ML22024A064
| ML22024A064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/20/2022 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Andrukat, Dennis | |
| References | |
| NRC-1807, NRC-2017-0227, RIN 3150-AK19 | |
| Download: ML22024A064 (74) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Rulemaking: Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors Public Meeting
Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: teleconference
Date: Thursday, January 20, 2022
Work Order No.: NRC-1807 Pages 1-72
NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1716 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234 -4433 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
+ + + + +
PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS RULEMAKING: ALTERNATIVE
PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVANCED
REACTORS
+ + + + +
THURSDAY
JANUARY 20, 2022
+ + + + +
The Meeting convened via Videoconference,
at 11:00 a.m. EST, Dennis Andrukat, Facilitator,
presiding.
PRESENT:
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ALSO PRESENT:
CHRISTOPHER CHWASZ, Idaho National Laboratory
KEVIN DEYETTE, NuScale
SCOTT FERRARA, Idaho National Laboratory
RANI FRANOVICH, The Breakthrough Institute
DYRK GREENHALGH, Kairos Power
EDWIN LYMAN, Union of Concerned Scientists
DAVID YOUNG, Nuclear Energy Institute
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NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com 4
P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
11:02 a.m.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, good morning.
Hopefully everyone can see the slides and can hear me
very well.
MR. YOUNG: We can year you, Dennis.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Thanks, David.
I want to welcome everyone, and thank you for
participating in today's public meeting to discuss the
Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advance
Reactors, also known as the Advance Reactor Security
Rulemaking.
My name is Dennis Andrukat. I'm from the
NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safeguards and
Rulemaking -- excuse me, and Security -- and I will be
serving as the facilitator for today's meeting on this
rulemaking.
This is an information meeting with a
question-and-answer session. The purpose of this
meeting is for the NRC staff to meet directly with the
individuals to discuss the regulatory and technical
issues.
Attendees will have an opportunity to ask
the questions to the NRC staff, or make comments about
the issues discussed, but we do ask that the attendees
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wait until the end of the staff's presentation.
The NRC is not actively soliciting
comments towards the regulatory decision at this
meeting.
The purpose of today's meeting is to
present the recently released, revised, preliminary
proposed rule language, as part of the Alternative
Physical Security Requirements for non-light water
reactors and small modular reactors. The proposed
rule is currently in development with the staff.
The staff will also present key elements
of the latest draft implementation guidance documents,
and there are currently two that are in development.
We are using Microsoft Teams. So, the
agenda today is broken into two main presentations.
We're going to discuss and present the preliminary
proposed rule language, the current version.
This is also the handout that we see in
the public meeting notice. And we will also discuss
the key elements of the associated implementation
guidance.
We do plan to have a break at about the
halfway mark, depending on how everyone feels and the
progress being made.
We are using Microsoft Teams for this
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public meeting, and so this will require all of us to
continuously assure that our phones and laptops are
muted when we are not speaking, and to do our best not
to speak over each other.
To help facilitate discussion during the
meeting, we request that you utilize the raised-hand
feature in Teams, so that we can identify who would
like to speak next. The staff will then call on the
individual to ask the question or make their comment.
The raised-hand button, which is shaped
like a small hand, is along the top row in the Teams
display area.
You can also use the chat window to alert
us that you had a question or comment. Please do not
use the chat window to actually ask the comment or to
address or ask your questions, as the window, the chat
window, is not part of the official meeting record.
It is reserved to identify when someone has a
question, or to handle logistical issues.
If you joined the meeting using the
Microsoft Teams bridge line, i.e., the phone, and you
would like to ask a question or provide a comment, you
may do so by pressing star-six to unmute your phone,
to identify that you have a comment or a question.
When you are done speaking, please go back on to mute
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by pressing star-six again.
The ADAMS Accession number for today's
presentation is ML22019A075. And the ADAMS Accession
number for the referenced preliminary proposed rule
language is ML21336A004.
And I placed a link to the ADAMS
presentation in the chat window. The ADAMS number for
the preliminary proposed rule language is in the
presentation. You'll see that here shortly.
This meeting is being transcribed. So, in
order to get a clean transcription and to minimize
distraction, again please be courteous. Please use
the mute function, as well as please be sure to
identify yourself before you speak and the affiliation
for which you're speaking.
A summary of the transcript will be made
available on or before February21, 2022.
Again, the format for today's public
meeting is an informational presentation, but I would
like to highlight a few items.
As you can see on this slide, you see the
name of the rulemaking. You can see the docket ID
number, NRC2017-0227, that you can find under
regulations.gov.
I would also like to point out a slight
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change. The supporting guidance, as I mentioned
earlier, there are two. DG1365 is now DG5022. And
those familiar with the NRC's regulatory guide
division structure will note that this is now a
Division-5 guidance document, which fits under the
Division for Physical Security.
The other associated draft guidance
document is DG 50.71, which focuses on the target set
identification process.
Ad now, we'd like to go through the
presentation slides, starting off with the preliminary
proposed rule language presentation.
As I mentioned earlier, here is the ADAMS
Accession number for the handout. This is the full
preliminary proposed rule language, the current draft.
It is in redline/strikeout format. And that is a
comparison of the proposed changes to the current
existing language in the regulation.
There is a disclaimer here. Please note
the NRC is making this preliminary proposed rule
language available to the public solely for the
purpose of providing information to the public.
The release of this proposed rule language
will facilitate today's discussion, but does not
represent the final staff position, nor has it been
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reviewed by the Commission. Therefore, the rule
language may undergo additional revisions throughout
the remainder of the rulemaking process.
I will highlight that the previous
released preliminary proposed rule language is ADAMS
Accession number ML20182A157, and that was released
September of 2020.
The next few presenters represent staff
from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Ms. Beth Reed, and the Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response, Mr.Lou Cubellis and Ms.Stacy
Prasad.
And with that, I'll turn the meeting over
to Beth Reed of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, to continue to present the preliminary
proposed rule language. Beth?
MS. REED: Thank you, Dennis, and good
morning everyone.
Today, we will discuss both the
preliminary proposed rule language and draft guidance
in 73.55(b) and 73.55(s). 73.55(b) addresses
performance requirements, and 73.55(s) addresses
applicability of the proposed rule and the specific
alternative security measures. Next slide, please.
MS. SAMPSON: Beth?
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MS. REED: Yes.
MS. VALLIERE: I apologize. Dennis, I
believe we had some opening remarks from Michele
Sampson that we inadvertently skipped over.
MS. REED: Sorry, you are correct.
Thanks, Nan.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Thanks, Nan. Go ahead,
Michele.
MS. SAMPSON: Thanks, Dennis. Thanks,
Nan. And I guess I won't hold us up. But, Michele
Sampson. I'm Acting Director in the Division of
Physical and Cybersecurity Policy in the Office of
Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
And I did want to thank everyone for
participating in today's public meeting on the
Preliminary Proposed Rule text for the Alternative
Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors.
The rule is intended to provide security
alternatives, recognizing that advanced reactors
encompass a broad spectrum of potential designs, such
as micro reactors, modular reactors, and on light
water reactors, with production potentially from the
tens of megawatts up to the power levels of today's
light water reactor designs.
While not every alternative may work for
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every reactor size and design, the rulemaking is
intended to adapt the physical security framework that
was designed for large light water reactors, to
provide risk-informed, technology-inclusive options
for advanced reactors.
The Commission's direction to the staff
for this rule was to develop these alternatives within
the existing security framework.
Power reactors licensed under 10C.F.R.
Parts50 or 52 must defend against the design basis
threat of radiological sabotage at all times, and
would be subject to the NRC's force-on-force
inspection program.
In keeping with the Commission's advanced
reactor policy statement, these security alternatives
provide a regulatory framework to allow credit, in the
form of operational flexibilities, when a reactor
design can show increased margins of safety, including
cellular transient times and relatively small and slow
release efficient products, when considering the
effects of the design-basis threat of radiological
sabotage.
The proposal includes novel approaches not
previously included in the regulatory framework for
power reactors, and addresses certain specific
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prescriptive security requirements.
The framework enables a licensee or
applicant to include one or more of these alternatives
in its protective strategy design.
We will discuss the preliminary rule
language for each of these alternatives today, and
then cover some of the key guidance on it that will
accompany the proposed rule.
While this rulemaking provides
alternatives within the existing security framework of
10C.F.R.73.55, there is a concurrent rulemaking
effort, known as Part53, which provides additional
security options for advanced reactors.
These are two separate activities, and we
will be focused only on the limited scope rulemaking
in today's meeting.
So, again, thank you for joining us for
this meeting, and I'll turn it back over to Beth so
that she can begin talking about the rule language.
MS. REED: Thank you, Michele. Sorry
about that. Didn't mean to skip over you.
So, we should be on Slide7. And I'll
just start again. The preliminary proposed rule
language was updated to ensure that the alternative
security measures would be applicable to a variety of
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power reactors, even those who don't have reactor
cores similar to those of the existing fleet of large
light water reactors.
Staff determined that using the existence
performance objective and requirements of significant
core damage found in 73.55(b), may not be a
technology-inclusive measure in determining which
systems need to be protected in order to prevent an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
The preliminary proposed rule language now
includes, prevent a significant release of radio
nuclides from any source, to the performance
requirements under73.55(b)3.
This approach is in alignment with the
current framework for large light water power reactors
that must protect against significant core damage or
spent fuel sabotage. Both events have the potential
to cause a significant release of radio nuclides.
Next slide, please.
The previously proposed three-eligibility
criteria, or change, that are now one applicability
requirement found in 73.55(s)(1)(i), under
applicability.
The alternative security measures are
applicable to an applicant or licensee of a small
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modular reactor, or a non-light water reactor,
provided they meet the requirements in 73.55(s)(1)(ii)
and (iii). Next slide, please.
Another update to the preliminary proposed
rule language was to clarify what elements needed to
be included in the analysis that is done to justify
using the alternative security measures.
As part of the analysis, an applicant or
licensee must identify the site-specific alternative
security measures they intend to implement.
As part of the analysis required by
73.55(s)(1)(iii), a licensee or applicant should
develop scenarios that examine the capability to
maintain the site's physical security plan, protect
target-set equipment from the DBT, or prevent an
offsite release from exceeding referenced doses.
While employing the alternative security
measures, using any or all of the former eligibility
criteria are examples of some scenarios that could be
considered. Next slide, please.
This analysis starts after the target-set
identification process, which will be discussed later
in this presentation.
This analysis focuses in on achievable
target sets identified in the target-set
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identification process, and assesses if they could
defend against the DBT or not.
If a target set is compromised with the
alternative measures in place and offsite dose above
the referenced values occurs as a result, the
alternative measures cannot be used.
The analysis should discuss the inherent
features, engineered features or operator actions,
employed at the facility, that would allow the
radiological release to be delayed, minimized, or
prevented.
For example, if following the left side of
the flowchart you end up at the red box that says,
cannot implement additional physical security
requirements, the analysis can be expanded to include
mitigative measures that could mitigate and prevent an
offsite release, as shown on the right side of the
flowchart, the blue box that says mitigative measures
prevent release.
And if it's yes, then you could implement
the alternative security measures. If no, then you
can't use the alternative security measures.
Before turning the presentation over to
Lou, I'd like to remind everyone that these proposed
alternatives do not represent a final NRC staff
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position, nor have they been reviewed by the
Commission. Therefore, the preliminary proposed
ruling, which may undergo significant revision during
the rulemaking process, and the Commission may not
approve any or all of the alternatives.
Now, I will hand the presentation over to
Lou Cubellis from NSIR.
MR. CUBELLIS: Thank you, Beth. Good
morning everybody. I'm Lou Cubellis, I'm a Senior
Security Specialist in the Office of Nuclear Security
and NSIR response, and today I'll be taking you
through the five alternative security measures that we
have currently in the proposed rule language.
Dennis, if you go ahead and hit next to
get the five on the screen. As we look at these five
proposed alternative physical security requirements,
it may be helpful if we keep a couple of thoughts in
mind.
One of these Michele mentioned during her
opening remarks, which is that by Commission
direction, this rule would have a limited scope, which
means that licensees would still have to exist with
the physical security requirements inside the existing
security framework.
Therefore, they would be subject to the
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requirement to protect against the design-basis threat
of radiological sabotage, which is what we and I might
today refer to as the DBT.
The Commission has generally described the
attributes of the design-basis threat in
10C.F.R.73.1, including the type, composition and
capabilities of an adversary that power reactor
licensees must defend against.
The second thought to keep in mind is that
except for the specific relief contained within this
proposed rule, which I'll be covering in more detail
here in the next several slides, small modular reactor
and non-light water reactor applicants and licensees
would need to comply with all of the other
requirements in the existing 10 C.F.R. 73.55. Can we
move to Slide12, please, Dennis? Thank you.
This and the other predetermined relief
contained in the proposed rule language would
eliminate the need for advanced reactor applicants or
licensees to request exemptions from the NRC prior to
implementing these alternative security requirements.
With respect to the proposed S2I
requirement, power light reactor licensees are
currently required to have at least ten armed
responders.
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The proposed alternative security
requirement you see here would provide flexibility for
an applicant or licensee to consider design of its
reactor facility, as well as other site-specific
conditions, and then determine the appropriate minimum
number of armed responders, including zero armed
responders, that would be needed to defend against the
design-basis threat.
Would you please move to the next slide,
Dennis? Thirteen? Oh, sorry. I'm sorry, Dennis.
One thing I want to say here is, I'm not sure if
everybody's seeing that, but my slides are kind of
moving around. So, I'm not sure if it's my
connection. If it is, I apologize. I see we're on
Slide12 still--
MR. YOUNG: Hey Lou, this is David Young.
It looks fine to us. Just so you know.
MR. CUBELLIS: Okay. It's kind of doing
some pixelations and it's making some weird animations
on my screen. So--
MR. YOUNG: Okay. Well, it looks good
here.
MR. CUBELLIS: All right. So, we should
be on Slide13. I hope that the slides that gets on
is Slide 13. If it is, you should see S2 and an Alpha
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under S2.
For these two alternative security
requirements, before we talk about the specifics in
Alpha, I want to point out that the proposed security
requirement here in S2, subparagraph ii, the point I
want to make is that an applicant or licensee would be
able to choose to meet this alternative security
requirement only if it has zero onsite armed
responders. That's the way it's currently written.
And so, the applicant or licensee has to have zero and
meet the requirements in an S1I.
And as we look at the proposed requirement
for Alpha, licensees would at all times retain the
responsibility for interdicting and neutralizing
threats, up to and including the design-basis threat.
However, licensees wouldbe able to rely
on law enforcement or other offsite responders to
perform the interdiction and neutralization functions.
And when I say interdicting and
neutralizing a threat, it means to interrupt whatever
the adversary is doing, and in preventing the
adversary from continuing any actions that would
threaten the safe operation of a site.
Law enforcement responders could be from
any level of government agencies-- for example,
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local, state or federal -- as long as they would have
the authority and capabilities to interdict and
neutralize the design-basis threat.
For example, local police or sheriff's
department may have the authority to respond to a
licensee's call for assistance, but a state patrol
agency may not have that authority, because they may
have authority only on state property, like a state
highway.
We included in this proposed language
other offsite responders. Those three words mean that
a licensee or applicant could rely on armed security
personnel who are employed by a licensee -- what we on
staff sometimes refer to as a proprietary guard
force-- or armed security contractors hired by the
licensee, all of whom would be routinely positioned at
an offsite location.
Relying on armed security personnel, their
stationed offsite as a method that the Departments of
Defense and Energy have employed for decades, to
secure some of their sensitive facilities. Dennis,
could you hit the forward button one time to go to the
next requirement, please?
The staff is proposing five, what I'll
call conditions, that would apply when a licensee
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relies on offsite responders to interdict and
neutralize threats up to and including the design-
basis threat.
The proposed rule language you see here in
Alpha-1 reinforces the fact that licensees would
continue to be responsible for detecting and assessing
threats.
If the licensee is relying on law
enforcement for interdiction and neutralization, the
licensee would communicate threat information to law
enforcement so law enforcement could respond.
If the licensee was relying on other
offsite responders -- for example, licensee-controlled
proprietary or contract security force-- licensee
would initiate response actions in accordance with
existing requirements. Dennis, would you forward to
Alpha-2, please?
The proposed rule language in Alpha-2
captures another key element for facilitating an
effective offsite response, either from law
enforcement or other offsite responders.
Sufficient the way they would prevent the
design-basis threat adversary from completing tasks,
and provide the opportunity for offsite responders to
interdict and neutralize the adversary before it could
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cause significant release of radio nuclides. Our next
slide, please, Dennis, should be Slide14.
The proposed requirement in Alpha-3 that
you see here, would ensure that licensees give
information to law enforcement or other offsite
responders prior to an actual incident.
Site information may include things like
sketches or drawings of the facility layout, including
structures and avenues of approach and the owner-
controlled protected areas, floor or elevation
drawings for site structures, particularly those that
are important from a safety or response tactical
movement perspective, barrier information and defeat
methods, which could include the use of standard
access control items like access cards or mechanical
keys, and then communication systems information.
The proposed requirement in Alpha-3 would
also ensure that a licensee that relies on law
enforcement or other offsite responders to interdict
and neutralize the design-basis threat, provides those
responders with recurring training opportunities so
the responders can apply their knowledge and skills in
the environments in which they would be expected to
operate during real-world safeguards events.
Slide15, please, Dennis?
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The proposed rule language in Alpha-4 that
you see here would ensure that a licensee performs
adequate contingency response planning, and should be
able to satisfactorily implement its protective
strategy when relying on law enforcement or other
offsite responders, in lieu of, say, onsite licensee-
on responders, to interdict and neutralize the design-
basis threat.
The purpose of this requirement is to
ensure that licensee documents in sufficient detail
the specific role or roles that law enforcement or
other offsite responders have in its physical
protection program.
Staff understands here that a licensee may
be able to document fewer details than it would for
onsite responders, but a licensee should be able to
document the roles, responsibilities, and expected
actions, by offsite response personnel, that describe
how the offsite response personnel intend to fulfill
the interdiction and neutralization capabilities.
For example, when licensees are relying on
law enforcement, a licensee obviously may not know
where the law enforcement responders may be starting
from when they get the call for assistance, because
those officers will likely be performing routine
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duties in the community.
However, if a licensee is relying on an
offsite proprietary and contract security force, the
licensee will likely know that force's starting
location and state of readiness. Slide16, please,
Dennis.
All right, licensees would still be
responsible for ensuring that the capabilities to
interdict and neutralize threats, up to and including
the design-basis threat, are maintained at all times.
Licensees would need to consider the
possibility that unlike when relying on onsite-on
responders, also responders may be impeded or
prevented from interdicting and neutralizing the
design-basis threat by circumstances that are
independent from the safeguards of that at a site.
For example, simultaneous events in the
community may compete for the same law enforcement
resources. Or weather may preclude any offsite
responders from reaching a site before the design-
basis threat can complete radiological sabotage
actions.
Therefore, the proposed requirement in
Alpha-5 would require licensees that rely on law
enforcement or other offsite responders for
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interdiction and neutralization, to identify criteria
and measures to compensate for the degradation or
absence of that support, and to describe suitable
compensatory measures within its security plan.
I think it's important to note here that
the proposed requirement would also ensure that the
compensatory measures that licensees identify for the
degradation or loss of interdiction and neutralization
capabilities, will provide an equivalent level of
protection, and can be implemented in a timely manner,
which are the same two principles that the NRC
currently require for compensatory measures associated
with equipment, systems and components that perform
required security functions. Slide17, please,
Dennis?
When relying on law enforcement to
interdict and neutralize the design-basis threat,
licensees would not be required to meet the response
requirements in the current 73.55 Kilo-3 through7
paragraphs, or the response initiation requirement in
Kilo-8, subparagraphII.
For example, a licensee would be relying
on law enforcement personnel to initiate the response
actions to interdict and neutralize threats, rather
than an armed licensee personnel force.
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Other offsite responders would be under a
licensee's control, so the proposed relief in Bravo-1
would not apply, and the licensee would need to meet
all the response requirements in 73.55 Kilo. Would
you hit forward once, please, Dennis, to go to
Bravo-2?
For Bravo-2, staff accepts the fact that
law enforcement personnel qualifications and skills
are equivalent to those required by Appendix Bravo to
Part73.
Therefore, licensees that rely on law
enforcement for interdiction and neutralization, would
not be responsible for ensuring that law enforcement
responders meet most of the security and training
qualification requirements in Appendix Bravo.
Examples would be things like employment
suitability or qualifications, or duty and reference
training qualifications or requalifications. The
licensee would not be responsible for any of those
things.
As we saw earlier in this presentation,
the proposed requirement in S2III Alpha-3 would
require licensees to still provide periodic onsite
training opportunities, so that law enforcement could
apply its skills and test its equipment in the actual
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environment that it would operate in during a real-
world safeguards event.
It's important to mention that a licensee
relying on offsite proprietary contract security force
would still need to train that force in accordance
with Section6 in Appendix Bravo to Part73.
And regardless of whether licensees rely
on law enforcement or other offsite responders to
perform the interdiction and neutralization functions,
the licensees would be required to establish,
implement and maintain a performance evaluation
program consistent with the requirements in Section 6
Charlie-3 in Appendix Bravo to Part73.
The reason for this is that a performance
evaluation program is a critical tool that licensees
use to demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of
their physical protection programs and protective
strategies, including the capabilities of an armed
response team, or in this case law enforcement or
offsite responders, to carry out assigned duties and
responsibilities during safeguards contingency events.
Would you highlight Bravo-3 please, Dennis?
When we look at the proposed relief in
Bravo-3-- I'm sorry, my slide--there we go. My
slides are still doing funny things for me and I
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apologize.
When we look at the proposed relief in
Bravo-3, the phrase, law enforcement or other offsite
responders, means that an applicant or licensee that
chooses to implement the proposed alternative
requirement in 73.55CR(2)(ii), would be relying solely
on an armed response force that originates outside a
protected area, to interdict and neutralize the
design-basis threat.
This particular proposal in Bravo-3
provides relief from three existing requirements that
restrict armed responder movement or duties.
The requirements from which licensees
would be relieved would be, first, be required to
designate areas inside a protected area that would
house the armed responders.
Second, that the armed responders remain
inside the protected area at all times. And the third
requirement from which licensees would be relieved
would be to ensure that armed responders are not
assigned any other duties or responsibilities that
could interfere with their assigned armed response
team duties and responsibilities. Would you move to
Slide18, please, Dennis.
The proposed rule language that you see
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here would provide advance reactor applicants and
licensees with the flexibility to consider and
implement methods other than physical barriers that
are currently defined in 73.2, to achieve the delays
needed for the physical protection program.
As you see, we say that acceptable means
are really any method. You're not limited to just the
couple that are defined within the 73.2. Slide 19,
please, Dennis.
The proposed rule language in S2IV would
allow an applicant or licensee to establish a
secondary alarm station at an offsite location. Okay,
Dennis, I think we need to go forward one more. There
we go. Thank you.
For example, when a slight footprint is
small enough that an onsite secondary alarm station
would be impractical, or potentially able to be
disabled by a single act, an offsite secondary alarm
station may enable a licensee to better ensure that
that facility maintains the redundant functions of the
central alarm station.
This provision also would provide
licensees with flexibility to possibly improve
efficiency by consolidating required secondary alarm
station functions for multiple sites at a single
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offsite location, potentially reducing construction,
operation and maintenance costs. Would you please
show B, Dennis?
The proposed language in essentially what
is 4-Bravo, would require that an offsite secondary
alarm station be able to perform the same functions as
the onsite central alarm station, but a licensee would
be relieved from the requirements to construct, locate
and protect the offsite secondary alarm station to the
same standards as the central alarm station.
For example, a licensee would not need to
do things like locate the secondary alarm station
inside a protected area, ensure the interior of the
secondary alarm station is not visible from the
perimeter of the protected area, or construct the
secondary alarm station to be bullet-resistant.
A licensee would also be permitted to
install equipment in the secondary alarm station that
is different than that in the central alarm station,
as long as the secondary alarm station can perform the
equivalent and redundant functions of the central
alarm station. Slide 20, please, Dennis. Very good,
thank you.
The proposed rule language in Alpha would
relieve advanced reactor applicants and licensees from
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the requirements to designate the secondary alarm
station as a vital area, and to locate the power
systems supplies for the offsite secondary alarm
station in a vital area.
For those of you that may not be familiar,
a vital area is one where the licensee can limit
access to protected equipment or operations that are
important to safety or security. Would you go to
Bravo please, Dennis?
The secondary alarm station and its power
supply provide backup to a site's primary alarm
station, which is the central alarm station.
Plus, the secondary alarm station does not
contain any material that would pose a risk of
radiological sabotage. Therefore, locating secondary
power supplies offsite, as well as the secondary alarm
station offsite, means they'd be in a different
location than where our safeguards of that would be
occurring.
It's important to know that the proposed
rule would not prevent an applicant or licensee from
implementing measures to protect an offsite secondary
alarm station or its power supplies, or its functions.
But those measures would not be a regulatory
requirement.
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At this point, I'll turn the discussion
back over to Beth to start the presentation on the
draft guidance.
MS. REED: Thanks, Lou. Next slide
please, Dennis, unless you have anything to interject
on for Slide21. I take that as a no.
Okay, so we are now on Slide22. Draft
Guide5072, which was formerly Draft Guide1365, is
new guidance that is applicable to small modular
reactors and non-light water reactors wanting to use
the alternative measures foundin 73.55(s)(2).
This regulatory guide describes methods
and approaches the staff of the NRC consider
acceptable for advanced reactor applicants or
licensees to comply with requirements in
Further, the guidance discusses each
alternative found in 73.55(s)(2), that may be applied
if the requirements in 73.55(s)(1) are met. Next
slide, please.
The draft guidance explains one approach
for conducting a site-specific analysis required by
73.55(s)(1)(iii) that demonstrates that the
performance requirement set forth in 73.55(b)(3) are
met when selected alternative to use.
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This analysis should identify each
alternative that will be used, demonstrate the ability
of the physical protection system while using the
alternative measures in defending against the DBT, and
if a target-set is compromised, perform a site-
specific radiological consequence analysis to
demonstrate that a significant release of radio
nuclides does not occur. Next slide, please.
So, what is meant by significant release?
As stated in the proposed rule, the term, significant
release of radio nuclides, covers those security-
initiated events that could impact the safety systems
of the reactor, potentially resulting in a release of
offsite doses that approach or exceed referenced
values defined in 10 C.F.R. 50.34A.1.III.d(1) and (2),
and 10C.F.R.52.79A.1.VI.a and b.
The 25-rim criteria has been used in
Parts50, 52 and 100, as a reference value that is
used to evaluate plants' assigned features with
respect to postulated reactor accidents, including
design-based accidents, or DBAs.
DBAs are postulated accidents that a
nuclear facility must be designed and built to
withstand without loss to the systems, structures and
components necessary to ensure public health and
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safety.
By identifying and assessing the DBA, the
NRC has been able to provide a useful perspective with
regard to doses that ought not to be exceeded. It was
for this reason that the requirements exist that the
dose consequences be evaluated at the outer boundary
of the low population zone over the course of the
postulated accident.
As stated in the footnote in
10 C.F.R. 50.34A1, the use of 25 rim, and I quote, is
not intended to imply that this number constitutes an
acceptable limit for an emergency dose to the public
under accident conditions. Unquote.
Likewise, the performance requirements in
the proposed security regulations do not mean that
this is an acceptable consequence.
Conservatism built into these assessments,
a person standing in the plume for its full passage,
and multiple layers of defense in-depth found, provide
additional assurance that approved designs for
reactors provide assurance of low-risk of public
exposure to radiation in the event of an accident.
Next slide, please.
As a follow-up to the last public meeting,
NEI submitted a letter to the NRC requesting staff to
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stop reviewing NEI-2005. Staff incorporated some of
the concepts from 2005 into DG50.71 and DG50.72,
such as target-set identification and radiological
dose consequence analysis.
The discussions on the eligibility
criterion are being issued as examples of scenarios
that could be included in the analysis required by
73.55(s)(1)(iii). Next slide, please. Thanks.
Guidance, both for target-set
identification and to determine the ability to use the
alternative measures, will discuss an acceptable
method to perform a radiological consequence analysis.
For the purpose of this proposed rule, the
required analysis for 73.55(s)(1)(iii) will be
performed by the applicant or licensee to determine
radiation doses at the exclusion area boundary and the
outer boundary of the low population zone from a
postulated radiological release.
The consequence analysis will be based on
achievable target sets, which will be further
discussed by Stacy Prasad shortly.
The consequence analysis should determine
the type and amount of radioactivity potentially
released to the environment and offsite consequences.
The guidance will describe elements that
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should be included in the radiological consequence
analysis, such as, but not limited to, physical and
chemical processes affecting the timing, composition
and magnitude of release, facility-specific
radiological source terms and atmospheric release and
transport.
Now, I'll turn the presentation back over
to Lou to discuss the guidance for the alternative
measures.
MR. CUBELLIS: Thanks, Beth. Staff
anticipates that the guidance for the specific
alternative security requirements portion of the
proposed rule will cover three primary areas, and you
see those areas here on the slide.
Methods and approaches the staff will find
acceptable for satisfying the alternative security
requirements themselves, a methodology for calculating
security delay time that would be required as a
condition of relying on offsite response for the
indiction and neutralization functions, and
explanatory information and clarifications related to
the relief provided within the alternatives proposed
in 73.55CR(2).
Stacy, I think I turn it over you now for
5071.
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MS. PRASAD: Thanks, Lou. You can go to
the next slide, Dennis.
5071. This is just a revision of the
current breakout 581, and that's targets of
identification and development for nuclear power
plants. Currently, it only addresses light water
reactors.
So, what's happening with this revision?
Two things. We're going to identify target sets for
SMRs and non-light water reactors. And that's
consistent with the changes that Beth previously spoke
about with 73.55 Bravo-3.
The other thing this guidance is going to
do is, it's going to have some pointers back to
DG 50.72 that's going to establish how the target that
process can be utilized to support implementation of
the alternative physical security controls.Next
slide, Dennis.
Here, the definition that you've been
seeing in the past few meetings, this definition
aligns with the B3 brew language, again, that we
discussed earlier.
In addition, the definition provides an
example of a significant release and it defines that
as exceeding the radio nuclide release fraction
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analyzed for the DBA, and it also includes creation of
a released pathway.
As Beth just discussed in the slide-basis
accident analysis, important structures, systems and
components are identified to ensure public health and
safety.
So, the reason we have this EG is to
ensure the target sets are appropriately identified in
analyzing the systems and the design of the physical
protection program. Next slide.
This is the flow chart we've seen a bunch
of times, is consistent to what we presented
previously, but the exception is the example that we
just talked about with exceeding the DBA release
fraction.
The actual guidance, actually there's a
paragraph describing how you'd work through the
process.
If nothing would scream out saying that
you can implement alternative physical security
requirements, get to that bottom red box, and that red
box will knock you back over to the flowchart that
Beth provided earlier. So, there's a line between
this reg guide and the other reg guide that was just
discussed. All right, back to you, Dennis.
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MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, thank you guys very
much. Before I get to the next slide on the next
steps here, I guess what we'll do is we can go ahead
and open this up to the attendees. We want to make
sure everyone's had a chance to speak.
So, again, if you have any questions or
comments, please use the raised-hand feature. And we
will kick it off to the first attendee here. Let me
see. Okay, I see Kevin Deyette from NuScale. Go
ahead.
MR. DEYETTE: Yes, thank you. I want to
first thank the NRC staff for taking the effort to go
through what we're doing here for the rulemaking for
advanced reactors for physical security. I think it's
very important, so I do appreciate your efforts.
I have two questions. The first one deals
with, I guess you could look at Slide7, where it
talks about the sources, where we're looking at the
release from any source.
And it states on that slide that it is
retaining the significant core damage and spent fuel
sabotage for the light water reactors. And we did
want to go to a performance-based rule.
But the question I have with this is the
NRC has an SGI document which provides a definition
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for spent fuel sabotage and a scenario.
If we change it to the wording that you
have now, release of radio nuclides from any source,
does that mean that additional scenarios for spent
fuel need to be analyzed?
MS. REED: So, I guess this is my slide,
so I can take that.
Thank you for the question. And that
third bullet talk about retaining for the large light
water reactors, so the significant core damage and
spent fuel sabotage will be only applicable for the
existing fleet of the large light water reactors.
The intent here is that the small modular
reactors and non-light water reactors will have the
requirement to prevent a significant release of radio
nuclides from any source.
So, if you have a spent fuel pool, you
should analyze it to see if a DBT could defend against
the DBT if there was an attack. Would that spent fuel
pool release any -- lower the threshold of -- not the
threshold, but over the DBA.
And that's how, under Stacy's process, the
target-set be determined to see if that needs to be
protected.
So, I don't know if any small modular
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reactors or non-light water reactors will have a spent
fuel pool. That language is retained in B3 just for
the large lights.
MR. DEYETTE: Okay, thank you. I
appreciate that response. I still have somewhat of a
concern. I know that folks that have been working on
their design for a while incorporated security-by-
design and the spent fuel is one area. And this may
cause a change in direction or philosophy that we may
need to look at. So,on that comment there.
MS. REED: Okay. Well, thank you. And
this is trying to take into account the MSRs that have
may have sources outside the reactor.
So, that's why I say that this is
technology-inclusive, because you may not have the
highest source in the core. It may be somewhere else.
So, any place that could potentially have a release
should be examined and analyzed, and see if it needs
to be protected.
MR. DEYETTE: Okay, thank you. My second
question dealt with the secondaryalarm station, and
would the language that's being put in, I think
Slide19 would be the best one to look at for that,
it's talking about the fact that the secondary alarm
station offsite would need to have the same
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capabilities and functions as the existing central
alarm station.
The fact that it doesn't have to be in a
vital area and doesn't have to be bulletproof
obviously would present some cost savings. But having
the same function of capabilities may be problematic.
And the other concern I have with that is,
with this offsite secondary alarm station, now you're
looking at the cybersecurity implications, or
security-related components, digital components, that
are offsite and how is that going to impact the
licensee's cybersecurity plan? So, that's just some
food for thought.
MS. REED: Thank you. We appreciate that
input.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, let me switch back
here. Ed Lyman, I think you're next.
MR. LYMAN: Hi. Good morning. I'm from
the Union of Concerned Scientists. Can you hear me?
MR. ANDRUKAT: Yes, sir.
MR. LYMAN: Okay, great. I just have a
few questions. There's a lot here. So, on Slide--
let's see, slide 14, about the provision of necessary
information about the facility.
So, I presume that this will be safeguards
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information, I guess. And so, where are the
provisions for how that information is going to be
protected and how the recipients are going to be
properly vetted for receipt, and as well as, right,
not only approved protection for the recipient, but
also electronic potential for electronic transmission?
What are the requirements for protecting that
information?
MS. SAMPSON: Thank you for that question.
So, these alternatives are within our existing
security framework. So, the regulatory requirements
that apply to power reactors for protection of
safeguards information will still apply to these
applicants.
MR. LYMAN: Okay. The second question.
So, the local law enforcement would not be exempt from
the performance evaluation program. So, that includes
whatever drills manual. Is that correct?
MS. SAMPSON: So, to be clear, the NRC
does not have jurisdiction over law enforcement. The
licensee--
(Audio interference.)
MS. SAMPSON: So, the licensee will be
subject to a performance evaluation program
requirement and the licensee must ensure that they are
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meeting the regulatory requirements to assess, detect,
interdict and neutralize at all times.
MR. LYMAN: Right, but that means to stay
on the line in local law enforcement to satisfy the
functions, if they're going to have to be drafted into
these drills and exercises. Right?
MS. SAMPSON: So, the licensee is required
to identify the role that law enforcement will
perform, and to provide law enforcement with site-
specific information.
The licensee must also make periodic
training specific to the interdiction and
neutralization functions available to law enforcement.
MR. LYMAN: All right. I mean, I think,
don't get me wrong, I think that's actually critical
if they're going to have this expanded role if they
have to be captured by this program. But if they,
practically speaking, maybe unless it's too heavy for
the licensee.
So, my third is, well, if I could comment.
So, you've written this rule to be extremely general.
And a lot of details are being put in the guidance,
including -- doesn't mention significant, even though
that's the same design as this release that's already
in the regulations.
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So, I guess I have a general concern about
in the bag, making the rule too general, that it might
have milestones or goalposts that some of those have
to be incorporated into the regulation as
requirements, rather than leaving so much in the
guidance. And that's so that the public at least
knows that there are certain minimum requirements that
are being met in these evaluations. Those are my
initial thoughts on this. Thank you.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Thanks, Ed. I'm sorry.
And Ed, I didn't know if you had any specific examples
for that last comment, that you wanted to share, or if
that was more of a general comment.
MR. LYMAN: Well, one comment is the
definition of the significant release. Because if you
put in the guidance, you're going to get arguments
about what is useful.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay.
MR. LYMAN: Also, things like the target-
set. Well, again, I've looked at this rule and seen
what particular aspects are already a regulatory
requirement and should be -- an analogous requirement
should be retained for this alternative. I haven't
done that yet, but that's what I was thinking of.
MR. ANDRUKAT: I think this is helpful.
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Okay, let's see. I'm going to move on to the next
one. Rani Franovich?
MS. FRANOVICH: Good morning, Dennis. And
it's good to have this opportunity to engage with you,
Beth and Lou. And Happy New Year to all of you.
I have a question, Dennis, on Slide 14, if
you could pull that up.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay.
MS. FRANOVICH: Hold on. I thought it was
Slide 14. It may be -- oh, apologies. It's Slide 15,
Dennis.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Sure. There you go.
MS. FRANOVICH: Great. So, I see on this
slide a reference to high assurance. And my question
is--well, first an observation. High assurance is
not typically used in the regulatory lexicon. It's
typically reasonable assurance.
And I am aware that a high assurance
standard found its way into the inspection and
oversight documents used for security inspections,
primarily the force-on-force inspection, and it led to
a lot of confusion about the level of assurance sought
under the NRC's oversight process.
And the Commission and its SRM2 SECY
160073, back on October5, 2016, made it very clear
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that high assurance is equivalent to reasonable
assurance.
And as a result of that Commission
clarification, the term high assurance was stricken
from oversight manual chapters, inspection manual
chapters, in the security cornerstone.
And I'm wondering how the NRC staff is
reconciling that Commission direction that the
assurance standard for security is no different than
it is for any other aspect of our regulatory mandate.
How does the staff reconcile the use of
the term high assurance with that Commission
clarification that it's reasonable assurance, even in
security?
MS. SAMPSON: Thank you, Rani. We
appreciate that question. And as you've correctly
noted, the Commission has addressed this issue and the
staff fully appreciates the Commission's clarification
that high assurance is equal to reasonable assurance.
The reason that we have used the term high
assurance in this regulatory requirement is to mirror
the existing regulatory language in 10C.F.R.73.55.
But as you've noted, the Commission has weighed in on
this issue in the past and this is preliminary
proposed rule text which has not been through
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management review or the Commission.
So, should the Commission choose to use
two different terms within 73.55, the staff would
certainly appreciate that guidance when the proposed
rule is with them for review. Thank you.
MS. FRANOVICH: Great. Thank you for that
explanation. Appreciate that.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay. All right, let's
see. And Rani, can you just remind us your
affiliation real quick?
MS. FRANOVICH: Apologies, Dennis. Of
course. I'm with the Breakthrough Institute.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Okay, I'll go
ahead and move on to David Young of NEI.
MR. YOUNG: Yeah. Hi guys. Good morning.
David Young, NEI. I've got two questions. The first
is, on Slide10 on the flowchart, it talks about an
analysis demonstrates. And so, it goes to that on a
couple of blocks, but analysis demonstrates. That
talks about that on Slide10.
And then, when you go down to Slide 30 for
the target set portion of it, it talks about screening
for achievable target sets. I just want to say to the
Committee, just discuss what they see are the key
differences between assessments that might be done at
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the target-set stage, or on screening for achievable
target sets, and the analysis or assessment that would
be done at the later stages, where I'm looking at
analysis demonstrates.
Given that some of the features I'm
looking at are the same kinds of features-- things
being within DBT capabilities, or certain dose limits
be exceeded offsite-- just want to understand what
the differences are between the screening and the
analysis.
MS. REED: Stacy, do you want to start
from the beginning with the target set, and then I'll
pick up with the analysis for the achievable target
sets?
MS. PRASAD: Sure. So, the analysis
that's going to be done in DG 50.71 is supposed to be
a simpler analysis. So, this analysis is kind of
consistent to the programs and the systems-- every
time I have to talk I feel like I can't--
(Simultaneous speaking.)
MR. ANDRUKAT: You okay?
MS. PRASAD: I apologize for that. So,
this is supposed to be a simpler analysis using the
same kind of programs that you use for your DBA
analysis. It's not supposed to be intended to be this
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huge expanse of an analysis that we're looking at in
the consequence analysis.
So, when you bounce it over to Beth's
slide and she's looking at the consequence analysis,
in that space you can lose the complete target set and
you can still demonstrate that you're below the
reference values. So, this is kind of a more
encompassing analysis.
I know initially we toyed with the fact of
having the same analysis for both, but then we
separated the two to make the line of targets a little
simpler, and then you only have to do the consequence
analysis and kind of the bigger analysis if you go
through a certain staff and DG50.71.
Beth, you want to add anything to that?
Or I misspoke about your guidance?
MS. REED: No, you were spot on, Stacy.
Thanks. And just to reiterate, the analysis is only
on the achievable target sets. And you go through it
and you see what's achievable. Then, you apply the
alternative measures and you have to demonstrate that
they can defend against the DBT.
If they can't, then you do the
radiological consequence analysis. And if it comes to
the point where that analysis shows that there would
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be offset release above the reference values, you then
have to discuss mitigation measures. That's that on
the bottom line, that blue box.
You can throw into your analysis what
steps you do to mitigate and prevent or stop an
offsite release. If it's then able to be mitigated
and there's not a release above the 25-rim reference
value, then you can use the alternative measures.
If it's not, if it is above the reference
values, then you can't use the alternative measures,
or you need to think of a different alternative
measure, maybe a more robust one that can withstand
the DBT, or different mitigative measures.
And whatever you come up with, that's what
we need to see for 73.55(s)(2)(i). We need that
description.
MR. YOUNG: Okay. Okay. All right.
MS. REED: So, the right consequence
analysis for the 25-rim is only done if you can't
defend against the DBT with the alternatives in place.
MR. YOUNG: All right. Okay. All right,
I guess I'll just have to wait and see the guidance
document when it comes out. And I appreciate the
explanation. I got a little bit clearer picture, I
think, of what you're looking for.
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I still just maybe have some detail
questions, but perhaps they'd just be better addressed
when we see the proposed documents.
The second question I had was, is on
Slide29 and Slide30. You talk about release
fractions exceeding DBA analysis. And I guess, again,
not solving it here, but just going to remind staff
that there's different DBAs that get analyzed. It
could be many DBAs.
So, having guidance on what particular DBA
provides the threshold, or provides the criteria for
which it's being exceeded, which DBA is that?
MS. PRASAD: Yeah, I appreciate that
question. And I also appreciate you asking all these
questions on my three slides.
We're having the same discussions to make
sure we accurately reflect the DBA that we're talking
about, whether it's going to be the most restrictive,
or maybe specific to a target set, and the DBA that
was analyzed consistent with those systems and
equipment.
So, that hasn't been decided. Right now
it's a more flexible determinate. As you said, it can
be many different things, so we're going to make sure
we get the right wording in there in the reg guide.
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MR. YOUNG: Okay. Great Stacy. I'm glad
you guys are thinking about that. And the other thing
then, kind of related to that same thought, is as you
start thinking about which DBAs you're going to look
at and specify in the guidance, if you would, just
make sure that the wording is pretty crystal clear on
that, that you are talking about the design-basis
accidents, you're not talking about like Chapter19,
severe accidents and beyond design-basis events and
things like that.
MS. PRASAD: Yeah, because we are thinking
about the Chapter15--
MR. YOUNG: Yeah, yeah.
MS. PRASAD: --access.
MR. YOUNG: Right.
MS. PRASAD: Good point. I'll make sure
that's clear in there as well.
MR. YOUNG: Okay, cool. All right,
Dennis. That's all I had. Thank you.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Okay, let's
see, Mr.Chris. Okay, let's move on to--
MR. CHWASZ: Oh, I'm sorry, I had trouble
unmuting.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Oh, sure.
MR. CHWASZ: Hi, this is Chris Chwasz from
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INL. So, I had a couple of questions starting back on
Slide 9. And this is kind of echoing Ed's concern for
not defining significant release in the regulation.
So, I guess I'm curious as to the staff's
thought process for not directly referencing in the
regulation 50.34, and theassociated Part52 values.
MS. REED: So, this is Beth. I appreciate
your question, and that is something that, a
conversation we've had internally about should it be
in the rule language. It should be in guidance.
And we decided to clarify it in guidance.
Leave it higher level, just like in Bravo-3, what
significant core damage. That's not defined in the
regulations either. It's more into the guidance.
So, that's the way we have chosen to go.
Like we've said before, this is just preliminary
proposed rule language. And once this draft is
released for comment, that's a very appropriate
comment to submit to the NRC once it's been released.
I don't know if anybody else has any
further comments to add to mine. Feel free. I mean,
anybody else from the NRC. Sorry.
MS. SAMPSON: Nothing further from me,
Beth. I think you've captured it. Our intent was to
align with a similar framework that we had for the
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large light water reactors, where we used significant
core damage.
MR. CHWASZ: That's understandable.
Significant core damage isn't a value. So, not having
value codified, like Dr.Lyman said, opens it up to
interpretation.
In addition, that value or similar values
being codified under Part 53. So, I don't understand
why it wouldn't be codified here if it's the same
expectation across the board. So, food for thought.
Moving on, Slide 15. All right, so I feel
like there needs to be an observation or maintenance
requirement with this, in that the offsite response
needs to notify the site when they are in a degraded
condition. I don't see that here. And I question the
timeliness of compensatory measures without it.
MS. SAMPSON: We appreciate that comment.
I would note that the NRC does not have regulatory
jurisdiction over law enforcement. So, we are not
proposing specific requirements for law enforcement to
make notifications within this regulation.
The licensees are expected to have routine
communications with law enforcement that would be
providing this type of support, and the requirement
for compensatory measures is a requirement that the
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licensee identify and document compensatory measures
within their security plans. So, it would not be
something that they're identifying on the fly. It's
an advance requirement.
MR. CHWASZ: I understand that, but I'm
talking about the timeliness of enacting those
compensatory measures.
And I'm not saying you would regulate the
local law enforcement agencies, but you can certainly
regulate the licensee and require that they have a
program that considers that, and include it either in
guidance or here in the rule.
MS. SAMPSON: Thank you for that comment.
Thank you.
MR. CHWASZ: All right. Okay.
Additionally on Slide15, I just wanted to make a
comment that licensees are taking on a large risk
using the local law enforcement for offsite response,
when ultimately the local law enforcement is not under
the jurisdiction of the NRC, like you've said.
And so, if the LLEA doesn't meet the
performance requirements, then the licensee is on the
hook for that.
So, Slide18. I think a little further
clarification here on the physical barriers could be
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needed. The 73.55(e) is a fairly large section and it
covers PA, VA and vehicle barriers.
And the language described here makes it
sound like none of those are required necessarily.
And it brings up questions about access control. So,
food for thought.
MS. SAMPSON: Thank you.
MR. CHWASZ: And then, Slide 19. And this
goes back to a comment that was made earlier on the
expense of having a SAS still. I mean, it's a fixed
cost. A SAS is required whether it's onsite or
offsite. I was curious as to the NRC's response to
the possibility of a SAS serving multiple sites. Like
a fleet-wide SAS.
MS. SAMPSON: There is nothing in the rule
that would prohibit that, as long as the licensee can
meet regulatory requirements.
MR. CHWASZ: Okay.
MR. CUBELLIS: Yeah. And Chris, this is
Lou. I actually, if I didn't say it, I certainly had
it in my notes to present on that exact point. That's
one of the cost savings we envision, is a single SAS
serving multiple sites.
MR. CHWASZ: Great. Thanks, Lou.
MR. CUBELLIS: Yep.
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MR. CHWASZ: Okay. All right, next slide,
28/29. And this relates to Draft Guide 50.72. I know
we don't have the text yet, so maybe this is a little
bit premature. But are we going to see further
guidance on security assessments and the consequence
analysis required for advanced reactors to really
address their unique technologies and materials on
sites?
MR. ANDRUKAT: Sorry. Which slide did you
want again?
MR. CHWASZ: Oh, it's like 28/29. I guess
it can be 29.
MS. PRASAD: Yeah, I think that would be
more applicable to the guidelines-- sorry, this is
getting a little crazy-- in DG 50.72. So, for the
draft guide for target sets does not assume success of
the physical protection program.
So, when you're looking at if things can
be defended beyond, if it's within the DBT's ability,
that's going to be looked at in DG50.72. So, with
the ability to neutralize and stuff like that, of
security systems.
The security system is not looked at for
the success in target-set identification. Did I
answer the question, or am I not understanding the
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question?
MR. CHWASZ: No, sorry. I probably picked
the wrong flight. So, relating to 50.72, I want to
speak to that, and the kind of guidance it's going to
provide specifically for our advanced reactors.
Reg Guide 5.81 does a good job of
addressing target sets that's generally applicable.
It looks like you're going to update it for advanced
reactors. But I'm curious more about the expectations
for the consequence analysis for like sodium being
onside, or molten salt, or other like unique
technologies and materials that are intrinsic to
advanced reactors, and how will those be paired with a
necessary like security assessment?
MS. PRASAD: Understood. I'm going to
hand it over to Lou or Beth.
MS. REED: So, I'm not sure about the
security assessment, but for the radiological
consequence analysis, that's one that the guidance
discusses exactly what elements we would find
acceptable to be included.
And one of them is definitely the chemical
compensation and how the chemical form affects the
release and the engineered systems and all that stuff
for the reactor, that we are in guidance discussing
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how those are some of the elements that should be or
could be included in the analysis.
And that one box on the flowchart I shared
in Slide 10 gets into also mitigative strategies. And
you could also include in that if it's a molten salt,
obviously it's a lot slower release, definitely that
different chemical properties. And so, those are the
sort of things we're looking for and discuss in the
guidance for the analysis.
MR. CHWASZ: Okay. I very much look
forward to looking at that. Consequence analysis can
be very, very tricky. And like in the example with
molten salt, there are many different sources of
radioactivity and release pathways.
And then, when you add in deliberate
sabotage acts, those multiply.
MS. REED: Mm-hmm.
MR. CHWASZ: And so, I'm curious to see
your methodology to determine a bounding analysis for
some of these technologies. So, all right.
MS. REED: Okay. Thanks for your comment.
MR. CHWASZ: Thanks all for your work.
MS. REED: Thank you.
MR. CHWASZ: I'm done.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, fantastic. Okay,
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let's go back to Ed Lyman.
MR. LYMAN: Yeah, thanks. Just a couple
of follow-up. So, these guidance documents, are you
envisioning they're going to be SOI? Are going to be
publicly available, or partially? What's your
thinking?
MS. REED: In the 50.72, as it stands
right now, it is publicly available. The 50.71 is
basically an update on Reg Guide 5.81, which is OUO
SRI. Is that correct, Stacy?
MS. PRASAD: Yes, that's correct.
MR. LYMAN: And just one more question on
these slides. Could you go to Slide33? So that is
confusing me, is there a stray arrow here, or between
screens for achievable target sets, and within DBT
capabilities you have this little arrow?
MS. PRASAD: Yeah, there's a little arrow
that's in there. It should be the little arrow, and
not the no. It should just to right to the block
within DBT capabilities.
MR. LYMAN: That makes a lot more sense.
Thanks.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, let's go on to Scott
Ferrara. And don't forget to highlight your
affiliation.
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MR. FERRARA: Yeah, Scott Ferrara, Idaho
National Laboratory. Had a question regarding the
implementation of the local law enforcement
interdiction. Personal experience from previous NRC
and LLEA management of a facility, it seems like we're
placing a lot of onus on LLEA and their response. Is
it the NRC's expectation that a licensee would have to
provide an MOU that is audible and inspectible by the
NRC to ensure that LLEA will perform those duties?
MS. SAMPSON: So, the NRC's regulatory
requirement for an MOU is unchanged by this
rulemaking. We do recognize that allowing licensees
to rely on offsite support to fulfill the interdiction
and neutralization function is a novel approach and
has not previously been included in the regulatory
framework for power reactors.
So, we are developing guidance to assist
licensees with how to implement these requirements and
that guidance will be available with the draft rule
once it's approved for publication by the Commission.
MR. FERRARA: Okay, thank you very much.
I'd be very interested in looking at that guidance,
having firsthand experience with this exact topic and
requirement.
It can be very onerous and probably should
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be something developers and licensees are looking at
during their siting process. Thank you.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, looks like we have
one more. Hopefully, I'm saying this right. Is that
Dyrk? Is that right?
MR. GREENHALGH: You are correct, thank
you.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic.
MR. GREENHALGH: My name is Dyrk
Greenhalgh. I'm affiliated with Kairos Power. I
appreciate the hard work that the staff has done to
make this presentation available, and also the
background analyses that support it.
One of the questions that I have, I
believe it's back on Slide14, relating to the
73.55(s)(2)(ii)(a), Condition 3, the licensing
providing necessary information.
What type of information is the Commission
looking for that the licensee must provide to local
law enforcement? And then the second corollary to
that is, what's the imagined periodicity of the
training to law enforcement, and what types of
training would meet that requirement, since it is a
must? Lou, you might be a good person to answer this
one.
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MR. CUBELLIS: Yeah, this is Lou Cubellis.
First off, good afternoon, Dyrk. I think I have met
you on multiple occasions, so it's good to hear you're
in the audience.
I would say the short answer to the first
part of your question, is what information do we
envision being provided, required being provided. Is
there really any information that law enforcement or
the other offsite responders need to perform their
functions?
So, whatever that looks like, it will
largely be determined by whatever roles the licensee
is relying on those offsite forces to perform, and the
familiarization with the facility and the different
methods for defeating delay features and systems of
the facility to carry out the functions that they're
required to carry out for the licensee's protected
strategies.
So, I then gave some examples of basic
sketches of the facility layout, structures that are
important from either a tactical perspective or a
safety perspective, avenues of approach, certainly
structure elevation drawings, barrier information,
defeat methods, key blocks locations, all that kind of
stuff.
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If that's something that law enforcement
or other offsite responders would need to carry out
their functions, then we would expect the licensee to
provide that information. Obviously, communications
is part of that.
MR. GREENHALGH: Yeah, excellent. Would
that include, in your opinion, the need to provide
them target sets?
MR. CUBELLIS: So, I'm only going to speak
from my personal experience. I have, with the large
light water reactor training that we do with law
enforcement, I've been doing it for more than
15 years, we don't ever provide target set information
to law enforcement because, in my experience, it has
not been necessary to do that.
Providing general locations of equipment
is generally sufficient and we don't provide
combinations. The way we do it in the large light
water world is, here is a list of all the equipment or
potential actions in a given elevation and structure,
and we made law enforcement aware of all of those
different locations.
But they don't really know the
relativeness of one location to another.
MR. GREENHALGH: Excellent. Thank you.
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And then, the periodicity. What do you think would
meet that requirement for training?
MR. CUBELLIS: So, right now-- and I'm
sorry, I thought I had enough information to be
dangerous. I didn't mean to cut you off.
The periodicity is, right now, spelled out
in Section 6 Charlie 3, in Appendix Bravo to Part 73.
The tactical response drills are clearly the
exercises are annual. And then, as you know, every
third year is a force-on-force inspection.
MR. GREENHALGH: Okay.
MR. CUBELLIS: And we do not envision that
period as changing. At least we haven't at this
point.
MR. GREENHALGH: Okay, I appreciate it.
No more questions.
MR. CUBELLIS: Yes, sir.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Fantastic. Let's go back
to Ed Lyman. I think have your hand up again.
MR. LYMAN: You know, I just want to
express my reservations once more about what's going
on here.
I don't think it's the right time for the
NRC to contemplate allowing licensees to transfer more
of their responsibilities to local law enforcement,
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especially with the lack of clarity about the vetting
process for local law enforcement, given the political
climate, the potential infiltration of extremist
groups in local law enforcement, and recruitment from
those ranks.
And I think this is a dangerous path we're
going down. In fact, there's so little guidance about
how the licensee's going to maintain their controls
over information, whether they have target-set
information or not.
And I'd say that what happened in the past
is not necessarily what would be needed for the
future, given the increased, the greater authority of
local law enforcement that may be needed to fulfill
these duties.
So, I am very concerned about this. I
don't think it's the right time. And that's all I
have. Thanks.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay, thank you very much.
And Rani, I think you have your hand up again.
MS. FRANOVICH: Thanks, Dennis. And
again--
MR. ANDRUKAT: Did we lose you?
MS. FRANOVICH: I'm sorry. Can you hear
me?
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MR. ANDRUKAT: I can hear you now.
MS. FRANOVICH: Okay, my apologies.
Again, this is Rani Franovich from the Breakthrough
Institute. And I have a question that's kind of a
follow-on to one Ed Lyman had asked earlier in the Q&A
session.
And so, I'm just going to ask it directly.
Is the NRC's expectation that LLEA will participate
in force-on-force exercises as a component of an SMR
licensee's protective strategy?
MS. SAMPSON: Hi Rani. This is Michele
Sampson with the NRC. So, the regulatory requirement
that we're putting in place is for the licensee to
maintain the requirement to assess, detect, interdict
and neutralize at all times.
Licensee may rely on law enforcement or
other offsite responders to fulfill the interdiction
and neutralization functions for threats up to and
including the design-basis threat of radiological
sabotage.
The question of what role will law
enforcement have, we expect to be very dependent upon
the reactor design. And it will be incumbent upon the
licensee to do the radiological consequence assessment
and the target-set analysis that have been discussed,
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and to identify the protective strategy for the
facility and what role law enforcement plays in that
protective strategy.
At the end of the day, the licensee's
compliance with security requirements, with the
security regulations, will be subject to NRC's
oversight included in the NRC's force-on-force
inspection program.
So, that's the way is currently
structured. And of course we look forward to comments
during the public comment phase.
MS. FRANOVICH: Thanks, Michele. I think
that answers the question. But just to confirm, I'm
going to repeat back what I think I heard you say.
It really depends on the role local law
enforcement agencies are assigned by a licensee, and
if that role is one of having a protective function,
then it would be subject to those oversight activities
that the NRC implements at nuclear facilities. Did I
understand that correctly?
MS. SAMPSON: Yes, I think that's a good
summary.
MS. FRANOVICH: Okay, great. Thank you.
That answers my question, Michele. Thanks.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Okay. I'm not seeing any
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other hands raised. And for the folks that have
dialed in and can't raise their hand, if you have any
comments or question, you just hit star-six, and then
you can be unmuted and you can let us know if you have
anything.
In the meantime, I will go ahead and go on
to the next slide here. And apologies to Stacy. I
inadvertently put an extra arrow in there.
Okay, so the next steps here, so we had
some good comments, good discussions and good
questions. The next steps, of course, are to finalize
this draft proposed rule packet, in addition with the
draft implementation guidance, these two draft
regulatory guides here, and then of course begin the
concurrence process. And with that, several
challenges, of course, along the way. This is a long
time coming.
I will state that the plan, as far as
future public meetings, for the most part we are not
planning to have additional public meetings before the
publication of the proposed rule.
So, the focus is now, we've had several
public meetings, we've received a lot of good
feedback, we've tried to consider that feedback, and
we wanted to share kind of our latest development with
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the rule text and some of the key elements of the
guidance, especially since NEI2005, right now we're
ceasing the review of that, and thus incorporated such
guidance into these two DGs here.
So, the focus now is to put together this
rule package and get it into concurrence, and kind of
get it out onto the streets out to the public during
the official public comment period.
And to give you an idea of the dates for
that, same dates as the last public meeting if you
attended. The public schedule here is, we are due to
give the proposed rule package to the Commission by
June28th, and then of course the final rule package
to the Commission for their review and approval by
October19, 2023.
Okay, I'd like to switch gears for a quick
second here. So, this is a transformation survey.
So, this is unrelated to the rulemaking. This is just
an opportunity that the agency has been recently
developing and putting out to share with the public at
our various public meetings.
The agency is currently undergoing a kind
of a transformation environment and there's a group of
staff members that put together this public survey.
It's not required, and again, it's not related to this
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rulemaking. It only takes about ten minutes, but
please feel free to click on it and provide your
thoughts on that survey.
And going back to this rulemaking, a huge
thank you to not only the staff on our side, but the
attendees and those that provided their interest,
their comments, and their questions.
Again, the docket ID for this rulemaking
is NRC-2017- 0227. That's on www.regulations.gov. And
the last link on the slide there is the public meeting
feedback form/survey.
Please feel free to click on that to
provide feedback on this particular public meeting,
and we would love to hear from you.
Now once again, if you have any questions
or comments, feel free to email myself-- that's
dennis.andrukat, so D-E-N-N-I-S-.-A-N-D-R-U-K-A-T
@nrc.gov (dennis.andrukat@nrc.gov), and I'm going to
switch back over just to make sure -- we have one more
raised hand. Mr.Tony. There you go.
MR. UNKNOWN: Tony Qualenca.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Yes, go ahead.
MR. UNKNOWN: I'm sorry. I just wanted to
clarify. You said the timeline, October '23. That's
calendar year, not fiscal year?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com 73
MR. ANDRUKAT: Correct. Correct. So, it
will be the very beginning of the fiscal year 2024.
Right?
MR. UNKNOWN: Yes.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Yeah.
MR. UNKNOWN: Thank you.
MR. ANDRUKAT: Of course. Okay, seeing no
other hands raised, I will go ahead and conclude
today's meeting. We ended early, which is good. You
guys have some time back. And thank you very much.
(Whereupon the above-entitled matter
went off the record at 12:43 p.m.)
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com