ML20096C582

Alleges Poor Traceability of Matl Used in Thermocouple Extension Wire Conductors,Faulty Testing of Onsite Cable Repairs,Nonqualification of Replacement Cable Trays & Lack of Adequate Flood Protection for Critical Components

ML20096C582
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	05/30/1984
From:	AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20096C581	List: ML20096C582
References
NUDOCS 8409050356
Download: ML20096C582 (1)

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DO NOT DISCLOSE 6W 3 0E64 e

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 ;29an Plaza Drive Suite 1000

• Arlington, TX 76011 Gentlemen:

I understand that, some years ago, numerous problems in the design and procurement of materials for River Bend were called to your attention, but the NRC declined to take steps to enter corrections on the basis that the licenaee, Gulf States Utilities, had, themselves identified the problems, and there was reason to believe that they would enter the necessary coureotionse This has not proven to be the case. ,

- Despite the efforts of CSU's prime contractor, Stone & Webster, there is still no direct traceability on the material used in the conductors for thermocouple extension wire at River Bend.

On 600Y power cable and on insulated 600Y control cable, there is no known test by the vendor, Okonite, on their repairs and splices made in the factory, to -

qualify this material for Class 1E nuclear power plant application, ,

The cable tray vendor, Busky Products, Florence, Ky, has gone out of business, thus throwing into question the (ualification of all replacement cable tray used at i

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River Bend. Also, much of the cable tray is aluminum, and there is.no good procedure in place to insure that aluminum tray will not be inadvertantly used in radiation areas of the plant. Finally Husky proposed that, with the close-spaced cable tray l

rungs used at River Bend, to make bending radius on cable drop-thsoughs of large l

diameter cables, tray runge be removed. However, such trays have not been qualified to the plant's seismic criteria!

Finally, the plant last year sustained considerable damage from the heavy flooding that occurred in the area. Nowhere in Stone & Webster's PSAR or FSAR is such l

flooding contemplated, nor is any provision made to re-qualify critical plant components in the wake of the damage that would be caused by such flooding. The first knowledge of damage is likely to be a cataerophic failure during a SCRAM l

condition when critical components fail to perform as a result of weakening caused by prolonged submersion in brackish water. The NRC should insist that this matter l be addressed before any further licensing is granted.

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8409050356 840827

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