ML041270139

Supplemental Response to NRC Order EA-03-086

ML041270139
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	04/28/2004
From:	Bhatnagar A Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
References
EA-03-086
Download: ML041270139 (11)

Text

SAFEG UARD)S lNFOR~fATION 1TH4OW{TT CI'C-  ;~ItTPS %i-Ny n TO Z_0 VIL AND CR.MIsNAL SAciCTICN4S m IAT I Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000. Decatur. Alabama 35609-2000 Ashok S. Bhatnagar Vice President, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant April 28, 2004 EA- 03-086 10 CFR 2.202 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No.50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNITS 1, 2, and 3 - SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO NRC ORDER EA-03-086 The NRC issued an Order dated April 29, 2003, Requiring Compliance with Revised Design Basis Threat ("Order EA-03-086" or "Order")

and other security related Orders (collectively "Orders") for the BFN. This Supplemental Response of TVA to Order EA-03-086 supplements the previous response dated June 3, 2003 that TVA filed pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.4 and Section III, Conditions A.1, B.1 and B.2.

Order EA-03-086 imposes license conditions on nuclear power plants licensed pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.Section III.A of the Order requires licensees to revise their physical security plans and safeguards contingency plans to provide protection against the revised design basis threat (DBT) set forth in Attachment 2 to the Order.Section III.A also requires licensees to revise the security force training and qualification plan to implement the revised DBT. These revised plans, along with an implementation schedule, were required to be submitted to the Commission for review and approval no later than April 29, 2004.

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SAFEGUARDS iNFORMATION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 April 28, 2004 In accordance with the Order and 10 CFR § 50.4, TVA is submitting this Supplemental Response for BFN. This submittal includes, as Enclosure A, revisions to the BFN Physical Security Plan, the Contingency Plan, and the Training and Qualification Plan as required by Order EA-03-086. These plans contain the integrated commitments to comply with Order EA-03-086 and the other security related Orders issued on February 25, 2002, January 7, 2003, and April 29, 2003. As a result, these plans supersede previous submittals of TVA in these areas, including those related to the February 25, 2002, January 7, 2003, and April 29, 2003, Orders.

TVA will continue to implement the provisions of those previous submittals except to the extent that they are superseded by these plans. All changes that have been or will be made have been evaluated to ensure that they do not compromise plant safety.

TVA has developed these plans to be consistent with NEI-03-01 (Revision 1), Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Program (April 2004); NEI-03-09 (Revision 2), Security Officer Training Program (April 2004); and NEI-03-12 (Revision 2 (draft)), Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program (April 2004). The schedule for completing those actions, which includes the identification of major transitional activities, is provided in Enclosure B to this submittal. To facilitate the NRC's review, any provisions that are different from NEI-03-12 are identified and the justification provided in Enclosure C, Deviations from NEI-03-12, to this submittal. TVA does not have previous exemptions to 10 CFR Part 73. Therefore, any differences in the currently approved PSP/CP which will be incorporated in this submittal are incorporated in Enclosure C, as Deviations from NEI-03-12. Enclosure D notes this location of differences. Enclosure E, Justification for Alternatives, includes the justification for any of the alternatives provided in NEI-03-12 or in "NRC Guidance on Implementation of the April 2003 Revised Design Basis Threat" that TVA has adopted. Finally, TVA has chosen not to implement Option 1 of Section 9.4.1.2. of NEI-03-12; therefore, Enclosure F, Justification for Vehicle Search Criteria, is not enclosed in this submittal.

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SAFEGUARDS INFORNMATION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 April 28, 2004 When the final revision of NEI-03.12 is approved by the NRC, TVA will supplement this response, it necessary, to conform with NEI-03-12 as finally approved. However, with the filing of these plans, TVA will be implementing its revised protection strategy and completing plant modifications and security-personnel.training pursuant to these plans to ensure that implementation will be completed by October 29, 2004, as required by the Orders. Upon completion of the implementation of these plans, TVA will be in compliance with all applicable security requirements. For the purpose of complying with the requirements of 10 CFR Part- 73 to conduct an annual audit,, the date of the letter that will be submitted to the NRC pursuant-to Order EA-03-086 certifying that implementation of the plans is complete will be the effective date for determining commencement of the annual audit requirement period.

Because of the requirement for these plans to be fully implemented by October 29, 2004; the need to integrate the requirement of the revised DBT Order with the Orders issued February 25, 2002, January 7, 2003, and April 29, 2003; and the Commission's determination that it would be appropriate to exercise enforcement discretion to accommodate any transitional issues which may arise as licensees, in good faith, take reasonable actions to implement the specific requirements of the Orders, TVA requests that enforcement discretion be exercised during the transition period until full implementation of the plans is accomplished and the physical plant modifications and security force training are complete. At that time, the revised plans will be fully implemented and the exercise of enforcement discretion will no longer be necessary.

No new regulatory commitments are identified in this letter.

This response contains "Safeguards Information" as defined in 10 CFR 73.21. TVA, therefore, requests that the Enclosure A CD be withheld from public disclosure.

If you have any questions about this response, please contact Mr. John Ogle at (256) 729-2929 or e-mail jmogle@tva.gov.

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SAFEGUARDS NFORMATION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 April 28, 2004 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 2 8 th day of April 2004.

Sincerely, Ashok Bhat r Enclosures cc: See page 4 I

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(W/O Enclosures)

(Via NRC Electronic Distribution)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3415 Mr. Stephen J. Cahill,-Branch Chief (W/Enclosure)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II I Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 10833 Shaw Road Athens, AL 35611-6970 Kahtan N. Jabbour, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (MS 08G9)

One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 Eva A. Brown, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (MS 08G9)

One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 0

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SAFEGUARDS INFr.ORMATION ENCLOSURE A BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 NRC ORDER EA-03-086 REVISION TO PSP/CP AND T&Q PLAN Enclosure A contains a signed copy of BFN Physical Security Plan, Contingency Plan and Training & Qualification Plan. TVA is providing it on the enclosed CD. This CDMcontains "Safeguards Information" as defined in 10 CFR 73.21.- TVA, therefore, requests that the CD be withheld from public disclosure.

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SAFEGUARDS INIFORMATION ENCLOSURE B BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT* (BFN) UNIT 1, 2 AND 3 NRC ORDER EA-03-086 SCHEDULE FOR MAJOR ACTIVITIES The following implementation schedule is provided pursuant to Section III.A.1 of the Order. The implementation schedule covers the major milestones for implementing the plans submitted in Enclosure A and is intended to provide'a general understanding of expected progress in meeting the October 29, 2004 commitment date for implementing the new DBT. These dates should not be construed as commitments.

AREA OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATI'ON DATE SECURITY PLANS

- Develop Site Implementing Procedures 8/31/04

- Train security personnel on 10/15/04 Implementing Procedures

- Train Security personnel on new site 10/15/04 security plans TRAINING ORDER

- T&Q and DBT Protective Strategy 8/15/04 Evaluation - SAT Methodology

- Conduct training on new training order 10/15/04 elements

- Develop T&Q Monitoring Program 10/1/04

- Install enhancements to range 7/31/04 facilities SITE PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS

- BRE Installation 10/29/04

- VBS Installation 10/29/04

- Delay Barriers 10/29/04 I

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SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION ENCLOSURE C BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1, 2 AND 3 NRC ORDER EA-03-086 DEVIATIONS FROM NEI-03-12 BFN Nuclear Plant has the following deviations from NEI 03-12, Revision 2 (DRAFT).

• A difference is contained in Section 9.4, "Searches." To strictly follow the NEI 03-12 template for-Section 9.4.1, the site would choose one of four options for searches conducted at the VBS checkpoint based upon site vehicle bomb analysis and the consequent placement of the barrier system.

BFN has opted to install one vehicle barrier system and to locate plant personnel parking areas outside of this system.

With this configuration, the only vehicles entering the VBS checkpoint will be those vehicles entering the protected area or those vehicles going between the protected area fence and the new vehicle barrier system.

Based on this, all vehicles entering the VBS system will be searched according to the protected area search criteria of 9.4.3 "PA Vehicle Search".

The wording of BFN security plan Sections 9.4.1 has been modified to accurately reflect this difference.

• In current NRC approved PSP/CP and T&Q Plan, a difference incorporated in Section 4, paragraph 4.1.6 addresses Physical Barriers. Namely, the licensee shall locate vital equipment only within a vital area, which in turn, shall be located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. More than one vital area may be located within a single protected area.

In this submitted plan, this difference is incorporated in Section 6, paragraph 6.2.

• In current NRC approved PSP/CP and T&Q Plan, a difference, incorporated in Section 4, paragraphs 4.3, also addresses Physical barriers. Namely, the walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and any windows in the walls and in the doors of the reactor control room shall be bullet-resisting.

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SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION ENCLOSURE C BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT-(BFN) UNIT 1, 2 AND 3 NRC ORDER EA-03-086 DEVIATIONS FROM NEI-03-12 In submitted plan, This difference is incorporated in Section 6, paragraph 6.3.

• In current NRC approved PSP/CP and T&Q Plan, a difference incorporated in Section 5, paragraph 5.1.2 addresses General performance objective and requirements. Namely, for unescorted access to the nuclear power facility or for access to Safeguards Information. Namely, NRC employees and NRC contractors on official agency business; individuals-responding to a site emergency in accordance with the provisions of § 73.55(a); a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA Safeguards Agreement at designated facilities who has been certified by the NRC; law enforcement personnel acting in an official capacity; State or local government employees who have had equivalent reviews of FBI criminal history data; and individuals employed at a facility who possess "Q" or "L" clearances or possess another active government granted security clearance, i.e., Top Secret, Secret.

In this submitted plan, this difference is incorporated in Section 9, paragraph 9.1.

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SAFEGUARDS INF01IMATrzON ENCLOSURE D BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT -(BFN) UNIT 1, 2 AND 3 NRC ORDER EA-03-086 PREVIOUS EXEMPTION TO 10 CFR PART 73 TVA does not have previous exemptions to 10 CFR Part 73.

Therefore, any differences to 10 CFR Part 73 in the currently approved PSP/CP and T&Q Plan are incorporated in Enclosure C, as Deviations from NEI-03-12.

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SAFEGlUA RDTS TNTORMATON ENCLOSURE E BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT -(BFN) UNIT 1, 2 AND 3 NRC ORDER EA-03-086 JUSTIFICATION FOR ALTERNATIVES The list of deviations from the NEI 03-12 were previously approved in BFN's Physical Security Plan and has been brought forward to the attached Physical Security Plan with the exception of searches at the vehicle barrier checkpoint in Section 9.4.1. Justification for this exception is provided below.

BFN Nuclear Plant has determined that they will implement a vehicle barrier system (VBS) that provides the necessary protection from both Design-Basis Threat (DBT) vehicle bomb limiting explosive amounts. The placement of this VBS is such that the only vehicles entering the VBS checkpoint will be vehicles that are proceeding into the protected area or those vehicles going between the protected area fence and the new vehicle barrier system.

Those vehicles will be searched according to the protected area criteria of Section 9.4.3, "PA Vehicle Search." Therefore, the requirements in Sections 9.4.1 of the security plan template (i.e., NEI 03-12) are not applicable at BFN. Finally, the NEI security plan template has been modified.

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