05000321/FIN-2017004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | A violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.3 was identified because two of eleven safety relief valves were found to be outside the tolerance allowed by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 for the opening set-point pressure. |
Description | Description: During the February 2017 Unit 2 refueling outage, all eleven 3-stage safety relief valves (SRVs) were removed and replaced. The SRVs were Target Rock model 0867F, a 3-stage valve design which was in its first use on Unit 2. This design was adopted as a corrective action to address corrosion bonding experienced by 2-stage SRV model 7687F valves which were previously in use at Hatch. "As-found" testing results indicated two of the eleven SRVs had experienced a setpoint drift during the previous operating cycle which resulted in their failure to meet the Technical Specification (TS) opening setpoint pressure as required by TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1. The SRV pilot valves were disassembled and inspected to determine the reason for the drift. The licensee determined that the abutment gap closed pre-maturely most likely due to loose manufacturing tolerances. For the 3-stage design, the pilot disc seating stresses should increase proportionally as reactor pressure increases to where a mechanical gap within the valve stem mechanism, referred to as the abutment gap, is closed. Additional pressure increases will cause the valve stem mechanism to reduce the disc seat pressure until the valve eventually opens. This same cause was previously identified in 2016 (CAR 264544) after two of eleven SRVs removed from Unit 1 also experienced setpoint drift. Because the Unit 2 valves were already installed when the cause was initially identified, there was no opportunity for the licensee to take corrective actions for the valves that are the subject of this LER. Additionally, there were no symptoms available to operators or maintenance personnel to indicate the potential for the set point drift prior to post-service testing. As a corrective action, when the eleven valves were removed for post-service testing, the licensee installed eleven refurbished pilot valves that underwent the corrective actions identified by CAR 264544 which included the vendors usage of revised tolerances.Enforcement: Hatch Unit 2 TS limiting condition for operation 3.4.3, Safety/Relief Valves, required 10 of 11 SRVs be operable in MODES 1, 2 and 3. With two or more SRVs inoperable, the required TS action must be taken by the applicable completion time. Contrary to the above, Unit 2 operated from the initiation of the degraded condition until February 6, 2017, with two SRVs inoperable. The inspectors concluded that the violation would normally be characterized as a Severity Level IV violation because it was of very low safety significance (Green). However, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion (EA-18-006) in accordance with Section 3.10 of the Enforcement Policy because the violation was not associated with a licensee performance deficiency. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 10382586. |
Site: | Hatch |
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Report | IR 05000321/2017004 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2017 (2017Q4) |
Type: | Violation: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Jones A Ruh D Retterer B Caballero P Heher J Munday |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2017004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2017Q4
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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