ML20155C040

Size of Problem, Presented at 980914-18 Intl Conference on Safety of Radiation Sources & Security of Radioactive Sources in Dijon,France

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Issue date:	09/14/1998
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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SAFETY OF RADIATION SOURCES AND THE SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES l

Dijon, France,14-18 September 1998 KEYNOTE ADDRESS THE SIZE OF THF PROBLEM THE HONORABLE GRETA JOY DICUS' United States of America l

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1 ' On 15 February 1996 Greta Joy Dicus was sworn in as a Commissioner of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and completed that term on 30 June 1998. She has

, been nominated to a second term by President Clinton.

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1. INTRODUCTION 1

' It is a privilege to be invited to participate in this, the International Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials, it is again a pleasure to visit France, this time the historic city of Dijon and the acclaimed Province of Burgundy. It is an j excellent setting for this important conference.

It is fair to state that much attention has been directed by international safety organizations and national authorities at the potential radiation and environmental hazards associated with the nuclear fuel cycle. The radiation and environmental risks resulting from hazards associated with the mining and milling of the raw materials of nuclear energy, uranium and thorium, are 4

well documented. The nuclear accidents in 1979 at Three Mile Island and in 1986 at Chernobyl, while significant!y different in their impacts, reinforced the need to pay close, detailed attention to recognizing and controlling the risks associated with the operation of 4 nuclear power plants. Equally important, we teamed from these events important lessons to be applied in emergency response planning. Radioactive waste disposal presents different, but no less important, radiological and environmental protection challenges. In all of these areas, the work of safety professionals is carefully scrutinized and often augmented by legislators, the communications media and by the public. Ensuring that radiation and environmental safety in the nuclear fuel cycle is consistent with societal expectations is a constant challenge to all

concerned.

But there is another challenge. That challenge is to assure that, while focussing on the clearly visible and well publicized hazards associated with the use of nuclear power, sight is not lost of other radiological and environmental risks resulting from the use of radiation sources outside of the nuclear fuel cycle. The imprint upon the public psyche of events like Three Mile Island and Chernobylis an incredibly strong one. One positive result of these events is that the impressions that they leave create strong public and political support for international and national initiatives to improve the safety culture and regulatory infrastructures related to nuclear power and the fuel cycle. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that, worldwide, the number of nuclear power reactors is relatively small, approximately 440, and, except for those in ships, they are in fixed, known locations. The foregoing cannot be said for radiation sources. The uses of radiation sources are myriad and their applications are nearly universal. Further, accidents involving radiation sources occur. Some of them have resulted in serious, sometimes fatal, radiation exposures. When radioactive materials are involved, radioactive contamination of the environment can also become a consequence. However, accidents with radiation sources seem to not make the same strong imprint upon the public that accidents involving nuclear power reactors do, One consequence of this is that the public ano political pressure for legislative and regulatory action in this area is not always as strong as for nuclear power and the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle. As a result, regulatory efforts have not always been as effective as they should be in this area. Equally important, legislative bodies have not always provided the requisite resources to national regulatory authorities so that they can implement effective radiation safety regulatory programs for radiation sources. Our challenge, then, is to i

ensure that allradiation sources receive appropriate levels of attention to protect public health y and safety.

This conference is a response to that challenge and I am grateful to the sponsors, the European Community, the international Atomic Energy Agency, Interpol, and the World i

3 Customs Organization for organizing it.

2. SAFETY OF RADIATION SOURCES To illustrate this chal!cnge, let me begin by citing the U.S. operational experience with licensed  ;

nuclear power plants and radioactive sources. In the U.S. there are 103 licensed operating nuclear power plants. Resident inspectors are present at all of these sites and their inspection ,

activities are routinely supplemented by inspections performed by regional and headquarters  ;

offices. The worst U.S. nuclear power plant accident, the accident at the Three Mile Island unit two, resulted in release of radioactive materials to the environment. However, no member of the public was exposed to radiation even in excess of the radiation dose limits for members of the public in normal situations from this accident nor from any other U.S. licensed nuclear  ;

power plant accident or from routine operations of U.S. licensed nuclear power plants. This j l statement, however, cannot be made with respect to U.S. operational experience with licensed radioactive sources, l

in comparison to the 103 licensed nuclear power plants, about 153,000 licensees use radioactive materials subject to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, as amended either in accordance with a specific license or in the form of certain devices containing radioactive sources l

authorized by a generallicense. About 1.8 million devices containing radioactive sources have been distnbuted to U.S. licensees. It is important to note that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) does not license all radioactive sources - radium sources being the l predominate example - and does not regulate radioactive sources used by the U.S. Department

of Energy, U.S. operational experience with radioactive materials includes serious accidents, some of them

! resulting in radiation injuries and others in radioactive contamination. The major applications in l which major accidents have occurred are irradiation, industrial radiography and teletherapy.

l Accidents with radiation sources are also a world wide problem. During this conference, we will learn more about some of these individual accidents and about lAEA summary reports on them.

l Another area of concern is lost, stolen and abandoned radioactive sources. Each year, the

! USNRC receives about 200 reports of lost, stolen or abandoned radioactive sources and devices. It is important to note that such reports are received only when licensees recall that they have a source, know that is lost or stolen, know that there is a requirement to report the loss or theft and make that report. Therefore, the volume of reports received probably represent but the tip of the iceberg. In some of these cases, the loss of control of radioactive l

sources resulted in radiation over exposures of unsuspecting members of the public or radioactive contamination.

The U.S. metal recycling industry has been particularly affected by losses and thef ts of radioactive sources which subsequently become mixed with metal scrap destined for recycling.

Since 1983, U.S. steel mills accidentally melted radioactive sources on 20 occasions and radioactive sources have been accidentally melted at other metal mills on 11 other occasions.

, While radiation exposures of mill workers and the public have, thus far, been low, the financial consequences have been large. U.S. steel mills have incurred costs averaging US$ eight to ten million as a result of these events and, in one case, the cost was US$ 23 million.

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4 Lost, stolen and abandoned sources appearing in recycled metals also constitute a worldwide problem. Thirty-four other, similar events are reported to have occurred in at least nineteen other countries (table 1). Others may have occurred but have not come to our attention or cannot be confirmed. These events also have the potential for international consequences as well because of the transboundary transport of radioactive effluents from a mill that has accidentally melted a source, such as occurred recently in Spain, or as the result of international marketing of mill products and by products that have become contaminated, such as "Co contaminated steel products. Radioactively contaminated products imported into the U.S. have been found on ten occasions (table 2). The sources of contamination in most of these cases are probably radioactive sources that became mixed with the raw materials used to l make the products. Although none of these cases resulted in significant exposures of the

! public in the U.S., another result of their unexpected appearance in the marketpiace is to raise l

concerns about the effectiveness of regulatory programs to assure the safety of radiation sources.

To again cite from U.S. experience, the USNRC has a well developed regulatory program for radioactive sources. Nonetheless, the data that has been collected on lost and stolen I

radioactive sources and on discoveries of uncontrolled sources in the public domain, such as recycled metals, showed a clear need for modifications of that program, in response, in 1998, the Commission directed that changes be made to provide more routine contacts with licensees using radioactive sources to remind them that they are responsible for accounting, control and proper disposal of licensed material. The point of this example is that the Commission could not have justified making this decision - which has resource implications - without the collection and analysis of operational data to support it. Equally important is the need to share this kind of information, l

l The IAEA has taken a leadership role in this regard. For example, with respect to operational l experience with radiation sources, the IAEA has prepared nine reports on individual accidents, six of them published, as well as reports on lessons learned from a collection of approximately 140 accidents that occurred in three major application areas, irradiators, industrial radiography and teletherapy. The IAEA has assisted in national efforts to " condition" unused, surplus radium sources to prevent their entering the public domain in an uncontrolled manner. In another initiative the IAEA is working with individual competent authorities to strengthen national regulatory programs to oversee the safety of radioactive sources.

When serious radiation accidents occur, the demands upon responding national authorities can l become overwhelming, in such cases, arrangements for interagency and intergovemmental assistance are essential. IAEA provided assistance to investigate and deal with accidents involving radiation safety and security on 10 occasions.

l There are many lessons to be learned from these operational safety experiences. The most of i important of these is the need for strong, effective national regulatory programs to oversee the l use of radiation sources. This will be a recurrent theme in the papers to be presented this week. It is equally important that there be in place a program to review and evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory programs and, when appropriate, the will and the flexibility to enact changes to improve their effectiveness. Considering the rather large number of radiation sources in use world wide, the safety record is reasonably good. When used properly by trained personnel with effective regulatory oversight, the many uses of sources are safe and

5 provide a net benefit to society, it is when proper procedures are not followed, effective radiation control programs are lacking or control of radiation sources is lost that our problems begin.

3. SECURITY AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS Within the radiation protection community the security of radioactive materials is always an l integral part of the normal radiation protection program for radioactive materials. Historically, I thef ts of radioactive sources or devices are not unknown but, in most cases, such thefts were  !

commonly motivated by misguided thcughts on the part of the thieves that stolen radioactive sources or devices may have monetary value similar to the value of stolen metals or specialized i

equipment. Such motivation for thefts continues today. Unfortunately, when thieves learn that I the stolen items cannot be sold, they of ten discard them in trash or metal scrap creating radiological risks for people who handle and dispose of wastes or who process and use recycled metal scrap.

1 In comparison, the theft and smuggling of radioactive materials for the purpose of using the '

stolen material for malevolent purposes have historically been relatively rare. Even so, thef ts and smuggling for this purpose have always been a matter of concern to national authorities.

Today, because of recent political changes, such events take on greater significance for safety ,

and police authorities. The increase in the numbers of incidents where radioactive materials have been stolen or smuggled for this purpose increases the risk that members of the public may be exposed and possibly harmed by these incidents and increase the opportunities for actually using stolen materials to deliberately expose people or contaminate property.

The majority of the materials that have been offered for sale for malevolent purposes to date have in actuality not been weapons-usable nuclear material, however, in some cases, they have been radioactive materials that,if handled improperly, could cause harm to the public health and safety. These incidents merit close attention. Although terrorists worldwide continue to utilize conventional weapons to commit their heinous crimes, the Sarin attack by the Aum Shinrinko in Japan against the Tokyo subway system brought to reality what had only been viewed as a crime of the future. The uses of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials by terrorists as a weapon of mass destruction and to create fear are no longer crimes of the future.

We are confronted by them today.

Thus, it is important that we exchange information and expand our knowledge in this area as well as in the conventional areas of radiological protection.

4. CONCLUSIONS This international conference will serve to increase our ability to successfully meet the i challenge to assure that radiation sources are used safely and securely. All of those involved with radioactive materials - suppliers, manufacturers and distributors, users, persons

, transporting radioactive materials, waste disposal facility operators, and the national and l international safety and police authorities have a responsibility to apply that knowledge to enhance public and environmental safety. Successfully doing that will,in turn, enhance public

! confidence that radioactive materials can be used safely, i

6 Finally, it should be noted that often the consequences of losses, thefts and smuggling of radioactive sources and materials cross national boundaries. For this reason, programs to facilitate the international exchange of information and international cooperation in control and security of radioactive materials are essential. In this respect, the International Atomic Energy Agency has been a leader and is to be commended. This international conference is a key step to achieving these important objectives and I suggest that we do our part by fully participating in it. Therefore, Ilook forward to the rest of this conference and to meeting with you.

Thank you.

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7 l TABLE 1 MELTINGS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS Year Metal Location isotope Activity (GBq)

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1 gold NY 8Pb,2'0Bi,8Po unknown 2 1983 steel Auburn Steel, NY "Co 930 l

3 1933 Iron / steel Mexico * "Co 15,000 l 4 1983 gold unknown, NY 2*' Am unknown 5 1983 steel Taiwan * "Co >740 6 1984 steel U.S. Pipe & Foundry, AL Cs l

' 0.37-1.9 7 1985 steel Brazil * "Co unknown 8 1985 steel Tamco, CA '3'Cs 56 9 1987 steel Florida Steel, FL Cs 0.93 10 1987 aluminum United Technology, IN 22 era 0.74 11 1988 lead ALCO Pacific, CA C s 0.74 0.93 12 1988 copper Warrington, MO accelerator unknown 13 1988 steel Italy * "Co unknown 14 1989 steel Bayou Steel, LA '2'Cs 19 15 1989 steel Cytemp. PA Th unknown 16 1989 steel Italy ' 'Cs 1000 17 1989 aluminum Russia unknown unknown 18 1990 steel NUCOR Steel, UT ' 'Cs unknown 19 1990 aluminum Italy '8'Cs unknown 20 1990 steel Ireland '8'Cs 3.7 21 1990 steel" Czechoslovakia "Co unknown 22 1991 steel India * "Co 7.4 20 23 1991 aluminum Alcan Recycling, TN Th unknown 24 1991 aluminum Italy '3'Cs unknown 25 1991 copper Italy 2Am unknown 25 1992 steet Newport Steel, KY Cs 12 27 1992 aluminum Reynolds, VA 22sRa unknown 28 1992 steel Border Steel, TX ' 'Cs 4.67.4 29 1992 steet Keystone Wire,lL '3'Cs unknown 30 1992 steel Poland ' 'Cs unknown 31 1992 copper Estonia / Russia **Co unknown 32 1993 unknown

• Russia 22 era unknown 33 1993 steel (?) Russia Cs unknown 34 1993 steel Auburn Steel. NY ' 'Cs 37 35 1993 steel Newport Steel, KY Cs 7.4 36 1993 steel Chaparral Steel, TX 'S'Cs unknown 37 1993 zinc Southern Zinc, GA U(dep) unknown 38 1993 steel Kazahkstan* "Co 0.3 39 1993 steel Florida Steel, FL ' 'Cs unknown 40 1993 steel South Africa ^ Cs < 600 8q/g

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41 1993 steel Italy '2'Cs unknown i

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42 1994 steel Austeel Lemont, IL '37Cs 0.074  :

43 1994 steel US Pipe & Foundry, CA '8'Cs unknown 44 1994 steel l Bulgaria * "Co 3.7 45 1995 steel Canada" l

Cs 0.2 0.7 46 1995 steel Czech Rep. "Co unknown 47 1995 steel (?) ltaly '8'Cs unknown 48 1996 steel Sweden "Co 87 49 1996 steel Austria "Co unknown 50 1996 lead Brazil' 2' Pb,8' Bi,2' Po unknown 51 1996 aluminum Bluegrass Recycling, KY 232Th unknown 52 1997 aluminum White Salvage Co., TN 84'Am unknown l

53 1997 sleel WCl,OH "Co 54 1997 0.9(?)

steel Kentucky Electric, KY 'Cs 1.3 55 1997 steel Italy '37Cs/"Co 200/37 56 1997 steel Greece '3'Cs 11 Bq/g l 57 1997 steel Birmingham Steel, AL Cs44 'Am 7 Bq/g i 58 1998 carbon" unknown unknown unknown 59 1997 steel Brazil * "Co < 0.2 l 60 1997 steel Bethlehem Steel,IN "Co 0.2 i

61 1998 steel Sweden "Co 0.02

! 62 1998 steel Spain Cs

' > 37 63 1998 steel (?)"* Slovenia unknown unknown 64 1998 steel Sweden '"Ir 8 65 1998 aluminum Southern Aluminum, AL Th unknown

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' Table is compiled from database maintained by James G. Yusko, CHP, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection,400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA, 15222 4745, U.S.

multiple cases reported, earliest circa 1910 railroad box car doors, detected in Italy contaminated product exported to United States contaminated V slag exported to Austria; detected in Italy.

l contaminated by. product (electric furnace dust) exported to United States l slag contaminated, metal not identified l

graphite electrodes, detected in Italy l metal coils, detected in Italy l

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TABLE 2 R.ADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED PRODUCTS i l i IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED STATES '

Product Contaminant Year Discovered &

Country of Orioin

1. Steel & iron "Co 1984 Mexico

2. Steel "Co

3. Steel 1984 Taiwan l "Co 1985 Brazil l 4. Steel "Co

5. Steel 1988 Italy I "Co 1991 India

! 6. Ferrophosphorus "Co

7. Steel 1993 Kazakhstan I

"Co 1994 Bulgaria

8. Furnace dust '37 Cs

9. Lead 1995 Canada 8' Pb,2' Bi,2' Po 1996 Brazil

10. Steel "Co 1998 Brazil NOTE:

Table was compiled by Joel O. Lubenau, CHP, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, U.S.

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