ML20199F224
| ML20199F224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Haddam Neck, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1985 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199F155 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606240230 | |
| Download: ML20199F224 (5) | |
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Attachment 2 Northeast Nuclear Energy Cornpany Millstone Unit No. 2 i Supplement to Annual Report t
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May,1986 I
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8606240230 860529 .
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i Index Jumper-Lifted Lead-Bypass (3-LL-B) Changes 3-LL-B No. 3-LL-B-Title 2-85-19, 20, 21 Pressurizer Heater Back-Up Distribution Panel
. 2-85-22, 23, 24 Pressurizer Heater Back-Up Breaker Control Fuses i
2-85-39 Hi Chlorine Start Signal Of Control Room Ventilation Fans Defeated I
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3-LL-B Numbers 2-35-19,20, and 21 3-LL-B Numbers 2-85-19, 20, and 21, entitled " Pressurizer Heater Back-up Distribution Panels," are complete.
Description Of Change This change lif ted leads at Pressurizer Heater Distribution Panels L102, L103, and L104. The lif ted leads were restored on June 13th,1985.
Reason For Change The lifted leads were instituted to provide electrical power to the vendor skids in containment during the refueling outage.
Safety Evaluation These lifted leads provided a temporary power distribution system in the containment during the 1985 refueling outage. This was accomplished utilizing the power supply for the pressurizer back up heaters, a non-safety related source of power. The distribution system did not interface with any other Unit 2 system. The system was temporary and non-category one electrical (class IE) and it met all applicable National Electric Code (NEC) requirements.
The only potential safety hazard of this installation would be an electrical fault on the system affecting the physical integrity of the containment penetration.
The cable and fuses of the system were sized so that any possible faults would not cause any damage to the penetration.
Based on the above, the lifted leads do not involve an unreviewed safety question per the criteria in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).
3-LL-B Numbers 2-85-22,23, and 24 3-LL-B Numbers 2-85-22, 23, and 24, entitled " Pressurizer Heater Back-up
. Breaker Control Fuses," are complete.
4 Description of Change
- This change (lifted leads) removed the fuses at Bus 22B load center B0206. Bus ;
22C load center B0307 and Bus 22D load center B0407. The fuses were >
reinstalled on June 17th,1985.
Reasons For Change
- The lifted leads were instituted to prevent inadvertent loss of power to the vendor skids in containment during the refuel outage.
Safety Evaluation These lifted leads were provided a temporary power distribution system in the 4 containment during the 1985 refueling outage. This was accomplished utilizing the power supply for the pressurizer back up heaters, a non-safety related source of power. The distribution system did not interface with any other Unit 2 system. The system was temporary and non-category one electrical (class IE),
and it met all applicable National Electric Code (NEC) requirements.
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The only potential safety hazard of this installation would be an electrical fault on the system affecting the physical integrity of the containment penetration. I The cable and fuses of the system were sized so that any possible faults would not cause any damage to the penetration.
Based on the above the lifted leads do not involved an unreviewed safety question per the criteria in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).
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3-LL-B Number 2-S5-39 J-LL-B Number 2-85-39, entitled "Hi Chlorine Start Signal of Control Room Ventilation Fans Defeated," is complete.
Description Of Change This lifted lead removed the "Hi Chlorine" start signal from the logic for the control room ventilation fans F21 A and B. The lead was restored on June 8, 1985.
Reason For Change The old chlorine monitors had been removed from service and the fans were running continuously. The leads were lif ted because their Hi chlorine signal was not required in this mode of operation.
Safety Evaluation These lifted leads disabled only the "Hi Chlorine" start signal for the control room ventilation filter fans F21A & B. The remaining fan start signals (Auxiliary Exhaust Actuation Signal, Enclosure building Filtration System and hand switch 8007) will be lef t intact. While in the present mode the control room ventilation system is not required by the Technical Specifications. The lifted lead will be relanded before entering any mode for which the ventilation system is required.
Based on the above, this change affects no FSAR analyses and reduces no Technical Specification Safety margin. Therefore, it is found not to involve an unreviewed safety question with respect to the criteria contained in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).