NUREG-0880, Transcript of 860619 Commission Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Safety Goals.Pp 1-58.Related Info Encl
| ML20206L866 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/19/1986 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7, RTR-NUREG-0880, RTR-NUREG-880 NUDOCS 8606300455 | |
| Download: ML20206L866 (77) | |
Text
e e 9 ORIGihAl UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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In the matter of:
1 COMMISSION MEETING
,k, Discussion /Possible Vote on Safety Goals (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
(t, o Location: Washington, D. C.
Date: Thursday, June 19, 1986 Pages: 1 - 58 N.
ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES l Court Reporters
\- 1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 g63j0455060619 oCFR PDR (202) 293-3950 PT9.7 .
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D 1 SCLA 1 MER 2
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, 6 This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on e 6/19/86 . in the Commission's office at 1717 H Straet, 9 N.W., Washington, D.C. The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation. This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracles.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes. As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed. Expressions of opinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs. No le pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement i
20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may i
21 authorize.
22 23 24 25
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ***
4 Discussion /Possible Vote on Safety Goals 5 ***
g 6 PUBLIC MEETING 7 ***
8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 Room 1130 10 1717 H Street, Northwest 11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 Thursday, June 19, 1986 14 15 The Commission met in public session, pursuant to 16 notice, at 10:00 a.m., the Honorable NUNZIO J. PALLADINO, 17 Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
19 NUNZIO J. PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission h 20 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission
(
21 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commission
- 22 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 23 LANDO W. ZECH, JR., Member of the Commission 24 25
__, . . . .. .. - - _ _ _ = . . .. . .
2 1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
2 3 S. CHILK 4 M. MALSCH 5 J, SNIEZEK g 6 D. RATHBUN
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8 9
10 11
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15 16 t -
f 17 ,
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21 22 23 24-25 i_ _ _. _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _. _ . _ _ .
3 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Good morning, ladies and 3 gentlemen. I apologize for the delay.
4 This morning, the Commission meets to discuss, and 5 possible vote, on a safety goals policy statement after a two 4 6 year evaluation period. With us we have representatives from 7 the Office of Policy Evaluation and the Staff to provide input 8 and comments.
9 By way of background, in hebruary 1982 the 10 Commission published NUREG 0880, a proposed policy statement 11 on safety goals for the operation of nuclear power plants, and 12 solicited comments on it.
13 In March 1983, following the comments, the 14 Commission publir>hed for evaluation in regards to policy 15 statement. The Staff evaluation has been completed, and a 16 draft policy statement on qualitative safety goals and 17 quantitative objectives was submitted to the Commission for 18 consideration for publication.
19 For the last six months we have had several l 20 Commission Meetings on the subject, the most recent of which
'r 1 21 have been Commission Meetings with ACRS on May 1986, and with 22 the Staff on February 1986.
23 By memorandum dated June 18th, a modified version of 24 the safety goal policy was circulated by me. That version of 25 the policy is the subject of today's meeting. I understand
4 1 that copies are available on the table in the back of the 2 room.
3 The agenda proposed for today's meeting is to have 4 Dennis Rathbun, from the Office of Policy Evaluation, 5 summarize briefly the current policy.
s 6 At this precentation, Staff comments will be 7 solicited. The remaining time will be devoted to Commission 8 discussion and possible vote.
'9 I' understand that Commissioner Asselstine has two 10 proposals to submit to amend the proposed version, and I will 11 give him an opportunity to bring those up after the opening 12 summary.
13 over the past five years the subject of safety goals 14 has indeed proved to be as complex as we all expected.
15 However, it appears at this time that a consensus is near on 16 the qualitative safety goals and associated quantitative 17 objectives. .
18 Therefore, at the completion of today's meeting, I l
19 intend to poll the Commissioners as to whether they are 20 prepared to approve the safety goal policy and to vote to t
21 direct the Secretary to publish the final safety goal policy 22 in the Federal Register.
- 23 I understand that representatives from Region I will i 24 be listening to today's meeting over the telephone.
I 25 Let me ask if the other Commissioners have l
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5 1 additional remarks at this time?
! 2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Joe, I have some opening 3 comments, but why don't we let Dennis go ahead first, and then 4 I will make my comments at that point.
l 5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. Any other.
3 6 COMMISSIONER ZECH: No.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. Let me turn the o
8 meeting over to Dennis Rathbun, then.
9 MR. RATHBUN: Yes, sir. Thank you. The policy 10 statement which the Chairman circulated to the Commission on 11 June 18th differs from his earlier proposal on May 19th, 12 primarily through the addition of a one page summary statement 13 that Commissioner Bernthal has asked be put -- taken in the 14 statement.
i 15 I am not sure there is any particular point in going 16 through book, chapter, and verse of the various elements of 17 the policy statement, although I would do that if the
! 18 Commissioners were so interested.
19 The organization is the introduction, the T
20 background, the third section presents the qualitative goals, t
21 the two qualitative goals governing individual risk and 22 societal risk.
23 The fourth section presents the commission's two 24 proposed safety objectives for individuals and societal. The j 25 fifth section is a discussion of how the Staff would treat
6 1 uncertainties. States that the Staff would use mean estimates 2 in taking into account uncertainties, and confidence intervals 3 to the extent practicable.
4 The sixth section on implementation says that the 5 Staff will require specific guidelines to use as a basis for
, 6 determining whether a particular level of safety posed by a 7 reactor is consistent with the safety goal policy statement, 8 and that the Commission would review and approve the guidance 9 for the Staff. -
10 These guidelines will cover three things according 11 to the text in the June 18th paper. These would be plant 12 performance indicated for operational performance, and the 13 conduct of benefit cost analyses.
14 The Chairman has included a section, or a proposed 15 goal for Staff examination and study which would -- let me 16 just state it: Consistent with a traditional defense in depth 17 approach and the accident mitigation philosophy requiring a 18 reliable performance of containment systems, the overall mean 19 frequency of a large release of radioactive materials to the T
20 environment from a reactor accident should be less than one in 21 a million per year reactor operation.
l 22 Lastly, the implementation section states that the l
l l 23 safety goals would not be a substitute for compliance by 1
24 licensees with NRC's regulations, and did not relieve -- does l
25 not relieve licensees from the need to comply with our i
7 1 regulations.
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2 And in addition, that safety goals would not be the 3 sole basis for a licensing decision, but would be considered 4 as one factor in the licensing decision.
5 That concludes my short summary statement.
3 6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. Thank you. Jim, do 7 you have any Staff comments on this?
8 MR. SNIEZEK: Yes, sir. I just say that in 9 reviewing the June 18th proposal, I believe it is basically 10 consistent with what the Staff has evaluated before. With 11 qualitative safety goals, a quantitative objectives. We have 12 looked at that ten to -- one in a million probability of a 13 large scale release, and I agree it is something that should 14 be evaluated by the Staff to see what impact it would have, 15 and what is the best way to approach that.
16 I believe that this document is something the Staff 17 could take and commence developing implementing procedures for 18 Commission approval, and get on with implementing a safety l 19 goal if the Commission so desires.
! T 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I also think that one in a 21 million is consistent with ACRS's comments as well.
22 MR. SNIEZEK: I believe it is, yes, sir.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Okay.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: If we all agree that one in 25 a million is consistent, why don't we put it in the safety I
- 8 1 goal instead of in the explanation section?
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That probably ought to be 3 the heart of this morning's debate.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I think it is important that 5 some evaluation be done on it, because I think additional i
9 6 specificity needs to be developed in which is meant by large 7 scale release, and what impact it will have on our 8 regulations, so to put it in the implementation section where 9 I think it is part of the development of further guidance.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, what is meant by a 11 large scale release, Joe, is easy to define . If we wish, we 12 could peg a number, whether it is ten to the minus six, or 13 perhaps a number not quite that number, in the vicinity, that l 14 is consistent witt our legal definition for extraordinary
< 15 nuclear occurrence. It is quite simple.
i 16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I still think it is 17 something which should be evaluated, not jumped to, at this 18 particular time.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH: And I agree with that. I think T
20 safety goal is a very important initiative. It has t
21 significant implications, not only in our country but will be 1
I 22 looked at internationally with great interest and carefully 23 reviewed, and I think that the safety goal that we have come 24 up with is a responsible effort.
25 I think it does emphasize our interest in our r,-_ _ -, , , , . , _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _______ _ -
9 1 primary mission of public health and safety. I think it talks 7
2 about -- tries to focus on radiation release, and our emphasis l 3 on making sure that that doesn't happen.
4 I think the safety goal as we stated is in broad 5 terms, but specific enough for the Staff to try to improve and t
4 6 to me the safety goal as we have stated is a culmination of 4
7 many years of effort, many workshops, public meetings, 8 comments. Two year evaluation period.
9 The Staff, I think, has done a particularly good job 10 in this regard. OPE has also contributed significantly.. I 11 think we have come up with something that is responsible, and 12 I think we should go forward with it, and not try at this 13 eleventh hour to take any change that would cloud what we are 14 trying to do.
- 15 What we are trying to do is state as clearly as we 16 can, in layman's language, the safety goal for our country.
4 17 And I think we have,done that, and I think we should go 18 forward with it.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Joe, I wonder if I could 1
20 make a couple of preliminary observations if both Jim and s
21 Dennis are done.
J 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Can hardly hear you, Jim.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: First, I think I would 24 like to say that there are a number of people that I think we 25 owe a great deal to in this process.
i
10 1 It is one that has gone on certainly for as long as 2 I have been on the Commission, and I think for as long as you 3 have been on the Commission. I would say at the outset one of 4 the people that I think we owe a debt to on this is you.
5 I think that for as long as you have been on the 3 6 Commission this has been something of great interest to you, 7 and I hope that we can wrap it up while you are here, so that 8 this can be one of the last major accomplishments under your 9 tenure as Chairman, and I think we do owe you a great deal for 10 having focused the Agency's attention on this particular 11 issue.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Thank you for that, although I 13 think credit goes primarily to the many people that worked so 14 diligently on it, but nevertheless I appreciate your kindness.
i 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: And I want to single out a 16 few of those, too.
17 First, I think we also owe a great deal to the ACRS, 18 because after all they are the one's that I think really got 19 this process started. People like Dave Okrent who began to T
! 20 say, you know, we really do need some safety goals, including L
21 some quantitative objectives that we can use to explain to the 22 public what it is we are trying to achieve, and also to give 23 some guidance to the Staff and to the industry on the level of 24 performance and the level of safety that we think really is 25 needed.
11 1 Now, I voted for the first safety goal. I had some 2 misgivings about a few elements of it, but I felt the process 3 and the overall objective was important enough that it 4 deserved commission support, particularly during the 5 evaluation period that we have gone through the past couple of 9 6 years, and I for one think that that evaluation period was 7 very useful.
8 I think that it brought to light some real concerns 9 and questions about what should be in the safety goal, and how 10 it should be formulated, and I think we owe a great deal to 11 people like Harold Denton and Bob Minogue that stepped forward 12 during the -- or after the evaluation process, and said: You 13 know, this goal is good. There are a few things that need to 14 be re-formulated, but there is also an element that really is 15 missing, and that is the element of some performance objective 16 for the plants.
17 What it is we expect to see in terms of the level of 18 accident risk, and particularly those accidents that might 19 result in large offsite releases of radiation that could harm 1
20 the public, contaminate property, and lead to evacuation of t
21 people in this country, and I think we owe them a great deal 22 for the memos that they wrote, for the issues that they put on 23 the table.
24 In fact, I think that issue has really dominated the 25 debate on the safety goal that we have had over the last six
12 1 months, at least.
2 When I reviewed the draft that you circulated I 3 guess on June 18th, it seemed to me that there were many 4 things in there that I basically agreed with. That there were 5 a couple of elements that I thought were improvements over the
, 6 first safety goal. I think the way the societal risk 7 calculation has now been reformulated is a step forward. I 8 think it makes that a more meaningful goal than we had 9 before, and I thought your addition at least for evaluation 10 purposes of a quantitative performance objective for large 11 offsite releases, accidents that would result in large offsite 12 releases of radiation, was a big step forward.
13 But I did feel, and I guess I still do feel, that 14 the safety goals could still be improved with a couple of 15 modifications, and that is why I prepared a couple of 16 amendments, and I should apologize to everybody, since I think l
17 the delay in the meeting this morning was really so people 18 could focus attention on those ideas.
19 Let me just describe briefly the two ideas which I 1
i 20 think everybody has had a chance to take a look at.
t 21 First, it seems to me that it would be useful for us 22 to say in the qualitative statement what our objective is 23 respecting severe core damage accidents, and for myself I 24 would say that we really want to achieve high confidence that 25 one won't occur over the operating life of the plants we have
Y 13 1 now.
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2 It seems to me that is a reasonable statement of 3 what our objective is. I accept the concept of a safety goal 4 which is this is not an absolute requirement on each and 5 every plant, but it is the objective that we are striving to
, 6 achieve, and to me, that was a reasonable objective. And I 7 think it is one that we all share, and that we make our 8 individual decisions we are all trying to work toward.
9 The second change that I propose, tried to build on 10 your initial concept of the quantitative performance ob'jective 11 for the plants, and I agree with your formulation. That what 12 we ought to be aiming for in terms of the performance of all 1 13 of the plants together that we now have is a one in a million i
14 chance or less per reactor year, of an accident resulting in a
- 15 large offsite release of radiation.
l 16 I tried to build on the concept that you had 17 proposed at least for evaluation purposes.
, 18 It seems to me we ought to be aiming to establish i 19 that -- or reach that goal with high confidence, and giving l
20 appropriate consideration to the uncertainties that are
. 21 involved in trying to achieve whether we meet that.
22 It also seemed to me that !?he ACRS's point about not 23 putting all of our eggs in the prevention basket made a great 24 deal of sense. What we ought to be trying to do is balance 25 prevention and mitigation, and that is why my second amendment
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14 1 would also propose a containment performance objective of one 2 in a hundred core meltdowns to assume for a large offsite 3 release, to assure a proper balance between prevention and 4 mitigatien.
5 -
And I would just note that I received recently a
, 6 letter from the President of the Atomic Industrial Forum, 7 arguing on the basis of the IDCORE work, that the industry 8 already meets a one in two hundred chance of a large offsite 1
9 release from core meltdowns for -- given the existing 10 containments that we have. I was even willing to step back, 11 cut that in half, but it is interesting to me to note that the 12 President of the AIF is already arguing that they would meet 13 double what I am proposing.
14 And I would also, I think, define a large offsite i
15 release as a five rem, whole body exposure at the site i 16 boundary, and I do that for a couple of reasons.
17 First, I tried to pick up on Fred's idea, key this 18 in to what the staff proposed or recommended for the level for 19 an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, and I think that the five l
1 20 rem level makes sense for two reasons.
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21 First, that is the trigger for evacuation. And what 22 we would be saying is we want to reduce to a very low level 23 the chance of an accident that would require evacuating the 24 public, and second, with the -- tying it to the ENO level, t
25 that ties into the trigger for the waiver of defenses under E
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15 1 the Price Anderson Act, so the second thing we would be saying
- ~ - l 2 is: And we want to keep to a very low level an accident that 3 would result in offsite public consequences that would require 4 large scale public compensation under the Price Anderson Act.
5 It seems to me that both of those are useful
$ 6 objectives to seek, and they ought to be part of the goal that 7 we are seeking to achieve on safety.
8 Both of these changes aren't everything that I would 9 like to see in a safety goal. I don't think they are i 10 everything that Fred would like to see. I agreed very much 11 with many of the concepts that Fred had originally proposed 12 that I think go beyond the things that I am now suggesting.
13 I suspect they are also not everything that others 14 on the Commission would like to see. The reason I offered 15 them is that it does seem to me that there is at least the 16 possibility for narrowing the differences for achieving the 17 greater consensus on what this document should be, and 18 providing some long term and lasting guidance that will really 19 stand the test of time in terms of the level of safety that we l
- 20 are trying to achieve, and I think in the aftermath of the L
21 Chernobyl accident, trying to do as much as we can to make it i
22 clear to the public the level of safety that we think is not 23 only achievable, but is our ultimate objective, is something 24 that would be very useful for us to do, and I think I will 25 stop at that point with my opening comments.
16 1 And again, apologizing for the burden that I have 2 put on you and the others in terma of my amendments at the 3 last minute this morning, but with the hope that they might 4 lead to some constructive benefit in improvement in terms of 5 what we are all trying to achieve.
, 6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Thank you, Jim. I think you l 7 did focus on a couple of very important points. I do want to 8 further expand in part to your second suggr3 tion about putting 9 a limit on the containment performance, and also why I think 10 they need further study.
11 With the goal of not having an large radioactive 12 release any more frequently than one in a million reactor 13 years, what -- the reason I think it needs some study is 14 because I would not want somebody that says: Well, I have a 15 ten to the minus fifth core melt, and therefore I can get 16 sloppy on containment, and I will go to a ten to the minus 17 one, and I meet it.,
18 Or, somebody that says: Well, I have a ten to the 10 minus two,.and I don't have to work any harder, because ten to 1
20 the minus two, and ten to the minus four for core melt 6
21 frequency is good enough.
22 I think we want to look at that so that we just 23 don't fall in those kind of traps.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Let me see if there are any 25 other comments on your proposal. I was going to suggest to
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17 1 take each of them in order, and vote and see if there is a f-w 2 majority willing to amend the proposed safety goal on each one 3 of those two.
4 But first, let me see if there are any comments that 5 anybody wants to make at this time.
e 6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Joe, maybe I could just 7 respond briefly to the last comment that you made. I 8 certainly understand the concern, and I think quite frankly 9 that you do want to be very careful about how individual 10 plants make those trade-offs, but it seems to me that one of 11 the concepts of the goal itself was that we are saying for all 12 the plants that we now have, this is the objective that we 13 want to aim for, both in terms of a one in a million chance of 14 low likelihood, and in terms of assuring a proper balance 15 between prevention and mitigation.
16 That is our overall objective. It may well be when 17 we try to decide how to go about implementing something like a 18 safety goal, that you have to look carefully at each 19 individual case.
I i
20 I think that is probably true. If you had a plant 21 that is located in a very remote area, and that was very, very 22 good on prevention, but was somewhat weak on containment 23 , capability, you might want to consider that, allowing some 24 flexibility there in a particular case.
25 At the same time, if you had a plant in a very high
18 l
1 population density area, with real questions about containment t
7.
2 performance, I think you would want to focus very carefully 3 and very hard on that issue, about whether you really were 4 confident in putting heavy weight on the prevention side.
5 And Fred raised, I think, those kind of concepts in
. 6 his memo and proposal. But it seemed to me in terms of saying 7 this is our overall objective for the universe of plants that 8 we now have, you could be a little more specific in terms of 9 saying what the balance is between prevention and mitigation, 10 and at the same time tell people when we look at individual 11 plants, you are not to take a great deal of comfort from this, 12 and simply say you are slacking off. You can slack off 13 because you meet ten to the minus four, as long as you think 14 you meet ten to the minus two as well.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I think the evaluation of 16 the proposal of one in a million, I think gives us the 17 opportunity to address some of the questions that you have 18 posed.
i 19 Let me ask for Commission action on your first i
20 amendment, and I have two options. One is to read it as you 6
21 have proposed, and one to read it as, I gather a consensus 22 exists to support, so why not read it that way if that does l 23 not do injustice to your proposal.
j 24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think I have described i
25 my proposal, so you don't necessarily have to read it.
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19 1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I may as well read it, because 2 we want to know what it is we are amending.
3 This would be on page 6, at the end of Section III, l 4 Qualitative Safety Goals, and we would add the following: ,
1 5 Severe core damage accidents can lead to more
. 6 serious accidents with the potential for life-threatening 7 offsite releases of radiation, for evacuation of members of 8 the public, and for contamination of public property. Apart 9 from their health and safety consequences, such accidents can 10 erode public confidence in the safety of nuclear power and can 11 lead to further instability and unpredictability for the 12 industry. In order to avoid these adverse consequences, the 13 Commission intends to continue to pursue a regulatory program 14 that has as its objective to provide reasonable assurance,
! 15 giving appropriate consideration to the uncertainties involved, that a severe core damage accident will not occur at
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16 17 a U. S. nuclear power plant.
i 18 That is the proposed amendment.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: May I make a grammatical ,
9 20 suggestion. I think you want to say, and this is the change, L
21 "has as its objective providing," rather than, "to provide."
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, providing. At one time i
23 we had providing -- providing is sort of conditional, and that 24 is why I changed it to, " provide," but I am not hung up on
, 25 that.
1 i
1
20 1 COMMISSIONER RO3ERTS: I think grammatically --
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let the lawyers decide that.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: You want providing? Okay. I 4 was going -- I will go back ',o, "providing."
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: You wonder if it is a noun.
. 6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Your objective is fine. I 7 don't want to get hung up on that. I will put providing, if 8 everybody understands what it means.
9 !s there any further discussion on this proposed 10 amendment.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I will accept that.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I would also.
13 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I will.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I will also.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I will tell you, my own 16 view is it is certainly better than being silent on the 17 issue. .
18 What I proposed originally was assuring that we meet 19 that objective with high confidence. I still would prefer s
20 that, and I guess I am a little concerned that people feel s
21 compelled to stick only with the statutory limit rather than 22 saying what we are really seeking is that we meet that 23 objective with high confidence.
24 But in the interest of getting something in the 25 safety goal statement on this question, I would say I would e
l 21 1 accept it as better than being silent on the issue.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Maybe I should let Lando Zech 3 introduce the thought, but assuring with high confidence is a 1
4 new expression we haven't used, and I think it can mean a lot 5 of different things to different people. Putting in the
- - 6 statutory language, I think, it at least keeps us consistent 7 with what we have been saying and using as objectives for 8 other activities.
9 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Well, my thought was that we 4
1 10 would be consistent by using the statutory language, and by --
11 you know, it is a matter of interpretation I suppose. You can 12 say well, it means high confidence, and I think we are talking i
- 13 about a very, very narrow and possibly almost very, very, j
14 difficult difference. Maybe no difference at all.
1 15 But there is a slight interpretation to what we mean i
16 by introducing a new term, and my only thought was that i
17 perhaps you can consider it high confidence, but we wccid be 18 more consistent by using the statutory words, "providing
. 19 reasonable assurance."
i
- 20 This is what we have been statutorily directed to 6
21 do. I think we would be carrying out our responsibilities 22 that way, and it is a matter of interpretation, perhaps, but t
! 23 it seemed to me we would be much more consistent by doing that 24 rather than trying to introduce another uncertainty when we i
- 25 are trying to be, in layman's language, as clear as we i
i
1 22 1 possibly can to express our safety goal.
. ,e -
2 This was my only concern in that regard. I think it 3 is a very small difference. I thought this would be a little 4 more clear, and a little -- again,. involving a little less 5 uncertainty which I think it is important that we try to do
. 6 when we come up with such an important, significant safety 7 goal.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I can certainly respect 9 that view and that judgment, and I suspect the difference may 10 not be terribly great.
11 My own feeling was, and I think is, that the 12 reasonable assurance standard is certainly an appropriate one i 13 for regulatory decision making, but I think that is a slightly
\
14 different purpose than the safety goal.
4 15 I think in the safety goal, what we are really 1
16 trying to do Lando, and I agree with your comment, is to say 17 in clear and understandable English: This is our objective; 18 this is what we are trying to achieve. We make that decision
- 19 in individual cases and on individual issues that come before 20 the Commission on the basis of a reasonable assurance 21 standard. That is what the law requires.
22 But in terms of our overall philosophy, what we are j 23 trying to tell the American public that we are trying to 24 achieve here, I would say high confidence that one of these 25 won't happen here, accurately characterizes what I would like i
23 1 to see the Agency say to the public.
I 2 Now, the difference may not be great, and I respect 3 tour comment and your thinking on it, but that -- I just 4 wanted to expand on my own as well.
5 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I appreciate that, too. And I
. 6 just think we are so close together that it is an awfully fine 7 point. And I appreciate your viewpoint, too. And I think we 8 are just about saying the same thing.
9 MR. MALSCH: I should just make a small note. I 10 don't think it affects the discussion, but reasonable 11 assurance is a usual and customary term, and it has been 12 accepted by the Supreme Court as equivalent of the statutory 13 terms, but I don't think it actually appears in the statute.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That is true. You are 15 right, you are right.
16 COMMISSIONER ZECH: But it has the standing of the 17 term we have used for years.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That is correct.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH: And is understood, I think, 20 rather widely.
l 21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Jim, did I gather you vote to 22 accept this amendment?
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yeah. I stated what my 24 clear preference is. I understand the views of the majority 25 of the Commission, and I would accept it with that
24 1 modification because I think, again, it is better than being 2 silent on the issue.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Fred?
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I have no problem with 5 that. Let's see, you struck the last words, "over the
. 6 remaining lives of the plants now in operation and under 7 construction."
8 What was the rationale for that?
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: This makes it more plant 10 specific. It will occur at U. S. nuclear power plants.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I would have to say, Fred, 12 for myself, I would read that still as being implicitly i
13 there. If you say it won't occur at a U. S. nuclear power 14 plant, I think that means as long as you have U. S. nuclear l 15 power plants, we don't expect --
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: That is why I wondered why 17 it was struck. .
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: It is a problem of getting 19 consensus.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Right.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: So, we accept that amendment.
j 22 Now, there is your second amendment. Do you want me to read 23 it. You highlighted it.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think I have highlighted 25 it, and again I think there are copies back at the back of the
25 1 room after the meeting, so I don't think you have to go e
2 through and read it in detail.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, with regard to the second 4 amendment, I think I explained the problems I had. It is 5 jumping to numbers that may cause inflexibility, and may cause
. 6 the wrong answer at some plants, and I, for one, would not 7 support the amendment.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I agree with you, 9 Mr.' Chairman.
10 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I agree, too. I think we 11 already have, as I understand it, the first sentence which 12 talks about radiation materials -- release cf radiation
, 13 materials to the environment from a reactor accident should be
\
14 less than one in a million per year of reactor operation.
15 We already have ,that sentence, as I understand it, 16 in the performance guideline part of the statement, and so 17 that is accommodated.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: For study purposes.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH: For study purposes. For 20 evaluation. And I think in order to -- I think that is 21 appropriate because I think it is stated as something that we 22 are working towards. I think the intent is there. I think 23 that is accommodated.
24 And I would accept that in the place that we have it 25 in the guidelines. I think, frankly, my view is, going much
26 1 further than that, confuses and provides a degree of
. . N
- 2 uncertainty which we really don't have, even though there are 3 judgments been made, but we don't have in my understanding, a 4 clear confidence that that -- that we can go much further than 4
5 that.
. 6 So, my view is going any further than that provides 7 a degree of uncertainly again to this very significant safety 8 goal that we are trying to come forward with which we don't l
9 need, and which may again detract from the very significant 10 goal that we are trying to articulate.
, 11 So, it is an uncertainty that we are putting into 12 it. I don't necessarily agree or disagree with what I think 13 the thought uhat both Commissioner Bernthal and Commissioner l 14 Asselstine have on this, but I do feel that it provides a f
l 15 degree of uncertainty which we just don't need.
I -
16 I don't disagree so much with what I think is behind.
17 their thinking at all. It is just that I think it does
-18 provide another uncertainty which I don't really think is l
19 appropriate.
! o l 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: One question I had, Joe, 21 for the Staff, since Jim had mentioned the evaluation of this 22 kind of a standard, is what precisely is it that you think 23 needs to be evaluated on this? What is the purpose of the 24 evaluation? Is it to see whether plants meet it, is that what 25 you are interested in looking at before you commit to what the
27 1 goal ought to be? You want to know if the plants already meet 4
2 it?
3 MR. SNIEZEK: I think we want to know what type of 4 impact that it could have. Without doing an evaluation, it 5 could mean, I would envision, on the top of my head, that the
- 6 ten to minus six goal would really be the driving performance 7 objective, and the tenth of percents would fall by the 8 wayside.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: How about ten to the minus 10 two for containment performance?
11 MR. SNIEZEK: We have got a containment performance 12 study that is underway right now. It is supposed to be done 13 by the end of the year, approximately, to come down to the 14 Commission.
15 I don't know what is going to come out of that. It 16 may be that ten to the minus two is a good goal for 17 containment performance. We have the source term work that is 18 wrapping up now, or a good portion of it. 0956 coming to 19 fruition. We have the re-base line of the plants that 20 ought to be ccming out, NUREG 1150 towards the end of the 21 year.
22 I think there are a lot of things going on right now 23 that -- what does that mean relative to ten minus six. You 24 want to include that in your evaluation before we say that ten 25 to the minus six is the way to go.
I l
i I
28 l l
1 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I tell you why I think a
-3 2 containment performance objective is important. After 3 Chernobyl, one of the strong arguments I think the industry 4 has been making is an accident with large offsite releases 5 just won't happen here, and the reason it won't is because of 6 the containments.
7 And it seems to me if that is to be a valid 8 argument, and I hope it is, what we ought to be saying is:
9 This is what we expect from containment performance, so that 10 that projection really is a realistic projection.
. 11 It seems to me that is what it is all about.
12 MR. SNIEZEK: And I don't think you will hear the f 13 Staff arguing against that at this stage, but to say it is ten 14 to minus two is the right number I think is premature at this 15 time.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: But what I hear you saying 17 is that much of the, evaluation process is really going to be 18 to look at the plants to see what they can achieve, and it I 19 strikes me that what a goal is all about, particularly a goal 20 where we say we are not going to apply this goal in making 21 individual plant decisions, is to say what we want the level 22 of protection to be.
t l 23 This is what we are striving for rather than to l
24 write a goal that meets what actually exists at the plants.
25 That is why I guess the evaluation process bothers me a bit.
I e
' + - -
Y - - - --
29 1 It seems to me that the process is turned around.
2 What you want to do is say: This is what we are 3 striving to achieve. This is a reasonable and realistic level 4 of safety that is going to provide the public the assurance 5 that it needs that this kind of thing just isn't going to 6 happen, or it is going to be very, very unlikely rather than 7 trying to tie a goal to what actually exists.
8 MR. SNIEZEK: I think part of tying the goal, 9 though, is to look at what is possible in technology. There 10 may be something that is even more stringent than ten to the 11 minus two.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I think -- I am sorry. There
, 13 is another point, though. I think the evaluation is the 14 balance of the trade-offs. How are you going to balance it.
15 What factors come in? And that is why I referred to one could 16 have very good containment, and then say: Well, I can sloppy 17 about core melt frequency.
18 one could have a low core melt frequency, and say:
19 I can be sloppy about containment.
l l 20 I think this gives an opportunity to evaluate the 21 factors involving in the achieving that balance, and where the 22 balance might be struck.
23 I think it is more than just looking at history. We 24 may learn something from history, and the current status of 25 the plants, but I think we shouldn't overlook the opportunity
30 1 to consider factors that influence the balance.
2 MR. SNIEZEK: I don't want to preempt the staff work 3 that is underway'now, which is to try and establish a 4 containment performance objective, and this would essentially 5 do that.
. 6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I find it interesting that 7 there is this concern at this point, when two or three months 8 ago the Staff came in with a rather detailed recommendation on 9 a safety goal, and the policy. In fact, everyone sitting at 10 this table, myself included, complained that it was too 11 complicated. That sort of in this little matrix table was 12 everything you ever wanted to know about how to achieve a 13 safety goal, including containment performance, including core 14 melt criteria, including offsite release criteria.
15 MR. SNIEZEK: Containment performance was not in 16 there.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Say that again.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I am sorry, you are right.
19 Containment performance was not in there. Core melt 20 probability was there, and offsite release was there though 0
21 and, therefore, containment performance is clearly implicit.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes. That is right.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: And it may still emerge out of 24 this evaluation.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: So, the point is that the
- , _ _ . - - ,---r- - - , - -~
31 1 Staff came in and was recommending something that, frankly, I 2 thought was too complex for the public to understand. For me 3 to understand, let alone the public understand, and the 4 recommendation I think, virtually unanimously on this side of 5 the table was that let's come up with something that 6 Commissioners can understand, and then most assuredly everyone 7 will be able to understand it.
8 But why then are we now reaching the point at which 9 we are saying we have to restudy all this, when Staff came in 10 with a hard recommendation full of a matrix of numbers that I 11 could hardly understand. .
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: But it didn't guarantee
( 13 achieving one in a million.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: If you recall, it was very 15 specific.
16 MR. SNIEZEK: The matrix was not a safety goal. It 17 was the implementation which the Staff would say the safety 18 goal would have been met. The matrix was not the safety 19 goal. The Staff went back to the two qualitative goals and
- 20 used all the qualitative elements as this -- if you do this, 21 you are meeting the qualitative goals.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But that is a quibble. I 23 mean, you set forth a rather detailed implementation schedule 24 that had implicit in it, if not explicit, containment 25 performance. It explicitly had core melt objective, and it
32 1 explicitly had societal -- or rather offsite release, because 2 it had a societal risk objective, and there was no problem, 3 apparently, at that time with that implementation.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, there were problems, 5 because the Conmission didn't buy it, for one. It just said
. 6 we are willing -- if these conditions prevail, well, here is 7 how much money you ought to spend on fixing up the plant, and t
8 it didn't really speak to meeting the safety goals in the end.
9 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: We have been debating this 10 for five minutes.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I understand.
12 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I would like to propose that-13 we adopt the safety goal as per your June 18th working paper, 14 plus the alterations made here at the table with Jim's 15 Suggestion 1.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: We are still in the process of 17 voting on the Motion to Amend. It takes precedent.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I still would like my 19 second amendment.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. And Fred?
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let's see. We are on the 22 second amendment?
l 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Yes, the second amendment.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I would have made some
! 25 modifications to that, but since there is no chance apparently
.ms. - . . , , - , . , , . , . - , , - -
33 1 that that would be adopted in any case, those are probably t
2 irrelevant at this point.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: So, you vote in favor of the 4 amendment?
I' 5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes. I would have voted for i
6 the amendments with some modifications.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I recognize, Fred, it is 8 not everything that you or I wanted. Quite frankly, it was an 9 attempt to put something less than that on the table.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Unless there are other 11 questions, it is moved that we adopt the proposal circulated 12 on June 18th, as amended, by our action just a few minutes
, 13 ago.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: On Number 1.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: On Number 1.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I would like to take some 17 time for discussion.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Yeah, I want to discuss it.
19 And my motion would have two components; one, that the 20 Commission approve it, and; two, direct the Secretary to get j 21 it published in the Federal Register.
22 Now, the motion is up for discussion.
I 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Just for the record's l 24 sake, my second amendment, there are three opposed to it, and 25 two in favor of it.
I
, - , . .,---...--,,-~-.,-,,-_-__.________.,._._mm _ _ _ _ . - - _ - , . _ . . - , _ _ _ _ _ - . _ - - - - _ . _ _ _ . _ . - _ . - - . . . . - . - - - - - - - . , _
34 1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Yes, that is right.
2 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: That is correct.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Now, any comments and questions 4 on the main motions?
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, let me just pick up
- 6 where I left off. We have now gone from a detailed, numerical 7 matrix of implementation that the Staff, let alone let's leave 8 out what the commission's position was. We all agreed it was 9 too complicated, but why is the Staff now saying that that all 10 needs more study, when you came in here three months ago and 11 essentially said that you thought that was a valid 12 implementation vehicle? What's changed?
13 MR. RATHBUN: I am not quite sure that is a fair 14 question, Commissioner, with all due respect.
- 15 The Staff -- the steering group finished it's work a 16 year ago, and the matrix that you talked about was something i
17 that came out of the office manager's review that Mr. Dirks 18 called for.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: So this does not represent 20 the Staff's position then? That matrix?
21 MR. RATHBUN: Oh, I think it does represent.
22 MR. SNIEZEK: Let me take from a slide that we 23 presented when we gave the Commission presentation on the 24 matrix on February 20th, 1986. The Staff conclusions: Issue 25 in final form, as a Commission safety goal policy, two
35 1 qualitative statements regarding individual and societal 2 risk. Eliminate qualitative objectives and benefit cost 3 guideline as individually discreet statements. Combine them 4 into an integrated matrix which the Staff can use as a 5 quantitative measurement of the Commission's qualitative
. 6 safety goals.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: So it was a quantitative 8 interpretation.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Precisely.
10 MR. SNIEZEK: And we did not address a ten to the 11 minus six probability of release. We did not address any 12 specific containment performance objective, and the Commission 13 advised -- directed us to do a study of containment f
14 performance objectives, which the Staff is underway right now, 15 which we expect to have wrapped up near the end of the year.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: You did have a core melt 17 objective didn't you?
18 MR. SNIEZEK: Yes. It was a series of them that 19 ranged from ten to the minus three to ten to the minus fifth, 20 and the action and the monies that would be necessary to --
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Can we display a copy of 22 that matrix so people have some idea of the detail that was on 23 that?
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I find this interesting since 25 the Commission voted not to adopt it.
i
36
, 1 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, the thing I find 2 interesting is that we had numerical guidelines for 3 implementation, and those have now been entirely removed from 4 the safety goal, and the Staff apparently no longer recommends 5 that they even be there.
. 6 Whereas three months ago there was a detailed 7 implementation matrix that a core melt objective -- I would 8 still maintain because of the two numerical public health and 9 safety objectives -- there was implicit some kind of offsite 10 release criterion, and a thousand dollar person rem criteria, 11 for example, was in there.
12 That implies an offsite release criterion it seems i
13 to me. Will you agree to that?
s 14 MR. SNIEZEK: There is no question that that would 15 apply --
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Okay. So, whether it is ten 17 to the minus six or,something else, you could work out the i
j 18 numbers, but it was clearly implicit in that matrix.
19 COMMISSIONER ZECH: But I think it should be pointed 20 out, too, that the Commission at that time, at that briefing,
! 21 was not at all satisfied that that matrix and all those
! 22 specifics were something that we were prepared to agree with, 23 and I think it was almost unanimous here at the table -- on
> 24 this side of the table, that we were not prepared to accept
- 25 those figures and we asked the Staff, as I recall, to go back 1
I
37 1 and review it, and that is what they are doing.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, you are saying now 3 that you no longer support that matrix, is that true, for an l 4 implementation matrix?
- 5 MR. SNIEZEK
- No, I am not saying that. It may be
. 6 that if the Staff goes back and evaluates -- we have more to 7 evaluate, including the ten to the minus six, what that means 4
j 8 as far as implementation.
I 9 We have to examine various factors and see where we
- 10 come out. It is a new ball game now. There is a ten to the l_ 11 minus six criteria that has been thrown in for Staff i
12 evaluation.
g 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, that has been thrown 14 in, though, today. And I would agree you would have to go 15 back and rework the matrix, but you, independent of that ten 16 to the minus six, you would still stand by that had this ten 17 to the minus six not been there, and you would consider that a 18 good implementation plan, is that true?
t 19 MR. SNIEZEK: That would have been the Staff's view 20 for implementation of qualitative -- two qualitative goals.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: The tenth of a percent goals
- 22 you mean?
23 MR. SNIEZEK: The two qualitative goals. The tenth 24 of a percent were the quantitative objectives which the Staff 25 would have used as part of the determination whether or not i
38 1 the qualitative goals had been met.
4 2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINEi If I could ask a question, 3 Fred. Jim, is this ten to the minus six such a new concept 4 for the Staff? My impression was that imbedded in the 5 regulatory thinking of this Agency literally for years, and
, - 6 years, and years has been this concept that ten to the minus 7 six is about the right level for a large offsite release of 8 radiation.
9 Am I wrong on that? Or is this a revolutionary new 10 concept that is totally outside of the Staff's thinking, going 11 back literally for years?
12 MR. SNIEZEK: I don't believe it is a totally new 13 concept. You can look at the various factors that can go into 14 making up that ten to the minus six, and what it means. I 15 think that has to be looked at specifically.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Is the concept of a 17 balance between prevention and mitigation a revolutionary 18 concept for the Staff? \)
19 MR. SNIEZEK: No, it isn't. That is not 20 revolutionary at all.
21 MR. RATHBUN: Actually, that is why the core melt 22 probability was there in the first place.
, 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: If I recall the matrix, 24 was at least one of the concepts that something less than ten 25 to the minus -- or more likely ten to the minus four for core
i l
39 1 melt was something that the Staff had a great deal of trouble 2 with.
3 That indeed, the concept was if you fell -- well, 4 above ten to the minus four; ten to the minus three or 5 whatever, the Staff's idea was: We really want to get that
. 6 fixed.
7 MR. SNIEZEK: That is correct. And that is how we 8 used averted onsite cost concept.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Which would mean then that 10 the other side of the coin, the mitigation side of the coin, 11 would be somewhere in the neighborhood of ten to the minus 12 two, wouldn't it?
13 MR. SNIEZEK: Somewhere in that neighborhood.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. Because as you got 15 up toward ten to the minus five, the concept in the Staff's 16 matrix was: We probably don't need to do much more on the 17 prevention side. ,
18 So, that would mean that the mitigation side would 19 be somewhere on the order of ten to the minus two.
20 MR. SNIEZEK: But the emphasis in the matrix was on 21 the health effects, the tenth of a percent.
22 Most emphasis was on there. But also some emphasis 23 on decreasing core melt.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But the health effects and 25 offsite release are just -- it is a number conversion.
. . -. . _ .~ -.
40 1 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yeah.
I 2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: When you talk about health 3 effects, you are talking about offsite releases, which is what 4 the Chairman is talking about basically.
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That is right.
1
. 6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Now, whether it is ten to 7 the minus six that corresponds to those health effects, we can 8 get a mathematician to work out for us, but they are one and '
4 9 the same thing. They are just saying the same thing in two 10 different ways.
i 11 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Bat it is for this very reason, 12 this very reason, that I don't think they should be included 13 in this, because you can see it is a technical discussion. It 14 is -- there is uncertainties involved. There are more studies 15 to be made.
16 And because of that, it seems to me to include it in 17 a very significant safety goal at this stage is simply not 18 appropriate.
19 It is something that we should continue to work on.
20 We should continue to study. We should try to get more finite 21 answers, and certainly work towards exactly the thing that we 22 all want, and that is improved safety.
23 But because of the uncertainties, I think including 24 a in a goal at this time, is simply not appropriate.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: May I make a comment? I think
41 1 Commissioner Zach makes a good point, and I think Jim made the 2 same point -- maybe we all made the same point.
3 This is not the last word in safety goal. As a 4 matter of fact, it is only the first step, where the Staff 5 would recommend we adopt as our policy these qualitative
. 6 safety goals, and the most recent quantitative objective, and 7 I think we are at that step.
8 We do provide for further study. We did introduce 9 an important number that I think ACRS mentioned also, and set
- 10 it for further evaluation, and I think if we can agree up to 4
11 this point, I think we have made significant progress, and can 12 now develop the guidance to go further.
, 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, I have no disagreement 14 with the number, Joe. As you know, we have talked at great 15 length about that, and I think that your ten to the minus six 16 boils down to one and the same, with great regulatory 17 flexibility, I might add, of combining a reasonable core melt 18 criterion and a reasonable containment performance objective.
1 19 And we might do well to look at more carefully, although I 20 suspect we could define exactly what that should be in fairly 21 short order, but we probably should take a look at the 22 implications of that broad ten to the minus six objective.
23 But on the point that there is so much to learn here i
24 yet, I would like to read you a document here of a suggested
! 25 safety goal.
l 42 1 And this document says: The proposed approach of 2 the establishment and use of quantitative safety goals in the 3 nuclear regulatory process, and the suggested goal in this 4 document is the following suggested goal, it says, in bold 5 type: Ten to the minus four per reactor year for probability
, 6 of large scale fuel melt.
7 That was one of the safety goals suggested.
8 There is a second safety goal suggested, which 9 amounts to our -- what is it, a thousand dollar per man rem, 10 person rem criteria.
11 Now, would anybody care to suggest where I am 12 reading this from? This was prepared by the Atomic Industrial j 13 Forum in May 1981.
14 They were prepared to say that ten to the minus four 15 reactor year for probability of large scale fuel melt was a 16 reasonable objective back in 1981, and the Commission isn't 17 ready to say it in 1986. It says we need more study.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Oh, no. It says we don't work 19 on only one side of this equation, a core melt frequency. And 20 we want to have a balance between the core melt frequency and 21 the containment performance so that we can achieve one in a 22 million.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, I point out --
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I heard various versions where 25 it had ten to the minus four, ten to the minus two. Just
43 1 having trouble either selling the Staff. As a matter of fact, 2 I had Forest Remick who had an early hand in some of this, 3 just said you are beginning to over-specify it, and especially 4 for one in a million, and then you try to specify all the 5 parts. You have lost your flexibility in doing a good job of
. 6 regulation.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But with one in a million 8 you don't specify the parts.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: That is right.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: And I also point out the
. 11 DIF, the DICORE, has now said that they meet better than one 12 in a hundred containment -- one in two hundred.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: One thing I noticed. You know, 14 at a recent hearing, the question about whether EPA does 15 better than we on setting standards, EPA when they set 16 standards, they set the standard. They don't go in and say:
17 Well, now, the emissions will be so much.
18 But to make sure that the emission is met, they 19 don't go and say: Well, but we further want the stack to be 20 so strong, so you meet this objective, or go to having a 21 certain amount of pumping power to get the exhaust at the 22 right speed.
23 They set the standard. Now, we are tending in ours, i 24 because of our defense in depth philosophy, to go into l
25 subordinate, or supplemental standards along the way, and I l
L
44 1 don't say that is wrong, but I think when we do that we ought 2 to be very careful that we aim at the right target, and that 3 is to reduce the probability of a large amount of radioactive 4 release.
5 And that is why I think some of these things are
. 6 worthy of further study.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, that is your ten to 8 the minus six criterion, and we agree on that. I don't see 9 that we are disagreeing with anything.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: An urgency, a sense of urgency 11 to go and set what the supplemental goals ought to be as well, 12 and --
t 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Let's drop that point, and I 14 would like to raise another issue here that concerns me, and 15 that is that this is the NRC and the Commission talking now.
16 I don't know where this document came from, but it is in your 17 draft, Joe, where we said, quote: We are prepared to move 18 forward with an explicit policy statement on safety 19 philosophy, which may be a contradiction in terms. I am not 20 sure philosophy is ever explicit.
21 But then more importantly, the role of safety cost 22 trade-offs in the NRC safety decisions.
23 I don't have an answer to that. And I don't even 24 know what it means or meant. I thought that was what our
! 25 backfit rule did. Safety cost trade-offs, but it is clear to
45 1 me that one thing is sure, and that is there is not a word 2 about this in the current safety goal statement, and at least i
3 we ought to say why we don't need to say anything, or whether 4 the backfit rule encompasses it, or whether we intend to say I 5 that as well when we come out with whatever we come out with
, 6 at some point in the future.
l 7 That is just a point I wanted to make so that we
- 8 don't forget that here.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I agree with that.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: You are proposing an amendment?
j 11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: No, because I don't know i
l 12 what it meant. The role of safety cost trade-offs in this 13 context, I simply don't know what it meant. But I noticed in 14 your draft it quotes that from the Commission's original l j 15 commitment here, and there aren't three words in this
! 16 statement about that, so I am not sure.
- 17 MR. RATHBUK: It is a historical statement, as I am
' 18 sure you realize, from the Kemeny Commission, and you are 19 making a good point, I think, in the sense that there was at 20 one time this benefit cost standard of a thousand dollars per l ~1 person rem, which was addressing that.
22 Now, not having that, it probably says something l
- 23 about a need for a supplemental statement there, changing 1
24 that.
( 25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I missed your last part.
i l
46 1 MR. RATHBUN: I am just saying that I think 2 Commissioner Bernthal is making a good point. That the 3 statement is a historical one that came from the Kemeny 4 Commission. It has been in the original in each of the NUREGs 5 here, and in each of those there was this benefit standard of
, 6 a thousand dollars a person rem.
7 Now, not having that, says something about the need 8 to put a supplemental sentence in there or words, or something 9 like that.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think the concept was 11 earlier on that this goal would explain how we are going to go 12 about making these cost benefit judgments in deciding whether i
13 the goal is met, and if not, what more should be done, and 14 somehow that got lost in the process, and I think Fred is 15 right. It is a significant element that is not here.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: It is not completely lost. On 17 page 12, it says: And guidelines for conduct of benefit-cost 18 analyses.
19 It is not completely lost. It is just not
( 20 definitive.
f*
i 21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yeah.
! 22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, is that saying --
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I think there is still a l
! 24 continuing part of our process to go beyond this point.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Doesn't our backfit rule i
i
- - 47 1 deal with that, though?
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: In a sense it does. This, at 3 least, keeps the cost-benefit concept in the safety goal
- 4 implementation plan.
5 MR. SNIEZEK: And that says the cost would be
, 6 commensurate with the approval of the safety.
! 7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I don't know if you have 1
8 something that you would like to propose as an amendment. I 9 propose we leave it at this for the moment.
i.
i 10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I will make a proposal, 1
11 which I have made for six months now, just as a matter of
- 12 record, that as all of you here know, I believe we have a j .
13 joint responsibility to the American people under the law.
\'
14 It is first of all, and foremost, to protect public i 15 health and safety, but it is also to comply with the i
l 16 Congressional intent that this nuclear option be preserved.
- 17 And that implies that we make some effort and set as
\
18 a goal for this Agency, that we not only not have large f 19 offsite releases, but that we, consistent with our defense in i*
l 20 depth philosophy, have relatively low probabilities of Three
!' 21 Mile Island-style events.
22 And as you know, I would have preferred that we say 23 something that I think anybody in the public can understand, 24 and anybody at this table can understand, and that is the 25 following; that frankly and cleanly it should be the goal and
48 1 the objective of this commission that we not have severe core 2 damage -- you can read Three Mile Island-style incidents, if 3 you will, more than once in a hundred years in this country.
4 Factors of two are easily thrown around in this 5 business, but the long and the short of it means that it is
, 6 something you talk to your grandchildren about, but we 7 oughtn't to be talking to each other about overy ten years or 8 so.
9 The second objective that I would have preferred 10 that the commission say explicitly would be that we shouldn't 11 expect a large scale offsite release, and I think we all know
- 12 what that means now, based on recent events, more than once in 13 a thousand years.
14 That that should be the goal of this commission.
15 Those goals should be met with the conservatism that 16 underlies them. I think that the ACRS, in its advise to the 17 commission, reflects that general, broad philosophical, if you 18 will, position, Lithough they did agree, and I agree that the 19 issue of containment performance, for example, is worthy of 20 some further exploration.
21 So what I would suggest is that I'm prepared to 22 approve this statement because there's nothing in it that I 23 disagree with, Joe. I think it's a nice statement of 24 philosophy. But as the ACRS has pointed out and, as you know, 25 I've felt for some time, especially now given recent events,
-- = ~ . . . - - . . - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . . . - . . - .__ _ . - - -
l
, 49 1 we need to do more than this. We need to set some numerical 2 goals here. And I'm prepared to approve in part and I gussa 3 reserve a certain amount of disapproval or more appropriately, 4 I guess, abstention, at least, until the point at which the ,
5 Commission completes its work in this area.
And if the Commission is prepared to go on record
, 6 7 here as saying that it intends to address these quantitative 8 issues within the next twelve months, then I'm willing to go 9 along with this statement as it stands.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: With regard to one of your
- 11 comments, I think we've addressed your first point in our 12 first amendment, maybe not as specifically as you'd like to 2
)
, 13 see, but I think it's an improvement.
14 Well, I would suggest that if you don't disapprove i l 15 of what's in there -- well, I guess, you'll vote as you see I
- 16 fit -- then approve it for publication and exhort the i 17 Commission to keep on going and do its work.
l 18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, what my amendment
- I i 19 would be is that -- maybe I should offer an amendment. Let's i*
20 just put it this way: As an amendment, that the Commission i.
- 21 intends to finaliza quantitative safety goal objectives within I
- 22 the next year or call it 18 months or whatever.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I would not have any objection, j 24 except I'd have difficulty picking what that time ought to be, 1
i 25 because many things can influence the schedule. ,
i I e i
i
50 1 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, the ACRS suggested 2 that a year was an appropriate timeframe.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, we had a two-year 4 evaluation period that took three years.
5 Your proposal is that we intend to follow through
, 6 and come up with quantitative safety goals within the next 12 7 to 18 months, if I understood you correctly.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, that's correct.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: That's a statement of intent.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: That's right.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I like that idea.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot Any comments on it? I have a 14 little difficulty voting for or against it, because I won't be 15 here to influence whether 12 or 18 months is followed.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: That's why I think we were 17 both hoping, Joe, that you'd join with us in putting the 18 numbers in and put your mark on this for all time.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINot I think I've gone as far as I 20 can hope to get at this particular point in time.
21 COMMISSIONER ZECH No, I would like to look at what 22 has been proposed. It's a brand new proposal, I think, right 23 here at the end of the table, and I'd like to see what it 24 means in writing and think about it.
25 I'm prepared to vote, Mr. Chairman, on what we've
51 1 seen before we walked in here today. But if that's something 2 new, I want to take a look at it and think about it a little 3 bit. It seems to me that's appropriate.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It's that within the next 12
, 5 to 18 months that we will complete work on quantitative safety
. 6 goals.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: The intent is to --
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: The intent is.
9 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I'd like to see it in writing 10 before I commit to anything. Other than what I walksd in here 11 with, I want to review it. It's a very, very significant 12 issue, it seems to me.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I'm running out of time 14 for review.
15 (Laughter.)
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: No, I'm being serious. I'd I
17 like to see this thing passed. We can drag it out for another 1
18 year. If we don't vote today and we get hung up 2-to-2 after 19 I leave, it may be quite some time before you get another
. 20 Commissioner on who is familiar enough and getting himself up 21 to speed to even get this far. Meanwhile, we don't even 22 approach getting anything done in the next 12 to 18 months.
23 So I would urge -- I would urge that we either vote 24 this amendment up or down and then proceed to the main 25 question.
52 1 COMMISSIONER ZECH: I don't think we need any more 2 uncertainty in what we're doing than we've got. I think --
3 I'm against anything other than what we saw before we walked 4 in this room today.
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I agree with that.
. 6 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Rather than studying -- I need 7 to study it.
8 -
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Excuse me, Lando.
9 COMMISSIONER ZECH: No, go ahead.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: You vote no on the amendment?
11 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Right.
j 12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: It sounds like a "no" to l
13 me.
14 (Laughter.)
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think it's reasonable to 16 say we'll do it in a year, but even if it's not said, it will i 17 at least be considered --
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: The only thing that bothered me l
19 on it was the specificity of the timeframe. I think it is --
, . 20 I would urge the Commission to have the intent of getting on
!=
21 with its job and bringing about the specificity, and I would 22 even encourage that we try to do it within the next 12 to 18
)
23 months. But I just found it a little bit difficult to put it l
24 in a policy statement at this time.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Okay. Well, maybe we
~ wn. - r - -a ,,n- --. - - + , w---,---- -~ -
.r. . - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, -
53 1 should wrap this up, then.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Let me see if I can get a vote 3 on, first, approving the safety goal as modified or as amended 4 by Amendment 1 that we voted on earlier.
5 All those in favor cf approving, say aye.
. 6 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Aye.
, 7 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Aye.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Aye.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: My position is going to be 10 the same, I think, as Fred's. I approve in part and j 11 disapprove in part. I approve in part, because what's there i
12 is acceptable, but I disapprove in part because I think that t I, k3 we're not going as far as we really should be going, 14 particularly in specifying the quantitative elements. That's l 15 my vote.
l 16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: So I gather there are three --
17 you said yes? ,
j 18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, I did, but I'm waiting l 19 for the next question. I'm going to say yes to that one, too.
j s 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. So there are four 21 yeses and a yes-and-no in part.
22 (Laughter.)
i
! 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: But I think Fred's is a 24 yes-and-no, too.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Now the second question -- ,
}
54 1 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Does that add up to four 2 yeses?
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: That added up to about four 4 yeses.
S COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: It probably does add up to
, 6 four yeses, that's right. Two half-yeses.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: The second question, do yod 8 approva directing the Secretary to have this policy statement 9 publishe'd in the Federal Register?
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes, I'll support that.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I'll have some additional 13 views that explain what I would have done further.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, I do. Do I understand, 15 though, Joe, that you agree that the Commission should, within 16 some reasonable timeframe, complete quantitative action?
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I'm exhorting the Commission to 18 do that.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But you won't vote for it?
t
- 20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO
- I won't vote for it in a policy 21 statement that has specific numbers.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: But you will for it outside 23 the policy statement?
, 24 (Laughter.]
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: I'll even write you a memo
55 1 exhorting -- ,
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: How about an SRM to the ,
3 Staff?
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: So I gather there is a vote to 5 publish this in the Federal Register.
6 You will have some additional comments, Jim?
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Yes.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: You'll have some additional 9 comments?
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Probably yes.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. Any other 12 additional comments?
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Not at this time.
i 14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Now what timeframe might we get 15 the additional comments in?
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Probably the first of next 17 week. ,
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: The last week is coming up.
19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: right. We'll get it out
, 20 before you go.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Could we get them by Monday 22 night.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I think so, yes.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, that's fine.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I want to say once more,
56 1 Joe, too, that I appreciate everybody's forebearance in 2 considering my amendments.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: What's that?
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I appreciate everybody's 5 forebearance in considering my amendments.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: A 45-minute delay in a 7 meeting.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, I think the 45-minute 9 delay gave us the opportunity to understand your propocals and 10 look at them.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I appreciate that.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: And I think they're very
, 13 important.
14 So let me -- before, we close, I've got to make a 15 housekeeping statement.
16 Let me thank all the many individuals that 17 participated in the, safety goal. As I indicated, I don't i 18 think it's the final step; it's the first step. And I do i
19 exhort the Staff -- and now I speak for myself, and I think I 20 have a couple of colleagues here -- maybe we all exhort the 21 Staff to try to get the quantification of some of these l 22 guidelines settled, and I would urge you within the next year i
j 23 to a year and a half as proposed.
( 24 And Dennis and Jim, thank you very much for your l
25 work on this effort.
l i
57 1 Now we have an affirmation session that was 2 scheduled for 11:30; however, I understand from General 3 Counaal that there is a new version and some new input.
4 Let me ask the Commission when it feels it can meet 5 on this? Is it something that we can --
6 MR. MALSCH: It's a very small change. It's mostly 7 giving some references to some of the statements.
i' 8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, let me ask if the 9 Commission would be willing to come back in 15 minutes for an 10 affirmation.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Unfortunately, I've got a 12 foreign visitor who has been waiting for 15 minutes for me.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, there was some urgency.
{
14 How is this afternoon?
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: Well, I'm going this 16 afternoon to an administrative conference meeting, but I'll 17 tell you what. If I don't have any problems with it, you can 18 go ahead and do it without me. If I don't have any problems 19 with it, and I don't expect that I will, you can go ahead and 20 do it without me.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. What's the pleasure 22 of the rest of the Commission.
23 COMMISSIONER ZECH: It's fine with me either way.
24 I'll be here.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I'll be here, l
t
58 1 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I'll be here after 2:00 2 o' clock.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It doesn't matter to me.
4 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Either way.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Okay, we'll aim for 2:00 6 o' clock.
r
$ 7 Thank you very much. We'll stand adjourned.
8 [Whereupon at 12:02 o' clock, p.m., the Commission 9 meeting was adjourned.]
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 ,
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 1
2 REPORTER'S CER*IFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a 5 me.eting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7 TITLE OF MEETING: Discussion /Possible Vote on Safety Goals (Public Meeting) 8 PLACE OF MEETING: Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING: Thursday, June 19, 1986 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for'the file of the Commission taken 13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17 ,
18 - ----- - i C' ~-
Garre t J. Walsh, Jr.
19
. 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
23
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24 25
DISCUSSION VERSION June 18, 1986 POLICY STATEMENT ON SAFETY G0ALS FOR THE OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS I. [entirelynewsection]
SUMMARY
This policy statement focuses on the risks to the public from nuclear power plant operation. Its objective is to establish goals that broadly define an acceptable level of radiological risk. In developing the policy statement, the NRC sponsored two public workshops during 1981, obtained public comments and held four public meetings during 1982, conducted a two year evaluation during 1983-to 1985, and received the views of its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. , -
The Commission has established two qualitative safety. goals which are supported by two quantitative objectives. These two supporting objectives are based on the principle that nuclear risks should not be a significant addition to other societal risks. The Commission wants to make clear that no death attributable to nuclear power plant operation will ever be
" acceptable" in the sense that the Commission would regard it as a routine or permissible event. We are discussing acceptable risks, not acceptable deaths.
e The qualitative safety goals are:
-- Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no significant additional risk to life and health.
-- Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating
- electricity by viable competing technologies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risk. -
l
)
e The following quantitative objectives are to be used in determining achievement of the above safety goals:
-- The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of cne percent (0.1%) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U.S.
population are generally exposed.
-- The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes.
~
E.-h . INTRODUCTION A. Purpose and Scope In its response to the recommendations of the President's Comission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) stated that it was " prepared to move forward-with an explicit policy statement on safety philosophy and the role of -
safety-cost tradeoffs in the NRC safety decisions." This policy statement is the result.
Current regulatory practices are believed to ensure that the basic statutory requirement, adequate protection of the public, is met.
Nevertheless, current practices could be improved to provide a better means for testing the adequacy of and need for current and proposed l
l regulatory requirements. The Commission believes that such improve-ment could lead to a more coherent and consistent regulation of nuclear power plants, a more predictable regulatory process, a public l
l understanding of the regulatory criteria that the NRC applies, and 1
public confidence in the safety of operating plants. This statement
of NRC safety policy expresses the Commission's views on the level of risks to public health and safety that the industry should strive for in its nuclear power plants.
This policy statement focuses on the risks to the public from nuclear power plant operation. These are the risks from release of radioactive materials from the reactor to the environment from normal operations as well as from accidents. The Commission will refer to these risks as the risks of nuclear power plant operation. The risks from the nuclear fuel cycle are not included in the safety goals.
These have been considered in their own right and determined to be quite small. They will continue to receive careful consideration.
The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nu' clear material are also not presently included in the safety goals.~ At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission's intention that everything that is needed shall be done to keep such risks at their present, very low, level; and it is our expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is our intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be taken into account to -
the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques.
In the evaluation of nuclear power plant operation, several types of releases are considered by the staff. The risks to the public resulting from operating nuclear power plants are addressed ~in current NRC practice. Before a nuclear power plant is licensed to operate, NRC prepares an environmental impact assessment which includes an evaluation of the radiological impacts of routine l operation of the plant and accidents on the population in the region around the plant site. The assessment is subjected to public comment and may be extensively probed in adjudicatory hearings. For all
! plants licensed to operate, NRC has found that there will be no l measurable radiological impact on any member of the public from -
'. '. j routine operation of the plant. (
Reference:
NRC staff calculations of radiological impact on humans contained in Final Environmental Statements for specific nuclear power plants; e.g., NUREG-0779, NUREG-0812, and NUREG-0854.)
The objective of the Comission's policy statement is to establish goals that broadly define an acceptable level of radiological risk which might be imposed on the public as a result of nuclear power plant operation. While this policy statement includes the risks of normal operation, as well as accidents, the Comission believes that because of compliance with Federal Radiation Council (FRC) guidance, 40 CFR 190, and NRC's regulations (10 CFR Part 20 and Appendix I to Part 50) the risks from routine emissions are small compared to the safety goals. Therefore, the Comission believes that they need not
~
be routinely analyzed on a case-by-case basis in order to demonstrat'e conformarce with the safety goals.
B. Development of This Statement of Safety Policy In developing the policy statement the Comission solicited and benefited from the information and suggestions provided by workshop discussions. Two NRC sponsored workshops were held, the first in Palo Alto, California, on April 1-3, 1981 and the second in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, on July 23-24, 1981. The first workshop addressed general issues involved in developing safety goals. The second workshop focused on a discussion paper which presented proposed safety goals. Both workshops featured discussions among I
knowledgeable persons drawn from industry, put,lic interest groups, universities, and elsewhere, and represent a broad range of !
per'spectives and disciplines.
The Comission received and considered a Discussion Paper on Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants submitted in November 1981 and a l
j
\
o revised safety goal report submitted in July 1982, by its Office of Policy Evaluation.
The Commission also took into consideration the comments and suggestions received from the public in response *to the proposed Policy Statement on " Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants."
published on February 17, 1982. Following public comment, a revised Policy Statement was issued on March 14, 1983 and a 2-year evaluation period was begun.
In developing this final Policy Statement, the Commission received and considered a staff report and its recommendations resulting from the 2-year evaluation of safety goals. Additionally, the Commission had benefit of further comments by its Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and by senior NRC Management.'
Based on the results of this information the Commission has deter-mired that the qualitative safety goals will remain unchanged from its March 1983 revised policy statement and the Commission adopts these as its safety goals for the operation of nuclear power plants.
4 M , -It. QUALITATIVE SAFETY G0ALS The Commission has decided to adopt qualitative safety goals which are supported by quantitative health effects objectives for use in the regulatory decisionmaking process. The Commission's first qualitative safety goal is that the risk from nuclear power plant operation should not be a significant contributor to a person's risk of accidental death or injury. The intent is to require a level of safety such that individuals living or working near nuclear power plants should be able to go about their daily lives without special concern by virture of their proximity to such plants. Thus, the Commission's first safety goal is:
i -- --,, ,.e . ,., , , , , , _ - - , . - - _ - -
Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no significant additional risk to life and health.
Even though protection of individual members of the public inherently provides substantial societal protection, the Commission also decided that a limit be placed on the societal risks posed by nuclear power plant operation. The Commission also believes that the risks of nuclear power plant operation should be comparable to or less than the risks from other viable means of generating the same quantity of electrical energy. Thus, the Commission's second safety goal is:
Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation should be comparable to or less than the risks o'f generating electricity by viable competing technolo.gies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risks.
The broad spectrum of expert opinion on the risks posed by electrical generation by coal, and the absence of authoritative data, make it impractical to calibrate nuclear safety goals by comparison with coal risks based on what we know today. However, the Comission has established the quantitative health effects objectives in such a way that nuclear risks are not a significant addition to other societal risks.
N -A- QUANTITATIVE OBJECTIVES USED TO GAUGE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SAFETY G0ALS A . -t- General Considerations The quantitative health effects objectives establish NRC guidance for j
public protection which nuclear plan + designers and operators should i strive to achieve. A key element in formulating a qualitative safety goal whose achievement is measured by quantitative health eff.ects.
objectives is to understand both the strengths and limitations of the techniques by which one judges whether the qualitative safety goal has been met.
A major step forward in the development and refinement of accident risk quantification was taken in the Reactor Safety Study completed in 1975. The objective of the Study was "to try to reach some meaningful conclusions about the risk of nuclear accidents." The Study did not directly address the question of what level of risk from nuclear accidents was acceptable.
Since the completion of the Reactor Safety Study, further progess in developing probabilistic risk assessment and in accumulating relevant data have led to recognition that it is feasible to begin to use quantitative safety objectives for limited purpo'ses. However, because of the sizable uncertainties still present in the methods and the gaps in the data base--essential elements needed to gauge whether the objectives have been achieved--the quantitative objectives should be viewed as aiming points or numerical benchmarks of performance.
In particular, because of the present limitations in the state of the art of quantitatively estimating risks, the quantitative health effects objectives are not a substitute for existing regulations.
The Commission recognizes the importance of mitigating the consequences of a core-melt accident and continues to emphasize features such as containment, siting in less populated areas, and emergency planning as integral parts of the defense-in-depth concept associated with its accident prevention and mitigation philosophy.
S. -ft QuantitativehrtMft{?RiskObjectives The Commission wants to make clear at the beginning of this section that no death attributable to nuclear power plant operation will ever be " acceptable" in the sense that the Comission would regard it as a -
O
- routine or permissible event. We are discussing acceptable risks, not acceptable deaths. In any fatal accident, a course of conduct posing an acceptable risk at one moment results in an unacceptable death moments later. This is true whether one speaks of driving, swimming, flying or generating electricity from coal. Each of these activities poses a calculable risk to society and to individuals.
Some of those who accept the risk (or are part of a society that accepts risk) do not survive it. We intend that no such accidents will occur, but the possibility cannot be entirely eliminated. Fur-thermore, individual and societal risks from nuclear power plants are generally estimated to be considerably less than the risk that society is now exposed to from each of the other activities mentioned above.
C. . Health Effects - Prompt and Latent Cancer @crtdity} Risks The Commission has decided to adopt the following two health effects as the quantitative objectives concerning mortality risks to be used in determining achievement of the qualitative safety goals.
The risk to an average individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed.
The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of cancer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes.
The Commission believes that this ratio of 0.1% appropriately reflects both of the qualitative goals, which would provide that -
individuals and society bear no significant additional risk.
However, this does not necessarily mean that an additional risk that exceeds 0.1% would by itself constitute a significant additional risk. The 0.1% ratio to other risks is low enough to support an expectation that people living or working near nuclear power plants would have no special concern due to the plant's proximity.
The average individual in the vicinity of the plant is defined as the average individual biologically (in terms of age and other risk factors) and locationally who resides within a mile from the plant site boundary. This means that the average individual is found by accumulating the estimated individual risks and dividing by the number of individuals residing in the vicinity of the plant.
In applying the objective for individual risk of prompt fatality, the Commission has defined the vicinity as the area within 1 mile of the nuclear power plant site boundary, since calculations of the consequences of major reactor accidents suggest that individuals within a mile of the plant site boundary would generally be subject to the greatest risk of prompt death attributable to radiological causes. If there are no individuals residing within a mile of the plant boundary, an individual should, for evaluation purposes, be assumed to reside 1 mile from the site boundary.
In applying the objective for cancer fatalities as a population guideline for individuals in the area near the plant, the Commission has defined the population generally considered subject to significant risk as the population within 10 miles of the plant site.
The bulk of significant exposures of the population to radiation ;
l would be concentrated within this distance, and thus this is the appropriate population for comparison with cancer fatality risks from all other causes. This objective would ensure that the estimated increase in the risk of delayed cancer fatalities from all potential radiation releases at a typical plant would be no more than a small -
l
fraction of the year-to-year normal variation in the expected cancer deaths from non-nuclear causes. Moreover, the prompt fatality objective for protecting individuals generally provides even greater protection to the population as a whole. That is, if the quantitative objective for prompt fatality is met for individuals in the immediate vicinity of the plant, the estimated risk of delayed cancer fatality to persons within 10 miles of the plant and beyond would generally be much lower than the quantitative objective for cancer fatality. Thus, compliance with the prompt fatality objective applied to individuals close to the plant would generally mean that the aggregate estimated societal risk would be a number of times lower than it would be if compliance with just the objective applied to the population as a whole were involved. The distance for averaging the cancer fatality risk was taken as 50 miles in the 1983
. policy statement. The change to 10 miles, could 'be viewed to provide additional protection to individuals in the vicinity of the plant, although analyses indicate that this objective for cancer fatality will not be the controlling one. It also provides more representative societal protection, since the risk to the people beyond 10 miles will be less than the risk to the people within 10 miles.
I, TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTIES The Commission is aware that uncertainties are not caused by use of quantitative methodology in decisionmaking but are merely highlighted l through use of the quantification process. Confidence in the use of probabilistic and risk assessment techniques has steadily improved since the time these were used in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). In fact, through use of quantitative techniques, important uncertainties have been and continue to be brought into better focus and may even be reduced compared to those that would remain with a sole reliance on deterministic decisionmaking. To the extent practicable, the Commission intends to l ensure that the quantitative techniques used for regulatory decisi.onmaking_ -
1
take into account the potential uncertainties that exist so that an )
estimate can be made on the confidence level to be ascribed to the quantitative results.
The, Commission has adopted the use of mean estimates for purposes of implementing the quantitative objectives of this safety goal policy (i.e.,
the mortality risk objectives). Use of the mean estimates comports with the customary practices for benefit-cost analyses and it is the correct usage for purposes of the mortality risk comparisons. Use of mean estimates does not however resolve the need to quantify (to the extent reasonable) and understand those important uncertainties involved in the reactor accident risk predictions. A number of uncertainties (e.g.,
I thermal-hydraulic assumptions and the phenomenology of core-melt <
progression, fission product release and transport, and con'tainment loads
~
and performance) arise because of a direct lack of severe accident .
experience or knowledge of accident phenomenology along with data related ,
to probability distributions.
In such a situation, it is necessary that proper attention be given not only to the range of uncertainty surrounding probabilistic estimates, but also to the phenomenology that most influences the uncertainties. For -
this reason, sensitivity studies should be performed to determine those uncertainties most important to the probabilistic estimates. The results
- of such studies should be displayed--such as the range of variation 1
together with the underlying science or engineering assumptions that ;
dominate this variation. Depending on the decision needs, the l r
probabilistic results should also be reasonably balanced and supported ;
through use of deterministic arguments. In this way, judgments can be .
made by the decisionmaker about the degree of confidence to be given to these estimates and assumptions. This is a key part of the process of ,
determining the degree of regulatory conservatism that may be warranted for particular decisions. This defense-in-depth approach is expected to continue to ensure the protection of public health and safety.
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32I. GUIDELINES FOR REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION The Comission approves use of the qualitative safety goal, including use of the quantitative health effects objectives in the regulatory decisionmaking process. The Commission recognizes that the safety goal can provide a useful tool by which the adequacy of regulations or ,
regulatory decisions regarding changes to the regulations can be judged.
Likewise, the safety goals could be of benefit in the much more difficult task of assessing whether existing plants, designed, constructed and operated to comply with past and current regulations, conform adequately with the intent 'of the safety goal policy.
However, in order to do this, the staff will require specific guidelines to use as a basis for determining whether a level of safety ascribed to a plant is consistent with the safety goal policy. As a separate matter, the Commission intends to review and approve guidance to the staff regarding such determinations. It is currently envisioned that this guidance would address such matters as plant performance guidelines, indicators for operational performance, and guidelines for conduct of benefit-cost analyses. This guidance would be derived from additional studies conducted by the staff and resulting in recommendations to the Commission. The guidance would be based on the following general performance guideline which is proposed by the Commission for further staff examination:
Consistent with the traditional defense-in-depth approach and the accident mitigation philosophy requiring reliable performance of containment systems, the overall mean frequency of a large release of radioactive materials to the environment from a reactor accident shoJ1d be less than 1 in 1,000,000 per year of reactor operation.
To provide adequate protection of the public health and safety, current NRC regulations require conservatism in design, construction, testing, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants. A defense-in-depth.
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l approach has Leen mandeted in order to preve;1t accidents from happenirg and to mitigate their consequences. Siting in less populated areas is emphasized. Furthermore, emergency response capabilities are mandated to provide additional defense-in-depth protection to the surrounding population.
These safety goals and these implementation guidelines are not meant asta substitute for NRC's regulations and do not relieve nuclear power plant permittees and licensees from complying with regulations. Nor are the safety goals and these implementation guidelines in.and of themselves meant to serve as a sole basis for licensing decisions. However, if pursuant to these guidelines, information is developed that is applicable to a particular licensing decision, it may be considered as one factor in the licensing decision. ~
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ASSELSTINE AMENDMENT N0.1 On page 6, at the end of section III, qualitative safety goals, add the following:
Severe core damage accidents can lead to more serious accidents with the potential for life-threatening offsite releases of radiation, for evacua-tion of members of the public, and for contamination of public property.
Apart from their health and safety consequences, such accidents can erode public confidence in the safety of nuclear power and can lead to further '
instability and unpredictability for the industry. In order to avoid these adverse consequences, the Commission intends to pursue a regulatory program that has as its objective assuring with high confidence, giving appropriate consideration to the uncertainties involved, that a severe core damage accident will not occur at a U.S. nuclear power plant over the remaining operating lives of the plants now in operation and under construction.
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ASSELSTINE AMENDMENT NO. 2 On page 10, at the end of section IV, quantitative objectives, add the following:
D. Quantitative Performance Objective Consistent with the traditional defense-in-depth approach and the accident mitigation philosophy requiring reliable performance of containment systems, the overall mean frequency of a large release of radioactive materials to the environment from a reactor accident should be less than 1 in 1,000,000 per year of reactor operation. This frequency should be established with high confidence, giving appropriate consideration to the uncertainties involved. In order to assure a proper balance between accident prevention and accident mitigation, the mean frequency of containment failure in the event of a severe core damage accident should be l less than 1 in 100 severe core damage accidents. For purposes of this performance objective, a large release of radioactive materials is a release that would result in a dose of 5 rem whole body to an individual located at the site boundary.
NOTE: The first sentence of this performance objective is identical to the performance guideline proposed by Chairman Palladino on page 12 of the working draft.
NOTE: The dose level for a large release of radioactive materials is the whole body dose proposed by the NRC staff for defining an Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence.
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