ML20106C944
| ML20106C944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1992 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Degrassi G BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210060459 | |
| Download: ML20106C944 (133) | |
Text
.,
August 28, 1992 Mr. Giuliano DeGrassi Building 475C Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, NY l1973
Dear Giuliano:
Enclosed are the ABWR SSAR markups corresponding to the majority of the Piping Design Audit open items. The markups for the outstanding open items will be provided on the following schedule:
Onen item Date A-10 9/4/,92 l A-12 9/15/92 A-17 9/4/92 A-18 10/31/92 A-25 9/15/9?
A-2 8 9/4/92 Sincerely,
. b.$N Jack N. Fox Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Chet Poslusny/ Shou Hou I /
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DAMIG ABMR P_D' 13 1[ SUtadaM F1 ant l l i TABLE 3.21 h CLASSIFICATION SLM1ARY (Continued) Quality Group Quallry Saferv Loca. Classi- Assurance Seismic P-int ier Comrenent 8 N 'b ge fleatfend Recuirement' Catecenf h 3 C C B 1
- 2. Vess:1- air aceadaters (for ADS and SRVs)
- 3. Pipi:g induing supports - (@ C (B[
c B I (b) p, E saf::v/re!!:f vahe Escharge J ' (L N) fla tndill' O O 3141 Amendment 11
1 i MMrR uanx , l Standard Plant
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NOTE: (Coctinued)
- 4. All other instrassent lin:s:
i Through th: root vahe th: lines sh20 b: of th: sasn: dassificatico aa 6: spte= l to which they are attached. ii E yond the roct vahe,if used to actuat: a saferv spt:m, the lines shall be of the sam: dass$ cation as de syst:rn to whid ti:y ve attad:d. iii Eeyend th: rect vahe,if cot us:d to acreat: a saf::y syst:m the li::s =ay be Cod: Greup D. 5 A!! sample lices frem the outer isolation vah: or th: prec:ss rect vahe through th: rems::::: of the sampling syste= =ay be Code Group D.
- 6 A!! safety.r:laed instrument sensing lines shall be in conformance with th: criteria of E
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R:gulatory Guide 1.151. f, Safm Reuci val.e discharge line ISRVDL) pipmg and quencher shall te Quality Group C and Seismic ,
! C.;:ccan In add:: ion an acids m i:te SRI DL pipmg in the acraeil above the swface of the suppression pcci
\ shau be non. des:rucm cly aammed :o :he requiremen:s of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Secnon ill, C:.:ss 2.
sri DL p:p ng pom the safc:v/re!!cf vaite to the quenchers in the suppression pool consis:s of two pans: the jirst pan is loca:cd m the dqucll and is attached at one end to :he saferv/ relief valve and a:: ached at its other una :o :he a:aphrag n licor penetranon. Diis first pan of the SR t DL is analped ai:h the main steam piping as a comp;e:e system. Die second pan of the SRVDL is in the actuell and arends from the penet anon :o :he , auenchers m the sup;)?cssion pool. Because of the pene:ranon on this part of the line, it is phys:ca!!y decoupled pom the :navi steam piping and the jirst pan of the SRLDL piping and is therefore anals:ed as a sepa a:e p;pmg sys:cm.
. E'::.-ical 4: sic:s includ: components such as switch:s. controllers, sole:cids, fuses.
pncuen bcx:s. and transduc:ts which at: discrete components of a lars:: subass:=elyj medui:. Nuc!:ar safety related d: vices at: Seismic Cat: gory 1. Fail safe d: sic:s at: non S: sma Category 1. j The control rod drive insert lines from the drive flang: up to and including the first vah e on the hydraulic control unit are Safety Class , and non safety relat:d beyond the first s ah e.
- k. Th: hydraulic centrol unit (HCU) is a factcry-assembi:d engin::::d module of vakes, tubing, piping. and stcred water which cc: trois two contro: tod drises by the applicauca of pr:ssur:s a:d flows to acco=plish rapid ins: tion for reactor scram.
Although the hydraulic co= trol unit, as a unit, is fic!d installed and conn:cted to process piping, many of its internal parts diff:r markedly frem proc:ss piping components becaus: of t:: mer: comp!:x functions they =ust provid:. Thus, although the codes and sta:dards i: oked by Groups A B. C, and D pressure integrity quality levels clearly apply at all levels to the int:rfac:s h::we:n the HCU and the connection to ecnsentional piping compecents (e g., pip: nipp!:s. fitungs, simple hand vahes etc.), it is considered that they do not apply to the i t spe::.dt) parts (e.g., sol:ncic salves pneumatic ccmponents. and instruments). . 1 sa Amen: c. t c 3M
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ABM ux6imie Standard Plant prv a SECTION 3.6 CONTENTS Sedian Ilus Eaze 3.6.1 Postulated Ploine Failures in Fluid S3 stems inside and Outside of Containment 3.6- 1 3.6.1.1 Design Bases 3.6 1 3.6.1.1.1 Criteria 3.6 1 3.6.1.1.2 Objectises 3.6-2 3,6.1.13 Assumptions 3.6-2 3.6.1.1.4 Approach 3.6-3 3.6.1.2 Deseription 3.6-3 3.6.13 Safety Evaluation 3.6-3 3.6.1.3.1 General 3.6-3 3.6.13.2 Protection Methods 3.6-4 3.6.13.2.1 General 3.64 3.6.13.2.2 Separation 3.6-4 3.6.13.23 Barriers, Shields, and Enclosures 3.65 _ 3.6.13.2.4 Pipe Whip Restraints 3.6-5 l 3.6.13 3 Specific Protection Measures 3.6-5 Od4M J, 6 .1, 4 M Las h M [ M J. R 3.6.2 Determination of Break Locations an Dynamic E!Tects Associated with the Postulated Ruoture of Ploing 3.6-6 3.6.2.1 Criteria Used to Define Break and Crack Location and Configuration 3.6-6 3.6.2.1.1 Definition of High Energy Fluid Systems 3.6-6 3.6.2.1.2 Definition of Moderate Energy Fluid Systems 3b-6 3.6-il Amendment 21
ABWR 2346imst S.tandard Plant uv s SECTION 3.6 CONTENTS (Continued) Section Iltle Eagt 3.6.2.1.3 Postulated Pipe Breaks and Cracks 3.6-6 3.6.2.1.4 Locations of Postulated Pipe Breaks 3.6-7 3.6.2.1.4.1 Piping Meeting Separation Requirements 3.6-7 3.6.2.1.4.2 Piping in Containment Penetration Areas 3.6 7 3.6.2.1.43 ASME Code Section ill Class 1 Piping in Areas Other Than Containment Penetration 3.6 9 3.6.2.1.4.4 For ASME Code Section Ill Class 2 and 3 Piping ' in Areas Other Than Containment Penetration 3.6-9 3.6.2.1.4.5 Non ASME Class Piping 3.6-10 3f.2J.4.6 Separating Structure with High-Energy Lines 3.6-10 3.6.2.1.4.7 Deleted 3.6.2.1.5 Locations of Postulated Pipe Cracks 3.6 10 3.6.2.1.5.1 Piping Meeting Separation Requirements 3.6-10 3.6.2.1.5.2 High Energy Piping 3.6-10 - 3.6.2.1.5.3 Moderate Energy Piping 3.6-10 3.6.4. , T.1 Piping in Containment Penetration Areas 3.6-10 3.6.2.1.5.3.2 Piping in Areas Other Than Containment Penetration 3.6 10 3.6.21.5.4 Moderate Energy Piping in Proximity to High Energy Piping 3.6-11 3.6.2.1.6 Tyves of Breaks and Cracks to be Postulated 3.6-11 3.6.2.1.6.1 Pipe Breaks 3.6-11 3.6.2.1.6.2 Pipe Cracks 3.6-12 3.6-iii Amendment 21
ABWR m.6ixxt Standprd Plant PIV B SECTION 3.6 CONTENTS (Continued) Section Elk Paee 3.6 2.2 Analytic N1etbods to Deline b;owdos.n Forcir.; Functions and Response Sto4.s 3.6 13 3.6.2.2.1 Analytical Methods to Defme Blowdown Foremg Functions 3t -13 3.6.2.2.2 Pipe Whip Dynamic Response Analyses 3.6 14 3.6.23 Dynamic Analysis hiphods to Verify Integrity and Ope;avdity 3.6-15 3.6.23.1 Jet Impingement Analyses and Effects on Safety-Related Components 3.6-15 3.6.23.2 Pipe Whip Effects on Essential Components 3.6-18 3.6.23.2.1 Pipe Displacement Effects on Components in the Same Pipe Run 3.6-18 3.6.23.2.2 Pipe Displacement Effects on Essential Structures, Other Systems, and Components 3.6 18 4.6.23 3 Loading Combinations and Design Criteria for Pipe Whip Restraints 3.6-19 --. 3.6.2.4 (-f&& 5!1'd_/ p Guard Pipe Assembly Design 3.6-22 3.6.2.5 Material to be Supplied for the Operating License Review 3.6-22 3.63 Lenk-Before Break Evaluation Procedures 3.6-22 3.63.1 General Evaluation 3.6-23 3.63.2 Deterministic Evaluation Procedure 3.6-24 3.6.4 COL License information 3.6 27 3.6.4.1 Details of Pipe Break Analysis Results 0.6 Protection Metbods 3.6-27 3.6.4.2 Leak Before-Break Analysis Report 3.6-27.1 3.6.5 Refereoces 3.6-27.1 3.6-iv Amendment 21
MN 23A6100AE Standard Plant ma SECTION 3.6 TABLES Iahle Iltle Eagt 3b 1 Essential Systems, Components, and Equipment for Postulated Pipe Failures Inside Containment 3.6 28 3.6-2 Essential Systems, Components, and Equipment for Pv tulated Pipe Failures Outside Containment 3.6-30 3.6-3 High Energy Piping Inside Containment 3.6-31 3.6-4 High Energy Piping Outside Containment 3.6-32 = 3.6-5 Deleted 3.6-6 Moderate Energy Piping Outside Containment 3.6 33.1 3.6-7 Additional Criteria for Integrated 1.cakage Rate Test 3.6-33.2 ILLUSTRATIONS - Eigurs Iltle Eags 3.6 1 Deleted 3.6-2 Deleted _ 36-3 Jet Characteristics 3.6-36 h 3.6-4 Deleted 3.6-Sa Deleted 3.6-5b Deleted 3.6-6 Typical Pipe Whip Restraint Configuration 3.6-40
- 3. la -] 1mha! &lwa%n ud 60soe force.s 3.6-v Amendment 2t
tGWR us61ma: Standard Plant arv ni 3,6 PROTECTION AGAINST DYNAMIC EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH TliE Subsection 3.6.3 and Appendix 3E describe the POSTULATED RUPTURE OF PIPING implementation of the leak before break (LBB) evaluation procedures as permitted by the broad This Section deals with the structures, sys- scope amendtnent to General Electric Criterion 4 tems, components and equipment in the ABWR (GDC-4) published in Reference 1. It is antici. Standard Plant. pated, as mentioned in Subsection 3.6.4.2, that i a COL applicant will apply to the NRC for Subsections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 describe the approval of LBB qualification of selected piping design bases and protective measures which ensure by subtnitting a technical justification report. that the containment; essential systems, compo- The approved piping, referred to in this SSAR as nents and equipment; and other essential struc- the LBB piping, will be excluded from pipe tures are adequately protected from the conse- breaks, which are required to be postulated by quences associated with a postulated rupture of Subsection 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, for design against bigh energy piping or crack of moderate-energy their potential dynamic effects. However, such piping both inside and outside the containment. piping are included in postulation of pipe cracks for their effects as described in i Before delineating the criteria and assump- S u b s e ctions 3. 6.1. 3.1, 3. 6.1. 2.1. 5 a n d l tions used to evaluate the consequences of pip- 3.6.2.1.6.2. It is emphasized that an LBB i ing failures inside and outside of containment, qualification submittal is not a mandatory it is necessary to define a pipe break event and requirement; a COL applicant has an option to a postulated piping failure: select from none to all technically feasible piping systems for the benefits of the LBB Pipe break event: Any single postulated approach. The decision may be made based upon a piping failure occurring during normal plant cost benefit evaluation (Reference 6). operation and any subsequent piping failure and/or equipment failure that occurs as a direct 3.6.1 Postulated Piping Failures consequence of the postulated piping frilure, in Fluid Systems inside and Outside of Containment Postulated Piping Failure: Longitudinal or circumferential break or rupture postulated in This subsection sets forth the design bases, high-energy fluid system piping or throughwall description, and safety evaluation for determin-leakage crack postulated in moderate energy fluid ing the effects of postulated piping failures in system piping. The terms used in this definition fluid systems both inside and outside the con-are explained in Subsection 3.6.2. tainment, and for including necessary protective measures. Structures, systems, components and equipment that are required to shut down the reactor and 3.6.1.1 Design Bases mitigate ibe consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power, are defined as 3.6.*.1.1 Criteria essential and are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Pipe break event protection conforms to 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4. Environ-The dynamic effects that may result from a mental and Missile Design Bases, The design postulated rupture of high. energy piping include bases for this protection is io compliance with missile generation; pipe wbipping; pipe break NRC Branch Technical Positions (BTP) ASB 34 and reaction forces; jet impingement forces; compart- MEB 3-1 included in Subsections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. ment, subcompartment and cavity pressurizations; respectively, of NUREG 0800 (Standard Review decompression waves within the ruptured pipes and Plan). seven types of loads identified with loss of cool-ant accident (LOCA) on Table 3.9 2. 36-1 Amendment 21
ABWR. 23461oone Standard Plant Rev B MEB 31 describes an acceptable basis for selecting the <lesign locations and orientations of postulated breaks and cracks in fluid systems piping. Standard Review Plan Sections 3.6.1 s,nd 3.6.2 describe accepteble measures that could be taken for protection against the breaks and cracks and for restraint against pipe whip that may result from breaks. The design of the containment structure, com-potent arrangetnent, pipe runs, pipe whip re-straints and compartmentalization are done in 3 *I I Arnendment 21
ABN Standard Plant m woxs ma consonance with the acknowledgment of protection in item (4) below. A SACF is malfunction or against dynamic effects associated with a pipe loss of function of a component of electric. break event. Analytically sized and positioned al or fluid systems. The failure of an ac-pipe whip restraints are engineered to preclude tive component of a fluid system is consi-damage based on the pipe break evaluation. dered to be a loss of component function as a result of mechanical, hydraulic, or elec. 3.6.1.1.2 Objectives trical malfunction but not the loss of com-ponent structural integrity. The direct i Protection against pipe break event dynamic consequences of a SACF are considered to be effects is provided to fulfill the following ob- a part of the single active failure. The ; jectives: single active component failure is assumed ! to occur its addition to the postulated I (1) Assure that tbc reactor can be shut down piping failure and any direct consequences safely and maintained in a safe cold shut- of the piping failure, down condition and that the consequences of l the postulated piping failure are mitigated (4) Where the postulated piping failure is as- j to acceptable limits without offsite power. sumed to occur in one of two or more reduo. 1 dant trains of a dual purpose moderate-en- l (2) Assure that containme it integrity is main- ergy essential system (i.e., one required to , tained. operate during normal plant conditions as well as to shut down the reactor and miti-(3) A;sure that the radiological doses of a pos- gate the consequences of the piping fail-tulated piping failure remain below the ure), single active failure of componcan in limi ts of 0CFRICO. the other train or trains of that system only are not assumed, prosided the system is 3.6.1.1.3 Assumptions designed to Seismic Category I standards, is powered from both offsite and onsite sour-The following assumptions are used to deter- ces, and is constructed, operated, and in-mine the protection requirernents. spected to quality assurance, testing and inservice inspection standards appropriate (1) Pipe break events may occur during corrnal for nuclear safety related syste ns. Re-plant condi' ions (i.e., reactor startup, sidual heat removal system is an example of operation at power, normal hot standby
- or such a system.
reactor cooldown to a cold shutdown condi-tions but excluding test modes). (5) If a pipe break event involves a failure of non Seismic Category I piping, the pipe (2) A pipe break event may occur simultaneously break event must not result in failure of g with a seismic event, however, a scismic essential systems, components and equipment e event does not initiate a pipe break event. to shut down the reactor and mitigate the This applies to Seismic C gory non- consequences of the pipe break event consid. Seismic Category I piping. Meyt $ ering a SACF in accordance with items (3) and (4) above. (3) A single active component failure (SACF) is assumed in systems used to mitigate conse- (6) If loss of offsite power is a direct conse-quences of the postulated piping failure and quence of the pipe break event (e.g., trip to shut down the reactor, except as noted of the turbine-generator producing a power Normal hot standby is a normally attained zero power plant operating state (as opposed to a hot standby initiated by a plant upset condition) where both feedwater and main condenser are available and in use. Amendmeni 3 m
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American Sauenal Standard ANSI ANS48 21958
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For BWRs, the reactor coolant system extends to used to denote a recommendation; and the word and includes the outermost primary containment "may"is used to denote permission, neither a re. M isolation valve in the main steam and feedwater quirement nor a recommendation, piping. terminal end. That section of piping enginating required systems and components. Systems at a structure or component (such as a vessel or and components (structures, equipment, compo. component no=le or structural piping anchor) that nent of a system or total systemirequired for safe acts as an essentially ngid constraint to the piping shutdown following an associated postulated pipe thermal expansion. Typically, ar : hor assumed rupture. for the piping code stress analysts would be a ter. mmal end. The branch connection to the main run safe shutdown The shutdown with (1)the reae. is one of the terminal ends of a branch run, ex. tivity of the reactor is kept to a marpn below cre cept for the special case where the branch pipe ticahty consistent with technical specincations, is classiSed as part of a main run (see deGnition G the core decay heat is being removed at a con. for branch runt In line fittings, such as valves, trolled rate sufDetent to prevent core and reactor not assumed to be anchored in the piping code coolant system thermal design limits from being stress analysis, are not terminal ends. exceeded, @ components nd systems necessary to maintam these conditions operating within their design hmits, and (4) components and systems necessary to keep doses within prescribed limits 4. Postulated Rupture Locations and operating properly. Configurations safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). That earth. 4.1 General Requirements. Postulated pipe rup. quake which is based upon evaluation of the max. tures shall be considered in all plant piping sys-
.)g y mum earthquake potential considering regional tems and the associated potential for damage to .i f.y e
and local geology and seismology and spectne char. actenstics oflocal subsurface material. It is that required systems and components evaluated on the basis of the energy in the system. System pip. ' l ing shall be classified as high energy or moderate ' pM p earthquake tory ground motion which for whichproduces certain structures,the maximum vibra. energy, and postulated ruptures shall be classi6ed g systems, and components are designed to perform as circumferential breaks, longitudinal breaks, their nuclear safety function. leakage cracks, or through wall cracks. Each pos. tulated rupture shall be considered separately as seismic category L The category of nuclear safety. a single postulated initiating event, related structures, systems and components that I are required to perform their nuclear safety func. For each postulated circumferential and lonptu. tion dunng or after an SSE as necessary to ac. dinal break, an evaluation shall be made of the commodate any event involving an SSE. J etTects of pipe whip, jet impingement, compart. ment pressurization, environmental conditions, _f and Gooding, in accordance with Sections 6 throu;;h f setstrucally analyzed ANSI B31.1 piping. ASME Code for Pressure Piping, B31, " Power Piping," 10, respectively. Also,if required to demonstrate ANSifASME B31.11986 (4), piping which is not safe plant shutdown, an internal fluid system load required to be Seismic Category I but is designed evaluation shall be performed of the effects of to accommodate seismic loadings. Guid forces on components within or bounding the fluid system. However, only general guidance for shall, should, or may.The word " thall" is used this evaluation, for components other than piping, to denote a requirement; the word "should" is is provided in this standard. If a postulated break ! results in missile generation, an additional eval. ! Tras definttwn is equivalent to the definmon of"Essenual uation shall be performed of the effect of the mis. dvstems and Com;onen:.s" in NI/ REG-Oe00, " Standard i sile; however, specific guidance for the evaluation Review Plan." Secuens 3 6.1 and 3 6 2 " Required" is uwd is not provided in this standard. For each postu. m p: ace of"essennal" because the werd "essenna!" mav he e simnar but d;fferent meanmgs cu:stde the context of pcstu. lated leakage crack, an evaluation shall be made lated pipe rupture design. of the effects of compartment pressuri:ation, en- g 4 1
ABWR: .
-mre .
Standard Plant nrv n surge which in turn trips the main breaker), 3.6.1.1.4 Approach then a loss _ of offsite power occurs in a mechanistic time sequence with a SACF. To comply with the objectives previously Otherwise, offsite power is assumed available described, the essential systems, components, with a SACF, and equipment are identified. TSc essential systems, components, and equipment, or portions = d 4; ( ) "A whipping pipe is not capable of rupturinel thereof, are identified in Table 3.61 for pip-gi impacted pipes of equal or greater nomino. ing failures postulated inside the containment pipe diameter, but may develop throughwall and in Table 3.6 2 for outside the containment. 6 cracks in equal or larger nominal pipe sizes with thinner wall thickness. 3.6.1.2 Description (8) All available systems, including those ac- The lines identified as high energy per tuated by operator actions, are available to Subsection 3.6.2.1.1 are listed in Table 3.6 3 mitigate the consequences of a postulated for inside the containment and in Table 3.6 4 piping failure. In judging the availability for outside the containment. Moderate energy of systems, account is taken of the postu- piping defined ip Subsection 3.6.2.1.2 is listed lated failure and its disect consequences in Table 3.6 fior outside the contninment. such as unit trip and loss of offsite power, Pressure response analyses are perform and of the assumed SACF and its direct con- subcompartments containing high. energy piping. sequences. The feasibility of carrying out A detailed discussion of the line breaks operator actions are judged on the basis of selected, vent paths, room volumes, analytical ample time and adequate a: cess to equipment methods, pressure results, etc., is provided in being available for the proposed actions. Section 6.2 for primary containment subcompartments. Although a pipe break event outside the containment tuay require a cold shutdown, up to The effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, eight hours in bot standby is allowed in order spraying, and flooding on required function of for plant personnel to assess the situation essential systems, components, and equipment, or and make repairs.g -
} portions thereof, inside and outside the containment are considered.
M - (10) Pipe whi occurs in the plane de6tred by the piping geometryr.d causes movement in the In particular, there are no high enerry lines
. --tirecnon orthe jet reaction. If p Ie- near the control room. As such, there are no MM frained, a whipping pipe with a constant effects upon the habitability of the control room by a piping failure in the control building y energy source forms a plastic hinge and rotates about the nearest rigid restraint, or elsewhere either from pipe whip, jet impinge-anchor, or wall penetration. If unre- ment, or transport of steam. Further discussion on control room habitability systems is provided
', 'g strained, a whipping pipe without a constant energy source (i.e., a break at a closed in Section 6.4. valve with only one side subject to pressure) is eot capable of forming a 3.6.1.3 Fafety Evaluation plastic hinge and rotating provided its movement can be defined and evaluated. 3.6.1.3.1 General (11) The 'luid internal energy associated with An analysis of pipe break events is performed the pipe break ceaction can take into to identify those essential systems, components, account any line restrictions (e.g., flow and equipment that provide protective actions limiter) between the pressure source and required to mitigate, to acceptable limits, the_ break location and absence of energy consequences of the pipe break event, reservoirs, as applicab' Pipe break events invalving high energy fluid w g - o
- mmu . g,Ma gp w,
3nSCf f ( fe 5,b .E l i fpe whip shall be considered capable of causmg circumferential and longitudinal breaks, individually, in impacted pipes of smaller n'omi. nal pipe size, ir.espective of pipe wall thickness, ' and developing through wall cracks in equal or larger nominal pipe sizes with equal or thinner wall thickness. Analytical or experimental \ data, or both, for the expected range ofimpact energies ' may be used to demonstrate the capability to with. stand the impact without rupture; however, loss of function due to reduced flow in the imparted pipe should be considered. /
- 4. .
ABWR ms-htndard Plant prv n systems are evaluated for the effects of pipe therefore, is the basic protective measure whip, jet impingement, flooding, room pressuri. incorporated in the design to protect against zation, and other environmental effects such as the dynamic effects of postulated pipe failures. temperature. Pipe break events involving moderate. energy fluid systems are esaluated for Due to the complexities of several divisions wetting from spray, flooding, and other environ- being adjacent to high energy lines in the dry-mental effects. well and rea tor building steam tunnel, speci-fic break locations are determined in accordance Bv means of the design features such as with Subsection 3.6.2.1.4.3 for possible spatial separation, barriers, and pipe whip restraints, a separation. Care is taken to avoid concentra-discussion of which follows, adequate protection ting essential equipment in the break exclusion is prosided against the effects of pipe break rone allowed per Subsection 3,6.2.1.4.2. If esents for essential iterns to an extent that spatial separation requirements (distance and/or their ability to shut down the plant safely or arrangement to preveni damage) cannot be met mitigate the consequences of the postulated pipe based on the postulation of specific breaks, failure would not be impaired. barriers, enclosures, shields, or restraints are provided. These methods of protection are dis. 3.6.1.32 Protection Methods cussed on Subsection 3 3.6.1.3. 2.3 a n d 3.6.1.3.2.4. 3.6.1.32.1 General For other areas where physica! :paration is The direct effects associated with a particu- not practical, the following higE snergy line-lar postulated break or crack must be mechanis- separation analysis (HELSA) evalu. ion is done tically consistent with the failure. Thus, actu- to cetermine which high- energy lines meet the al pipe dimensions, piping layouts, material pro- spatial separation requirement and which lines perties, and equipment arrangements are consider- require further protection: ed in defining the following specific measure for protection against actual pipe movement and other (1) For the HELSA evaluation, no particular assocated consequences of postulated failures, break points are identified. Cubicles or areas through which the high energy lines (1) Protection against the dynamic effects of pass are examined in total. Breaks are pos-pipe f ailures is provided in the form of tulated at any point in the piping system. t pipe whip restraints, equipment shields, and physical separation of piping, equipment, (2) Essential systems, components, and equipment and instrumentation. at a distance greater than thirty feet from any high energy piping are considered as (2) The precise method chosen depends largely meeting spatial separation requirernew No upon limitationr placed on the designer such damage is assumed to occw due to jet im-as accessibility, maintenance, and provimity p;ngement since tne impingement force be-to other pipes. comes negligible beyond 30 feet. Likewise, a 30 't evaluation zone is established for 3.6.1.322 Separation pipt areaks to assure protection against potential damage from a whipping pipe. As-The plant arrangement provides physical surance that 30 feet represents the maximum separatioe to the extent practicable to maintain free length is made in th( piping layout, the independence of redundant essential systems (including their auxiliaries) in order to prevent (3) Essential systems, components, and equipment the loss .of safety function due to any single at a distance less than 30 feet from any postulated event. Redundant trains (e.g., A and high-energy pipin* are evaluated to see if B trains) and divisions are located in separate damage coult ut to more than one compartments to the extent possible. Physical essential division, preventing safe shutdown separation between redundant essential systems of the plant. If damage occurred to only with their related auxiliary supporting features, one division of a redundant system, the Amendment 7 164
ABM m 6xoxe Standard Plant nv n requirement for redundant separation is protected against the effects of these m e t. Other redundant divisions are postulated pipe failures will be provided by the available for safe shutdown of the plant and applicant referencing the ABWR design (see no further evaluation is performed. Subsection 3.6.4.1, item 4 and 6). (4) If damage could occur to more than one Barriers or shields that are identified as division of a redundant essential system necessary by the HELSA evaluation (i.e., based within 30 ft of any high energy piping, on no specific break locations), are designed other protection in the form of barriers, for worst. case loads. The closest high.cnergy shields, or enclosures is used. These pipe location and resultant loads are used to methoA of protection are discussed in Sub- size the barriers. section 3.6.1.3.2.3. Pipe whip restra;nts as discussed in Subsection 3.6.1.3.2.4 ar e 3.6.1.3.2.4 Pipe Whip Restraints used if protection from whipping pipe is not possible by barriers and shields. Pipe whip restraints are used where pipe break protection req'litements could not be 3.6.1J.23 Barriers, Shields. ed Enclosures satisfied using spatial sep. ration, barriers, shields, or enclosures alone. Restraints are Protection requirements are met through the located based on the specific bret- 'ecations protection afforded by the walls, floors, determined in accordance with Subsections columns, abutments, and foundations in many 3.6. 2.1. 4. 3 a a d 3. 6. 2.1.4.4. Af ter the cases. Where adequate protection is not already restraints are located, the piping and essential present due to spatial separation or existing systems are evaluated for jet impingement and plant features, additional barriers, deflectors, pipe whip. For those car es where jet or shields are identified as necessary to meet impingement damage could still occur, barriers, the functional protection requirernente. shields, or enclosures are utilized. Barriers r shields that are identified as The design criteria for restraints is given in necessity by the use of specitic break locations Subsection 3.6.2.3.3. in the drywell are designed for the specific loads associated with the particular break 3.6.133 Specific Protection Measures location. (1) Nonessential systems and system components The steam tunnel is made of reinforced are not required for the safe shutdown of concrete 2m ' hick. A steam tunnel subcom. ttment the reactor, nor are they required for the analysis was performed for the postulated rupture limitation of the offsite release in the of a mainstean line and for a feedwater line (see event of a pipe rupture. However, while Subsection 6.2.3.3.1). The peak pressure from a none of this equipment is needed during or mainsteam line break was focad to be 11 psig following a pipe break event, pipe whip The peak pressure from a feedwater line break was protection is considered where a resulting found to be 3.9 psig. The steam tunnel is failure of a nonessential system or designed for the effects of an SSE coincident coraponent could initiate or escalate the with bigh energy line break inside the steam pipe break event in an essential system or tunnel. Under this conservative load component, or in another nonessential system combination, no failure in any portion of the whose failure could affect an essent;ai steata tunnel was found to occur; therefore, a system, high energy line break inside the steam tunnel will not effect control room habitability. (2) For high energy piping systems penetrating through the containment, isolation valves The MSIVs and the feedwater isolation and. check are located as close to the containment as valves located inside the tunnel shall be possible. designed for the effects of a line break. The details of how the MSIV and feedwater isolation (3) The pressure, water level, and flow sensor and check valves functional capabilities are instrumentation for those essential systems. Amendment 17 36-5
ABWR meme Standard Plant REv n which are required to function following a pipe rupture, are protected. (4) High ecergy fluid system pipe whip restraints and protective measures are designed so that a postulated break in one pipe could not, in turn, lead to a rupture of other nearby pipes or coreponents if the secondary rupture could r esult in consequences that would be considered un ccertable for the initial postulated break. (5) For any postulated pipe rupt e,the structural in egrity of the containment structure is maintained. In addition, for those postulated ruptures classified as a loss of reactor coolant, the design leak tightness of the containment fission product barrier is maintained. (6) Safety / relief valves (SRV) and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system steam-line are located and restrained so that a pipe failure would not prevent depressuri-zation. Amcodment 2t 36-51
ABWR u,ms ps n Standard Plant (7) Separation is provided to preserve the those systems or portions of systems that, independence of the low. pressure flooder during normal plant conditions (as defined in (LPFL) systems. Subsection 3.6.1.1.3(1)),are either in operation or are maintained pressurized under conditions (8) Protection for the FMCRD scram insert lines where either or both of the 'ollowing are met: is not required sicce the motor operation of the FMCRD can adequately insert the control (1) max,imum operating temperature exceeds rods even with a complete loss of insert 200 F, or lines (See Subsection 3.6.2.1.6.1). (2) manmum operating pressure exceeds 275 psig. (9) The escape of stearn, water, combustible or corrosive fluids, gases, and heat in the 3.6.2.1.2 Definition of Moderate Energy Fluid esent of a pipe rupture do not preclude: Systems. (a) Accessibility to any areas required to Moderate energy fluid systems are defined to cope with the postulated pipe rupture; be those systems or portions of systems that, during normal plant conditions (as defined in (b) Habitability of the control roc:n; or Subsection 3.6.1.1.3 ( 1)), are either in i operation or are maintained pressurized (above c) T h e a biIit y of esseatia1 atmospheric pressure) under conditic.ss where gJ yp instrumentatica, electric power supplies, components, and controls to both of the following are met: perform their safety related function. (1) maximum operating temperature is 200 F M or less, and a 3,6 2 Determination of Break Locations and Dynamic Effects (2) maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or Associated with the Postulated less. Repture of Pipina Piping systems are cl: ssifie d a s s Information concerning break and crack moderate energy systems when they operate as location criteria and methods of analysis for high energy piping for only short operational dynamic effects is presented in this Subsection, periods in performing their system function but, The location criteria and methods of analysis are for the major operational period, qualify as _ c needed to evaluate the dyna nic effects associated moderate-energy fluid systems. An operational with postulated breaks and cracks in high and period is considered short if the total fraction moderate energy fluid system piping inside and of time that the system operates within the outside of primary containment. This information pressure temperature conditions specified for provides the oasis for the requirements for the high energy fluid systems is less than two protection of essential structures, systems, and percent of the total time that the system components defined in introduction of Section operates as a moderate-energy fluid system. 3.6. 3.6.2.13 Postulated Pipe Breaks and Cracks 3.6 2,1 Criteria Used to Define Bnak and Crack Location and Configuration A postulated pipe break is defined as a sudden gross failure of the pressure boundary the following subsections establish the either in the form of a complete circumferential criteria for the location and configuration of severance (guillotine break) or a sudden postulated breaks and cracks. longitudinal split without pipe severance, and is postulated for high energy fluid systems 3.6.2.1.1 Definition of High-Energy Fluid only. For moderate energy fluid system, pipe Systems failures are limited to postulation of cracks in piping and branch runs. These cracks affect the High energy fluid systems are defined to be surrounding environmental conditions only and do 3M Amendment 7
SM k D _ _ _ .- 3.Y y-we%.-
=_ : : na
/ "'
BREAX LOCATION AND PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT j
> 1 The procedure of determinating a break location and sizing a pipe whip restraint is as follows:
1 l (1) Use break criteria in SRP 3.6.2 June 1987, Rev. 2 to-find the break ; location. l (2) Use ANS 58.2-h , dix B and break type (longitudinal or circumferential sr limited separation) to get the thrust load of the broken pipe. (3) Use GE pipe whip restraint (PWR) data (REDEP file) to select applicable rod size, quantity, bend, straight length, force and deflection, clearance, elastic and plastic displacements. Use other PWR design and characterics as required for the calculation. (?) Use pipe stress / strain curve, pipe mechanical properties and pipe dimensions for piping model. (5) Use PDA computation program and a joystick model to confirm the adequate selection of PWR in capacity, dispacement, time at peak load and lapsed time toward static state. (6) Perform one dimensional wave propagation calculation to find the r time history thrust load of each pipe segment (li.nited to 5 segment e._) in one model) beyond the first one. h) Model a piping, apply thrust and retrain the pipe movement by using PWR as selected in step 3. Use ANSYS or equivalent program with input preparation (step 7).
-(8) l (9) Check displacements at broken end and PWR; stresses in holy pipe against ASME Code, Section III, Equation 9 (NB3650) with 2.25 Sm limitaiton.
(10) Check operability of MSIV using limitation of bonnet flange bolt load and limits of acceleration. l l l r I t r
~ -
ABM asasioont Rrv A Standard Plant not result in whipping of the cracked pipe, are generally not identified with particula-High-energy fluid systems are also postulated to break points. Breaks are postulated at all have cracks for conservative environmental possible points in uch high energy piping conditions in a confined area where high and systems. However, in some systems break points moderate energy fluid systems are located. are particularly specified per the following subsections if special protection devices st.cb The following high energy piping systems (or as barriers or restraints are provided. portions of systems) are considered as potential candidates for a postulated pipe break during 3.6.2.1.4.2 Piping in Conminment Penetntion normal plant conditions and are analyzed for Areas potential damage resulting from dynamic effects: No pipe breaks or cracks are postulated in (1) All piping which is part of the reactor those portions of piping from containment wall coolant pressure boundary and subject to to and including the inboard or outboard reactor pressure continuously during station isolation valves which meet the following operation; requirement in :.ddition to the requirement of the ASME Code, Section IIL Subarticle NE.1120: (2) All piping which is beyond the second isolation valve but subjec: to reactor (1) The following design stress and fatigue pressure continuously during station limits are not exceeded: operation; and For ASME Code. Section ITL Class 1 Pirine (3) All other piping systems or portions of piping systems considered high-energy (a) The maximum stress range between any two systems. loads sets (including the zero load set) does not exceed 2.4 S , and is Portions of piping systems that are isolated calculated
- by Eq. (10) in NBS53, ASME from the source of the high energy fluid during Code, Section III.
normal plant conditions are exempted from consideration of postulated pipe breaks. This if the calculated maxin.um stress range includes portions of piping systems beyond a of Eq. (10) exceeds 2.4 S the stress normally closed valve. Pump and valve bodies are ranges calculated by both"h,q. (12) and also exempted from consideration of pipe break Eq. (13) in Paragraph NB 3653 rnect the because of their greater wall thickness, limit of 2.4 S,. 3.6.2.1.4 Locations of Postuistad Pipe Breaks (b) The cumulative usage factor is less than 0.1 Postulated pipe break locations are selected as fellows: (c) The maximum stress, u calcuided by Eq. (9) in NB-3652 under the loadings 3.6.2.1.4.1 Piping Meeting Separation resulting from a postulated piping Requirements failure beyond these portions cf piping does not exceed the lesser of 2.25 S Based on the HELSA evaluation described in and 1,8 S except that following'S Subsection 3.6.1.3.2.2, the high-energy lines failure outlide containment, the pipe which meet the spatial separation requirernents between the outboard isolation valve and I For those loads and conditicni in which l Level A and Level B stress limits have been specified in the Design Specification. 367 Amendment t i
tBWR usumat Standard Plant rav n the first restraint may be permitted analyses, or tests, are performed to bigber stresses provided a plastic hinge demonstrate compliance with the limits of is not formed and operability of the item (1). valves with such stresses is assured in accordance with the requirement (3) The number of circumferential and longi. specified in Section 3.9.3. Primary tudinal piping welds and branch connections l loads include those which are deflection are minimized. Where penetration sleeves limited by whip restraints. are used, the enclosed portion of fluid system piping is seamless construction and For ASME Code.Section !IL Class 2 Piring without circumferential welds unless specific access provisions are made to (d) The maximum stress as calculated by the permit inservice volumetric examination of sum of Eqs. (9) and (10) in Paragraph longitudinal and circumferential welds. NC-3652, ASM E Code, Section III, considering those loads and conditions (4) The length of these portions of piping are thereof for which level A and level B reduced to the minimum length practical. stress limits are specified in the system's Design Specification (i.e., (5) *be design of pipe anchors or restraints sustained loads, occasional loads, and J., connections to cont ainme nt thermal expansion) including an OBE .octrations and pipe whip restraints) do event does not exceed 0.8(1.8 S + not require welding directly to tbe outer Sg). The Shand S, are allowa le surf ace of the piping (e.g., flued integ-stresses at maximum (h'ot) temperature rally forged pipe fittings may be used) and allowable stress range for thermal except where such welds are 100 percent expansion, respectively, as defined in volumetrically examinable in service and a Article NC 3600 of tbc ASME Code, detailed stress analysis is performed to Section III. demonstrate compliance with the limits of item (1). (e) The maximum stress, as calculated by Eq. (9) in NC 3653 unde- the loadings (6) Sleeves provided for those portions of
- r. ulting from a postulated piping piping in the containment penetration areas fai.ure of fluid system piping beyond are constructed in accordance with the rules these portions of piping does not exceed of Class MC, Subsection NE of the ASME Code, the lesser of 2.25 S and 1.8 5 . Section Ill, where the sleeve is part of the I containment boundary, in addition, the Primary loads include those which are entire sleeve assembly is designed to meet deflection limited by whip restraints. The the following requirements and tests:
exceptions permitted in (c) above may also be applied provided that when the piping (a) The design pressure and temperature are between the outboard isolation valve and the not less than the maximum operating restraint is constructed in accordance with pressure and temperature of the the Power Piping Code ANSI B31.1, the piping enclosed pipe under normal plant is either of seamless construction with full conditions. radiography of all circumferential welds, or all longitudinal and circumferential welds (b) The Level C stress limits in NE-3220 are fully radiographed. ASME Code, Section !!!, are not exceeded under the loadings associated (2) Welded attachments, for pipe supports or with containment design pressure and other purposes, to these portions of piping temperature in combination with the are avoided except where detailed stress safe shutdows earthquake. AmCodmtfit 21 1
__ __ _- _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ ____ __ .. m._. _ _ _ _ ABR zwi=1 arv s . Standard Plant _ (c) The assemblies are subjected to_ a single. As a result of piping re analysis due to pressure test at a pressure not less differences between the design configuration than its design pressure. and the as built configuration, the highest ; stress or cumulative usage factor locations. ' (d) The assemblies do not prevent the access may be shifted:- however, the-initially required to conduct the inservice determined intermediate break locations need examination specified in item (7). no_t be changed unless one of the following conditions exists: (7) A 100cc volumetric inservice examination of all pipe welds would be conducted during (i) The dynamic effects from the new each inspection interval as defined in (as built) intermediate break locations :i IWA 2400, ASME Code, Section XI. are not mitigated by the original pipe l whip restraints and jet shields. l3.6.2.1.4.3 ASME Code Section 111 Class 1 (ii) A change is required in pipe parameters P1 ping In Areas Other "Ilian Containment Penetration such as major differt nces in pipe size, wall thickness, and routing. With the exception of those portions of piping identificd in Subsection 3.6.2.1.4.2, breaks in 3.6.2.1,4.4 ASME Code Section til Class 2 and l ASME Code, Section III, Class 1 piping ate 3 Piping in Artas Other Than Containment postulated at the following locations in each Penetration piping and branch run: With the exceptions of those portions of (a) At terminal ends' piping identified in Subsection 3.6.2.1.4.2, breaks in ASME Codes, Section III, Class 2 and 3 (b) At intermediate locations where the piping are postulated at the following locations maximum stress range b W % in those portions of each piping and branch run:
', 34 4 S y f (1)( " as cMeulated by Eq. (10) M" C, umE (a) A t terminal ends (see Subsection C i:, C L,. 4,W4 g,,q. f g , 3.6.2.1.4.3, Paragraph (a))
7 If the calculated maximum stress range) (b) At intermediate locations selected by one of of Eq.(10) exceeds the stress range the following criteria: l calculated by both Eq.(12) and Eq.(13) L- in Paragraph NB 3653 should meet the (i) At each pipe fitting (e.g., elbow, tee, g limit of 4.4 Sm. s cross, flange, and nonstandard i fitting), welded attachment, and (c) At intermediate locations where the valve. Where the piping contains no cumulative usage factor exceeds 0.1. fittings, welded attachments, or . valves, at one location r.t each extreme
.of the piping run adiacent to the Extremittes of piping runs that connect to structures, components _(e.g., vessels, pumps, protective structure.
valves), or pipe anchors that act as rigid constraints to piping motion and thermal (ii) At each location where stresses calcu. l expansion. - A branch connection to a main lated (see Subsection 3.6.2.1.4.2,: piping run is a terminal end of the branch Paragraph (1)(d)) by the sum of Eqs. run, except where the b_ ranch run is classified (9) and (10) in NC/ND-36$3, ASME Code, as part of a main _ run in the stress analysis Section ill, exceed 0.8 times the sum and is shown to have a significant effect ois of the stress limits given in NC/ND. the main run behavior. In piping runs whic., 3653. are maintained pressuri:ed during normal plant conditions for only a portion of the run As a result of piping te. analysis due (i.e.,- up to the first normally closed valve) to differences between the design j a terminal end of such runs is the piping configuration and the as-built connection to this closed valve. configuration, the highest stress m Amendment 2t l
MN MA61TAE m,g Stand.ard Plant locations may be shifted; however, the initially determined intermediate break I I 349I Amendment 21
ABWR wm Standard Plant m4 locations may be used unless a redesign identified in Subsection 3.6.2.1.4.2. leakage of the piping resulting in a change in cracks are postulated for the most sesere the pipe parameters (diameter, wall environmental effects as follows: thickness, routing) is required, or the dsnamic effects from the new (as built) (1) For A5ME Code, Section III Class 1 piping, intermediate break location are not at axial locations where the calculated mitigated by the original pipe whip stress range (see Subsection 3.6.2.1.4.2. restraints and jet sbicids. Paragraph (1)(a)) by Eq (10) and either Eq (12) or Eq. (13) in NB 3653 exceeds 12 3.6.2.1.4.5 Non ASME Class Piping Sm-Br.:aks in seismically analy?ed non ASME Class (2) For MME Code, Section III Class 2 and 3 or (not ASME Class 1,2 or 3) piping are postulated non ASME class piping, at axial locations according to the same requirements for ASME Class where the calculated stress (see Subsection 2 and 3 piping above. Separation and interaction 3.6.2.1.4.4, Paragraph (b)(ii)) by the sum requirements between Seismically analyzed and of Eqs. (9) and (10) in NC/ND 3653 exceeds non seismically analyzed piping are met as 0.4 times the sum of the stress limits gisen described in Subsection 3.7 3.13. in NC/ND-3653 3.6.2.1.4.6 Separating Structure %1th High- (3) Non.ASME class piping which has not been Enerp Lines evaluated to obtain stress information have leakage cracks postuhted at axial locations If a structure separates a high energy line that produce the most severe environmental from an essential component, the separating effects. structure is designed to withstand the consequen-ces of the pipe break in the high energy line at 3.6.2.1.5.3 Moderate. Energy Piping locations that the aforementioned criteria require to be postulated. However, as noted in 3.6.2.1.5.3.1 Piping in Containment Penetration Subsection 3.6.1.3.2 3, some structures ' bat are Areas identified as necessary by the HELSA evaluation (i.e., based on no specific break locations), are Leakage cracks are not postulated in those designed for worst-case loads. portions of piping from containment wall to and inc'uding the inboard or outboard isolation 3.6.2.1.5 Locations of Postulated Pipe Cracks valver provided they meu the requirements et the ASME tode, Section III, NE-1120, and the Postulated pipe crack locations are selected stresses calculated (See Sut'section 3.6.2.1 4 4, as follows: Paragraph (b)(ii)) by the sum of Eqs. (9) and (10) in ASME Code, Section Ill, NC-3653 do not 3.6.2.1.5.1 Piping Meeting Separ3 tion exceed 0.4 times the sum of the stress limits Requirements given in NC 3653. Based on the HELSA evaluation described in 3.6.2.15.3.2 Piping in Areas Otnerihan Subsection 3.6.1.3.2.2, the high- or moderate- Containment Penetration energy lines which meet the separation require-ments are not identified with particular crack (1) Leakage cracks are postulated in piping locations. Cracks are postulated at all possible located adjacent to essential structures. points that are necessary to demonstrate adequacy systems or components, except: of separation or other means of protections pro-vided for essential structures, systems and (a) Where exe mpte d by S ub s e ctio n s components. 3.6. 2.1.5.3.1 a n d 3.6. 2.1.5. 4, 3.6.2.1.5.2 High. Energy Piping (b) For ASME Code, Section III, Class 1 pip. ing the stress range calculated - u With the exception of those portions of nipicg Sh" r 3 4 '1 4' Paracranh . L Amend nent t 3SP
._ . . _ _ _ _ . . ._ _ _ _ __ __ __ ~ .
tdM uAsixAt Standard Plant prv A 4 H by Fq. (10) M % 4 M r C;- Table 3.21). Additionally, the 11/4 inch p in NB 3653 is less than 1.2 S,. hydraulic control unit fast scram lines do not reoa"a special protection measure (c) For ASME Code, Section 111, Class 2 or 3 and bec, ,e of tbc following reasons: non ASME class piping, the stresses calcu-lated (see Subsection 3.6.2.1.4.4, Paragraph (a) Tbc piping to the control rod drives (b)(ii)) 5 .he sum of Eqs. (9) and (10) in from the hydrauEc control units (HCUs) NC/ND 3653 are less thaa 0 4 times the sum are located in the containment under of the stress limits given in NC/ND 3653. reactor vessel, and in the reactor building away from other safety related (2) Leakage cracks, unless the piping system is equipment; therefore should a line f ail, exempt 4 by item (1) above, are postulated it would not affect any safety re!sted at axial and circumferential locations that equipment but only impact on other HCU resul; in the most severe environmental lin e s. As discussed in Subsection 3.6. consequences. 1.1.3, Paragraph (7), a whipping pipe will only rupture an impacted pipe of (3) Leakage cracks are postulated in fluid smaller nor- al pipe size or cause a system piping designed to nonscismic through wah rack in the same cominal standards as necessary to meet tbc pipe size but with thinner wall environmental protection requirements of thickness. Subsection 3.6.1.1.3. (b) The total amount of energy contained in 3.62.1.5.4 Moderste Energy Piping in Prodmity the 11/4* piping between normally to High Energy Pipisg closed scram in.crt valve on tbc HCU module and the ball-check valve in the Moderate-energy fluid system piping or control rod housing is small. In the portions thereof that are located within a event of a rupture of this line, the compartment of confined area involving ball-check valve will close to present considerations for a postu;ated break in rentor vessel flow out of the break, high. energy fluid system piping are acceptable without pestulation of'.tnoughwall leakage cracks (c) Even if a number of the HCU lines rup-except where a postulated leakage crack in the tured, the control ro l insertion func. moderate energy finid system piping results in tion would not be in. paired since the more severe envirc omer:al conditions than the electrical motor of the fine motion con-break in the proxienate high-energy fluid system trol drive would drive in the control piping, in whir b case the provisions of rods. Subsection 3.6.2.1.5.3 are applied. (2) Longitudinal breaks are postulated only in 3 6.2.1.6 Types ofIltsaks and Cracks to be piping having a nominal d.iameter equal to or Postulated greater than four inches. 3.6.2.1.6.1 Pipe Bevaks (3) Circumferential breaks are only assumed at all terminal ends. The following types of breaks are postula e in high energy fluid system piping et (4) At each of the intermediate postulated break l l locations identified by the criteria specified in locations identified to exceed the stress Subsection 3.6.2.1.4 and usage factor limits of the criteria in Subsections 3.6.2.1.4.3 a n d 3.6.2.1 4 4, (1) No breaks are postulated in piping having a considerations is given to the occurrence of nominal diameter less than or equal to one either a longitudinal or circumferential inch Instrument lines one inch and less break. Examination of the state of stress nominal pipe or tubing size meet the in the vicinity of the postulated break provision of regulatory Guide 1.11 (See location is used to identify the most 3W l Amaomeu i
ABWR mirm Sinndard Plant av n probably type of break, if the maximum in ti.e center of the piping at two stress range in the longitudinal direction diametrically opposed points (but not is greater than 1.5 times tbc maximum stress concurrently) located so that the reaction range in the circumfetential direction, only force is perpendicular to the plane of the the circumferential break is postulated. piping configuration and produces out of-Con ~ersely, if the maximum st en rang; in plane bending. Alternatively, a single
> be circumferential direction is greater split is assumed at the section of highest than 1.5 times tbc stress range in the tensile stress as (.termined by detailed tongitudivial direction, only the longitudi- stress analysis (e.g., finite element nal break is postulated. if no significant analysis).
difference between the circumferential and longkudinal stresses is determined, then (9) The dynamic force of the fluid jet discharge both types of breaks are considered. is based on a circular or elliptical (2D a 1/2D) break area equal to the effective (5) Where breaks are postulated to occur at each cross sectional flow area of the pipe at the intermediate pipe fitting, weld attachment, break location and on a calculated fluid or valve without the benefit of stress pressure modified by an analytically or calculations, only circumferential breaks experituentally determined thrust coefficient are postulated. as determined for a circumferential break at the same location. Line restrictions, flow (6) For both longitudinal and circumferential limiters, posithe pump coutrolled flow, and breaks, af ter assessing tbc contribution of the absence of energy reservoirs may be upstreat piping flexibility, pipe whip is taken into account as applicable in the assumed to occur in the plane defined by the reduction of jet discharge. piping geometry and configuration for circumferential breaks and out of plane for 34.2.14.2 Pipe Cracks longitudinal bre sks and to cause piping mosement in the direction of the jet reac- The following criteria are used to postulate tions. Structutal members, piping throughwallleakage cracks in high or moderate. restraints, or piping etiffness as demon- energy fluid systems or portions of systems. strated by inelastic limit analysis are considered in determining the piping (1) Cracks are postulated in moderate energy movement limit (alternatively, circumfer- fluid system piping and branch runs ential breaks an assumed to result in pipe exceeding a nominal pipe size ok one inch. sescrance and separation amounting to at least a one diameter lateral displacement of (2) At axial I 4 itions determined per Subsection the ruptured piping sections). 3.6.2.1.5, t h e p 9st ulat e d e r a c k s a t e orla t ted circumferentially to result in the (7) For a circumlerential break, the dynamic mm severe environmental consequences. force of the jet discharged at the lesk location is based upon the effecove (3) Crack openings are assumed a. a circular cross sectional flow area of the pipe and on orifice of stea equal a that of a rectangle a calculated fluid pressure as modified by having dimensions one half pipe diameter in an analytically or experimentally determined length and coe half pipe wall thickness in thrust coe f fiele n t. Limited pipe width. displacement at the break location, line restrictions, Cow limiters, positive G The flow from the crack opening is assumed pump controlle ? uow, and the absence of to result in an environment that ~ cts all energy reserve. . are used, as applicable, u:. protected components within the compart, in the Nductiot a the jet discharge. raent, with consequent flooding in the com-partment and communicating compartments. (S) Long'.tudinal bresks in the form of axial based on a conservatively estimated time split witbout pipe severtrce are postulated period to effect corrective actions. Arundroent 7 3W l
ABWR msmo Slandard Plant REV H 3.6JJ Analytic Stethods to Define Illowdown turbine. A pipe break causes the steam flow to ' Forting runctions and Response hfodels. reverse its direction and to flow from the turtine to the break location. The pipe segment 3.62J.1 Analytic htethods to Define filowdown force time histories are determined by forcing functions, calculating the momentum cpnge in the pipe segments of a closed systemDThe broken pipe ,i The rupture of a pressurized pipe ;auses the segment force time history is calculateo in flow characteristics of the system to change accordance with AgdgNSI ANS.582?/ffg creating reaction forces which can dynamically escite 'the piping system. The reaction forces
~
A Md Mi Q07 are a function of time and space and depend upon s . fluid state within the pipe prior to rupture, s4 Md N l
- break flow area, frictional losses, plant system characteristics, piping system, and other g -
./
g factors. The melbods used to calculate the reaction forces for various piping systems are presented in the following subsections. $ h ~~ The criteria that are used for calculation of ' fluid blowdown forcing functions include: (1) Circumferential breaks are assumed to result in pipe severance and separation amounting to at le ast a one diameter lateral - displacement of the ruptured piping sections unless physically limited by piping restraints, structural members, or piping stiff ness as may be demonstrated by l inelastic limit analysis (e.g., a plastic hinge in the piping is not developed under loading). (2) The dynarnic force of the jet discharge at the break location is based on the , cross. sectional flow area of the pipe and on a calculated fluid pressure as modified by analytically. or experimentally determined thrust coefficient. Line restrictions, flow limiters, positive pump. controlled flow, and the absence of energy reservoits are taken into accounts, as applicable, in the reduction of jet discharge. (3) All breaks are assumed to attain full size within one millise cond af te r bre a k initiation. i The fcrcing functions due to th. s_tula t e d m g I pipe breaks near the reactordt branch connection are calculated by the solution of one dimensional, compressible unsteady sica,m flow l ' I in the gas system. The numerical analysis is performed by the method of characteristics. The flow starts with steady flow from the RPV to the
) 6 13 Amendmeni 2
1 ABM DA617 AE Standard Plant prv n (5) Piping within the broken loop is no longer considered part of the RCPB. Plastic deformation in the pipe is considered as a potential energy absorber. Limits of strain are imposed which are similar to strain ;
, levels allowed in restraint plastic l 3 members Piping systems are designed so that plastic instability does not occur in the pipe at the design dynamic and static loads i;nless damage studies are performed which show the consequences do not result in direct damage to any essential system or component. -
(6) Components such as vessel safe ends and val-3.6.2.2.2 Pipe Whip Dpamic Response ses which are attached to the broken piping Analyses system, do not serve a safety telated func-tion, or failure of which would not further The prediction of time dependent and steady. escalate the consequences of the accident thrust teaction loads caused by blowdown of sub- are not designed to meet ASME Code-imposed cooled, saturated, and two phase fluid from rup- limits for essential components under fault-tured pipe is used in design and evaluation of ed loading. However, if these components dynamic effects of pipe breaks. A discussion of are require 1 for safe shutdown or serve to the analytical methods employed to compute these - protect the structural integrity of an es. l blowdown loads is given in Subsection 3.6.2.2.1. sential component, limits to meet the Code Following is a discussion of analytical methods requirements for faulted conditions and li-used to account for this loading. mits to ensure required operability will be met. The criteria used for performing the pipe whip dynamic response analyses include: (7) The piping stresses in the containment penetration areas due to loads resulting (1) A pipe whip analysis is performed for each from a postulated piping failure can not exceed the limits specified i Subse ion INg postnlated pipe break. However, a given analysis can be used for more than one post-ulated break location if the blowdown fore-3.6.2.1.4.2(1)(c). .g I Ig M % gt, ing function, piping and restraint system An analysis for pipewhip ter.raint selection > geometry, and piping and restraint system PDA computer
'- ' '^; _ N3 properties are conservative for other break program /1 ^.3 program;"
.m c.'._f
^ 7'; 9 described in locations. Appendix 3D, which predicts the response of a pipe subjected to the thrust force occurring (2) The analysis includes the dynamic response after a pipe break. The program treats the of the pipe in question and the pipe whip situation in terms of generic pipe break con-restraints which transmit loading to the figuration which involves a straight, uniform support structures. pipe fixed at one end and subjected to a time-dependent thrust force at the other end. A l
(3) The analytical model adequately represents typical restraint used to reduce the resulting l the mass / inertia and stiffness properties of deformation is also included at a location l between the two ends, Nonlinear and the system, ' time independent stress strain relationships are (4) Pipe whipping is assumed to occur in the used to model the pipe and the restraint. Using plane defined by the piping geometry and a plastic hinge concept, bending of the pipe is configuration and to cause pipe movement in assumed to occur on1y at the direction of the jet reaction.
% 14 Amendment 21
{ .- - ,- , . -- . - - - , ,
ABWR msat Standard Plant prv o the sted end and at the location supported by the restraint. Effects of pipe shear deflection are consider-ed negligible. The pipe bending moment deflec-tion (or rotation) relation used for these loca. tions is obteined from a static nonlineat 3.6.2.3 Dynamic Analysis Methods to Verify cantilever beam analysis. Using th s moment to- Integrity and Operability tation relation, nonlinear equations of motion of the pipe are formulated using energy considera-tions and the equations are numerically integrat. 3.6.2.3.1 Jet Impingement Analyses and ed in small time steps to yield time history of Effects on Safety Related Components the pipe motion. The methods used to evaluate the jet effects The piping stresses in the containment resulting from the postulated breaks of high-penetration areas are calculated by the ANSYS energy pipiag are described in Appendices C and computer program, a program as described in D of ANSI /ANS 58.2 and presented in this Appendix 3D. The program is used to perforin the subsection. non linear analysis of a piping system for time varying displacements and forces due to The criteria used for evaluating the effects postulated pipe breaks. of fluid j-ts on essectial structures, systems, and components are as follows: (1) Essential structures, systems, and compo-nents are not impaired so as to preclude es-sential functions. For any given postulat-ed pipe break and consequent jet, those es-sential structures, systems, and components need to safely shut down the plant are identified. (2) Essential structures, systems, and compo. nents which are not necessary to safely shut down the plant for a given break are not protected from the consequences of the fluid l jet. (3) Safe shutdown of the plant due to postulated pipe ruptures within the RCPB is not aggravated by sequential f ailures of safety related piping and the required emergency cooling system performance o maintained. (4) Offsite dose limits specified in 10CFR100 are complied with. (5) Postulated breaks resulting in jet impingement loads are assumed to occur in high energy lines at full (102?c) power l operation of the plant. (6) Throughwall leakage cracks are postulated in moderate energy lines and are assumed to 3615 Amendment 21
l i ABWR umxu SIAndJlrd Plant um a result in wetting and spraying of essential (7) The distance of jet travel is divided into structutes, systems and components. two or three regions. Region 1 (Figure 3.6 3) extends from the break to the (7) Reflected jets are considered only when asymptotic area. Within this region the there is an obvious reflecting surface (such discharging fluid flashes and undergoes as a fl.1 plate) which directs the jet onto expansion from the break area pressure to an essential equipment. Only the first the atmospheric pressure. In Region 2 the reflection is considered in evaluating jet expands further. For partial separa-potential targets. tion circumferential breaks, the area increases as the jet expands. In Region 3, O g,, (8) Potential targets in the jet path are con- jet expands at a half angle of 10 sidered at the calculate.d final position of (Figures 3.6 3a and c.) the broken end of the ruptured pipe. This selection of potential targets is considered (8) Tbc analytical model for estimating the adequate due to the large number of breaks aspnptotic jet area for subcooled water and analyzed and the protection provided from saturated water assumes a constant jet the effects of these postulated breaks, area. For fluids discharging from a break which are below the saturation temperature The analpical methods used to determine which at the corresponding room pressure or have targets will be impinged upon by a fluid jet acd a pressure at the break area equal to the the corresponding jet impingement load include: room pressure, tbc free expansion does not occur. (1) The direction of the fluid jet is based on abe arrested position of the pipe during (9) The distance downstream from the break steady state blowdown. where the asymptotic area is reached (Region 2) is calculted for circum-(2) The impinging jet proceeds along a straight ferential and longitudinal breaks. path. (3) The total impingement force acting on any cross sectional area of the jet is time and distance inviriant with a total magnitude equivalent to the steady state fluid blowdown force given in Subsection 3.6.2.2.1 and with jet characteristics shown in Figure (10) Both longitudinal and fully separated 3.63. circumferential breaks are treated similarly. Tbc value of fL/D used in the (4) The jet impingement force is uniformly blowdown calculation is used for jet distributed across the cross sectional area impingement also. of the jet and only the portion intercepted by the target is considered. (11) Circumferential breaks with partial (i.e., b< D/2) separation between the two ends of (5) The break opening is assumed to be a circu- the broken pipe not significantly offset tar orifice of cross sectional flow area (i.e., no more than one pipe wall thickness equal to the effective flow area of tbc lateral displacement) are more difficult to break. (6) The jet impingement force is equal to the steady state value of the fluid blowdown force calculated by the methods described in Subsection 3.6.2.2.1. Amendment 21 3W i
-7
;R t 4 21A6100AE nuw A?>ci - . nx n e., .) em these cases, the following e . m .ons are made.
- - .- t he jet is uniformly distributed around the periphery.
The jet cross section at any cut through Target loads are determined tising the l (b) (12) the pipe axis has the configuration following procedures. depicted in Figure 3.6 3b and the jet regions are as therein delineated. (a) For both the f ully separated I circumferential break and the (c) The jet force F. = total blowdowa F. longitudinal break, the jet is studied I by determining target locations vs. (d) The pressure at any point intersected by :-F^ ^ distance and applying the jet is: ANSI /ANS 58.2, Appendices C and D. l F J l fy where A g= the total 360" area of the jet at a radius equal to the distance frorn the pipe centerline to the target. (c) The pressure of the jet is then multiplied by the area of the target submerged within the jet. l (b) For circumferential break lignited , O _s aration, the jet is analyzed by using ' equations of ANSI /ANS
$8.2, Appendices C and D and determing respective target and _rm ... . . : c locations l
l. 3 6-17
.. Amendment 21
A.BWR 23A61C0AE Standard Plant prv n c) After determination of the total area of the D = pipe OD of target pipe for a fully jet at the target, the jet pressure is submerged pipe. calculated by: When the target (pipe) is larger than the area F. of the jet, the effective target area equals the J p . expanded jet area I A 3 A =A, wbere (3) For all cases, the jet area ( A,) is as-P g
= incident pressure sumed to be uniform and the load is uniformly distributed on the impinged target A = area of the expanded jet at the area A .
tar get inte rsection. If the effective target area ( A ) is less than expanded jet area ( A e < A )','the target is fully submerged in the jet and*the imping nent load is equal to (P g) (A effective target area is greater k$a)n expanded
. If the A , the target intercepts jet the area entire (jet Aan>d the*) impingement load is equalPipe Whip Effects on Essential 3.6.2.3.2 to (P ) ( A =F Components area fA,,)I) o r vark. The effective ous geometries follows:target This subsection provides the criteria and (1) Flat surface For a case where a target methods used to evaluate the effects of pipe is oriented at angle displacements on essential structures, systems, with d withphysical respect toarea the A, jet axis and with and no components following a postulated pipe flow reversal, the effective target area rupture.
Pipe whip (displacement) effects on essential structures, systems, and components can be
=
(A') (sin $,. placed in two categories: (1) pipe displacement A effects on components (nozzles, valves, tees, etc.) which are in the same piping run that the (2) Pipe Surface As the jet hits the convex break occurs in; and (2) pipe whip or controlled surface of the pipe, its forward momentum is displacements onto external components such as decreased rather than stopped; therefore, building structure, other piping systems, cable the jet impingement load on the impacted trays, and conduits, etc. area is expected to be reduced. For conservatism, no credit is taken for this 3.6.2.3.2.1 Pipe Displacement Effects on teduction and the pipe is assumed to be Components in the Same Piping Run impacted with the full impingement load. 110 w e v e r, w h e r e s h a p e f a c t o r s a r e The criteria for determining the effects of justifiable, they may be used. The pipe displacetnents on inline components are as effective target area A is: follows: Ag = (Dg) (D) (1) Components such as vessel safe ends and valves which are attached to the broken where piping system and do not serve a safety function or failure of which would not D = diameter of the jet at the further escalate the consequences of the 3 accident need not be designed to meet ASME tatget interIaee, and 3 61B Amendment 21
ABWR == SIAIldArd Plant nv s Code Section lil imposed limits for essential failure in a piping system carrying high energy components under faulted loading. fluid. In the ABWR plant, the piping integrity does not depend on the pipe whip restraints for (2) If these components are required for safe any piping design loading combination including shutdown or serve to protect the structural earthquake but shall remain functional folicwing integrity of an essential component. limits an earthquake up to and including the SSE (See to meet the ASME Code requirements for Subsection 3.2.1). When the piping integrity is f aulted conditions and limits to ensure lost because of a postulated break, the pipe required opCrability arc met. whip rCstraint acts to limit the movement of the broken pipe to an acceptable distance. The pipe The methods used to calculate the pipe whip whip restraints (i.e., those devices which serve loads on piping components in the same run as the only to control the movement of a ruptured pipe pattulated break are described in Section following gross failure) will be subjected to 3.6.2.2.2. once in a lifetime loading. For tbc purpose of the pipe whip restraint design, the pipe break ' 3.6.2.3.2.2 Pipe Displacement Effects on is considered to be a faulted condition (See Essential Structures, Other S) stems, and Subsection 3.9. 3.1.1. 4 ) and the structure to Components which 'bc restraint is attached is also analynd and designed accordingly. The pipe whip p The criteria and methods used to calculate the restraints are non ASME Code comp nents;;7 effects of pipe whip on external components however,thc ASME Code requirements used consists of the following: in the design selectively to assure its safety related function,i! m. u u. u m Other (1) The effects on essential structures and bar- methods, i.e. testing, withyeliable data base tiers are evaluated in accordance with the for design and sizing of pip t whip restraints barrier design procedures given in Subsec- can also be used. k tion 3.5.3 The pipe whip restraints utilire energy ab-(2) If the whipping pipe impacts a pipe of equal sorbing U rods to attenuate the kinetic energy or greater nominal pipe diameter and equal of a ruptured pipe. A typical pipe whip re-or greater wall thickness, the whipping pipe straint is shown in Figure 3.6 6. The principal does not rupture the impacted pipe. Other- feature of these restraints is that they are in-wise, the innpacted pipe is assumed to be stalled with everal inches of annular clearance ruptured. between them and the process pipe. This allows for installation of normal piping insulation and (3) If the whipping pipe impacts other compo- for unrestricted pipe thermal movements during nents (valve actuators, cable trays, con- plant operation. Select critical locations in-duits, etc.), it is assumed that the im- side primary containment are also monitored pacted component is unavailable to mitigate during hot functional testing to provide serifi-the consequences of the pipe break event, cation of adequate clearances prior to plant l operation. The specific design objectives for (4) Damage of unrestrained whipping pipe on es. the restraints are: l sential structures, components, and systems other than the ruptured one is prevented by (1) The restraints rb.11 in no way increase the citber separating high energy systems from reactor coolant pressure boundary stresses the essential systems or providing pipe whip by their presence during any normal mode of restraints. reactor operation or condition; 3.6.2.3.3 Loading Combinations and Design (2) The restraint system shall function to stop Criteria for Pipe Whip Restraint the movement of a pipe failure (gross loss of piping integrity) without allowing damage Pipe whip restraints, as differentiated frorn to critical components or missile desclop-l piping supports, are designed to function and ment; and carry load for an extremely low probability gross 3W Amendment 2t l l
ABWR uxsimxt i Standard Plant - nrv n (3) The restraints should provide minimum ! hindrance to intervice inspection of the ; process piping. For the purpose of design, the pipe whip restraints are designed for the following dynamic loads: (1) Blowdown thrust of the pipe section that impacts the restraint; (2) Dynamic inertia loads of the moving pipe section which is accelerated by the blowdown thrust and subsequent impact on the restraint; (3) Design characteristics of the pir.e whip restraints are included and verified by the pipe whip dynamic analysis described in Subsection 3.6.2.2.2; and (4) Since the pipe whip restraints are not contacted during normal plant operation, the postulated pipe rupture event is the only design loading condition. i n l Amendment 21 l
ABWR . ui. Standars[ Plant pg f I l l 3421 Amer.dment 21
13A6100AE
'lant PM D fM r
%~/
3.6.2.4 Guard Pipe Assembly Design e ABWR primary containment does not require guard pipes.
))
( [ 3.6.2.5 Material to be Supplied for the Operating IJeense Review See Subsection 3.6.4.1 3.6 3 Leak liefore Ilreak Evaluation Procedures Per Regulatory Guide 1.70, Re vision 3, November 1978, the safety analysis Section 3.6 Strain rate effects and other material has traditionally addressed the protection property variations have been considered in the measures against dynamic effects associated with design of the pipe whip restraints. The material the non mechanistic or postulated ruptures of properties utilized in the design have included piping. The dynamic effects are defined in one or more of the following methods: introduction to Section 3.6. Three forms of piping failure (full flow area circumferential (1) Code minimum or specification yield and and longitudinal breaks, and throughwall leakage ultimate strength values for the affected crack) are postulated in accordance with components and structures are used for both Subsection 3.6.2 and Branch Technical Position the dynamic and steady state events; MEB 3-1 of NUREG 0800 (Standard Review Plan) for their dynamic as well as environmental (2) Not more than a 10% increase in minimum code effeets. or specification strength values is used when designing enmponents or structures for liowever, in accordance with the modified the dynamic event, and code minimum or General Electric Criterion 4 (GDC 4), effective specification yield and ultimate. strength November 27,1987, (R e f e re nce 1), t he values are used for the steady state loads: mechanistic leak before break (LBB) approach, justified by appropriate fracture mechanics (3) Representative or actual test data values techniques, is recognired as an acceptable are used in the design of components and procedure under certain conditions to exclude structures including justifiably clevated design against the dynamic effects from strain rate affected stress limits in excess postulation of breaks in high energy piping. of 10%; or The LBB approach is not used to exclude postulation of cracks and associated effects as (4) Representative or actual test data are used required in Subsection 3.6.2.1.5 and 3.6.2.1 for any affected component (s) and the .6.2. It is anticipated, as mentioned in minirnum code os specification values are Subsection 3.6.4.2, that a COL applicant will used for the struttures for the dynamic and apply to the NRC for approval of LBB quali-the steady state events fication of selected piping. These approved piping, referred to in this SSAR as the LBB-Amendment 21 4 22
ABWR Standard Plant mama g,w a qualified piping, will be excluded from pipe breaks, wbich are required to be postulated by Subsections 3.6.1 and 3.6.0, for design against
- their potential dyeimic effects.
The following subsections describe (1) certain design bases where the LBB approach is not recognized by the NRC as applicable for exclusion of pipe breaks, and (2) certain conditions which limit the LBB applicability. Appendix 3E provides guidelines for LDB applications describing in detail the following necessary elements of an LBB report to be submitted by a COL applicant for NRC approval: fracture mechanics methods, leak rate prediction methods, leak deteetion capabilities and typical special considerations for LBB applicability. Also included in Appendix 3E is a list of candidate pipir.g systems for LBB qualification. The LBB application approach described in this subsection and Appendix 3E is consistent with that documented in Draft SRP 3.6.3 (Reference 4) and NUREG 1061 (Reference 5). The LBB approach is not used to exclude postulation of cracks and associated effetts in 3Wl Amendment 21
ABWR umm Standard Plant _, prv 9 accordance with Subsections 3,6.2.1.5 and portion thereof) is evaluated with the following 3 6.2.1.6.2. considerations in addition to the deterministic LBB evaluation procedure of Subsection 3.6.3.2 The LBB approach is not applicable to piping systems where operating experience has indicated (1) Degradation by crosion, erosion / corrosion particular susceptibilit) la failure from tbe and erosion / cavitation due to umfasorable effects of intergranular stress corrosion flow conditions and water ebemistry is cracking (IGSCC), water bammer, thermal fatigues, examined. The esaluation is based on the or erosion. industry experience and guidelines. Addi. tionally, fabrication wall thinning of el. The LBB approach is not a replacement for bows and other fittings is considered in the existing regulations or criterin pertaining to purchase specification to assure that the the design bases of emergency core cooling system code minimum wall requirernents are met. (Subsection 63), containtr at system (Subsection These evaluations demonstrate that these me-6.2) or equipment qua' ann (Subsection chanistus are not potential sources of pipe 3 11). However, benefits d tb LBB procedures rupture to these areas will be taken and the subsections will be revised as the regulations will be (2) The ABWR plant design invohes operation relaxed by the NRC. For clarity, it is noted bebw 7000F in ferritic steel piping and that the LBB approach is not used to relax the below 8000F in austenitic steel piping. design requirements of the primary containment This assures that creep and creep fatigue system that includes the primary containment are not potential sources of pipe rupture, vessel (PCV), vent systems (vertical flow channels and borizontal v'nt discharges), drywell (3) The design also assures that the piping zones, suppression chamber (wetwell), vacuum material is not susceptible to brittle breakers, PCV penatrations, and drywell head. cleavage type failure over the full range of Howeser, in designing for loads per Table 3.9 2, system operating temperatures (that is, the which does not apply to these PCV subsys tems, material is on the upper shelf). the seven types of design loads identified with LOCA induced dynamics of suppression pool or (4) The ABWR plant design specifies use of shield wall annulus pressurization are excluded austenitic stainless steel piping madw of if they are a result of LOCA postulated in those material (e.g., nuclear grade or low carbon piping that meet the LBB criteria, type) that is recognized as resistant to IGSCC. The material of piping in reactor Appendix 3E characterizes fracture mechanics coolant pressure boundary is ferritic steel. properties of piping materials and analysis me-thods including leakage calculation methods, as (5) A systems evaluation of potential water required by the criteria of this subsection. bammer is made to assure ibat pipe rupture Following NRC's review and approval, this appen- due to this mechanism is unlikely. Water dix will become approved LBB methodology for app- bammer is a generic term including various lication to ABWR Standard Plant piping. Appendix unanticipated high frequency hydrodynamic 3F applies these propertie. and methods to events such as steam bammer and water specific piping to demonstrate their eligibi- slugging. To demonstrate that water hammer lity for exclusion under the LBB approach. See is not a significant contribuior to pipe Subsection 3.6.4.2 for interface requirernents. rupture, reliance on historical frequency of water hammer events in specific piping systems coupled with a review of operating procedures and conditions is used for this evaluation. The ABWR design includes features such as vacuum breakers and jockey 3.6.3.1 General Esaluation pumps coupled with improved operational procedures to reduce or climinate the pot. The high energy piping system (or analyzable ential for water hammer identified by past l Amtndment 7 3W
ABWR - S11Bd11d.PJn nt pn i experience. Certain anticipated water (1) Use the fracture mechanics and the leak bammer events, such as a closure of a salve, rate computational methods that are accept-are accounted for in the Code design and ed by the NRC staff, or are demonstrated analysis of the piping. accurate with respect to other acceptable computational procedures or with (6) The systems evaluation also addresses a po. experime ntal data. tential for fatigue cracking or failure from thermal and mechanical induced fatigue. (2) Identify the types of materials and ma. Based on past experience, the piping design terials specifications used for base metal, avoids potential for significant mixing of weldments and safe end4, and provide the high and low temperature fluids or teaterials properties inclading toughness mechanical vibration. The startup and and tensile data,long. term effects such as preoperational monitoring assures avoidance thermal aging, and other limitations. of detrimental mechanical wbration. (3) Specify the type and magnitude of the loads (7) Based on experience and studies by Lawrence applied (forces, bending and torsional Livermore Laboratory, potential indirect moments), their source (s) and method of sources of indirect pipe rupture are remote combination. For each pipe size in the causes of pipe rupture. Compliance with the functional system, identify the location (s) snubber surveillance requirements of the which have the least favorable combination technical specifications assures that of stress and material properties for base snubber failure rates are acceptably low, metal, weldments and safe ends. (8) Initial LBB evaluation is based on the (4) Postulate a throughwall flaw at the design configuration and stress levels that location (s) specified in (3) above. Tbc are acceptably higher than those identified size of the flaw should be large enough so by the initial analysis. This evaluation is that the leakage is assured detection with reconciled when the as. built configuration sufficient margin using the installed leak is documented and the Code stress evaluation detection capability when the pipes are is reconciled. It is assured that the subjected to normal operating loads. If as built configuration does not deviate auxiliary leak detection systems are relied significantly from the design configuration on, they should be described. For the to invalidate the initial LBB evaluation, or estimation of leakage, the normal operating a new evaluation coupled with necessary loads (i.e., deadweight, thermal expansion, configuration modifications is made to and pressure) are to be combined based on assure applicability of the LBB procedune, the algebraic sum of individual values. (9) Sufficiently reliable, Mundant, diverse Using fracture mechanics stability analysis and sensitive leak detection systems are or limit load snalysis based on (11) below, provided for monitoring of leak. The system and normal plus SSE loads, determine the that in relied upon to predict the through- critical crack size for the postulated wall flaw used in the' deterministic fracture throughwall crack. Deterruine crack size mechanics evaluation is suf ficiently margin by comparing the selected leakage reliable and sensitive to justify a margin size crack to the critical crack size. of 2 on the leakage prediction. Demonstrate that there is a margin of 2 between the leakage and critical crack 3.6.3.2 Deterininistic Evaluation Procedurt sizes. The same load combination method selected in (5) below is used to determine The following deterministic analysis and the critical crack size, evaluation are performed as an NRC. approved method for the ABWR Standard Nuclear Island to (5) Determine snargin in terms of applied loads justify applicability of the LBB concept. by a crack stability analysis Demonstrate Amcument 1 3W l
ABWR w w. Standard Plant uv4 that the leakage size cracks will not expe- adequate, a determination is made to demon. rience unstable crack growth if 1,4 times strate that the generic data base represents the normal plus SSE loads are applied. De. the range of plant materials to be evalu-monstrate that crack growth is stable and ated. This determination is based on a com. the final crack is limited such that a parison of the plant material properties double ended pipe break will not occur. The identitied in (2) above with those of ths dead weight. thermal expansion, pressure, materials used to develop the generic data SSE (inertial), and seismic anchor motion base. Tbc number of rnaterial beats and weld (SAM) loads are combined based on the same procedures tested are adequate to coser the method used for the primary stress esalu- strength and toughness tange of the actual ation by tbc ASME Code. The SSE (inertial) plant materials. Reasonable lower bound and SAM loads are combined by square root- tensile and toughness properties from the of.the sum of the squares (SRSS) method. plant specific generic data base are to be used for the stability ana!ysis of indisi-(6) The piping material toughness (J.R curves) dual materials, unless otherwise justified. a nd t e nsile (stress strain curves) properties are determined at temperatures ladustry generie data bases are reviewed to near the yet range of normal plant provide a reasonable lower bound for the operatiou population of material tenkile and toughness properties associated with any individual (") The specimen used to generate J R curves is specification (e.g., A106, Grade B), material assured large enough to provide crack type (e.g., austenitic steel) or welding extensions up to an amount consistent with procedures. 1/T condition determined by analysis for the application. Because practical specimen The number of material beats and weld proce-size limit ations e xist, t he ability to dures tested should be adequate to cmcr the obtain the desired amount of experimental range of the strength and tensile properties crack extension may be restricted. In this expected for specific material specifica-case, extrapolation techniques is used as tions or types. Reasonable lower bound described in NUREG 1061, Volume 3, or in tensile and toughness properties from the NUREG/CR 4575. Other techniques can be used ind stry generic data base are used for the if adequatelyjustified. stability analysis of individual materials. (8) The stress strain curves are obtained over if the data are being developed from an the range from the proportional limit to archival beat of material, three stress-maximum load. strain curves and three J resistance carses from that one best of material is sufficient. (9) Preferably, the materials tests should be The tests should U anducted at temperatures conducted using archival materials for the near the upper range of normal plant pipe being evaluated. If archival material operation. Tests should also be conducted at is not available, plant specific or industry a lower temperature, which may represent a wide generic material data bases are plant condition (e.g., hot standby) where pipe assembled and U d to define the required break would present safety concerns similar to material tensile and toughness properties. normal operation. These tests are intended Test materialincludes base and weld rnetals. only to determine if there is any significant dependence of toughness on temperature oser (10) To provide an acceptable level of reli. the temperature range of interest. The lower ability, generic data bases are reasonable toughness should be used in the fracture lower bounds for compatible sets of material mechanics evaluation. One J R curve and one tensile and toughness properties associated stress strain curve for ooe base metal and with materials at the plant. To assure that weld metal are considered adequate te the plant specific generic data bast; is determine temperature dependence. Amendment 1 3O
Y nasnoAt Standard Plant pg (11) There are certain limitations that currently When the master curve is constructed using preclude generic use of limit load analyses Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) or (5), the allowable to evaluate Icak before break conditions circumferential throughwall flaw length can be deterministically. However, a modified determined by entering the master cune at a limit load analysis a be used for stress index (SI) value determined from the a;stenitic steel piping to demonstrate loads and austenitic steel piping material of acceptable margins as indicated below: interest. The allowable flaw size determined from the master curve at the appropriate 51 Construct a master Curve where a stress index, value can then be used to determine if the 51, given by required margins are met. Allowable values of 0 are those that result in S being greater Si =5+MP m (1) than zero from Eqs. (3) and (5). The flow is plotted as a function of postulated total stress used to construct the master cune and circumferential throughwall flaw length, L, the definition of Si used to enter the master defined by curve are defined for each material category as follows: L =20 R (2) Base Metal gad TIG Weld,g where The flow stress used to construct tbc master S = hr [ 2 sinB sin 0], (3) curve is w at = 0.5 (oy+o) u B = ? '. l(w 8) . w (Pm/of)) (4) when the yield strength, ay , and the ulti-0 -= balf angle in radians of the postu- mate strength, o u, et temperature are lated throughwall circumferential known, fla w. If the yield and ultimate strengths at temper-R = pipe mean radius, that is, the aver- ature are not known, then Code minimum values age between the inner and outer at temperature can be used, or alternatisely radius, if
= the combined membrane stress, LSD < 2.5, then I'm including pressure, deadweight, and 17M seistnic components, o( = $1 ksi, or M = 1.4, the snargin associated with the load combination method selected for if the analysis, per item (5).
CiD > 2.5, thea at = flow stress for austenitic steel 17M pipe material categories, at - 45 ksi. If 0 + $ from Eqs. (1) and (4) is greater than w,then The value of SI used to enter the master cune for base metal and TIG welds is S = hr [ sins) (5) w Si = M (Pm+P) b l7) where where S= w(Pm/of). (6) Pb = the combiaed primary bending stress. Amendmem t M
MVR uAsiwa Standard Plant PfV D (1) A sua mary of the dynamic analyses applicable to high energy piping systems in accordance with Subsection 3.6.2.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.70. This shall include: (a) Sketches of applicable piping systems showing the location, size and orientation of postulated pipe breaks and the location of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers. (b) A summary of the data developed to select postulated break locations including calculated stress intensities, cumulative usage f actors and stress ranges as delineated in BTP MEB 31. (2) For f ailure in the moderate energfy piping systems listed in Table 3.6 7, l descriptions showing how safety related j systems are protected from the resulting ; jets, flooding and other adverse environmental ef fects. (3) Identification of protective measures provided against the effects of a postuleted pipe failures for protection E of each of the systems listed in Tables 3.61 and 3.6 2. (4) The details of how the MSIV functional , capability is protected against the y effects of postulated pipe failurcs. ' (5) Typical examples, if any, where protection for safety related systems and components against the dynamic effects of pipe failures include their g enclosure in suitably designed a structures or ce npartments (including any additional drainage system or i equipment environmental qualification l 3.6.4 COL License information needs). !
- 3. 6. .t .1 Details of Pipe Break Analysis Results (6) The details of how the feedwater line and Protection Methods check and feedwater isolation valves functional capabilities are protes d The following shall be provided by the. COL against the effects of postulated pi, >
applicant (See Subsection 3.6.2.5): failures. Amendment 21 4 27
I l MN uAs;mre Standard Plant ,f3, n I 3.6.4.2 Leak Befort Break Analysis Repett ! l As required by Refetcoce 1, and LBB analysis report shall be prepared for the piping systems proposed for exclusion from analysis for the dynamic effects due to f ailure of piping ; f ailu r e . The report shall be prepared in accrodance with the guidelines presented in Appendix 3E and Submitted by the COL applicant to
, the NRC for approval 3.6.5 References
- 1. Modification of General Design Criterion 4 Requirements for Protection Against Dynamic Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture, Federal Recister. Volume $2, No. 207. Rules and Regulations, Pages 41238 to 41295, October 27, 19S7
- 2. RELAP 3, A Computer Program for Reactor Blowdown Analysis, IN 1321, issued June 1970, Reactor Technolocy TID 4500.
- 3. ANSl/ANS 58.2. Design Basis for Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants Against the Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture.
- 4. Standard Review Plan; Public Comments Solicited. Federal Renister. Volume 52, No.
167, Notices, Pages 32626 to 32633, August 28, 1987.
- 5. NUREG 1061, Volume 3, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Breaks, Report of the U.S. .!RC Pipng Review Committee, November 1984.
- 6. Mehta, H. S., Patel, N.T. and Ranganath, S.,
Application of the Leak Before Break Approach \ to BWR Piping, Repo t NP 4991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, December 1986. Amendment 21 3W1
l l ABWR :wim ! Standard Plant prv g Table 3.61 I l ESSENTIAL SYSTESIS, C051PONENTS, AND EQUIPAIENT* FOR POSTULATED PIPE FAILURES INSIDE CONTAINh1EST j
- 1. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (up to and including the outboard isolation vahes)
- 2. Containment isolation system and Containment Boundary (including liner plate)
- 3. Reactor Protection 9 stern (SCRAM SIGNALS)
- 4. Emergency Core Cooling Systems" (For LOCA events only)
One of the following combinations is available (see Table 6.3 3): (a) HPCF (B and C) + RCIC + RHR LPFL (B and C) + ADS (b) HPCF (B and C) + RHR LPFL ( A and B and C) + ADS (c) HPCI- (B or C) + RCIC + RHR LPFL (A and either of B or C) + ADS
- 5. Core Cooling Systems (other than LOCA esents)
(a) HPCF (B or C) or RClC (b) RHR.LPFL(A or B or C) + ADS (c) RifR sbaldows Cooling Mode (two loops) (d) RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Mode (two loops)
- 6. Coritrol rod drive (scram / rod insertion)
- 7. Flow restrictors (passise)
- 8. Atmospheric control (for LOCA ever.t only)
- 9. Stacdby gas (natment"* (for LOCA esent only)
- 10. Control Room Ensironmental"*
- 11. The following equipment /syste:ns or portions thereof required to assure the proper operation of those essential item:
iisted in items 1 through 10. (a) Class IE electrical systems, ac and de (including diesel generator system"', 6900,40 and 120V ac, and 125V de emergency buses * * *, motor control centers * *', switchgear'", batteries"* and distribution systems) Amendment 1 36 5
ABWR msms prv n
$1mndsed Klaid -
Table 3,61 ESSENTIAL SYSTEhtS, COh1PONENTS, AND EQUIP 5fENT* FOR ' POSTlalATED PIPE FAILURES INSIDE CONTAIN>1ENT (Continued) (b) Peactor Dullding Cooling Water"* to the following:
- 1. Room c.aolers
- 2. Pump cooters
- 3. Dlest generator lacket coders
- 4. Electrical st4tecgru coolers ,
(c) Envittnmental Systems"' (HVAC) (d) in 'rumentation (including post.LOCA monitoring) (c) Fire Protection Systen '" 4 (f) HVAC Emergency Coolic6 Water System '" (g, .ocess Sainpling Sptem '" , NOTE f
- The essential items listed in this table are protected in accordance with Subsection 3.6.1 ccasistent with the particular pipe break evaluated. ,
" Reference Section 6.3 for detailed discussion of emergency cote 2
cooling capabilities.
'" Located outside containment but listed for completeness of l essential shutdown requirements.
l e
)w l- ' A..w .i io i . L ,., ; , . ,_ . , _:- , . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i ABWR msint Standard Plant prv s Table 3.6 2 ESSENTI AL SYSTEMS, COMPONESTS, AND EQUIPMENT
- FOR POSTULATED PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE COSTAINMEST
- 1. Containment isolation Syste n and containment boundary.
- 2. Reactor Protc tion System (SCRAM signals)
- 3. Core Cooling systems t (a) HPCF (B or C) or RCIC (b) RHR LPFL(A or B or C) + ADS (c) KH?t ibut&wa cooling mode (two loops)
(d) RHR suppression pool coolLe t ode (two loops) 4 Flow restrictors
- 5. Control room habitability >
- 6. Spent fuel pool cooling
- 7. Standby gas treatment S. The following equipment / systems or portions thereof required to assure the proper operation of those essential items listed in items 1 through ,
7. (a) Class 1E electrical systems, ac and de (including diesel generator system,6900,480 and 120V ac, and 125V de emergency buses, motor con. col centers, switchgear, batteries, auxiliary shutdoern control panel, and distribution systems). - (b) Reactor Building Cooling water to the following: (1) Room coolers (2) Pump coolers (motors and seals) (3) Diesel generator auxiliary system coolers j l_ (4) Electricalswitchgear coolers-(5) RHR heat exchangers [ The essential items listed in this table are protected in accordance with Subsection 3.6.1 consistent with the particular pipe break evaluated. 4M
' Amendment 17 l
L
ABWR zw:= , Standard Plant RRT
- Table 3.6 2 ESSENTIAL SYSTEMS, COMPONESTS, AND EQUIPMENT
- FOR POSTULATED PIPE FAILURES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT (Continued)
(6) FPC heat exchangers (7) HECW refrigerators (c) ilVAC i (d) Instrumentation (including post accident monitoring) . (c) Fire Water System (f) IIVAC Emergency Cooling Water System ? (g) Process Sampling System 5 i 4 9
%M 1 Amth0 ment 17
eGWR u4 mort SIAndard Plant prs;j Table 3.6 3 HIGil ENERGY PIPING INSIDE CONTAINMENT Piping Sptem ( Main steam - Main steam draim n Steam supply to RCIC
~
Feedwater Recirculation motor cooling HPCF (RPV to first check valve) RHR LPFL (RPV to first check vahe) RHR (Suction from RPV to first normally closed gate vahe) Reactor Water Cleanup (from RHR and RPV drain) RPV bead spray (RPV to first check valve) RPV vent (RPV to first closed valve) Standby Liquid Control (from HPCF to fust check valve) CRD (Scram / rod insertion) _ RPV bottom head drain lines (RPV to fast closed valves) Miscellaneous 3-inch and smaller piping Amendment 7
q
)
i ABWR mome Standard Plant gna Table 3.6 4 IIIGli ENERGY PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Piping Sptem' l ! i l Main Steam Main Steam Drains Steam supply to RCIC Tmbine CRD(to and from liCU) R11R(injection to feedwater from nearest check valves in the R11R lines) Reactor Water Cleanup (to Feedwater via RHR and to first inlet valve to RPV bead spray) Reactor Water Cleanup (pumps suction and discharge) Fluid systems operating at high energy levels less than 2 percent of the total time are not included. These systems are classified moderate energy systems, O.e., HFCF, RCIC, SAM and SLCS). Amendment 17 3 32
ABWR meu Standard Plant _ pn' a
]
Deleted Amendment 21 3633
ABWR UA61XAE hdard Plant prv n Table 3.6 6 MODERATE ENERGY PIPING OUTSIDE COSTAINMENT Residual Heat Removal Sptem (Piping beyond dermost isoladon nive) High Pressure Core Flooder Sptem (Piping beyond outermost isoladon vahe) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (Suction line from condensate storage pool beyond j second shutoff .ahe, vacu"m pump discharge line from vacuum pump to containment isolation vane) ; Control Rod Drive System (Piping up to pump suction) Standby Liquid Control System (Piping beyond injection vahes) Suppression Pool Cleanup Sptem (Beyond containment isolation vahe) j Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Radioactive Waste System (Beyond isolation valve) Instrument / Service Air System (Beyond isolation vahe) HVAC Cooling Water System Makeup Water System (Condeusate) Reactor Building Cooling Water System Turbine Building Cooling Water System Atmospberic Control System (Beypad shutoff valve) 36331 Amendment 10
ABM nacixat Standard Plant piv a Table 3.6 7 ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR INTEGRATED LEAKAGE RATE TEST (1) Those portions of fluids systems that are part of the t'.t.ctor coolant pressure boundary, that are open directly to the primary reactor containment atmosphere und:t post accident conditions and become an extension of the boundary of the primary reactor containment, shall be opened or vented to the containment atmosphere prior ;o or during the T)Te A test. Portions of closed systems inside containment that penetrate primary containment and are not relied upon for containment isolation purposes following a LOCA shall be vented to the containment atmosphere. (2) All vented systems shall be drained of water to the extent necessary to ensure exposure of the system primary containment isolation valves g to the containment air test pressure, j (3) Those portions of fluid systems that penetrate primary containment, that are external to containment and are not desigud to provide a containtnent isolation barrier, shall be vented to the outside atmosphere as applicable, to assure that full post accident differential pressure is maintained across the containment isolation barrier. (4) Systems that are required to maintain the plant in a safe condition during the Type A test shall be operable in their normal mode and are not vented. (5) Systems that are normally filled with water and operating under post LOCA conditions need not be vented. 4 36332 Amendmen: 10
1 i ABWR DA6 m E StADdard Plant R13' D f I l
)
l Deleted 3gy Amendment 21
ABWR memu StandaM Plant prv B Deleted Amendment 21 l '" U
ABM ux6more Standard Plant nrv o Regiog _segfen 2, a,gton 3 I '
, 10 D
e; jet core g a sMtatic _f plane (A) Circeferential break Lc Break with Full , P I " "' " Separation i N J L I Region 3
;- as m tetic plane t,
' \\bj'/ Region: a,gq,n 3
__s. q Lc
.A A ~ -w e n
, - >resi n. .. "G_ q _
(B) Circeferential Irvak with Lit :;ed " AT CRC 51 $t CTiON POA SEpaR ATiCN ns C12 10' Region 3 L i asMtotic plane Region ! ' t t a \ plane at end of jet core ( l/. break plane f (C) Longitudinal treak l Figure 3.6-8 JET CHARACl' ERISTICS Amedment 21
ABWR mamu ; Standard Plant an' n 1 Deleted 3 Amendment 21
s ABM useixxu Standard Plant Rrv a l i I Deleted 36M Amendment 21
ABWR mame Standard Plant REV B Deleted l l 3 b)9 Arnendment 21
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ABWR uxexy Standard Plant wrv 9 SECTION 3.7 CONTENTS Section Title P_agt 3.7.1 Seis mic Inout 3.71 3.11.1 Design Response Spectra 3.7 1 3.7.1.2 Design Time History 3.72 3.7.1.3 Crideal Damping Values 3.7 3 3 7 1.4 Supporting Media for Seismic Category 1 Structures 3.73 3 7 1.4.1 Soil Structure Interaction 3.74 3.7.2 Seismic Svstem Analvsis 3.7-4 3.7.2.1 Seismir 2.nalysis Methods 37-4 3.7.2.1.1 The Equations of Dynamic Equilibrium for Base Support Excitation 3.7-4 3.7.2.1.2 Solution of the Equations of Motion by Modal Superposition 3.7 5 3.7.2.1.3 Analysis by Response Spectrum Method 3.75 3.7.2.1.4 Support Displacements in Multi Supported Structures 3.7-6 3.7.2.1.5 Dynamic Analysis of Buildings 3.7 7 3.72.1.5.1 Description of Mathematical Models 3.7 7 3.7.2.1.5.1.1 Reactor Building and Reactor Pressure Vessel 3.7 7 3.7.2.1.5.1.2 - Control Building 3.78 3.7.2.1.5.1J Radwaste Bui! ding 3.7-8 3.7.2.1.5.2 Rocking and Torsional Effects 3.78.1 3.7.2.1.5.3 Hydrodynamic Effects 3.78.1 3.7.2.2 Natural Frequencies and Response Loads 3.7-9 3.7il Amendment tS
AB M Slandard Plant
*lf}
SECTION 3.7 CONTENTS (Continued) Section Igli Pap 3723 Procedure l' sed for Ntodehng 33 9 3.7.2.3i N1odel.ing Techniques for Systetos Other Than Reactor Pressure Vessel 3.7 9 3.723 Modeling of Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals 3.79 3.714 Soi!-5t ructure Interaction 3.7 10 3'2.5 Deselopment of Floor Response Spectra 3.7 10 3'.16 Three Components of Earthquake Motion 3.7 10 3.7.2.' Combination of Niodal Responses 3.7 11 3.7.2,8 Interaction of Non Category I Structures with Seismic Category I Structures 3.7 11 3.7.19 Effects of Parameter Variations on Floor , Response Spectra 3.7 11 i 3.7.2.10 Use of Constant Vertical Static Factors 3.7 12 372.11 Methods Used to Account for Torsional Effects 1 7-12 3.7.2.12 Comparison of Responses 3 7-12 3.7.2.13 Methods for Seismic Analysis of Category I Dam 3.7 12 ! 3 7.114 Determination of Seismic Category i Structure Overturning Moments 3.7-12 37115 Analysis Procedure for Damping 3.7 13 l 3.7.3 Seismic Subssstem univsis 3.7 14 37.3.1 Seismic Analysis Methods 3.7-14 17.3.2 Determination of Number of Earthquake Cycles 3.7 15 3.7 iii Amendment i
l M MARMAE Standard Plant m3
.SECTION 3.7 CONTENTS (Continued) lestion Illis P. age 3.7.321 Piping 3.7 15 3.7322 Other Equipment and Components 3 .15 37.33 Procedure Used for Modeling 3 15 3.7331 Modeling of Piping Systems 3 15 17331.1 Summary 3.? 15 3.7.33.1.2 Selection of Mass Points 3.7 16 3.7.33.13 Selection of Spectrum Curses 3.'.16 3.7332 Modeling of Equipment 3.7 16
-3.7333 Field Location of Supports and Restraints 1 7-17 1.3. 3. T>. %
3.73.4 Aesl 3 sis ef F9mL TyptAye5 y h Basis of Selection of Frequencies 3717 3.73.5 Use of Equivalent Static Load Methods of Analysis 3.7 17 3.73.5.1 Subsystem Other Than NSSS 3.? 17 3.7.3.5.2 NSSS Subsystems 17-17 3.7.3.6 Three Components of Earthquake Motion 3.7 17 3.73.7 Combination of Medal Responses 3.718 f- 3.7.3.7.1' Subsystems Other Than NSSS 3.718 3.73.72 NSSS Subsystems 3.7 18 3.73.7.2.1 Square Root of the Sum of the Squares Method 17 18 3.73.7.2.2 Double Sum Method . . 3.7 19 3,7,17.3 me.NJogies used to Accowd wig, Frqueec].719Modfo 3.7.3.8 = ytical Procedure for Piping 3.73.8.1 Piping Subsystems Other Than NSSS 3.7 19 3,g, 3,3,),4 'D'f naMC. A 5'15 Ok SCIW'C kdj 1) h*PI 'U W*"'A D 3,3, 3,3,1. 5 Selectim of Lpd The.- Fhrhvita v., 3 s. t. l. Made19 of P fj syFh
- 3. 3 1.3. I- ]
' Amendment 1.
Nodelicy .$ speciel Geyeere/ Mpt yh
ABWR :34si u t Standard Plant orv s SECTION 3.7 CONTENTS (Continued) Section Illit Eagg 3." 3 3.1.1 Qualification by Analysis 3.7 19 3.73 S.1.2 Rigid Suhystems with Rigid Supports 3.7 19 3.73.8.1.3 Rigid Subs >ter: with Flexible Supports 3.719
- 3. 7.3.8.1.4 Flexible Subsystems 3.7 20 3.7.3.S.1.5 Static Analysis 3/7 20 3.73.81.6 Dynamic Analysis 3.7-21 3.73 3.1.7 Damping Rati.' 3.7 22 17381.8 Effect of Differential Building Mosements 1 '7 1,Y I *I 3.7 22 3.73.8.2 Des *)n o [r 5 % 11 d ( e tA d Sm a// 8e(f. 3.72p/My ff NSS$' Piping Subsystems .
3i38.2. ham e is 3.7-3.73.8.2.2 Effect of Differentia' Building Movements 3.723 3.7.3.9 Multiple Supported Equipment Components With Distinct inputs 3.7-23 3.7 3.10 Use of Constant Vertical Static Factors 3.723 3.7.3.11 Torsional Effects of Eccentric Masses 3,7 23 3.7 3.12 Buried Seismic Category i Piping and Tunnels 3.7 23 3.7 3.13 Interaction of Other Piping with Seismic Category l 1 Piping 3.7 23 3.7 3.14 Seismic Analysis for Reactor Internals 3.7 24 3.7.3.15 Analysis Procedures for Damping 3.7 24 3.73.16 Analysis Procedure for NonSeismic Structures in Lieu of Dynamic Analysis 3.7 24 l / 3.7 3.16.1 - Lateral Forces 3.7 24 3.7 Y Amendment 20
LAB M mwrit
- Standard Plant prv s SECTTON 3.7
- CONTENTS (Continued)
Section Title P_ age 3.7.1 16.2 l ateral Force Distribution 17 04.1 3.7.3163- Accident Torsion 3.7 24.1 3.7.3.16.4 Lateral Displacement Limits 37241 3.7.3 16.5 Ductility Requirements 3704.1 3.7.4 Seismic Instrumentation - 3." 24.1 ~ 3.7.4.1 Comparison with NRC tegulatory Guide 1.12 3.7 24.1 3.7.4 2 Location and Description of Instrumentation 3,7241 3,7.42.1 Time History Accelerographs- 3.7 04.2 17.4.2.2 Peak Recording Accelerographs 3.7 25 3.7.4.2.3 Seismic Switches 3.7 25 3.7.4.2.4 Response Spectrum Recordets 3.7 25 3.7.4.2.5 Recording and Playback Equipment 3.7 25 3.7.4.3 Control Room Operator Notification 3.7 25 17.4.4 Comparison of Measured and Predicted Responses 3.7 26. 3.7.4.5 In.sersire Surveillance 3.7 26 3.7J COL Ucense Information . 3.7 26 3.7.11 Seismic Parameters 3.7 26 3.7.6 Refereaces 3.7 26 3.7-vi Amendent 21
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- . a . -
. . - . .. .. . - ~ . . , _ - . . . .- .- . . . . . - - ~- . . .-
5
~ A.BM uism^t.
Standard Plant . REva - SECTION 3.7 , TABLES Table Iltle Eagt 3.7 1 Damping for Different Materials 33 27 33 2- Naturi Frequencies of the Reactor Building Complex in X Direction (0 ; ISOP Axis) - Fixed Bue Condition 33 23 33-3 Natural Frequencies of the Reactor Building Complex in Y Direction (90' 270 Axis)- Fixed Base Condition 33 29 3.7 4 Natural Frequencies of the Reactor Building Complex in Z Direction (Vertical) Fixed Base Condit.on 33 30 3.75 Natural Frequencies of the Control Building - Fixed Base Condition- 33 30 3.7 6 Number of Dynamic Response Cycles Expected During.a Seismic Esent for Systems & Components '33 31 3.7 7- Description of Seismic In:trumentation 33 32 3.7 8 Set Points for Active Response Spectrum Recorders 3.7 33 33 9 . Seismic Monitoring fastrumentation Surveillance-Requirements 33 34-
- 33 10 Natural Frequencies of the Radwaste Building -
Fixed Base Coedition 33 M 1
-- 3.7 11 - , Site Coefficents .- = 3JM3 .
33 12 Structural Sprems 33 34.3 J i 3.7vii Amendment 20
ABM usai m t Standard Plant pfv , SECTION 3.7 ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Etig gagg 3.7 1 Horizontal Safe Shutdows Earthquake Design Spectra 3.7 35 3,7 2 Verdeal Safe Shutdows Earthquake Design Spectra 3.7 36 3.7 3 Sgthede Time History, Fest Horizontal Direcuen. Damptng Ratio 0.01 3.7 37 374 Sgthetic Time History, Fttst Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.02 3.7 38 3.7 5 Synthetic Time History, First Horuontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.03 3.7 39 3.7-6 Spthetic Time History, First Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.04 3.7 40 3.7 7 Spthetic Time History, First Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.07 3.7 41 3.7-8 Spthetic Time History, First Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.10 3.7.4: 3.7 9 Synthetic Time History, Second Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.01 3.7-43 3.7 10 Sgthetic Time History, Second Horizontal i Direction, Damping Ratio 0.02 3.7 44 3.7 11 Synthetic Tirne History, Second Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.03 3.7-45 3.7 12 Synthetic Time History, Second Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.04 3.7-46 3.7 13 Spthetic Time History, Second Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.07 3.7-47 3.7-14 Synthetic Time History, Second Horizontal Direction, Damping Ratio 0.10 3.7 48 3.7 dii Amcadment 1 , i
l M61JCAE Standard Plant pr.. g SECTION 3.7 ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) Figure Illig Eagt 3.7 15 Spthetic Time History, Vertical Direcion Damping Ratio 0.01 3.7-49 3.7 16 Synthede Time History, Vertical Direction Damping Rado 0.02 3.7 50 3.7 17 Sgthede Time History, Vertical Direction Damping Ratio 0.03 3.7 51 3.7 18 Synthetic Time History, Vertical Direction Camping Ratio 0.04 3.7 52 3.7 19 Synthetic Time History, Vertical Direction Damping Rado o 37 3.7 53 3.7 20 Spthetic Time History, Vertical Direction Damping Ratio 0.10 3.7 54 3.7 21 Coherence Function Cn, for Earthquake Components H1 and HT 3,7 55 3.7 22 Coherence Function C g for Earthquake Components H1 and N 3.7 56 3.7 23 Coherence Function C for Earthquake 3 Components H1 and 5 3 3.7 57
~
3.7 24 Power Spectral Density Function of Synthethic H1 Time History 3.7 58 3.7 25 Power Spectral Density Function of Synthethic H2 T1me History 3.7 59 3.7 26 Deleted 3.7-60 , 1 3.7 27 Deleted 3.7 61 3.7 28 Seismic Sptem Analytical Model 3.7 62 3.7ix Amendment 16
MNE ux6 xat Standard Plant ofy 3 SECTION 3.7 ILLUSTRATIONS (Continued) Figure Illit East 3.7 09 Reactor Building Elesation (0 180 Sectjon) 3.7 63 3.7 30 Reactor Building Elevation (90 270 Section) 3.7 64 3.7 3' Reactor Building Model 2 ' 65 3.7 32 Reactor Pressure Vessel and laternals Model 3.7 66 3'.33 Control Building Dynamic Model ;.7 67 3.7.M Radwaste Building Seismic Model 3.768 3.7=4 Amendment 18
$ %T{~ ((t f. N 84llT l 10 M /)() . N~Y Standard Plant V- ~
ma
- 3.7 SEISMIC DESIGN - that earthquake which produce vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear All structures, systems, and equipment of the power plant necessary for continued operation facility are defined as either Seismic Category I without undue risk to the health and safety of-or non Seismic Category 1. The requirements for 'he public are designed to remain functional.
Seismic Category I identification are given in During the OBE loading condition, the safety-Section 12 along with a list of systems, compo- related systems are designed to be capable of nents. and equipment which are so identified. continued safe operation. Therefore, for this loading condition, safety related structures, All structures, systems, components, and equip. and equipment are required to operate within ment that are safety related, as defined in Sec. design limits. tion 3.2, are desicned to withstand earthquakes as defined herein and other dynamic loads includ- The scismic design for the SSE is intended to ing those due to reactor building vibration (RSV) provide a margin in design that assures caused by suppression pool dynamics. Although capability to shut down and maintain the nuclear this section addresses seismic aspects of design facility in a safe condition. In this case, it anJ analgis in accordance with Regulatory Guide is only necessary to ensure that the required 1.70, the methods of this section are also systems and components do not lose their applicable to other dynamic loading aspects, capability to perform their safety related except for the range of frequencies considered. f unction. This is referred to as the The cutoff frequency for dynamic analysis is 33 no loss-of-function criterion and the loading ( Hz for seismic loads and 60 Hz for suppression condition as the SSE loading condition. pool dynamic loads tThe definition of rigid system used in this section is applicable to Not all safety related components have the seismic design only, same functional requirements. Fo example, the reactor containtnent must retain capability to The safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) is that restrict leakage to an acceptable level. i earthquake which is based upon an evaluation of Therefore, based on present practice, clastic the maximum earthquake potential considering the behavior of this structure under the SSE lmding regional and local geology, seismology, and condition is ensured. On the other hand, there specific characteristics of local subsurface are certain structures, components, and systems material. It is that earthquake which produces that can suffer permanent deformation without the maximum vibratory ground motion for which loss of function. Piping and vessels are Seismic Category I systems and components are examples of the latter where the principal designed to remain functional. These systems and requirement is that they retain contents and components are those necessary to ensure: allow fluid flow. (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure Table 3.21 identifies the equipment in boundary; various systems as Seismic Category I or non. I' Seismic Category _1. (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; and 3.7.1 Seismic Input l l (2) the capability to prevent or mitigate the 3.7,1.1 Desigr. Response Spectra l consequences of accidents that could result l in potential offsite exposures comparable to .The design carthquake loading is specified in I the guideline exposures of 10CFR100. terms of a set of idealized, smooth curves called the design response spectra in accordance . The operating basis earthquake (OBE) is that with Regulatory Gu.de 1.60. l earthquake which, considering the regional and local geology, seismology, and specific charac. Figure 3.71 shows the standard ABWR design teristics of local subsurface material, could values of the horizontal SSE toectra applied at
- reasonably be expected to affect the plant site the ground surface in the free field for damping l during the operating life of the plant. It is ratios of 2.0, 5.0, 7.0 and love af critical MhpW, whedt %e. maMue W
! \ 3nud .ccegg Amenamem hMy $ )%g yjf c;t, fsec{n M(M f $ 006h, ke w He, the cM hepey & dyn*pey d e- a~lsh yeaw y is ntwHs fe seismic heh ad too es b l spe ssion p ol d p w ,ie. m ds
, .p g_ s.,- - w vhe w $ , m.m M NoA ocsyn tN N 4 m6100AE Standard Plant %
salues of the vertical SSE spectra appited at the The magnitude of the SSE design time history ground wrface in the free field for damping is equal to twice the magnitude of the design ratios of 2.0, $.0, 7.0, and 10.0% of critical OBE time history. The OBE time histories and daruping where the maximum vertical ground response spectra are used for dynamic analysis acceleratic.o is 0.30 g at 33Hz. same as the and evaluation of the structural Seismic Sstem: maximum horizontal ground acceleration. the OBE results are doubled for evaluating the structural adequacy for SSE. For development of The design values of the OBE response spectra floor response spectra for Seismic Subsystem are one-brJP of the spectra shown in Figures analysis and evaluation, see Subsection 3.7.2.5. 3.7 1 a nd 3.7-2. These spectra are shown in Figures 3.7 3 through 3.7 20. The response spectra produced from the OBE design time histories are shown in Figures 3.7 3 The design spectra are constructed in through 3.7 20 along with the design OBE accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.60. The response spectra. The closeness of the two normalization factors for the maximum values in spectra in all cases indicates that the two horizontal directions are 1.0 and 1.0 as synthetic time histories are acceptable. applied to Figur,; 3.7-1. For vertical direction, the normalintion factor is 1.0 as applied to The response spectra from the synthetic time Figure 3.7 2. histories for the damping values of 1, 2, 3 and 4 percent conform to the requirement for an 3.7.1.2 Design Time History enu. aping procedure provided in item II.1.b of Section 3.7.1 of NUREG-0A00 (Standard Resiew The design time histories are synthetic Plan, SRP). However, the response spectra for acceleration time histories generated to match the higher damping values of 7 and 10 percent the design response spectra defined in Subsection show that there are some deviations from the SRP 3.7.1.1. requirement. This deviation is considered inconsequential, because (1) generating an The design time histories considered in GESSAR artificial time history whose response spectra (Reference 1) are used. They are developed based would envelop design spectra for five different on the metbod proposed by Vanmarcie and Cornell damping values would result in very conservative (Reference 2) because of its intrinsic capability time histories for use as design basis input. of imposing statistical independence among the and (2) the response spectra from the synthetic synthesized acceleration time history time histories do envelop the design spectra for components. The earthquake acceleration time the lower damping values. This is very history components are identified as H1, H2, and important because the loads due to SSE on V. Thr. H1 and H2 are the two horizontal structures should use 7 percent damping for components mutually perpendicular to each other. concrete components, but are obtained by Both H1 and H2 are based on the design norizontal ratioing up the response froa: the OBE analysis ground spectra shown in Figure 3.71. The V is involving the lower damping. The OBE analysis the vertical component and it is based on the uses only the lower damping values (up to 4c*c), design vertical ground s'pectra shown in Figure which are consistent with the SRP requirements 3.7 2. (See Subsection 3.7,1.3). The OBE given in Chapter 2 is one third of the SSE, i.e., 0.10 g, f>r the ABWR Standard Nuclear Island design. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, a more conservative value of i on e-h alf of th e SSE, i.e., 0.15 g, was [ employed to evaluate the structural and l component response. Amendment t 3 ?.;
ABM lw ncAE I Standard Plant Prv s The frequency range used in generating the response spectra from synthetic histories is 0.2 i to 33 Hz. The frequency range intervals used in generating those spectra is the same as given in 3 Table 3.7.11 of SRP Section 3.7.1. The coherence function for the three earthquake acceleration time history components H1, H2, and V are generated to check the statistical indepen-dence among them. The coherence function for H1 and H2 is given in Figure 3.7 21; for H1 and V in l Figure 3.7 22; and for H2 and V in Figure 3.7 23. All values within the frequency range between 0 to I 50 Hz are calculated at a frequency increment of 0.1 Hz. The small values of these coherence functions indicate that the three components are sufficiently statistically independent. 3.7.1.3 Critjcal Damping Values To assess the energy content of the synthetic The damping values for OBE and SSE analyses time history, the power spectral density functions are presented in Table 3.71 for various (PSDFs) are generated fron- the two horizontal structures and components. They are in components H1 and H2. The PSDFs are computed at a compliance with Regulatory Guides 1.61 and 1.84 frequency increment of 0.024 Hz, and are smoothed using the average method as rer.ommended in For seismic system evaluation of the SSE, the Resision 2 of Reference 3. larger SCE damping values shown in Table 3.7-1 are not used. The SSE loads are obtained by The stationary duratiou used in the calculation doubling the OBE loads that result from the OBE is taken to be 22 seconds which is the total Seismic System analysis based on the lower OBE Juration of the synthetic time history. The damping values (see Subsection 3.7.1.2). calculat:d PSDFs for the H1 and H2 time histories normalized to 0.15g peak ground acceleration are For analysis and evaluation of seismic shown in Figures 3.7 24 and 3.7-25, respectively, subsystems (piping, components and equipment), for frequencies ranging from 0.3 to 24 Hz. the floor response spectra are obtained fram 'he OBE time history response of the seismic system. The target PSDFs and 80% of target PSDFs that supports the subsystems. The floor specified on revision 2 of Reference 3 are also response spectra are coinputed (see Subsection plotted on these figures for comparison. As 3.7.2.5) for damping values that are applicable shown, PSDF of H1 and H2 time histories envelope to the subsystems under OBE as well as SSE; and the target PSDF with a wide margin in the further the OBE spectra are doubled to obtain specified frequency range of 0.3 to 24 Hz. This the SSE floor response spectra for input to the demcastrates that the two synthetic time keetonies SSE analysis in design of the subsystetes. base sufficient energy content. 3.7.1 A Supporting Media for Seismic Category I Structures The following ABWR Standard Plant Seismic Category I structures have concrete mat i foundations supported on soil, rock or compacted I backfill. The muimum value of the embedment l depth below plant grade to the bottom of the i base mat is given below for each structure. l l l Amendment 16 3%3
IN M m6m Standard Plant pg (1) Resetor Building (including the enclosed mode shapes, and appropriate damping factors of primary containment vessel and reactor the particular system toward the solution of the pedestal) 25.7 m (84 f t, 4 in.). equations of dynamic equilibrium. The time-Listory approach may al enately utilize the ( ) Control Building 112 m (40 ft), direct intestation mehi or solution. Wheo the structural response is computed directly from (3) Sernce Building Surfaa founded. the coupled structure soil system, the time-history approa:b solved in the frequency domain All of the above buildings have independect is used. The frequency domain analysis method foundations, in all cases the maximum value of is described in Appendix 3A. embedment is used for the dynamic analysis to determine seismic soil structure interaction 3.7.2.1J 'The Equations ot Dpamic Equilibrium effects. The foundation support materials foc Base Suppyt Excitation withstand the pressures imposed by appropriate loading combinations without failure. The total Assuming selocity proportional damping, the structural beight of each building is described in dynamic equilibrium equations for a lumped. mass. Subsection 3.8.2 through 3.8.4 For details of distributed stiffness sytteto are expressed in a the structural foundations refer to Subsection matrix form as: 38.5 The ABWR Standard Plant is designed for a range of soil conditions given in Appendix 3A. 3.72) 3.7.L4.1 Soil Structure Interaction (P(t)} When a structure is supported on a flexible where foundation, the soil structure interaction is taken into account by coupling the structural ( u (t) } = time dependent displacement model with the soil medium. The finite elemcot vector of non support points representation is used for a broad range of relative to the supports supporting medium conditions. A different (ug(t) = u(t) + ug(t)) representation based on tbc continuum impedance approach is also used for selected site (6(t)} = time dependent velocity sector conditions. Detailed methodology and results of of non support points relatise the soil structure interaction analysis are to the supports provided in Appendices 3A and 3G, respectively. {'u'(t)) = time dependent acceleration 3.7.2 Seismic System Analysis vector of non-support points relative to the supports This subsection applies to the design of Seismic Category I structures and the reactor [M) = mass matrix pressure vessel (RPV). Subsection 3.7.3 spplies to all Seismic Category I piping systems and [C] = damping matru equipment. [K] = stiffness matrix 3.7.2.1 ocismic Analysis Methods (P(t)} = time dependent inertia force Analysis of Seismic Category I struuares and vector (-[M] (u s(t)) acting the RPV is accomplished using the response at non-support points spect.um or time history approach. The time-history approach is made either in the time domain The manner in which a distributed mass, or in the frequency domain. distributed stiffness system is idealized into a lumped mass, distributed stiffness system of Either approach utilizes the natural period, Seismic Category I structures and the RPV is Amendment 7
l i
-I ABM
' Standard Plant m- 1
_ uv 4 ; shown in Figure 3.7 28 along *'ith a schematic
. The mode shape vectors are also orthogonal representation of relative a,cceleration:'d (t). +ith respect to the mass matrix [M].
support acceleration; u s(t) and total a e c e l e r a t i o n ; 'u*: ( t ) . Tbc orthogonality of the mode shapes can be 3.7.2.1.2 Solution of the Equatiens of MotEn used to effect a coordinate transformation of the by Modal Supegosition displacements, velocities and accelerations such that the response in each mode is independent of
]
I the respocse of the system in any other mode : The technique used for_the sclution of the Thus, the problem becomes one of solving n ' equations of motion is the method of modal independent differential _ equations rather than n superposition. simultaneous differential equations; and, since the system is linear, the principle of superposi. h.e set of homogeneous equations represented by tion holds and the total response of the system-the undamped free vibration of the sptem is: oscillating simultaneously in a modes may be determined by direct addition of the responses in [M) {'d(t)) + [K) {u (t)} = {0}. (3.73) the individual modes. Since the free oscillations are assumed to be 3.7.2.1.3 Analysis by Response Spectrum Method harmonic, the displacements can be written as: The response spectrum method is based on the {u (t)) = {$) eist, (3,7..t) fact that the modal response can be expressed as a set of convolution integrals which ratisfy the where governing differential equations. The advantage of this form of solution is that, for a given ground motion, the only sariables under the in. ($} = column matrix of the amplitude of tegral are the damping factor and the frequency. displacements (u) Thus, for a specified dampics factor it is possi- - ble to ccastruct a curve _which gives a maximum s = circular frequency of oscillation value of the integral as a function of frequency , t = time. Using the calculated natural frequencies of vibration of the system, the maximum salues of Substituting Equation 3.7 4 and its derivatives the modal responses are determined directly from in Equation 3.7-3 and noting that eiwt is not the appropriate response spectrum. The modal accessarily zero for all values of wt yields: maxima are then combined as discussed ir Subsection 3.7.2.7. [J[M] + [K)) { } = (0}. (3.7 5) When the equipment is supported at more than Equation 3.7 5 is the classic dynamic two points located at different elevations in tbc characteristic equation, with solution involving building, the response _ spectrum analysis .is the eigenvalues of the frequencies of vibrations performed using the envelope response spectrum of si and the eigenvalues mode shapes, {p};, all attachment points. Alternatively, the. (i = 1, 2, .. c). multiple support excitation analysis tuethods may be used where acceleration time histories or - F o r e a e h f r e q u e r.cy v;, t h e r e is a response spectra are applied to all the equipment corresponding solution vector {$}; determined attachment points. In some cases, the worst to within arbitrary scalat factor Y known i as single floor response spectrum selected from a the normal coordinate. It can be shown that the set of floor response spectra obtained at sarious mode shape vectors me orthogonal with respect to floors may be applied identically to all-floors o the weighting matrix [K] in the n dimensional provided there is no significant shift in fre. vector space. quencies of the spectra peaks. A:nendment 1 3M i i __#.. ., .. %-.m ..--w.~m --ew~*--- - - - - - + + * - * ' ~ " * - - - " - * - " ' -
.pa .a6 .a. .,u..aa , _ . , u. . -au. .a.w., a + aa .x.,.=..us s .+_um. ,-p, _- , a UA6%0AE Standard Plant _
nrv 4 3.7 2.1.4 Support Displacements in 51ulti. Supported Structures Cas and K as = damping aod stif(ness matrices denoting the in the preceding sectio'ns, analysis proce. coupling forces developed in dures for forces and displacements induced by the active degrees of time. dependent support displacement were dis- freedom by the motion of the cussed. In a multi supported structure there supports and vice versa; ' are, in addition, time dependent support dis. _ placements abich produce additional displace. Fa = pre 5eribe d e *t e r n a1 ments at consupport points and pseudo static time dependent f:.ces forces at both support and nonsupport points, applied on the active degrees of freedom; and The gosetning equation of motion of a structural system which is supported r more than Fs = reaction forces at the one point and has different excitations applied system support points. at each may be expressed in the following concise matrix form: Total differentiation with respec6 , time is denoted by (-) in Equation 3.7 6. Also, the
. mao U]a Caa Ca3. eUa j contributions of the fixed degrees of freedom OM 3, UJ u
3 N -- C C
,u ss, f sJ J have been removed ic 'he equation. The procedure utilized to construct the damping
,K matrix is discussed in Subsection 3.7.2.15. The aa Kas jUa [= ;Fa] mass and elastic stiffness matrices are
+ - -
7 formulated by using standard procedures.
K Kss,[U/t#fo/W[#Si 3
tithe r -)% t time bis)Dfy M&&od er f t96nst sfes se m. t(
Css and Kss = support forces due to unit Modal superposition is used to determine the y eg _.
velocities and displacement solutions of the uncoupled form of Equation of the supports; 3. . 7 4. The procedure is identical to that ,
described in Subsection 3.7.2.1.2. /)ddiff ond )
II- (CM Alfo 64 h HIM M C.
i ndepemdee) suppod ~hn <espese.
^~ ~ n s(eetru- nep t .5 4,j%
sl* M Mecha 3 7, 3, .g f, jp ,
ABWR mm Standard Plant ms 3.7.2.13 Dytiamic Analysis of Buildings (a) the reinforced concrete containment sessel (RCCV) that includes the reactor shield wall The time bistory method either in the time (RSW), the reactor pedestal, and the reactor domain or in the frequency domain is used in the pressure vessel (RPV) and its internal dynamic analysis of buildings. As for tbe components (b) the secondary containment rene modeling, both finite.elernent and lut, ped mass having marty equipment compartments, and (c) the methods are used. clean zone. The building basemat is assumed to be rigid. Building elevations along the O' 3.7 1 1 5.1 Description of Mathematical Models 180 aad 90 -250 sectioos are sbow n in Figures 3.7 29 and 3.7-30, respectisely The A mathematical model reflects the stiffness. mathematical model is shown in Figure 3.7 31 mass, and damping characteristics of the actual Model elevations are with respect to the RPV structural systems. One important consideration bottom head. The model X and Y axes correspond is the information required from the analysis. to the RB 0 180 and 90 -270 _ Consideration of maumum relatise displacements directions, respectisely. The Z axis is along among supports of Seismic Category I structures, the sertical direction. The combined RB model systems, and components require that enough as shown in Figure 3.7 31 basically consists of points on the structure be used. Locations of two uncoupled 2 D models in the X-Z and Y.Z 5eismic Category I equipment are taken into planes since the building is essentially of a consideration. Buildings are mathemati ;ly symmetric design with respect to its two modeled as a system of lumped masses located at principal directions in the horizontal plane. elesations of mass concentrations such as floors. Tbc coupling effects of the lateral and torsional motions on the building natural In general three dimensional models are used frequencies in the horizontal directions are for seismic analysis. In all structures, six found to be negligible. Therefore, the degrees of freedom exist for all mass points uncoupled 2 D models which omit the torsional (i.e., tbree t r a n slatio nal a nd th r e e degrees of freedom are used for seismic dynar,ic rotational). Howeser, in most structures, some analysis. The methods used to account for of the dynamic degrees of freedom can be torsional effects to define design loads are neglected or can be uncoupled form each other so given in Subsection 3.7.2.11. that separate analyses can be performed for different types of motions. The model shown in Figure 3.7 31 corresponds to the X Z plant The only differences in terms - Coupling between the two borizontal motions of schematic representation between the X Z and occurs when the center of mass, the centroid, and Y Z plane models are that (1) the two building the center of rigidity do not coincide. The walls represented above EL 18.5 m (60.7ft) in degree of coupling depends on the amount of the X-Z plane by two sticks combine into one eccentricity and the ratio of the uncoupled stick in the Y Z plane, and (2) the rotational torsional frequency to the uncoc. pled lateral spring between the RCCV top slab (node 90) and frequency. Since lateral / torsional coupling and the basemat top (node 88) is presented only in torsional response can significantly influence the X Z plane, floor accelerations, structures are in general designed to keep minimum eccentricities. Each structure in the reactor building Howeser, for analysis of structures that possess complex is idealized by a center lined stick unusual eccentricities, a model of the support model of a series of mauless beam elements. building is developed to include the effect of Axial, flexural, and shear deformation effects lateral /torsinnal coupliug. are included in formulating beam stiffness terms. Coupling between individual structures 3.7 1 1.5.1.1 Reactor Building and Reactor is modeled by linear spring elements. Masses Pressure Vessel including dead weights of structural elements. equipment weights and piping weights are lumped The reactor building (RB) complex includes: to nodal p Ents. The weights of water in the Mendment 1 3
AB M usu m Standard Plant _ pn a spent fuel storage pool and the suppression pool reactor pedestal is a cylindrical structure of a are also considered and lumped to appropriate composite steel. concrete design. The total locations. stiffness of tbc pedestal includes the full strength of the concre:e core. Mass points are The portions of the reactor buildin,; autside selected at equipment interface locations and the RCCV are box type shear wall systems of geometrical discontinuities. In addition, reinforced concrete construction. The major intermediate mass points are chosen to result in waUs between floor slabs are represented by beam more uniform mass distribution. ~. ae pedestal elements of a box cross section. The shear supports the reactor pressure sessel and it also rigidity in the dir ection of excitation is provides lateral restraint to the reactor prunded by the parallel w alls. The bending control rod drise housings below the sessel. rigidity includes the cros walls contribution. The top o' the RSW is connected to the RPV by The reactor building is fully integrated with the the RPV stabilizers which are modeled as spring RCCV through floor slabs at sarious elesations. elements. Spring elements are used to represent the slab in. plane shear stif fness in the horizontal The model of the RPV and its internal direction. The outer and inner walls between EL. components is described in Subsection 44 7 m (146 6ft) and IU m (60.7ft) alot.; the X 3.713.2. This model as shown in Figure 3332 direction are also coupled rigidly in rotation is coupled with the abose described RB model for about the Y axis at the connecting slab the seismic analysis. locations. In the sertical direction a single mass point is used for each slab and it is 3.7.2.1.5.1.2 Control Building connected to the walls and RCCV by spring elements. The spring stiffness is determined so The control building dynamic model is shown that the fundamental frequency of the slab in the in Figure 3.7 33. The control building is box verticai direction is maintained. type shear wall system reinforced concrete. The major walls between floor slabs are represented The RCCV is a cylindrical structure with a by beam elements of a box cross section. The flat top slab with the drywell opening, which, shear rigidity in the direction of excitation is along with upper pool girders and reactor provied by the parallel walls. The bending building walls, form the upper pool. Mass points rigidity includes the cress walls contribution are selected at the RB floor slab locations. In the vertical direction a single mass point is Stiffnesses are represented by a series c,1 beam used for each slab and it is connected to the elements. In the X-Z plane, a rotational spring walls by spring elements. The spring element element connecting the top slab and the basemat stiffness is determined so that the fundamental is used to account for the additional rotational frequency of the slab in the vertical direction rigidity provided by tne integrated RCCV. pool is maintained. girder-building walls system. Tbc RCCV is also 3upled to the RPV through the refueling bellows, 3.7.2.1.5.1.3 Radwaste Building to the RSW through the RSW stabilizers, and to the reactor pedestal through the diaphragm The radwaste building dynamic model is shown floo r. Spring elements are used to account for in Figure 3.7 34. The radwaste building is box these interactions. The lower drywell access type shear wall system of reinforced cot. rete. tunnels spanning between the RCCV and the reactor The major walls between floor slabs are pedestal are not modeled since flexible rings are represented by beam elements of a box cross j prosided which are designed to reduce the section. The shear rigidity in the direction of coupling effects. excitation is provided by the parallel walls ; The bending rigidity includes the cross walls The RSW consists of two steel ring plates with contribution. In the vertical direction a concrete fill in between for shielding purposes. singic .nass point is used for each slab and it Concrete in the RSW does not contribute to is connected to the walls by spring elemenn stif fness; but its weight is included. The The spring element stiffness is determined so AmeMmem 19 3
ABWR uwxat Standard Plant prv a that the fundamental frequency of the slab in the sertical direction is maintained. 3.7.2.13.2 Rocidag and Torsional Effects Rocking effects due to horizontal ground mosement are considered in the soil structure interaction analysis as described in Appendix 3A. Wheneser building response is calculated from a second step structural analysis, rocking effects are included as input simultaneously applied with the horizontal translational motion at the basemat. The torsional effect considered is described in Subsection 3.7.2.11, 3.7.2.1J.3 Hydrodynamic EITects For a dynamic system in which a liquid such as water is invohed, the hydrodynamic effects on adjacent structures due to horizootal excita-tion are taken into consideration by including hydrodynamic mass coupling terms in the mass matrix. The basic formulas used for computing these terms are in Reference 4 In the vertical excitation, the hydrodynamic coupling effects Amendment 18
ABM UA$rXAE Standard Plant uv s are assumed to be negligible and the water mass Rr = Fundamental frequency of the supported is lumped to appropriate structural locations. subsystem / frequency of the dominant support motion 3.722 Natural Frequencies and Response Loads If the subsystem is comparatively rigid in The natural frequencies up .o 33 Hz for the relation to the supporting system, and also is reactor-control buildings and radwaste are rigidly connected to the supporting system, it presented in Tables 3 '-2 through 3.7-5 and is sufficient to include only the ciass of the 3.710 for the fixed base condition. subsystem at the support point in the primary spte:n model. On the other hand, in case of a Enseloped response load, at key locations in subsystem supported by very flexible the reactor building complex due to OBE for the connections, e g., pipe supported by hangers, range of site conditions considered in Appendix the subsystem need not be included in the 3A are presented in Appendix 3G Response primary model. In most cases the equipment and spectra at the major equipment elevations and components, which come under the definitior of support points are also given in Appendix 3G. subsystems, are analyzed (or tested) as a decoupled system from the primary structure and The SSE loads are two times the OBE loads as the seismic input for the former is obtained by explained in Subsection 3.7.1.2. the analysis of the latter. One important exception to this procedure is the reactor 3.7.2J Procedure l' sed for Stodeling coolant system, which is considered a subsystem but is usually analyzed using a coupled model of 3.1.2.3.1 Stodeling Techniques for Sptems the reactor coolant system and primary Other Than Reactor Pressure Vessel structure. An important step in the seismic analysis of in the second method of modeling, the systems other than the reactor pressure vessel is structure of the system is represented as a two. the procedure used for modeling. The techniques or three dimensional finite element model using center around two methods. The first method, the comM'stions of beam, plate, shell, and solid system is represented by lumped masses and a set elem scs. The details of the mathematical of spring dashpots idealizing both the inertial models are determined by the complexity of the and stiffness properties of the system. The actual structures and the information required details of the mathematical models are determined for the analysis. by the complexity of the actual structures and the information required for the analysis. For 3.7.2.3.2 51odeling of Reactor Pressure Vessel the decoupling of the s tbsystem and the and Internals supporting system, the following criteria equivalent to the SRP requirements are used: The seismic loads on the RPV and reactor internals are based on coupled dynamic analysis (1) If Rm 10.01, decoupling can be cone for with the reactor building. The mathematical any R t. model of the RPV and internals is shown in Figure 3.7 32. This modelis coupled with the (2) If 0.011 Rm 10.1, decoupling can be done reactor building model for this analysis. if Rr 10.8 or R t.it.1.25. The RPV and internals mathematical model (3) If Rm > 0.1, an approximate model of the consists of lutnped masses connected by clastic subsystem should be included in the primary beam element members. Using the elastic proper-system model. ties of the structural components, the stiffness properties of the model are determined and the Where R m and Rtare defined as: effects of axial bending and shear are included. Rm= Tota: ..iass of the supported system / Mass points are located at all points of N! ass that supports the subsystem critical interest such as anchors, supporis. AmcMment 18 3 *.7
I I MN uwmr Standard Plant prv 4 l points of discontinuity, etc. In addition. mass then obtainie. its natural frequencies and mode points are chosen so that the mass distribution shapes. The dynamic response at the mass points i in sarious zones is uniform as practicable and is subsequently obtained by using a tirne bistory the full range of frequency of response of inte- approach. rest is adequately represented. Further, in , order to f acilitate hydrodynamic mass calcula- Using the acceleration time history response tions, seseral mass points (fuel, shroud, sessel) of a particular mass point, a spectrum response are selected at the same ekvation. The RPV and curve is developed and incorporated into a internals are quite stiff in the vertical diree- design acceleration spectrum to be utilized for tion. Vertical modes in the frequency range of tbc seismic analysis of equipment located at the interest are adequately obtained with few dynamic mass point. Horizontal and vertical response degrees of freedom. Therefore, sertical masses spectra are computed for various damping values are distributed to a few key nodal points. The applicable for OBE and SSE evaluation of sarious length of control rod drise housing are equipment. Two orthogonal borizontal and one grouped in to the two representatise lengths vertical earthquake component are input shown in Figure 3.7 32. These lengths represent se p a r a t e ly. Response spectra at selected the longest and shortest bousing in order to locations are then generated for each earthquake adequately represent the full range of frequency component separately. They are combined using response of the housings. the square root of .be sum of the squares (SRSS) method to predict the total co directional floor Not included in the mathematical model are the response spectrum f or tbat patticular stiffness proper'ies of light components, such as frequency. This procedure is carried out for in core guide tubes and housings, sparger, and each site soil case used in the soil structure their supply headers. This is done to reduce the interaction analysis. Response spectra for all complexity of the dynamic model. For tbc seismic site soil cases are finally combined to arrise responses of these compor 2ts, floor response at one set of final response spectra spectra generated from systern analysis is used. An altarnate approach to obtain co direc-The presence of a fluid and other structural tional floor response spectra is to perform components (e g., fuel within the RPV) introduces dynamic analysis with simultaneous input of a dynamic coupling effect. Dynamic effects of various carthquake components if those water enclosed by the RPV are accounted for by components are statistically independent to each introduction of a hydrodynamic mass matrix which other. will serve to link the acceleration terms of the equations of motion of points at the same The SSE floor response spectra are obtained clesation in concentric cylinders with a fluid by doubling the OBE response spectra as entrapped in the annulus. The details of the explained in Subsection 3.7.1.3. hydrodynamic mass derivation are given in Reference 4 The response spectra values are computed as a minimum either at frequency internis as 3.7.2A Soil Structure lateraction specified in Table 3.7.11 of SRP 3.7.1 or at a set of frequencies in which each frequency is The soil model and soil structure interaction within 10% of the previous one. analysis are described in Appendix 3A. 3.7.2.6 Three Components of Earthquake Motion 3.7.2.5 Deselopment of Floor Response Spectra The three components of earthquake motion are In order to predict the seismic effects on considered in the building seismic analyses. To equipment located at various elevations within a properly account for the responses of systems structure, floor response spectra are developed subjected to the three directional excitation, a using a time bistory analysis technique. statistical combination is used to obtain the net response according n the SRSS criterion of The procedure entails first developing the Regulatory Guide 1.52. The SRSS method accounts mathematical model assuming a linear system and for the randomness of magnitude and direction of .uneneent 1 3'
ABM Sjandard Plant un m ut 1 i p3 carthquake motion. The SRSS criterion, applied the maximum acceleration range having the to the responses associated with the three same amplification factor as the most components of ground earthquake motion, is used strongly amplified. - for seismic stress computation for steel structural design as well as for resultant (2) The time history used to calculate the floor seismic niember force computations for reinforced response spectra produces a ground response concrete structural design. which envelopes the design ground response spectra. In order to do this, it bas 3.7.2.7 Combination of 3fodal Response spec:re peaks which are substantialis hight r than the design spectra. Since only the time-history method is used for seismic system analysis, the response spectrum (3) The building and soil damping values used in combination of modal responses is nor applied, the analysis ue near the lower bound of the available damping data. The actual salues 3.7.2.8 Inter 3ction of Non Category I of darnping are expected to be much higher Structures with Seistnic Category I Structures than the values used in the analysis. The interfaces between Seismic Category I and (s) Tbc yield strengths used in the analysis are non Scismic Category I structures and plant based on the minimum values and are equipment are designed for the dynamic loads and considerably lower than expected values. displacements produced by both the Category I and non Category I structures and plant equipment. (5) The additional strength and damping that is All non Category I structures will meet any one available when materials are stressed beyond of thc following requirements: yield are neglected when using linear classic analytical methods. (1) The collapse of any non Category I structure will not cause the non Category I structure (6) The working stresses for most equipment are to strike a Seismic Category I structure usually considerably below the yield component. stresses. (2) The collapse of any non Category I structure (7) The calculated natural frequencies of will not impair the integrity of Seismic equipment are usually lower than actual Category I structures or components because of conservative m o d e lin g assumptions. (3) The non-Category I structures will be analyzed and designed to prevent their These elements of conservatism ate in series failure under SSE conditions in manner such (i.e., they are compounded), which results in an that the margin of safety of these structures extremely conservatise design. T he only reason is equivalent to that of Seismic Category I for broadening the spectra at all is to account structures. for the unlikely possibility that a particular piece of equipinent might have a natural 3.7.2.9 Effects of Parameter Variations on f requency which is not on the calculated I'loor Response Spectra spectral peak but is on the real peak. The fo' lowing conservative assumptions are Since the peaks characteristic of the low included in the calculation of the floor response damping response are narrow, such an occurreece spectra: is extremely improbable. Fven if this eventuality does occur, the extreme conservatism (1) The expected actual earthquake time histories described above ensures seismic adequacy of are enveloped by a smooth ground response equipment design. Further, the floor response spectrum for design use. The smooth curve rpectra obtained fror ne time history anatysis leads to conservative effects on modal of the building are F ed plus and minus 10% analysis because it treats all the modes in in frequency. A! vely, peak shifting Amendment t 3D
ABWR mmt , Standardflant my method of ASME Code Case N W, as permitted by 3.7.2.13 Methods for Selimic Analysis of Regulatory Gwde 1 S4, Reusion 24, is used Category i Dams The broadening method of accounting for The analysis of all Category I dams, if sariations causes modes baung freqt,encies near a pplic a ble f or the sit e, Ia king in t o ' the spectral peaks to be calculated as though consideration the dynamic nature c. forces (due they esperience the peak acceleration. This is to both horirontal and vertical earthquakr quite consersatise because the spectra for the loadings), the bebastor of the com material actual strutture base only one narrow peak under earthquake loadings, soil structure somewhere in the 209 broadened range interaction effects, and nonlinear stressatrain relations for the soil, will be used. Analyus 3,7.2.10 Use of Constant Vertical Static of earth. filled dams, if applicable, includes an, f actors evaluation af deformations. Since all seismic Category I uructures anil 3.7.2.14 Detennination of Seismic Category I the RPV are subjected to a vertical dynamic Structurt (herturning Moments analyus with a time history defining the input, no constant settical static factors are utilized Scistnic load: are dynamic in nature The method of calculating seismic loads w1th dynamic 3.7111 Methodi Used to Account for Torsional analysis and then treating them as static loads Effr(ts to evaluate the osetturning of structures and f oundation f ailures
- bile treating the Toruonal effects for two.dtmensional analyt- fouridation materials as linear clastic is ical models are accounted for in the following conservative. Overturning of the structure, manner The locations of the center of mass are assuming no soil slip failure occurs, can be calculated for each Door. The centers of rigid. ccused only by the center of gravity of the ity and rotational stiffness are determined for stracture moving far enough horizontalls to eac h story. Torsion effects are introduced in cause instability.
each story by applying a rotational moment about its center of rigidity The totatiorial moment is Pursbermore, wt n the combined effect of calculated as the sum of the products of the in. carthquake ground moti;n cod spctural response
- ertia! force applied at the center of mass of is strong enough, t $ sitw e undergoes a each Door abose and a moment arm equal to the rocking motion pivd ig abca citier edge of the distance fron, the center of mass of the Moor to base. When the au.s.tude of .ocki 1 moto 15,e center of rigidity of the story plus fisc becomes so large that the center of structure '
percent of the manmum building dimension at the mass reaches a position . 3bt above citber edgs leul under consideration. To be conservatise, of the base, the structure becomes unstable and the absolute values of the moments are used in may tip over. The mechanism of the rocking tbc sum. The torsional moment and story shear motion is like an inverted peudulum a o its are distributed to the resisting structural ele, natural period is long compared with the linear, ments in proportion to each individual stiffness, clastic struc tural response. Thus with regard to overturning, the structure is treated as a The RPV model is arisymmetric with no built in rigid body, e c c e nt ricit y. Hence, the torsional effects for the RPV are only those associated with the The maximum kinetic energy can be conserva-reactor building model, tisely estimated to be 3.7.2.12 Comparison of Responses E=1 g E mj (vn) 2 + (vy) 2 2i I *, (3.7 5) Since only the time.bistory method is used for structural analysis, the responses obtained from where ($H) and (vy)are the maximum values of response spectrum and tiene. history methods are the total lateral $clocity and 'atal vertical l not compared velocity, tespectively, of mass m;. I dlMfidMf f%l t )*,' l
M uAunt Standard Plant m, V aiue s (o: (vHIi aad (vv)3 a r e eompu ed a s Ioilow s ; (2) An eigenvalue analpis of the linear system
)
model is performed. This results in the i eigenvector matrices (di) which are ' (vg) = (vd 2 + pu) 2 normalized and satisfy the orthogonality 8 I E (3.7 9) conditions: ) (3.7 12) by) 2 = (v r) 2
- DY) 2 T 4' g 4 . v , and $Ti K4j 2
i ' s (3.7 10) 8
= 0 for igirj where (vH)g and (vy)g are the pe ak where horizontal and vertical ground selocity, espectis ely, and (vi )j and (vr): are the K = stiffness matrix; maximum values of the relative lateral and i scrtical velocity of man mi. wi =
circular natural frequeng asso. , cisted with mode i; and i
' tting mo be total mass of the structure and rase mat, the energy required to overturn the 4T structure n equal to 8 = transpose of th mode eigen.
En=mgb vector 4( ; a (3.7 11) Matrix 4 contains all translational and where h in the height to which the center of mass rotational coordinates. of the situcture must be lifted to reach the oserturning P0sition. Because the structure may (3) Using the strain energy of tbc individual not be a symmetrical one, the value of b is components as a weighting function, the computed with respect to the edge that is neater following equation is derived to obtain a ; to the center of mass. The structure is defined suitable damping ratio (Bi) for mode i. ! as stable against overturning when the ratio E n to Es exceeds 1.5. g , (3.7 13 ) ! These calculations assume the structure rests B*ha g Cj (f K4j); i on the ground surface, hence, are conservative i j=1 because the structure is actually embedded to a considerable depth. The embedded effect is where considered only when the rptio Eo to Es is less than 1.5. Si = modal damping coefficient for ith mode; 3.7.2.15 Analysis Proceduct for Damplag N = total number of. structural in a linear dynamic analysis using a modal elements;
.uperposition approach, the procedure to be used to properly account for damping in different gg = component of i th mode elements of a coupled system modelis as follows: eigenvector corresponding to ,tb elementt (1) The structural percent critical damping of the various structural elements of the model (TI = Transpose oldi efined d abose; is first specified. Each value is referred l to ularascomponent the damping which ratio (Cj)ibutes to theof a partic.
contr = percent critical da m pio; Cj complete stiffness of the system, associated with eleme nt j; Amendment 1 3 ' II w m-<w + =-r - w ,3w.- .o ,eer w ry& g,~, - .ge e m s ye,e,.v-nve.,-ee -.r.ew.we2,--e,--%,r . - e .-r e me, m e e w. r u - ry r-y..,,cyr ,, w
ABWR Standard Plant mm m, K = stiffness matrix of element j; and described in Subsection 3.7.2.1.1 generates titnebistories at various support elesatwas foi
.; = circulas natural frequency of mode use in the analysis of subsystems and i.
equipment. The structural response spectra curses are subsequently generated from the time 3.7.3 Seismic Subs) stem Analysis history accelciations. 3.U.1 Seismic toaMis Methods it each !csel of the structure where sital coeuponents are located, three orthogonal This subsection discusses the methods by which components of floor response spectra, two seamic Category I subsystems and components are horizontal and one vertical, are de$ eloped. The qualified to coture the functional integrity of floor response spectrum is smootbed and the specific operating requirernents which enselopes all calculated response spectra froen c h a r a ct e rize t h eir seismic Cat e gory I different site soil conditio as. Tbc response d e sa go ation , spectra are peak broadened plus or minus 10% When components are suppcrted at two or more lo general, one of the following five methods elevations, the response spectra of each of seismically qualifying the equiprocat is chosen elevation are superimposed and the resulting based upon the characteristics and complexitiet spectrum is the upper bound covelope of all the of the subsystem: iodindual spectrum curves considered. r (1) dynamic analysis; ( For y(brating systemyaod theff suppo s, multi degree ef.freedod modely are use in Q testing procedcres; #l O) eqwvalent static load method o analysa; M.b accordance Mtb the lumped parameter modeling tecaniqueslnd normaf mode the'o ry described in Ji'u b s e c tio n 3. 71.1.1. P) fin g a lilysis is d e s c rjf e d in S/b s e c t ioji 3.7.3. .1. (4) a combination of (1) and (2); or When testing is used to qualify Seismic (5) a combination of (2) and (3). Category I subsystems and components, all the loads normally acting on the equipment are Equivalent static lond method of subsystem simulated during the test. The actual mounting analysis is described in Subsection 3.7.3.5. of the equipment is also simulated or duplicated. Tests are performed by supplying Appropriate design response spectra (OBE and input accelerations to the shake table to such SSE) are furnished to the manufacturer of the an extent that generated test response spectra equipment for seismic qualification purposes. (TRS) envelope the required response spectra. Additional information such as input time history
.: Wa n'pplied only when necessary. For certain Seismic Category I equipment and compoocess where dynamic testing is necessarv to When analysis is used to qualify Seismic ensure functional integrity, test performance Category I subsystems atd componcats, the data and results reflect the following:
analytical tecbsiques must conservative ly account for tbe dynamic nature of she subsystems or (1) performance data of equipment which has been components. Both the SSE and OBE, with their subjected to dynamic loads equal to or difference in damping values, are considered in greater than those expericaced under the the dynamic analysis as explained in Subsection specified teismic conditionst 3.7.1.3. (2) test data from previously tested comparable
--Tie ;eee!:! 2pp::::h :=p!:pd b :he dp;mie equipment which has been subjected under analms-of 44ismiMM*t**4-+4 E P*+:: ::d- similar conditions to dynamic loads equal to emeow4+d g : a b:::d :: :he :::per u or greater than those specified; and
-94 mum 4*kaQue. The time history technique The-dynamic analysis of Seismic Category I subsystems and components is accomplished using the response spectrum or m time-history approach. Time History analysis is performed using either the direct integration method or the modal superposition method.
& GENuclear Energy Alv
,.c ATTACHMENT A for page 3.7-14 1
I For vibrating systems and their supports, two general methods are used to obtain the solution of the equations of dynamic equilibrium of a multi-degree-of-freedom model. I The first is the Method of Modal Superposition described in ' subsection 3.7.2.1.2. The second method i of dynamic analysis is the Direct Integration Method. I vit solution of the equations of motion is obtained by i
':re: t step-by-step numerical integration. The numerical l 1.Msgration time step,6t, must be sufficiently small to accurately define the dynamic excitation and to render i stability and convergency of the solution up to the highest frequency of significance.
l The integration time step is considered acceptable when smaller time steps introduce no more than a lot error in the total dynamic response. For most of the commonly used numerical integration methods (such as Newmark6 -method and Wilson 6- method), the i maximum time step is limited to one-tenth of the smallest period of interest. The smallest period of interest is generally the reciprocal of the analysis cutoff frequency. When the time-history method of analysis is used, the time-history data is broadened plus and minus 15% of At in order to account for modeling uncertainties. For loads such as safety-Relief Valve blowdown, tests have been performcd which confirm the conservatism of the analytical results. Therefore, for these loads the calculated force time-histories are not broadened plus and minus 15% of Lt. Piping modeling and dynamic analysis are described l in subsection 3.7.3.3.1. i i l 1 NEO R7 iAf v a e81 l \ t
t I ABWR Standardflant Wstxn m., (3) actual testing of equipment in accordance witt, one of the methods described in (1) the fundamental frequency and peak seismic Subsection 3.9.2.2 and Section 3.10. loads are found by a standard seismic analysis (i.e from eigen extraction and 3.7J.2 Detertolastion of Number of Earthquake forced response analysis); Cycles . (2) the number of cycles which the component 3.7.3.2.1 piping experiences are found from Table 316 according to the frequency range within Fifty (50) peak OBE cycles are postulated for which the fundamental frequency lien and fatigue esaluation. (3) for f atigue evaluation, one half percent [ 3.7.3.2.2 Other Equipment and Components (0.005) of these cycles is conservatisely assumed to be at the peak load, and 4 59 Criterion ll.2.b of SRP Section 3.73 recom. (0.045) at the three quarter peak. The mends that at least one safe shutdown earthquake remainder of the cycles have negligible > (SSE) and the operating basis earthquakes (OBEs) contribution to fatigue usage. should be assumed during the plant life. It also ,
?
recommends that a minimum of 10 maumum stress The SSE has the highest level of response cycles per carthquake should be assumed (i.e.,10 Howeve , the encounter probability of the SSE is cycles for SSE and 50 cycles for OBE). For so sm. I that it is not necessary to postulate equipment and co.nponents other than piping,10 the possibility of more than one SSE during the peak OBE stress cycles are postulated for fatigue 60. year life of a plant, Fatigue t <aluation due evaluation based on the following justification, te the SSE is not necessary since it is a - faulted condition and thus not required by ASME To evaluate tbc number of cycles engendered by Code Section III. a given earthquake, a typical Boiling Water Reac. ter Building teactor dynamic model was excited by The OBE is an upset condition and is included three different recorded time histories: May 18, in fatigue evaluations according to ASME Code 1940. El Centro NS component,29.4 see: 1952, Section Ill. Investigation of seismic bistories Taft N69* W component, 30 see; and March for many plants show that during a 60 year _ life 1957, Golden Gates 39 E component,13.2 rec. It is probable that five carthquakes with The modal response was truncated so that the icensities one. tenth of the $$E intensity, and response of three different frequency bandwidths one earthquake approximately 20% of the proposed could be studied. 0 %to.10 Hr.10.to.20 Hz, and SSE intensity, will occur. The 60 year life 20 to.50 Hr. This was done to give a good corresponds to 40 years of actual plant approximation to the cyclic behavior espected operation divided by a 67% usage factor. To from structures with different frequency cot; tent, cover the comoined effects of these earthquakes and the cunnulative effects of even esser Engelop;ng the results from the three earth, earthquakes,10 peak OBE stress cycles are quakes and averaging the results from several postulated for fatigue evaluation. different points of the dynamic model, the cyclic i behavior given in Table 3.7 6 was formed. 3.7JJ Procedure Used for Modeltag ' Independent of earthquake or component 3.7JJ.1 Modelins of Piping Systems i frequency,99.5% of the stress reversals occur ' below 75% of the mammum stsess level, and 95% of 3.7JJ.1.1 Sammary the reversals lie below 50% of the mammum stress level. To predict the dynamic response of a piping system to the specified forcing functio' the in summary, the cyclic behavior number of dynamic model must adequately accoun' .c all fatigue cycles of a component during a carthquake significant modes. Careful selection must be-is found in the following manner: made of the proper response spectrum curses and Amnomeni t 3W
.1
, , - ,,m - . . - - . . .
. .,_..-._,,,,___.___.,___.._.,,._,.m_._ .._,__....._.m,,_m.,,...-. . - - . - .--4
t u) O A ny:x q Sandard Pl. ant my prop:r location of anchors in order to separate The stiffness matrix at the attachment Icca I 5eismic Category I f rom non Category I piping tion of the process pipe (i e , main steam. systems. RHR supply and return, RC!C etc 1 beaJ l fitting a sufficiently high to decoupl: tne 3 *JJ.!J 5 election of Slass Points penetration assembly from th: prec:ss piet Pr:vious analysis indicates that a sans.
'b:n p:rictming a dsnamic anaksis, a pir. 4 factory =inimum stiffness for Ibis attacom:nt syste , is icealized :ither as a mathem scal point is equal to the stif' ness in bendine moc:1 nusung of lump:d masses corprtct:d by and toruon of a cantileserec pipe scenen ci f pe:gntle , ciasuc memoers or as 4 consiste:it the same size as the process pipe and ::ual nass mod: Tb: :tasuc membe[are gnen the 1:: len;th to thrt: times th: proc:ss pipe P prop:rties c, tne piping syst% being anaisted. outer diameter.
gg The mass poi t s a r e c aff f ul,y lo c a t e d t o aj:;uatel'+ r:pr:. nt trfdynaeuc propern:s of For a piping syst:m supported at mor: tnan
, tn: piping s,st:m. nass point is laccred at two points located at differ:nt elesation: :n tne regin:nng and epd i esery ! bow or vane, at the butiding, the response spectrum ananus is
- he ext:nded v fve t e *ator, and at tbe performed using the enselope respons: spec: rum interse ction r every tet n straight runs, of all attachment points. Alternatis ch. In:
mass points tre located at sea ings no greater multiple support excitation anai> sis methods mas than the syln length corresponcin. to D Hr. A be used wnere m .
-m- -
m a r an po .t is located at every ett:ne d mass to r:sponse spectra are applied at all trie piping
.i c c o u . t f or torsional ef f ects on t. piping attachment points. Final!), th: worst ur ;t:
spt / in addition. the incr:ased stiffn. s and floor response spectrum seiected from a set M m s of san:s are consid:r:d in the modeh. ' of floor response spectra obtain:d at sarious piping sptem, floors may be applied identically to all floors prouded it envelops the other floor response speetta in the set. 3.72).1J Selection of Spectrum Cunes 4 [pr a .c
. In seleenng the spectrum curve to be used for 3.7JJJ Stodeling uf Equipment dsnacuc analyus of a particular piping system, a curve is cncstn which most closely describes the For dynamic analysis. Setsmic Categer. !
acceierations custing at the end points and equipment is represented by lumped mass surems
' restraints ot' In: sy stem. The precedure for de- which consist of dircrete masses connectcJ b cru;hng smail branch lines from the main run of weighti:ss springs. The criteria us:d to lump Seismic Category 1 piping systems when estab. masses are:
lahin; th: anahtical r.odels to perform seismic anaissis at: as follows: . (1) The number of modes of a dynamic system is controlled by the number of masses used; m The sma!! Manch lines are decoupled from the mam therefore, the' number of masses is chosen so nms 4f the <ano of run to branch pipe moment of that all significant modes are included
~
mcma n .S to 1, or more, j The modes are considered as significant if the corresponding natural frequenti:s at: Q The stiffness of all the anchors and its less than 33 Hz and the stt:sses calculat:d s apporting steel is large enough to from these modes are greater than 10cc of the effectively decouple the piping on either total stresses obtained from lower modes. side of the anchor for analytic and code This approach is acceptable prouded at jurisdicnonal boundary purposes The RPV is l e a s t 9 0 "o of the loading /ine rtia is very stiff compared to the piping system and contained in the cnodes used. Alternatelb there fore, it is modeled as an anchor. P:netration assemblies (head fittings and penetration sleeve pipe) at: very stiff compared to the piping system and are model:d as anchors. AtatMment 21 *\*.s# oo - - - - -- m
. - ._-_ . = _ _ . . _ _ - _ _ _ - . - _ - - _ _ . _ - - - -- --
& GENuclear Energy HEV ATTACHMENT B for page 3.7-16 3.7.3.3.1.2 Selection of Mass Points Mathematical models for Seismic Category I piping systems are constructed to reflect the dynamic characteristics of the system. The continuous system is modelled is an assemblage of pipe elements supported by hangers, guides, anchors, struts and snubbers. Pipe and hydrodynamic masses are lumped at the nodes and are connected by weightless clastic beam elements which reflect the physical proporties of the corresponding piping segment. The nodo points are selected to coincide with the locations of large masses, such as valves, pumps and motors, and with locations of significant geometry change. All pipe mounted equipment, such as valves, pumps and motors, are nodelled with lumped masses connected by clastic beam elements which reflect the physical proporties of the pipe mounted equipment. The torsional effects of valve operators and other pipe mounted (guipment with of fset centers of gravity with respect to the piping center line are included in the mathematical model, on straight runs, mass points are located at spacings no greater than the span which would have a fundamental frequency equal to the cutoff frequency stipulated in Subsection 3.7 when calculated as a simply supported beam with uniformly distributed mass.
NEO su':REV 4 661
l
> GENuclear Energy .,
mv ATTACHMENT C to page 3.7-16 3.7.3.3.1.7 Modelling of Special Engineered Pipe Supports Modifications to the normal linear-elastic piping analysis methodology used with conventional pipe supports are required to calculate the loads acting on the supports and on the piping components when the special engineered supports, described in Subsection 3.9.3.4.1(6), are used. l These modifications are needed to account for greater I damping of the energy absorbers and the non-linear behavior of the limit stops. If these special devices are used, the , modeling and analytical methodology will be in accordance ' with methodology accepted by the regulatory agency at the time of certification or at the time of application, per the discretion of the applicant. 3.7.3.3.1.5 Selection of Input Time-Histories "In selecting the acceleration time-history to be used for dynamic analysis of a piping system, the time-history chosen is one which most closely describes the accelerations existing at the piping support attachment points. For a piping system supported at more than two points located at different elevations in the building, the time-history analysis is performed using the independent support motion method where acceleration time histories are input at all of the piping structural attachment points." 3.7.3.3.1.6 Modeling of Piping Supports Snubbers are modeled with an equivalent stiftness which is based on dynamic tests performed on prototype snubber assemblies or on dcta provided by the vendor. Struts are modeled with a stiffness calculated based on their length and cross-sectional properties. Tne stiffness of the supporting structure for snubbers and struts is included in the piping analysis model, unless the supporting structure can be considered rigid relative to the piping. The supporting structure can be considered as rigid relative to the piping as long as the criteria specified in Subsection 3.7.3.3.4 are met. Anchors at equipment such as tanks, pumps and heat exchangers are modeled with calculated stiffness proporties. Frame type pipe supports are modeled as described in Subsection 3.7.3.3.4. NEO8014AEv 4.681
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. ABWR PROGRA515 h!ECliANICAL SYSTEhtS DESIGN bvM/#7uh)
FILE: hili A13 DISTRIBUTION: DATE: AUGUST 27,199': TO: h1ARYANN lier 7OG FRohl: E.O. SWAIN
SUBJECT:
AUDIT ITEh! A 13 RESPONSE SPECTRA AT DECOUPLED PIPE CONNECTION
~
sepi (, 3.7.3.3.1. Dynamic Analysis of Dategory 1. Decoupled Branch Pipe Sel%;c, . The dynamic analysis of' Category 1, decoupled branch pipe is performed either the equivalent static method or by one of the dynamic analysis methods descri ed in the SSAR. In addition small bore branch' pipe may be ' designed and analyzed in accordance with a small bore pipe manual in accordance with the requirements of Paragraph 3.7.3.8.1.9. The response spectra used for the dynamic analysis or for determining the static input load when the equivalent static method is used will be selected as follows: (1) The response spectra will be based on the building or structure elevation of the branch line connection to the run pipe and :he elevation of the branch line anchors and restraints (2) The res onse spectra will not be less than the envelope of the response spectra use in the dynamic analysis of run pi e. Whfi&thon b the run pV>e. mus de 4Ccamh l b'** S CDC$ (3 If the location o branch connection to the run pipe is more than three run pipe diameters from the nearest run pipe seismic restraint, amplification by the run pipe will be accounted for. When the equivalent static analysis method is used, the horizontal and vertical load coefficients, Cs and C Paragraph 3.7.3.8.1.5.y, applied to the response spectra accelerations will conform with The relative anchor motions to be used in either static or dynamic analysis of the , decoupled branch pipe shall be as follows: (1) The inertial displacements only, as determined from analysis of the run pipe, may be applied to the branch pipe'if the relative differential building movements of the large pipe supports and the branch pipe supports are less than 1/16". (2) If the relative differential building movements of the large pipe supports and-the branch pe supports are more than 1/16", motion of the restraints and anchors of e branch pipe must be considered in addition to the inertial displaceme. : of the run pipe.
- - , , , a w , ,.n--, - a - - - . , s- - < , . , + - -m,-
. , ,-.-an-- u
ABWR zwa Sudard Plant uv s the number of degrees of freedom are taken engineer. An additional examination of these more than twice the number cf modes sith supports and restraining devices is made to frequencies less than 33 Hr. assure that their location and characteristics are consistent with the dynamic and static (:) Mass is lumped at any point where a analyses of the :) sten.. significant concentrated weight is located (e.g., tbc tuotor iu the analysis of pump 3 :3 3.I Anatssis of Frarne Trpe Pure suppons motor stood, tbc impellet in tbc analysis of pump shaft, etc). The design loads on frame type pipe supports mclude (al loads transmated to the suppon by the pipmg (3) li the equipment has free *end ovetberg span response to thermal expansion. Jead neight. and the ssth fictibility significsot compared to the inertia and anchor motion effects, and (bl suppon ctr:tet span, a mass is lumped at (be ovetbang mtemalloads caused by the neight dermal and memt span. effct ts of loads of the structure itself, and (c) fncnon loads caused by the pipe sliding on the support. To (4) Wbec a mass is lumped berveen two supports, calculate the frictieral force acting on the support, at is located at a potDt ubete the maximum dvtamic loads that are cyclic in nature need not be dispiecttoent is exytt1ed tc occur. This considered. The coefjicient offriction useJ wdl be static teeds ta loset tbe oatural Itequeocies of the coefficients and udt be substannated by actual test data equipment becaust tbt equipment itequencies covenng the range of rnatenals. geometry and loadmg are in tbe bigbet spccttal taoge of ihe conditwn. To detennine the response of the suppon response speetta. Simi1ari), io tbe ease oi structure to applied dynamic loads, the equivalent statsc lac loads (mobile) and a variable support load method o$ analysis described in Paragraph stificess, the location of the load and the 313813 may br used. 7he loads transmitted to the rnagnitudt of support stiffness ett cbosen to suppon by the piping wdi be applicJ as stat c loads yield the lowest frequency content for the actmg on the support. s u t e rn. This cosures conservative dynamic loads since the equiprnent frequencies are As m the case of other suppons, the forces the piping sucb that the floor spectra peak is in the places on the frame type suppon are obtamed from an loser itequeocy racge. If not, the roodel is anaksis of the piping. In the analysts of tu piping the atjusted to gisc toore conservatire resuits. stiffness of the frame type suppons shall be i e':ded in the pipmg analysis model, unless the support can be 3.1.3.33 YieiTLocsdon of Supporu an.' shown i be ngid. The frame type suppons may be Restraints _ 7-- p V / er < t modeled as nxid restraints providing they are destgned so the mamumkdeflection its the direction of the applied The: fteld' location of seismic supports and load is less than 1/lMnch andpading the totalgap or restraintPfor Seismic Category 1 piplog and diametrical clearance gernun the pipe and frarne
- . suppon is between 1/l6 'and 3/1tfnhen the pipe is in piping systems components is selected to satis (y the following two conditions: eith r the hot or cold condition. 4 A// h .f/@
3.7.3.4 Itssls of Sdection of Trsquencies (1) the location selected must furnish the required response to control strain within Where practical,in order to avoid adverse allowable limits; and resenance effects, equipment and components ase I designed / selected such that abeir fundamental (2) adequate building strength and stiffness for frequencies are outside the range of 2/2 to attachment of the component supports must be twice the dominant frequency of the associated :; , available. support structures. Moreover,in any case, the t $ equipment is analyzed and/or tested to Tbc finallocation of seismic supports and re- demonstrate that it is adequately designed for straints for Seismic Category I piping, piping the applicable loads considering both its system components, and equiprocal, including the fundamental frequency and the forcieg frequency
.. placement of soubbers, is checked against the or the opphcable support structure.
I drawings and instructions issued by the t AfetfMtfit J l
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Y Wsixa S1Andard Plarit ,n , the number of degrees of freedom are taken engineer An additional examination of these more than twice the number of modes with { supports and restraining devices is made to ! frequencies less than 33 Hz. ' assure that their location and characteristics are consistent with the dynamic and static (2) Mass is lumped at any point wbere a analyses of the system. l I significant concentrated weight is located ! ge g., the motor in the analysis of pump .UJ.4 Hasis of Selectian of frequencies i motor stand, the impeller in tbc analysis of pump shaft, etc) Where practical, in order to avoid adverse rmnance effects, equipment and compoetets are (3) If the equipment bas free end oserbang st'an designed / selected such that their fundamentai with flexibility significant compared to the frecuencies are outside the range of 1/2 to center span, a mass is lumped at the oserbang twice the dominant frequency of the associated t span. surrott structures. Moreover, in any case, the { equipment is analyzed and/or tested to (a) When a man is lumped berseen two supports, demnnstrate that it is adequately designed for it is located at a point where abe maximum the applicable loads considering both its displacement is expected to occur. This fonemenial frequency and the forcing frequency tends to lower the natural frequencies of the ofihs applicable support structure, equipment because the equipment frequencies are in the bigber s; ectral range of the MI frequencies in the range ef 0.25 to 33 Hz response spectra. Similarly, in the case of arc consittered in the analysis and testing of live loads (mobile) and a variable support uruciures, systems, and components. These stiffness, the location of the load and the frequencies are excited under the seismic magnitude of support stiffness are chosen to c scit ation. yield the lowest frequency content for the system. This ensures conscrsative dynamic if the fundamental frequency of a component loads since the equipment frequencies are is greaict than or equal to 33 Hz,it is treated such that the floor spectra peak is in the as i.ismically rigid and analyzed accordincly lower frequency range. If not, the model is Frequencies less than 0.25 Hz are not considered adjusted to give more conservatise results. as they represent scry flexible structures and are not encountered in this plant. 3.?JJJ Tield locatJon of Supports and Restraints The frequency range between 0.25 Hz and 33 Hz ensers the range of the broad band response The field location of seismic supports and specitum used in the design. restraints for Seismic Category I piping and piping systems components is selected to satisf3 ,UJJ Use nr Equisalent Statie lead Methods the following two conditions: of Analph (1) the location selected must furnish the ,UJJ.1 Suinplems Other Than NSSS required response to control strain within allowable limits; and see subscetion 3.7.3.8.1.5 for equivalent st.itic load analpis method. (:) adequate building strength and stiffness for attachment of the component supports must be 3.?>J.2 NSSS Subsptems asailable. When the natural frequency of a structure of The final location of seismic supports and re. component is unknown, it may be analyzed by straints for Seismic Category I piping, piping applying a static force at the center of mass. system components, and equipment, including the in order to conservatively account for the placement of snubbers,is checked against the pmsibility of more than one significant dynamic drawings and instructions issued by the mmte. the static force is calculated as 1.f Amen &ent 3 3Y'
4 5 AB M usuxst Standard Plant on y titoes the mass times (be masimum spcCtral acceleratico Itom the floor response spectra of Ibc point of attaebments of multispan structures. Tbc (4 Clot of 1.$ is adequate for simpit beam type structures. For other more complicated situelures, (bc factor used is j u st ifie d 3.7J 6 Thru Components of Eersbquake Motjon The total seismic tesponse is predicted by combining the response calculated from tbc two i Amendmem ) 3 *, j .,
#1D Vth Standard Plant mm i,tv 3 boritental and oc thertatidsettical anaksis, Mtd *j N
(.c4 = number of modes consiocred in the anajnis. When the response spectrum method $s used, the method for combining the responses due to Ibe thf ee orthogonal components of seistnic excitation Closely spaced modes are combined by takicg is gisen as follows: the absolute sum of the such modes. 3 ./2 An alternate to tbc absolute sum enethod R*
, presented in Regulatory Guide 1.92 is the i
1 R7.
" *% Ioll0*icS:
(3.7 14) j=1
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1/2 R= wher, , R3+ClRfRml 1 (3.7 16)
,i=1 Rji
= maximum, coaxial seismic response of interest (e g.. displacement, where the second summation is to be done on all moment, shear, stress, strain) in f and m modes whose frequencies are closely directions i due to earthquake spaced to each other.
excitation in direction j, (j - 1, 2,3). 3.7J.7.2 NSSS Subsptems Ri = seismic response of interest in i in a response spectrum modal dynamic direction f or design (e.g., analysis, if the modes are not closely spaced displacement, moment, shear, (i.e., if the frequencies differ from each other stress, strain) obtained by the by more than 10% of the lower frequency), the SRSS rule to account for the modal responses are combined by the nonsimultaneous occurrence of the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS)
' n%R; j's.
sert 4.t f'6 chm 6M method as described in Subsection 3.7.3.7.1 and
- 3. . ,
moin2uon~6tauodai nes D Regulatory Guide 1.92. if some or all of the modes are closely 3.7J.7.1 Subsptems Other nan NSSS spaced, a double sum method, as descrited in Subsectiou 3.7.3.7.2.2, is used to evaluare the When the response spectrum snethod of modal combin:d response. In a time history method of anal.ssis is used, contributions from all modes, dynamic analysis, the vector sum of every step except the closely spaced modes (i.e., the is used to calculate the combined response. The difference between any two natural frequencies is use of the time history analysis metbod equal to or less than 10%) are combined by the precludes the need to consider closely spaced square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) modes. combination of modal responses. This is defined mathematically as: 3.7,3.7.2.1 Squart Root of the Sum.of the-Squares Method N R= ( Rj ) 2 Mathematically, this SRSS method is expressed E as follows: (3.7 15) i=1 where 3 R= ( Rj ) 2 )1/2 R = cambined respeme; 1*l j (3.7 17) Ri = response to the ith mode; and Amendmert t
- o. .-- --- -.
A TTAcH MNT bb hm. 3. 7 -Kr When the time history method of anahsis is used and separate analyses are performed for each earthquake component, the total combined response for all three components shall be obtained using the SRSS method described above to combine the maximum codirectional responses from each earthquake component. The total response may alternatively be obtained,if the three component modons are mutually statistically independent, by algebraically adding the codirectional responses calculated separately for each component at each time step.
- When the time history analysis is performed by applying the three component motions simultaneously, the combined response is obtained directly by solution of the equations of motion.
This method of combination is applicable only if the three component motions are mutually statistically independent. e
-n v ,.--w # .n .-+ y - m.,,. , - r-e
i td N , /
) :3As:nt Standar.d Plant / j 7, b on. ,
/
*bere / where sk and 3k are the modal frequency
/ and th jamping ratio in tbc kth mode.
R = combined response; respectively, and td is the duration of the R; a response to the ith mode; and 3.7JJ Analytical Procrdurt for Piping N = number of modes considered in the anahsis 3.7JJ.1 Piping Subsptems Other Than NSSS 3.?J.*JJ Double sum %lethod 3.73J.1.1 Qualineation by Analysis ! This method as defined in Regulators Guide The methods used in scismic analysis '.ary 190. is mathematically: according to the type of. subsystems ana supporting structure involved. The tollowing possible cases are defined along with the fN N 31 /2 associated analytical methods used. R= 1 3 3 lRk R l iks / 3 I i k =l s=l (3.?.18) 3.7JJ.l.2 RJgid Subsptems with RJgid , Supports where If all natural frequencies of the subsystem . R = representative maximum value of a are_ greater than 33 Hz, tbc subsystem is . particular response of a given considered rigid and analyzed statically as i element to a given component of such. In the static analysis, the seismic excitation: forces on each component of the subsystem att obtained by concentrating the mass at the center Rk = peak value cf the resgonse of the of gravity and multiplying the mass by the element due to tbc kt mode; appsopriate maximum floor acceleration. N = n u m b e r c f s i g ni fic a a t m o d e s 3.7J.B.1J lt'gid Subsystems with Flexible considered in the modal response Supporta , combination; and if it can be shown that the subsystem itself R5 = peak value of the response of the is a rigid body (e.g., piping supported at only element attributed to sth niode two points) while its supports are flexible. the overall subsystem is modeled as a single. degree. where of freedom subsystem consisting of an effectise mass and spring. (4 wb q2< 1
' k.s = 1+4 The natural frequency of the subsystem is d (${ sk + Bs' Ws), computed and the acceleration determined from (3.7 19) the floor response spectrum curve using the appropriate damping value. A static analysis is in which performed using 1.5 times the accelera:iun value. In lieu of calculating the natural 1/2 frc,vency, the peak acceleration frorn the w{'=wk 18 2 k Spectrum curve may be used.
r if the subsystem has no definite orientation. S,k
- Sk*-t the excitation along each of three mutually --
( 'd *k perpendicular axes is aligned with respect to ' the system to produce cuaximum loading. The Amendment 21 '
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-sewn seansoee sawnanis a,,,,,
A ttad' d"
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- 3. J. 3. 7. 3 Me %doky>es used b 4 acanf for Hijh - Fregaevcy Noc/es Suffic)ent modes are to be inc/uded'in flie d namie analysis lo ensure tiraf /Re ),rc/u.sion of aa'a',hona/
na/es c/oes not resa/f in more /Aan a Jok inc res:e in responses. To sahsfy this re guiremenk responses associatec/ wifA diyA f:r efregaeacy a<e nioc coAined a># tAe re onses N }} l1 - fre f u CY Cy /v1O/ow- E 3 &Yt fregaeney hOJe. r%10hS muda/ l1 60ily[H
$reater han fAe dynai,iic anaf. sis cah4 fregaency speciR ed in sabseefun s. 7.
I For modal combinaden invoking high frequency modes. the following procedure applies: Step 1 - Determine the modal responses only for those modes that have natural frequencies less than that at which the spectral acceleration approximately returns to the ZPA of the input response spectrum (33 Hz for seismic), Combine such modes in accordance with the methods described abwe in su65 ect;0rii 5. 7. 3 , 7. I .2- d 2. Step 2 - For each degree of freedom (DOF) included in the dynamic analysis, determine the fractiori of DOF mass included in the summation of all of the modes included in Step 1. This fraction d ifor each DOF i is given by:
^
i f 1
& so,sm.c ces;~
{
t c,, ~ . a . . . , . YN 1mTUsta wtryawevs Mt5Hn 4 N to d,= { f xo n n (Qg n=1 where: n = order of the mode under consideradon N = number of modes included in Step 1 C.n
" mass normalized mode shape for mode n and DOF i Tn =
pardcipadon factor for mode n (see Eq. 3.7 5 for expression) Next, determine the fraction of DOF mass not included in the summadon of these modes: 2I e, = !d,- ; 5g (3.7.}rf where 69 is the Kronecker delta, which is one if DOF iis in the direction of the input modon and zero if DOF iis a rotation or not in the direction of the input motion. If, for any DOF i the absolute value of this fraction ei exceeds 0.1, one should include the response from higher modes with those included in Step 1. Step 3 - Higher modes can be assumed to respond in phase with the EPA and, thus, with each other; hence, these modes are combined algebraically, which is equisalent to pseudo stadc response to the inertial forces from these higher modes excited at the
,_2PA. The pseudo-static inertial forces associated with the summation of all higher modes for each DOF 1 are given by:
p P, = 2PA x M3x e, (3.7 J[ where Pi is the force or moment to be applied at DOFi, and M isi the mass or mass moment ofinertia associated with DOF i The system is then stadcally anahted for this set of pseudo-static inertial forces applied to all of the degrees of freedom to determme the maximum responses associated with high frequency modes not included in Step.1 Step 4 -The total combined response to high frequency modes (Step 3) are combined by the SRSS method with the total combined response from lower frequency modes (Step 1) to determine the overall peak responses. This procedur ,equires the computation ofindividual modal responses only for lower. frequency modes (below the Zi%). Thus, the more difficult higher frequency modes s ., - 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . - . _-_ A
soean M. Srsndar:t Sofrrv Analtsis Reterr need not be determined The procedure ensures inclusion of all modes of the muctun! rn:. del and proper representat:en of DOF rnasses In acu of the abose procedure, an alternause method is as follows Moda!respor res are c ampated :ct enough modes to ensure that the inclusion of add donal modes does nc t mcrease the total triponse by more than 10 percent. Modes that hate natural trequencies :ess than that at which the spectral acceleration approximateis returns a the ZPA are combined in accordance wuh RC 192. Higher mode responses are combined 2:gebraicalls u e . retain sigru mth each other. The absolute salue of the comb:ned hgher modes is then added directiv to the total response from the combined lower modes N 3 7 2 3 (nteraction of Non Category I Structures with Seismic Category I Structures, ' The interfaces between Seismic Categon I and nonCategon I structures and plant equipment are designed for the dynamic loads and displacements prodtaced by both the Seismic Categorv i and nonCategory I structures and plant equiptrient. All non-Categon I stmetures meet any one of the following requirementsi s y a The collapse ofsany non Categctry I structure will not,cause the non<ategon I structure to str:Le'a Seismic Categon I stucture orcomponent. x / e The collapse of any non Category I structure wi'll not impaii sne integrity of Senm:c Categon I structures or coriiponents. /
's /
s The non-Categorv i structures will nalyzed and designed to present their f:ulure under SSE condidoruin a manrict such hat the marg n of safetv cf these structures is equivalent to that of Seistru(Category I ctures.
/
/
3.7.2.9 Effects of Parameter Varia ns on Floor Respons pectra floor response spec calculated according to the proce res described in Subsecuon 3.7.2.5 are peak b adened to account for uncertaindes in e structural frequenc:es owing to unceptinties in the matenal properties of the structk and soil and to approximarMns in the modeling techniques used in the analvsis.h o parametric variatioru,udies t are performed, the spectral pea ks associated with eac f the structural frequedcies are broadened by 115. If a detailed parametric variation stu q made, tne minimum peak broadening ratio is :10. When the seismic analvsis is perforrhed for a
,mde range of site condidons with sufficient variation in soil properties for the p po>e
,/ of standardized design, the site envelope floor response spectra are peak broadene bs l :10. In lieu of peak broadening, the peak shifting method of Appendix N of ASME Section !!!. as permitted by RG 1.84, can be used.
l l l m se s- c :n ;- ! 7 l
. _ _ - .. . - . _ . ._-. -_.-___- ____-- -.~._ __- _.- - _-- _
ABWR / sududriant . mo m3 enestition in each of the three ases is % considered to act simultaneously. The g wkf l a,~ h excitations are combined by the 5 RSS method 2 R= I R2 . y# 4 8
}fAmll (3 ):0) 3.7.Ls 14 Hesjble Subsptems '\' 1 = 1 -
- 4 .- %
lf Ibe piping subustem bas more than two be seccad. supports, it cannot be considered a rigid body whe[d Lan m mo(;/gutnmatioc whose fr[r$nciedre &sely p to be dcre o 1 and must be rundeled as a mults. degree.of. freedom rpared to each othe\, subsptem. and *bere The subsystem is modeled as discussed in Subsectson 3.7 3.3.1 in sufficieat detail (i e . Ri = response to the ,tb mode number of mass points) to ensure that the lowest > natural frequency between mass points is greater N = number of significant modes than 33 Hr The mathematical model is analyzed considered in the modal response using a time.bistory analysis technique or a cocbinations, response spectrum analpis approach. After the natural frequencies of the subsyste m are Tbc excitation in each of tbc three major obtained, a stress analysis is performed using orthogonal directions is considered to act the inertia forces and equivalent static loads simultaneously with thett effect combined by the obtamed from the dynamic analysis for each mode. l SRSS melbod. t For a respdase specJ*pm arwlysis based oct,a 3.7.3.8.1.5 Static Analysis modal supe 4cshion me4/od, the' anodal response ' iccelet ions art taken direcdy from the A static analysis is performed in lieu of a s pe ctra'm The total seismic strets is normally dynamic analysis by applying the follo.ing obi =Ined by corubining the mod (I stress using the forces at the concentrated mass locations SRSS method. .The seismic stress of closely (nodes) of the analytical medel of the piping
,ipaced modes (i.e., withio 10% of the adjacent system:
mode) are combined by. absolute summulon. The' resultinkt total is treated as a pseudomode ata es (1) borizontal static lo=d, Fh " C W. n one b then c,rimbined'with the remaining modal stresses of the bar:2ontal principal directions, ly th'c SRSS merfrod. 7 /
' ' f
/ '; .e-) , , (2) equal static load, Fh , in the otb:r The approec'b is sinfple/and straightforward in horizontal principal direction; and all cases wher's the group'of modes with closely spaced frequencies is tightly bundhd (i.e., tbe (3) venical static load, F, = CvW; lowest and the b)gbeat modes of th& group are within 10% of eack'other). How'ever) when the where group of closely spaded modes,ls spac6d widely oser the frequesicy raige oMaterest while the Cb, Cy = multipliers of the grasity frekuencies of Abe adjacenimodes erecciosely acceleration, g, determined spaced, the a.bsolute survinethod of combicing frotn the horizontal and $ct-respohse tends to yiefd over.conservativp tical floor response spectrum
} results To prevent this problem, a genept curves, respectively. (They approach' applicable to all modes is consideted I are functions of the period and
{ appropriate. The fellowing equalon is meiety a the appropriate damping of the mathematicaficpresentation of this approach. piping system); and
/ / L:
The most prehble system response, Ikis given W = weight at node points of the analpicel model. In a response spectrum dynamic analysis, modal responses
' are combined as described in Subsection 3.7.3.7. '. ~
In a response spectrum or time-history dynamic analysis, responses due to the three orthogonal components of seismic excitation are combined as described in Subsection 3.7.3.6.
. _ _ _ _ _~. . -
ABWR Standard Plant
$^f For special case analyses, Cb and Cy may g be taken as:
M;$;; (1) 10 times the Tcro period acceleration of the t=1 response spectrum of subsystems described in s; = _. . - Subsection 3.7.381.0; y M,7 { (3 7.:13 11 () 1.5 tim s the salue of the response spectrurn at tee determined frequency for subsystems [i=1 described in Subsection 3.7 3 S.1.3 and 3 7.3 5.1.4; a n d
*bere O) 15 tic:es the peak of the response spectrum for subsystems described in Subsections Mi = ths mm
- 3. 7. 3. 8.1. 3 a n d 3. 7.3. 8.1. 4.
=
An alternate method of static analysis which gij component o f C i j, i n t h e e attbqua ke ditectt09 allows for simpler technique with added conscrsa-tam is acceptable No determination of natural g, . tb characteristic displacerrent frequeacies is made, but rather the response of in the jth mode the subsystem is assumed to be the peak of the appropriate response spectrum at a conservatise sj = modal participation f actor fo-and justifiable value of darnping. The response (be jib mode is then multiplied by a static coefficient of 1.5 to take into account the effects of both N = number of masses. multif reque ncy excitation and multimodal response. (5) Using the appropriate response spectrum curve the spectral acceleration. fa . I0.f 3.7.3.8.1.6 D.snamic Analysis the jth mode as a function of the jt3 mode natural frequency and the dampio; et The dynamic analysis procedure using the the system is determined. response spectrum method is pros,ded as follows: (6) The mantnum modal acceleration at each enass (1) The number of node points and members is point, i, in the model is computed as indicated. if a computer prograro is follows: utilized, use the same order of number i n the computer program input. The mass at each a;j = sj rajg');j (3.7c) node point, the length of each member, elastic constants, and geometric properties are determined. where (2) The dynamic degrees of freedom according to a;j = acceleration of the ith mass the boundary conditions are determined. point in the jth mode. (3) The dynamic properties of the subsystem (7) The maximum modal inertia force at the ith (i.e., natural frequencies and mode shapes) mass point for the jth mode is calculated ! are computed. from the equation: (4) Using a given direction of earthquake motion, Fi j Mi aij (3.7 2.3) the modal participation factors, sj, for j each mode are calculated: (S) For each mode, the muimum inertia forces j i 1
. l Amndmens t '
AbM :nn.E Standud Plaat _ or A ue applied to the subsystem model, and the modal into the piplog systern. The stress thus pro, f orce s, sh e ar s, mom e nts, stresse s, an d duced is a secondary stress. It is justifidle - d e fle c tion s ar e d e t e r: min e d. to place this stress, w hich r e sults f r om C restraint of free end displace =ect of the pi;U:g $ (9) The modaj forces, shears, mecents, stresses, systern,in the seccedary stren categ:ry beca se and deflections for a given direction are the stresses are self li:::iting aed, when the cornbined in accordance with Subsection s t r e s s e s e x c e e d y i e l d s t r e n g t h , :n i c o r 3.7.3.3.1.4. distortions or defor: nations sithin the pipi:g t syste:n satisfy the condition which caused the (10) Steps (5) thscugh (9) ue perfer=ed fer each stress to occur. of the three euthquake disections. The earthquake thus produces a stress-(11) The seismic fcrce, shear, :cc=ent, and stress e x hibitin g p r op e r t y tn u c h lik e a t h e r = al resultieg frc:n the si=ultane ws applicatico espansion stress and a static analysis can be of the three ce=ponents of earthquake used to obt ain a ctu al str esse s. The loading are obtained in the followieg differential displacements are obtd ed frc:n the tuanner: dyn a:nic a nalysis of the building. The displacements are applied to the ;ipi g a ch:rs R=R2-R2+R2 (3.7 a) and restraints corresponding to the =axi:num x y z differential displace =ents which could occur. a The static analysis is :made three times: c:ce R = c q uivale nt s e i s :n i c for one of the horizontal differential response quantity (force, displace:nents, once for the other horize:tal s h e a r, ta a:n e nt, str e s s, differential displace:nent, and once for the
/)pp /NS02 [ [
Rg R y R z = c o1ia e a r respoate 37.3.S.1.9 Destps of Small Branch and Small Eore l q u a n titie s due to Armg
! ~
cuthquake motion in the x, y, and e dircetions.
~
(1) Sma!! branch knes a'e depned at tlwse hncs that can tesyectisely. be decoupled from analyncal model used fo' the anaa:u cf the mam rutt piping to which the b'anch hnes a::.;c 3.7.33.1.7 Damping Ratto As allowed by Parag aph 31.3.3.1.3 branch hncs can be decoupled ahen the rano of run to branch pipe momc'u , The dunping ratio getcentage of critical damp- of inema is 25 to 1, or g' eater. In addinon to the moment G ing of piping subsystems corresponds to Regula- ofinema cntenon for acceptable decouphng these sma l tcry Guide 1.61 or 1.Ss (ASME Code Cue N-4111). branch lines shall be desspred wuth no concentratcJ The dunpics ratio is s ecSed in Table 3.71. masses. such as vahes. m the prst one-half span lenph 1
---) ))b b /tJ.5 E R J from the mam run pipe; and niin sufpcient pcxbihtv to 0' 3.7.33.13 Eftest of Dittertattal Buildlag prevent restram of mosement of the mam run pipe. De Movetnents small branch line is considered to hare aJeauate ,,
jkutthtv af as prst anchor or restramt to mosemcm is a: c 10 most etw i %ing sumyrtems are anchored l cast one half pipe span in a direcnon pcTend:cula' to 'i
?od restn . 4 * 'cors ad walls of buildings roc d rcenon of relame morcmem beracen the pipe n.n that a,q %- seatiat movemeats dutiag a and ihe prst anchor or restramt of the b anch pipmc A ,
scistnic o ' ~ a movements tnay range from pipe span as depned as the Icnph tabulatea m Tacic \ insignificant O tectial displacements between NF 36111. Sursested Pipmg Support Spacmp. ASME l
- tigid walls of a common building at low eleva. BL?l' Code. Section Ill Subsecnon NF. For trancacs ,
tions to relatively f arge displacements betweea wacre toe precedmg cmeno for suhictent f!c.ubshtv can et separate buildings at a high seismicity site, be met. the apphcant a !/ demonstrate acceptatuhrv by usm; an c:tcmanvc cntena for suf;Tcient pcxhlm, or by Diifeteatiai eadpi or teStrsiat def}ee. accannung for the effects of the branch ptping m nc ; tions cause force, 3 9 -- nents to be induced cualysd of the mam nm ptpmg. , Aettedmet t 3 ?.::
i, , . t INSERT F page 3.7-22 The inertie (primary) and displacement (secondary) loads are dynamic in .iture and their peak values are not expected to occur at the same time. Hence combination of the peak values - of inertia load and anchor displacement load is quite conse rvative . In addition, anchor movement effects are computed from static analyses in which the displacements are : applied to produce the most conservative loads on the components. Therefore, the primary and secondary loads are . combined by the SRSS method. ' INSERT G page 3.7-22 St ain energy wei dynamic analysis.ghted Strain modal energy damping can is weighting also be used ur,ed to obtain in the the modal damping coefficient due to the contributions of damping in the different elements of the piping system. The element damping values are specified in Table 3.7-1. Strain energv weighted modal damping is calculated as specified in Subsection 3.7.2.15. In direct integration analysis, damping is input in the form of x & S dampin of critical damping,g Aconstants, as a function whichofgive the the percentage circular frequency, w . h. 0\ _ f ON 2W 2. 1 I 1
,-er,ee-n,ew,---t- - - ----n m-- - . - -'--- <- n-
.- . .. . _ . .- -. -- -. _ _ _ . =__. .- . _
u..... .... . a s Standtrd Plant er< g 01 Fo? sntall bore ppmg. depocJ as ppng 2 inches and Nest, the mode shapes and (be unda:: ped icss nmmnal ppe sisc, and small tranch ancs 2 mches natural frequencies are obtained. The dynamic aqj lcss nonunal ppe sisc, as acj"cd 8 II' abo'c, a is response of the subsystem is usually calculated
\ -
by using tbe response spectrum method ci analy. \ l 2$cptabl: ;0 use small borc pipng nandbooks _ s!s. When i1 ocu cf the Connected equip:3cDL is sVpported c femne n;a system Beubdtry anJesis, at Nmnuc usmg more stanc than twoat;d points located at differe:t
- ncmancal mcu*els to obtain loads on the
~cc cie.ncms and using these loals to calueJ!c s!'c3ses cle*<atioos io the buildiog, the response 5pec-C,hc cananons sn NB. NC and Spys m 5ccnon /// trum analysis is performed using the enselope response spectrum of all attach =ent poicts.
9' aS3!f Ccdc. whencier thefo!!oamf a'c "'et Alternatively, the multiple excitation analysis tl} Ytc small t ore ppmg handbook at the nme of mtthods may be used where acceletation tit;c i a-;. canon is currently accepted by the 'crulators histories or response spectra are applied at all a nn p* use on cpna!cnt ppmg at other nuc! car the equiptnent and piping attach: cent points. poac';! ant 1 ,,, ,,,,,::qp gp ,g g [jg,=f* f 1 ) 11hcn the small bore ppng handbook is servmg ine pu rpose of the Design Repon a meets all of the ASSIE rept'ements for a pipmg design repon. Dus mcludes the ppmg and its supports. (3) Formal documentation custs shosing piping Jesigned and installed to the small bore pipmg i handbook (a) is conservative in companson to I resul:s from a detail stress analysis for all applied loads and load combinatwns depned in the destgt i specificanon, Ib) does not result m piping that is less l reliable because of loss offlexbility or because of I, etcessive number of suppons, (c) satisifes required clea'ances around sensttive components. l T're sma!l bo e ppmg handbook methodolog uill not be appitcJ < hen spectfic informattan is needed on (a) r mag utude of pipe and pitmg stresses. (b) pipe and fimng cumulattre usage factors, (c) accelerations of pipe j mounted equipment, or locations of postulated breaks and leaks. Ytc small bore piping handbook methodolog will not be applicJ to pip. sg systems that are fully engmeered and mstal led m accordance wah the engmeeting drawings. y }Q 3.7.3.32 NSSS Piping Subsystem 7 3,7.3.82.1 Dpamle Analysis As described in Subsection 3.7.3.3.1, pipe line is idealized as a mathematical c)odel co:sistieg of lumped :nasses coccected by clastic members. The stiffness matrix for the piping subsystem is determined using the clastic properties of the pipe. This includes the effects of torsional, bending, shear, and axial defor:aations as well as chaeges in stificest due 3,~_, to curved me=bers. t
O GENuclear Energy 25A5122 Mv A s m 22
'5.5 Anahsis Procedure for Dimoine. Damping values for equipment and piping ue shown in Table 31 and they are consistent with RG 1.61. For piping systems damping vah es of ASME Cde Case N-411 1 (alternative damping values for response spectra analysis of Class 1,2,3nd 3 piping, Section illeDivision 1), may be used as permitted by RG 1.84. For systems made of subsptems with ;
different damping properties, the analysis procedures described in Section~4.13 are applicable. t 5.6 Three Components of Earthevake Motion. The applicable methods of spatial combination of responses due to each of the three input motion components are described in Section 4.6. 5.7 Combination of Mod:tl Resnonses. The appWible methods of modal response combination ' are descnbed in Section 4.7. 5.8 Interaction of Other Svstemswffh corv i Systems. Each non Category I system should be designed to be isolated fronpufy Category I system by either a constraint or barrier, or should be remotely located with r 'd to the Category I system. Ifit is not feasible or practical to isolate the Category I system, 'acent non Category I systems should be analyzed according to the same seismic criteri applicable to the Category I systems. For non Category I sysems attached to Category fstems, the dynamic effects of the non Category I systems thquld be simulated in the mod g of the CateFory I system. The attached non Category I systems, ojyo the first anchor b fond the interface, . suld also be designed in such a manner that during airorthquake of SSE intensity it will not cause a failure of the Category I system.
\ ;
3/7,3,8.!') fuhich-Suocorted Eculement and Comoonents with Distinct inputs Jude For multi supported systems (equipment and piping) analyzed by the response spectrum method fo the determination ofinertial responses, either of the following two input mouons are , acceptable:
- a. envelope response spectrum of all support points for each orthogonal direction of excitation, or
- b. independent support motion (ISM) response spectrum at each support for each orthogonal direction of excitauon.
When the ISM response spectrum method of analysis is used, the following conditions should be met:
- a. ASME Code Case N-411 1 damping is not used.
- b. A support group is defined by supports which have the same time history input. This usually :
means all supports located on the same floor, or portions of a ficut, of a structure.
- c. The responses due to mouons of supports in two or more difTerent groups are combined by the SRSS procedure in lieu of the response spectrum analysis, the time history method of analysis subjected to distinct support motions may be used for multi-supported systems.
4 NCO 907 (8tf y 6 tot
,,..-..,,.,,.,,.~,,-...._-,;,,__..--,.--,..,--,.-_.-.i._, - , . - - .,.- -.
IF* I page 3.7-22.1 In a response spectrum dynamic analysis, modal responses are combined as described in Subsection 3.7.3.7. In a independent support motion response spectrum analysis, group responses are combined as described in Subsection 3.7.3.8.1.10. In a resoonse spectrum or time-history dynamic responses duo analysis of seism [c excitation a'e combined as described into the three orthogonal components Subsection 3.7.3.6. INSERT BB page 3.7-23 3.7.3.12 Buried Seismic Category I Piping anu Tunnels All underground Category I piping systems are installed
'n tunnels. The following items are considered in the analysis:- -
(1) The inertial effects due to an earthquake upon underground piping systems and tunnels will be INSERT CC page 3.7-23 (2) The design response spectra for the underground piping are the horizontal and vertical design spectra at the ground surface given in Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2. These design spectra are constructed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.60. The piping - analysis is performed using one of the methods described in Subsection 3.7.3. 4 w...,,, ,, ,, , ,
i ABWR m x.y Standard Plant ,rv n 3.7J.8.2.2 Effect of Differential Building adequately accounted for in the analpis. In Stos aments case of buried systems sufficicotty fleu ; ible relatise to the surrounding or under. ' The relatise displacement between anchors is lying soil, it is assumed that the systems determined from the d) amic analysis of the will follow essentially the displacements and structures. The results of the relatise anchor. deformations that the soil would base if the . point displacement are used in a static analpis systems were abscot. When applicable. to determine the additi. al stresses due > procedures, which take into account the relatne anchor. point displacements. Fur %er phenomena of wave trasel and wase reflection details are gisen in Subsection 3.7.3.8.1.3. in compacting soil displacements from the hd ground displacements, are emplo',ed. 3.7J.9 Sluitiple Supported Equipment Components With Distinct inputs r g Wg { . (2)l The effects of static resistance of the frJS@ surrounding soil on piping deformations or c/ The procedure and criteria for analysis are displacements, differential movements et d e s c rib e d in S u b s e c tio n s 3.7.2.1.3 a nd piping accbors, beat geometry and cunature 3.7 3.3.1.3. changes, etc., are considered. When applicable, procedures utilizing the 3.7.3.10 l'se of Constant Vertical Static principles of tbc theory of structures on Factors Qastic foundations are used. _ All Seismic Category I subsystems and compo. (3) When applicable, the effects due to local nents are subjected to a vertical dynamic soil settlements, soil arching, etc., are analysis with the vertical floor spectra or time also considered in the analysis. histories defining the input. A static analysis > is performed in lieu of dynamic analysis if the 3.7.3.13 Interaction of 0ther Piple peak value of the applicable floor spectra times Seismic Category l Piping a f actor of 1.5 is used in tbc analysis. A factor of 1.0 instead of 1.5 can be used if the In certain instances, non. Seismic Category I equipment is simple enough such that it behases piping may be connected to Seismic Categorv i essentially as a single degree of freedom piping at locations other than a piece of equip. 9 sptem. If the fundamental frequency of a compo. ment which, for purposes of analpis, could be ?, eat in the vertical direction is greater than or represented as an anchor. The transition points , equal to 33 Hz, it is treated as seismically typically occur at Seismic Category i vahes rigid and analyzed statically using the which may or may not be physically anchored. zero pe sponse spectrum. Sine: a dynamic analysis must be modeled from pipe .nchor point to anchor point, two options 3.7.3.11 Torsional Effects of Eccentric $1 asses cxist: Torsional effects of eccentric casses are (1) specify and design a structural anchor at included for Seismic Category I subsystems the Seismic Category i valve and analyze the similar to that for the piping systems discussed Seismic Category I subsystem; or, if in Subsection 3.7.3.3.1.2. impractical to design an anchor, 3.7.3.12 Buried Seismic Category I Piping and (2) analyze the subsystem from the anchor point Tunnels in the Seismic Category I subsystem through
~
the valve to either the first anchor point - For buried Category I buried piping systems in the non. Seismic Category I subsptem; or and tunnels the following items are considered in - a..!..."'"-:-'"-"c- - the analysis: Cr :;; . , l C.L., m .; '- sig .:h. 4, L ;: 2 ^ ^ :: - -- M (1) The inertial effects due to an earthquake a d ei- "": L . mm . i upon buried systems and tunnels will be Sof cs dis b ec steca %cd..s-/he(& #6 ( wnenm a $ (#osleas %e %to.h two seismic.- of hop) dW e cH0et ' rest. - feid Rylace. 4- INS 6RT M
e d 3 j# k AB%R gan W dtCMf umut Standard Plant y ., o Where small, not.. Seismic Categery piping is 3.7.3.16.11.ateral Fora , I directly attnhed to f ,ismic Category I piping, ! i s:N :: :h: Seismic Category I piping 4.= Seismic loads are characterized as a force profile n _ _ .. . . ; o. W : ;:-._. :! L r .. - that varies with the bei6 ht of the structure. These n; a :h: pa 4 forces are applied at each floor of the structure and th:
"'*r ". .shm per 54. .5ec .;h0n 3 ~) u 1 d ,, ,,
the resulting forces andmoments are calculated
, from itatic equilibrium Furthermore, oco Seismic Category I piping (particularly high erargy piping as defined in .
The buildings total base shear is characterized by l Section 3.6)is designed to withstand the SSE to the following equation: avoid jeopardizing adjacent Seismic Category I piping if it is not feasible or practical to isolate V = Z'!*C*W/R,; w here, these two piping systems. 3.73.14 Seismic Analysis for Reactor V =
!aternals Totallateral force or shear at the l base. l 1
The mndeling of RPV internals is discussed in F, F, F, = Lateral force applied to leseli, n, or x Subsection 3.7.23 2. The damping values are gnen respectisely. in Table 3.71. The seismic model of the RPV and internalin shown in Figure 3.7 32. F, = That portion of \ considered to be concentrated at the top of the 3.73.15 Analysis Procedurts for Damping structure in addition to Fn Tbc modeling of RPV internals is discussed in Z = Seismic zone factor Subsection 3.7.23.2. The damping values are giseo - in Table 3.71. The seismic model of the RPV and I = Importance factor - internals is shown in Figure 3.7 32. C = Numerical Coefficient 3.7J.16 Analysis Procedurt for NonSeismic , Structures la Lieu of Dynamic Analysis R, = Numerical Coefficient The method described here can be used for S = Coefficient for site soil characteristics non. seismic structures in lieu of a dynamic analpis. T = Fundamental period of vibration of Structures designed to this method should be the structure in the direction under able to do the following- consideration, as determined by using the properties and deformation (1) Resist minor levels of earthquake ground characteristics of the resisting motion without damage, elements in a properly substantiated analysis. (2) Resist moderate levels of earthquake ground motion without stnctural damage, but possibly W = Total dead load of building including experience some nonstructural damage. the partition load where applicable. (3) Resist major levels of earthquake ground ww , , = That portion of W which is located at motion having an intensity equal to the or is assigned to level i or x, respect-strongest either experienced or forecast at the isely building site, without collapse, but possibly with l some structural as well as nonstructural h,b, = Height in feet above the base to leseli damage, or x, respectively Amendment 20 3 M4
. . _ . . . _ _ . . ~ . ~ . . . . . - . . . . - ~ . _ . . _ . - _ - _ . _ . . . . _ _ - _ . . . - . - . _ .
- . w. i ~ + . .~ 9 mu y w d GHh t fyie3 we fhe A sMc code Seshon llT SeNuo level b rtec /hih.
MN GG hrn den Mpo Tesys earfreed +/af hae%l cop 412y is assurs/ \ Standard Plant fAe sfreues are /es; fA,n fAe me -
' Min h / b d/*4M _
prv a analyzed for the faulted loading conditions. The 3.9.1.4.10 ASME Class 2 and 3 Pumps i ECCS and St.C pumps ate active ASME Class 2 compo- : cents. The allowable stresses for active pumps Elastic analysis methods are used for evaluat-are provided in a focteote to Table 3.9 2. ! ing faulted loading conditions for Class 2 and 3 pumps. The equivalent allowaHe stresses for ! The reactor coolant press are boundary compo- nonactive pumps using clastic technique are ob- I nents of the reactor recirculation system (RRS) tained from .WC/ND 3400 0f the ASME C 'ection pump motor assembly, and recirculation motor cool-Ill. Then allowables are above el ..ic lim- , ing (RMC) subsystem beat exchanger are ASME Class its. The allowab.es for active pumps are pro. ' I and Class 3, respectively, and are analyzed for vided in a footnote to Table 3.9 2. the faulted loading conditions. All equipment stresses are within the elastic limits. 3.9.1.4.11,dME Class 2 and 3 Valve: 3.9.1.4? f oel Sto.m y and Refueling Equipment Elastic analysis methods ane ' erd design
.ules are used for evaluatica d loading Storage, refueling, and servicing equipment conditions for Class 2, an a valves. The which is important to safety is classified as es. equivalcat allowble stresses for nonactive sential components per the requirements of valves using clastic techniques are obtained 10CFR50 Appendix A. This equipment and other from NC/ND 3500 of ASME Code, Section 111.
equipment which in case of a failure would de. These allowables are above clastic limits. -T'm . grade an essential component is defined in Sec. 2!!c" d ! n f r n . n n : n . m p u ide d ... . tion 9.1 and is classified as Seismic Category f::::::: te Td!: 'a1
!. These components are subjected to an clastic dynamic finite elemeat analysis to generate load. 3.9.1.4.12 ASME Class 1,2 e ad 3 Pipink ings. This analysis utilizes appropriate floor response spectra and combines loads at frequen- Elastic analysis methods are used for evaluat.
cies up to 33 Hz for seismic loads and up to 60 iug faulted loading conditions for Class 1, 2. ] Hz for other dynamic loads in three directions. and 3 piping. The equivalent allowable stresses
/
imposed stresses are generated and combined for using clastic techniques are obtained from 'm normal, upset, and faulted conditions. Stresses di: " (f;; C : . O ::$C/ND-3600 (for Class ',, are compared, depending on the specific saferv and 3 piping) of the ASME Code Section Ill. ' , class of the equipment, to Industrial Codes, " - ' - ' " ^ " " - - - - ^ ' ^ " - ^ ' ^ ^ ' - ' "- 4SME, ANSI or Industrial Standards, AISC, $ H = h '" '" " ^ " ' n ; d "" . O f d : n allowables. M! p!;!:;; r: p^: !d:d i; :. f;mu N
.r.m. . , n. ,
3.9.1.4.8 Fuel Assen bly (Including Channel) 3.9.1.5 laelastic Analpls Methods GE BWR fuel assembly (incids inel) de. sign bases, and analytical and evale.,o mtAods inelastic analysis is only applied to ABWR including those applicable to the faulted condi. components to demonstrate the acceptability of tions are the same as those contained in E sfer- three types of postulated events. Each event is ences 1 and 2. an extermly low probability occurence and the equipment affected o) these events would n< t be 3.9.1.4.9 ASME Class 2 and 3 Vessels reused. These three events arc: Elsstic nalysis methods are used for evaluat. (1) Postulated gross piping failure.
;ng faulted loading conditions for Class 2 and 3 vessels. The equivalent allowable stresses using (2) Postulated blowout of a reactor internal clastic techniques ar. obtained from NC/ND-3300 recirc slation (RIP) motor casing due to a wa NC 3200 of the ASME Code Section Ill. These veld failure.
%osables are above elastic limits.
(3) Postulated blowout of a conitol rod drive (CRD) housing due to a weld failure. mer e.em 11 393
, ,;. .~ .u x
;dnda rd Ehin11 3 9 2 and are containe d in the d e sig a specifications and/or design reports of it:
15: results of :he data analyses. vibration respective equipment. (Se: Subsection 3 9 7 4 amplitudes. natural frequencies, and .od: shapes for COL license information) at: then ce mpared to those obtained from the theor:tical analysis. Table 3.9 2 also presents the evaluation models and criteria. The predicted loads or Such comrarisons provide the anabsts with str:ss:s and the design or allowable values fcr ad:::d insient into the dynamic behasior of the the most critical areas of each component are re actor internals. The additional knowledge compared in accordanc: with the applicatie code cained from preuous nbration tests has been c rit eria or ot h e r limitin g c rit e ria. The utdizec in th: ;:neranen of the dynamic moce!s calculated re sults m eet th e limits. fcr seismic and loss cf coolant accid:nt (LOCA) 2::ahs:s f ar this pia::t. The mod:Is us:d for Th: d: sign life for the ABW R Standard P! ant t his pla::t ar: omtiar to those used for the is 60 ):a rs. A 60 year design life is a
.ir r ation a::al. ' .s of e arlie r prot otype B WR r:cuire==::t for all c ajor plant camporents wah piants reasonacle expection of meetine this des, ~
hfe. However, all plant operanonal ecmponea:s 3.9.3 ASME Code Class 1. 2, and 3 and equipment except the reactor vesset at: Components. Component supports and designe d to be replaceable, d: sign life :o: Core Support Structures withstancing. The design lif e requir = = ::: allows for refurbishment and repair, as
.W . ! Loadma Combinations. Design appropriat:. to assure the design life of the Trunuents. and strns Limits ov e r all pla n t is a c h te ve d. In effeet, essentially all piping systems, components and This s e c::a n d:!in e a t e s t h e c rit:::3 for equipment are designed for a 60 year design se::ctio,. and definition af design lim:ts and lif:. Mtuy of these components are classified laacine camcination associated with normal as ASME Class 2 or 3 or Quality Group D.
;ceranon. postulated accidents. and specifit f h he a fnl J" non Caff I comfontmf aff Jek tJ !a GC -
se:sc , ad atner teactor building vibtatn uaa.ngr. <ncua.ng creranng oc ranon lu21 a,a ther at ca-ra ~5
- R S' -
for the design of safety.r !att . < cir. at a mac*umac Jnar daranon so m ere tu: n.r sJ i < AS' :omponents (except contatnm: %ss; s Ac can act te assureJ tv reqintes CcJe ::.o...::= a ich are scussed in Secnon 3.S npucams rHerencusg the .wis'R Jt1Q s sd ;Jr"t;". *t:t cemencn:s and canc prenae an a;;repr:::e :ah ru a ar =:?.::e T' - diseusses the A$ME C' ass 1. w recaca .:a:p Mc cr preua< c<sc r a mmra , r.< -acmn.;< s an; > nt and associated pressure r:tainu tw.::an ar .nr c3 che laaas Campenents mi a<J vm ms p 1rts ans a ntifies the applicable loading er.porement are W uct io.c e mmng of het a.-a a.J Nas acc. :
- .culahan methods. calculated stresses. at and :hcrmat :!co rs hat e ocen ; ouacJ rn acc mcc ana "
ad )w able stresses. A discussion of majc P.U&s. Q components rucn as u:e pencic for a men a lang.c c::uipment is :nciuded on a component.by.compone: ancivra har atiraav been performed preudmg zhr component a basis to proude etampies. Design transients at Jerz;-cd so ar to nas caar, meme locateca ee::cs. ar zum.t ds namic loading for ASME Class 1. L and :nerma caa.<nis vi the ppe ma:t <n reca.a:er ggmg usa, ecuipment are coscred in Subsection 3 9.1. con:emment Jiat s JcI: ped 10 och !aaJ.ngt anJ mn:ct are 'c 5e:smic related loads and dynamic anahses ai . arc ue : nan cperiencta ev catr i ggmg mrec cama.-cm. nscussed in Section 3.7. The suppressio pn!.reiateu RSV loads are described in Append 1.9.3.1.1 Plant Conditions 3B Tacle 3.94 presents the combinat >n u All events that the plant will or might js nam- ments to be considered for the a:sien 4 an anahsis of all AB%.R ASME Code Class ,. .,.. t cred.. io lv
- experience during a reactor year are ana 3 components. component supports. core evaluatec. to establ.is h desien bas.is for plant equipment. These events at: d m. .d e d in t o .,o u r support struc:ures and equipment. S p e c i f.ic plant conditions. The plant conditions leastng com:nnations consider:d for evaluanen of.
eacn spec:iic equipment are derhed from ,i ab.le
. described .in the followine paracraphs at: base, o n : v e :: t pr obability (i.e., fre qu e ncy of occurrenc: as discussed in Subsection 3.9. 3.1,1.5 ) and correlated to service levels for d: sign limits defined in the ASME Boder and
. wmem n P :ssure Vessel Code Section Ill as shown in Tables 3.91 and 3.9 ,.
Jus
MMirAE Staridard Plant m.g to accomplish its safety functions as required The MS system piping extending from the out. ! by any subsequent design condition esent, board main steam isolation valse to the turbine
, , . stop valse is constructed in accordance with the { ;
spe4 ic ess c Tript m h4 fu'nA. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code req item rprire #ntif d in footakte 111. Class 2 Criteria. V ~~ Yti L95 3 2/ l ' W.[5&R Yf} 3.9J.1.4 Recirculation Motor Cooling i RMC) N-3.9J.1.2 Reactor Pressure ressel ucmbly Subsystem The reactor sessel assembly consists of the The RMC system piping loop between the recir. reactor pressure e ssel, sessel support s kir t. culation motor casing and the heat exchanger is and shroud support. constructed in accordance with the ASME Boiler ; and Pressure Vessel Code Section III. Subsection , 5, The reactor pressure sessel. sessel support N B . 3600. ": ri; n ;&:d yper S r skirt, and shroud support are constructew in ^ WE C h Sc9 "' 2e used M ei 292% accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure fachedla;d N condL o adcpcad aF ,i K Vessel Code Section 111. The shroud support e b:3:d;; =depu d:g end!: e %r I consists of the shroud support plate and the **keb::d a n u ebs'!: 52 1 2w a~1 a shroud support cylinder and its legs. The *< cu r d r e ecin reactor pressure sessel assembly components are classified as an ASME Class 1. Complete stress 3.93.1.5 Recirculation Pump Motor Pressure reports on these components are prepared in Boundary accordance with ASME Code requirements. NUREG-0619 (Reference 5) is also considered for The motor casing of the recirculation inter. feedwater nonle and other such RPV inlet noule nal pump is a part of .nd welded into an RPV design. nozzle and is constructed in accordance with the requiments of an ASME Boiler and Pressure 3 The stress analysis is performed on the Vessel Code Section 111, Class I corr ,onent. The ii reactor pressure vessel. vessel support skirt, motor cover is a part of the pump / motor assembly and shroud support for sarious plant ;perating and is constructed as an ASME Class I compon. conditions (including faulted conditions) by nent. These pumps are not required to operate using the clastic methods except as noted in during the safe shutdown earthquake or after an Subsection 3.9.1.4.2. Loading conditions, design accident. stress limits, and methods of stres; analysis ior the core support structures and other reactor 3.9.3.1.6 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Tank internals are discussed in Subsection 3.9.5. The standby liquid control tank is con. 3.9J.lJ Main Steam (MS) System Piping structed in accordance with the requirements of ; an-ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section E j l The piping systems extending from tbc reactor 111, Class 2 component. pressure vessel to and including the outboard l main steam isolation valve are constructed in ac. 3.9 3 : 1 RRS and RHR Heat Exchangers
.I cordan:e with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel j lI Code Section III, Class I criteria. 7treTtrtu. The primary and secondary sides of the RRS * ~
m.a _ d m %..dk " d ".T" Cet "::ac; '" (reactor recirculation system) are constructed l
.. . a ; :. g .: ; M S d b d N :=dic;; in accordance with the requirements of an ASME '
padcper':"':cd c&r det:ge n! 2per :in; Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section !!!. ;
"w : n es d e bted r a :/!: Class 1 and Class 2 component, respectisely. 3 "r
N.; , ;:: : A ted " - :d:*e: ' 'M The primary and secondary side of the RHR system heat exchanger is constructed as an ASME Class 2 and Class 3 component respectively. i Stresses are calculated on an elastic basis and evaluated ! in accordance with NB-3600 of the ASME Code Section III. I Amendment 21 3M
I
)
ATTACKMENT h( to page 3.9-20 Turbine stop valve (TSV) closure in the main steam (MS) piping system results in a transient that produces momentary unbalanced forces acting on the MS piping system. Upon closure of the TSV, a pressure wave is created and it travels at sonic velocity toward the reactor vessel through each MS line. Flow of steam into each MS line from the reactor vessel continues until the steam cotpression wave reaches the reactor vessel. Repeated reflection of the pressure wave at the reactor vessel and the TSV produce time varying pressures and velocities, throughout the MS lines. The analysis of the MS piping TSV closure transient consists of a stepwise time-history solution of the steam-flow equation to generate a time-history of the steam properties at numerous locations along the pipe. Reaction loads on the pipe are determined at each elbow. These-loads are composed of pressure-times-area, momentum change and fluid-friction terms. The time-history direct integration method of analysis is used to dettrmine the response-of the MS piping system to TSV closure. The forces are applied at locations on the piping system where steam flow changes direction thus causing momentary reactions. The resulting loads on the MS piping are combined with loads due to other effects as specified in Subsection 3.9.3.1. 6 4 4 4
.. - . < .,. , . , - . --- . _. y . , _ - - .,.
tw b h rarq , Sunkd Plamt _ are 3.9.3.1.3 RCIC Turbine equipment. ASME Bouer and Pressure Vessel Code Section !!! for Class 3 components is used as a Althouch not under the jurisdiction of the
,! guide in constructing the RWCU System pu=p and ASNIE C$de, the RCIC turbine is designed and best exchanger compon nts. l'j evaluated and fabricated following the basic guidelices of AShtE Code Section !!! for Cl ass : 3. 9.3.1. ! ! Fuel Pool Cooling .nd Cleanup ccopenents. System Pumps and Heat Exebangers 3.9J.1.9 ECCS Pumps Tb pumps and beat exchacqers are ccostructea l 3 in accordacce with the requnements for ASNtE ( {
The RHR. RC:C. and HPCF pumps are construc ed Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 5cetion !!!. f{; r
? in acccrdance uth the requirements of an ASNtE Class 3 componcat.
Ccce Section III. Class : component. 3.93.1.16 ASSIE Class : and 3 Vessels 3.9J.1.10 Standby Liquid Control iSLC) Pump The Cl ass 2 and 3 vessels (all esseis not 's 2 The SLC system pump is constructed in accordance wnn the requirements for AShtE Cade prestously discussed) are constructe in jj accordance with the ASSIE Boiler and Pressur Secuen !!!. C: ass : componect. Vessel Code Section !!!. The stress anh..s of these vessets is performed using !astic 3.9J.l.11 St.andby Liquid Controi (SLQ Vahe methods, t injection Vahei
;I. 3.9.3.1.17 AShlE Class : and 3 Pumps E
"' The SLC p. stem injection valve is constructed in accercance mth the requirements for AS5tE Code The Class and 3 pumps f ail pumps not f Scenen 111, C: ass I component. previously discussed) are designed and eval. A uated in accordance with the ASNIE Bader ana 3.9J.l.12 slain Steam holation and Pressure Vessel Code Section !!I. The stt:s.
- Safety / Relief Vahes analysis of these pumps is performea usin.-
j elastic tuet hod s. See Subsection 3.) 3 : 27 3 The main steam isolation sabes and SRVs are additional information on pump operam.a. eens ructed in accordance mth ASNtE Boder and Pren. re Vessel Code Seetion !!!. Subsec: ion 3.9.3.1.18 AS$1E Class 1. 2 and 3 Valgs NS .500, requirements for Class ! compone:tt. 3.9J.t.13 Sarcty/ Relief Vahe Piping and Quencher The Class 1. 2. and 3 val es (all sahes mi l; previously discussed) are construct:0 in l { i ILc sawrehef sane discharge pipmg in the devwell accordance with the ASNIE Boiler and Pret,sure l e.uenJing from the relief valve discharge flange to the Vessel Code Section Ill. Jiaphragnt paar penetration and the safetv/ relief valve Jacnarge p:nne ut the actuell extending from the All salves and their extended structures are
- aparagnt floor penetration to and incl.Aing the designed to withstand the accelerations due to
- ,cncher is cons:mcted .a acco?Jance wuth the ASME seismic at>d otber RBV loads. The attac:ed Smier and Pressure vessel Code. Section ll/, piptog is supported so that these acce!: anens l 1 c.nenis far Cl ass 3 components. In addman, all are not exceeded. The stress analysis at these ae!Js m the SRVDL piping m the werwe!I above the vaives is performed using clastic methods. See s:. face of the suppression pool shall be non destmcaveiy Subsection 3.9.3.2 for additional inictmation on i , l aannned to the requirements of ASME Boiler and l valve operability.
F?cssi.re l'essci Cade. Section 111, Class 2. l 3.9.3.1.14 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) ' 3.9J.1.19 AS$1E Class 1. 2 and 3 Piping S,sstem Pump and Heat Exchangers The Gass 1, 2 and 3 piping (all pipu:g cat s The RWC- pump and heat exchangers previously discussed) is constructed in accora. 5 (regeneratise and nonregenerative) are not part of a safety system and are non Scismic Category I 3e A.menaem :t
_. - ~ For Class 1 piping,
/ ABM bcoic Code ASME and Section evaluated III. in accordance with NB-3600 the ofstre
/ Standard Plant l *R ante with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel 3.9J.2.1.1 ConsideratJon of loading,
./ Code Section III. F- Ch ' pipig. 6 i Stress, and Accelersdon Condidons in the C Med thec^-F" m sP- * !m d Analyils
%w, q W e a ,1 m m a a m m.a .m..
4 AppedHr ! S O h For Class 2 and 3 la order to avoid damage to the ECCS pumps piping, stresses are calculated on an elastic during the faulted plant condition, the stres. basis and esaluated tn accordance mth NC/NIXE0 ses caused by the combination of nortnal ope. of t.he Code. rating loads, SSE. other RBV loads, and dyna. mic system loads are litnitec to the material 3.9.3.2 Pump and Valse Operabillry A.ssurance clastic limit. A three dimeasional finite. element model of the pump and associated motor Actise mechanical (with or without electrical (see Subsections 3.9.3.2.2 and 3.9 3.2.1.5 for operation) equipment are Seismic Category I and RCIC pump and turbine, respectively) and its each is designed to perform a mechanical motion support is developed and analyzed using the for its safety.related function during the life response spectrum and the dynamic analysis me. of the plant under postulated plant conditions. thod. The same is analyzed due to static noz-Equipment with f aultad condition functional rie loads, pump thrust loads, and dead requirernents include actne pumps and valves in weight. Critical location stresses are com, fluid systems such as the residual beat removal pared with the allowable stresses and the cri. system. emergency core coo:ing system, and main steam system. tical location deflections with the allow. ables; and accelerations are checked to eval. uate operability. The average membrane s:ress This Subsection discusses operability am for the faulted condition bads is assurance of active ASME Code Section III pumps limited to 1.2S or approximately 0.75 c y and salves, including motor, turbine or operator (a y = yield stress), and the maximutn that is a part of the pump or valve (See stress in local fibers (om + bending stress S ubse ction 3.9.2.2). ab) is limited to 1.8S or approximately 1.1
- o. Tbc max. imum faulted event nozzle Safety.related valves and pumps are qualified loads are also con. sidered in an analysis of by testing and analysis and by satisfying the the pump supports to assure that a system stress and deformation criteria at the critical misalignment cannot occur.
locations within the pumps and valves. Operability is assured by meeting the Performing these analyses with the requirements of the programs defined in conservative loads stated and with the Subsection 3.9.2.2, Section 3.10, Section 3.11 restrictive stress limits as allowables and the following subsections, assures that critical parts of the pump and assoc!sted motor or turbine will not be S e ction 4.4 of G E's Envir o n m e nt al damaged during the faulted condition and that Qualification Program (Reference 6) applies to the operability of the pump for post. faulted this subsection, and the seismic qualification condition operation will not be impaired. methodology presented therein is applicable to mechanical as well as electrical equipment. 3.9.3.2.1.2 Pump / Motor Operation During and Following Dynamic Imading 3.9J.2.1 ECCS Pumps, Motors and Turbine Active ECCS pump / motor rotor combinations Dynamic qualification of the ECCS (RHR, RCIC are designed to rotate at a constant speed and HPCF) pumps with motor or turbine assembly is under all conditions. Motors are designed to also described in Subsections 3.9.2.2.2.6 a n d withstand short periods of severe overload. 3.9.2.2.2.7 The high rotary inertia in the operating pump
.wnomni ? 3 ' 22
<GWR S.tandard Plant %.
m., quirements and perform their mechanical motion in thermal expansion of the connecting pipe, and conjunction with a dynamic (SSE and other RBV) reaction forces from valve discharge. load esent. These vahes are supported entirely by the piping, i e., the vahe operators are not C) A production SRV is demonstrated for used as attachtnent points for piping supports operability during a dynamic qualification ( S e e S u bs e c tio n 3 9.3.4.1). The dynamic (shake table) type test with mornent and qualification for operability is unique for each 'g* loads a pplie d gre ate r than t he s ahe type: therefore, each methad of required equipment's design limit loads qualification is detailed indisidually below. and conditions. J.9JJ.4.1 Main Steam isolation Vahe A mathematical model of this vahe is included in the main steam line system The typical Y-pattern MSIVs described in analy.iis, as with the MSIVs. This analysis Subsection 5.4 5.2 are evaluated by analysis and assures the equipment design limits are not test for capability to operate under the design exceeded. loads that envelop the predicted loads during a design basis accident and safe shutdown 3.9J.2.4.3 Standby IJquid Control Vabe eattbquake. (Injection Vahe) The valve body is designed, analyzed and The typical SLC injection-Valve design is tested in accordance with the ASME Code Section qualified by type test to IEEE 344 The vahe III, Class I requirements. The MSIVs are modeled body is designed, analyaed and tested per the mathematically in the main steam line system ASME Code, Section III, Class 1. The a naly sis. The loads, amplified accelerations and qualification test demonstrates the ability to resonance frequencies of the valves are remain operable after the application of the determined from the overall steamline analysis, horizontal and vertical dynamic loading The piping supports (snubbers, rigid restraints, exceeding the predicted dynucsic loading. etc.) are located and designed to limit amplified accelerations of and piping loads in the valves 3.93.2.4.4 High Pressure Core F'aoder Yahe to the design limits. (Motor Operated) As described in Subsection 5.4.5.3, the MSIV The typical HPCF valve body design, and associated electrical equipment (wiring, analysis and testing is in accordance with the solenoid valves, and position switches) are requirements of the ASME Code, Section !!!, dynamically qualified to operate during an Class 1 or 2 components. ThrClass 1E-accident condition, electrical motor actuator is qualified by type 3.93.2.4.2 Main Steam Safety / Relief Valve test in accordance in Subsection with IEEEmodel 3.11.2. A mathematical 382,ofas discussed l this valve is included in the HPCF piping The typical SRV design described in Subsection system analysis. The analysis results are 5,0.2.4.1 is qualified by type test to IEEE 344 assured not to exceed the horizontal and for operability during a dynamic event. vertical dynamic acceleration limits acting Structural integrity of the configuration during simultaneously for a dynamic (SSE and other a dynamic event is demonstrated by both Code RBV) event, which is treated as an emergency (ASME Class 1) analysis and test. condition. (1) Valve is designed for maximum moments on 3.9J.2.5 Other Active Valves inlet and outlet which may be imposed when installed in service. These moments are Other safety related active valves are ASME resultants due to dead weight plus dynamic Class 1. 2 or 3 and are designed to perform loading of both valve and connecting pipe, their mechanical motion during dynamic loading l
~
Amendment 8 3
P
*O ABWR N mm Sindard Plant conditions. The operability assurance program k ur. =
particular ASME Class of salve anahzed ensures that these valves will operate during a ^ d di.io u d J si.,; o ,;,c.,i.mii, . J-dynarr.,c seismic and other RBV esent ep=bA = pr .d:d - : '- - ' -t & TSS 3.9.32J.1 Procedures Dynarnic load qualification is accomphsbed ' Quahfication tests accompanied by analyses in the following way: aie conducted for all active vahes Procedures for qualifying electrical and instrumentation (1) All the active salves are designed to hase compocents which are depended upon to cause the a fundamental frequency which is greater sabe to accomplish its intended f unction are than the high frequency asymptote (ZPAi or described in Subsection 3 9.3 2 3 1 3 the dynamic c ent. This is shown M suitable test or analysis. 3.9J2J.1.1 Tests (2) The actuator and yoke of the vahe system Prior to invallation of the safety related is statically loaded to an amount greater sabes, rhe f allowing tests are performed; (1) than that due to a dynamic event. The shell bydrostatic test to ASME Code Section 111 load is applied at the center to grauts requirernects; (2) back seat and main seat leakage of tbc actuator alone in the direction of tests; (3) disc hydrostatic test; (4) functional the weakest axis of the yoke. The tests to verify that the valve will open and simulated operational dif f ere ntial close within the specified time limi:s when pressure is simultaneously applied to the subject to the design differential pressure; and valve during the static deflection tests. (5) operability qualification of sabe actuators for the environmental conditions over the (3) The valve is then operated while in the installe d life. Environmental qualification deflected position (i.e., from the normal procedures for operation follow those specified operating position to the safe position) in S e ctio n 3.11. The results of all required The valve is verified to perform its tests are properly documented and included as a safety related function within t he part of the operability acceptance documentation specified operating time limits package. (4) Motor operators and other electrical 3.932.5.12 Dpamic Load Qualli1 cation appurtenances necessary for operation are qualified as operable during a dynamic The functionality of an acthe valve during event by appropriate qualification tests and after a seismic and other RBV event may be prior to installation on tbc vahe. These demonstrated by an analysis or by a combination motor operators then have individual of analysis and test. The qualification of Seismic Category I supports attached to electrical and instrumentation components decouple the dynamic loads between the controlling valve actuation is discussed in operators and valves themselves. Subsection 3.9.3.2.5.1.3. The valves are designed using either stress analyus or the The piping, stress analysis, and pipe pressure temperature rating requirements based support design maintain the motor operator upon design conditions. An analysis of the accelerations below the qualification lesels extended structure is performed for static with adequate margin of safety. equivalent dynamic loads applied at the center of gravity of the extended structure. See If the fundamental frequency of the valve. S u bse ction 3.9.2.2 for furthe r det ails. by test or analysis, is less than that for the ZPA, a dynamic analysis of the valve performed The maximum stress limits allowed in these to determine the equivalent acceleration to be analyses confirm structural integrity and are the applied during the static test. The analysis limits developed and accepted by the ASME for the provides the amplification of the input Amendment t .-
MN murar Standard Plant m.g 3.9.3.4 Cc nponent Supports - correspond to those used for design of the sup. Port e d p,pe. i The component loading The design of bolts for component supports combinations are discussed-in Subsection is specified in th3 ASME Code Section !!!, 3.9.3.1. The stress limits are per ASME Ill, Eubsection NF. Stress limits for bolts are gisen Subsection NF and Appendix F. Supports are in NF-3225. The rules and stress limits w hich generally designed either by load rating must be satisfied are those given in NF 3324.6 method per paragraph NF4260 or by the stress multiplied by the appropriate stress limit factor limits for linear supports per paragraph for the particular service loading level and NF 3231. The critical buckline loads for the stress category specified in Table NF-3225.21. Class 1 piping supports subje'cted to faulted loads that are more severe than normal, upset Morcoser, on equipment which is to be, or and emergency loads, are determined by using may be. mounted on a concrete support, sufficient the methods discussed in Appendices F and XVil holes for anchor bolts are prmided to limit the of the Code. To avoid buckling in the piping anchor bolt stress to less than 10,000 psi on the supports, the allowable loads are limited to nominal bolt area in shear or tension. two thirds of the determined critical buckling (twc.kdirg under-cd fyjM. aedOM ioads. A h Concrete anchor bolts (which are used for .TM S FAT d6W Ph J O ),i 31 l pipe support base plates will be designed to the The design of all supports for non nuileTr applicable factors of safety which are defined in piping satisfies the requirements of NSI 11E Bulletin 79 02, " Pipe Support Base Plate B31.1, Paragraphs 120 and 121. A SMi/ Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts," bJeMM SL l979, pg py;9 Qg, For the major 1ctive valves identified in Revision 2. 1' dated ! c :', @/ic.ho Subsection 3.9.3.2.4, the valve operators are jg j,j3 . 3.9.3.4.1 Piping p pnes A5 not-used as attachment points for piping nbsec. hoe Nb supports. Supports and tiiWr attachments for essential ASME Code Section 111 Class 1,2, and 3 piping The design criteria and dynamic testing re. are designed in accordance with Subsection NF' ' quirements for the ASME !!! piping supports to the interface of the building structurej %eA are as follows: 3 ? i. ., . - w. . . - - y . ,u : . n_ ::. __at , m i , c "' " '
-.m (1) Piping Supports All piping supports are g '. _ r: ! e s tm . o . ' " : d S :: _ arr3t designed, fabricated, and assembled so e a ,:-,,;,,, s a r.. - ~- - mfg p.,7 that they cannot become disengaged by the
,,,g : % , w r, . . t - s " i . . -rc rrre movement of the supported pipe d'*OY" J"-- ' " 5 :: _ _, .c! 5:.J L . i .M., equipment after they have been installed.
^ 11 Pii P ng supports are designed in The.
NOutlo Aen) co.4inatiou & h accordance with the rules of Subsection NF opa condMCML of the ASME Code up to the building structure interface was defined strMiT~h
' Augmented by the following: (1) application of h,,,:5dNN* boundaries in $4Hcii@ N Code Case N 476, Supple. ment 89.1 which governs (2) Spring Hangers - The operating load on-the design of single ac,gle members of ASME Class r.pring hangers is the load caused by dead 1,2,3 and MC linear component supports; and (2) weight. The hangers are calibrated to en-when eccentrie loads or other torsional loads are sure that they support the operating load.
not accommodated by designing the load to act at both their hot and cold load settings. through the shear center or meet " Standard for Spring hangers provide a specified down Steel Support Design *, analyses will be performed travel and up travel in excess of the in accordance with torsional analysis methods specified thermal movement. Dellech0M such as: " Torsional Analysis of Steel Members, fug, }o c( ge,, loadt o.f C C. hec ke d b USS Stee! Manual *, Publication T114 2/S3. g g, 4 4.g WOf k (qt. d NS. Spf ed yQ wiatios \+ %t. suppot} lod does co+- Amendment 2t kA 08.,lJNACCe d . 3 oW Obk sycpo 4 ,
.g a_Ji 4 - m.- a - - 4 A. Ja ,,..c.,i.Ae. t -.J .a -J,.+. 4
/06W PA 84. 39-3/A _
defledom at sypor/ kcan%s we aecbd to amfun1 %t the sappor/ Aas nof rotated beyonc/ /k mdor's reconimeese'd cone of achar, or th reconnena'ed arc of /eb y. NEW PAR &. 3.9 - 318
/ine.s are a'esigned and ama/yzel m accoraa'na alth AsNd 4c6.Sechw m ,
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_ms
ABWR Siandard Plant uwen a.tv n (3) _ Snubbers . The operating loads on snubbers are the loads caused by dynamic events (eg, seismic, RBV due to LOCA and SRV dis-charge, discharge through a relief valve line or. valve closure) during various operating conditions. Snubbers restrain piping against response to the sibratory excitation and to the associated ' differen-tial mosement of the piping system support anchor points. The criteria for locating snubbers and ensuring adequate load capacity, the structural and mechanical performance parameters used for snubbers and the installation and inspection consider- , ations for the snubbers are as follows: (a) Required Load Capacity and Snubber Loca-tion
.T ' : 3 4 ,_ p g g,m inanatng
-valves and-wpport sysem-be!" en e e h pe!-!: it -etkemash mede! d Jor co m @ &4-pipin g t ""
a n+4 y*4+c 4*-th S. d n 2 -- ! c n 9 : :: Y +b-+euWm-an disase a e - :- with a given spring stiffness depenM on the snubber size. The aptlysis determines the forces and moments acting I on each piping components artd the forces
! acting on the snubbtfs due to all dynamic loading and p d e fi n e d i n t he'piping perating conditions design specification;/The forces on snub.
bers are ope' rating loads,for various operating conditions. The calculated loads cannot exceed the snubb loot' capacity for various erying op\ design jdaditions, i.e., design, normal, uph, . m:rg:::y =d fe' :i
- The loads _ calculated in the piping dynamic analysis, described in Subsection 3.7.3.8, cannot exceed the snubber load capacity for design, normal, upset, emergency and faulted conditions.
l l l Amendment 21 3931.1 i
h ABM
?
Standard Plant * '
- nr 3 Snubbers are generally used in agreement, they are brought it situations where dynamic support is required because thermal growth of the agreement. and the system analys s i piping prohibits the use of rigid is redone to confirm the snubb:r supports. The snubber locations and loads. This iteration is continued until all snubber load capacities support directions are first decided by a nd sprin g- con st a nts ar:
estimation so that the stresses in the r e c o n cile d. papieg system will.have acceptable salues The snubber locations'and (c) Snubber Design and Testing support directions are refined by performing the dynamic analysis of the To assure that the required piping and support system as described above in order that the piping stresses structurai aod meehaoi:a: performance characteristics a:d and support loads meet the Code product quality are achieved. ::: r e q uir e = e nt s. following requirements for desig: and testing are imposed by t:: The pipe suppert design specification design specification: requires that snubbers be provided with position icdicators to identify the rod (i) The snubbers are required t! position. This indicator facilitates the pipe support desig: the checking of hot and cold settings of specification to be design:d the snubb r, as specified in the in accordance with all of the
- nstallation manual, during plant rules and regulations of the preoperational and startup testing. ASME Code Section !!!,
Subsection NF. This desien (b) Inspection, Testing, Repair and/or requirement includes analysis Replacement of Snubbers for the norm al, u p s e'- emergency, and f aulte: The pipe support design specification loads. These calculate: requires that the snubber supplier loads are then compar:d prepare an installation instruction against the allowable loacs manual. This manual is required to t o in a k e s u r e t h a t th: contain complete instructions for the stresses are below the 'coce testing, maintenance, and repair of the allowable limit, snubber, it also contains inspection points and the period of inspection. (ii) The snubbers are tested to insure that they can perfor:n The pipe support design specification as required during the requires that hydraulic snubbers be seismic and other RBV even:s. equipped with a fluid level indicator so and under anticipat 4 that the level of fluid in the snubber operational transient loacs can be ascertained easily, or other mechanical loads associated with the design The spring constant achieved by the requirements for the plant. i snubber supplier for a given load Th e - f o11o win 3 t e s t capacity snubber is compared against the requirements are includedi spring-constant used-in the _ piping syste.n model. If the spring constants o Snubbers are subjected to are the same, then the snubber location force or displacement _versus and support direction become confirmed, time loading at. frequencies if the_ spring constants are not in wit hin tbe r a' n g e ' o f f Arnendmeris 1 3 F
- u. _ _ ,u, _ _ _ ___ _ ,_ --. -, - . . _ , .
f e D y d lc- cyc.Iic. 1oa A +tsts ave cu h e+rd b M M'R Standard Plant y0* M. lic- 5 * 'd
- 5
- de fea'sc is.
MW ConYVo l @ )06 . o r+ah*^l[ch"* c W significant modes of the ciping (i) There are no visible signs of system; damage or impaired M operability as a result of o Displacements are measured to s t o r a g e, h a n dling, o r determine the perfo mance in s t alla tio n. c h a r a ct e ris tic s s pe cifie d: (ii) The snubbe r loc ation, o Tests are conducted at various o rie n t a tio n, position temperatures to ensure operability setting, and configuration oser the specified range; (attachments, extensions, etc.) are according to design o Peak test loads in both tension and drawings and specifications. compression are required to be equal to or higher than the rated load (iii) Snubbers are not seized. requiremen, na frozen or jammed. o The snubbers are tested for various (iv) Adequate swing clearance is abnormal enviroamental conditions, provided to allow snubber Upon completion of the abnormal movements, environmental tran:,ient test, the snubber is tested dynamically at a (v) If applicable, fluid is to be frequency within a specified recommended level and not be frequency range.. The snubber must leaking from the snubber operate noreaally during the dynamic system. t est. (vi) Structural connections such (d) Snubber Instalbtion Requirements as pins, fasteners and other connecting hardware such as A n installation instruction manual is lock nuts, tabs, wire, cotter required by the pipe support desig: pins are installed correctly. specificatten. . This manual is required to contain instructions for storage, If the period between the handling, erection, and adjustments (if- initiai pre serviee necessary) of snubbers. Each snubber examination and initial has an installation location drawing system pre operational tests which contains the installation location exceeds 6 months because of of the snubber on the pipe and unexpected situations, structure, the hot and cold settings, reexamination of items 1. 4, and additional information needed to and 5 will be performed. install the particular snubber. Snubbers which are installed incorrectly or otherwise fail (c) Snubber Pre sernce F2 amination to meet Ihe a b o y e-requirements will be repaired The pre service examination plan of all or replaced and re examined snubbers covered by the Chapter 16 tech- in accordance with the abose nical specifications will be prepared. criteria. This examination will be made after i snubber installation but not more than 6 (4) S t r u t s - T E : d::!;: ! :d 2: 'i m months prior to initial system pre oper. Autu d++-t h e:: !::d: n=:dbydnd ational testing. The pre service wigh :h::r:! rpr:h M9 ' - examination will verify the following: -4 4., OBE rd S S E), ::Er '""! !ri l' 4 L L l-Amendmen 7 .. [ nn
- =f
s h{ ff
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N _ f &
- - - - , _ .J Struts Struts are denned as ASME Section 111 Subsection NF, Component Standard Supports, They consist of rigid rods pinned to a pipe clamp or lug at the pipe and pinned to a clevis attached to the building structure or supplemental steel at the other end.
Struts, including the rod, clamps, clevises, and pins are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III Subsection NF,3000, Struts are passive supports, requiring little maintenance and in service inspection, and will normally be used instead of snubbers where dynamic supports are required and the movement of the pipe due to thermal expansion and/or anchor motions is small Struts will not be used at locations where restraint or pipe movement to thermal expansion will signiGeantly increase the secondan piping stress ranges or equipment nozzle loads, Increases of thermal expansion loads in the pipe and nozzles will normally be restricted to less than 20c, Because of the pinned connections at the pipe and structure, struts carry axialloads only. The design loads on struts may include those loads caused by thermal expansion, dead weight, and the inertia and anchor motion etTects of all dynamic loads, As in the case of other supports, the forces on struts are obtained from an analysis, which are assured not to exceed the design loads for various operating conditions.
1 . - __ _._ . _ - _ - . ._ - _ _ _ ._ n ABM meme Standard Plant- / - / xrv a 1 'g / / syshm , todi lacem4 (/ is, air eacti forcei aused 'sc rg or (?/ Pent) * (4/9dd + (r/fst) t vahe c sus etc.,re}fe) valt
< (1/S.F.)
D\ uts are ,or t&e s ASN where: pe S tionMi$c4 o a 'on NF. #0 Subsec k 4 t be
<caph 'e o f c ay Ra g t d sig loat for q = longitudinal load t var o -P ha tions. s in akof
=
be\ .perpng external pressure m so t- t forces', strut aN t ainb4 r = transverse shear stress te 4; fifm an alysis, hk a assu'ed not to S F. = safety factor exceed j tQ de ign lo f r h ous\ = 3.0 for design, testing, service
'k operating unditions levels A & B N N '
=
2.0 for Senice Level C 3.93.4.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel Support SkJrt = 1.5 for Senice Level D. The ABWR RPV support skirt is designed as an 3.9.3.4J Reactor Pressure Vessel Stabillaer ASME Code Class I component per the reqmtements of ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF' The The RPV stabilizer is designed as a Safety loading conditions and stress criteria are given Class i linear type component support in in Tables 3.91 and 3.9 2, and the calculated accordance with the requirements of ASME stresses meet the Code allowable stresses in the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, critical support areas for various plant Subsection NF. The stabilizer provides a operating conditions. The stress level margins reaction point near the upper end of the RPV assure the adequacy of the RPV support skirt. An to resist horizontal loads due to effects such analysis for buckling shows that the support as carthquake, pipe rupture and RBV. The skirt complies with Subparagraph F.1332.5 of ASME design loading conditions, and stress criteria
!!1. Appendix F, and the loads do not exceed two are given in Tables 3.91 and 3.9 2, and the i thirds of the critical buckling strength of the calculated stresses meet the Code allowable skirt. The permissible skirt loads at any stresses in the critical support areas for elevation, when simultaneously applied, are various plant operating conditions.
limited by the following interaction equation: 3.9.3.4.4 Floor Mounted Major Equipmert (Pumps, Heat Exchangers, and RCIC Turbine) Since the major active valves are supported by piping and not tied to building structures, valve ' supports
- do not exist (See Subsection 3.9.3.4.1),
The HPCF, RHR,' RCIC, SLC, FPCCU,
- Augmented by the following: (1) application of SPCU, and CUW pumps; _ RMC; RHR,-
Code Case N 476 Supplement 89.1 which governs RWCU, and FPCCU heat exchangers; and RCIC the design of single angle members of ASME Class turbine are all anslyzed to verify the 1,2,3 and MC linear component supports; and (2) adequacy of their support structure under when eccentric loads or other torsional lot.ds are various plant operating conditions.- In all not accommodat.ed by designing the load a act cases, the load-stresses in the critical through the shear center or meet *Standa.d for support areas are within ASME Code allowables. Steel Support Design *, analyses will be performed in accordance with torsional analysis methods Seismic Category I active pump supports are such as: " Torsional- Analysis of Steel Members, qualified for dynamic (seismic and other RBV) USS Steel Manual *, Publication T114 2/83. loads by testing when the pump supports Amendmcoi t.5 3
p - - - - ~ l Y , "b }
- /
Add new Paragraph 3.9.3.4.1 (5)
' Frame Type (Linear) Pipe Supports Frame type pipe supports are linear supports as defined as A5ME 5ection Ill. Subsection NF. Component Standard Supports. They cor.sist of frames constructed of structural steel elements that are not attached to the pipe.
They act as cuides to allow axial and rotational mosement of the pipe but act as rigid r-93.wto lateral mosement in either we or two directions. Frame type pipe supports are designed {in accordance witn ASME Code Section 111. Subsection NF 3000.
<sstrads ' Frame npe pipe supports are passive supports. requiring little maintenance and in-sersice inspection, and will normally be used instead of struts when they are more economical or where ensironmental conditions are not suitable for the ball bushina at the pinned connections of struts. Similar to struts, frame type supports will not be usid at locations where restraint of pipe movement to thermal expansion will significantly increase the secondary riping stress ranges or equipment nozzle loads. Increases of thermal expansion loads in the pipe and nozzles will normally be restricted to less than 20c. c f~ramt ,7 Y Sugd
'The design loads on frame type pipe support include thos,e loads caused by thermal expansion, dead weight, and the inertia and a chor motion efTects of all dynamic loads. As in the case of other supports, the forces on are obtained from an analssis, which are assured not to e.xceed the design loads for various operating conditions.' Add new Paragraph 3.9.3.4.1 (6): Special Engineered P:pe Supports In an efTort to minimize the use and application of snubbers there may bewinstances where special engineered pipe supports can be used where either struts or frame type supports cannot be applied. Examples of special engineered supports are Energy Absorbers, and Limit Stops. Energy Absorbers - are linear energv absorbing support parts designed to dissipate energy associated with dynamic pipe movements by yielding. When energy absorbers are used they will be designed to meet the requirements of ASME Section III Code Case N 420. Linear Energv Absorbing Supports for Subsection NF Classes 1. 2, and 3 Construction. Section 111. Division 1. The restrictions on location and applicacion of struts and frame type supports. discussed in i4i and (5) above, are also applicable to energy absorbers since energy absorbers allow thermal movement of the pipe only in its design directions. Limit Stops - are passise seismic pipe support devices consisting oflimit stops with gaps sized to allow for thermal expansion while preventing large seismic displacements. Limit stops are linear supports as defined as ASME Section IIL Subsection NF. and are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III.
~
Subsection NF 3000. They consist of box frames constructed of structural steel elements that are not attached to the pipe. The box frames allow free mosement in the axial dir*ction but limit large displacements in the lateral direction.
,n l 3.9.7 COL License information M 3.9.7.3 Program Pump and Vahe Insenice Testing 3,9.7.1 Reactor Intermals Vibration Analysis.
Steasurement and Inspection Program COL applicants will provid: l The first COL applicant wil! provid:. at th: d: tailed pump and v a plan for th: l time of application, the results of the vietatica inspection program.This alveplan inservice will t: sting and assessment program for the ABWR pect typ: internals. These r:su!rs will inclu:: the (1) Include baseline pre service testing to ta;! awing :ntormation specified in Regulatory support the periodic in senice t:stine of G uid: 1.20- - the :omponents requir:d by te:hnical s p e:ifica tio ns. g r ' '.2 W; Provisions at: included to disasse=ble a::d inspect the pump, check vaives, and StOVs within tne Code an C.:. Vibration Ana!)s.s safeturelated classific: tion as ce::ssary: Praeram d:; ::ing on test results. (S:: Surse:tions C1 33 6. 33 6.1, 3.9 6.2.1 and 3.9 o 1: 1 Vibratien Steasur:m:nt Pregram C.13 (:) Cis Inspecaon Pr:grun Provide a study to determine the opumai Documentanon et f t:q u e n cy f o r valve s t r o ki::g d u rin g inse:cice Results t: sting. (Se: S u ose: tic: 3.9 6.2.2) l wrmanen:en the urst COL appiic:nts (3) Addr::s accLetNRC the concerns r .iewand ana issuesarproval e of ic:ntifi d m il : m cie:: the ai r:non assessment pragt:m in Generic Letter 59-10: se::if!::lly the re:uirements for protatspe reactor intern:ts. metnca of assessment of the icacs. the metnoa of sizing the actuators. and the l ::ase.Inthe acamen to the information t: uiated setu:g of the torcue and limit switches. ist COL anplicant wiil prosic: the (Se: s uosecuan 3.9.6.2.2) intarmanon in: an the seneuuies in accorcan:: uth 20prie:0!c portions of position C 3 of 3.9.7.4 Aucit of Desh;n Specification and Design Reports R egui tory Guide 1.20 for non prototype in::rnals. COL 2:piicants stil make availabie to en: nese:.: t CCL :: N RC staff d: sign specific:non an: Jesign
". : .nicrmanon on (n:piicants ne:d ann ;rmice schedules in ac:Orcar : r:perts ::putred by ASSIE Caa for vesseis.
uth tue a:piic:cle pornocs of posinon C.3 of rumps, sanes and piping systems for in: purpos: of audit. R:gulatory Guide 1.20 for non prototype int:rnals. (S : Subsec: ton 3.9.3.1) requirement < (Se:
>. Subsection 3.9.2.4 for int:rfs:: 3.9.3 References 9
i 3.9.7.2 ASSIE Class : or 3 or Quality Group D BWit 7 Fuel Channet Mecitanic:t De:itm ana Camponents mth 60 Year Design Life h De! ec::en. NEDE.21354-P. Sept:me:r 1976. 2.
\\ COL .:ppii::n:s m!!idennjy ASME Cl:ss 2 or 3or Quality EMt. 6 Fuel Assembly Evalu non clC;m me:
Group D components : hat are subjec:ed to cyclicSafe loaaings,shutdown Earthauake fSSE1 ana inc:ua:ng ape?:::ng cibration loads and themtal tr:nsients Loss of Caoiant Ac:: dent (LOC 4) Laaaings. encc:s. of m:ru:ude and/or dura: ion so severe the 60 NEDE year21175 P Novemoer 1976. Jev7t lif.* can not be assured by required Code calculations 3. ana. iwn,':r des:r:s have not already been es::u::ed. euher NEDE.:;057-P (Class ill) 2:d NEDE h057 pro.:ac :n app cyn::e an:iys:s :o demonste:te the req:ured (C1 ass n Asse1sment of R::: tar i:t: rnai 1. acsipi hlc or prm ude designs to mitigate the m:gn:::de orVibtauca in BWRis and S WR. 5 ?13 ats. dur: nan of:he cyc:::lo:ds. (See Subsec::on 3.9.3.1.) {l Amen ment M 3945
tGWR :3seixxt Standard Plant _ ntv n Table 3.9 1 PIANT EVESTS B. Dynamic Loading Events (8) ASME Code No. of Senic umtt[10) III ) tuna
- 12. Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) Esent at B 10 Cycles (4)
Rated Power Operating Conditions
- 13. Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) (5) at Rated D(9) 1(3) Cycle Power Operating Conditions
- 14. Turbine Stop Valve Full Closure (TSVC)(6) B dycle3)) $CMb l During Event 7a and Testing W
- 15. Safety Retief Valve (SRV) Actuation (One, B M h67d l Two Adjacent, All or Automatic Depresseri- Events (7) zation System) During Event 7a and 7b 16, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
Small Break LOCA (SBL) D(9) 1(3) Intermediate Break LOCA (IBL) D(9) 1(3) Large Break LOCA (LBL) D(9) 1(3) NOTES (1) Some events apply to reactor pressure vessel (RPV) only. The number of events / cycles applies to RPV as an example. (2) Bulk average vessel coolant temperature change in any one hour period. (3) The pnnual encounter probability of a single eveet is <10 2 for a Level C event and
< 10' for a Level D event. See Subsection 3.9.3.1.1.5.
(4) 50 peak OBE cydes for piping,10 peak OBE cycles for other equipment and components. (5) One stress or load reversal cycle of maximum amplitude. Amendment 21
MN uA6 tun StandatiPIant pg,g Table .3.9 1 PLANT EVE.NTS B. Dynamic Loading Events (Continued) NOTES (6) Applicable to main steam piping sptem only. (7) The number of reactor building vibratory load cycles on the reactor vessel and internal components
,is 29,400 cycles of varying amplitude during the 396 events of safety / relief val"e actuation.
l [ (8) Table 3.9 2 shows the evaluation basis combination of these dynamic loadings.- (9) Appendix F or other appropriate requirements of tbc ASME Code are used to determine toe senice Lese! D limits, as described in Subsection 3.9.1.4 (10) These ASME Code Service Limits apply to ASME Code Class 1,2 and 3 components, component supports and Class CS structures. Different limits apply to Class MC and CC containment vessels and components, as discussed in Section 3.8. The nudere o2 (eadr b>uI) din N d fIh ]' b dC/ClfJ on the. figing sysPes ins de At anNn me++ is vahe ukk, 4ze tai % 3.enwh s tYou cyc 04 s%)lesesub/y Med 3% eoemff relito fC Safeh/Ve,Iiefh}0EachadcM okAN96)#5 Of he Atetie up<esswiadrew. sysw va Ney WiYh 3 5 YYEIl CyCIti y ey'. e\)eonI, Amendment 2t
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Table 5.2-4 9 REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY MATERIALS Component f.o.Ltgl Staterial Soccificatimi MSTSt/ASSIE) Main Steam Isolation Valves l Vahe Body Cast Carbon steel - SA352 LCB ~i. Cover Forged Carbon Steel SA350LF2 _, Poppet Forged Carbon Steel ' SA350LF2 Vahe stem Rod 17 4 pH SA 564 630 (H1100) ! Body bolt Bolting Alloy steel SA $40 B23 CL4 or 5 I Hex nuts Bolting Nuts Alloy steel SA 194 GR7 Main Steam Saferv/ Relief Vahe Body Forging Carbon steel ASME SA 350 LF2 or Casting Carbon steel ASME SA 352 LCB Bonnet (yoke) Forging Carbon steel ASME SA 350 LF2 I or Casting Carbon steel ASME SA 352 LCB Nozzle (seat) Forging Stainless steel ASME SA 182 Gr F316 or Casting Carbon steel ASME SA 350 LF2 Body to Bar/ rod Low alloy steel ASME SA 193 Gr B7 I-boncet stud Body to Bar/ rod Alloy steel ASME SA 194 Gr 7 l bonnet nut Dise Forging Alloy steel ASME SA 637 Gr 718 or Casting Stainless steel ASME SA 351 CF 3A Spring washer Forging Carbon steel ASME SA 105 Adjusting Screw Alloy steel ASME SA 193 Gr B6 (Quenched + or tempered or normalized & tempered Set point adjust- Forgings Carbon and alloy Multiple specifications . meat assembly steel parts Spindle (stem) Bar Precipitation . ASTM A564 Type 630 (H 1100) . .l hardened steel Spring - Wire or Steel ASTM A304 Gr 4161 N Bc!]ville washers Alloy steel 45 Cr Mo V67 Main Steam Picina ( be,fpJt0% - $?\/ M iUINAO E AstAE i Pipe Seamless Carbon steel '! SA 333 Gr. 6 - N Contour nozzle - Forging Carbon steel
- SA 350 LF 2 200A 1500# Forging Carbon steel
- SA 350 LF 2 large groove flange l
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REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY MATERIALS (Coedaued) Component faun Material Specingadea LASTM/A5 ME) ASM6 50A special Forging Carbon steel [SA 350 LF 2 nor2Je prAd Elbow Seamless Carbon steel SA 420 Head fitting /pene- Forging Carbon steel
- SA 350 LF 2 ;
tration piping Feedwater PiFi nj f 6ete RPV %J k seismic idedace feskeln seamless ca e n ste.l AsMr se 511 Gr. s Pipe. El 6 sea less cv6 steel ASMe sA 4eo D"Ol Fogig cw6 steel Astir s4 15V 4F2 r>enhah.on y\fn3 . WW Sftsl A SM6 A ** l* f 2'- Nottle Twgiy l l . j .. l l Anwndenent 15 32 321}}