ML20138H947
| ML20138H947 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/23/1985 |
| From: | Wilkinson E NRC - ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT POLICY |
| To: | Asselstine J, Palladino N, Roberts T NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| FRN-52FR7432 AC45-1-36, NACEP, NUDOCS 8512170380 | |
| Download: ML20138H947 (1) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:~ 1 November 23, 1985 Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Honorable Thomas R. Roberts, Commissioner Honorable James K. Asselstine, Commissioner Honorable Frederick M. Bernthal, Commissioner Honorable Lando W. Zech, Jr., Commissioner Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20555
Dear Commissioners:
It is my privilege to present to you the Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee for Review of the Enforcement Policy. As described in the Introduction to the Report, the Committee considered a wide range of testimony and documents from interested persons and organi-zations in developing its Report. All persons who wished to be heard were given the opportunity to present their views in writing or in person. The members of the Cmunittee have appreciated the opportunity to serve on this Committee. We hope the Report will be beneficial to you in assessing the Commission's enforcement policy and practice. Sincerely, SE.P. Wilkinson
Enclosure:
Report cc: Colin S. Diver Michael V. Hasten, Esq. Joseph M. Hendrie Howard L. Parris William J. Dircks
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,+ - 4 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY Submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission November 22, 1985
( E. P. Wilkinson Colin S. Diver Michael V. Hasten, Esq. Joseph M. Hendrie Howard L. Parris
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l Table of Contents i 1
- Paae 1 I. Introduction.................................................. I v
II. Background.................................................... 4 l 1 A. A Brief Description of Cur rent Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 ; l i Perceptions of the Enforcement Proces s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 ! 8.
- 1. Summa ry o f Util i ty Commen ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 i
- 2. Summary of Comments from Public Interest Groups..... 7 III. Philosophy of Enforcement..................................... 8 8
3 A. Purposes of En forcement General ly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( B. Incapacitation........................................... 9 C. De te rre n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 j 1. The Importance of Deterrence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 l
- 2. Implications of the Deterrence Perspective.......... 11 l a. Uncontrollable Conduct......................... 11
- b. Harmless Violations............................ 11
! c. Perception and Reality......................... 12 l 1 . d. Sanctions, Costs and Penalties................. 12 i ! e. Probability of Detection....................... 12 i
- f. Positive and Negative Incentives............... 12 IV. Evaluation of Current NRC Enforcement Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 ;
A. Performance.............................................. 13 B. Design................................................... 21 ! V. Specific Aspects of Program Considered for. Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1
- A. Material False Statements................................ 23 4
Recommendation...................................... 27 l 1 9
Page B. Timeliness.;............................................. 27
- 1. Negative Impacts of Untimely Actions................ 27
- 2. Staff Efforts to Improve Timeliness................. 28
- 3. Timeliness of Actions Involving Alleged Wrongdoing.......................................... 30
- 4. Recommendations..................................... 31 C. Enforcement Conference................................... 32
- 1. Perceptions of the Enforcement Conference. . . . . . . . . . . 32
- 2. Purpose of the Enforcement Conference............... 32
- 3. Availability of Inspection Reports.................. 33 i 4. Recommendations..................................... 34 4
D. Press Releases................,.......................... 34
- 1. Current Practice and Perceptions of Its Impact...... 34
- 2. Alternate Practices................................. 36 i 3. Recommendations..................................... .
38 E. Re g i o na l i za ti o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Recommendation...................................... 40 i F. Posi tive Incentive s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Recommendation...................................... 40
- G. Numbe r o f Seve ri ty Level s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 H. Classi fication of Violations By Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4
) Recommendation...................................... 42 i I. Determination of Relative Base Penalties for the Various Supplements.............................................. 42 J. R emo va l o f Ec o n omi c B e n e fi t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Recommendation...................................... 44
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< Page K. Ability to Pay........................................... 45
; L. Nonpenalization of Level III Viol a tions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 M. Complete Mitigation for Self-Identified and -Corrected Violations............................................... 46 N. Nonmitigation of Level I Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Recommendation...................................... 47 i 0. Penalizing Individuals................................... 47 Recommendations..................................... 48 j
P. Orders vs. Fines......................................... 49 i Q. Technical Specifications................................. 49 ( j - Recommendation...................................... 50 i 1 R. Licens ee Performance Evalua tion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 ; 4 ,
- 1. Extent of Licensee Compliance....................... 51 i
l R e c omme n d a ti o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
- 2. SALP................................................ 53
! 3. Root Cause Identification........................... 55 i l Recommendation................................. 57 , ,i ! S. Inspection Program....................................... 58 ,
- 1. Policy, Staffing and Rotation....................... 58 l t
- 2. Inspector Selection. Training and Evaluation........ 59 i
- a. Selection...................................... 60 ,
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- b. Training....................................... 60 I
- c. Evaluation..................................... 62
, 3. Recommendation...................................... 62 T. Materials Licensees...................................... 62 f I l L
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Pace U. Of fi ce of I nvesti gati ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 VI. Suma ry o f Re come nda t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Appendix: Tabular Review of Coments Enclosures 1-4 l
- iv -
l I. INTRODUCTION The Advisory Committee for Review of the Enforcement Policy was formally established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commissic, on August 31, 1984(49FR35273, September 6,1984). The Commission stated that it believed the establishment of the Committee was necessary and in the public interest "to obtain independent advice and recommendations concerning NRC enforcement policy and practice" and directed the Committee to review NRC's current enforcement policy to determine whether it has achieved its defined purposes and to provide the Commission with recommendations on any changes it believes advisable. The following individuals agreed to serve on the Committee: Colin S. Diver, Michael V. Hasten, Joseph M. Hendrie, Howard L. Parris, and E. P. Wilkinson. William J. Dircks, in his letters confirming their invitations, asked that their report address the following questions:
- 1. Is the current enforcement policy improving compliance with the NRC requirements by: (a) obtaining prompt and corrective actions; (b) deterring future violations;and(c)encouragingdevelopmentorimprovement of a licensee's own programs for detection of incipient i
problems? , 2. Does the current enforcement policy either as written or implemented have any negative impacts on safety?
- 3. Are there alternative or more effective enforcement options available to the Commission to improve compliance with its requirements?
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Mr. Dircks assigned Karen Cyr of the Executive Legal Director's office to act as liaison with the Comittee and to assist in any j administrative tasks. Jane Axelrad, Director of Enforcement, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, has also assisted the Comittee in its efforts by providing requested infonnation. Meetings open to the public were held on December 18-19, 1984, January 30-31,1985, April 10-11,1985, April 30-May 1,1985, July 9, 1985 July 24-25, 1985 and November 1, 1985. During these hearings, testimony was given by a total of 46 witnesses from NRC Staff, utilities, other federal agencies, law / consulting firms, the Atomic Industrial Forum and the Edison Electric Institute as listed (Enclosure 1).
! By notice published in the Federal Register on January 9, 1985, the b
comittee requested public coment on a series of questions (Enclo-sure 2). In addition to the testimony of the 46 witnesses given at the j public hearings, the comittee received many written coments both on l enforcement in general and with specific attention to the published j questions. Many times more voluminous was the other background material provided by the NRC staff. This included many other earlier public com-ments and a number of publications and enforcement sumaries. A biblio-graphy is attached (Enclosure 3). In a letter to Mr. Dircks on December 19, 1984, the Comittee ! provided a report of its planned actions in carrying out its charter and
- invited suggestions by individuals and organizations that should be soli-
! cited for their views (Enclosure 4). The suggestions in the responses I
! included public interest groups. Representatives of the Government Accountability Project and William Jordan, an attorney for many public r
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interest groups, met with the Committee. The Union of Concerned Scientists declined the Committee's invitation. Solicitations to material licensees also failed to generate witnesses to testify, and our reference material in this area consists of written comments and staff testimony. The majority of data the committee has obtained therefore refers to civilian power reactor enforcement issues. The material listed in the bibliography comprises a large amount of reference material. Review of that material shows that much of it is based on the subjective impressions and opinions of individuals. The enforcement data has not been normalized to changing requirements or statistically compiled so as to be easily amenable to analysis. In its review and use of the material, the committee has been constrained by limited time and resources. The committee feels that a proper approach to enforcement is very important and that there is information of value in the reference material that deserves further consideration. It is suggested that the NRC staff (or perhaps, recognizing the Enforcement Staff's limited resources, a contracter) could undertake a further collation and analysis of this material and other such data available to develop findings and recommendations to augment those of the committee. Within the limits of the time and resources available to the com-mittee, the following discussions, comments and recommendations are based on the committee's review and analysis of the testimony and reference material provided. 4
6 II. BACKGROUND A. A Brief Description of Current Program The NRC enforcement program is intended to " promote and protect the radiological health and safety of the public, including employee's health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment." With some exceptions, whenever noncompliance with NRC requirements is identi-fied, enforcement action is taken. Principal tools of enforcement are Notices of Violation, orders and fines. Violations are categorized in terms of five levels of severity to reflect their relative importance. Dependent upon the seriousness of the violation, a penalty in the form of a monetary fine may be levied. The intent of the fine is to assure prompt corrective action and to deter future noncompliance. The potential severity of fines was significantly increased in 1980 by ' Congress upon the recommendation of the NRC. When fines are considered and proposed, a number of aggravating and mitigating factors are con-sidered in determining the appropriate amount of the fine.
- 8. Perceptions of the Enforcement Process Existing regulatory practice has resulted in divergent viewpoints between the regulators and the regulated (see, for example, the Federal Register Vol. 47, No. 46, March 9,1982). With some exceptions, the regulators believe the current enforcement program is effectively serving the public interest. The utilities, while accepting the fact that they are working in a regulated environment, contend that there have baen some unintended consequences of the regulatory process which are
counterproductive to the intended objective and assert that changes to the program are needed. The range of reactions and perceptions to major policy issues is reflected by a summary of written comments received in response to committee solicitation. (See the Appendix.) A comparable range of responses was also offered in oral testimony to the committee. A brief summary of the comments received is given below. Topics covered by these comments will be treated later on in this report in greater detail.
- 1. Summary of Utility Comments The utilities contend that:
The current policy on material false statements has had a chilling effect on timely and accurate communications which inhibits a free and open flow of communications so important to an effective regulatory program. It is extremely sensitive and a high priority issue requiring resolution. Enforcement philosophy is based almost exclusively on a punitive system and too little recognition is given to good performance and effective licensee audit programs, identification of noncompliance and corrective actions. Penalties seem inevitable regardless of diligence because NRC seeks perfection rather than excellence and fails to consider extenuating circumstances or exemplary past performance. Management conferences, which could be a very effective tool, are seldom used. Enforcement conferences are too oft +.n i
characterized by an arbitrary attitude on the part of the NRC representatives. There is a lack of clarity in the examples of violations in the supplements and there are inadequate distinctions between severity levels assigned to violations in the various activity areas.
- The NRC's recent efforts to increase the frequency and magnitude of mitigation are a step in the right direction but Severity Level I cases should be eligible for mitigation.
Inconsistency between regions is a problem. Regions have authority to initiate routine enforcement actions but, due to differences in philosophy and the interpretation of regulations and technical specifications, an event judged to be a violation in one region may not be considered as a violation in another region. Current enforcement publicity emphasizes the negative and conveys a false message to the public at large that utility managers are inept or dishonest (or both) and impairs confidence in the industry. Negative publicity is not counterbalanced with recognition of good performance.
There has been a rapid expansion in the number and detail of Technical Specifications in recent years, many of which are not safety significant or intelligible. The NRC should maintain its present policy of not imposing sanctions directly on individuals since utilities should nanage their own personnel and it is often difficult to affix responsibility on a single person. One very objectionable characteristic of the present system is untimely action. Fines are sometimes assessed months after a problem is identified and corrected which can adversely affect the morale of licensee employees. The current program does not place enough emphasis on identifying root causes and broad scale corrective action. I
- 2. Summary of Comments from Public Interest Groups The public interest qroups contend that:
Penalties are too lenient. The present enforcement program represents a benign attitude on the part of the NRC toward sloppy industry performance. Fines and orders have little or no effect since the enforcement action is not directed to the individual responsible. A licensee has no reason to fear a fine because of a liberal mitigation policy.
The industry is a victim of a very unbalanced and inconsistent enforcement program becaose of regional differences in enforcement attitude. Political, public, and financial pressure upon the NRC has resulted in precipitous licensing in some instances. III. PHILOSOPHY OF ENFORCEMENT A. Purposes of Enforcement Generally The Committee found that, in order to address the questions presented to it by the Commission, it was useful to attempt to define the purposes of enforcement in a more general way. The discussion which follows describes what the Committee believes to be the appropriate role of an enforcement program for nuclear regulation. The purpose of NRC requirements is fundamentally to maintain and enhance safety of operations. It is to the licensee's advantage to comply with these requirements and such compliance is the norm. Only to a limited extent does noncompliance cccur and even of this small percentage of licensee activity, self-identification and initiation of corrective actions by the licensee is the usual practice. Thus, the arena for enforcement sanctions, especially escalated sanctions, is a small one. The imposition of sanctions can be used to serve any one of three purposes: retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence. Of these, the second and third are relevant to the context of nuclear regulation. Retribution is appropriate--if at all--only in the context of crimes against the moral order. Most regulatory violations involve conduct
9-h which is prohibited not because it is inherently immoral or evil (malum in se), but because its value is not outweighed by the harm it might ! cause in the particular context. i B. Incapacitation ! Incapacitation has a legitimate role in nuclear regulation, but a limited one. Where a regulated entity shows itself to be fundamentally j and chronically incapable of carrying out its responsibilities, it should i be disqualified by suspension or revocation of its' license. One would expect this sanction to be used only very selectikely in the nuclear I context, however, for two reasons. First, the degree of incapacity i ,
- necessitating license removal occurs very rarely. The entities regulated
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- by NRC are typically responsible and competent. The corporata entities regulated by NRC--electric utilities, laboratories, hospitals ~, etc.--have i
1 longstanding ties to their communities, employ professional staffs, and i guard their reputation. In order to succeed in their lines of business, ] , j they must display a generally high level of competence that presumably carries over to their conduct of activities regulated by NRC. Likewise, j the individuals licensed by NRC typically have extensive training and j responsibility. The licensing process itself, moreover, should screen { out those corporations and individuals who lack the basic qualifications i to conduct regulated activities in accordance with NRC requirements. ! Second, removal of a license can impose a cost on the public by reducing i the sources of supply of an essential service. Consequently, this sanction should be reserved for extreme cases. i h I
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1 C. Deterrence Sanctions can serve a deterrent function by increasing the perceived cost (as viewed from the perspective of the regulated entity) of noncompliance with requirements. It is the threat of the sanction, not its actual imposition, that achieves the deterrence. The purpose of actually imposing a sanction when a violation has occurred is to maintain the credibility of that threat.
, 1. The Importance of Deterrence i The relative importance of the deterrence function of regulatory l enforcement depends on two things: the strength of existing (extra-l regulatory) incentives for compliant behavior and the social consequences of (otherwise undeterred) violations. In the nuclear area, these two factors often point in opposite directions. The existin'g incentives for j compliance are, in most contexts, quite numerous and strong. Violating an NRC requirement presumably increases the risk of an incident or accident. The consequence of such an incident or accident to the i licensee may include injury to its own personnel, damage to its own I property, loss of capacity utilizat'fon, liability for injury or damage to
! others, and adverse-impact on reputation in the financial, labor, i j service, and political marketplaces. Compared to those existing poten-i tial costs, regulatory sanctions are viewed by ma'ny as having little deterrent impact. While that,is perhaps true as a' general matter, existing incentives are not equally effective in all contexts. Insur-ance, for example, may d) ute the fear 'of liability. ~$o may statutory l ceilings on liability. The ability of some electric /ufflf hies to pass l increased fuel costs directly through to the consumer may dilute the
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1 deterrent value of a fear of shutdowns. Problems in communication, ! supervision, and personnel development within large organizations can also weaken the translation of corporate incentives into employee behavior. A sensible regulatory enforcement program should therefore focus its energies on those areas of regulated activity where non-regulatory incentives are weakest. Effective regulatory deterrence is also especially important where the harmful consequences of error are greatest. The less serious the violation, the more uncertainty one can tolerate concerning the effectiveness of nonregulatory incentives. Where potential harmful consequences are severe, however, those uncertainties should be resolved in favor of using regulatory penalties as a major supplement to other incentives for compliant conduct.
- 2. Imolications of the Deterrence perspective Designing an enforcement policy to achieve effective deterrence requires the regulator to keep several points in mind.
- a. Uncontrollable Conduct. No deterrent function can be served by l punishing someone for an action or outcome wholly beyond his control. If
- an agency is perceived as punishing people for such events, its enforcement program will lose credibility. One should concentrate on preventable occurrences. Punishing a corporation for its employees' behavior must be predicated on a plausible belief that the corporation could have controlled its employees' behavior.
- b. Harmless Violations. Because general rules can never be P
perfectly tailored to every situation to which they will be applied, some I violations may occur that pose no real threat to the public heaith, i
, s 4 safety, or welfare. A regulator should, at the enforcement stage, attempt to distinguish these harmless violations from those that do pose
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the Office of Inspection & Enforcement, and granting a certain degree of autonomy to the regional offices, differences in enforcement programs and practices may develop. The better view seems to be that regionalization has not had a major effect on the enforcement program and its effective-ness, although there may be some increased difficulty in obtaining ! l I timeliness and consistency between regions. The processing of both routine and escalated enforcement actions is much the same now as before the move toward greater autonomy for the regions. The only significant change has been the delegation of authority to Regional Administrators to sign escalated enforcement actions which have been reviewed and concurred in by IE Headquarters. Previously all such actions were signed by the IE Ofrector. - It is generally felt on both the staff and licensee sides that natierwIde consistency in enforcement is a desirable goal. While regionalization may have contributed in some degree to inconsistency, it appears to the Comittee to be a reasonable price to pay for the improved contact of regional staffs with the Ifcensee facilities. The escalated enforcement actions, at Severity Levels I, II, and III, are all processed through IE Headquarters so that a reasonable degree of consistency is enforced. However, the individual regions handle all aspects of Severity Level IV and V violations and IE Headquarters has not been involved in the past. The Comittee notes with approval that a headquarters program of sampling Severity Level IV and V violations from each of the regions is being instituted. This should provide some basis for adjustment of practice between the regions to achieve greater consistency for these lower level violations.
- -- a - -
i An additional aspect that needs consideration is that corrective actions proposed by licensees and arcepted by.. regional staffs are not examined to see that the treatment and results are consistent across the country. Recomendation. The staff should c'onsider ways of reducing regional inconsistencies, such as improved training and the formulation of standard operating policies and procedures. F. Positive Incentives. , l , The Enforcement Policy has been extensively criticized as excessively " punitive" and " negative." The Committee is, sympathetic with this concern, but r.ctes that only; limited measures are available. Truly
" positive" incentives like subsidies are unavailable t'o the NRC. The NRC could bestow public prafse on good performances, but there is an obvious danger of its being misinterpreted w distorted. More realistic are suggestions for reduction or mitigation of regulatory burdens. Since-inspection is a form of regulatory burden, reduction in its frequency should be perceived as a " positive" incentive for good performance.
Mitigation of penalties is another form of reduced burden. It is discussed in sections IV.L-N. Recommendation. The frecuencyeof inspections should be* based on a' , , licensee's performance. c, - i' s 8
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7' il ' G. Number of Severity Levels.,- 4 < Some comenters propose that there should be fewer severity levels t . < > than the existing five. Some feel that there is no reasad to distinguish
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between Levels IV and V (since both are treated alike: no penalty). Others combine this proposal with a proposal to eliminate all penalties for Level III violations (making it possible to consolidate IIIs, IVs and
,' perhaps Vs).
The Committee does not support these proposals. In its view, the existing number of levels is appropriate. There are enough categories to enable the staff to avoid the need to lump together violations posing widely divergent levels of risk. Yet the number is small enough to be manageable. H. Classification of Violations by Level. Some comenters claim that the policy provides inadequate guidelines , on classifying violations by severity level. Our attention was particu-larly drawn to the fuzzy criteria for making the crucial distinction between a III and a IV. The Ccmittee agrees that many of the published criteria are indeed vague (see, e.g., Supplement I's distinction between a "significant violation" (III) and a "less significant violation" (IV)). We urge the NRC to accelerate efforts underway to give greater content to these distinctions, through written guidance, training, and selective headquarters review of regional practices involving Level IV and V violations. But we recognize that given the enormous range of regulated activities and contextual factors, gravity rating of violations necessarily involves a high degree of professional judgment. Bright-line guidelines will never be a substitute for careful selection, training, rotation, and supervision of regional inspectors and managers. i i
Recommendation: The staff should accelerate its efforts to better define the criteria for classifying violations by Severity Level through written guidance, training and selective headquarters review of regional 3 practices involving Severity Level IV and V violations. I. Determination of Relative Base Penalties for the Various Supplements. The Supplements have been criticized for attempting to equate the incommensurable. There is no way, so the argument runs, to correlate, say, reactor operation violations with transportation violations. Table 1A of the policy, by assigning differing base penalties, has the effect of doing just that. The Committee agrees that ranking violations by relative severity across activities is difficult. But so is ranking violations within activities. It may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Indeed it is impossible to avoid making such comparisons implicitly (by the relative penalties in fact assessed). We commend the NRC for making these comparisons scmewhat more explicit than many regulators do. Whether the precise ranking system adopted by NRC is sensible is a much more difficult question. Several witnesses contended that there are no conceivable violations in, say, the health physics or transportation areas that could approach in gravity the Level I violations in reactor operations or construction. Consequently, they argue, there should be no level I (or even Level II) violations in the fonner categories. The flaw in this argument is that it disregards probabilities. It may be true that a worst-case reactor disaster would dwarf in magnitude a worse-case transportation disaster. But the probability that such wr e - - ,%-- - -y. _.
O . disasters might result from any particular violation may differ considerably. Since reactor requirements involve multiple redundant systems, the actual risk that a particular failure will cause an accident is extremely low in most cases. It may, therefore, make perfectly good sense to equate (in terms of severity) the actual exposure of a member of the public to radiation exceeding 0.5 rems (See Supplemental V, Level I) with, say, exceeding a reactor Safety Limit (Supplement I, Level I). Whether this is so in fact undoubtedly depends on the circumstances. The relative penalty levels appropriate for violations of different Supplements may also depend on other factors such as the relative strengths of nonregulatory incentives and the relative probabilities that violations will be detected. If, for example, transportation violations were much less likely to be detected than reactor violations, higher penalties would be needed in the former area to achieve comparable deterrence. J. Removal of Economic Benefit. In an earlier version of the policy, the NRC proclaimed that
" noncompliance should be more expensive than compliance." This has been changed to: " Sanctions should be designed to ensure that a licensee does not deliberately profit from violations of NRC requirements." The Committee prefers the original version because the new version has two undesirable connotations: 1) that penalties only apply when licensees act deliberately; and 2) that licensees do intend to profit from viola-tions in many cases when, in our view, few violations are the result of a calculated judgment.
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The Consnittee subscribes to the philosophy that effective deterrence requires that the regulated population believe that compliance is preferable to noncompliance. This applies to any preventable violations, not just " deliberate" violations. The Committee concludes that, while few violations are " deliberate," most violations are " preventable" at least in the sense that their likelihood could have been reduced by the exercise of more effective design, supervision, auditing, or personnel development. By failing to install such a procedure, the violator has in effect benefited by his wrong, and the purpose of enforcement should be to eliminate that benefit. On the other hand, the Committee recognizes that actually measuring the benefit in particular cases would often be extremely difficult. It is feasible where the violation consists of a failure to install an identified piece of equipment or system. The Environmental Protection Agency is able to use such a system because each pollution source must obtain a permit that specifies the pollution control equipment or systems required. The benefit approach is less workable, however, in dealing with one-shot violations of operating procedures. An attempt to estimate the benefit in such cases would usually provoke controversy over what alternative procedures might have been used and how effective they would have been. A policy of computing the benefit in all cases would therefore dramatically increase the administrative costs of enforcement and reduce its predictability. Recommendation. The current language in the Enforcement Policy on removing the economic benefit of noncompliance should be changed to that of the earlier version of the Policy or to other language to eliminate its [ , l _. - l
undesirable connotations. Any computation of civil penalties on the basis of removing an economic benefit should be done only in clear cases. K. Ability to Pay. Lurking behind some criticism of the relative penalties assigned to different activities is a concern that penalties should more explicitly reflect relative abilities to pay. A penalty of $40,000 or even $100,000 is not significant monetarily to a large utility. The implication of such comments seems to be that reactor penalties should be raised. But this does not necessarily follow. As indicated above, penalty levels should reflect other factors such as relative gravity of the violation and probabilities of detection. Moreover, penalties are only ore component of noncompliance cost. The combined effect on a utility of a penalty, administrative costs, and adverse publicity can be very substantial. Also, since penalties may not be included in a regulated utility's cost of service, it is more likely to get the attention of management than a comparable cost item. Finally, to the extent that the nominal ceiling on penalties ($100,000) is too " low" for large utilities, , the NRC can (and sometimes does) use its "per diem" authority to generate much larger actual penalties for especially serious violations. L. Nonsenalization of Level III Violations. Some commenters recommend that the NRC never issue civil penalties for Level III violations. The Committee does not agree. At least some Level III violations strike us as serious enough to warrant the impost-tion of an appropriate penalty. l l
M. Complete Mitigation for Self-Identified and -Corrected Violations. Related to the previous proposal is a proposal from several utilities that civil fines never be imposed for a violation identified and promptly corrected by the licensee. Existing policy allows a maximum 50 percent mitigation for each of these two factors, as well as 100% mitigation for prior good performance. (This policy does not apply in the case of Level I violations where no mitigation is permitted. We will discuss the wisdom of this limitation in the next section.) The Committee prefers the existing policy to the proposed change. Self-identification and correction are merely two factors among several that should go into the determination of a penalty. The policy should not, for example, totally excuse a poor prior history, prior notice of a similar event, or willfulness. N. Nor. mitigation of Level I Violations. The NRC's refusal to permit mitigation of Level I violations has been criticized as illogical. The Committee agrees. The thecretical and practical justifications for allowing mitigation apply with equal force to all violations, even the most severe. Since mitigation is based on a percentage of the base penalty, level I penalties (even if mitigatable) will still be considerably higher than comparable Level II penalties, reflecting the former's greater severity. Allowing mitigation of Level I violations will also eliminate any incentive to misclassify a I as a II in order to give recognition to good performance. l t
e 0 Recommendation. Mitigaticn of the penalty for a Severity Level I violation should be available on the same basis as for Severity Level II and III violations. O. Penalizing Individuals. The Committee heard very little support for the idea of imposing sanctions on individual employees or contractors of corporate licensees. Some commentators took the position that civil penalties should never be imposed on individuals; others, that they should be imposed only on licensed operators for particularly egregious violations. The Committee subscribes to the former view: civil penalties, as opposed to other enforcement actions, should never be imposed on j individuals. Since most NRC requirements run to the corporate licensee, it is inappropriate to penalize individuals for contributing to viola-tions of those requirements. It is up to the licensee to decide how best to meet its commitments. This includes deciding how to allocate responsibility and duties within the organization, how to select, train, and develop personnel, how to monitor their conduct and reward or punish them. Imposing NRC penalties directly on individuals inevitably inter-feres with that discretion. The NRC becomes drawn into managerial prerogatives, and employees are subjected to the demoralizing conundrum of having to serve two masters. Furthermore, the attempt to assign individual blame will often require prolonged inquiry. This does not mean that the NRC is placed in the position of
" condoning" individual wrongdoing. The corporate licensee is expected to take such remedial action as it feels appropriate, and that expectation
48 - is backed by the NRC's requirement that all violations be " corrected." Correction also means taking action to prevent the violation's recurrence. If the licensee fails to discipline, retrain, or reassign an errant employee, the NRC can refuse to mitigate the penalty, can escalate the penalty for failure to take " prompt and extensive corrective action" or can issue an appropriate order. Licensed operators present a somewhat different case, since they have already been singled out for attention from the NRC. Arguably, they owe individual obligations to the NRC which it can enforce directly. Since operators are licensed only to a particular facility, however, we feel that their primary supervision should come from management. Only if they exhibit a serious incapacity to discharge their licensed functions , should they be subject to direct sanctions from the NRC. In that' case, the appropriate sanction may range from a letter of reprimand to a temporary suspension or revocation of the license as suits the circum-stances. The Committee believes that civil penalties are inappropriate in dealing with licensed individuals because of the Committee's percep-tion that such fines would have an adverse effect on morale. Recommendations.
- 1. Civil penalties should never be addressed to individuals.
- 2. Enforcement actions should be taken against individuals only
' in the case of licensed operators who exhibit a serious incapacity to discharge their licensed functions. In such a case, the appropriate sanction could range from a letter of reprimand to a suspension or revocation of the license. _y. _ -w.- .,_,, , _.,g -..
P. Orders vs. Fines. Some witnesses recommend that the NRC make greater use of orders (and less use of penalties). Orders are perceived as more " remedial" and less " punitive." In fact, there has been a modest increase in the use of orders of late. (There were 4 in 1982, 8 in 1983 and 10 in 1984.) Still, they are ccmparatively infrequent. The Comittee perceives both positive and negative features regarding this issue but elects not to make any specific recommendation. It is difficult to assess the value of orders in the abstract, since their value depends on their content and enforceability. Orders can serve an educative function and, since their use imposes administrative (and perhaps publicity) costs on utilities, they can also serve a deterrent function. But orders require specification of requirements to a degree that is not always feasible or wise. We have heard extensive criticism of technical specifications as excessively detailed and inflexible. We fear that widespread use of orders would compound these problems. The NRC ought generally to be moving in the direction of substituting performance (output) standards for engineering (input) standards. The former allow industry more room to " breathe" (to innovate anddevelopefficientsolutions). Furthernore, orders like other requirements must be enforced. Eventually, NRC must be able to make a credible threat to impose costly sanctions on violators. Q. Technical Specifications Until 1974, all nuclear power plants had " custom" technical
- specifications; there was no consistent standard and format. In 1974, l
l
. o the NRC implemented Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Since 1974, several sets of changes to the technical specifications have been made to (1) implement new requirements, (2) keep the technical specifications up-to-date with plant modifications, or (3) to make improvement based on requests by the licensee.
The growth of technical specification requirements over the years has brought problems with it. Licensees assert that some of the tech specs are almost unintelligible and are subject to broad interpretation
-which can vary significantly as a function of the training and experience of the individual making the interpretation. In addition, utilities contend that many tech specs are not safety significant. Furthermore,
- t. e utilities claim to have accepted poor tech specs so as not to prejudice their chance for license. The NRC agrees that the tech specs need to be improved and a study committee has been established. However, to date, this effort has not generated any tangible results. An NRC estimate to effect the necessary reform is ten years. In the meantime, both the utilities and NRR must live with tech spec deficiencies.
Recomendation. The Comission should establish a priority and accelerate a prooram to reform technical specifications. R. Licensee Perfomance Evaluation The Comittee's difficulties in evaluating the performance of NRC's enforcement policy in Section IV above dramatize the importance of estab-lishing an ongoing system of collecting and evaluating data on the enforcement program. The Committee does not mean to diminish either the l'
O e I difficulty of that endeavor nor the NRC's considerable accomplishments in this area to date. But more can and should be done.
- 1. Extent of Licensee Compliar.ce Enforcement effectiveness should be measured by the extent of licensees' compliance with their substantive obligations. " Extent of compliance" must, of course, reflect both the quantitative and qualita-tive dimensions of compliance (how ofter, did violations occur and how serious were they). The former can be measured, of course, simply by counting the number of violations detected. Since NRC relies on licensees to report violations as well as on its own inspectors to detect them, the reporting system should indicate the source of identification of each violation and the severity level. In this way the agency can evaluate the relative efficacy of self-regulation and agency monitoring.
The best summary measure of the seriousness of violations is the severity levels assigned to violations by regional officials. Using the severity levels, one can compute a " noncompliance index" for any particular facility comparable to the " weighted value" parameter in our eleven-unit sample (discussed in Part IVA, above). (The procedure used by the Committee was to weight each violation by a percentage figure corresponding to its severity level, derived from Table 18 of the enforcement policy, and add the resulting values for all violations in thesample.) Index figures can be computed for an entire facility (e.g., generating unit) or for each of several activities conducted by a unit (corresponding to the Supplements). Then by tracking the movement of these index figures from year to year, one could roughly gauge the relative impact of enforcement efforts. 1
The Comittee recognizes the shortcomings of this approach. First, the severity level classification system is only a very rough and imperfect measure of relative safety-significance of violations. But it is the best measure available. As we have urged elsewhere, NRC should continue to refine and improve it, whenever possible. Second, the violations detected by NRC (including those reported to it) do not comprise all nor necessarily a representative sample of the violations that actually exist. For this reason, NRC may wish to adjust each licensee's index figure by a factor representing the relative intensity of the NRC's regulatory oversight or the relative reliability of the licensee's self-detection and reporting program. Third, not all variations in noncompliance levels can be attributed to variations in enforcement. For that reason, NRC should count only those violations that are in principle preventable. But, as explained earlier, it should , be doing that in any event. It is true that the level of compliance may vary because of independent changes in regulatory requirements, capacity utilization, or nonregulatory incentives (new state laws, changes in the insurance l market, new management). But the enforcement effort should respond to those sorts of events. If compliance falls, for example, because extrinsic incentives have weakened, NRC should toughen its enforcement program accordingly. One may also object that no single measure of compliance (or noncompliance) can do justice to the wide variety of requirements (especially TSs) applicable to different licensees. For that very reason, we do not recommend using the " noncompliance index" to l l
1 compare licensees (or plants or event units). Rather, it should be used to track the performance of any one licensee (plant or unit), over time. This system requires that all preventable safety-significant violations be reported centrally. That may not presently be the case since an unknown number of Level IVs and Vs are never cited (as an inducement to self-regulation). Since the criteria for noncitation include self-detection, reporting, and correction, however, omission of those violations is probably not a serious loss. Incorporating t'hese violation in a performance index might well reduce the incentive for effective self-regulation. Another obstacle is the fact that Level IV and V violations are not routinely reported to headquarters. But that is not a serious problem, since data e, those violations are captured in the 766 system. Presumably the system can be easily modified to report and 1 present the data in an appropriate format and' to the appropriate officials in IE HQ. Recommendation. The staff should study means to collect data on preventable safety-significant violations, including source of identifi-cation, severity level and contributing and root cause factors.
- 2. SALP In addition to licensees' violation histories, there are many other indications of licensee performance that can be useful in structuring the Commission's enforcement program. Examples of indicators used by INP0 include capacity utilization, equivalent availability, forced load reductions, forced outages, personnel errors, unplanned challenges to protective systems, control room instrument operability, corrective maintenance backlog, routine maintenance performance, equipment failures, l
l l
j unit thennal efficiency, personnel radiation exposure, surface and i airborne contamination areas, and number of industrial accidents. None of these (and comparable) measures relate exclusively, or even primarily, j 3 to compliance with NRC requirements. But significant changes or , long-term trends in such parameters may be an early warning sign of l potential compliance problems. The best summary index of licensee performance used by the l Commission is the Systematic Appraisal of Licensee Performance (SALP) i ratings. SALP evaluates licensee performance in ten functional areas, , . t roughly every 18 months, using a three point scale ("1" = high, } "3" = low). The Committee heard some criticism of SALP ratings as j excessively subjective, but its overall impression is that the system works well. Some subjectivity is probably unavoidable in any system that tries to evaluate so complex an operation as nuclear power generation. ) The SALP rating system seems designed, however, to reduce the danger of , l
- selective bias to acceptable levels. As the Committee understands the j process, all reactors in a region are rated by the same team of
- evaluators. It would be desirable to have the same team rate all ;
I reactors in the entire country. But this may be impractical. If that is [
- . the case, at least intra-regional uniformity is attained by the current system.
] l SALP ratings are used in the enforcement process primarily as a l- basis for integrating or escalating base civil penalties for good or bad compliance history. Some commenters claimed that a SALP " score"-(1, 2, i i ! or 3) is too summary and general to be useful for this purpose. It appears, however, that the enforcement staff looks behind the bare score, l [ ] [ i. {
to the trend in the rating and the underlying evidence on which the score was based, when evaluating prior enforcement history. The Committee believes that this is an appropriate use of the rating system.
- 3. Root Cause Identification Another way to evaluate the performance of NRC's " enforcement program" in a broad sense of that tern is to examine its success in identifying and understanding the root causes of a violation. A major objective of the NRC mission is to identify why violations occur and to disseminate guidance and information so as to preclude their reoccurrence. Unfortunately, this objective is not being met with the degree of efficiency that it should. In many cases, the root causes of violations are very complex and may include multiple variables: design, communications, training, procedures, human error, etc. The enforcement
~
policy supposedly focuses on the fundamental problems and root causes of violations which in turn necessitate the acquisition of a lot of facts whenever an individual item of noncompliance is identified--the who, what, why, where, and when regarding the violation. While there is guidance to the inspectors in a manual on how to develop enforcement actions and how to write an inspection report, there is not a standard form designed to capture all the necessary information, nor is there any coding in inspection reports at all. Citations are tracked in a computer system but the total information needed for analysis to determine root causes may be on different documents in different places in lieu of a standardized format for input into a computer-based data system amenable to effective analysis. NRC makes extensive use of a computer-based data system on inspection reports
called the 766 Form. This form reflects the readout of the licensee's enforcement history, the text of the violation, the requirement that was violated, and will categorize what the severity level was. It does not, however, address root causes. As NRC is currently structured, the major source for root cause analysis appears to be the office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00). The objective of the office is to collect, screen, analyze and feed back operational experience or data to the NRC, the industry, and to the public. The AEOD has access to a large number of reports from the industry and foreign event reports based upon bilateral agreements. A principal source of information is the Licensee Event Report (LER)--a report which documents reportable events occurring ! at the operating facilities. However, due to the looseness of the reporting format, LER's were often ineffective in determining root causes before 1984. In recognition of the dominance of the human element in many of the reported events, the LER system was modified in January 1984 to get better information on human factors variables contributing to the event. Even with this improvement, the NRC does not get good information with every LER. Currently, the AEOD is generally successful in deriving root causes for violations involving equipment and hardware but is less successful for the people oriented v.folations, i.e., human error. That improvement in this regard is necessary is evidenced by the fact that studies of significant events in 1983 by AE0D and INP0 concluded that the incidence of human error was around 40% and was particularly prevalent in the test and surveillance area. i l I
A large number of reports are disseminated by the NRC, such as notices, bulletins, circulars, generic letters, and summaries of abnormal operational events. Although useful, these releases, as reported by the recipient utilities, are frequently untimely, and, in many cases, lack identification of root causes and appropriate explicit solutions. Industry interaction in other ways (such as pertinent news releases and shared information between utilities) and the issuance of good practices by INPO are helpful and constructive an' d these efforts should be accelerated along with a parallel effort by the NRC to issue more timely reports with explicit recomended corrective actions. It is the belief of this comittee that the NRC's regulatory program would be more effective if it concentrated more on the identification of root causes with particular emphasis upon human error. Improved reporting is basic. Root cause identification an& incident prevention should be enhanced by promoting and encouraging a cooperative atmosphere between the NRC and the utilities during day to day interactions, better use of management conferences and enforcement conferences with free and open exchange between the NRC and the licensees. Recomendations.
- 1. The staff should increase its emphasis on the identification and correction of root causes of violations, with particular emphasis on the element of human error.
- 2. Better use of management and enforcement conferences to identify and correct root causes of violations should be encouraged.
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- 3. The NRC should increase its efforts to issue timely evaluations of incidents and their causes with explicit recomended corrective actions.
S. Inspection Program
- 1. Policy, Staffing and Rotation Violations of NRC requirements are identified in one of three ways:
by an NRC inspector in the normal course of an inspection; by the licensee with a subsequent report to the NRC; and by receipt of an allegation with subsequent follow-up of those allegations by either the investigative staff or the inspection staff. To the disappointment of this committee, the NRC staff could not identify the percentage of violations identified by the NRC and those identified by the licensees themselves, although one NRC official reported that it was his belief that the majority of violations were reported by the licensees. Whichever is the case, it is clear that the effectiveness of the enforcement program depends fundamentally on what comes into it -- the results of the agency's inspection program to verify that licensees are meeting their comitments and regulatory r:rograms. Basic issues of consistency and fairness of enforcement can best be addressed through the careful selection, training, supervision and evaluation of the people who detemine compliance with requirements in the first instance -- the inspectors. Approximately one-third of NRC's resources are directed to the inspection program. This includes the actual inspection, the development of programs and procedures to carry out the programs, and support to the actual on-scene inspection. The
e 0 f inspection program is managed by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and involves the five regions as well as some direct inspections via special teams out of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. However, the bulk of the inspections are carried out by regionally based inspectors and resident personnel. In concern for a potential loss of objectivity, the NRC originally had a policy of frequent rotation of its resident inspectors. Currently, most inspectors now stay on their assignments for at least five years. i 4 It is difficult to say whether this current practice is predicated on the : cost of relocation or inspector efficiency. Three problems perceived by former regional inspectors were: (1) There seems to be a problem of burnout and the feeling of some inspectors that confinement to one plant does not give them the proper frame of reference for comparative purposes when they are only* familiar with one i plant. (2) The volume of paper work reduces the time available for actual inspection activities. (3) There is in effect a " quasi" quota system which is contradictory to official policy, i.e., in the absence of reported violations, the resident inspector is likely to receive 4 questioning phone calls.
- 2. Inspector Selection, Training and Evaluation NRC has established a program for the selection, training and evaluation of inspectors to meet two basic and essential objectives:
To ensure that inspectors meet minimum knowledge and qualification standards, and I
_ = -- - _ _ = -. . _ . _ _ _. - _ _ - - To maintain inspector qualifications and training in general j confonnance to standards for comparable job activities in the ; nuclear industry,
- a. Selection. Hiring of inspectors in general 1/ ollows f the standard process utilized by other federal agencies. Career opportunity announcements are listed in NRC Form 114 with a description of duties. ,
1 The form also lists qualifications required by the job and the rating factors that are utilized to evaluate the candidate. Interested candi-dates apply through the submission of a personal qualifications statement, SF 171, and a vacancy application status notice, NRC Form 115. Basically, three types of appointments are made: Resident Inspector, Senior Resident Inspector, and Regional Inspector. The first two types of inspectors must have been an NRC employee for six months and two years, respectively. This is advantageous in that appointments can take into account actual
- perfomance on the job. Regional inspectors can be a new employee.
i b. Training. Newly hired personnel seldom possess all of the required qualifications. Therefore, both fomal class room training, as stipulated in an Inspection and Employment Manual, (Chapter 1231) and on-the-job training are utilized to ensure that the necessary knowledge is acquired. j Each inspector must attend the required training or verify through successful completion of a written equivalency examination the desired 4 1/ Certain positions require that the candidate already be an NRC employee. l
. -- . . . - . _ - _ = -. -. - _= . _ . _ _ - . - . --.
level of knowledge in the inspector's specialty, such as Radiological Safety Inspection. The passing grade for each course, series of courses, or equivalence examination is 70%. Other requirements, such as oral boards or regional training, may be used to supplement or enhance training. For example, there is a training manual, "IE Training and Qualifications Journal" that goes with IE 1231. Upon completion of the training journal, the region may convene a " Board" i to give the candidate an oral examination. Upon the Board's recomendation, the inspector is certified. Neither the composition of the Board nor its process is standardized. Two regions utilize formal boards, two regions do not utilize boards at all, and a fifth region utilizes an informal process
- wherein one regional representative conducts a walk throbgh evaluation.
J Little is known about the reliability and validity of either the formal { or informal board evaluation process. l All newly hired personnel and assignees are required to complete the t training activities or take and pass equivalency examinations within the l first 24 months of being assigned. In general, only those inspectors who have successfully completed the required training will be allowed to perform inspections. However, if regional management evaluates the background and performance of an l individual inspector and concludes that the inspector has demonstrated an ability to perform inspections in specific areas, even though the required training has not been completed, the Regional Administrator can authorize the individual to perform inspections in those areas.
o .
- c. Evaluation. Performance evaluations are accomplished by standardized annual appraisals. Explicit guidance for this evaluation is contained in an IE Manual with particular emphasis on objectivity.
In summary, NRC has put in place a program for hiring, training, and evaluating inspectors so as to achieve policy objectives of assuring the competence necessary for inspectors to discharge position requirems. cs in an effective manner which is apparently working well but could possibly be made even better.
- 3. Recommendation.
The rationale of utilizing or not utilizing boards to evaluate - prospective inspectors should be examined with the objective of establishing standardization throughout the five regions. T. Material Licensees As noted at the outset, The Committee did not look at the materials licensing program in much detail., Materials licensees include fuel facilities, uranium mills, new fuel production plants, hospitals, and other industrial users of uranium products. There are roughly 8000 licensees of this type licensed by the NRC throughout the United States. The NRC tries to look at those with the most significant quantities of radi.occtive material and those that represent potentially the greatest threat to public health and safety. The licensees in these areas are inspected usually about once a year, but in the case of other materials licensees it may be years before they are inspected by the NRC. This program, like that for reactors, also depends upon voluntary reporting. i l
l l l A potential source of complication in the materials licensee { category is that, in addition to the approximate 8000 cases where the license is issued by NRC, there are that many again where the licenses are issued by Agreement States. NRC does, however, coordinate their , activities with Agreement States. Furthermore, it is a requirement that the NRC judge the comparability of Agreement State programs to the NRC programs. The sense of those appearing before the Committee was that the program is working well. { U. Office of Investications Several individuals appearing before the Committee expressed concerns about the activities of the Office of Investigations. The l Committee did not have the time or resources, nor was it central to its l review, to examine the activities of that Office, except to the limited extent of the impact of investigations on the timeliness of enforcement , i actions (SectionV.B.). The Committee does note that the Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resources Committee (NUMARC) has established a Working Group on Investigations of NRC Licensed Activities. If the Commission has an interest in further views frcm the industry in this area, it may wish to review their conclusions when available. " i 5
1 VI.
SUMMARY
OF RECOMMENDATIONS i
- 1. The material false statement policy should be changed to limit citations for material false statements to written statements or sworn testimony made knowing the statement was incorrect or made with careless disregard for correctness. If incorrect oral statements or omissions are to be cited, it should be under another label. The paper SECY-84-421 covers all of the Committee's points and is recommended as the vehicle for action. ,,
, 2. The staff should come as close to meeting the 8-week schedule in the new manual chapter as it can without sacrificing the quality of its enfsrcement actions.
- 3. The staff should expedite the process of preparing and obtaining concurrence on Commirsion papers referring escalated enforcement actions to the Commission.
, 4. The staff should, by screening and assignment of priorities, reduce the number of requests for investigation to those cases clearly ,
a requiring Office of Investigations participation.
- 5. The agreement, reflected in the EDO Memorandum of July 5, 1985, that OI will provide a priority and schedule for each investigation should be fully utilized.
i _ - . . . ~ . . . , , __ , ,,,y. - _ , _ _ - . _ _ _ m
_ _ _ . . _ - .- . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ ~ _ . _ . _ _ _ . - - - - __ . _ _ -
- 6. Cases referred to 0I but of lower priority and for which 01 is unable to start an investigation within some reasonable time I
should be returned to and followed up by IE, in preference i 4 to more extended delays in 01.
- 7. Enforcement conferences should generally be serious exchanges between staff and licensee of information and points of view about i the occurrence giving rise to the conference. The staff should be prepared to outline its understanding of the occurrence and its position on possible violations. The licensee should be prepared to provide as accurate an account of the occurrence as he can, the results of his investigation of the root causes of the occurrence, i
j and the corrective actions taken and contemplated. l 8. The licensee should be given as much notice as practicable, with a
- minimum of 3 working days, that a meeting to which he has been
- called is an enforcement conference. The notice should be in writing, and should include the pertinent inspection report.
- 9. The enforcement program manual chapter section on press releases should be amended to provide for a one working day grace period between verification that the subject licensee has received a copy of the Notice of Violation and issuance of the press release on the proposeo enforcement action.
4
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.66 - ,
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- 10. Press releases oli enforcement actions should incibde such infomation as the initiation and prograu of licensee corrective programs for the violation in question and plant operating status and recent-operating history in order tn present a more complete and balanced account to the public. s
- 11. The staff 'should con-ider ways of reducing regional inconsistencies,
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such as improved training and the formulatfon of standard operating policies and procedures. , ' f,
- 12. The frequency ^of inspections shoald be based on a licensee's performance.
- 13. The staff should accelerate its efforts to better define the ,
criteria for classifying violations by Severity Level through - written guidance, training and selectjve headquarters review of
^
regional practices invo1ving Severity Level IV and V violations.
- 14. The current language in the Enforcement Policy on removing the economic benefit.of noncompliance should be changed to that of the _
earlier version of the Policy or to other language to eliminate its undesirable connotations. An/ cesputation of civil penalties on the basis of removing an economic benefit should be done only in clear cases. 4 N 4
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- , ?' .
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- 15. Mitigation of the penalty for a Severity Level I violation should be i available on the same basis as for Severity Level II and III !
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l violations. t
- 16. Civil penalties should never be addressed to individuals. [
i
- 17. Enforcement actions should be taken against individuals only in the j case of licensed operators who exhibit a serious incapacity to discharge [
l their licensed functions. In such a case, the appropriate sanction ; could range from a letter of reprimand to a suspension or revocation of i the license. ! 1 i l
- 18. The Commission should establish a priority and accelerate a program ,
5 to reform technical specifications.
- i
- 19. The staff should study means to collect data on preventable safety- ;
significant violations, including source of identification, severity level and contributing and root cause factors. t
- 20. The staff should increase its emphasis on the identification and ;
i
- correction of root causes of violations, with particular emphasis on !
the element of human error. l c l i P f i $
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- 21. Better use of management and enforcement conferences to identify root causes of violations should be encouraged.
- 22. The NRC should increase its efforts to issue timely evaluations of incidents and their causes with explicit recommended corrective 4
actions. s
- 23. The rationale of utilizing or,not utilizing boards to evald.ite.
prospective inspectors should be examined with the objective' of i establishing standardization throughout the five regionh. f 1 h
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Respectfully submitted, 4
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E. P. Wilkinson A f
! /ColinS. Diver
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l* , Michael V. Hasten N , 7 Josep)M.Hendrie ' W,M f ed Howard L. Parris i ,k.(
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4 S Accendix TABULAR REVIEW OF COMMENTS l l l l l l l
TABULAR REVIEW 0F COMMENTS Effect of Enforcement Policy On: None or
. Positive Minimal Negative
- 1. Detection & correction of violation 3 ,
11 5
- 2. Reporting of violations 6 7 4
- 3. Prevention of violations 2 12 3
- 4. Safety record of licensee 1 14 -
- 5. Morale of licensee 1 3 14
- 6. Public confidence - 1 14
, 7. Worker's and public's - 6 5 willingness to report violations 1
Particular Features of Policy
- 1. Civil penalty levels (A) In General Too high About right Too low 7 4 -
(B) Relative Levels About right Inconsistent (across Supplements)
- 11 -
- 2. Upward or downward adjustments About right Upward adj. too Downward adj. too t Generous Limited Generous Limited (A) As written 5 1 8 4
. (B) As Applied - - -
5 I
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- 3. Classification of. violations by severity level (A) Number of levels -
Too many About right Too few 3 3 - (B) Assignment of violations to About right Too lenient Too harsh levels 1 - 6
- 4. Material false statements policy About right Too lenient Too harsh In General 1 1 15
-(A)
(B) If too harsh, should be restricted to: ] 5
- Written statements (not oral) 4 4
Willful and/or reckless misstatements 10
' Affirmative statements only (not 4 omissions)
- Statements on which NRC did, or have 2 i
been expected to, rely
- 5. Relative emphasis on negative and About right Insufficient Use of Positive Incentive positive incentives In General 2 17 (A)
(B) If Insufficient use.of positive j incentives - should use: - - ' Mitigation for past good perfomance 4 1 1
*Public commendation for good performance 1
- Total mitigation or no citation for -
corrective action 10
- Reduced inspections 2
- 6. Progressive escalation of enforcement About right Too harsh or rapid escalation ,
sanctions 8 6
- 7. Procedures (A) Enforcement Conferences About right Problems 1
- 2 5 i If problems:
, 'NRC not sufficiently communicative 3
*NRC not sufficiently responsive 2 i
t Too late in the process 1 (B) Publicity About right Problems (in general) 3 } If problems:
- Inadequate notice to licensee 5 i
- Contents too one-sided 7 4
1 1
*Should not be issued at all -
' Subsequent mitigation not well publicized 1
- 8. Supplement 8 of the Policy Satisfactory Unsatisfactory 1 4 Responses to Specific Questions
- 1. Impose sanctions on individuals? Never Willful A serious viol. only Licensed operators only 4 11 8 i
- 2. Effect of regionalization? None or minimal Positive effect Reduced consistency 3 6 12
- 3. Identification of root causes? Usually Sometimes Rarely 6 8 5
- 4. Increased reliance on self- Yes No identification?
13 2 4 (A) Increased reliance on Yes Yes, INPO-like organ. only No third parties 5 2 7 1 i . 1
Enclosure 1 INDIVIDUALS PROVIDING TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW 0F THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY 4
INDIVIDUALS PROVIDING TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW 0F THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY December 18-19, 1984 Richard C. DeYoung, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC James M. Taylor, (then) Deputy Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC Jane Axelrad Director of Enforcement Staff, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC James Lieberman, Director and Chief Counsel, Regional Operations and Enforcement Division, Office of the Executive Legal Director, NRC January 30-31, 1985 Thomas R. Murley, Regional Adminstrator, Region I, NRC James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator, Region II, NRC James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III, NRC Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region IV, NRC John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V, NRC Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Donald B. Mausshardt, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, NRC Victor Stello, Deputy Executive Director of Operations for Regional Operations and Generic Requirements, NRC C. J. Heltemes, Director, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Frederick Hebdon, Chief, Program Technology Branch, AE00, NRC G. Wayne Kerr, Director, Office of State Programs, NRC
~ Ben Hayes, Director, Office of Investigations, NRC Roger Fortuna, Deputy Director, Office of Investigations, NRC William H. Beach, Senior Enforcement Specialist, Enforcement Staff, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC (former senior resident inspector at River Bend) L. Joe Callan, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC (former senior resident inspector at Arkansas) April 10-11, 1985
, Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq., Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds Sanford L. Hartman, Esq., Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds Sol Burstein, Vice Chairman, Board of Directors, Wisconsin Electric Power Company, on behalf of the Edison Electric Institute David VandeWalle, Director, Nuclear Licensing, Consumers Power Company 1
Billie Pirner Garde, Government Accountability Project , George Showhet, Esq., Government Accountability Project Lee Oxsen, Vice President for Nuclear Operations, Boston Edison Company Robert E. Denton, General Supervisor for Technical Services, Calvert Cliffs, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Thomas Mascolino, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, Mine Safety and i Health Administration, Department of Labor Ron Schell, Mine Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor J. W. Williams, Jr., Group Vice President, Nuclear Energy Department, Florida Power and Light Company, on behalf of the Atomic Industrial Forum Robert Douglass, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Art Bivens, Atomic Industrial Forum Alan Cutter, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing, Carolina Power and Light Company
William L. Stewart, Vice President, Nuclear Operationss, Virginia Power Company Ray Hardwick, Manager, Nuclear Programs and Licensing, Virginia Power Company William Henry, Assistant Shift Supervisor, Surry, Virginia Power Company April 30-May 1, 1985 John Cassidy, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration Robert McKendrick, Assistant Shift Supervisor, McGuire, Duke Power Company Joseph J. Fouchard, Director, Office of Public Affairs, NRC Jonathan Libber, Chief, General Policy and Review Branch, Criminal Enforcement and Special Litigation Division Office of Enforcement and Compliance, EPA Susan Watkins, General Policy and Review Branch, Criminal Enforcement and Special Litigation Division, Office of Enforcement and Compliance, EPA Willima Jordan, Esq., Harmon, Weiss, and Jordan Jay Pilant, Technical Staff Manager for Nuclear Power Group, Nebraska Public Power District Morris Howard, Director, Site Operations, Crystal River, Florida Power Corporation Dennis Terrill, Design Engineering Group, Florida Power Corporation Ed Berry, Shift Supervisor, Millstone, Unit 1. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
6 9 Enclosure 2 REQUEST FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS O l
.i I
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE [7590-01] Ad Hot Advisory Comittee for Review of Enforcement Policy; Reouest for Written Comments On March 3,1982, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission adopted a comprehensive statement of enforcement policy, applicable to matters involving the public health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment. 47 FR 9987 (March 9,1982). t The policy was based on an interim policy published on October 7, 1980 (45 FR 66755). The policy statement specified criteria for the issuance of notices of i violation, imposition of civil penalties, and issuance of orders with the principal criterion being the " severity" of the violation. The policy statement established five " severity levels", and provided guidance for classifying: violations in each category.' As a genen1 rule, no sanctions were to be imposed for low-hazard violations (those classed in Severity Levels IV or V), while more serious violations (those in Severity Levels I-III) would be subject to the imposition of civil penalties end, in some cases, appropriate orders. The policy statement prebnted a formula for establishing the " base civil penalty" for violations, based on their severity level and activity category, and standards for adjusting base penalties for escalating or mitigating
~~~
f a ctors'.- On March 2,1984, the Commission made several revisions .to the enforcement policy, including an increase in the base penalty (from 580,000 to S100,000) for the most severe categories of violations and e 0
, ( , , -_ _. , .--,n.
2 increases in the percentages by which base amounts may be adjusted. 49 FR 8583 (March 8, 1984). The revised policy statement also directed an "in-depth study of the enforcement program" to be conducted "by a small comittee of individuals from outside the agency to be selected by the Comission." On August 31,1984, (49 FR 35N3, Sept. 6,1984) the Comission established the Ad Hoc Advisory Comittee for Review of the Enforcement Policy to undertake this study. In aid of its undertaking, the Comittee is soliciting comments from interested persons on the extent to which the NRC's enforcement policy has served the purpose announced by the Commission upon its promulgation, namely:. " to promote and protect the radiological health and safety , of the public including employeeg' health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment by:
' Ensuring compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions; -
' Obtaining prompt correction of.noncomplia'nce; .
' Deterring future.none'ompliance;.and ,
.
- Encouraging improvement.of ]jcensee's perfonnance, and by example, that of industry, including the prompt identifi-cation and reporting'of potential. safety problems.
47 FR 9989 (M' arch,2* 1982). , ,
., ,, g, r
3-The Corm:ittee recognizes that comments were solicited on the revised Enforcement Policy (49 FR 8583, March E,1984) and has reviewed the comments received in response to that request. Additiionallyand more particularly, the Comittee now invites comments from the public on the effect, if any, that the enforcement policy has had, on:
- 1. The prompt detection and correction of violations by licensees; Z* The prompt reporting of violations by licensees;
- 3. The prevention of violations by licensees; T.-
- 4. The safety record of licensees;
- 5. The morale of licensees and their employees;
- 6. The public's confidence in the Commission!s enforcement program; and
- 7. The willingness of workers and members of .the public to' report alleged violations..
i To the extent that the enforcement policy has had an appreciable effect, positive or negative, to what particular feature of the policy, if any, is that effect attributable? In this connection, the Comittee particularly [nvites comments relating to the following features of the - enforcement policy:
, 1. Are the tables of, civil penalty 1.evels set at appropriate amounts?
l~ Upward and downward adjustment of base civil penalties;
- 3. Classification of violations by Severity Level; Policy on material false statements;
~
4. 4 de $ e,
.- - - . - _g- s
4_
- 5. Relative amphasis on negative and positive incentives;
- 6. Progressive escalation of enforcement sanctions; 7, . Enforcement procedures such as enfor:ement conferences, publicity policy, etc; and
- 8. Supplement 8 of the revised enforcement policy.
In addition, coments are requested on the following questions:
- 1. Under what circumstances, if any, should the NRC iho's.e sanctions directly on individuals responsible for violations?
- 2. What has been the effect of regionali:atio'ri on the enforcement program and its implementation? --
- 3. Does the present system identify roa,t.causes of violations so that effective corrective actions can be taken? Are lessons learned effectively promulgated to the industnj and, if so, by what means?
- 4. Should the NRC consider increasing its relialce for compliance on licensee self-identification or evaluations of third parties?
Following ,its review of the coments received the Comittee may , wish to have re.prese.ntative vi.ewpoints sumarized orally to .the Comittee during a public meeting. Comenters should indicate if they would be willing to make such a presentation and, if so, indicate a
~
person to contact concerning a possibl,e presentation. If presentations are requested, the Comittee may, depending upon the number of coments received and the number of persons expressing a willingness to be heard, ask several comenters to. consolidate their presentations.
~
6 -
- 5-Coments are due on or before February 26, 1985. Coments received af ter this date will be considered if it is practical to do 50. Coments should be submitted to: Secretary of the Comission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission,
- Washington, D.C. 20555, ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch. Deliver comments to: Room 1121, 1717 H Street, N.W. , Washington, D.C. between 8:15 a.m. and
- 5:00 p.m. weekdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
' ~
For further information contact Karen Cyr, Office of the: Executive t.egal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Telephone: (301)492-7269. - -
/ ~
~ JOHN C. HOELE Advisory Cqmmittee ManagemeSt Officer Dated at Wash'ington, DC , ,
this 3rd day,of January, 1985 , 4 0 . a s e O O d g g e 6
- e O O e e
' b N
e e t b
,. ea
o v-Enclosure 3 BIBLf0 GRAPHY e
D L BIBLIOGRAPHY
- 1. Civil Penalties Issued to Commercial Reactor Licensees and Paid by January 6, 1984.
- 2. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular No. 00-46C, " Aviation Safety Reporting Program",
2/4/85.
- 3. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Order 2150.3 Chg 1, " Compliance and Enforcement Program," Oct. 1983.
- 4. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Order 1000.90, " Enforcement Policy", 10/18/82.
- 5. Docket No. PR-2 (49 FR 8583), Public Comments on the March 1984 Revised Enforcement Policy, 49 FR 8583 (March 8, 1984).
- 6. Docket No. PR-2 (50 FR 1142), Public Comments in Response to Request by Ad-Hoc Advisory Committee for Review of Enforcement Policy, 50 t
FR 1142 (January 9, 1985). Commenters: Lynne S. Goodman, Marvin Lewis, Department of Environmental Quality, Wyoming; Department of Health, Utah; Georgia Power Co., T.G. Staskal; John D. Parkyn; Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.; Duke Power Co.; Shaw, Pittman, Potts
& Trowbridge; Edison Electric Institute; Arkansas Department of Health; Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds; Arkansas Power & Light Co.; Jean Bernstein; J. B. Abrahamsen; Sally Isham; Consumers Power Co.; Omaha Public Power District; General Electric Co. - Wilmington; Florida Power Corp.; Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.; Louisiana Power & Light Co.;
Westinghouse Electric Corp.; GPU Nuclear Corp.; Southern California Edison Co.; Virginia Power Co.; KMC, Inc.; Boston Edison Co.; Frank J. Long, John M. Puckett.
- 7. Draft Staff Paper on Vendor Enforcement Policy.
- 8. Draft Statement of Work for Staff's Proposed Study of the Enforcement Program.
4
- 9. Energy & Water Development Appropriations for 1986, Part 6: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Water Development of the Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong.,1st Sess.
221 ( A Report to the Committee on Appropriations on the NRC, March 1985 ("Bevill Report")).
- 10. Environmental Protection Agency, General Enforcement Policy GM #21,
" Policy on Civil Penalties," February 16, 1984,
- 11. Environmental Protection Agency, General Enforcement Policy GM #22 "A Framework for Statute Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments",
February 16, 1984. i m e - w - ->+-w w-.
. (
- 12. Environmental Protection Agency, BEN, A Model to Calculate the Economic Benefit of Delayed Compliance for Civil Penalties.
1
- 13. Inspection and Enforcement Manual Chapter 0215, "NRC Inspector Objectivity",1/1/83. .
- 14. Inspection and Enforcement Manual Chapter 0400, " Enforcement Program",
4/25/85.
- 15. Inspection and Enforcement Manual Chapter 1231, " Inspector Qualification",4/1/83.
- 16. Inspection Report No. 50-313,368/84-30, Arkansas Power & Light Co.,
ANO 1 & 2. ,
- 17. Inspection Report No. 50-155/84-13, Consumers Power Co., Big Rock Point.
- 18. Inspection Report No. 50-413/84-101, Duke Power Co., Catawba.
- 19. Inspection Report No. 50-29/84-13, Yankee Atomic Electric Co.,
Yankee Rowc.
- 20. Inspection Report No. 50-250,251/84-18, Florida Power I Light Co.,
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
- 21. Inspection Report No. 50-206,361,362/84-29,30, Southern California Edison Co., San Onofre, Units 1, 2 and 3.
- 22. Inspection Report No. 50-295,304/84-08, Commonwealth Edison Co.,
Zion Units 1 and 2. l
- 23. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Good Practice OA-102, I Performance Monitoring - Management Information, August 1983.
- 24. Ltr to E. P. Wilkinson fra J. Asselstir.e, dtd 1/3/85 re: Comments
, on December 19, 1984 ltr to W. Dircks.
- 25. Ltr to E. P. Wilkinson fra P. R. Clark, dtd 7/31/85 re: Status of Activities of NUMARC Working Group on Investigations of NRC Licensed Activities.
- 26. Ltr to E. P. Wilkinson, frm N. Palladino dtd 1/23/85 re: Comments on December 19, 1984 ltr to W. Dircks.
- 27. Ltr. to N. Palladino frm J. Ebersole dtd 3/20/84 re: ACRS Report on the General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions.
- 28. Memorandum for Commissioners frm S. Connelly dtd 12/10/84 re:
! Material False Statements (SECY 84-421).
b e
- 29. Memorandum for Commissioners frm B. Ha es dtd 12/10/84 re:
Material False Statements (SECY 84-421.
- 30. Memorandum for H. Denton, et al., frm W. Dircks dtd 7/5/85, re:
Procedures for Requesting DTTnvestigations.
- 31. Memorandum for Office Directors & Regional Administrators frm W.
Dircks dtd 9/19/84 re: Proposed NRC Manual Chapter 0517,
" Management of Allegations", w/ enclosure.
4
- 32. Memorandum for Comissioners frm J. Fouchard dtd 12/1/83 re: Proposed Revised General Statement of Policy and Procedures for Enforcement Actions.
- 33. Memorandum for K. Cyr frm J. LaFleur, Jr., dtd 2/20/85 re:
Enforcement Policies in Other Countries, w/ Summary of Responses and Responses.
- 34. Minutes of Public Meetings of Advisory Committee for Review of the Enforcement Policy, July 9, 1985; July 24-25, 1985; November 1, 1985.
35.- NRC Press Releases dtd 3/5/85 re Swank-Metacon Systems; 3/13/85 re James River Corp.; 3/7/85 re A-1 Inspection, Inc.; 3/8/85 re Dravo Corporation; 3/12/85 re Vess Beverages; 4/1/85 re VA Medical Center; 3/26/85 re Public Service Electric and Gas Co.; 3/22/85 re Mississippi Power and Light Co.
- 36. NUREG-0940, Enforcement Actions: Signification Actions Resolved, Vols. 1, 2, & 3, September 1982 through July 1984.
- 37. NUREG/CR-0387, "A Study of the Utility of Incentive Systems for Nuclear Licenses", TRW Energy Systems Planning Division for the NRC, August 1978.
- 38. NUREG/CR-3883, " Analysis of Japanese-U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Maintenance," Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers and Pacific Northwest Laboratory for the NRC, June 1985.
- 39. Office of Investigations, Investigative Policies, Nos. 1 - 26,
- 40. Proposed General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions, issued October 7, 1980.
- 41. Region I Operating Reactor Enforcement Actions, 1983 - 1984, i 42. Region I Answers to Specific Questions Raised by Advisory Comittee on Enforcement, January 30, 1985.
! 43. Revised General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions, issued March 9, 1982. , ! 44. Revised General Statement of Policy, issued March 8, 1984.
o e . l
- 4-4
- 45. SECY 84-159, Material False Statements - Policy Options, April 16, 1984.
- 46. SECY 84-421, Material False Statements, October 30, 1984.
- 47. SECY 85-149, Material False Statements, April 26, 1985.
- 48. Surmary Tables of Escalated Enforcement Actions for FY 1980-1983.
- 49. Table Comparing Enforcement Resources to Total IE Resources, 4
January 19, 1975 - February 2, 1985.
- 50. " Thoughts on Section 186 - Material False Statements", Paper presented by Harold F. Reis, Newmaq & Holtzinger, P.C., before Atomic Industrial Forum Conference, " Insurance and Legal Issues of the 80's," January 24, 1985.
- 51. Transcripts of Public Meetings of Advisory Committee for Review of Enforcement Policy, December 18-19, 1984; January 30-31, 1985; April 10-11,1985; April 30-May 1,1985.
O
Enclosure 4 LETTER DESCRIBING THE COMMITTEE'S APPROACH FOR ITS REDORT
.= . _-
4 .---
.DEC 191984 I' Mr. William J. Dircks
, Executive Director for Operations
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
, Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Hr. Dircks:
I stm writing on behalf of the members of the AD HOC Advisory Committee for Review of the Enforcement Policy tc inform you of the course of action we
; intend to pursue absent further direction frorn the Commission.
i The basic question to be addressed is the extent to which the current . enfcretment policy achieves its identified purpose, that is: ] To prcmote anc protect the radiclogical health and safety cf the public, including empicyees' health and safety, the ccamon defense and security, i and the environment by:
. Ensuring compliance with hKC regulations and license ccndit.isns;
- . Obtaining prcept correction of violations;
. Deterrina future violations; and ,
t i . Encouragirg imprcvement uf licensee performance, and by example, ! that of industry, including the prompt identificatien and reporting
- of potertial safety problems, r
j Within inherent limitaticns of time and scope, the Committee will examine and j evaluate a series ci bcsic issues and generate reccamendations for the i j censiderhtien cf the Comission. Representative of the issues to be addressed ' i ere: 1.' hat is the apprcpriate role of incentives (bcth positive and negative) d to motivate licensees te ccmply with requirements? What alternate incentives right be more effective?
**t j- . Are the tables of civil per.elty levels set at appropriate amcunts?
i
. Ilhet criteria shculd apply to the mitigation or escalation of civil l penalties? Sheuld these criteria be applied equally to Severity Levels I, II and III? -
t j
. How shculd the Cc=nission deal with violations of minor significance?
! . Under what circumstances, if any, should the HRC impose sanctions i f directly on individuals responsible for violations.
. - -- = . - -- --
> v l
Mr. William J. Dircks CEO 19 IM
. What has been the effect cf regionalization on the enfcrcement pro 5 ram ano its implementation? Is nationwide cer.sistency in enforcement necessary or desirable? It it being achieved?
. Does the present system identify root causes of violations so that effective corrective actions can be taken? Are the lessens learned generalized to the industry at large?
. Is the current policy en material false statements effective in encourE5 i ng candid, complete and timely information? Should changes
-be made?
. To what degree might the NRC increase reliance fer compliance on licensee self-identification - or evaluaticns cf third parties; e.g.,
IliPO activities? '
. Should charges be made in the systen used by the Ccar.ission to collect, analyze ar.d repcrt data on enforcement activities?
In order to address thc:c questions, we intend to have an acditional meeting ! with liRC headquarters and regional staff in late Janucry. tie also will be issuing shortly a rec,uest fer written public cerments on the issues before the Advisory Comittee, such ccir.cnts to be submitted apprcr.inately 60 days fc11owing the Federal Register anncunccecnt. In coc'iticn, the Ccemittee will draw upcn input frca licensees, the scientific community and the public. We invite recommendations frce the Cctr.ission of specific individutis and crganizations frcm whcm the Cerr.ittee should solicit views.
!!c currently anticipate that we will :cbrett cur written report to you ir.
August, ISES. i Sincerely, l l 0E. P. Uilkinson &[ l Chairman cc: ltr. Colin S. Diver l liichael V. Hasten, Esq. l Dr. Jcscph Hendrie Dr. Howard L. Parris i I i _ L : s
f . o . Distribution K. Cyr, OELD J. Liebeman, OELD G. Cunningham, OELD J. Axelrad, IE J. Taylor, IE V. Stello, ED0 J. Sniezek, EDO T. Rehm, EDO H. Denton, NRR J. Davis, NMSS I T. Murley, RI J. Grace, RII J. Keppler, RIII R. Martin, RIV J. Martin, RV - J. Fouchard, PA C. Heltemes, AE00 G. Kerr, SP B. Hayes, 01 J. Hoyle, SECY SECY
- yPDR OPE OGC}}