ML20129B775
| ML20129B775 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1985 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129B781 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507290255 | |
| Download: ML20129B775 (88) | |
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a 1
1 BEFORE THE PACT FINDING TASK F.ORCE k 2 OF Tile NitCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 - -- - -
4 Re: :
5 Davis-Besse event 6 of June 9,"1985 :
7 - - - - -
8 P R O C E E D I N G S 9 - - - - -
10 Proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory 11 Commis'sion Fact Finding Task Force-in regard to the 12 aforementioned event,-held at Conference Room 210, O 13 oevis-nesse nuc1eer Piene. Ook n o r t,o r , Ohio, 14 'connencing on Thursday, June 20, 1985, .a t 5:30 15 o' clock p.n.
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-18 19 20 21 22 3- '
'23 8507290255 850620 PDR ADOCK 05000346 T PDR 24 ACE.. FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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1 PRESENT: ,
1 0 .2 J. T. Beard (NRC)
, 4
, 3 E. Rossi (NRC) i 4 Wayne Lanning (NRC) 5 T.-L. Bell (NRC) .
6 W. D. Shafer (NRC'RIII) i 7 Steve'Wideman 'TED-Senior Licensing r
- 8 Specialist) -
9 W. C.:Rowles.(TED-Assistant to the V.P. f 10 Nuclear) 7
- 11 Sushil Jain (TED/ Davis-Besse) t i 12 Larry Grime (TED/ Nuclear Safety)'
(b ~
13 .
John Johnsons.(TED/ Operations) i .
14 Dennis Hominee (TED/Ouality Assurance) '
i
, 15 Rick Gradomski.(TED/ Nuclear Fac. Engg.) <
16 Phil'Hildebrandt (MPR Associates) 17 Dan Wilczynsk1 ~ (TED/ Nuclear Pac. Engg.) ,
. . Y
. -18 Chuck'Rupp (TED/ Nuclear Pac. Engg.)
19 Pete Whold (NRC RITI) 20 Ned Choules (NRC RIII) ;
21
~
Jim Dunne - (TED/ Nuclear Pac.'Engg.)
L 22 '
Bernie'Deyer1(TED/ Nuclear-Projects) )
?
l 23 . Don Missig (TED/ Operations)' .
l l 0 l 24 wait Rogers (NRC RIII)
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3 1 Thursday Evening Seselon k) 2 June 20, 1985 3 5:30 o' clock p.m.
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5 6 Md. ROSSI: Why don't we go ahead and 7 begin. We are going to talk about the 8 trouble-shooting action plans for the auxiliary 9 feed pumps overspeed trips that occurred during the 10 June 9th event and the auxiliary feedwater pump 11 overspeed trip throttle valve problems. We will 12 talk about the auxiliary feedpump overspeed trip
() 13 one first. This is Action Plan No. IA and 19.
14 And before we start, I would like to say 15 a cou pl e of things. This action plan has some testino 16 in it that requires the plant to go to Hode 3. And 17 I want to make sure that the release of just this 18 particular action plan doesn't mean that we have 19 approved you going to Mode 3.
l 20 So the discussion on what you are going 21 to do with the plant in terms of taking it to Mode t
22 3 nas to been resolved with Region III and whatever 23 other limitations exist on going to Mode 3 have to ,
rm 24 be followed, and our discussion on this action plan G.
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1 'shouldn't imply
- hat we have approved you going to
()
4 2 Mode 3 in any way. .
3 MR. GRIME: Can I ask a clarification on
- i 4 that? You are saying that Region III would be the j a
5 only block with approval of the plan or with review j
! 6 of this plan of going to Mode 37
- 7 MR. ROSSI
- The question of going-to Mode i
i 8 3'ought to be handled separately from agreement of ;
2 9 this plan. ,
10 MR. DEYER: We did not anticipate and i
I j 11 expect that by approving this you were in any way .
12 approving going to Mode 3. We understood whatever
() 13 would be required to go to Mode.3 would take place 14 before we would complete whatever parts of this [
15 action plan required Mode 3. t 16 MR. ROSSI: Okay. The.other thing is.I '
I .
i 1 17 know some of the members of the team and~they are !
i 18 going to speak in a minute or so have some concerns -
4: i 19 that you may not have identified all of the i 20 possible alternatives on wnat could have caused the
! 21 overspeed of the aux feedwater pumps, and I would 22 like.to just reiterate that, you know,'this was a l 23 serious proolem,where. redundant pieces of equipment i
24 both failed simultaneously, and it's very important
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,.. I that you make sure that you have done everythinq k) 2 you can to have an action plan that identifies the 3 actual cause of the problem.
4 uccause if you go through all of this 5 thing and you can't figure out what caused the 6 problem, that's going to create a lot of concerns, 7 because it's going to be very impo'rtant that people 8 understand that we really know what the problem is i
9 and it's been corrected before the plant starts up 10 again.
11 So I just want to reiterate that you 12 really need to look carefully that all of the bases
() 13 have been covered and all problemn that your 14 vendors can think of that could have caused this 15 are included in the trouble-shooting so you don't 16 end up going through all these steps and cominq 17 back saying, gee, we can't find the problem, but it 18 looks like it works okay now. Because I think 19 that's going to give people a lot of concerns.
20 I would like to mane a comment on some of 21 the things that I see --
22 MR. WIDEMAN: Ernie, how about if I start 23 with an introduction of the people that were (3 24 involved in developing this action plan before we LJ ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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5 6
1 get involved with it so you know who the key I
2 participants were in developing the action plannt 3 okay?
4 Rick Gradomski, who is in nuclear 5 facility corporate offices; Phil fli l d eb r a nd t , as 6 you know, is an MPR consultantt Dan Wilczynski, who 7 is in nuclear facility engineering at the siter 8 Chuck Rupp -- I drew a block there for a minute --
9 who is also in nuclear facility engineering at the 10 siter Don Missig, who is in station operations 11 department in the red shirt; and then Jim Dunne, 12 who is in facility engineering at corporate (O/ 13 headquarters.
14 MR. ROSSI: One of the things that I 15 noted about the write-up on the overspeed trips is 16 that there is a flavor in here that these pumps 17 nave not been routinely tested supplying the steam 18 for the turbines via these cross-over lines, and 19 supplying steam to the turbines for the pumps 20 through the cross-over lines is a design feature of 21 the plant tnat is required for some accident 22 conditions.
23 And it'oppears that that mode has not -
t'N 24 been tested on any kind of periodic basis over the
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i 1 lifstime of the. plan. And I think that these modes
- h. ,2 that haven't been tested -- and I think there are 3 probably some others in here too -- routinely over
- 4 the lifetime of the plant, that in your summary of 5 looking at maintenance and testing history, that ,
1 t
6 ought to be' pointed out in here because that may be .
7 a key item in terms of what happened on June 9th.
f 8 Because had these kind of tests been done ,
?
4 9 like even every refueling under the conditions that -
1 i 10 the pumps might be expected to operate under, I
! 11 mean, there are cases where you have steamline or ,
l 12 feedline ruptures where.you - might really have to
() 13 start-these pumps up and use them feeding steam 14 ' through the cross-over lines, that.had they been j 15 tested that;way, some of your apparently 1
- 16 hypothetical problems here might have been-found ;
)
17 l before the June-9th event. ,
i e 18 They might have been found in tests a n'd l l 19 so I think - your ' summa ry of maintenance and' testing i i
- 20 history ought to include a discussion of the kind 5 t
. 21 of tests thatfperhaps have not beenidone that woul'd l 1
l 22 have revealed this problem. ;
) l l 23 MR. BEARD: .Could we just ask the ;
24 question ~at this point, is the flavor that Dr.:
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, 1 Rossi's just explained in fact true?
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- 2 MR. WILCZYNSKI: That is in fact true 1 1
3 that;the-cross-over valves were not used during ]
t 4 testing. .
- 5 MR. BEARD: You say it is or is not? l
! I i
6 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Is, is-true. i i ,
- j. 7 MR. ROSSI: You see,-I think that may be -- ,
8 well, I think it may be a key thing. If that turns l
!. i j 9 out to be-a problem, that testing would have !
- i 10 probably found it a long time ago and then it [
i !
11 wouldn't have_been found during the real event on i
I think you ought_to put that in here.
12 June 9th. i
() 13 I think that's an important piece of information in j 14 summarizing what you have learned from the review !
i 15 of past trips and surveillance testing.- t 16 And also on page two, Item 2A'where you ,
- 17 talk about past trips and survelliance testing, f i'
18 even aside from the comment I just made, there i
- 19 isn't really a summary of what you learned from
! i
. 20 reviewing that. history. And there may be some i 21 other lessons that you learned from< reviewing that- :
I'
, 22 history that ought to.be discussed in.a little !
l 23 -summary at the end of section.A here.
24 Let's see, with that, IAr me turn it.to p ACH PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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p 1 J. T. Beard who has a number of more specific
(-) 2 questions, most of which I think are related to 3 concerns about whether you have really looked for ,
4 all the hypotheses that might have caused the 5 overspeed and our concerns that you could go 6 through this and not find the root cause. J. T.
7 HR. BEARD: Okay. I don't know whether I 8 should be addressing this to Dan or Chuck, but let 9 me throw it out. On the first page where in the 10 introduction, you are describing I think what took 11 place on June the 9th and then there is a list in 12 the middle there that says item one, the valves rm 13 MS-106 and MS-107, the implication those valves
'ss) ,
t 14 were closed. ;
15 I guess my question is not the single 16 aspect of it, but the question has to do with do we 17 know at this time whether those valves, in fact,
, 18 did close as it's described in here?
19 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes, it is documented on 20 the alarm printer from the control room that those 21 valves did close. ,
22 MR. DUNNE: It's documented 106 closed?
23 MR. RUPP: 100 closed, 107 would have i
24 closed, but it did not get a signal to open so it
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1 1 10 l i i z 1 should have remained closed. :
2 Mn. ROSSI: Had it opened, that would i
3 have been apparent from the review of the computer j i i 4 printouts from the event? j i
- 5 MR. DUNNE: It did open later on in the f
- I i ?
j 6 event and we got a signal that it opened. !
i ?
7 MM. BEARD: I guess what I'm trying to f i !
] 8 decipher is that how doesEthis aspect of what .!
l 1 I
l 9 valves closed and what didn't close relate to the :
10 formulation of the investigation? Because I had a i
- 11 question of, you know, which one of these actually ,
i l 12 did close during the event and how that relates. i 1
( 13 Maybe you can elaborate a little bit o n ,.
t 14 for example, if 107'did not close, does that have !
i
, 15 any impact on the trouble-shooting plan that you i 1 ;
- 16 formulated 7
- 17 MR. RUPP
- Do you want to address it or ,
i i 18 co you want me to?. ;
19 MR. WILC0YNSKI: I'm not really sure what 20 it is'you are looking for, but let me say this.
t
.I 21 That MS-106 opened as designed and then received I 22 its close signal and did in fact go closed-at that 1
I i
- - 23 time. That No. l' turbine would be running on the i
24 cross-connect valve. MS-106-A, MS-107 was not
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i 11 1 called on to open by the first SPRCS actuation, but
() 2 was called upon by the manual trip of SPRCS low 3 pressure. .
i 4 MR. DUNNE: 107-A in this cano.
5 MR. BEARD: 107-A, that was called on by 6 the low pressure actuation?
7 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Right. ,
8 MM. huPP And 107 got the signal to I
9 close at that time a n ti it remained closed from all' i 10 indications.
l 11 MR. HEARD: It was previously not even 12 open?
) 13 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Riqht.
14 MM. BEARD: And later didn't there turn i 1
15 out to be another actuation that would have lid 107 4
16 off on low level?
i 17 MR. DUNNE: Yes, and it did open. We qot 18 an indication it dil'open later on after the low 19 pressure trip cleared we had low level trips still '
20 existing, and 107 opened and we postulate 107-A and 21 10b-A would have then closed.
i 22 MR. BEARD: Now, did 106-A and 107-A 23 actually reopen during.the event?
{) 24 MR. DUNNE: To the best of our knowledge, ACH FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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12 1 eney only opened once, and that was on the low d 2 pressure trip signal that the operators sent.
3 106-A and 107-A should have opened, and with that 4 trip -- when that signal cleared, they should have 5 closed. But we don't think we have indication of 6 that.
7 MR. BEARD: I said that wrong. Let me 8 restate the question. Did 106-A and 107-A -- let 9 me back up.
10 When the low pressure type actuation 11 occurred, I understand 106-A and 107-A were t
12 signalled to open. They did in fact open?
() IJ MM. WILCZYNSKI: Yes.
14 MR. BEARD: Did 106-A and 107-A 15 subsequently close during the courne of the 16 transient?
17 MR. WILCZYNSKI: No.
18 MR. BEARD: Does that have any inpact, 19 this one open, one closed, one up and one down have 20 any impact?
21 HR. RUPP: Most of that though was later 22 after they tripped.
23 -MR. WILCZYNSKI: We address that --
i l 24 MR. RUPP We didn't go that for past the
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13 1 actual overspeeds.
O 2 MR. BEARD: You mean later past the 3 overspeed trips?
i 4 MR. RUPP That's when the other ones are 5 reopening.
6 MR. udARD: In follow-up to Ernie's 7 question about the summary on your past trips on 8 page two and your past surveillance data, I see 9 that you looked at speed data for a number of 10 events between March 2 in 1984 and the current one.
11 You didn't give us any summary of conclusions or i 12 what you learned from lookina at that data, but l'
(s) 13 could you tell us here what you learned?
14 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Okay. The speed data 15 for tne No. 1 pump, we have the speed all graphed 16 out versus time and.you can see a definite pattern 17 that the governor responds -- let's say it has a 18 footprint, and you can see that pattern in each 19 trip. The same type of pattern exists on No. 2 20 pump except that the difference there is the No. 1 21 footprint includes three or four oscillations l
22 before reaching rated speed. 1 23 MR. RUPP: On a cold start, with the ,
l 24 pipes initially cold. I i
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14 1 MR. WILCZYNSKI Right.
2 MR. H6ARD: This is No. 2 footprint has 3 some oscillations?
4 MR. w1LCZYNSKI: No. 1.
5 MR. BEARD: No. 1. Three or four 6 oscillations for cold start?
7 MM. WILCZYNSKI: Right.
8 MR. HEARD: Can you give me some rough '
i 9 idea as to the nagnitude of these oscillations in 10 terms of percentage of rated speed or something?
11 MR. RUPP: They are approximately what?
12 MR. WILCZYNSKI: 30 percent.
) 13 MR. RUPP Eight hundred or a thousand 14 rpm.
15 MR. REARD: Now, if the -- help me 16 remember some numbers here. What's the normal 17 rated speed for these things?
18 MR. WILCZYNSKI Thirty-six hundred.
- 19 MR. BEARD: And the trip value?
20 MH. WILCZYNSKI: Porty-five hundred.
21 HR. BEARD: So if you had a thousand rpm 22 swing, would it likely hit the --
23 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Okay. The swing appears ---
24 MR. RUPP: Before~ rated speed.
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15 1 ' ltR . WILCZYNSKI: -- right before rated (m
(-) 2 speed as it's on it's way out. It might jump on 3 the top.
4 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The average is well 5 below rated speed.
6 MR. HEAHD: I see. That's what I'm 7 trying to understand. And these footprints for 8 No. I and No. 2 were different from each other? ,
9 HR. RUPP Yes.
I 10 MR. HEARD: But were consistent 11 throughout the sets of data you reviewed?
12 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes. The only one r
) 13 difference was on the June 9th, testing that was 14 done on No. 7 listed there on aux feedpump No. 1, i 15 there were no oscillations seen in that data.
16 HR. BEARD: No oscillations.
17 HR. WILCZYNSKI: ~Right. i 18 MR. BEARD: Is that of any significance?
19 You have a history of previous tests where you do 20 see oscillations and now you don't?
21 MR. RUPP: On-the June 9th test it was 22 approximately ten hours after the trip and the 23 lines are insulated, and we assumed those that 24 didn't have the oscillations, that there wouldn't
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16 1 be as much condensation in the lines and the lines
) 2 would still be considered warm.
3 MR. ROSSI: So you believe the i 4 oscillations are related to condensation and water i
5 going through the turbines?
o MR. RUPP Right.
7 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes.
8 MM. BEARD: Okay.
t 9 MR. GRADOMSKI: Knowing full well the r
10 governors on pumps one and two are different and ,
11 that the March 2nd, 1984, data would not include 12 PGG, the new governor that was installed on the No. l
) 13 2 pump in our last outage.
i 14 MR. Sil A P E R : Durinq the June problem, you i 15 had irradic control on No. I aux feedpump, the sama 16 example, did you not? During the June incident 17 when the aux feedpump came i n, you had irradic ,
18 indications?
19 HR. WILCZYNSKI: Same oscillations were 20 present.
21 MR. SHAFER: And you were using then only 22 the IG6-A, not the 106-A valve.
23 HR. RUPPs Right.
24 MR. S!! AP E R : You are saying condensate
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- 17 I 1 builds up in either line --
O 2 MR. RUPP Right. ,
3 MR. S il A P E R : -- from disuse. There is no ,
o r
- 4 traps in those lines.
5 MR. RUPP: Yes, there are traps.
6 MR. DUNNE: But there is about two 7 hundred to three hundred feet of piping between the 8 closed isolation valve and the inlet to tha turbine. ,
9 MR. ROSSI: And the piping runs are such i
10 that the traps won't insure --
11 MR. DUNNE: The traps will drain the I 12 condensate, but you have the upstream isolation
() 13 valve that in closed, that piping is qoing to cool 14 off and when you get an open signal, that isolation 1
15 valve opens and it's now dumping steam.
16 MR. ROSSI: To the cold pipe, so it's i 17 condensation that occurs after you put the stean in 18 the cold pipe. '
19 MR. DUNNE: At the startup of the system 4
20 of the turbine.
21 MR. ROSSI: See, I had a question that --
22 at the top of page three in the maintenance history, 23 you indicate that the --
there was several itens :
24 replaced and adjusted in June of '85, June 2nd of '85, ACP. FEDURAL RP, PORTERS INC.
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I and I was curious as to what necessitated that, tho ;
k/ 2 three items that were done on June 2nd, with 3 respect to pump No. 17 I
4 MM. WILCZYNSKI: During the June 2nd i j 5 event, control from the control room of the speed -
t 6 setting motor on the ho. I governor was lost. ,
7 After the event, that was investigated and it was 8 found the Dodine motor was burned out. T h a '. motor i
! 9 was changed out, and also internal inspection i
10 showed that the low speed stop roll pin was bent.
11 So that also was replaced.
12 MR. DEARD: The roll stop -- what was the 13 pin?
l 4
14 HR. WILCZYNSK!: Low speed stop roll pin.
4 l
15 MR. SHAPER: Is that normal? Did you 4
16 determine why it was bent at that time or you just 17 replaced it?
18 MR. GRADOMSK!: In conversations with 19 maintenance personnel, when they adjust the [
20 governor's slip clutch setting in order to torque 21 the nut that holds the clutch on to the speed 22 setting shaft, they must either run it to the high 23 speed stop or to the low speed stop in order to ,
{) 24 come up with an opposing force for then tightoninq ACE PEDERAI, RMPOR7ERS INC.
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1 1 or loosening the nylon lock nut that is installed
() 2 in that clutch.
3 we have determined in testinq that it
- 4 takes approximately 24 inch pounds in order to bend ;
5 that roll pin. We think that was sufficient during 6 that slip clutch setting evolution that they could ;
I 7 in fact bend those roll pins.
8 MR. DEARD: Did you determine the cause, ;
9 the reason that nodine motor burned out?
10 MR. GRADOMSKI: I do not know that.
11 MR. udARD: Does anybody know the cause >
12 of the burnout of the motor? [
r
() 13 MR. DUNNB: No.
I 14 HK. HEARD: Was there any investigation !
15 conducted to determine the cause other than just 16 replace the broken pieces, no to speak? Does l i
17 anyone know?
10 MR. w!LCZYNSK!: Not to my knowledge.
i
) 19 MM. BEARD: I would like the record to ;
20 show everyone said nobody knows.
i
, 21 MM. DEYCRs We might also say, I don't l i
22 know that anyone here is aware that there may be [
23 some investigation going on as well. I 24 HR. GMADOMSKI This is true. This is l )
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I true. j
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2 MM. REYER: That's basically a week 3 before the June 9th occurrence and it's quite ,
4 possible that somebody has initiated follow-up i
5 action.
6 Mx. ROGERS: I have got a question. Were i l
7 they slowing the thing down on a slow speed stop to 1 .
8 adjust the clutch?
3 9 MR. GRADOMSK1 In order to either remove j 10 that nut enat holds the clutch on or to tighten j 11 that nut, they would have to be either runnino it 12 to the high speed stop or to the low speed stop. [
() 13 MR. ROGERS: Do you know which one they [
14 were putting it on? l 15 MR. GRADOMSXI: I do not know 4
16 MR. S !! A P E R : You said the individunt that t
i 17 was doing tnat could have bent that.
10 MR. GRADOMSKI: It takes 24 inch pounds 19 force on that roll pin to bend it. ,
20 MR. BEARD: That's not a large amount of 21 force, is it?
, t 22 MR. GRADOMSKI: It's not. It's not a 23 large roll pin. .
24 MR. DEARD: 24 inch pounds, to that what
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21 1 you said?
()
2 MR. GRADOMSKI Yes, sir.
3 ti R . REARD: In that two pounds a foot? '
4 MM. GRADOMSKI Yes. '
S MR. S ti A P E R : Was there anything in the ,
[
6 procedure that described caution in that aran or 7 criteria for setting that? ,
8 MR. GRADOMSKI: No, sir, I do not think
, 9 there is. There is an internal memo that was l 10 supplied by myself on the testing that was done i 11 when the roll pins were investigated September 2nd, ;
! J 12 1983, that does in fact have a 1ummation of the
. t
() 13 test data that says 24 inch pounds will bend the 14 roll pins.
15 MR. S !! A P E R : That was 19837 J
i 16 MR. G R A D Ott S K I : Septenbar 2nd, 1983, at 17 the conclusion of some major modifications we mada
- lo to the PGPL governors. I 19 MR. DEARD
- Ernie, I would like to ask u [
20 question of you. This is a procedural question. f 21 Could we or should we ank as an action item as a '
i
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22 result of this meeting that the licensee come back l 23 and answer the question or provide an answer to the
{} 24 question of whether or not some investigation into ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC. *
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22 p i 1 the root cause of the burned out motor and the bent O 2 pin was initiated or has been initiated to date and, 3 if it has, what the status and the results are?
4 4 Mn. ROS6It Well, I think what you ought I
5 to do is, you know, you have a maintenance history 6 here, and I would say that it is probably not 7 couplete without that kind of information. So I i
8 think that information ought to be included in the 9 maintenance history.
]
i 10 MR. BEARD: I think if there was no 11 investigation, it ought to be stated that way.
1 12 MR. ROSSI: And if there was, that ought
) ) 13 to be also indicated.
t i 14 MR. HEARD: Okay. But in view of this I 15 discussion that you provided about these June 2nd 16 actions, what was your basis for the statement here f
i 17 that says a review of these maintenance records I 18 does not reveal any evidence that would support the
! 19 overspeed trips 7 I quess I fail to see how you 20 draw that conclusion.
! 21 MR. WILCZYNSKI: What we were looking for i 22 in the review of the maintenance history was a l
23 problem that indicated or that showed up tan both i
24 governors. ,
ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC. i (202) 347-3700 l
23
. 1 MR. BEARD: You were looking for a O 2 problem on both governors? '
! 3 HR. WILCZYNSKI: Ritht. ;
4 MM. ROSSI: You me in a common problem on .
- 5 both governors?
1 ;
A common problem, riqht.
6 MR. WILCZYNSKI:
i 7 MR. ROSSI: I don't think you ought to
- I 8 rule out the possibility that you could have ,
9 ditterent problems with each governor.
i 10 MR. DEARD: I was hoping you weren't 11 going to say that, because I had a general comment.
l 12 I previously noted that I read a fl avor in this '
() 13 that tne process through which Toledo Edison ,
14 developed this product here was such that there wam
, 15 an inordinate amount of emphasis on a common 1
16 problem to the point that I was left with a feelinq 17 that maybe there was not enough attention to two 18 separate problems. That's the feeling on my part.
19 HR. !!!LDEBRANDT I think you will find 20 one of the hypotnesis clearly points out that was 21 specifically considered, that there may be two l l 22 problems. ,
)
1 23 MR. dr.AMD: Could you show me or direct l l
24 me to where that is? I mean, I could have very
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24 (
I easily missed it, you know.
2 MR. HILDEDKANDT: On Hypothesis C, page l
3 four, paragraph three, second sentence of that 4 paragraph three. ;
5 HR. BEARD: Could you help me a little ,
6 more. I'n trying to understand, you said the place i
7 where it points out you were actually considerinq ,
) 8 separate problems that could cause these two !
i !
9 different pumps to trip out. I guess ! --
10 HR. HILDEDRANDT Well, I quess in the
- 11 context -- and this is perhaps you are close to the i
12 readinq, the paragraph C(3) in that second part, ;
13 there is a point that there has been a long 14 experience of no overspeed on the PGPL governor.
l l 15 However, there is a shorter experience with the PGG, 1
i 16 and that's only been installed since the last '
4 17 refueling outaqe. And it is the only installation 18 of that governor we are aware of on a Terry Turbino.
)
19 Therefore, the emphasis would he on lookinq ;
20 for a potential problem with the POU hecause there 21 is a shorter history with it. The PGPL there is a
! 22 tong history both on these turbines and on other 23 turbines in the industry, and so that the suspect 24 may he that PGG governor. That was the intent of
)
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25 l i
i i that paragraph. !
)
2 HR. H6ARD: But this is the paragraph I
]
3 should have gotten the nessage that you were
]
4 considering --
5 MR. HILDEnRANDT If you didn't, perhaps 6 that should be clarified.
7 Mn. ROSSI: This comes back to the 8 general thing of make sure you looked at everything, ;
9 because if you go through it and you don't find 10 anything, we have all got a problem.
11 MR. SHAPER: Can I ask a clarifying 12 question there? The pumps tripped on an overspeed
() 13 within seconds of each otherr is that correct?
14 MR. WILCZYNSKI: True. -
15 MR. SHAFER: Have you l ook ed to determine 16 whether the first trip contributed to the second?
17 I don't recall seeing anythinq -- any statement in 16 here.
19 MR. WILCZYNSKI: No, we haven't. I quess 20 we had no reason to suspect that. There is really 21 no ties between the two that we could see to lead 22 us toward that direction.
23 HK. DEARD: Ties between the two sort of 24 suggests you are looking for a common problem.
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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k 26 1 MR. WILCZYNSKI: No. What I mean there O 2 is that there in no tie between the No. I pump and ,
3 the No. 2 pump such that something that happened on 4 1 wouldn't cause something to happen on No. 2.
l 5 MR. SHAPER: That may be part of your 6 explanation as to why it's not a problem. You know, I i-7 I would suggest you not reject anything. If you '
8 are very confortable with the idea that regardless 9 of what happened with one of them it would not 10 affect the other one, it would pretty well put that 11 to bed.
- 12 MR. WILC3YNSKI: So your point is to &
)
() 13 include it in the report?
14 MR. SHAPER: Absolutely.
15 MR. ROSSI- Don't prematurely reject it i
j 16 in really what he said. ,
17 MR. SHAFER: That's right.
18 MR. WILCZYNSKI: All right.
19 MR. HEARD: I would like to go on then --
P 20 MR. LANNING: Can I ask_a clarifying 21 question tor.ny benefit? On the summary of the 22 data on page two, which of the feedwater pumps are l
23 experiencing those five trips?
24 MR. WILCZYNSKI: First, the first five
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, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC. l (202) 347-3700 l
l
y
- 27 i
'l trips, both aux feedpumps were called upon to I
. () 2 initiate.
l- 3 MR. LANNING: And both tripped.
4 'MR. DUNNE: That's plant trips. ,
i -
I 5 Mk.EWILCZYNSKI: ~These are plant trips. i 6 MR. DUNNE: These are actuations of the l 7 system by a' plant. trip, and that's not a trip -- i l
8 MM. HILDEBRANDT: There are no overspeed
)
! 9 trips listed there.
L
' MR.,'LANNING ' ;
10 Okay.
1 !
-11 MR. HILDEBRANDT: Zero. l i
12 MR.1 BEARD: The first experience on an
[
() 13 overspeed trip I'believe is listed on -- well, I
! 14 - guess it's in.a separate report having-to do with ,
- IS the trip throttle valve. Why the two reports are l 16 separate is beyond me,-but I think that's where it 17 shows up. ,
! 18 Okay.. In the area of Section III on 19 change analysis, I wouldclike to understand better -- ;
20 I guess-maybe I. missed the point -- but in item No.
21 1 there is a parenthetical statement that says it -
12 2 is noted that the aux feedwater turbinen previously 1 5
23 prior to February '84_ started against AP-360 and j f 24 AP-388 neing closed,- colon, at turbine speeds.of
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20 I twenty-eight hundred rpm, these valves would open.
h
(_,J 2 Are you telling me that there is a difference 3 between that configuration and what what occurred 4 on June the 2nd -- or June the 9th, rather?
5 MM. WILCZYNSKI: There is a difference o there that the reason that statement was added was 7 to show that in fact we have called upon these 8 pumps to operate when only min restart flow is 9 available.
10 MR. ROSSI: Rut not all the way up to 11 speed?
12 MR. DUNNE: Right.
( 13 MK. WILCZYNSKI: That's true in this case.
14 The surveillance testing that is done is done only 15 with min restart flow and it is a quick start all 16 the way to rated speed.
17 MR. ROSSI: That's the way you normally 18 do the survelliance test?
19 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes.
20 MR. ROSSI: So the way you do the -
21 surveillance test is consistent with startinq these 22 , pumps with AP-599 and 600 closed?
23 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes.
r~ 24 HR. ROSSI: That's what you are saying?
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29 1 MR. RUPP No. There are other valves R/
2 that are closed. The path is isolated.
3 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The path is isolated.
4 MR. RUPP: Right.
5 MR. ROSSI: But as far as the 6 characteristics that the pump sees, it's the same 7 thing.
8 MR. MUPP: Right.
9 MR. ROSSI: So the fact the AF-599 and 10 608 were closed during this particular start of the 11 punps, you have tested then in similar situations 12 with other valves closed but at least that would
( 13 indicate tnat it's unlikely, it's justotied to the 14 fact that AP-608 and 599 were closed.
15 MK. WILC3YNSKI: Yes.
16 MR. MOSSI: Okay.
17 MR. uBAMD: I guess I still fail to .
18 understand, the paragraph says these are the '
19 differences and conditions listed below exist ed 20 only on the 6-9-85 trip. And I thought what I 21 neard you say was in Item 1 that the test 22 conditions which those valves AP-360 and 388 closed 23 is quite similar of having that pathway blocked by 24 599 and 608. Is it too late in the day, am I dense,
(}
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30 1 or what you saying here?
2 MR. WILC3YNSKI: The reason that's listed 3 as a difference, if this is what you are lookino 4 for, is because that was what happened on 6-9-05 5 but had not happened during other trips.
6 MR. BEARD: I think you are saying the 7 difference is not significant.
8 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes.
9 MK. BEARD: Okay. So you are not saying 10 it is not a significant difference?
11 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The attempt in, as has 12 been requested, the attempt here is list all the
()
(,/ 13 differences that can be pointed out regardless of 14 whether they may be important.
15 MR. REARD: Okay. At the bottom of the 16 page where you got hypotheses, causes of the 17 overspeed, I would like to make a general comment I 18 think we made, and tnat is you hypothesized A, B, 19 C, D, E, I guess through E, and I read this section 20 as saying we considered these various things and on 21 the basis of analysis or whatever reasons as 22 presented here, they.are not considered viable and 23 because of that you are down to one hypothesis.
r~'s 24 And all you are testing is based on a single
,- i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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t i
1 31 l
I hypothesis, and this goes back to some comments i U]
e 2 made a little while ago.
3 un the loss of pump suction, I understand 4 that later during the event or after the actual 5 overspeed occurred, there was an unexplained 6 switchover in the aux feedwater suction to the 7 service water, and I understand further that that 8 switchover can be caused by low pump suction, and I 9 would have expected therefore to see something in
. 10 here that would address that occurrence as it 11 relates to Item A here and maybe a discussion as to 12 why it is not relevant or not significant, but I
()
q 13 don't see any discussion.
14 I'm just wondering if you could give un 15 your thoughts at this time.
16 MR. WILCZYNSKI: I thought it was 17 explained in the next paragraph there, that --
18 MR. BEARD: Next paragraph is the one on ;
19 sudden decrease on pump load.
20 MR. WILCZYNSKI No. The bottom of page 21 three. The switchover that occurred later on in 22 the event wan -- there is two pressure switches on 23 that pump suction line. Only one of those switches 24 actuated, and there is another investigation going
{)
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- 1 on as to actually what happened there but it was
(%))
2 the lower pressure switch that had actuated.
3 MR. BEARD: I think you have a two-pound 4 switch and a one-pound switch.
5 MR. DUNNE: Right.
6 t1 R . BEARD: And the one pound switch is 7 the one that spuriously actuated.
8 MR. JAIN: The two pound switch is the 9 one.that transfers --
10 MR. BEARD: The two pound switch is the 11 one that transfers the pump.
12 MR. JAIN: Just the tolerances is what he
() 13 was talking about.
14 MR. WILCZYNSKI: But at the same time 15 that switch actuated, there was no flow going 16 through the pump.
17 MR. DUNNE: Going to the steam generator 18 it was just recirc flow going through the pump.
19 MR. BEARD: And that's your basis for 20 ruling out this case?
21 MR. DUNNE: If we had loss of suction 22 during the trip, we would have gotten one of those
'23 pressure signals coming into play and indicating a 24 low suction pressure which we did not see. And we
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l 33 1 did see a low suction pressure trip later on after
~
2 we had restored flow,'but not before the overspeed 3 trip.
4 Consequently because we didn't get the 5 indication of low suction pressure before the 6 overspeed trip, we don't think we had a loss of 7 suction source. ;
8 Ma. III L DEB R AN DT : All ~ plant indications 9 indicate no loss of suction.
10 MR. BEARD: I guess I agree with you, you 11 had some funny behavior going on a little after the 12 overspeed trip. I guess if you had f u r. n y behavior
( 13 within a day, so to speak, I would.have considered 14 that as a viable thing even though you .fidn't get 15 the alarm printout on it. Tnat's all I'm saying.
16 In the general context of ruling out possible 17 sources of tne root cause, you may want to rethink ~
18 that.
l '> The next page, page tour, under item C, 20 actually tio. I says a speed grasp for the trip ,
21 indicates that the governors were controlling speed 22 as designed during the initial turbine acceleration. .
23 The two questions, are we talking about the speed ;
24 grasp for the June 9th event?
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34 1 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Yes.
1 (7
2 MM. ROSSI: They are taken from whern?
3 They are taken from the DADS system or --
4 MR. RUPP: Yes. f 5 MR. BEARD: Which grasp are you lookinq
- 6 at, the DADS system?
7 MR. ROSSI: The DADS system.
9 MR. BEARD: You are saying your view of 9 those indicates the speed was being controlled as 10 designed?
11 f tR. WILCZYNSKI Yes.
12 #1 K . ROSSI: During the initial part?
() 13 MR. WILCZYNSKI During the startup 14 operation.
15 MR. RUPP: Right. There was no 16 ditterence between those and the other ones that we 17 have seen.
18 MR. HILDEBRANDT: The footprint was the 19 same. ,
20 HR. BEARD: These kinds of prints, this 21 was the smaller reduced version?
22 ftR. DUNNE: You can't see it on there.
23 MR. BEARD: Is this the reduced version 24 of the kind of thing you looked at?
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35 1 MR. RUPP: No.
13 2 MR. BEARD: You have a different print of 3 pump speed?
4 MR. RUPP: We have the computer printout 5 from the DADS system.
6 MR. BEARD: You mean the numerical 7 printout?
8 Md. RUPP Right.
9 MR. ROSSI: ll a n d graph, hand graphed it?
10 MR. DuMNE: Yes.
11 MR. UEARD: So if you take this kind of 12 data and spread it out, it looks like typical
() 13 prints?
14 MR. DUNNE: For the first fi f teen neconda 15 of the startup of the turbine, the footprint in 16 similar to what we have seen in the 3569 startups.
17 MR. HEARD: Then does it then take off 18 for none reason?
19 MM. DUNNE: It takes off then.
20 MR. nEARD: Does it go over to the 21 overspeed reading?
22 MR. DUNNE: One did. The other 23 oscillated a little up around four thousand and
(~} 24 forty-on'e hundred and continued on at forty-five t/
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3G 1 hundred. One of them just went straight up past.
O 2 The second one, and I don't know if it's one or two, 3 tended to oscillate around forty-one hundred for a 4 while for a couple of seconds and then one of the 5 oscillations kicked it over f o r t y - f 'i v e hundred and 6 tripped. ,
. 7 Md. DEARD: Then it suggests that the
, S governor was at least initially controlling it, 9 coming off high speed?
10 MR. DUNNE: Looks like it was initially, 11 yes.
12 MR. DEARD: And then something happened.
( 13 MR. DUNNE: Yes.
14 MR. REARD: That's helpful information.
15 MR. ROSSI: Before you go off page four, 16 I have a question. On the bottom of page four on 17 the last paragraph under D, this talks about the 18 fact that the Terry Turbine, if the steam. flow is 19 stopped and restarted when it's already rolling, it '
20 may cause it to overspeed.
21 It seems to me tnat with the way you had 1
22 the SFRCS systen used with MS-106 and 106-A, that 23 there are actual accidents and events where that 24 might very well happen. In other words, isn't it
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37 p
1 possible if I have a steamline break or a feedline L] 2 break, that MS-106 can open and get opened and then 3 1 detect low pressure in a steam generator and I 4 then close MS-106 and cpen up MS-106-A and indeed 5 I'll stop the steam flow and then restart it?
6 MM. RUPP Yes, that's correct. But the 7 reason we just discounted it here is because both 8 valves were open at the same tine and steam should y nave been flowing through there prior to the --
10 MR. ROSSI: My point is you may have a 11 basic denign problem with this pump in combination 12 with the way the SPRCS system is designed that you (J'
( 13 ought to be looking at.
14 fix . JOHNSONS: In that event you just 15 described, when MS-106 is going closed, MS-106-A in
., 16 opening at the sane time, you always have the <
17 steamlines pressurir.ed. So the turbine never stopn.
18 MR. ROSSI: 50 you would always have a 19 steam flow. You would not interrupt the steam flow 20 to the turbine and then restart it.
21 HR. JOHNSONS: Riqht. The SPRCS is 22 designed that one of the two valven is either 23 always opened or in a transition of about 30 r~3 24 seconds. You have actually both valves open. It (s .
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3G I wouldn't oc you close one, then you open the other.
U, 2 MR. III LDE B R AN DT : Very similar to the 3 vent that just occurred basically.
4 MR. JOHNSONS: Yes.
5 MR. III LD E B R AN DT : Transferred from 106 to 6 106-A.
7 MK. GRIME: This is John Johnsons from 8 operations section, by the way, that joined our 9 meeting.
10 MR. BELL: But one of these valves is on 11 a freeze lint and was placed on the freeze list i
12 because you people said it didn't achieve it's full
() 13 position, it appeared to change directions in 14 midstream.
15 HR. WIDEMAN: Preliminary indications. I 16 don't know where that action plan stands for 17 MS-106.
18 HR. BELL: Based on that, can you 19 guarantee 106 was all the way open and 106-A closed?
20 HR. DUNNE: No.
21 MR. BMLLs Can you guarantee this switch 22 took place an designed since the valve changed 23 direction in midstream? Such that this statement 24 is not -- is incorrect, that there may have been a
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s 39 l i ,
4 1 period such that 106, since it didn't travel to the r f-() 2 open limit shut before 106-A opened? -
I l 3 MR. l{ I L D E B R A N D T : The assumption stated !
' f i 4 in here are based on computer printouts-of what you l .
l 5 have reported by the computer. .
t I
- 6 MR. BELL
- We are getting data from on
- 4
- 7 that valve based on the computer.- It only traveln ,
I 8 for eighteen seconds j i
j 9 MR. HILDEDRANDT: Yes, sir, I was going i-i 10 to state that. And the movement of that valve and i I 11 the conclusions that are here are based on what was i 1 12 said on the computer, the scenario that --
i 1
f () 13 MR. J O l!N S O N S : The one just described
{ .
14 would have not been exactly as described here. l
!l 15 MR. ROSSI: lli s scenario is based ~on-i
[-
t
> +
! 16 everything working properly and what happened in f 4
- 17 the event that happened here is still being . looked ;
l lo at on 106 and 107-A. I 4 ;
i
. 19 MR. . III LDEBR ANDT : Yes, sir. We start on
- I~ 20 a 'different action plan. [
t 21 HR. WILCZYNSKI: This might help. If you f i zi l 22 look at the. timing, the MS-100 begins'to open, two 1, ,
- 23 seconds later the manual SPRCS initiation on low 24' pressure is operated ~by the operator, that begins
)
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40 1 to open 106-A at that time and then you don't see O 2 MS-lO6 being full closed until 20 seconds --
3 MR. RUPP: It's 16 seconds later.
4 MR. WILCZYNSKI: -- 16 seconds later.
5 MR. III LDE B R AtIDT : You may recall these 6 are also gate valves which means almost to the 7 point they are closed they are effectively open.
8 MR. BEARD: I think that you ought to 9 consider that in a trouble-shooting effort and also l
10 in the consideration of the adequacy of the design 11 of the plant, I think it's a very risky assumption 12 to assume everything is going to work perfect. I 13 think the event of June 9th is adequate 14 demonstration that it's unreasonable to assume that 15 everything is going to work and you might want to '
16 consider if a valve doesn't work right would that 17 then set you into the situation you just described 18 here of a stop/ start on steam and hence lead to an 19 overspeed of one or more on the speed turbines.-
20 And consider that, that's all.
21 Okay. If there are not any more 22 questions on that area, I would like to go to page 23 five, Item E. I'm particularly intrigued by a 24 statement in what looks to be about the forth
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41 1 paragraph that sort of reflects something that was (a 2 mentioned earliert that is, because of the various 3 reasons, you do expect some water slugs will be 4 formed in these long pipelines.
5 And my first general comment on thin 6 section' is that I and several other people have 7 been told for years and years that these Terry 8 turbines are very rugged and they can run basically 9 on water, et cetera, et cetera, and I read this 10 Section E as, No. 1, not discussing that type of 11 previous information, I'm sure.it's very general in 12 the nuclear industry, and not addressino what '
() 13 appears to be a complete change in that story in 14 that now I read this as your turbine design is 15 considered susceptible to. increased speed 16 excursions when water slugs are introduced. And I 17 Just don't understand the drastic reversal of 18 stories.
19 MR. ROSSI: When did you first learn that ,
20 the Terry turbines were susceptible to increased 21 speed excursions with water slugs 7 Did you learn 22 that after the June 9th event when you went back to 23 Terry Turbine or was that known before o r -- '
) 24 MM. WILCZYNSKI: It.was known after the J
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42 1 June 9th. And to clear something up, we had alwayn l
2 known that water slugs in Terry turbines, that 3 Terry Turbine was built to handle that water slug '
4 and that is in fact true based on testing that 5 Terry has done.
6 But when they did that testing they used 7 quantities of cold water which they said actually 8 balked the turbine down. They didn't even think of
.9 the fact that hot water might be a worse condition '
i 10 such that being at saturation poin't might flash 11 through the nozzles and give you a control problen.
4 12 MM. DEARD: Are you saying that sone A
(,) 13 testing was done by the Terry Turbine folks?
I 14 MR. WILCZYNSKI Yes. They told us that 15 in 1968 they did testing.
1 16 MR. II I LDC B R AN DT : Cold water testing.
17 HR. GRADOMSKI: And of course this is the
- 18 most conservative when you are dealina with a 19 turbine that is running at full speed and injecting 20 a large amount of cold water from any thermal shock 21 standpoint. I think we all realize that.
I 22 The point that is being made now is not 23 for the. integrity of the turbine, por se, but the 24 potential for overspeed considerationn with water ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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-- - - - . ___. _ _ , - _ _ __ ~ _ _
43 l
1 at saturation conditions. I 2 MR. ROSSI: And the problem in the water l 3 in saturated conditions carries more energy through 4 the turbine because it is water that flashan and 5 more gets through valves into the turbine? l 6 MR. HILDEBRANDT Imparts more energy 7 into tne turbine.
L 8 MR. ROSSI: llow did Terry Turbine 9 determine that this was the case? Ila d they gono 10 back and done-analyses since June 9th or testing or 11 what?
12 MR. WILCZYNSKI: They didn't say that
( 13 they had done testing. I would imagine that they 14 have done analysis and based on what we have just t
i 15 said here, it does impart more energy, you would 16 expect a control problem, possible overspeed.
17 MR. ROSSI: Does anyone including either la you or Terry Turbine know of any other plant 19 experience wnere this has occurred? ;
20 HR. WILCZYNSKI No, they do not. !
t j 21 HR. ROSSI: Did you ask them whether they 22 knew of any plant experience? :
23 MR. WILCZYNSKI Yes. We talked about 24 overspeed and other overspeed problems. We were ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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44 i
1 not able to find any other data that says other O 2 plants have had problems with this.
3 MR. BEARD: Do you know if Terry Turbine i
4 as a vendor would have been informed of overspeed !
5 events had they occurred in other plants?
6 MR. WILCZYNSKI: No. You can't say that.
7 HR. DEARD: Did they have experience in 8 other applications in the nuclear industry where
- 9 the vendor is often not told? In fact, it's more 10 infrequent than we would of course like, so that I 11 guess what I'n trying to get to is the fact they 12 are not aware of any doesn't mean it hasn't l O 13 hanPeeed.
14 HR. WILCZYNSKI: Right.
(
15 MR. ROSSI: I don't know, you might sec j 16 if there is some way you can do some sort of check i
17 with other plants through your owners groups or 18 INPU to see if there is nome experience, because 19 you are kind of placing your bets on this one thing ,
20 which comes back to the general problem that we 21 have of being concerned that you go through all 22 this and not know what caused the problem.
L 23 MR. REARD: Does tha NOTEPAD system 24 afford you the opportunity to ask that qtlestion on
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, -- ~ , . - - -
. ., _ _ _ ~ . . . - . _ ~ . . ___ .
45 >
I the air, so to speak, and get prompt responsen? !
( Yea, we did look at that and 2 MR. RUPP
! 3 it shows no indication of that. The only place !
l 4 that even had any kind of problems was -- well, ;
5 thin is off of our HPRDS, and the only nlant that '
{
6 had any problem was one other company.
7 HR. ROSSI: What was the nature of their I O problem, overspeed from water slugs or possible t 9 overspeed from water slugs? i 10 MR. WILCZYNSKI Let ne net to the right L1 page here. There are many problems here. They --
12 they have one nachanical speed novernor was not l
() 13 tripped at t h e: required speed netpoint. i i 14 MR. HEARD: Whiin you are lookinq, thin l
15 is an HPRbG printout you are looking at? +
l -
16 HR. WILCZYNSKt: Yes.
f i 17 HR. LANNING: Could we have a discunnion la off the record for a accond?
.f 19 (Discussion held off the record.) {
i 20 MA. HoSS!: We are back on the record now. .
I 21 Why don't you just tell us what you did find from f 22 one other utility or one other plantt you don't #
[
23 need to name the plant. !
24 HR. WILCZYNSK!: Okay. We had only one
[}
ACE F M U M H A 1. RMPORTERS INC. '
- (202) 347-3700 '
f i 46 :
I 1 instance of an overspeed, and it was found that the O 1 Woodward governor ramp generator had failed, and we 3 have no indication that that's what happened thero !
4 because after we -- later on June 9th we tested l 5 them and they both worked as designed.
6 MR. ROSSI: So that was not related to
- (
t
- 7 water slugs? !
2
- 8 MR. RUPP
- Right. }
I 9 MR. ROSSI: So you are really betting on {'
I i 10 something that hasn't been seen anywhere eine as I i l 11 far as anybody known for the cause? I mean, just l I i l 12 keep that in mind as you are thinking about what i
() 13 you Tre doing because, you know, one would think j 14 that that kind of thing would hava shown up before !
- 15 now. f
! L l 16 HR. HEARD: I understand that after the !
i 17 June 9th event, you called Terry Turbine folks and 1 e j 18 they told you this possibilityr is that correct? !
1 :
j 19 MH. WI LCZYtiS KI s Yes.
i 20 MR. DEARD: Did they tell you how they 21 happened to come across this information in terns l 22 of -- I think you suggested it night be through !
23 analysis. Did they tell you when this analysis was ;
! l' 24 conducted or performed?
{)
ACE PEDMRAL REPORTER 9 INC.
(202) 347-3700 k
i
47 '
1 MM. WI LC Z Yt! S K I : No, they didn't. t i, 2 HR. huGSI: Did they aircady know thin !
3 when you called them or did you call them with your ,
4 problem and they go off and think about it for a
! 5 couple of days and then come back and agreed it [
6 could happen?
-. 7 HR. w!LCZYNSKI: We entled then with n O problem with overspeed, and through tha ;
)
9 conversation we told them of the problem that we '
I !
1 10 nra experiencing with the hanger probican and ;
2 I
l 4
11 possible water in the lines. [
t I 12 And the conversation led to the fact that i 1
1
() 13 if there were water near the naturation point, then l
i l 14 you could expect control problems and possible ;
i f
15 overspeed. '
i I
- 16 HR. dCARD
- So they were aware of the i I
I 17 possibility as soon as you brought up the situation? !
10 HR. WI LC % Y tlS K ! : Yes.
19 MH. DEARD: 1 don't want to go into it at 20 this point personally unless I'm directed to, but !
21 would like to suggest that you recontact your
, 22 vendor and renind him of his responnihilitian under ,
i i
23 10 CPR Part 21, because these turbines are used 24 throughout the induntry.
D~j l
ACC PEDI:RAL REPOR7tRS INC.
(202) 347-3700 i
f f
40 ,
i 1 H it . ROSSI: That's a gond point. f
)
2 MR. DEARD: I trust the Region will take j 3 whatever action is appropriate in this matter no 4 the Pact Pinding Team doesn't have to get into that !
5 anpoet. !
I 6 uut along that line, I would like to aux ;
7 if this information had been qiven to you, would l 1
0 you as a company consider it an appropriate thing [
9 to advise other utilities of this information vin l 10 something auch as NOTCPAD7 l 11 MR. WI D EM Atl e f.et me see if I can addrenn I i
12 that. I think that we would probably want to
() 13 contact Terry Turbine to verify if they have indeed 14 done thin under analysin and then possibly put that !
i ;
15 information out under NOTEPAD if that in indeed tha --
16 is indeed the true case here of what happened. l l
- 17 HR. II E A R D
- What difference -- I'm trying 10 to understand what you are anying. What difference l 19 would it have nade whether they determined this i
20 through annlynis or testing or reported operational (
21 experiences or whataver? If this in their hellef n I I
22 failure mechanism, it seems like that's what other !
! 23 utilities would certainly like to be informed of j I
1
{) 24 before they run into a problem.
ACI: PR D E R AI, REPORTERS !MC.
(202) 347-1700 l
_ _ -- _ = . - . _ - . _ . - __ - . - . - _ _
49 1 necause you are saying that at your plant,
'() your best shoc at this point in time, thin document 2 l 3 right here, says that the reason that you had a 4 complete loss of safety function of aux feedwater ,
l 5 on both redundant traina in due to a phenomena that 6 your vendor has just told you about and basically l 7 it's possible that no other utility in the country 8 is aware of. It would neem to me that as a
, 9 responsible utility, as you folks are, you would
)
i 10 want to share that with your other utility friends '
i
- 11 in the industry.
J j 12 MR. WIDEMAN You are probably correct. '
I
() 13 1 don't know for sure if we would have put that 14 information cutt okay? ;
15 MR. REARD: I'm just saying you ought to ;
1 16 consider it.
17 HR. ROS81: I think we said enough about 18 it. I think you do need to contact Terry Turbine '
19 and inform them of their obliqation under Part 21, 20 and I think it is important that other people know j !,
21 about this. .
r i 22 MR. NHAPER: I would like to point out l 23 too, earlier in the year you identified in fact 24 damage on the aux feedwater systen piping which
{}
ACM FEDERAT, REPORTERS INC.
l (202) 347-3700 ,
l
s 50 !
[
1 would contribute to the potenttal for water hammer f O 2 or water slugs.
l l
I 3 MM. It ! LD E D R AN DT flo t piping. Piping i
4 supports. !
I i 5 tin. S il A P E R : All right. So he it, pipinq l 6 supports. Hut at that time, there was no [
I 7 indication that your aux feedpunpa tripped --
l 8 MR. !!!LDEDRANDTs That's true. I 9 HR. Sil A P f:R -- during the incident where l 10 that danage occurred?
j 11 MR. II I I.D f:n R At!DT s That's correct. ;
i 1 HR. ROSSI: You also not no damage to j 13 hangers that you found during the June 9th event.
j 14 HR. Iltt,DMDRANDT Yes, sir. That's [
+ i a ;
15 correct. ;
1 16 HR. L A N ti!!)G Let me understand one other 17 thing. There is an interaction between the i 10 novernor and the turbine on the pump, is there not?
19 MR. W! !,CZ YtlS K ! : Yes. ,
r 20 HR. LANNINGs And has the flovernor been
- 21 nanoted neparately from the turbine in the action ;
22 plans or should you ask the name question of the 23 novernor concerning the potential water and atean l p
V 24 supply? '
j ACf PCDHil Al, RT PORTMRn Ific. !
(202) 347-3700 i
51 l
I 1 MH. WI T,C Z YN S KI : The contact was rsa d e O 2 with Terry Turbine because they were the suppliers I
i 3 of the systen includinq the governor and the pump.
l 1 4 HR. LANN1tIG: All ric.ht.
l 5 NH. W I t,C 7.Yfl G K ! : They know best.
i o MR. ROSSIs Now, it'n my understanding 7 fron your action plan that the both vendorn are i
j 8 going to be here when you work on this stuff, both 1
l v the vendor for the governor and the vendor s
j 10 representative from Terry Turbine.
t 11 ftR. WILCZYNSK!: Yes.
12 fin. RUSSI: f.arry?
!O is n . n e r.r. . This water dana,e that was j 14 reported previously, that's through its normal l
! 15 -steam supply 106 and 1077 i
I 16 HR. RUPP Right.
l 17 itn. DUNNE: Not necasnarily. Initla11y i
l lil part of the nootfication made durinq the last refuelir 9 i
i 19 was to open all four valves simultaneously. 106, l
20 100-A, 107, 107-A.
! 21 after we started seeinq damage, we
! 22 postulated part of the damage may be due to the l 23 fact that we have all four valves open l 1 i I
24 simultaneously and we changed back to the original j A C K F fC D U R A I, RfPORTMitu INC.
1 (202) 347-3700 1 1
1 I
1
1
'12 !
i 1 design scheme, which tu just opening 107, 106 and '
O 2 107. l t
3 Mn. ncLL: Since you have changed back to i l !
4 the original dealqn scheme, only opening in6 and i i
107, have you seen any other hangar damage?
5 i i
I 6 MR. DUNNit Yes, 1 think we have. It f t
3 7 hasn't been to the magnitude of the damage we ;
I !
Il expected earlier in the year, but we are still j
] ;
i
! 9 expecting nome hanger damage.
J {
1 ,
] 10 HR. fl C L L : Even if the steam coning nut i 11 of the turbine as you said, there is water in the j !
{ 12 steam, why didn't the turbine oversteam when it f O 12 starts on the re,uine steam generator .unniv ic !
1 14 that hypothesis is true? I
! 15 fin . DutittE s f.e n s water. ;
i 16 HR. RUPP The other linen are n int 17 tonger in length, the cross-over lines.
4 la MR. Rons! would you tell un l 19 fractionally how much longer? j.
l 20 M it . DilN tift : About twiae. I 1
- 21 M it . HUPP One line in three timan, on i t
22 the other it is twice as long. !
! 23 HR. #111.DMHHAtIDT The cross-overn are I i
24 longer.
ACC P!:D15 R AI, It E P O R T I' R fl I rlC . !
(202) 347-J700 !
i i
4 53 i 1 1 HK. ROSSI: They are more likely to have ;
() 2 water. The amount of water may not just be 3 proportional to the pipelines?
i 4 MR. HILDEDRANDT Yes, sir, that's
( ,
l 5 correct. l
! f 6 MR. RUGERS: I wonder if I can ank a !
i '
7 couple of questions?
4 f
- a MR. RusSI
- Sure.
i ,
)
i 9 HR. ROGERS: No. 1, when you quys are on l i 10 the aux boiler, do you use the cross-over line to l i
i 11 feed that other aux feedpump to run it before you l i l 12 cross into Mode 37 1
4
() 13 HR. is I Lutn R AN DT : A cross-tie is used, !
! 14 it's not the cross-over.
15 HR. n0GERS: It's the cross-tie.
i j 16 MM. HILDEDRANDT A lower cross-tie.
i i 17 HR. ROGERS: So the hanger damage, you
,i l lo old see some danage on the cronn-tie, didn't you?
i i
19 MR. DUNNE: Yes.
20 HR. RocERS: Okay. So you did nee some l 3
l 21 damage on the crons-tic. When you all went off on !
l 22 MPROG, did you talk to the boilers to see if HPCI
, 23 and RCIC has seen any overspeed problem? I I -
l [}
24 MM. WILCZYNGK!: At the request of MPRDS L A C f. PEDERAL REPORTERG INC. i l (202) 347-3700 !
3
-. ., . ~ _ -_ ,_.__. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . _ - _ - . ._ _ . _ _ _ . _ -
.. - - .- . . - . _ _ - . - _ , . . ~ _ .
54 1 I don't believe was sent out just the nwRs. I i
2 imagine it was sent out through the various --
3 MK. ROGERS: You are saying PWR and HWRs
- 4 aren't seeing any overspeed trip?
5 HR. DUNNE: To the best of our knowledge, 6 yes.
i 7 MM. ROGERS: Okay.
8 HM. WILCZYNSKI: It doesn't show that.
I 9 MR. RUGERS: Okay. One other question.
10 Have you all calculated how much water, saturated 11 water should be in the line that would cause an 12 overspeed trip of the turbine. and have you been
() 13 able to correlate that amount of water to the 14 anount of water you think is actually in your 15 steamlines?
16 MR. !!!LDRBRANDT: That calculation is i 17 being done now. ,
)
la MR. ROGERS: Thank you very much.
19 MK. WilO L D : I would like to ask a ,
20 question on the piping design. Is it common
- 21 practice to supply a turbine with cold piping at 22 startup or is it more common to keep that piping '
, 23 heated a nti drained and ready to start with the hot
{} 24 piping up to the trip and throttic valves? It ACB PMDERAL REPORTERS INC.
(202) 347-3700
__-_,c- - ~ - - - e- r v - m-.. r--y-- ~ , - - - -
55 1 might be common industry practice to have hot .
2 piping and this would be an unusunt design.
3 MR. ROSSI: That would at least explain 4 why other. plants haven't seen this problem and it 5 does exist here.
6 MR. BEARD: I think niso the question of 7 the layout of the pipes in avoiding horizontal 8 runs, particularly long horizontal runs, it may be 9 replaced where you can have short ones, but it doen 10 raise questions concerning the piping. And I quess 11 the obvious follow-up to your question is the 12 utility.looking into the design anpects.
() 13 MR. W H O !, D Right.
14 MR.. BEARD: Would that be a part of their 15 now e x pa no eil trouble-shooting program?
16 MR. WHOLD: I think it should be found 17 out whether or not they have a unique design.
10 Maybe that's tne only reason they are experiencing 19 the problem.
20 -MR. HILDEDRANDT This work was already 21 in the process as a result of the hanger support 22 damage and they are looking at those particular 23 aspects including calculations on moisture, and 24 this event occurred in the process of that
)
ACE t"MDEHAI, REPORTERS INC.
(202) 347-3700
. . _ . _ . . . ~ , = _ _. m.. _ _ . - _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ - . . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ . - . , _ . .
e 56 1 investigation.
2 .Mk. DEARD: Do you know whether or not 4:
{ 3 with regard to this design it is unique along that
, i 4 line? '
5 MR. HILDEDRANDT We don't have that ;
r e
l- 6 answer yet. It is ongoing:at this point. .
i ;
- 7 MR. BEARD
- You don't know yet.- .}
i -
[
8 iMR. HILDEBRANDT No, sir. [
E 1
9 MR. DEARD: I guess if I can go back, I j l10 only had one or two quick items. I just want to j 11 reiterate when we getooverLhere to the details of l t
~
12 the~ action plan, my general comment was it does not (
- i. t
, () '13 appear that this scheme says all the things i
14 necessary to rule out all the other causes prior to I.
- 15 going to Mode 3,-but we talked about that quite a r 1,
16 bit.
I 17 I had a concern or question in regard to l' 18 the vendor representatives as to whether or not the !
i 19 people from Terry and Woodward are going to be t ,
20 service representatives of'the sup. technician j l- 21 . variety'or'whether they'are going to be people with
, t
- 22 the design knowledge that we. talked about previously. [
[
24 coming.from Woodward would'be just a service
} i ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC. ',
-(202) 347-3700
+-
u---__.-._...--__---___--.x-- - _ _ _ _ - _ . - . - -__-2ea _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . - - - - - . _ _ . _ _ - _ - - - - _ . - - - _ - - _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ - - - - - . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ -
l I
i 57 ;
e 1 representative to give a once-over of the governor I) 2 after pulling the cover off. The turbine, Terry 3 Turbine representatives, the first person that ;
4 would be here would he a service representative for 5 the disassembly and reassembly and also the ,
i 1 6 inspection in between there. .
f 7 ftK. HILDEBRANDT: Of the turbine.
8 MR. WILCZYNSKI: Of the turbine. Plans ;
L .
9 are being made.for an engineering representative to 10 be here during testing of the turbine using the [
11' cross-over lines. I 12 HR. BEARD: You don't believe it's ,
- O 13 necessary for en engineer to be there won you tau i
14 it apart,- when you are looking for the poten'tial of [
15 water damage or water intrusion so you can analyze 16 the visual things _that:were observed?
4 17 MR. ROSSI: Well, let me ask you another 18 question. -I assume that' damaged parts'of-any sort 1
?
19 twill tall under the1 general. guidelines and befsaved l
- 20 for future-analysis?
21 HR. WILCZYNSKI _ Yes, definitely. ,
4 r
i 1
~
- 22 'HR.'ROSSI
- . .ButqI think there'is a
'23 general proolem here that you'ought-to consider, ,
24 and that is that I think you have--a-very -- you -
ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC. '
(202)'347-370D [
4
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, . .. .. . , . . -.-. - . . . ~ . . . - .... - - - - , . - - - - -. -
58 r
i 1 apparently have a 'very complicated problem of some
-' j i 2 sort with these governors and the turbines and.you -
, i i 3 may want to look harder at the engineering support
< l 4 you are going to get out of the vendor as opposed 4 4
5 to just the people that can replace.the broken i 6 ' parts, and I think that is the point that J. T. is f
7 making.
{
8 MR. DEARD: We have had some unfortunate i- -
9 experience i n different_ pieces of equipment around 10 nuclear plants where thesparson looked at it, it t
11 was-assug t,echnician, to.use a' term, and then hy 12 telephone tried to communicate that visual i (I 13 information to an engineer across the country and ,
14 asked for some assessment,can'd we found that's a i
j 15 very poor way to analyze the effects that were .
b 16 observed.
e 17 The next best thing is obviously very I
j 18 goodfphotographs, but-I think the situation -- you 19
~
i- ,
may want to reconsider-having-the-people who are 20 ; design-oriented involved in that inspection because' -
F ~ 21' 1that's.the~ crux 1of.your solecthesis.
~
- . . 22 , 'With enat, realizing.-- ,
~ 23 M R .- Sil A PE R : I-would like to make a i
- '~i 24 comment.. .
ACE-FZ9ERAL' REPORTERS INC. -
1102)'.347-3700 ,
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- i 59 1 MR. BEARD: -- it is 6:40 in the evening,
- O 2 I have no further comments on this.
3 MR. ROSSI: You have.the other one to go ,
4 through. Go ahead. !
5 MR. SHAPER: This is the first action 6 plan which really describes a considerable amount 7 of maintenance work that is going to take place 8 including'possible removal and replacement of parts.
I
. 9 Last Saturday or Sunday, 1-requested from 10 the TECO a description an-to how they intend to 11 control and handle the parts that are replaced a
12 and/or sent out for further analysis. I have not !
() 13 received anything,- and until such.a time as I'do 14 receive something, that type of work activity is-15 going to be pinced on a hold.
16 M M .' 'WIDEMAN: Wayne, this-portion here is '
17 only trouble-shootings okay? And'they are, under ;
18 the guidelines, there was no replacement of parts j L19 to take place.-
20 MM. -DEARD: I think-there-is a step.in 21 - nere that says develop a procedure for the repair 22 and replacement.
23 MR.. SHAPER: Item four on the action plan L
q 24 says' prepare maintenance: work order for. repair and 1
ACE FEDERAL _ REPORTERS I tic .
(202) 347-3700 '
4
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I replacement of components as required, then reassemble- }
I) 2 turbine. So I assume if there is anything that is i 1
. 3 going to be replaced, you are going to do it ige f o r e :
4 you reassemble the turbine.
+
5 See, I'm just making it a point, and that ;
6 goes for any work activity,*any'teplacement of ;
i
'7 parts. This is a very-important'part of-the job is !
. 8 controlling this equipment.
'9 MR. ROSSI: Let's see. Can we go on to ;
.10 t h'e other action -- '
i .
~
.11 MR. BEARD: Does anyone' clse have any 12 comments on this? I seemed-to.have by default had-
) 13 a lot of comments. 'Did:anybodyfelse? ;.
i
, 14 MR. WHOLD: It may be because I h a v e n.' t '
15 hadi a chance to read this completely, b'ut I wonder 16 if theotime constants'have been evaluated in terms ~!
17 'of the governor; coming =open and~having to close and-
.i . . .
18 :th e 1 va r i ou s steam. supplies-and-openingrand--closing i
19 -and the discharge valves. ,
l 20 MR. BEARD: ,Especially~in the' presence of i --
21 . water.
l t
! 22 MR. WHOLD: ' Presence of' water. The 599 i g
23 and 608 valves,'for instance, drop halfiof.the load i i 24 on-the: turbine- in nine1 seconds. Ilguess.there was ACE FEDERAL' REPORTERS INC.
, '(202) 3.47-3700 L
. ._ _ .. ._ _ _ .. ~. _ _ . - ~ . . _ _ . . = . _ ..
f 2
i bl ;
j 1 rur f l ow at that timer it closed. But these time $
() , 2 constants are important in evaluating on overspeed. '
3 MK. !!I LDE D R AN DT : Those considerations 4 are:part of the same analysis that Walt was askinq l
.5 about earlier, that all tne conditions surrounding- ;
F 1 6 the turbines and steamlines are part of the '
i 7 analysis of going in and trying to reproduce what -;
J a -8. happened-and a consideration such as you mentioned ,
'9 would be true. :
J- 10 MR. BEARD: Would that analysis be part ;
1 2
1 1: -o f the information you'would -
-- the-licensee would 12 present as-part of. telling us-you found as a root -
() '
'13 cause.- .
i 14 MR. II I LD E B R AN DT : We.are doing that~for'
- i 15 the licensee. .I-oresume that- is the case.- ?
4 16 MR. WILCZYNSKI - Yes.
f f 17 HR. ROGERS: 'One.Last q u e s t i o n .-- When are '
, 18 you going to start-work? - 4 19 'MR. WILCZYNSKI Pardon?
. t
[ 20 MR. ROGERS: . When are you'~ going;to start 21 worx?- -
l
!~ -22' HR. WILCZYNSKI: On these turbines? ,
d l23 MK. ROGERS: Uh-huh.
24 MR. Sil A F E R : I -l th i nk personally you:have ACE ~PEDBMAL REPORTERS'INC. I L (202)E347-3700 l- -
f
- . ~ ._ __ _ .. . . . ~ . _. . - - . . . , . . . ,, _
d b ,
j 62 4
- i. 1 got,some work to do on this and then-you are coming
( f 2 back. You are not approving --
3 !!R . ROSSI: We aren't in a situation of i
4 approving these at all.- What we were asked to do l 5 is comment on these before they-started the work, 6 .and-I assume th'at you have heard our' comments. And ;
7 I-don't know that we have'any provisions for asking {
~
8 to come back and commenting on it again.
P 9 MR. BEARD: I guess tne. question'is; !
t f
l .10 whether we would like to see'it;again. I think 11 that's the question being put on the table.
12 M R . - S !! A P E R : ' Yes.-
- () 13 MR..ROSSI
- Whysdon't we get back to them 14 in.the-morning on1that. 'If.werare-through~ with i 15 tnis, I would 11xe to ask it anyoneLwould object if; i
16 we take a quick five-minute break? i-17 (Ther'upon, e a recess was taken.)
18 - - - --
19 MR.-ROSSI: Let's-go back'on thecrecord.-
J Do we-have people h'ere to 20 HR. BEARD:
i 21 return to. business?
22 MR. ROSSIt' WeLhave enough people?
23 MM. BELL: It's_all-r,ight~to conduct -
{ . ,
I 24 -- b u s i n e s s ?
[ ACE FEDERAL ~ REPORTERS INC. t (202) 347-3700 l
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v 4
63 f
1 'MM.
WIDEMAN: We are going to be talking
' 'O, -
2 about the throttle valve problem?
3 MR. ROSS.It -We had one-other thing - we ,
4 have had a discussion about -- ;
! 5 MR. -- WI DEM AN : Do we need this on the 6 record? .
e 7 MR. ROSSI: We are on the record. I ;
i 8 think you definitely-do. l l 9 MR.-BEARD: I wanted to ask the quest' ion, t
10 do.you have tne people t h'a t To l ed o Edison wants'to 11 finish the'last few minutes of discussion on this-12 overspeed plan that.you'have presented us or do you .j i
() 13 want to get some peoplelin the. room before we start?:
14 MR. GRADOMSKIs- I thinkT we should wait' .
I -
- 15 . for Bernie.- >
16 MR. ROSSI: Pine. Let's go off-the *
! ; 17 record until everybody is here.
18 (Discussion held:offlthe-record.)
i 19 MR. ROSSI: Why~ don't?-we go on the record. i
- 20 You have hea rd . a' _ lot -of comments and .
21 concerns and probl' ems-that we'have with the one ;
22 that weijustireviewed.'.Now, fromEour side it looks l i .
- - -23 like that you' are probably' going Jto be doing'a i
~
24 moderate amount'of-revisions ~to this'and, based on
, ' ACE PEDERAL REPORTERS INC. +
i: ~(202) 347-3700, I
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64
- -I that, we think we ought to see it again, you know,
.Ct 2 we ought to see this'one as if we are seaing it the 3 first time after it is redone.
4 .with that, the next question is what does 5 this do to your schedule if we don't go through the
.6 throttle valve one tonight but we do it tomorrow?
7 I-think it also brings up the-question that's 8 pretty ~ clear,~we.are not going to get- through . all 9 of these-by the end lof the day. tomorrow, so some of 10 them are going to have-to.be reviewed next week.
11 What does that do to your schedule?
12 MR. DEYER: Our plans are to get these
( 13 : plans finalized and proceed as they are approved.
14 As far as scheduling, we haven't laid out a
.15 . specific schedule to'say we'want to: start this now 16 .and this at given times.
17 HR. ROSSI: So'you don't have-definite 18 plans for the Terry-Turbine people and governor 19 people to come here on a given day next week?
20 MR. WILCZYNSKI: No, we.do not.
21 MR. ROSSI: Ho'is-it fairEto say if we 22 don't?look~at this other one tonight and we look,at 23 .tne oneLwe just. looked at, :the - one we just talked 24 about'early'next-week, that wouldn't delay you?
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1 HR. BEYER: When might we expect to get s
i 2 comments back?
- 3 MR. BEARD: I think-we had a discussion 4-4 with Mr. Williams tnis morning about these action
- 5 plans and how we might appropriately convey the 6 .information back and forth'between your engineering '
7 .and staff and us during the time we are in Bethesda, 8 and Bill Rowles was present for that. And I think 9 Mr.fwilliams had'some ideas:how that might be j 10 conducted. ,
1 r
- 11 MR. ROSSIt' -Excuse me, ' 'J.'T. Let me--- : i
! i i
- 12 there are a couple of ways it.canibe done. One in j
() 13 we can try to ao it by phone. We obviously will' -
I i 14 have-to have the; document, however.- Then-there be :
c i L ~15 other ways to speed:it.up.
i.
l' 6 But-one-possibility is we. simply get the ;
i 17 document Telefaxed to:us'and we have the 18 conversation-in conference call and there may be l
)
~ 19 other things that can;be done where we could do it
' I
-20 face.to face.
i L
-21 . MR.- Sil APER: Rernie,- I believe'you-have 22 this on-5520, do you not, these plans? ,
[
i . .
23' MR. BEYER: 1. don't~know if they are all 24 -on 5520 word 1 processing.:
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l 66 1 MR. SHAPER: I'would suggest you consider fO 2 that possibility. The Fax are very difficult to _
i 3 read once;they reproduce it three or four times. l i
4 LI f it's possible, you might. consider that. .
i i 5 MM. NIDEMAN: If they are on 5520, there j 6 is a possibility that we could transmit: those over j i
7 the 5520 to nethesda. You know, we do tnat ,
'~
8 frequently with.our project manager.
9 't Ut. - R O S S I : 'h, O you do? l 10 MR. WIDEMAN: We have that communications
}
11 established. '[
12 MR. MOSSI: If'you1have that, that makes j () 13 the problem simp'le on getting it there, and then .
.14 what we are talking about iss reviewing the thing .
j 15 and talking .about it by phone.
16 MR. WIDEMAN - Okay.
I
- 17. MM.-ROSSI: Which is1what I --
.18 'MM..WIDEMAN: Understand that ifHwe did 19 - do that, it would.noticome out on a form like this't '
i
- 20 okay? Itfwould~come-out on a blank piece of paper ;
2' 1 without the action-plan. .
-22 MR. ROSSI: . What we need is something
- l- l 23 that's.~ clear enough that: we can review-.and-._ comment-
'24 on.it,.-because we-are not - :we: don't. want to be in cACE:PEDERAL' REPORTERS INC. !
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67 I the position of doing any kind of sign-off approval.
U 2 We want to, you know, give you our comments on it 3 and what the benefits are and what we think the 4 weaknesses are. And I just -- the one we just saw, 5 we are very concerned that everything depends on 6 this one hypothesis that no one else has ever seen.
7 And I would think at this. point you would be 8 uncomfortable with that also.
9 MR. WIDEMAN: Okay. We can make the 10 necessary arrangements to get the documents to you.
11 Whether that means overnight Federal Express or wo 12 send someone on a plane to hand carry them to you, (n) 13 we can make whatever. arrangements are appropriate.
14 MR. BEARD: Let me see if I understand 15 the other question about scheduling. Is there any 16 interrelationship between this plan on aux feed 17 overspeed that we just discussed and the oversneed 18 trip throttle valve plan that we had planned 19 earlier to discuss tonight 7 20 MR. BEYER: I would ask Rick to address 21 that. I .think he can better relate the technical 22 relationship between tnese two plans.
23 MR. BEARD: I m.an, in terns of schedule.
24 MR. URADOMSKI: Excuse me. Could you (m) y.j -
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^1- repeat the question?
~ 'O . 2 MR. BEARD: I was trying to address the 3 scheduling question, and that is is there any l
~t 4 ~ schedule or. interaction between the plan we just t
-5 discussed-on the. aux feed overspeed trips, Plan 1A 6 and-1B, and t h'e other plan,-which is aux feedpump 4 .
7 turbine ove'rspeed trip ~ throttle valve linkage ;
8 problem in terms of when we need to review these l l
9 and give you comments? .
10 MR. GRADOMSKI: The connection between i -. .
11 the two comes in the testing of the hypothesis for
- 12 ~ action Plan 1D.. l 4
() 13 H R .~ =B E A R D s. 1 D7 - '
14 MR. GRADOMSKI: 1D, which is the trip C
15 throttle valve.
16 MR. ROSSI: That's the part about going
.. 17 .to Hoce 3 for tests. That's the. connection between b 18 the two?
ff 19 MR..GRADOMSKIt- That's the connection ;
~
- 20 between the.two,.that's true.~ The only'way to test 21 that~ hypothesis..is in Mode.3 and attempting'to open. 1
. I 4
22 -theLtrip-throttle valve ofsthe auxiliary feedwater l 23 ' pumps'against full steam generator pressure.
l _
24 'M R . REARD: Okay. Let me be more
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69 I specitic. I don't know whether you want to answer Iuj
.T 2 it or Bernie, but in view of the hour, if we were 3 to ask about reviewing this trip throttle valve 4 problem Plan ID tomorrow, would that impede your 5 progress in any way or is it important that we do 6 it tonight?
7 MR. BEYER: I think we can review it 8 tomorrow and still support our efforts. While we 9 were on break, we talked about our need to revise 10 the plan that you have already commented on today.
11 MR. BEARD: The one on the aux speed 12 overspeed trip?
() 13 MM. BEYER: Overspeed trip, and taking
~
14 that into consideration, we can postpone the review 15 or taking of your comments on the throttle valve "
16 until tomorrow without any impact.
17 I guess maybe we ought to clarify, our 18 approach here is to make'sure that we have a good 19 plan before we go out in the field. Yes, we are 20 anxious to get to the root cause o* these problems, 21 get the corrective action identified, and repair 22 the equipment and put it in an operable state, but 23 we don't want to do tnat at the s a c r i'f i c e , we don't
(~~' 24 want to push the schedule to sacrifice the quality
(
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5 70 I of that effort.
['
) .2 And that's why I'm a 1ittle evasive and l 1
3 cannot be specific about a given schedule. He are [
4 concerned about the process here to make sure that 5 we have given these: problems due consideration and !
i
- - 6 develop good action plans so that when we-go out in !
7 the field, we-indeed-identify that root cause. !
8 MR. HELL: But'there'is no schedule to i 9 say that, as an example, you want to work on the ;
i o , 10 main feedpunpa next Wednesday? You don't have a i 11 deadline for the action plan ~ to bendone say Monday {
I 12 and reviewed by the parties invol'ved by Tuesday and ,
i
() 13 then start tne job on= Wednesday 7- There is no such 14 schedule as that? l*
j 15 Md. BEYER: For a given action plan?
16 MR. BELL: Por all of them yin'their 1
l 17 -entirety.
18 MR. BEYER: That is correct. We have not 19 put that schedul'e - together.yet because we are still 20 in the process of developing the~' action plans.
r
)
' 21- MR. BELL: -And there is no critical path i 22 .to1the end Lof this t h a t ' s -'b e e n drawn'up by the -
( 23 . utility? I
! 24 MR. DEYER: We have~not.put an endfdate j ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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1 on it. As I said earlier, our intention is to make ,
/~'T i (J 2 sure we go through it right, and until we lay out j 3 our action plans, we can't logically put together a ,
i 4 meaningful schedule. I 5 MR. BELL: I understand. But as a result 6 of some of the other meetings, I thought there was 7 a schedule that was going to be developed so that 8 not only we could review action plans in a timely 9 manner as to not hold up your work, but also Region 10 III could schedule inspectors in to monitor those 11 maintenance activities.
12 MR. SHAPER: I specifically requested
() 13 that sone time ago. I have not seen any schedule 14 per se.
15 MR. BEYER: My interpretation or 16 understanding of what- you had requested was that we 17 appraised you of the schedule of the work and we la will do that. As we initiate actions in the field, 19 we will appraise you, and when we get the total i
20 package identified and can factor that into one 21 overall schedule, we will make that available if we 22 get to that point.
23 MR. BEARD: Of course you realize members
(')
%)
24 of this team have been working .long hours, nights, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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i 1 weekends, Saturdays and Sundays because we were led
[~
2 to believe if we didn't, we would be holding up 3 your recovery program, your schedule. !>
4 Md. BEYER: I understand that, and we too 5 have been working the long hours so that we can i 6 give you a plan so tnat we wouldn't be unduly 7 extending this effort.
8 MR. BEARD: Okay. We now understand.
9 HM. SHAPER: Could I make a suqqostion ,
10 too in order to make these. meetings flow more >
11 smoothly? I received these two documents maybe two 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> before this meeting, and you can see that the 13 ma]ority of the time was spent on this one and I 14 think most of us concentrated on this one. And I 15 agree with you, that we can take this one up 16 tomorrow. It would certsinly give us an 17 opportunity to review it. And consider scheduling 18 the meetings for these documents giving us enough 19 time to go through this before you set the meeting 20 up.
21 MR. ROSSI: Well, some of that is my 22 fault because I have been anxious to get the meetings 23 set up_while we are here. So I don't think that l
(")
(/
24 that's --
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73 1 MR. SHAPER: I just want to encourage we
(~N V,
2 take every step one step and a time and not try to 3 force it.
4 MR. BEYER: I personally looked at it 5 that you would schedule the meeting or tell us when 6 you had an opportunity to comment, review and 7 comment on these action plans. I understand that 7
8 you certainly have to have time to do it, an 9 adequate review, and we are the first link in that 10 path to give you a plan to review.
11 So I feel the burden is on us to get th*
12 plans to you. I have no concer.9 that you have not,
() 13 you know, responded reasonably with the plans that 14 we have given you.
15 MR. SHAPER: Tha nk you. '
16 MR. DEARD: Could I ask a different 17 question? I understand that while we are talking 18 about these plans on the two things, that you have 19 broken up several of the pieces of equipment or 20 several s y s t e ncs I will say into various sognents 21 tor purposes of aswigning team lead individuals and 22 development of teams and whatnot. Somebody has 23 suggested maybe the area of the aux feedpumps
- 24 divided up into maybe four or more parts. ,
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
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74 1 And I don't think I would like to hear O 2 the answer tonight, but at some point in the very i
3 near future I would like to understand hetter how 4 all this is going to be brought to a head in terms 5 of overall coordination and some naybe load effort ;
6 in terms of supervision of the entire say aux ,
7 feedwater system as contrasted to say some other ,
8 system. I would like to understand how your 9 management scheme is such that the engineering will 10 be coordinated, that's all.
- 11 HR. ROSSI
- Refore we adjourn-for tonicht, 12 does somebody have a cican copy of this one that we s
13 can put with the transcript? I should have done 14 that at the start.
15 !! R . nEAMD: In view of the comments you 16 heard us giving at the meeting here, does this give 17 you any feel for what time would be involved in 18 terms of when we might see this again? I mean, I ~
19 take it that is not an hour, but is it tomorrow or 20 next week or two weeks?
21 MR. BBYER: I would hope we can get it in 22 your hands tomorrow, but again I want the lead 23 individuals to take the comments and take the time r^ 24 to make sure we have factored in the relevant '
(_)'
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1 points.
L 2 MR. WILCZYNSKI I believe that most of 3 the comments can be addressed and you could see 4 this again tomorrow. The only one that I would 5 think might give us problem is to check around the 6 industry as far as we talked about our design being 7 different from everyone else's. I don't think -- I l
8 don't believe that there is any way we can get that 9 information by tomorrow.
10 'MR. ROSSI: I think it's not going to be 11 feasible for us to meet on this one here again 12 tomorrow. I think the best we could do if we get
() 13 it is to take it back with us. But I would -
14 strongly encourage you to, you know, do what it 15 takes to get it into shape and then we will look at 16 it.
'17 MR. BEARD: Bernie, are you sort of 18 ramrodding the development of these?
19 MR. BEYER: Yes.
20 MR. BEARD: Do you have any feel for what 21 other plans might be arising tomorrow to be presentedi 22 MR. BEYER: I think I might be able to do 23 that.
24 MR. BEARD: I don't nean anything
)
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76 1 definitive, but just a feel.
O 2 MM. DEYER: No. 18 on SP7A is in final 3 typing, and No. 27 on MS-lO6 is in final typing. I J
4 would expect you would have those tomorrow as well.
5 MR. BEARD: Tomorrow is Friday.
i 6 MR. HEYER: Priday.
7 MR. BEARD: Can you tell me roughly what 8 the status is on the PORV.
9 MK. BEYER: That is has be drafted and 10 reviewed by the group of Toledo Edison people.
11 MR. BEARD: I mean, just in the sense of-12 how many days down the road is it before we are
() 13 going to see that? One day, a week?
14 MR. nEYER: I would expect you would see 15 all of these by the first of the reek, if it's a
- 16 matter we have to send them in the mail to you. I 17 would expect from our efforts what we have done to 10 date, from the comments we have received from you 19 on the ones you have reviewed, that over this 20 weekend we will have finalized them for you, 21 submittal to you.
22 MR. BEARD: It might be, considering
- 23 though if you have a number like that, we consider ,
24 some batch type of treatment rather than earlier
{)
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77 I someone suggested batching one with 5520 and then C)
'~
2 having a phone conversation. Maybe some other 3 metnod might be appropriate if there is a number of ,
4 them.
5 HR. DEYER: Yeah. As Steve pointed out, 6 if we finish them over the weekend, naybe we can 7 get them down to you Pederal Express or however we 8 do it. I 9 MR. BEARD: I was thinking more of the 10 conduct of the review.
., 11 MR. WIDEMAN: J.T., are you saying that 12 you are going to be in Washington next week and p
13 that you would thing that we night want to come to 14 Washington to discuss them wit 5 you?
15 MR. DEARD: I'm not wanting to nuagent 16 that. You mignt consider that as a possibility and 17 you guys make sone decision. ,
18 MR. WIDEMAN: Okay. He will consider 19 that. ,
20 MR. ROSSI: Okay. Are we to the point f
21 where we will adjourn for the night?
22 MR. GRADOMSKI Do you have a time in l 23 your mind when you would like to review Action Plan
{) 24 10 on the overspeed linkage?
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78 r 1 HK. BEARD: Trip throttle?
2 MR. GRADOMSKI: Yeah.
3 MR. ROSSI: Wny don't we work the ,,
4 schedule out with Hill in the morning, because we 5 will have to look and see who is available for j 6 interviews.
7 HR. ROWLES: Late morninq or early 8 afternoon based on what I know now to be the 9 tentative schedule for tonorrow. f 10 Mn. ROSSI: Why don't we adjourn then.
11 - - - - -
12 Thereupon, proceedinqn were
() 13 concluded at 7:10 o' clock p.m. -
14 ---- - +
i 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ,
22 23 r^N 24 V
ACE FEDERAL RCPORTERS INC.
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79 1 CERTIFICATE O 2 1, Nicholas Harrone, a Registered 3 Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for 4 the State of Ohio, do hereby certify that I took 5 the aforementioned proceedings and that the 6 foregoing transcript of such proceedings is a full, 7 true and correct transcript of my stenotyny notes 8 as so taken.
9 1 do further certify that I was called 10 there in the capacity of a Registered Professional 11 Reporter, and an not otherwise interested in this 12 proceeding.
() 13 IN WITNESS Wi! E R E O P , I have~ hereunto set 14 my hand and affixed my seal of office at Columbus, ds %-
15 Ohio, on this 77y day of _Q g g ,_____, 1985.
10 17 ___
NICIOLAS
__[ [
A. MARRONE, Registered 18 Professional Reporter, Notary Public in and for the State of Ohio.
19 20 My Commission expires November 1, 1987.
21 22 23 24 ACK FEDERA!, REPORTERS INC.
(202) 347-3700
- i I
I DIRECTIONS ~FOR MAKING CORRECTIONS If you have any corrections that you wish to make on your transcript, please do so on the following page l in the following fashion:
1 Indicate the page of the correction, ;
a the line number, and then the change :
j to be made and the reason for making i the change. Date and sign all correc-
- tion pages that correspond with your transcript.
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