ML20207E132

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Insp Rept 99900400/86-02 on 861016.No Violations or Nonconformances Noted.Major Areas Inspected:B&W Sys for Providing Info to Nuclear Customers Re Installation & Operation of B&W-supplied Equipment
ML20207E132
Person / Time
Issue date: 12/29/1986
From: Correia R, Jocelyn Craig
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207E103 List:
References
REF-QA-99900400 NUDOCS 8701020071
Download: ML20207E132 (3)


Text

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. . l ORGANIZATION: BABC0CK & WILC0X

. LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION

-NO.: 99900400/86-02 DATES: 10/16/E6 ON-SITE H0llRS? 17 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Babcock & Wilcox, A McDermott Company Nuclear Power Division ATTN: J. H. Taylor Manager, Licensing Services D Post Office Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24506-0935 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: T. Stevens, Manager, Quality Assurance TFI FPHONE NUMRERt (R04) 1RG 111R NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Design and engineering services for B&W plants requesting reanalysis and modifications to existing systems, components and structures.

ASSIGNED INSPECTOR: o /2-24-8 6 R. P. Correia, Special Projects Inspection Date Section (SPIS)

OTHER INSPECTOR (S): P. D. Milano, SPIS APPROVED BY: D.M- -

J. W. Craig, Chief. SPI 5',

u Vendor Program Branch ll-M- tc Date INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:

A. BASES: 10 CFR Part 21,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.

B. SCOPE: The purpose of the inspection was t6 review the Babcock & Wilcox TliET system for providing information to their nuclear customers pertaining to installation and operation of B&W supplied equipment. '

PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: Arkansas 1 (50-313), Belefonte 1 & 2 (50-438 & 439),

Crystal River 3 (50-302), Davis-Besse 1(50-346), Oconee 1, 2, & 3 (50-269, 270 & 287), Rancho Seco 1 (50-312), Three Mile Island 1,(50-289), Washington Nuclear 1 (50-460).

8701020071 861230 PDR GA999 EMVB 99900400

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ORGANIZATION: BABCOCK & WILCOX y LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA REPORT:

INSPECTION NO.: 99900400/86-02 RESULTS:

3 AGE 2 of 3 A. VIOLATIONS:

None.

A B. NONCONFORMANCES:

None.

C. UNRESOLVED ITEMS:

None.

D.

STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS:

A review of previous inspection findings was not within the scope of this inspection. ,

E. INSPECTION REPORT

SUMMARY

During the NRC inspection, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) staff involved with field service infomation discussed with the NRC inspectors the various programs in place at B&W.  ;

B&W has both formal and informal programs in which B&W nuclear customers are supplied with information applicable to the operation and/or installation of B&W supplied equipment. B&W has established a close relationship with it's nuclear licensees during the last three years and much of the information being provided has been done thru the B&W Owners Group (BWOG).

The B&W system for the receipt and. evaluation of deficiencies potentially reportable under 10 CFR Part 21 provides the BWOG with a quarterly report of Potential Safety Concerns (PSC). The report contains the status in which current issues, new issues received since the last report and reported PSC's to the licensees are included. PSC's reported under 10 CFR Part 21 are matrixed in the quarterly status reports. Infomal feedback from licensees addressing their actions and evaluations of PSC's are compiled and included in the PSC status reports. If a new PSC appears to be of high concern, B&W will issue a letter to the licensees notifying them and will continue with the evaluation. There is also an annual meeting held in which PSC's are reviewed by the BWOG.  ;

The Transient Assessment Program (TAP) provided a reporting system in which B&W plant trips occuring between 1980 and present were evaluated by B&W and the licensees.

The evaluations resulted in recommendations beirg

'1...

i ORGANIZATION: BABCOCK & WILCOX LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900400/86-02 RESULTS:

PAGE 3 of 3 made to the licensees in order to prevent a trip reccurrence. The TAP reports were issued to licensees for information only until 1984. At that time, a more formal program came into being, the Trip Reduction Program.

A The program was maintained by a BWOG subcommittee which evaluated trips in order of priority by safety significance and made recommendations to prevent recurrence. After the Davis-Besse incident, another formal program, by the Safety and Performance Improvement Program (SPIP), was formed the BWOG.

This program-is currently active in evaluating TAP reports and also con-ducts interviews with operators at B&W plants. Results of these evalua-tions and operator interviews will be reported in the Recommendation TrackingSystem(RTS).

BWOG will track receipt, evaluation and implemen-tation of resultant RTS recommended facility changes. At the time of the inspection, B&W felt that as many as 500 recommendations could evolve as a result of SPIP.

The Nuclear Parts Advisory System addresses information on B&W procured or manufactured parts in the form of Nuclear Parts Advisory Bulletins.

The program provides for technical reviews and analyses of replacement parts B&W supplies to the nuclear industry. If the results of the

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reviews and analyses show that replacement parts may be necessary, a bulletin is issued. The bulletins address specific parts or assemblies and include information such as the particular component the part is in, the B&W plant applicability, background information as to why the bulletin is being issued and specific recommendations for effected utilities to follow.

B&W also has issued Service Bulletins (SB) and Site Instructions (SI).

SB's and SI's provide to B&W plant owners engineered technical documents, procedures, inspections, tests and/or changes. SB's and SI's are issued to licensees by letter with feedback requested. BWOG activities have taken issued.over much of the SB and SI activity and therefore, they are rarely B&W's assessment of their programs in 1986, specifically the SPIP, has resulted in a detennination that of the 13 trips at B&W plants in 1986 (as of the date of the inspection), seven could have been prevented and two could and have been implemented lessparticular at the severe iffacilities.

SPIP recommendations had been known