ML18094A900

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03/14/2018 RIC 2018 Session W20 Tom Wellock Presentation
ML18094A900
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/13/2018
From: Thomas Wellock
NRC/SECY
To:
Moulton C
References
Download: ML18094A900 (20)


Text

Quantifying Reactor Accident Risk: A History Panel W20: The Metamorphosis to a More Risk

-Informed RegulatorTom Wellock NRC Risk-Informed, Performance

-Based*A "New Paradigm"

-Efficiency

-Safety Significant

-Relieve Regulatory Burden

  • PRAs: "Significant Limitations"

-Industry-NRC gap-Methodology

-Data-Peer Review

  • New Safety IssuesNRC Chairman Shirley Jackson 2

Three Ds of the Deterministic Era

-Deterministic Design

-Design Basis Accidents-Defense-in-Depth*Inherent Safety

  • Active Systems
  • Siting*Static Layers (containment) 3 4

WASH-1400 and the Roots of PRA

  • Methodology: Models and Goals in the 1960s
  • Regulatory Necessity
  • Political Necessity 5

6Accident Modeling in the 1960s Farmer Curve 7Chauncey Starr

  • Loss of Coolant and the China Syndrome

-ECCS*Anticipated Transient Without Scram

-Beyond the Design Basis Accident-Need for regulatory risk expertiseNew Safety Issues 8

AEC Under Siege

  • Anti-nuclear Movement
  • Environmental Protection Agency-Class 9 accidents

.-Growing interest in risk

  • Congress Henry Kendall, UCS 9 WASH-1400: Positives
  • New tool for regulators
  • Aspectrum of accidents
  • Core damage more likely but lower consequences 10 Small LOCA Event Tree from WASH

-1400 11 WASH-1400: Negatives

  • Large error bands
  • Inappropriate comparisons to other risks
  • Some accidents not analyzed
  • Lacked adequate peer review
  • Lewis Committee (1978) 12 13WASH-1400, Executive Summary 14UCS Critique of WASH

-1400 Three Mile Island and WASH

-1400 Human factors and operationsSevere accidentsSafety systems other than ECCS 15TMI Control Room, March 1979 1980s: Beneficially Unfocused

-Beyond the Design Basis: ATWS, SBO, severe accidents

-Unresolved Questions: Generic issues, older plants

-Operating Reactors: Evaluating events

-New Reactors: Design certification

-Methodology: Industry PRAs and NUREG

-1150-Goals: Safety Goal Policy and Backfits 16 Toward Risk

-Informed Regulation, 1990sIndividual Plant ExaminationsTowers-Perrin ReportMaintenance RulePRA Policy Statement (1995) and Implementation Plan (1994) 17 References

  • Slide 4: C.A. Bennett to A.B. Greninger, "Evaluation of Probability of Disasters, HW-28767," July 20, 1953, DOE Public Reading Room Catalog, Accession # D8451637.*Slide 6: P.A. Crosettiand R.F. Furrer, "Comparative Reliability Analysis

-K-Reactor Secondary Coolant System, DUN

-4461" (Hanford, WA: Douglas United Nuclear, September 9, 1968), U.S. Department of Energy Opennet,,https://www.osti.gov/opennet/detail.jsp?osti

-id=16413875; B.J. Garrick, Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Protective Systems, HN

-190 , May 1967, (Los Angeles: Holmes & Narver, May 1967); R.S. Hart and W.T. Harper, Final SNAPSHOT Safeguard Report, NAA

-SR-10022(Rev.) (San Diego, CA: Atomics International, March 20, 1965

).*Slide 7: F.R. Farmer, "Siting Criteria

-A New Approach," Containment and Siting of Nuclear Power Plants, Proceedings of a Symposium, Vienna 3

-7 April 1967 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1976) 322; Chauncey Starr, "Social Benefit vs. Technological Risk," Science165 no. 3899, September 19, 1969, 1232

-38. 18 References (cont.)

  • Slide 9: Archive of the Norfolk Charitable Trust, Sharon, MA.
  • Slides 11 and 13: U.S. NRC, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. CommericalNuclear Power Plants, WASH

-1400 (NUREG

-75/014) (DC: U.S. NRC, October 1975).

-Cambridge, December 1974), 100B.*Slide 15: "TMI Control Room in 1979," U.S. NRC Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/nrcgov/7447591188/in/album

-72157628998200797/.

19 Acronyms*ATWS: Anticipated Transient Without Scram

  • SBO: Station Blackout