ML20128C915

Insp Rept 70-1113/92-17 on 921109-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls,Facility Operations,Facility Changes,Followup on Previously Identified Items & Current Issues

ML20128C915
Person / Time
Site:	07001113
Issue date:	11/23/1992
From:	Mcalpine E, Troup G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128C906	List: ML20128C903 ML20128C915
References
70-1113-92-17, NUDOCS 9212070041
Download: ML20128C915 (7)

Text

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.' 4 UNITED ST AT ES o- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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% y,,/ NOV 2 31992 Report No.: 70-1113/92-17 Licensee: General Electric Company Wilmington, hu 28401 Docket No.: 70-1113 License No.: SNH-1097 Facility Name: Nuclear fuel and Components Manufacturing Inspection Conducted: fovember 3 9-13, 1992 Inspector:

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L. Tr6up', fuel F/cility Project Inspector

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Date' Signed Approved by: O@

L. J. McAlpine, Cfiiif-cwYUL If!ZOA2.

Date Signed Radiation Safety Projects Section Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted in the areas of management controls, facility operations, facility changes, and followup on previously identified items. During the inspection, a meeting was held with Commissioner Curtiss to discuss current issues and tour-the facility.

Results:

1 i Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were

identified. One area identified which needed improvement was the conduct of i preoperational functional tests (Paragraph 2.d).

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• S. Babb, Manager, URLS Operations

• G. Bowman, Sr. Program Manager, Compliance Improvement

• D. Brown, Manager, Reclaim and Support

• M. Chilton, Manager, Fuel Chemical Technical Resources

• R. Keenan, Program Manager, Compliance Auditing

• D. McCaughey, Engineer, Criticality Safety Engineering

• R. Mciver, Manager, Plant Engineering and Site Maintenance

• D. McLemore, Manager, Fuel Chemical Manufacturing

• W. Ogden, Manager, Manufacturing Engineering

• W. Peters, Manager, Criticality Safety Engineering T. Reason, Sr. Engineer, Fuel Chemical Technical Resources G. Smith, Sr. Engineer, Fuel Chemical Technical Resources C. Tarrer, Engineer, Fuel Chemical Technical Resources

• J. iaylor, Principal Engineer, Criticality Safety Engineering

• C Vaughan, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

• P. Winslow, Manager, Licensing and Nuclear Materials Management Other licensee employees contacted included Area Coordinators, operators, technicians, and engineers.

• Attended exit interview

2. Engineered NDA Systems and Safe Tanks (88015, 88020)

a. Item 6 of the licensee's Performance Improvement Program (PIP) addressed the installation of new tanks and automatic measurement instrumentation (in-line uranium monitors) in the Nitrate Waste (NW) and Radwaste (RW) systems in the Uranium Recycle Unit (URV).

This project was known as the "V-104 Project." During the inspection period, the licensee was completing the actions to bring the new system for NW into service. The RW system was to be placed in service after the NW system was operational. Written approval to operate NW was given on November 11, 1992.

b. The basic document for the "V-104 Project" was facility Change Request (FCR) 92.138, "Radwaste and Nitrate Waste Expansion." The inspector reviewed the Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis for the expansion, the radiological assessment and audit, the Nuclear Safety Engineering preoperational audit and the documentation of training (which included operators and Area Coordinators, shift technical resources, and instrument and maintenance technicians).

The Process Requirement and Operator Documents (PROD) for the Primary Nitrate System, PROD 104.03, was revised and approved for the new NW equipment, and the computer graphics and controls were installed.

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c. An equipment failure in the systs..i could result in the discharge i of particulates into the tanks. To assure that samples analyzed by the in-line monitors or manual samples are representative of the tank contents and that settling does not occur,' a sample representative test was conducted on each tank using material which could be discharged into the tank after an equipment failure. Temporary Operating Instruction (TOI) T01-A-2396 "New i Quarantine Tanks - Sample Representativeness Test" was conducted 1 on each tank. The minimum mixing time which was determined for each tank was included in the process parameters. -l

d. Testing of Active Ei aneered controls (AECs), interlocks, and control software wa ; performed by functional Test Instructions (FTIs) 104.03 FI-F5 for NW and 106.05 FI-F5 for RW. All of the j FTIs were signed and accepted by Nuclear Safety Engineering. In '

reviewing the completed FTIs and comparing the tests with the 1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids), the inspector noted an apparent discrepancy between the two. The FTI (104.03 FI)-in the prerequisites section, required that two manual valves be closed; this was initialed as having been done. However, neither of the valves were shown on the P&ID (CP-402). .The inspector-questioned how the valves could be closed if they were not there.

Discussions rtivealed that two valves in the process stream had been closed to isolate the system. In discussions with the cognizant manager, the inspector stated that provisions exist for-noting discrepancies and changes in FTIs and should have been used, rather than signing off the incorrect valves. The manger acknowledged this and stated that the FTIs would be corrected and personnel instructed to properly document _ changes or corrections.

From a review of the P& ids, and the FTIs, and discussions with the operators, the inspector determined that this situation did not' affect the acceptability of the tests or compromise the safety of -

the system.

e. When the inspector was attempting to resolve the-question of the valves, licensee personnel utilized several sets of P& ids which were stored in the URU Control Room to identify the valves- The inspector observed that these sets were out of date and did not include the latest revisions of the P& ids. This was discussed-with the Area Manager, who agreed that only current P& ids should be in the Control Room. On November 12, 1992, the Area Manager designated an individual as custodiar, of the Control Room drawings with the assignment of maintaining the drawings current, but-other individuals were instructed to assist in milntaining the drawings-current.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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3. Organization Changes (88005) l The licensee announced two organization changes as part of the effort to l improve performance and upgrade programs,

a. fffective November 2, 1992, a Compliance Auditing group was established under the Man:.ger, Regulat9ry Compliance. This group will concentrate on verification of procedural conformance.

Members of the group were drawn from Radiation Safety Engineering, Radiation Protection, and Training and Development.

b. The Manager, Reclaim and Support, fuel Chemical Manufacturing was given a temporary assignment in charge of procedure improvement and development of new training programs for operators. During ,

this assignment, his duties as Area Manager for URV were assigned to the Program Manager, URLS Operation and as Area Manager for Shop Support were assigned to the Program Manager, Envirc1 mental Programs. The Program Manager, Compliance Improvement was assigned to also work on the procedures and tnMing project.

4. Followup on Previous liems (92702)

a. (r.losed) Inspector followup item (Ifl) 91 06-15, Restoration of UNH P oject System The IHH product tanks were taken our of service until the integrity of the tanks and foundations could be determined following an acid spill in the tank room in October 1991. The Stop Work Order issued by the Manager, Regulatory Compliance on November 6, 1991, was removed in January 14, 1992, after the structu; al concerns were resolved. However, the tanks were not release. .c use aatil several FCRs were completed.

FCR 92-431, Rosinstitute Use of Slab Tanks, was approved for installation on October 8, 1992. The FCR requirements were completed and approval for operation of the system was given in writing on October 19, 1992, by the Manager, Criticality Safety Engineering and the Area Manager.

In aodition to reviewing the FCR padage (including the ProVox icgic review and audit), the.ir.specar observed the panels in both the URU and Conversion control rooms and verified that the graphics displays had been changed to include the UNH tanks. The inspector a r verified that PR00 103.04, UNH Product intrat h.. Accountability, and 5 arage, had been revised to

. .rporate the tanks and was in the control rooms. The inspector also discussed the status of the tanks with operators in both control rooms and determined that they were cognizant of the status of the tanks.

This c epletes the actions to restor the system. IFI 91-06 15 is closed.

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b. (flosed) Ifl 91 06-04,_ Implement Training / Retraining Program for  !

Operators and Other Personnel.

Since the restart of the Solvent Extraction, process (Inspection Report 70 1113/91 05), the licensee has conducted training for i process and nuclear safety engineers and well as specific training  :

for operations personnel as changes have made to systems or new 1 systems were added. j As part of the PIP, the licensee included additional short-ter-m  !

training for operators. A ' longer term item was to develop a new -i training program for current operators and for new operator i trainees. This was discussed at the status meeting held on ,

October 14, 1992, which was 6.ocumented in Inspection Report 70-1113/92-16.

.i Subsequent to that meeting, the Manager, fuel Chemical  :

Manufacturing assigned a senior man ger to lead the program to

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upgrade the procedure system and develop the training ptogram (Paragraph 3).

The NRC will continue to follow the development and implementation of the training programs. However, this IFl is closed for record-purposes.

5. Commissioner's Visit (94702)

On November 10, 1992, NRC Commissioner James R. Curtiss-visited the facility--for a meeting with facility management and to tour the facility. A meeting summary is contained 11 Attachment I to the repoit.

6. ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 13, 1992,  ;

with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.- The inspector described these areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings and the inspector's observations.

Although proprietary documents and processes were reviewed during the inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report.

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ATTACHMENT t HEETING

SUMMARY

On November 10, 1992, Commissioner James R. Curtiss and other NRC representatives met with the licensee to discuss current issues and to tour the facility. i Attendees:

Nuclear _Reaulatory Commission J. Curtiss, Commissioner D. Trimble, lechnical Assistant, Office of the Commissioner  !

J. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, -

Region 11 G. Troup, fuel facility Project inspector, Region 11 General Electric _ Nuclear Enerav P. Harriott, Manager, Regulatory and Analysis Services General Electric Nuclear fuel & Comnonents Manufacturina OM. Bucci, Manufacturing Engineer, Control Rods and Stainless Steel Products Operation F. Jackson, Manager, Human Resources and Community Relations OP Kalish, Acting Manager, Channels, End Plugs and Spacers Operation D. McLemore, Manager, Fuel Chemical Manut4cturing W. Ogden, Manager, Manufacturing-Engineering (Acting-Plant Manager)

@J. Schardt, Manager, Tubing Products Operation P. Sick, Manager, Quality Assurance 08, it,,an, Manager, Material Services Parts Operation C. Vaughan, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

@ Participated in-facility tours ,

The formal meeting discussion started with-an overview of the various operations at the Wilmington facility. Specific topics which were then presented were:

• Status of corrective actions from the May 29, 1991 incident and resulting investigation reports.

• Improvements in the Nuclear Criticality Safety program, including specialized training programs.

• Fuel-Rod Weld Quality improvements.

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Attachment 2 following the discussions on these topics, tours were conducted of the plant facilities. Areas toured were:

• Service Components Operation (500)

• fuel Components Operation (FCO)

• Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) including the Uranium Recovery Unit m.--

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