ML20125B608

Methodological Concepts & Issues Involving Psychic Costs & Benefits,Risk Perception & Risk Aversion in Use Mgt of Alternative Energy Sources

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Issue date:	10/26/1979
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METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IJ1VOLVING PSYCHIC COSTS AND BENEFITS, RISK PERCEPTION, AND RISK AVERSION IN TliE USE MAf>AGEMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES

• Miller B.' Spangler U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 ABSTRACT Anxiaty or psychic costs deriving from perceived risks of alternative energy sources often play an important role in private and public decisions involving the acceptability and use management of alternative energy sources. This paper pro-poses a conceptual framnwork for integrating psychic costs and benefits along with other values of a more holistic, personal systematic and in manner social meritenergy assessing so that these policy values might option.s. be trea ENERGY POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF INNOCENCE ,

Accord bg to public opinion polls, many persons in the United States do not agree

~

there is truly an energy crisis. President Carter (1) has referred to it as an

" invisible" crisis:

Our energy crisis is an invisible crisis, which grows steadily worse even when it is not in the news. It has taken decades to develop,ill as our demand for energy has grown much faster than our supply. It w take decades to solve. But we still have time to find answers in a

)lanned, orderly way - if we define the changes we must make and if we l Jegin now.

In October 1968 at a seminar sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Gradu-ate School on The Critical Issues of the Future, I presented a scenario for petro- I leum developments through 1990 which anticipated many of the aspects of what energy '

1 planners today regard as salient features of the anargy crisis (2). The scenario assumed: (i) oil imports at 40-50% of U.S. re themajorfractioncoming from countries of political instability, (ii) quirementsasubstantialincreaseinoilprice (iii) the breakout of war between Arab countries and Israel with a serious risk of cutoff in U.S. oil supplies, and (iv) associated problems arising from national security requirements and balance-of payments deficits.

Despite the lessons learned in this personal effort, certain key aspects of the cur-rent energy crisis were either not anticipated or analyzed. Chief among these are:

(i) the tendency of a substantial fraction of our citizens to discount the exist-ence of an energy crisis or to downplay its gravity, (ii) the wide divergence of views by those who agree there is a crisis as to what should be done to resolve it, and (iii) the intensity of personal feelings of antagonists and protagonists of

• A paper prepared for presentation at the Second International Conference on Energy Use Management, Los Angeles, California, October 22-26,1979. To be pub-lished in the Conference Proceedings by the Pergamon Press.

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4 alternative energy source's and policy options affScting their use management. In my view, no policies directed to the solution of the energy crisis can hope to be successful unless they come to grips with these highly personal aspects whose divisiveness irpedes our national energy policy formulation "to find answers in a planned, orderly way.".

This divisiveness is traceable to a broad set of personal anxieties in our society about the future course of man and his relationship to his environment:

o That uncontrolled population growth compounded by continued increases in per capita consumption of finite, non-renewable resources will cause a serious wrench in the quality of living and despoil the natural environment.

e That estimates of undiscovered and economically recoverable energy resources will prove to have been overstated.

o That conservation measures to reduce our dependency on non-renewable er. orgy resources will not be accepted or implemented on a timely basis.

o That conversion to the use of renewable energy resources through roscarch and development and subsidization programs will be too slow-paced, on the one hand, or too inflationary, on the other.

o That greater use of conventional energy resources in more plentiful dcr.estic supply, such as coal and uranium, are objectionable because of their perceived adverse impacts on the human environment including safety and health effects, i i

o That our private and public institutions cannot be trusted to make  !

decisions regarding energy use management in keeping with specific or 1 wider public interests. l a That failure to resolve the energy crisis on a timely basis will )

undermine the free, democratic character of our political economy, j seriously strain the quality of our international relations and compro-mise our national security 90als.

It is readily apparent that divisiveness in our society over energy p'olicy is importantly characterized by wide variations in the " anxiety prof 11e of individ- - 1 uals regarding the above and related risk formulations (3). Anothermajorsource of divisiveness stems from limitations of knowledge of society in the highest informed sense possible to assess risks and to forecast relevant causal factors as well as even greater limitations among individual thought leaders and policy nakers. Indeed, the complexity of uncertainties pertaining to energy-related anxieties is so great and the span of information required to analyze them in i rational, decision-making contexts is so vast that even the most knowledgeable '

';culd experience great difficulties in mestering all of the requisite skills and facts. If " innocence" is characterized Ly a lack of knowledge or defects of a holistic rationality stemming from a defidency of relevant experience or sophisti-cation of multi-disciplinary skills, it is 6undantly clear that the energy crisis j is, above all, a " crisis of innocence."

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'* a vo o d) , . m THE INTERACTION OF PERSONAL At10 SOCIAL VALUES AFFECTING THE USE llAMGEl1ENT OF ALTEfDTATIVETITEEY- RESOURCES ]

Value Theory and the Concept of Psychic Costs an'd Benefits In dealing with such matters as risk and anxieties, traditional value concepts such as economic utility theory are often regarded as inadequate.* For example, many individuals and. decision-makers recoil against the notion that the value of l human life should be measured in dollars whose worth are reflected in the ebb and flow of marketplace transactions. Nevertheless, decisions to spend "X" dollars with the estimated rest.lt of saving "Y" lives are at least subject to having a de i

. minimus dollar value of numan life inferred from such decisions. In this manner ~ l Harvard professor, Richard Wilson (5) infers that our society is willing to spend

$100,000 for a human life saved by requiring factory-installed seatbelts in auto- ,

mobiles in contrast with a value of $100 million for a human life by the require- l ment of an additional capital cost of $2 million per nuclear plant and $300,000 in higher operating costs to reduce radiation deaths due to cancer and genetic effects. In a siuilar vein, a study by Lave and Seskin (6) indicates that a cost of over $200,000 per life saved would be required through measures to abate air pollution, a .:1ajor contributor of which is coal-fueled electricity generation.

Another method, often used by economists, is through computing the present value of lost earnings of a life cut short (7)(8). Although this approach has merit, it can only partially reflect the value of human life. For while it is true that human resources imply an economic value to society through loss of productive out- ,

I put, it is dvicus that a person's life also has a personal value plus a social value to others in the various social roles he or she occupies: wife, father, friend,scoutleader,etc.) !!c<.ever, these personal and social values are incommensurable and adding them to quantified earnings losses is like adding apples and oranges. Yet, the form of cost-bonefit balancing required under the National Environmental Policy Act and its interpretation by the Council on Environmental Quality (9) provides legal backing for such an apples and oranges accounting of societal impacts in a. comparison of alternatives to a proposed (onergy) development.

The uncomfortability with such a logic in the integration of disparate values and I the frequent disagreement as to what values should be taken cognizance of and how these should best be expressed su0 gests the need for a rethinking of our philoso-phies about man's relation to other men and to his environment. Henryk Skolimowski  !

(10) proposes such a change to a new "eco philosophy" which he feels is essential to provide our civilization with a restored confidence and direction to get us out of the swamp of our present hopeless meanderings. Whether this is too heady a counsel for some to accept, it is clear nonetheless that we must begin to rational-ize our policy formulations in less conventional terms than we have in the past. l This is particularly true of risks to public health and safety which have come to i dcminate our thinking about many of our social options. Moreover, a continual state of anxiety or fear experienced by individuals is a value in its own right which, for certain individuals, may exceed in its importance for energy policy formulation the value to be placed on the loss of human life itself. Even befo e the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant accident of March 28, 1979, article captions were increasingly in evidence relating to such anxietics:

e "The Fear of Nuclear Energy" - Washington Star, March 15, 1979.

4 e "New Fears Surround the Shift to Coal" - Fortune, November 20, 1978.

^Aithough a review of economic literature reveals a more comprehensive frame-work for the treatment of utility theory than its critics would suggest (4).

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6 e "On the Chicken 1.ittle School of Regulation" - Washington Post, llovember 28, 1978. ,

Indeed, as long ago as its Fourth Annual Report (1973), the Council on Environmen-tal Quality (11) drew attention to the need to include in our analysis of benefits and costs a form of intangible personal damage cost which was characterized as

" psychic costs" which included anxieties created by congestion, risks to health and safety, aesthetic blight and excessive noise.

Although the above CEQ reference is limited to psychic costs, the term " psychic value" should be defined to include psychic benefits as well. Thus, psychic costs are something Ohich individuals would ordinarily desire to avert and the reduction be thought of as " psychic benefit" by par- ,

of a " psychic mitting an improvedcost" state wouldofappropriately dysphoria / euphoria.

Psychic values, in dictionary terms, consist of values that are non-material, moral, or spiritual in origin or force.*

Inordertosttainanoperationalperspectivethatdistinguishesthemfremmarket values, " psychic values' for our purposes might be defined as personal perceptions of value associated with certain activities, transactions and reaT or potential >

events which are external to marketplace values.

i lithin the field of risk analysis as applied to public health and safety, other terms are sometimes used for psychic values. For example, Zeckhauser (12) in dis-  !

i.ussing risk aversion preferences related to safety matters uses the term " anxiety

<osts" in lieu of " psychic costs":

Because the types of risks that are being discussed in connection with radiation exposure are of the low probability variety, we must expect the anxiety cost to be a fairly substantial proportion of the amount that an individual would pay to avoid the risk. Mere extrapolation from more significant risks in other areas would not seem to be valid.

In contrast, Pahner (13) uses the term " psychological aspects" in place of the above usage of psychic values-l The contemporary concern for the social, economic, political, and psychological aspects of the nuclear energy debate has been clearly j portrayed in statements by scientists and political leaders at numerous international meetings and in reporting by the mass media. I i

The reaction to this particular technology has ranged from relative public indifference to wide-spread anxiety. In some countries the resistance has been so challenging as to stimulate serious social and political discussion. In several cases it has resulted in government I

decisions to halt further construction of nuclear power facilities.

Although " psychological" is less likely to be interpreted as relating to occult phanomena than " psychic," my own preference is for the latter term in order to avoid the mono-discipline connotation of psychological. For it is clear that the study of psychic values as defined above is decidedly multi-disciplinary encompas-sing such diverse fields as economics, sociology, philosophy, behavioral science, anthropology, ethics, and religion. Indeed, religion is one of the oldest institutions to deal directly and prescriptively with personal fears. William Pollard (14) cites the relation of religion to the conquest of fear noting that in man's use of energy the overcoming of fear and the choice between blessing and curse has been dominant.

• Webster's lfew CoTlegiatelictionary.

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. .. . Personal Divergences in Risk Perception and the Willingness to Accept or Reject Risks

_ Observations of human behavior in risk choice situations reveal a pattern of per-

- sonal bias in the acceptance or rejection of risks. A study in 1948 by Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage (15) revealed positive or negative preferences in the betting behavior of individuals in games of chance where the statistical quantifi-cation of the probability of winning or losing coul probability theory or, in the case of insurancechases, pur,d from be computed from a priori actuarial data.

Another example of differential attitudes or personality traits entering into a

. bias in the acceptance of risk is cited by Kneese and Schulze (16). They point out that it is not unreasonable to suppose that persons who accept risky jobs are less risk averse than the general population; therefore, the $260 por year additional income reported as paid to workers to accept higher radiation risk would not accurately represent the appropriat,e value of loss of life for society as a whole.

On the matter of voluntary vs. involuntary risks effecting a significant bias in the personal acceptance or i~e'jection of a risk, Starr et al (17) point out that an individual exposed to an involuntary risk is fearful oT tfie consequences, makes risk aversion his goal, and therefore demands a level for such involuntary risk exposure as much as one thousand times less than would be acceptable on a voluntary basis.

Moreover, the coupling of economic and psychic benefits with economic and psychic costs -- in assence, a personal balancing of costs and benefits -- is a crucial window to ederstanding what otherwise would appear as irrational choices in human behavior. For example, the continuing decisions for smoking despite personal understanding of the cancer and other health risks associated with smoking must assuredly be influenced by certain psychic benefits derived from smoking including I such variable factors as: (i) personal enjoyment in fulfilling an habituated taste; (ii) the possible " image" benefits of personal appearance as cultivated by mass media, and (iii) the possible weight-reducing benefits through reduced appetite.

By the same token, the psychic costs in mountain climbing would appear to yield proportional psychic benefits of expressing and reinforcing one's self-image, as well as the public image, of high courage. The self-image of courage of our ,

pioneering forefathers and modern-day leaders in business or political life as well I as in professional fields such as medicine, engineering and the like is probably an underemphasized aspect in undecstanding an important biasing factor in terms of variations in personal willingness to accept or reject risks. On the other hand, persons who lead the opposition to acceptance of risk of a given type should not be expected to think of themselves as uncourageous. Rather, it is more likely that the self-awareness of such a dominant personality or character trait would focus on j the " wisdom" of exercising caution, or a self perception of " protector" of some l worthwhile cause associated with the " good life." It is clear that our society and civilization at large has ceaped considerable benefits over the years both by pro-gressives who have led the public teceptance of the risks of technological and institutional change and also by cow ervatives who would protect against loss of values due to ill-advised or excessive action regarding certain prospective changes.

When psychic costs are related to anxieties about the future in appraising optional technological developments or in supporting regulatory or institutional changes, the inadequacies of forecasting methodologies to predict reliably the consequences or estimate their probability coef ficients are germane to potential pe'rsonal bias in risk perception. When actors are not neutral as to the personal and social out-comes inherent in the proposed action or its alternatives, there is often a 90013178

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• gT YQ oJuuM.klhL pronounced tendency of those with protagonistic views as to a beneficial conse-quence to elect a forecast value in the upper rangp of uncertainty and antagonists would elect a value at the lower range of uncertainty.

Moreover, since there is a complexity of causal factors affecting consequences as well as a wide variety of consequences to evaluate, there is an enormous amount of information to be assembled and analyzed if one is to be as objective as possible.

Given the limitations of personal resources (time and skills) to deal with such complexities, as noted above, the existence of polarized views can often be expected to have a profound bias on the kinds of information assembled or the willingness to be open minded to opinions or analyses of those with contrary views.

Indeed, there may even be a psychic benefit or pleasure in reading an article or listening to a view on such matters that has a similar polarity with the protag-onist or antagonist of an action as ucll as psychic costs in exposing oneself to information supporting an opposing view.

This tendency is particularly a source of great confusion to the lay public who feel a need to rely on expert opinion to appraise risk including associated costs

nd benefits. It is apparent that many experts are divided on whether to support or oppose a developmental action and their polarization may result in a divergence in risk perception as discussed above. Robert Stern (18), among others, has called attention to the public need for a better system to separate fact from opinion 7.nd also to restore trust of experts in their subjective appraisals of uncertainties.

The Impjct of Risk Assessment on Per<onal and Institutional Decisions Liformtion rescurces to which an individual is exposed is coupled with one's intellectual capacitics and personality and character traits to form personal values through a subjective process which combines reason with currently felt Lt.o ti on. The incompleteness of information and psycho-dynamic variabilities in this process often seriously ham er the objectivity of findings in opinion surveys.

According to Bowman and Bach (19 :

The problem of ascertaining the ends, or goals, of social policy is a very complex one. How, in a democratic society, can the attitudes of the majority of people be discovered? It is not enough to take a poll of opinions. Many attitudes are only half-conscious, and most people are only partially articulate. And apparently subtle variations in attitudes are sometimes very significant in revealing underlying differences. Moreover, human beings are neither consistent nor fully informed. Each individual has ideas which are mutually incompatible.

Conflicts will be even greater between different individuals.

Aside from the difficult problem of the analyst in ascertaining the cagnitude and frequency distribution of personal values, it is also important to assess the causative interaction between personal values and social values. Whenever one or nor s;gments of society come to hold strong views regarding proposed developments, there is a socialization of these values leading to a variety of propensities for social action. Particularly when there are strong anxi ety or psychic costs inher-ent in the social values of concern there can be exacce bated political costs if the psychic origins of these values are ignored.

In this regard, it is important to note the asymmetry of ocial values regarding the psychic costs and benefits associated with the use management of energy eptions.

Darrel Nash (20) provides the following summarization of a comparative analysis for nuclear and coal cptions of the health :nd safety aspects for the entire fuel cycle (i.e. , mining, processing, transportation, electric generation, and waste disposal):

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'A number of studies have been done to estimate health impacts of coal and nuclear fuel use in steam electric power plants. The estimates ,

vary widely.and in many_ cases the cause and ef fect relationships are only dimly understood. A report by Comar.and Sagan (21) reviews and summarizes 40. studies on this subject. One overall indicator of. health impacts is the number of ' premature deaths. For a 1000 iWe power plant, ,

estimated total occupational and public premature deaths per year for the entirq fuel cycle range from 2 to 116 for coal and from 0.11 to 1.0

. for nuclear.

A more recent study by Reginald Gotchy (22) provides a range of estimates for

, . excess mortality-in the entire fuel cycle (including accident and disease rates for occupational and general public exposures) of about 0.5 for a nuclear reactor year (1000 iWe capacity) versus 15 to 120 for a coal-fired plant of the same capecity.

One should-not conclude from these figures that coal is not acceptably safe as a fuel choice-in meeting-our national energy requirements, but only that in using existing data on health impacts the nuclear option would appear to have a signifi-cant advantage over coal in this area of social concern.

Despite such com?arative safety estimates, a 1977 study by Hohenemser et al (23) indicates that tie future of nuclear power is in trouble chiefly because' oT public

. distrust over nuclear safety even if nuclear advantages over certain other fuel options regarding low average pollution, economics, and substitution of foreign oil resources in electric power generation are conceded.

In all probability, differences in public attitudes toward coal and nuclear resources for generating electricity relates to basic differences of risk percep-tion and psychic costs associated with the two fuels. Coal technology has been on the world scene for a much longer period of time than nuclear leading to greater familiarity with the technology and its desirable and undesirable consequences. To be sure there is still considerable scientific uncertainty regarding the carcino-genic and other health impacts of coal pollutants as well as the potential long-term hazards of.the greenhouse effect changing world climate and raising oi aan i levels. But these uncertainties do not appear to have induced the same le'el of psychic costs with as large a segment of the public as in the case of nuc1 ar power. "oreover, the transportation and mining accidents and health effec .s, which are much greater for coal than uranium mining and transportation have rect ved limited publicity and do not put at risk the same segments of population v iich provide opposition in the nuclear licensing process.

A comparison between psychic cost aspects in the use management of nuclea; energy and less conventional energy sources such as solar, geothermal, biomass, etc.

involves a somcuhat different characterization than coal versus nuclear com

• Proponents of such unconventional energy sources such as Amorytend Lovins to (24) pa regard them as socially benign (soft energy paths) and consequently largely ignore associated safety and health risks. However, a study by Herbert Inhaber (25) pro-vides an analysis which suggests that nonconventional energy sources can have higher occupational and public health' risks than certain conventional fossil and nuclear sources:

Risk to human health was compared for five conventional and six non-conventional energy systems. The entire cycle for producing energy was considered,notjustpart. The most important conclusion drawn is that the risk to human health from nonconventional sources can be as high as, or even higher than, that of conventi~onal sources. This result is produced only when the risk per unit energy is considered, rather than the risk per solar panel or windmill. The risk from non-conventional energy sources derives from the large amount of material and labor D** 3' om o L m 90013180

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needed, along with their backup and storage requirements. Risk evalua-tion is a relatively new discipline, and therefore the results pre-sented here can be considered only a beginning. However, society should keep relative risk in mind when evaluating present and future energy sources.

'In particular, the views of proponents of solar energy and other soft energy paths cannot be properly understood without a recognition of the very large psychic bene-fits perceived by these individuals through a potential reduction of a number of anxieties introduced at the beginning of this paper regarding "liaits to growth" ccocerns and the desirability of v celerating the shift of energy use to renewable energy resources.

it is important to note that institutional decisions (i.e., by private industry or government) involving the use of energy options incorporate some of the same con-cerns and values as personal decisions regarding energy use or political support for energy options. However, there is of ten a drastic difference in the kind and scope of information mustered to ovaluate the costs and benefits of energy options and particularly in the weight or emphasis ascribed to such costs and benefits.

Private industry understandably gives greater weight to economic and business risk factors; yet with greater public concerns being expressed over environmcatal and safety issues and with the enactment of regulatory laws, increasing weight is being given to externalities.

In the governaent sphere, the analysis of societal costs and benefits pertaining to different energy options is even cara complex than for private industry sin e it must also deal with options that industry, by choice, may reject. Federal hnding for R&D in tveleping new energy technologies or reducing the environmental acid safety impacts of conventional technologies in the face of budgetary constraints is particularly encompassing of a wide span of information and analyses.

Regarding the holistic approach of making budgetary decisions using PPBS or systems nalysis ..:ethods, Hitch and McKean (26) note that analyses must be piecemeal since it is impossible for a single analysis to cover all problems simultaneously in a large organization. Whether by design or not, in the face of complex information and forecasting requirements associated with the analysis of energy options, it is inevitable that a great deal of piecemeal analysis will creep into personal and institutional decision-making. Nevertheless, 'he parochial or tunnel-vision nature of piecacal analysis is a threat to serious sub-optimization of social values in the use managnent of alternative energy resources. This point of view is quite evident in a recent paper by Wildavsky (27) on the subject of public risk assess-ment suggesting that an overcautious attitude toward new technological developments may paralyze scientific endeavor and end up leaving us less safer than ever before:

Is it our environment or ourselves that have changed? Would people like us have had this sort of concern in the past? Imagine our reaction if most of modern technology were being introduced today.

Anyone aware of the ambience of our times must be sensitive to the strong possibility that many risks, such as endless automotive engine explosions, would te postulated that need never occur, or, if they did, would be found bearable. Wouldn't airliners crash into skyscrapers that would fall on others, killing tens of thousands? Who could prove otherwise? Even today there are risks from numerous small dams far exceeding those from nuclear reactors. Why is the one feared and not the other? Is it just that we are used to the old or are some of us looking differently at essentially the same sorts of experience?

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DWh n 6 uAu g In sum, the appropriate development of methodological procedures to make effective social choices in the use management of alternative energy resources should incor-parate, above all, the following analytical features:

(1) Although piecemeal analyses such as economic, environmental and safety impacts cannot be avoided in making comparisons of energy options, a holistic a]proach in integrating such analyses should be pursued despite in1erent difficulties; and (2) Issues involving personal values such as psychic costs and benefits,

. risk perception and risk acceptance or risk aversion propensities should not be neglected in the analysis else political and social costs may be seriously undervalued in use management decisions.

REFERENCES

1. The National Energy Plan, Executive Office of the President, April 29, 19//.

2. Miller B.' Spangler, "The Use of Scenarios in a Technology Assessment of Offshore Oil Development," Technology Assessment and the Oceans, R. D.

Wilmot and A. Slingerland, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: ilestview Press, 1977), pp. 106-117.

3. For partial insight into such variations see, for examale: Barbara D.

Melber, Stanley M. Healey, et al., Nuclear Power and tle Public:

Analysis of Collected Surve7 Research, PR[~T430, a study prepared by 1 the BaTtelle Humiii~AYfairs Research Center for the Savannah River Operations Office of the U.S. Department of Energy, November 1977.

4. Nicholas Rescher, Unselfishness: The Role of the Vicarious Affects in ,

Moral Philosophy and Social lheory. (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-burgh Prass, 1915).

5. "The Cost of Public Confidence in Nuclear? 100 Million per Life, Says Professor," Weekly Energy Report, July 1,1974, p. 8.

6. lester B. Lave and Eugene P. Seskin, " Epidemiology, Causality, and Public Policy," American Scientist, March-April, 1979, pp. 178-186.

7. Allen V. Xnesse and William D. Schulze, " Environment, Health, and Eco-nemics - The Case of Cancer," American Economic Review, February 1977,

p. 331,

8. 3ryan C. Conley, "The Value of Human Life in the Demand for Safety,"

American Economic Review, March 1976, p. 45.

9. Council of Environmental Quality, " National Environmental Policy Act:

Implementation of Procedural Provisions," Federal Registar, Nov. 29,

~-

1978, pp. 55978-56007.

10. Henryk Skolimowski, "Eco philosophy versus the Scientific 'Jord Vicw,"

Ecologist Quarterly, Autumn 1978, p. 227.

11. Environmental Quality, The Fourth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality, September 1973, pp. 75-76.

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12. Richard Zeckhauser, " Procedures for Valuing Lives," Public Policy, Fall 1975, p. 442.

13. Philip D. Pahner, "A Psychological Perspective of the Nuclear Energy Controversy," a joint research report of the International Institute for Applied Agency, Vien, Systems na, Austria, AugustAnalysis 1976, p. 1, and the International Atomic E .

14. William G. Pollard, "A Theological View of i'u:1 car Energy," Nuclear News, February 1979, p. 82.

15. Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," The Journal of Political Economy, August 1948, pp. 279-304.

16. Kneese and Schulze, op. cit. , p. 331.

17. Chauncey Starr, Richard Rudman, and Chris Whipple, Hollander and M. K."

J. M.

for Risk Analysis,"

Simmons, eds. (PaloAnnual ReviewAnnual X1to, Calif: of Energy,iews, Rev Inc. ,1976), Vol.1,

p. 629.

18. Robert J. Stern, "When Experts Disagree," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1975, pp. 29-31.

19. Mary Jane Bowman and George Leland Bach, Economic Analysis and Public Policy, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. ,1943), p. 140.

20. Impacts of Later Reversin Interim Rule Permitting]g a Decision onstruction to of or Operation Adopt NuclearorPower Not to Adopt an PlaiiE~

Commiss,Tffice ofatNuclear ion (available the NRC Reactor Regulation, Public Document Room),U.S. Nuclear Appendix A, Regulator

p. 9.

21. C. L. Comar and L. A. Sagan, " Health Effects of Energy Production and Conversion," Annual Review of Energy, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 581-600.

22. Health Effects Attributable to Coal and Nuclear Fuel R. L. Gotchy, Cycle Alternat ives, tiURLG-0~332, a draf t report of the of fice of tTuc1 car Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1977, pp. 18-19.

23. Christoph Hohenemser, Roger Kasperson, Robert Kates, "The Distrust of Nuclear Power," Science, April 1, 1977, p. 25.

24. Amory B. Lovins, World Energy Strategies: Facts, Issues, and Options (New York: Friends of the Earth International, 1975).

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25. Herbert Inhaber " Risk with Energy from Conventional and Nor tional Sources'I Science, February 23, 1979, p. 718.

26. Charles J. Hii.-h and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of berense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 161.

27. Aaron Wildavsky, "No Risk is the Highest Risk of All," American ~

Scientist, January-February 1979, p. 32.

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