05000254/FIN-2009003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | 1/2 EDGCWP Failed to Swap Feeds |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and a NCV of Quad Cities Unit 2Renewed License No. DPR-30 condition 3.B were self-revealed on April 10, 2009, when a previously unidentified blown fuse on the 1/2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) control power transfer circuit resulted in failure of the power supply for the associated diesel generator cooling water pump to transfer from Unit 1 to Unit 2. The fuse had apparently failed on March 25, 2009, when operators attempted to replace a burned out light bulb resulting in the diesel being inoperable for Unit 2 for 17 days. Although operators had indications that a circuit problem existed, timely actions were not initiated to ensure the unit continued to operate in accordance with Technical Specifications. Immediate corrective actions were accomplished on April 11, 2009, with replacement of the fuse and verification of circuit operability. Inspectors determined this finding to be cross-cutting in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution for the corrective action component because station personnel failed to investigate the non-conforming condition as directed by station procedures to adequately assess the impact on system operability and did not meet procedural requirements for evaluating operability (P.1(c)).The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the finding is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment reliability and affected the cornerstone objective by impacting availability, reliability and capability of the Unit 2 emergency electrical supplies. Specifically, allowing the non-conforming condition on the 1/2 EDG to linger while performing maintenance activities on the Unit 2EDG challenged the availability of emergency AC power to Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed this finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspections Findings for At-Power Situations. The postulated accident where the 1/2 EDG would have failed its safety function is a loss of offsite power to both units followed by a loss of coolant accident on Unit 2. The Significance Determination Phase 2 performed by the residents and validated by the regional senior risk analyst showed risk significance much lower than the 1x10-6 threshold and therefore Green |
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000254/2009003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Matthews W Slawinski M Ring D Jones J Mcghee E Coffman B Cushman |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Quad Cities - IR 05000254/2009003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Quad Cities) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Quad Cities)
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