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MONTHYEARML23269A0232023-09-22022 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - TSTF-505 Audit Questions ML23240A3412023-08-28028 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2, Grand Gulf, and River Bend - Acceptance Review of LAR Revising TSs to Adopt TSTF-205, Revision of Channel Calibration, Channel Functional Test, and Related Definitions ML23194A1752023-07-13013 July 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 - Acceptance Review of Alternative Request ANO1-ISI-037 ML23187A0432023-07-0303 July 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 - TSTF-505 Audit Agenda ML23166A0132023-06-14014 June 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 - TSTF-505 Audit Questions ML23130A2752023-05-10010 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 2- Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action LAR to Adopt TSTF-505 Revision 2 ML23118A0692023-04-28028 April 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 1 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action LAR to Modify ANO-1 TS 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation (L-2023-LLA-0048) ML23104A1052023-03-10010 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 Final RAI Alternative Request for Life-of-Repair of RVCH Pen. 46 ML23072A3672023-03-0909 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Entergy Fleet - Acceptance Review of Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment ML23039A0872023-02-0808 February 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - Acceptance Review of Relief Request ANO2-RR-23-001, Half-Nozzle Repair of RVCH Penetration 46 (L-2023-LLR-0000) ML23026A1322023-01-26026 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 1 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action LAR to Adopt TSTF-505 Revision 2 ML22354A0122022-12-19019 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and ANO-2 - Acceptance Review of Request for Alternative ANO-CISI-002 Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection (L-2022-LLR-0080) ML22349A0112022-12-14014 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI Relief Request ANO1-ISI-035 ML22341A1202022-12-0707 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 1 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action LAR to to Remove Technical Specification Condition Allowing Two Reactor Coolant Pump Operation (L-2022-LLA-0161) ML22273A0982022-09-30030 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements ML22265A2012022-09-22022 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 - Acceptance Review of Relief Request ANO1-ISI-036 ML22188A1782022-07-0707 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 - Acceptance Review of Relief Request ANO1-ISI-035 ML22174A1362022-06-23023 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 Final RAI Relief Requests ANO2-ISI-023 Through -028 (EPIDs L-2022-LLR-0022 Through -0027) ML22151A3262022-05-31031 May 2022 August 2022 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22124A2452022-05-0404 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and ANO-2 - Final RAI 2 License Amendment Requests to Implement Provisions of 10 CFR 50.69 (L-2021-LLA-0105/-0106) ML22108A1642022-04-18018 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1: Final RAI License Amendment Request Concerning TS Changes Due to Revised Dose Calculations (L-2021-LLA-0181) ML22081A3902022-03-22022 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 - Acceptance Review of Relief Requests ANO2-ISI-023, -024, -025, -026, -027, and -028 (Epids: L-2022-LLR-022, -023, -024, -025, -026, and -027) ML22034A5482022-02-0303 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI License Amendment Requests to Implement Provisions of 10 CFR 50.69 (L-2021-LLA-0105/-0106) ML22020A0822022-01-19019 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and 2 - Final RAI 2 License Amendment Requests to Allow the ECP to Remain Operable on a One-Time Basis for Up to 65 Days to Perform Piping Upgrade (L-2021-LLA-0015) ML22020A0742022-01-13013 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Alternative ANO2-PT-003 ML21314A1212021-11-0909 November 2021 Verbal Authorization of Relief Request ANO2-RR-21-002 ML21312A4792021-11-0505 November 2021 Email: NRC Staff Preliminary Questions Regarding X Energy LLC Xe-100 Topical Report: Risk-Informed Performance-Based Licensing Basis Development ML21312A0382021-11-0505 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 RAI Relief Request ANO2-RR-21-002 ML21308A5602021-11-0404 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, Grand Gulf, River Bend, and Waterford, Unit 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-554, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements ML21292A0112021-10-18018 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO, 1 and 2, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Waterford, 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-541, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated Position ML21287A1692021-10-13013 October 2021 Record of 10-13-21 Verbal Authorization of ANO2-R&R-012 (L-2021-LLR-0082) ML21298A1562021-10-11011 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 Final RAI Relief Request ANO2-R&R-012 Concerning Rv Closure Head Penetration 46 ML21273A0672021-09-29029 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 Final RAI 2 License Amendment Request to Adopt a Safety Function Determination Program ML21238A3742021-08-23023 August 2021 RFI Email - Cyber PI&R Inspection (ANO) ML21252A0052021-08-20020 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and 2 Final RAI License Amendment Request to Allow the ECP to Remain Operable on a One-Time Basis for Up to 65 Days to Perform Piping Upgrade (L-2021-LLA-0015) ML21217A3302021-08-0505 August 2021 (ANO) Problem Identification and Resolution (PIR) Request for Information Combined ML21202A1662021-07-20020 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Alternative ANO2-PT-003 ML21201A0062021-07-19019 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, and Waterford, Unit 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML21197A0372021-07-16016 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and 2 - Final RAI Final Response to GL 2004-02 ML21179A0052021-06-25025 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 ML21179A0042021-06-25025 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 1 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 ML21174A0342021-06-22022 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Entergy Fleet (ANO, Ggulf, Rbend, & Waterford) - Acceptance Review for Relief Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Code, Section XI for Periodic System Pressure Tests Exemptions ML21116A1092021-04-26026 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and ANO-2: Final Supplemental RAI Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Requirements for Repair/Replacement of ECP Supply Piping ML21105A0122021-04-0909 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-2 Final RAI License Amendment Request to Adopt a Safety Function Determination Program ML21074A2552021-03-15015 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and ANO-2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action LAR for One-Time Change to Support Upgrade of the ECP Supply Piping ML21071A2172021-03-10010 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO-1 and ANO-2 - Final RAI Proposed Change to Quality Assurance Program Manual ML21022A1692021-01-22022 January 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Entergy Fleet (ANO, Grand Gulf, River Bend, and Waterford) - Acceptance Review for RR EN-20-RR-003, Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-711-2 ML21019A5142021-01-14014 January 2021 March 2021 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML20356A1142020-12-17017 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - ANO Unit 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action LAR Concerning LCO 3.0.6 and Proposed Adoption of SFDP ML20350B7602020-12-14014 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 - Acceptance Review of Request to Use Alternative Examination Requirements - ANO2-ISI-022 2023-09-22
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I rmteULcca cvease - Aacunonai information Pacie Paae nwecca iease - i400IlIonaI antormaxion From: 'WALKER, WOODYT <JWALKE2@entergy.com>
To: "'rinl @nrc.gov"' <rlnl @nrc.gov>
Date: 1/17/03 5:28PM
Subject:
Additional Information Rebecca: Apec-v3s P t-~e &Ite ).&-QdQ Cad theac - ' r l..Qp S cw In the attached Excel file, you will find 9-tw errn P ast c
. AND heas QXhfO (Ic7 ) d l btcu hue so r ti-n61A--V -harrio prasth (C4cJ)
- 1) Cable Data - this worksheet contains a list of cables with the applicable insulation type. All of the listed cables (with one exception) were determined to have thermoset insulation. Therefore, the failure temperature of these cables would be 700F. The one exception was a cable (RCB5721 D1) that was installed in the 90's. As of today, we have been unable to locate the work package that recorded the cable reel number. However, all other listed instances of this cable type (i.e. R74) are thermoset cables. We believe that this cable is also a thermoset cable.
- 2) Cable Routing - For the cables listed in the above item, the associated raceways in Zone 99-M are listed.
- 3) Raceway Layout - This worksheet contains a sketch identifying the location of the raceways of interest in Zone 99-M.
- 4) Ignition Sources - This worksheet contains a sketch of the relative locations of the electrical cabinets located in Zone 99-M.
e K ne tis inNoUD/D-c ArmefrareM Items to Consider Note: Focus has been placed on Zone 99-M (vs. 98-J) since there is no suppression system installed.
Most of the listed cables are also routed through Zone 98-J. Similar consideration should be given to Zone 98-J.
- 1) From our teleconference of 01/15/03, NRR did not predict a hot gas layer reaching 700F in any of the modeled scenarios. Accordingly, all components will not 'fail' due to development of a hot gas layer.
Instead, dependent on which ignition source is modeled, a certain set of components may incur damage (due to plume or ceiling jet effects) whereas others will not experience damage temperature due to the location of the circuits within the room. Without having run specific fire models, we would theorize the potential damage of circuits routed in raceways along the west wall of Zone 99-M (i.e. those associated with EFW) whereas those routed in the eastern half of the room (i.e. associated with HPI) would not incur damage. Conversely, if the ignition sources are on the eastern half of the room, we would theorize damage to HPI related cabling, whereas EFW cabling in the western half of the room would not incur damage. With one success path undamaged by fire, the HR!
A values for performing any manual actions will most likely be impacted.
- 2) For those components that do incur damage, there is a finite amount of time available prior to oIMeracfaiulcbr' (restFc d/S I 09'ofr -SdoKV-he hue -W~ < OS-X @:FW aP/9rH t t~~~~~~~~~~~~~/ . Al3 ;; n vrag
$beCO
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I rn1eeCa iNease - Aoolilonal InTormatlon __ Pagqee failure. Those closest to the ignition source would fail first, whereas those further away would fail sequentially as you progress to the least severe exposure. Availability of the systems during this interval could have a significant impact on the amount of time available to perform manual actions. For example, assume the EFW valves do not fail closed for approximately 15 minutes. A considerable amount of decay heat can be removed by the EFW system during this 15 minute time span. This will impact (positively) the amount of time available to manually reestablish EFW and potentially impact the HRA values.
- 3) When preparing the IPEEE submittal, ANO assumed that the Main Feedwater System would be unavailable in all fire scenarios. As a result, the PSA model built to support the IPEEE (and utilized for this SDP) assumed that a fire caused a loss of all MFW. In the process of evaluating this SDP, we have determined that one flow path of MFW will be available. Thus, the associated MFW pump will continue to run until failures occur in the support systems (e.g. loss of cooling water for the lubrication system).
Similar to Item 2, above, the availability of MFW to remove decay heat will impact the time available to perform recovery actions to restore EFW.
- 4) One of the conclusions of NUREG/CR-6776 was that in all the observed test cases, when a cable failure occurred, the failure ultimately resulted in the conductors shorting to ground. There are two flow paths from the motor driven EFW pump (i.e. P7B) to the steam generators. In order to lose a flow path (i.e. fail a valve closed), the controller for the solenoid valve (i.e. CV2646 or CV2648) must receive a spurious close signal. To fully close the valve, the close signal must be approximately 2OmA (vs. a 4mA (or less) signal that results in a fully open valve). The valve position signal is provided by the EFIC system and is normally a 4 mA signal (i.e. valve is normally open). With all related conductors ultimately failing to ground in a fire scenario, the prospect of maintaining a 2OmA signal for an indefinite period of time is virtually impossible. The NUREG/CR notes that the duration of hot short (for thermoset cable) is limited to a matter of minutes after t!
he onset of cable damge. Thus, while one (or both) flow path(s) from P7B may be temporarily impacted by fire damage, ultimately the flow control valve will reopen and allow EFW flow to the steam generators.
While ANO has received nothing 'official' from the NRC concerning the significance of a Zone 99-M fire scenario, the above factors should be considered in the evaluation. All of the factors increase the availability of a method for removing decay heat, without requiring the performance of recovery actions during the initial stages of the event.
If you have questions on any of this information, please don't hesitate to contact me @ (479) 858-4923.
Woody Walker ANO - Fire Protection Engineering CC: Troy Pruett (twp~nrc.gov)' twp~nrc.gov>, "COOPER, ROBERT M'
<RCOOPE3 @entergy.com>, WALKER, JESSICA M" <JWALK12@ entergy.com>
k1I 1cb -flo-4eC 7ercos Equip Cable Praceways A308 RCA308G E0C1175 EC1237 EC1236 A3 RCD1104A E_C1175 EC1190 EC1176 l RCD1104B E.C1175 EC1190 EC1176 P36A RCA306D E-. 1258 EC1190 EC1275 BS RCB512C EC1258 EC1 237 EC1257 P64A RCB5721D1 E.C1088 EC1093 RCB5721D E0C1175 EC1163 P64B B801B1 E.C1088 ECI 093 B801B EC1175 EC1165 EC1164 K4A RCA11C E.C1175 EC1236 ECI 237 RCAIR11D E0C1175 EC1236 ECI 237 RCE11C EC1258 EC1236 ECI 237 CV2680 RCB5124F E0C1504 RCB5124G EC1504 CV2620 RCD1514D E0C1504 RCD1514E EC1504 CV2627 RCD1522D EC1504 RCD1522E EC1504 CV2646 RJ1423A1 EJ1004 CV2648 RJ1423B1 EJ1004 CV2800 RCB5173E E0C1530 D15 RPDO121A1 E0C1589 RPDO121A2 E0C1589 P7A (RS2) GCY2200A EC2184 GCY2200B EC2184 GCD0242MA EC2212 EC2213 GCDO242AB EC2212 EC2213