ML20008F902

Final Deficiency Rept,Initially Reported 810206,re Unacceptable Welds Documented as Acceptable.Welds Identified as Unacceptable Have Been Documented by QC Info Repts & Will Be Corrected to Bring Welds Into Compliance

ML20008F902
Person / Time
Site:	Hartsville
Issue date:	05/04/1981
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, HTRD-50-518-81, NUDOCS 8105120287
Download: ML20008F902 (3)

Text

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. o TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY I CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 'testnut Street Tower II l

May 4, 1981 ,[+% c HrRD-50-518/81-07 8 1 1 1981 s .

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director off'.ce of Inspection and Enforcement h InD

/g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission 4.,

Region II - Suite 3100 sul

101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Beilly:

HARISVILLE PKX2 EAR PIRTP UNIT Al - REPORIABLE DmutNCY - UNACCEPTABLE WEIES DOCGemD AS ACCEPIABLE - EfRD-50-518/B1-07

'Ihe subject deficiency was initially reported to NIC-OIE, Region II Inspector, R. W. Wright on February 6,1981, as NCR HNPA-125. 'Ihe first interim report was sutmitted cn March 10, 1981. In ccanpliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency.

If you have any questions, please . call Jim Dcmer at FIS 857-2014.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY ADIECRITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety i Ehclosure oca Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)!

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

• i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccanission l Warhington, DC 20555 l

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HARISVILLE tKELEAR PLANP Al-UNACCEPIABLE WEWS DOCUMENTED AS ACCEPIABLE HTRD-50-518/81-07 10CFR50.55(e) REPORP NO. 2 (FINAL)

Description of Deficiency Unacceptable welds which required visual inspection have been documented as inspected ard accepted. Unacceptable welds were attributed to deficiencies such as arc strikes, overlaps, undercuts, parosity, slag inclusions, low grinds, insufficient fillets, excessive reinforcement, spatter, and emitted welds. h is condition was apparently caused by inspectors neglecting to follow acceptance criteria in isolated cases. Inspector negligence was caused by the inspectors striving to accmplish as nuch work as possible which resulted in overlooking marginal and/or unacceptable conditions.

Safety Imolications Failure of a system or feature due to undetected unacceptable welds could result in degradation of systems required for the safe operation or shutdown of the plant. W erefore, this condition could have jeopardized the safe operation of the plant had it remained uncorrected. .

Corrective Action Welds identified as being unacceptable by this investigation have been documented by CCIR's and will be corrected to bring them into cmpliance with "

requirements. Potentially unacceptable welds which are inaccessi.ble will be accepted as is based on final acceptance of pressure testing on pressure-containing welds and on the overall improbability of an occurrence of a defect that would cause a failure.

Reinspection of safety-related welds inspected by a total of 45 inspectors was performed. We reinspection was performed I '. incrementis of 20 reinspections for each inspector. Inspectors who had accepted more than two unacceptable welds or weldments in the initial sampling of 20 were identified, and an additional 20 welds or weldments were reinspected. Inspectors identified as having an aggregate reject rate of more than 10 percent for the 40 reinspections were identified and all identifiable, accessible safety-related welds or weldments inspected by them were reinspected.

We cmplete reinspection program was not conducted for sme inspectors due to their status as lead inspectors or due to their brief duration of employment.

Lead inspectors seldm perform inspections due to their supervisory responsiblities taking precedence over inspection duties. Sme welds which they had inspected were reexamined, but 20 accessible welds could not be identified for reinspection. Other inspectors did not have 20 welds which they had inspected which were available to reinspect.

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. o During the investigation, 1,641 welds or weldments were reinspected. An additional 914 welds were identified as inaccessible, i.e., embedded, covered with leak chase, buried, etc. As a result of the reinspection, 85 rejectable welds were identified; this is an overall rejection rate of 5.2 percent.

Rese rejectable welds were attributed to 15 inspectors who had accepted at least one rejectable weld. Seven of these inspectors had accepted in excess of 10 percent unacceptable welds during the first 40 reinspections. Only one inspector was identified as accepting more than 10 percent rejectable welds for the overall reinspection.

Inspectors still employed by TVA identified as having an aggregate reject rate of 10 percent or less in the first 40 welds but having at least one reject were counselled and shown his/her incorrect work by supervisory personnel. An informal record of the counselling session was prepared and placed in the unit files.

Inspectors still in the employ of TVA and identified as having an aggregate reject of greater than 10 percent in the first 40 welds were removed frm the inspection force and were required to attend 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of retraining and were tested for recertification. In addition, each was coenselled, shown those -

welds which had been incorrectly accepted, and a formal written recrimand placed in his/her personal history record.

Welders identified in this reinspection investigation will be required to "

repeat their attendance of the CA orientation program and the classrocm portion of the welder certification training module. Additionally, they will be individually counselled by their specific craft manager or his representative. Evidence of this retraining and counselling shall be documented.

To avoid further occurrences, responsible lead inspectors will, on a surveillance basis, evaluate routine welds accepted by inspectors under their supervision to verify the ability of the inspectors and the condition of the accepted welds. Inspectors who accept unacceptable work will be retrained, counsalled, disciplined, and/or removed frcm their psition as warranted by investigation of the particular incident. Welders identified as violating procedural requirements will be counselled, retrained, disciplined, and/or removed frca their position as warranted by investigation of the particular incident.

Evaluation of the unacceptable welds, dispositioning, and appropriate corrective action will be cceplete by July 1,1981. Identification of the involved inspectors was ccepleted by March 16, 1981. ReprimaMs have been issued aM retraining is in progress with ccepletion scheduled by May 1, 1981. Welders have been identified and appropriate actions will be completed by July 1, 1981.

his condition is uni .:e 7 to the Hartsville site and no other nuclear plants are involved.

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