort is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, and the cost per hour for secunty personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $330.000 (10 escorts / day / site x 365 days / year x 3 hrs / escort x $30/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year will be approximately

$24,000,000,

3. Control of Contractor Emolovee Badoes (G 73.55(d)(51).

The reguhtory burden on licensees will be reduced by a more effective use of security personnel, who will no longer need to handle badges for contractor personnel who have unescorted access. There will be no reduction in plant security because adequate safeguards will be in place to ensure that badges are property used and not compromised, and a system such as biometrics is in place to ensure that only the proper person uses the badge to gain access to the protected area.

Assuming that two security persons per working shift change,5 shifts per day, one hour per shift are relieved from the duties of controlling contractor employee badges during an outage lasting 3 months. Further, assuming that the cost per hour for security persork .. .: $30 (loaded), k rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $27,000 (10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> / day x 90 days / year x $30 hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year will be approximately $2,000,000.

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4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area (6 73 55fdif7)f0fA)).

The regulatory burden on licensees mil be reduced because licensees will have to keep only one access list for all vital areas and reapprove it quarteriy, rather than keep individual access lists for each vital area that must be reapproved monthly.

Assuming that the time to reapprove each of the individuallists is i hour per month, that a combined list will take 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> per month, that the average number of vital areas per site is 10, and that the cost of a clerk including overhead is $30 per hour (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings per cite per year is about $3,400 ((1x10 vital areas / month x 12 mor'thr.!yr-1.5x1 combined vital area / quarter x 4 quarters /yr) x $30/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year will be approximately $260,000.

5. Kev Controls for Vital Areas (6 73.55(dif 81).

The regulatory burden on the licensees will be reduced because fewer resources will be needed to maintain the system.

Assuming that, of approximately 60 locks that are changed each year under the current requirement, half of them were changed because an individual was removed for cause or the lock may have been compromised,30 lockc remain in need of change. Assuming that it takes a locksmith 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to change all 30 locks at a cost (loaded) of $45 per hour, a rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $450 (10 hrs / year x $45/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the industry per year will be approximately $34,000.

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4 Regulatory Flexibikty Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act as amended, S U.S.C. 6b5(b), the Commission certifies that this final rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule w.ll affect only licensees authorized to operate nuclear power reactors. These licensees do not fall within the scope of the definition of

small entities set forth in the Regulatory Flexibiiity Act, or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Sma!! Business Administration Act,13 CFR Part 121.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Faimess Act in accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Faimess Act of 199S, the NRC has determir,ed that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.

Backfit Analysis The Commission has determined that the backfit rule,10 CFR 50.100, does not apply to this final amendment because this amendment will not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The changes to physical security are voluntary arid should the licensee decide to implement this amendment, will be a reduction in burden to the licensee. Therefore, a backfit analysis has not been prepared for this amendment.

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I List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Cnminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export, import, Nuclear matenals, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Secunty measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; tne Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C.

552 and 553; the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.

PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows: ,

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53,161,68 Stat. 930,948, as amended, sec.147,94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073,2167,2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204,88 Stat.1242, as amended,1245, sec.1701,106 Stat. 2951,2952,2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841,5844,2297f).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135,141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C.10155,10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96 295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 600, Pub. L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

2. Section 73.55 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(7)(i)(A),

and (d)(8) to read as follows:

6 73.55 9eovirements for ohysical orv,ection of licensed activities in nuclear oower reactorg aaainst radiolooical sabotaan.

(d) "'

(1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of allindividuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and authonzation must be checked at these points. The search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and locallaw enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon entry into a protected area. Armed secunty guards who are on duty and have exited the protected area may reenter the protected area without being searched for firearms. When the licensee has cause to suspect that an individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into protected areas, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat down seatch of that individual. Whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment at a portalis out of service or not operating satisfactonly, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat down search of all persons who would otherwise have been subject to equipment searches. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected ares) must be isolated within a bullet resisting structure as described in paragraph (c)(G) of this section to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.

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o (4) All vehicles except under emergency conditions. must be searched for l' cms which could be used for sabotage purposes pnot to entry into the protected area Vehicle areas to be searched must include the cab engine compartment, undercarnage, and cargo area All vehicles except as indicated below requinng entry nto the protected area must be escor1ed by a member of the security organization while within the protected area and. to the extent practicsble, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific designated materials receiving area that is not adjacot to a vital area Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or licer.see owned or leased vehicles entenng the protected area and dnven by personnel having unescorted access Designated licensee vehicles shall be limited in their use to onsite plant functions and shall remain in the protected area except for operational, maintenance. repair. secunty and emergency purposes. The licensee shall exercise positive control over all such designated vehicles to assure that they are used only by authorized persons and for authonzed purposes (5)(i) A numbered picture badge identification system must be use a for allindividuals who are authonzed access to protected areas without escort. An individual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may be authonzed access to such areas without escort provided that he or she displays a licensee-Issued picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which indicates:

(A) Non-employee no escort required; (B) areas to which access is authonzed; and (C) the period for which access has been authonzed.

(ii) Badges shall be displayed by allindividuals while inside the protected area Badges may be removed from the protected area when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and authonzation for access of the badge holder upon entry into the protected area.

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• s e . . e (7) "*

(i)*"

(A) Establish a current authorization access list for all vital areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be reapproved at least quartetty. The licensee shall include on the access list onh individuals whose specific duties require access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions.

(B) All keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices used to control 4 nd vital areas must be controlled to reduce the probability of

(&h A F " te is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock: combination, or es may have been compromised, it must be changed or rotated.

s, locks, combinations and other access control devices to

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protected areas and vital areas onh to persons granted unescorted facility access. Whenever 17 -

an individual's unescortad access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness, reliability,  ;

or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices to which that person had access, must be changed or rotated.

t Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this M E ~ day of November,1997.

J For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

4 l JohryC Hoyle, S9eretary of the Commission.