ML17229A852

From kanterella
Revision as of 14:35, 29 June 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Requests Approval,Prior to Implementation of Change to Plant Radiological Emergency Plan.Proposed Change Clarifies Criteria Used in Classification of Radiological Emergency. Attachment 1 Provides Explanation of Changes
ML17229A852
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/31/1998
From: STALL J A
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-98-200, NUDOCS 9809090273
Download: ML17229A852 (66)


Text

CATEGORY1iREGULATYINFORM'ATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9809090273 DOC.DATE:

98/08/31NOTARIZED:

NOSCIL:50-335 St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPowerELightCo.50-3S9St'.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowerELightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION STALL,J.A.

FloridaPowerELightCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RecordsManagement Branch(Document ControlDesk)DOCKET¹0500033505000389

SUBJECT:

Requestsapproval, priortoimplementation ofchangetoplantCradiological emergency plan.Proposedchangeclarifies criteriausedinclassification ofradiological emrgency.

AAttachment 1providesexplanation ofchanges.T.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A045DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

Emergency Preparedness Plans,'Implement'g Proedures,(8NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3PD~INTERNAL:

AEOD/HAGAN,D NRR/DRPM/PERB EXTERNAL:

NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME GLEFILECENTERSTRACTNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111RY0UNOTETOALLnRIDSnRECIPIENTS PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR9ENCL9

'~5 PI@IFloridaPower&LightCompany.6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957August3'1,1998L-98-20010CFR550.54(q)

U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProosedChanetoEmerencPlanTable3-1:Classification ofEmerenciesPursuantto10CFR50.54(q),

FloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)requestsapproval, priortoimplementation, ofachangetotheSt.LuciePlantRadiological Emergency Plan.Theproposedchangeclarifies thecriteriausedintheclassification ofaradiological emergency.

Emergency actionlevelsremainconsistent withtheclassification criteriacurrently approvedbytheNRC.Attachment 1providesanexplanation ofchangestotheemergency classification tablecontained intheSt.LuciePlantRadiological Emergency Plan,Table3-1.Attachment 2providesadraftrevisionofTable3-1asitwouldappearintheRadiological Emergency Plan.Verticallinesareusedtoindicatechangestothetable.TheproposedchangewasreviewedbytheSt.LuciePlantFacilityReviewGrouponJuly14,1998.OnreceiptofapprovalfromtheNRCoftheproposedchange,FPLwillrevisetheSt.LuciePlantEmergency PlanandEmergency PlanImplementing Procedure EPIP-01toimplement therevisedclassification criterion.

Ifyouhaveanyquestions, pleasecontactMr.EdWeinkamat561-467-7162.

Sincerely, J.A.StallVicePresident St.LucieNuclearPlantAttachment QwJ'c:RegionalAdministrator, USNRCRegionII(2copies)SeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant98090'F0278 980831PDRADOCK05000335FPDRanFPLGroupcompany I'l Attachment 1Explanation ofProposedChangestoSt.LucieRadiological Emergency PlanTable3-1;Emergency Classification Table

Background:

Emergency Classification Table3-1(Revision 34oftheEmergency Plan)wasreviewedtoidentifysectionswherethedescriptive instruction tolicensedoperators andPlantmanagement couldbeimproved.

Specifically, thereviewaddressed areaswhereclarification couldbeprovidedtoemergency actionlevelswithoutchangingtheintentoftheclassification criteria.

Regulatory guidanceandindustrystandards havebeenconsulted aspartofthisreview.Thefollowing changesareproposed:

Event/Class EPlanRev.34CurrentEPlanRev.DRAFTProosedReasonforChane1.AAbnormalPrimaiyLeakNoCAUTIONstatement RateCAUTION:THISSECTIONSHOULDNOTBEUSEDFORSTEAMGENERATOR TUBELEAK/RUPTURE.

Clarifydifference betweenclassification criteriaforprimary/secondary leakage.UNUSUALEVENT2.Indication ofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow~1600 sia.UNUSUALEVENT2.Indication ofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:Unit1-1600siaUnit2-1736slaReliefvalvesettingsdifferent forUnits1and2.ALERT1.Charging/letdown mismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicates greaterthan50gpmbutlessthan132gpm.ALERT1.Charging/letdown mismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicates greaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavailable charincagelt.Currentsectiondoesnotrecognize lossofchargingcapacityandconflicts withSiteAreaEmergency section.

Event/Class 1.AAbnormalPrimaryLeakRate(continued) 1.BAbnormalPrimarytoSecondary LeakRateEPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.RCSleakagegreaterthan132gpmoccurring withRCSpressureaboveHPSIshutoffhead.

OR2.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailable makeupoccurring withRCSpressurebelowHPSIshutoffhead.OR3.LossofRCSsubcooled marginduetoRCSleakage(saturated conditions).

OR4.Containment HighRangeRadiation Monitorsindicate7.3x10'/hr(ifCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsindicatebetween100and1000mR/hr).SITEAREAEMERGENCY RaidfailureofsteameneratortubesGREATERTHANcharinumcaaciwithsteamrelease inroressEPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.RCSleakagegreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthanavailable chargingcapacity.

OR2.LossofRCSsubcooled marginduetoRCSleakage(saturated conditions).

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Raidfailureofsteam eneratortube sGREATERTHANcharinumcaacitwithsteamreleasein roressReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotrecognize lossofchargingcapability insomecaseswhereleakageislessthan132gpm.Currentrevisiondoesnotclarifycreditfornormalmakeup(charging) onlyoranymakeup.~Proposedrevisionprovidesforclearclassification criteriaforLOCAgreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthan(normal)chargingcapacity, whichisconsistent withNUREGguidanceandindustryexamples.

Criteriaforradiation monitorreadingsareidentified inEvent/Class 2.A(Uncontrolled EffluentRelease).

Currentrevisioncausedconfusion tousers,specifically concerning "unisolable statusofslightreleasepotential fromequipment (suchassteamdrivenAFW).3.Secondary steamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator (i.e.,ADVs,SteamSafety(s),

orUnisolable.)

3.Secondary steamreleaseinprogressfromaffecled generatorieeAADDVVas stucksteamsafesunisolable

~leakProposedrevisionprovidesadditional clarification touserontypesofsecondary steamreleasestobeconsidered whenclassifying event.

Event/Class 2.AUncontrolled EffluentRelease3.FireExplosion EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation (EPIP-09) worksheet valuesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldoseTEDE)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)for~/ihour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldoseTEDE)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)fortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolled firewithintheplantlastingmorethan10minutes.NoNOTEinsection.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation (EPIP-09) worksheet valuesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor250mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefor/ghour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor2500mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolled firewithinthegowerblocklastingmorethan10minutes.NOTE:EXPLOSION ISDEFINEDASARAPIDCHEMICALREACTIONRESULTING INNOISEHEATANDTHERAPIDEXPANSION OFGAS.ReasonforChaneConfusion byusersondoseratesversustotaldose.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriabasedondoserate.Useof"powerblockprovidescleardescription ofstructures ofequipment thatshouldbeconsidered inthisclassification.

"Powerblock"isspecifically definedinEPIP-01.NOTEprovidescleardefinition ofexplosion event.

Event/Class EPlanRev.34Current3.Explosion (continued)

ALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY Severedamagetosafeshutdownequipment fromexplosion.

Damagetofacilitybyexplosion whichaffectsplantoperation.

EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedALERTDamagetostructures/com onentswithintheProtected Areabyexplosion whichaffectsplantoperation.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Severedamagetosafeshutdownequipment fromexplosion Ji.e.bothtrainsrenderedinoerable.ReasonforChaneProposedrevisionprovidesclearidentification ofthelocation(Protected Area)whereconsideration forciassiTieation ofexplosions occur.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriaforthemeaningofseveredamagetosafeshutdownequipment, whichappliesregulatory guidancedefinition forlossofequipment functions.

4.BFuelHandlingAccidentSITEAREAEMERGENCY Majordamagetoirradiated fuelinContainment orFuelHandlingBuilding1.Stepincreaseinthereadingofradiation monitorsintheplantventand/orintheFuelHandlingBuildingAND2.Damagetomorethanoneirradiated fuelassembly.

OR3.Uncovering ofoneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies intheSpentFuelPool.SITEAREAEMERGENCY Majordamagetoirradiated fuelinContainment orFuelHandlingBuilding1.Affectedarearadiation monitorlevelsreaterthan1000mr/hr.AND~2.MaorDamagetooneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies OR3.Maordamaeresultinfromuncovering ofoneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies intheSpentFuelPoolCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidespecificradiation doseratethreshold.

Currentrevisioncriteriarequiresknowledge ofextentofdamage("morethanoneirradiated fuelassembly"

)whichwilllikelynotbeknown.Proposedrevisionprovidesspecificradiation doseratethreshold (consistent withotherclassification criteria) anddoesnotlimitclassification basedonunknownextentofdamage.

Event/Class 5.AEarthquake EPlanRev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT2.Anearthquake isdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments.

ALERTAconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.05g.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedUNUSUALEVENT2.Anearthquake isdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments orothermeans.ALERTAconfirmed earthuakehasoccurred1.Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlled Area.OR2.Aconfirmed earthuakehasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedatrioftheturbineeneratororreactor.ReasonforChaneCurrentclassification doesnotprovideforclassification basedoninformation receivedbyother(non-plant) seismicmonitors, suchasfromothernuclearsites,colleges, orscientific monitoring equipment.

Thecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistently identifythelocationoftheincreased seismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlled Area,asinUNUSUALEVENT).Theproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurement ofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlled Areaandprovidesfordirectindications foreffectsoftheearthquake onplantconditions (turbineorreactortrip).

Class/Event 5.AEarthquake (continued)

EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.1g.withplantnotincoldshutdown.

EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY Aconfirmed earthuakehasoccurred1.Aconfirmed earthuakeoccurswhichreistersGREATERTHAM0.1.withintheOwnerControlled Areaandthelantisnotincoldshutdown.

ORReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistently identifythelocationoftheincreased seismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlled Area,asinUNUSUALEVENT).Theproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurement ofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlled Areaandprovidesfordirectindications foreffectsoftheearthquake onplantconditions (lossofsafetyrelatedfunctions).

2.Aconfirmed earthuakehasoccurredthathascausedlossofansafetrelatedsstemfunctioni.e.both5.CTornadoALERTAnytornadostrikingfacility.

ALERTAnytomariostriking~theowerblock.Thecurrentrevisiondidnotidentifyspecificaffectedareasoftheplanttobeconsidered foratornadostrike.Useof"powerblock"providescleardescription ofstructures ofequipment thatshouldbeconsidered inthisclassification.

'Powerblock"isspecifically definedinEPIP-01.

Event/Class 6.AIncreased Awareness orPotential CoreMeltEPlanRev.34CurrentALERTEmergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions existwhichwarrant:1.Increased awareness andactivation ofEmergency Responsepersonnel.

EPlanRev.DRAFTCurrentALERTEmergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions existwhichhaveaotentialtoderadethelevelofsafetattheplant.ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusion towhetheruseofemergency responsefacilities oractivation ofanyemergency responsepersonnel initsselfjustifies ALERTclassification.

Proposedrevisionmakesjudgement criteriaclearthatdegradation ofplantconditions justifyclassification ofanALERT.1.Emergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions existwhicharesinificantl uncontrollable manner.1.Activation ofemergency responsefacilities andmonitoring teamsoraprecautionary notification ofthepublicnearthesite.SITEAREAEMERGENCY SITEAREAEMERGENCY Emergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions existwhichwarrant:Thecurrentrevisioncausesconfusion towhetheruseofemergency responsefacilities in~ifsselfustifiesSITEAREAEMERGENCY classification.

(Classification ofSITEAREAEMERGENCY alwaysresultsinnotification ofthepublic.)Proposedrevisionmakesjudgement criteriaclearthatdegradation ofplantconditions justifyclassification ofaSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

GENERALEMERGENCY 2.LOCAwithinitially successful ECCSandsubsequent failureofcontainment hearremovalsystemsforseveralhours.GENERALEMERGENCY 2.LOCAwithinitially successful ECCSandsubsequent failureofcontainment heatremovalhours.Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassification considerations.

Proposedrevisionprovidesspecifictimespan,afterwhichaGENERALEMERGENCY classification iswarranted.

Event/Class 6.AIncreased Awareness orPotential CoreMelt(continued)

EPlan,Rev.34CurrentGENERALEMERGENCY 4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofemergency feedwater makeupcapability forseveralhours.EPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosedGENERALEMERGENCY 4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofave:gemyfeedwater makeupcapability forP-"ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusion withuserinregardtowhatis"emergency feedwater".

Theplantdoesnotdesignate anyequipment as'emergency feedwater.

Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassification considerations.

Theproposedrevisionprovidesclearindication thatifthereisnofeedwater for'greater than2hours,thenaGENERALEMERGENCY classification iswarranted.

7.ALossofPowerALERT2.Failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorsynchronize.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.Sustained failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorsynchronize.

ALERT2.Failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.SITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.Sustained failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.Currentrevisiondoesnotaddressabilityofdieselgenerator toperformitsintendedfunction(loadtontoemergency buses)Proposedrevisionprovidesclearindication thatifthedieselisnotloaded,thenclassification iswarranted.

Event/Class 8.8LossofAlarms/Communication/

Monitoring 9.AAircraft/Missile EPlan,Rev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT3.Unplanned lossofmostorallSafetySystemannunciators forgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.Inability tomonitorasignificant transient inprogress.

ALERT1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlle'd Areadamagingplantstructures.

EPlan,Rev.DRAFTCurrentUNUSUALEVENT1.Unplanned lossofmostigrester~than75%oraltSafetySystemannunciators forgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.Inability to~effecttvet monitorasignificant transient inprogress.

NOTE:Sinificanttransient examlesinclude:reactortriturbinerunbackreaterthan25%andthermaloscillations reaterthan10%.ALERT1.Aircraftcrashintheowerblock.ReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovideforaquantitative valueforlossof"most'nnunciators.

Proposedrevisionindicates aspecificpercentage ofannunciators lostneededtoclassifyanUNUSUAL~EVENT.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovideguidanceondegreeofabilityinwhichatransient canbemonitored inclassifying theevent.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidedefinition ofsignificant transient.

Proposedrevisionprovidesadditional guidancefortheusertodetermine that,ifatransient cannotbeeffectively monitored, thenaSITEAREAEMERGENCY iswarranted.

Additionally, examplesofsignificant transients areprovided.

Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidereference tocrashormissileimpacttospecificplantstructures.

OR2.Visualoraudibleindication ofmissileimpactonplantstructures.

OR2.Visualoraudibleindication ofProposedrevisionprovidesclearindication (i.e.,thepowerblock)whereacrashormissileimpactwouldwarrantclassification ofALERT.

Event/Class 9.AAircraft/Missile (continued)

EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlled Areadamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damagetosafeshutdownequipment fromanymissile.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.Aircrahcrash~intheowerblockdamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damageresultininlossofsafeshutdownequipment fromanymissile.ReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidereference tocrashormissileimpactonspecificplantstructures.

Proposedrevisiondefinesspecificareaoftheplantwheredamageisconsidered classifiable.

Proposedrevisionidentifies effectonsafeshutdownequipment ascriteriafordetermining classification ofSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

Useof"powerblock"providescleardescription ofstructures ofequipment thatshouldbeconsidered inthisclassification.

"Powerblock"isspecifically definedinprocedure.

9.CToxicorFlammable GasSITEAREAEMERGENCY Toxicorflammable gashasdiffusedintovitalareasaffecting accesstoortheoperation ofsafeshutdownequipment.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Toxicorflammable gashasdiffusedintovitalareascompromising thefunctionofsafetyrelatedequipment (i.e.,bothtrainsrenderedinoperable)

Currentrevisioncausedconfusion withuserdifferentiating betweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

Currentrevisiondoesnotconsistently relatelossofsafetysystemfunctionwithotherclassification criteria.

Proposedrevisionprovidescleardifference betweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

10 ATTACHMENT 2DRAFTREVISIONOFST.LUCIERADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANTABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS t.A.ABNIBRMA, QRIMA~Y~IQUNUSUALEVENTrlnALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY TTHAN-LRATRTHAN<~in~~m~GENERALEMERGENCY rrrIlninCAUTtONThissectionshouldNOTbeusedforasteamgenerator tubeleak/rupture.

1.RCSleakageGREATERTHAN10gpmasindicated by:A.ControlRoomobservation QBB.Inventory balancecalculation QBC.Fieldobservation QBD.Emergency Coordinator judgement QB2.Indication ofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:-Unit1-1600PSIA-Unit2-1736PSIA1.Charging/letdown mismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicates greaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavaihblechargingcapacity.

1.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailable than50gpmandgreaterthanavailable chargingcapacity.

QB2.LossofRCSsubcooled marginduetoRCSleakage(saturated conditions).

1.Containment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan146X10sR/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.Performance ofEPIP-09(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesun/eysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,B,C,orDbelow:

A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)Lhhif(anytwoofthefolloviing

~xiandthethirdisimminent).

1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmed DEQl-131activitygreaterthan275IiCI/mL).

~N2.LOCAorTuberuptureon unlsolable steamgenerator.

~N3.Containment Integrity Breached.

~NTAlsoreferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A./RNRCEP3:43-5St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSlFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS 1.B.~BN~RMA~PRiMARYT

~EQNDAfIY

~LEAKRATUNUSUALEVENTRPRI/ELk1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakageexceedsTech.Spec.limits.AND2.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

ALERTRirfilrftnrtrtITHINcharinmiwithle~iff.site wr1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakagegreaterthanTech.Spec.Umitsandwithinchargingpumpcapacity.

AND2.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

~ND3.LossofbothNon-Vital 4.16KVbuses.RifilrftmnrtrtubeREATERTHAN hrin~um>~caacittf}1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakagegreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.

~ND2.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY irfailureofsteanrtrtRATTHANrinmwithlofff-itwr1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakageisgreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.

~ND2.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

AND3.LossofbothNon-Vital 4.16KVbuses.RifiirftmnrtrtREATERTHANrinmiwithtmrI~inrerr,~1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakagegreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.

AND2.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

AND3.Secondary steamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator.

(e.g.,ADVs,StuckSteamSafety(s),

orUnisolable Leak.)GENERALEMERGENCY Lossof2ofthe3fissionroductarriwithimmin ntIfth~thir(anytwoofthefollowing existandthethirdisimminent).

1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmed DEQl-131activitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~ND2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisolable steamgenerator.

AND3.Containment integrity breached.

NOTEAlsoreferto'Potential CoreMe!t'vent/Class 6.A./RNRCEP3I43-6St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS 1.C.LOSSOFSECONDARY COOLANTUNUSUALEVENTRaidereurizationof

~ondan~lant 1.Rapiddropineithersteamgenerator pressuretolessthan600psia.ALERTMrtmlkwithREATRTHAN1mrimnIk1.Rapiddropineithersteamgenerator pressuretolessthan600psia.AND2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan10gpm.~ND3.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

Totallossoffeedwater 1.Nomainorauxiliary feedwater flowavailable forgreaterthan15minuteswhenrequiredforheatremovaLAND2.SteamGenerator levelsarelessthan40%widerange.SITEAREAEMERGENCY Maorstamleakwith RETRHANrnrinIkandfuelinitd1.Rapiddropineithersteamgenerator pressuretolessthan600psia.~ND2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan50gpm.~ND3.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

AND4.Fuelelementdamageis indicated (Referto'FuelElementFailure'vent/Class 4.A).TLFwith-thrhlin~inititd1.Nomainorauxiliary feedwater flowavailable.

AND2.PORV(s)havebeenopenedtofacilitate coreheatremoval.GENERALEMERGENCY releashasrrriirressrultinin1.Containment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan-1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QR2.Performance ofEPIP%9(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,B,C,orDbelow:A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)Lossof2ofthefissionroductbarrierswithimminentlossofththird(anytwoofthefollowing

~xiandthethirdisimminent).

1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmed DEQI-131actiVitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~ND2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisolable steamgenerator.

AND3.Containment InteriBreached.

NOTEAlsoreferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.EP3:43-7St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS UNUSUALEVENTiIiIALERTArleahrrriiSITEAREAEMERGENCY riinGENERALEMERGENCY rrrliQFFQQNT~EE~AI=,1.Planteffluentmonitor(s) exceedalarmsetpoint(s).

~N2.Confirmed analysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichexceedsODCMlimits.~OIfanalysisisnotavailable withinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseisgreaterthanODCMlimit,dassifyas+~~I.gVVN:'rhis10timesthe~ffli~nflr+I1.Planteffluentmonitor(s) significantly exceedalarmsetpoints.

AND2.Confirmed analysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichNOTEIfanalysisisnotavailable viithinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseisequaltoorgreaterthan10timesODCMlimit,dassifyas~T'.rrrIinin1.Containment HighRangeRadiation Monitorgreaterthan7.3X10'/hr(Post-LOCA monitorsindicatebetween100and1000mR/hr,ifCHRRMinoperable).

QQ2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOff-siteDoseCalculation (EPIP-09) worksheet valuesatonemilelnexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)for1/2hour.QBB.500mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)fortwominutesatonemile.rrrIinin1.Containment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QQ2.Performance ofEPIP-09(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,B,C,orDbelovr.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDODCM-ReferstoChemistry Procedure C-200,'Off-site DoseCalculation Manual(ODCM)./RNRCEP3I43-8St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS

~VII~PNTUNUSUALEVENTALERTiiiIvlrimnmiinwhiIvrIninhrfiivriISITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY 1.Anyvalidareamonitoralarmfromindeterminable sourcewithmeternearorgreaterthanfullscaledeflection (10'R/hr).

QQ2.Unexpected plantiodineorparticulate airborneconcentration of1000DACasseeninroutinesurveying orsampling.

QB3.Unexpected directradiation doseratereadingorunexpected airborneradioactivity concentration fromanundeterminable sourceinexcessof1000timesnormallevels.3.PIIIEXPLOIONriii'hihwrIirrnfnxIInwihlnhwnrnrllAr!~nfLnnrll,~flr 1.Potentially affecting safetysystems.~N2.Requiring off-sitesupportintheopinionoftheNPS/EC.r/mnnwihinhPrArxIInwhihffIngfKEQiinirmrmiinhniImirnrinrIvrmfimnfrmI'nhinrnrinIReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.~NTExplosion isdefinedasarapidchemicalreactionresulting innoise,heat,andtherapidexpansion ofgas./RNRCEP3:43-9St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS 4A.jgg~~E~IQQgUNUSUALEVENTulIn1.Processmonitorsorarea radiation surveysindicateincreased letdownactivity~N2.Confirmed RCSsampleindicating:

A.CoolantactivitygreaterthantheTechSpeclimitforiodinespike(TechSpecFigure3.4-1.).~OB.Coolantactivitygreaterthan100/EpCi/gramspecificactivity.

~TIfanalysisisnotavailable within1hour,anditisexpectedthatactivityisgreaterthanTechSpeclimit,dassifyas~~NT'.ALERTFIlmnfilr1.Processmonitorsorarearadiation surveysindicateincreased letdownactivityandconfirmed RCSSamplesindicating DEQI-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275pCI/mL~NOIfanalysisisnotavailable within1hour,anditisexpectedthatRCSactivityforDEQ1-131isgreaterthan275pCi/mL,dassifyasanSITEAREAEMERGENCY ImnfilrwitntrIin1.RCSDEQI-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275pCi/mL.~ND2.HighestCETpercorequadrantindicates greaterthan10'Fsuperheat or700'F.GENERALEMERGENCY IriIIrItininContainment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QR2.Performance ofEPIP%9(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,B,C,orDbelow:A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)FIhnIiniesultinthrIfdiiviIntinmnrFIHandlin8ilin1.NPS/ECdetermines thatanirradiated fuelassemblymayhavebeendamaged.~ND2.Associated areaorprocessradiation monitorsareinalarm.rmtirriliContainmentorF elHnIin1.Affectedarearadiation monitorlevelsgreaterthan1000mR/hr.AND2.Majordamagetomorethanoneirradiated fuelassembly.

QQ3.Majordamageresulting fromuncovering ofoneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies intheSpentFuelPool./RNRCEP3:43-10SLLucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS 5.A.QAA'~QAl<g UNUSUALEVENTnfirmedrthuakeha1.Aconfirmed earthquake hasbeenexperienced withintheOwnerControlled Area.QQ2.Anearthquake isdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments orothermeans.ALERTAnfirmrthkhoccurred1.Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlled AreaQR2.Aconfirmed earthquake hasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedtripoftheturbinegenerator orreactor.SITEAREAEMERGENCY nfirmrthkhgcg~rrII1.Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.1gwithintheOwnerControlled Areaandtheplantnotincoldshutdown.

QR2.Aconfirmed earthquake hasoccurredthathascausedlossofanysafetysystemfunction(Le.,bothtrainsinoperable).

GENERALEMERGENCY NOTEReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.5.B.HIIRRI~AN nWmin1.Confirmed humcanewarningisineffect.Hurricanew minwithwindnr~dedsbess1.Confirmed humcanewarningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed175mphwithintheOwnerControlled Area.NOTEAtFPL'srequest,NOAAwillprovideanaccurateprojection ofwindspeedson-site24hourspriortotheonsetothurricane forcewinds.Ifthatprojection isnotavailable within12hoursotenteringintothewarning,classifytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.

Forexample,projected on-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhurricane windspeedifthetrackisawayfromPSLHrrinwminwithviinRATRTHANini1.Plantnotatcoldshutdown.

AND2.Confirmed hurricane warningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed194mphwithintheOvmerControlled Area.NOTEAtFPL'srequest,NOAAwillprovideanaccurateprojection ofviindspeedson-site24hourspriortotheonsetofhurricane torcewinds.Ifthatprojection isnotavailable within12hoursofenteringintothewarning,dassifytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.

Forexample,projected on-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhurricane viindspeedifthetrackisawaytromPSL.NOTEReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A./RNRCEP3:43-11St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT

~~!'VENT/CLASS 5.C.~TNA~5.0.~N(~RMAW~AT~VFQEP3I4UNUSUALEVENTrilrnIvliirffin1.Lowintakecanallevelof-10.5ft.MLWfor1hourormore.QQ2.Visualsightings bystationpersonnel thatwaterlevelsareapproaching stormdrainsystemcapacity.

TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLESITEAREAEMERGENCY ALERTrikinhPwrIwrhnIvniininilrfhniwgranii~n1.Thestormdrain'scapacityisexceededduringhurricane surgeorknownfloodconditions.

QQ2.LowIntakecanallevelof-10.5ft.MLWfor1hourormoreviithemergency barriervalvesopen.1.Flood/surge watertevelreachingelevation+19.5 ft.(turbinebuilding/RAB groundfloor).QQ2.LowintakecanallevelhascausedthelossofallICWflow.3-12GENERALEMERGENCY EQIKReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT/RNRC

~~'fIIItgq1 TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLENOTEActivation oftheEmergency ResponseFacilities doesnotrequiredeclaration ofanemergency orentryintoaspecificemergency classification.

EVENT/CLASS 6.A.LNNI~AcjgQ

~PTF~NTIA QQ~MIT(Page1of2)UNUSUALEVENTmnhIInninwhiwnlnWiffnIIgLi~hriii~ALERTEmerendmnthnniinniIxiwhivthlevlffhSITEAREAEMERGENCY mrnmnhir'ni'nxiwhirnifinrinlnnnnrImnnrGENERALEMERGENCY rnir'nhnniinxihmkIfirrnunii'hri~~l~lily(Anycoremeltsituation.)

1.Theplantisshutdownunderabnormalconditions (e.g.,exceeding cooldownratesorprimarysystempipecracksarefoundduringoperation).

QQ2.AnyplantshutdovmrequiredbyTechnical Specifications inwhichtherequiredshutdownIsnotreachedwithinactionlimits.1.LOCAwithfailureofECCSleadingtoseverecoredegradation ormelt.QQ2.LOCAwithinitially successful ECCSandsubsequent failureofcontainment heatremovalsystemsforgreaterthan2hours.QQ3.Totallossoffeedwater followedbyfailureofonce-through-cooling(ECCS)toadequately coolthecore.QQ4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithtotallossofemergency feedwater makeupcapability forgreaterthan2hours.QQ5.ATWSoccurswhichresultsincoredamageorcausesfailureofcorecoolingandmake-upsystems.QQ6.AnymajorInternalorexternalevent(e.g.,fire,earthquake ortornadosubstantially beyonddesignbasis)whichintheEC'sopinionhasorcouldcausemassivedamagetoplantsystemsresulting inanyoftheabove.(continued onnextpage)/RNRCEP3:43-13St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEA~EVENT/CLASS 6.A~INR~AEIED~PTENTtAL QQREMELT(Page2of2)UNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY

~NOTE1.Mostlikelycontainment failuremodeismelt-throughwithreleaseofgasesonly.Quickerreleasesareexpectedforfailureofcontainment isolation system.2.GeneralEmergency mustbedeclaredfortheabovelistedevents.Thelikelihood ofcorrective action(repairofAFWpump,etc.)shouldnotbeconsidered.

on-siteAwercabili1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.QR2.Lossofcapability topoweratleastonevital4.16kvbusfroma~navailable emergency dieselgenerator.

ttinBIkttIsofA1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.AND2.Failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.Lflion-siteD wr1.DropinAandBDCbus voltagestolessthan70VDC.tationBlkuotalLofAfrREATRTHAN1minut1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.AND!2.Sustained failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.AND3.FailuretorestoreACpowertoatleastonevital4.16kvbuswithin15minutes.NOTEReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.Lossofailvitalon-siteDforreaterthan1minutes1.SustaineddropinAandBDC busvoltagesto70VDCforgreaterthan15minutes./RNRCEP3:43-14St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE'EVENT/CLASS

~ONTRO~FN~TII~N UNUSUALEVENTALERTfInntrlFnin1.Completelossofanyfunctionneededforplantcoldshutdown.

QQ2.FailureoftheReactorProtection Systemtobringthereactorsubcritical whenneeded.QQ3.ControlRoomisevacuated (forotherthandrillpurposes) viithcontrolestablished locallyattheHotShutdownControlPanel.fhtwnIin1.Completelossoffunctions neededtomaintaincoldshutdown.

A.Failureofshutdowncoolingsystems,resulting inlossofcoldshutdownconditions.

~NB.RCSsubcooiing cannotbemaintained greaterthanO'.SITEAREAEMERGENCY CritiIfPlnntr~n~tin1.Lossofanyfunctionorsystemwhich,intheopinionoftheEmergency Coordinator, predudesplacingtheplantinHotShutdown.

QQ2.FailureoftheRPStotiipthe reactorwhenneeded,andoperatoractionsfailtobringthereactorsubcritical.

QB3.ControlRoomisevacuated (forotherthandrillpurposes) andcontrolcannotbeestablished locallyattheHotShutdownControlPanelwithin15minutes.GENERALEMERGENCY Referto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.S.B.LOSSOFALARMS/~MONITRINinifinIffflnmmnitiniiinIItwhiimirrnmn1.Lossofeffluentorradiological monitoring capability requiring plantshutdown.

QB2.Lossofallpnmary~nbackup communication capability withoff-sitelocations.

QQ3.Unplannedlossofmost (greaterthan75%)orallsafetysystemannunciators forgreaterthan15minutes.1.Unplanned lossofglIsafetysystemannunciators.

~N2.Planttransient inprogress.

~L~fl~rm1.Inability toemergency monitorasignificant transient inprogress.

Significant transient examplesinclude:Reactortrip,turbinerunbackgreaterthan25%andthermaloscillations greaterthan10%./RNRCEP3:43-15SLLucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT A

TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS OA~ICRAFT~~ILUNUSUALEVENTnIlrr'i1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlled AreaorunusualaircraftactivityoverfacilitythatintheopinionoftheNPS/EC,couldthreatenthesafetyoftheplantorpersonnel.

TininnnfilrALERTiriili1.AircraftcrashinthePowerBlock.QQ2.VisualoraudibleIndication ofmissileimpactonthePowerBlock.VIII<ih'nnnrSITEAREAEMERGENCY DmviImfrgllr;ryt~mI i~i1.AircraftcrashinthePowerBlockdamagingvitalplantsystems.QQ2.Damageresulting inlossofsafeshutdownequipment fromanymissile.GENERALEMERGENCY 9.C.~TXI~nirIiwnrIhIffInnffxirflmmIinniIIffinInTxirmmIiinviIrmrmiinhninfIIimnnrdinrIKGllEXXT~HgfQ'TY ThIIhriFrinnrfhiI1.Bombthreat2.AttackthreatS.Civildisturbance 4.Protected Areaintrusion 5.Sabotageattempt6.Internaldisturbance 7.Vitalareaintrushn8.SecurityforcestrikeIMYhnIIhriFfinInhfRITYEMERENYnvIvinimminnnhnrlrrrrviIhrifhfininhfrflkvrfhlnIIihrrnIIEP3I43-16St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT CATEGORY1REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9809090273 DOC.DATE:

98/08/31NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-335 St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower6LightCo.50-389St.'uciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowerSLightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION STALL,J.A.

FloridaPowerSLightCo.RECIP.NAME RECXPIENT AFFILIATION RecordsManagement Branch(Document ControlDesk)DOCKET0500033505000389

SUBJECT:

Requestsapproval, priortoimplementation ofchangetoplantCradiological emergency plan.Proposedchangeclarifies criteriausedinclassification ofradiological emrgency.

AAttachment 1providesexplanation ofchanges.TDISTRIBUTION CODE:A045DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:ORSubmittal:

Emergency Preparedness Plans,'Implement'g Proedures,CENOTES:GRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3PDINTERNAL:

AEOD/HAGAN,D NRR/DRPM/PERB EXTERNAL:

NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111RECXPIENT XDCODE/NAME GLEAVES,W CENTER01NUDOCS-ABNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111NOTETOALL"RIDSnRECIPIENTS PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOP'IESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR9ENCL9

FloridaPower&LightCompany,6351 S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957August31,1998L-98-20010CFR550.54(q)

U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDesk*Washington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ProosedChanetoEmerencPlanTable3-1:Classification ofEmerenciesPursuantto10CFR50.54(q),

FloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)requestsapproval, priortoimplementation, ofachangetotheSt.LuciePlantRadiological Emergency Plan.Theproposedchangeclarifies thecriteriausedintheclassification ofaradiological emergency.

Emergency actionlevelsremainconsistent withtheclassification criteriacurrently approvedbytheNRC.Attachment 1providesanexplanation ofchangestotheemergency classification tablecontained intheSt.LuciePlantRadiological Emergency Plan,Table3-1.Attachment 2providesadraftrevisionofTable3-1asitwouldappearintheRadiological Emergency Plan.Verticallinesareusedtoindicatechangestothetable.TheproposedchangewasreviewedbytheSt.LuciePlantFacilityReviewGrouponJuly14,1998.OnreceiptofapprovalfromtheNRCoftheproposedchange,FPLwillrevisetheSt:LuciePlantEmergency PlanandEmergency PlanImplementing Procedure EPIP-01toimplement therevisedclassification criterion.

Ifyouhaveanyquestions, pleasecontactMr.EdWeinkamat561-467-7162.

/j'Sincerely, J.A.StallVicePresident St.LucieNuclearPlant.Attachment cc:RegionalAdministrator, USNRCRegionII(2copies)SeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant9809090273 98083iPDRADQCK05000335FPDRanFPLGroupcompany

Attachment 1Explanation ofProposedChangestoSt.LucieRadiological Emergency PlanTable3-1;Emergency Classification Table

Background:

Emergency Classification Table3-1(Revision 34oftheEmergency Plan)wasreviewedtoidentifysectionswherethedescriptive

,instruction tolicensedoperators andPlantmanagement couldbeimproved.

SpeciTically, thereviewaddressed areaswhereclarification couldbeprovidedtoemergency actionlevelswithoutchangingtheintentoftheclassiTication criteria.

Regulatory guidanceandindustrystandards havebeenconsulted aspartofthisreview.Thefollowing changesareproposed:

Event/Class EPlanRev.34CurrentEPlanRev.DRAFT ProosedReasonforChan e1.AAbnormalPrimaryLeakRateNoCAUTIONstatement UNUSUALEVENT2.Indication ofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow~1600ele.CAUTION:THISSECTIONSHOULDNOTBEUSEDFORSTEAMGENERATOR TUBELEAK/RUPTURE.

UNUSUALEVENT2.Indication ofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:Unit1-1600siaUnit2-1736siaClarifydifference betweenclassification criteriaforprimary/secondary leakage.Reliefvalvesettingsdifferent forUnits1and2.ALERT.1.Charging/letdown mismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicates greaterthan50gpmbutlessthan132gpm.ALERT1.Charging/letdown mismatchormeasuredRCSleakageindicates greaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavailable charincaaciCurrentsectiondoesnotrecognize lossofchargingcapacityandconflicts withSiteAreaEmergency section.

Event/Class EPlan,Rev.34CurrentEPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosed1.AAbnormalPrimaryLeakRate(continued) 1.8AbnormalPrimarytoSecondary LeakRateSITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.RCSleakagegreaterthan132gpmoccurring withRCSpressureaboveHPSIshutoffhead.OR2.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailable makeupoccurring withRCSpressurebelowHPSIshutoffhead.OR3.LossofRCSsubcooled marginduetoRCSleakage(saturated conditions).

OR4.Containment HighRangeRadiation Monitorsindicate7.3x10'/hr(ifCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsindicate.

between100and1000mR/hr).SITEAREAEMERGENCY RaidfailureofsteameneratortubesGREATERTHAN charinumcaaciwithsteamreleaseinroress3.Secondary steamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator (i.e.,ADVs,SteamSafety(s),

orUnisoiable.)

SITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.RCSleakagegreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthanavailable chargingcapacity.

OR2.LossofRCSsubcooled marginduetoRCSleakage(saturated conditions).

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Raldfailureofsteam eneratortube sGREATERTHANcharinumcaaciwithsteamreleaseinroress3.Secondary steamreleaseinprogressfromaffededgenerator

~e..ADVsstucksteamsafesunlsolable

~leakCurrentrevisiondoesnotrecognize lossofchargingcapability insomecaseswhereleakageislessthan132gpm.Currentrevisiondoesnotctadfycreditfornormalmakeup(charging) onlyoranymakeup.Proposedrevisionprovidesforclearclassification criteriaforLOCAgreaterthan50gpmandgreaterthan(normal)chargingcapacity, whichisconsistent withNUREGguidanceandindustryexamples.

Criteriaforradiation monitorreadingsareidentified in-Event/Class 2.A(Uncontrolled EffluentRelease).

Currentrevisioncausedconfusion tousers,specifically concerning "unisolable statusofslight-releasepotential fromequipment (suchassteamdrivenAFW).Proposedrevisionprovidesadditional clarification touserontypesofsecondary steamreleasestobeconsidered whenclassifying event.

Event/Class 2.AUncontrolled EffluentRelease.3.FireEPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation (EPIP-09) worksheet valuesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldose TEDE)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)forI*hour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldoseTEDE)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoseCDE)fortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolled firewithintheplantlastingmorethan10minutes.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOffsiteDoseCalculation (EPIP-09) worksheet valuesatonemileinexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor250mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefor/~hour.ORB.500mrem/hr(totaldose~rateor2500mrem/hr(thyroiddose~ratefortwominutesatonemile.UNUSUALEVENTUncontrolled firewithinthepowerblocklastingmorethan10minutes.ReasonforChaneConfusion byusersondoseratesversustotaldose.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriabasedondoserate.Useof"powerblockprovidescleardescription ofstructures ofequipment thatshouldbeconsidered inthisclassification.

Powerblock"isspecifically definedinEPIP-01.Explosion NoNOTEinsection.NOTE'XPLOSION ISDEFINEDASARAPIDCHEMICALREACTIONRESULTING INNOISEHEATANDTHERAPIDEXPANSION OFGAS.NOTEprovidescleardefinition ofexplosion event.

Event/Class EPlanRev.34CurrentEPlanRev.DRAFTProosedReasonforChane3.Explosion (continued)

ALERTDamagetofacilitybyexplosion whichaffectsplantoperation.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Severedamagetosafeshutdownequipment fromexplosion.

ALERTDamagetostructures/com onentswithintheProtected Areabyexplosion whichaffectsplantoperation.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Severedamagetosafeshutdownequipment fromexplosion

~i.e.bothtrainsrenderedinoerable.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearidentification ofthelocation(Protected Area)whereconsideration forclassification ofexplosions occur.Proposedrevisionprovidesclearcriteriaforthemeaningofseveredamagetosafeshutdownequipment, whichappliesregulatory guidancedefinition forlossofequipment functions.

4.BFuelHandlingAccidentSITEAREAEMERGENCY Majordamagetoirradiated fuelinContainment orFuelHandlingBuilding1.Stepincreaseinthereadingofradiation monitorsintheplantventand/orintheFuelHandlingBuildingAND2.Damagetomorethanoneirradiated fuelassembly.

OR3.Uncovering ofoneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies intheSpentFuelPool.SITEAREAEMERGENCY Majordamagetoirradiated fuelinContainment orFuelHandlingBuildingAffectedarearadiation monitorlevelsreaterthan1000mr/hr.AND~2.MaorDamagetooneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies OR3.Maordamaeresultinfromuncovering ofoneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies intheSpentFuelPoolCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidespecificradiation doseratethreshold.

Currentrevisiori criteriarequiresknowledge ofextentofdamage("morethanoneirradiated fuelassembly"

)whichwilllikelynotbeknown.Proposedrevisionprovidesspecificradiation doseratethreshold (consistent withotherclassification criteria) anddoesnotlimitclassification basedonunknownextentofdamage.

Event/Class 5.AEarthquake EPlanRev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT2.Anearthquake isdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments.

ALERTAconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.05g.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedUNUSUALEVENT2Anearthquake isdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments orothermeans.ALERTAconfirmed earthuakehasoccurred1.Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlled Area.OR2.Aconfirmed earthuakehasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedatrioftheturbineeneratororreactor.ReasonforChaneCurrentclassification doesnotprovideforclassification basedoninformation receivedbyother(non-plant) seismicmonitors, suchasfromothernuclearsites,colleges, orscientiTic monitoring equipment.

Thecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistently identifythelocationoftheincreased seismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlled Area,asinUNUSUALEVENT).Theproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurement ofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlled Areaandprovidesfordirectindications foreffectsoftheearthquake onplantconditions (turbineorreactortrip).

Class/Event 5.AEarthquake (continued)

EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.1g.withplantnotincoldshutdown.

EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY Aconfirmed earthuakehasoccurred1.Aconfirmed earthuakeoccurswhichreistersGREATERTHAN0.1.withintheOwnerControlled Areaandthelantisnotincoldshutdown.

ORReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisiondoesnotconsistently identifythelocationoftheincreased seismicactivity(withintheOwnerControlled Area,asinUNUSUALEVENT).Theproposedrevisionrelatesthemeasurement ofseismicactivitytotheOwnerControlled Areaandprovidesfordirectindications foreffectsoftheearthquake onplantconditions (lossofsafetyrelatedfunctions).

2.Aconfirmed earthuakehasoccurredthathascausedlossofansafetrelatedsstemfunctioni.e.both5.CTornadoALERTAnytornadostrikingfacility.

ALERT,Anytomedostrikingtaheowerblock.Thecurrentrevisiondidnotidentifyspecificaffectedareasoftheplanttobeconsidered foratornadostrike.Useof"powerblock"providescleardescription ofstructures ofequipment thatshouldbeconsidered inthisclassification.

Powerblockisspecifically definedinEPIP-01.

Event/Class 6.AIncreased Awareness orPotential CoreMeltEPlanRev.34CurrentALERTEmergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions existwhichwarrant:1.Increased awareness andactivation ofEmergency Responsepersonnel.

EPlanRev.DRAFTCurrentALERTEmergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions existwhichhaveaotentialtoderadethelevelofsafeattheplant.ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusion towhetheruseofemergency responsefacilities oractivation ofanyemergency responsepersonnel initsselfjustifies ALERTclassification.

Proposedrevisionmakesjudgement criteriaclearthatdegradation ofplantconditions justifyclassification ofanALERT.SITEAREAEMERGENCY Emergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions existwhichwarrant:1.Activation ofemergency responsefacilities andmonitoring teamsoraprecautionary notification ofthepublicnearthesite.SITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.Emergency Coordinator's judgement thatplantconditions uncontrollable manner.Thecurrentrevisioncausesconfusion towhetheruseofemergency responsefacilities initsse)fjustifies SITEAREAEMERGENCY classification.

(Classification ofSITEAREAEMERGENCY alwaysresultsinnotification ofthepublic.)Proposedrevisionmakesjudgement criteriaclearthatdegradation ofplantconditions justifyclassification ofaSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

GENERALEMERGENCY 2.LOCAwithinitially successful ECCSandsubsequent failureofcontainment hearremovalsystemsforseveralhours.GENERALEMERGENCY 2.LOCAwithinitially successful ECCSandsubsequent failureofcontainment heatremovalhours.Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassification considerations.

Proposedrevisionprovidesspecifictimespan,afterwhichaGENERALEMERGENCY classification iswarranted.

Event/Class 6.AIncreased Awareness orPotential CoreMelt(continued)

EPlan,Rev.34CurrentGENERALEMERGENCY 4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofemergency feedwater makeupcapability forseveralhours.EPlan,Rev.DRAFTProosedGENERALEMERGENCY 4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithlossofemergency feedwater makeupcapability for8-'""'ReasonforChaneThecurrentrevisioncausesconfusion withuserinregardtowhatis"emergency feedwater".

Theplantdoesnotdesignate anyequipment as'emergency feedwater.

Currentrevisiondoesnotcontainspecifictimecriteriainclassification considerations.

Theproposedrevisionprovidesclearindication thatifthereisnofeedwater forgreaterthan2hours,thenaGENERALEMERGENCY cIassification iswarranted.

7.ALossofPowerALERT2.Failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorsynchronize.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.Sustained failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorsynchronize.

ALERT2.Failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.SITEAREAEMERGENCY 2.Sustained failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.Currentrevisiondoesnotaddressabilityofdieselgenerator toperformitsintendedfunction(loadontoemergency buses)Proposedrevisionprovidesclearindication thatifthedieselisnotloaded,thenclassification iswarranted.

Event/Class 8.8LossofAlarms/Communication/

Monitoring 9.AAircraft/Missile EPlan,Rev.34CurrentUNUSUALEVENT3.Unplanned lossofmostorallSafetySystemannunciators forgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.Inability tomonitorasignificant transient inprogress.

ALERT1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlled Areadamagingplantstructures.

OR2.Visualoraudibleindication ofmissileimpactonplantstructures.

EPlanRev.DRAFTCurrentUNUSUALEVENT 1.Unplanned lossofmostigreater t~han75%oratlSafetySystemannunciators forgreaterthan15minutes.SITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.Inability toe~ffeottvet monitorasignificant transient inprogress.

NOTE:Sinificanttransient examlesinclude:reactortriturbinerunbackreaterthan25%andthermaloscillations reaterthan10%.ALERTblock.OR2.Visualoraudibleindication ofReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovideforaquantitative valueforlossof"mostannunciators.

Proposedrevisionindicates aspecificpercentage ofannunciators lostneededtoclassifyanUNUSUALEVENT.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovideguidanceondegreeofabilityinwhichatransient canbemonitored inclassifying theevent.Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidedefinition ofsignificant transient.

Proposedrevisionprovidesadditional guidancefortheusertodetermine that,ifatransient cannotbeeffectively monitored, thenaSITEAREAEMERGENCY iswarranted.

Additionally, examplesofsignificant transients areprovided.

Currentrevisiondoesnotprovidereference tocrashormissileimpacttospecificplantstructures.

Proposedrevisionprovidesclearindication (i.e.,thepowerblock)whereacrashormissileimpactwouldwarrantclassificatio ofALERT.

Event/Class 9.AAircraft/Missile (continued)

EPlanRev.34CurrentSITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.AircraftcrashintheOwnerControlled Areadamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damagetosafeshutdownequipment fromanymissile.EPlanRev.DRAFTProosedSITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.Aircraftcrash~totheowerblockdamagingvitalplantsystems.OR2.Damageresultininlossofsafeshutdownequipment fromanymissile.ReasonforChaneCurrentrevisiondoesnotprovidereference tocrashormissileimpactonspecificplantstructures.

Proposedrevisiondefinesspecificareaoftheplantwheredamageisconsidered classifiable.

Proposedrevisionidentifies effectonsafeshutdownequipment ascriteriafordetermining classification ofSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

Useofpowerblockprovidescleardescription ofstructures ofequipment thatshouldbeconsidered inthisclassification.

"Powerblockisspecifically definedinprocedure.

9.CToxicorFlammable GasSITEAREAEMERGENCY Toxicorflammable gashasdiffusedintovitalareasaffecting accesstoortheoperation ofsafeshutdownequipment.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY Toxicorflammable gashasdiffusedintovitalareascompromising thefunctionofsafetyrelatedequipment (i.e.,bothtrainsrenderedinoperable)

Currentrevisioncausedconfusion withuserdifferentiating betweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

Currentrevisiondoesnotconsistently relatelossofsafetysystemfunctionwithotherclassification criteria.

Proposedrevisionprovidescleardifference betweenALERTandSITEAREAEMERGENCY.

10 ATTACHMENT 2DRAFTREVISIONOFST.LUCIERADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANTABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE

TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS 1A./~Nfl/~MAEGGQAAQIQIJi ThissectionshoukiNOTbeusedforasteamgenerator tubeleak/rupture.

UNUSUALEVENT1.RCSleakageGREATERTHAN10gpmasindicated by:A.ControlRoomobservation QBB.Invenlory balancecalculation QBC.Fieldobservation QBD.Emergency Coordinator Judgement QB2.Indication ofleakingRCSsafetyorreliefvalvewhichcausesRCSpressuretodropbelow:-Unit1-1600PSIA-Unit2-1736PSIAALERT1.Charging/letdovm mismatchormeasuredRCSleakageIndicates greaterthan50gpmbutlessthanavailable chargingcapacity.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY 1.RCSleakagegreaterthanavailable than50gpmandgreaterthanavailable chargingcapacity.

QB2.LossofRCSsubcooled marginduetoRCSleakage(saturated conditions).

GENERALEMERGENCY 1.Containment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post.LOCAmon!torsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.Performance ofEPIP<9(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysIndicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,B,C,or0betovcA.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)8.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.6000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)0.6000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)fhh~}(anytwoofthefollowing

~landthethirdisimminent):

1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmed DEQ1-131activitygreaterthan275yCI/mL).hhl22.LOCAorTuberuptureonunlsolable steamgenerator.

hHQ3.Containment Integrity Breached.

HITCHAlsoreferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A./RNRCEP3:43-5St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT 0

TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS

'I.B.BBBRRRMMAALL

~PRIMAYT~EQNDARY~AKRATI;UNUSUALEVENTPRI/'I<1.MeasuredRCStosecondary "leakageexceedsTech.Spec.limits.~ND2.Secondary phntactivityisdetected.

ALERTRirfilrfttrtIINrim~fff-~~it ILr1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakagegreaterthanTech.Spec.Umitsandwithinchargingpumpcapacity.

~ND2.Secondary phntactivityisdetected.

~ND3.LossofbothNon-Vital 4.16KVbuses.ifilrftmntrRRTHANrig~m~ggi~)

1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakagegreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.

~ND2.Secondaiy plantactivityisdetected.

SITEAREAEMERGENCY RirilrftntrtRATTHANimfff-itr1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakageisgreaterthanchargingpumpcapacity.

~N2.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

AND3.LossofbothNon-Vital 4.16KVbuses.RiilrftrnnrtrtsRARTHANrinwithIri1.MeasuredRCStosecondary leakagegreaterthancharging~pumpcapacity.

~ND2.Secondary phntactivityisdetected.

~N3.Secondary steamreleaseinprogressfromaffectedgenerator.

(e.g.,ADVs,StuckSteamSafety(s),

orUnisolable Leak.)GENERALEMERGENCY ffthfiirrriwithimminnIt~hir(anytwoofthefollowing existandthethirdisimminent).

1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmed DEQI-131activitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~N2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisohbie steamgenerator.

IitND3.Containment integrity breached.

Alsoreferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Chss 6.A./RNRCEP3:4St.LucieRev.NRCDRAFT

TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS 1.C.~LQ~F~QQNDARYQQQPNTUNUSUALEVENTidreuiitifggggn~gllnI 1.Rapiddropineithersteamgenerator pressuretolessthan600psia.ALERTRETHAN1miiIk1.Rapiddropineithersteamgenerator pressuretolessthan600psia.AND2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan10gpm.~ND3.Secondary phntactivityisdetected.

1.Nomainorauxiliary feedwater flowavaihbleforgreaterthan15minuteswhenrequiredforheatremoval.~ND2.SteamGenerator levelsarelessthan40/owiderange.SITEAREAEMERGENCY Fwitinitit-thrhli1.Nomainorauxiliary feedwater flowavaihble.

~N2.PORV(s)havebeenopenedtofacilitate coreheatremoval.RTTHANrikndfelfI~mggIndi~tII1.Rapiddropineithersteamgenerator pressuretolessthan600psia.~AN2.Knownpri/secleakofgreaterthan50gpm.AND3.Secondary plantactivityisdetected.

~AN4.Fuelelementdamageisindicated (Referto'FuelElementFailureEvent/Chss 4.A).GENERALEMERGENCY rlaharrriinrrritinin1.Containment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan.1.46X10R/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QQ2.Performance ofEPIP~(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,8,C,orDbelovr.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDE)LIfthefissionrrriwithimminntIIth~thir(anytwoofthefollowing existandthethirdisimminent).

1.Fuelelementfailure(confirmed DEQI-131activitygreaterthan275pCi/mL).~ND2.LOCAorTuberuptureonunisolable steamgenerator.

~ND3.Containment IntriBreached.

~NTEAlsoreferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.EP3:43-7St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS UNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY 2.AiIIlimirrIrIi1.Planteffluentmonitor(s) exceedalarmselpoint(s).

~N2.Confirmed analysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichexceedsODCMlimits.HQXKIfanalysisisnotavailable withinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseisgreaterthanODCMlimit,dassifyas~~V~1.Planteffluentmonitor(s) significantly exceedalarmsetpoints.

BED2.Confirmed analysisresultsforgaseousorliquidreleasewhichHQKIfanalysisIsnotavailable withinonehour,anditisexpectedthatreleaseIsequaltoorgreaterthan~iODCMlimit,dassifyasAiKBZ-1.Containment HighRangeRadiation Monitorgreaterthan7.3X10R/hr(Post-LOCA monitorsindicatebetween100and1000mR/hr,ifCHRRMInoperable).

QB2.MeasuredDoseRatesorOff-siteDoseCalculation (EPIP49)worksheet valuesatonemileInexcessof:A.50mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or250mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)for1/2hour.QBB.500mrem/hr(totaldoserate)or2500mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)fortwominutesatonemile.1.ContaInment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan1.46X10'/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.Performance ofEPIP-09(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,B,C,or0belovr.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-CDODCM-ReferstoChemistry Procedure C-200,'Off.site DoseCalculation Manual(ODCM).'RNRC EP3I43-8St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT

TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS UNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY

.2.8iihI1.AnyvalidareamonitoralarmfromIndeterminable sourcewithmeternearorgreaterthanfullscaledeflection (10'R/hr).

QB2.Unexpected plantiodineorparticulate airborneconcentration of1000DACasseenInroutinesurveying orsampling.

QB3.'nexpected directradiation doseratereadingorunexpected airborneradioactivity concentration fromanundeterminable sourceinexcessof1000timesnormallevels.nriiIIihiwrgggg0~II~ffLI1.Potentially affecting safetysystems.hE22.Requiring off-sitesupportIntheopinionoftheNPS/EC.inhReferto'Potenflal CoreMelt'venVCtass 6.A.IwihihwnrrlirHQKExplosion Isdefinedasarapidchemicalreactionresulting innoise,heat,andtherapidexpansion ofgas./RNRCEP3:43-9St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS 4>EUElZKhKEE Evil.llBK UNUSUALEVENT1.Processmonitorsorarearadiation surveysindicateincreased letdownactivity~N2.Confirmed RCSsampleindicating:

A.CoolantactivitygreaterthantheTechSpeclimitforiodinespike(TechSpecFigure3.4-1.).QQB.Coolantactivitygreaterthan100/EpCi/gramspecificactivity.

IfanalysisIsnotavailable within1hour,anditisexpectedthatactivityisgreaterthanTechSpeclimit,dassifyas~ALERTIil1.Processmonitorsorarearadiation surveysindicateincreased letdownactivityandconfirmed RCSSamp!esindicating DEQI-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275yCI/mLIfanalysisisnotavailable within1hour,anditisexpectedthatRCSactivityforDEQI-131isgreaterthan275pCi/mL,dassifyasanKBZ-SITEAREAEMERGENCY Iil1.RCSOEQ1-131activitygreaterthanorequalto275pCi/mL.2.HighestCETpercorequadrantindicates greaterthan10'Fsuperheat or700'F.GENERALEMERGENCY 1.Containment HighRangeRadiation monitorgreaterthan1.46X10~R/hr(IfCHRRMinoperable, Post-LOCA monitorsgreaterthan1000mR/hr).QB2.Performance ofEPIP49(Off-site DoseCalculations) ormeasureddoseratesfromoff-sitesurveysindicatesiteboundary(1mile)exposurelevelshavebeenexceededasindicated byeitherA,8,C,orDbelch.A.1000mrem/hr(totaldoserate)B.1000mrem(totaldose-TEDE)C.5000mrem/hr(thyroiddoserate)D.5000mrem(thyroiddose-COE)4,B.@+~ANhGQDKKElinP~nLfili3ijiilin,.

1.NPS/ECdetermines thatanirradiated fuelassemblymayhavebeendamaged.~N2.Associated areaorprocessradiation monitorsareinalarm./grig1.Affectedarearadiation monitorlevelsgreaterthan1000mR/hr.hHQ2.Majordamagetomorethanoneirradiated fuelassembly.

QB3.Majordamageresulting fromuncovering ofoneormoreirradiated fuelassemblies intheSpentFuelPool./RNRCEP3:43-10Sl.Wcie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFjCATjON TABLEEVENT/CLASS 5.A.~A~AKUNUSUALEVENTnfihk1.Aconfirmed earthquake hasbeenexperienced withintheOwnerControlled Area.QQ2.Anearthquake isdetectedbyplantseismicmonitorinstruments orothermeans.ALERTfirm1.Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.05gwithintheOwnerControlled AreaQQ!2.Aconfirmed earthquake hasoccurredthatcouldcauseorhascausedtripoftheturbinegenerator orreactor.SITEAREAEMERGENCY itk1.Aconfirmed earthquake occurswhichregisters GREATERTHAN0.1gwithintheOwnerControlled Areaandtheplantnotincoldshutdown.

QQ2.Aconfirmed earthquake hasoccurredthathascausedlossofanysafetysystemfunction(i.e.,bothtrainsinoperable).

GENERALEMERGENCY

~NReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.5.B.ARRI~ANnWmin1.Confirmed hurricane warningisineffect.Hu'iwithwinrit~in~i1.Confirmed hurricane warningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed175mphwithintheOwnerControlled Area.~NTAtFPL'srequest,NOAAviillprovideanaccurateprojection ofwindspeedson-site24hourspifortotheonsetofhumcaneforcewinds.Itthatprojection isnotavailable within12hoursofenteringintothewarning,cfassitytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.

Forexample,projected on-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhumcanewindspeedifthetrackisawayfromPSLRTANini1.Plantnotatcoldshutdown.

~N2.Confirmed hurricane warningisineffectandwindsareexpectedtoexceed194mphwithintheOwnerControlled Area.AtFPL'srequest,NOAAwillprovideanaccurateprojection ofwindspeedson-site24hourspriortothe.,onsetofhurricane forcewinds.Ifthatprojection isnotavaiiabfe within12hoursofenteringIntothewarning,classifytheeventusingcurrenttrackandwindspeedstoprojecton-siteconditions.

Forexample,projected on-sitewindspeedwouldbelessthanmaximumhurricane windspeeditthetrackIsawaytromPSLRefertoPotential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A./RNRCEP3:43-11St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT

TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS S.C.~~MAQUNUSUALEVENT ifinfmiALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY HQIEReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.5.0./~~A~WAT~~nIIiirIwwrlwvIni'.Lowintakecanallevelof-10$ft.MLWfor1hourormore.QB2.Visualslghtings bystationpersonnel thatwaterlevelsareapproaching stormdrainsystemcapacity.

1.Thestormdrain'scapacityisexceededduringhurricane surgeorknownfloodconditions.

QB2.Lowintakecanallevelof-10.5ft.MLWfor1hourormorewith emergency barriervalvesopen.1.Flood/surge watertevelreachingelevation+19.5 ft.(turbinebuilding/RAB groundfloor).QB2.LowIntakecanallevelhascausedthelossofallICWflow./RNRCEP3:43-12St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEHQIKActivation oftheEmergency ResponseFacilities doesnotrequiredeclaration ofanemergency orentryintoaspecificemergency classification.

EVENT/CLASS 6.A.~NQfAA'jgQ Qgj'~NTIA

~)ffMQIT(Page1of2)UNUSUALEVENTnIhniIwninrhfhriffnIgtt~hrii~1.Theplantisshutdovmunderabnormalconditions (e.g.,exceeding cooldownratesorprimarysystempipecracksarefounddurfngoperation).

QB2.AnyplantshutdovmrequiredbyTechnical Specifications inwhichtherequiredshutdownisnotreachedwithinactionlimits.ALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY itxigg~ifLgLLIIIIIhf, (Anycoremeltsituation.)

1LOCAvnthfailureofECCSleadingtoseverecoredegradation ormelt.QB2.LOCAwithinitially successful ECCSandsubsequent failureofcontainment heatremovalsystemsforgreaterthan2hours.QB3.Totallossoffeedwater followedbyfailureofonce-through-cooling(ECCS)toadequately coolthecore.QB4.Failureofoff-siteandon-sitepoweralongwithtotallossofemergency feedwater makeupcapability forgreaterthan2hours.QB5.ATWSoccurswhichresultsincoredamageorcausesfailureofcorecoolingandmake-upsystems.QB6.AnymajorInternalorexternalevent(e.g.,fire,earthquake ortornadosubstantially beyonddesignbasis)whichIntheEC'sopinionhasorcouldcause.massivedamagetoptantsystemsresulting inanyoftheabove.(continued onnextpage)/RNRCEP3:43-13St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS UNUSUALEVENTALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY 6A~INRF~AEDQQTTM~TIA QQRRMELT(Page2of2)~TE1.Mostlikelycontainment failuremodeismelt-throughwithreleaseofgasesonly.Quickerreleasesareexpectedforfailureofcontainment isolation system.2.GeneralEmergency mustbedeclaredfortheabovelistedevents.Thelikelihood ofcorrective action(repairofAFWpump,etc.)shouldnotbeconsidered.

7.A.FPWfff-twrrlfIIn-itAr1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.QR2.Lossofcapability topoweratleastonevital4.16kvbusfrom~navailable emergency dieselgenerator.

tatinBIttIf1.Lossofoff-siteACpower.~ND2.Failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.fII-it1.DropinAand BDCbusvoltagestolessthan70VDC.ttiBIktlfrRATTHAin1.Lossofoff.siteACpower.~AN!2.Sustained failureofbothemergency dieselgenerators tostartorload.~N3.FailuretorestoreACpowertoatleastonevital4.16kvbuswithin15minutes.II'II~itrrit~NTEReferto'Potential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A.1.Sustained dropinAand8DCbusvoltagesto70VDCforgreaterthan15minutes./RNRC.EP3:43-14St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT TABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLEEVENT/CLASS UNUSUALEVENT ALERTSITEAREAEMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENCY 8>LQGRQEZLBK QQHXEQI.~NQ~NS.B.MIQ~N~IQinifinlffflnInIIwhiiiiiifmrn1.Lossofeffluentorradiological monitoring capability requiring plantshutdown.

QB2.LossofallprimaryggIIbackupcommunication capability withoff-sitelocations.

QB3.Unpiannedlossofmost (greaterthan75%)orallsafetysystemannunciators forgreaterthan15minutes.I'n1.Completelossofanyfunctionneededforplantcoldshutdovm.

QB2.FailureoftheReactorProtection SystemtobringthereactorsubcnVcal whenneeded.QB3.ControlRoomisevacuated (forotherthandrillpurposes) withcontrolestablished locallyattheHotShutdovmControlPanel.in1.Completelossoffunctions neededtomaintaincoldshutdown.

A.Failureofshutdowncoolingsystems,resulting inlossofcoldshutdowncondiVons.

B.RCSsubcooling cannotbemaintained greaterthanO'.1.Unplanned lossofgffisafetysystemannunciators.

2.Planttransient inprogress.

1.Lossofanyfunctionorsystemwhich,intheopinionoftheEmergency Coordinator, predudespladngtheplantinHotShutdown.

QB2.Failureofthe RPStotripthe reactorwhenneeded,andoperatoractionsfailtobringthereactorsubcriVeal.QB3,ControlRoomisevacuated (forotherthandrillpurposes) andcontrolcannotbeestablished locallyattheHotShutdownControlPanelwithin15minutes.M~Mium1.Inability toemergency monitorasignificant transient inprogress.

EQIFSignificant transient examplesindude:Reactortrip,turbinerunbackgreaterthan25%andthermalosdffatlons greaterflail10%.HQXKRefertoPotential CoreMelt'vent/Class 6.A./RNRCEP3:43-15St.Lvcie,Rev.NRCDRAFT sTABLE3-1EMERGENCY CLASSlFlCATlON TABLEEVENT/CLASS 9>.~IRRAFF)~MIIUNUSUALEVENT1.AircraftcrashlntheOwnerControlled AreaorunusualaircraftactivityoverfacilitythatintheopinionoftheNPS/EC,couldthreatenthesafetyoftheplantorpersonnel.

ALERTIrII1.AircraftcrashfnthePowerBlock.QB2.VisualoraudibleIndication ofmlssgeimpactonthePowerBlock.SITEAREAEMERGENCV 1.AircraftcrashinthePowerBlockdamagingvitalplantsystems.QB2.Damageresultinginlossof safeshutdownequipment fromanymissile.GENERALEMERGENCV 9B.INIIiIii9.C.~T)~lnnnrIIIIrhnIfiIffiIIin1o.GKLlEZf.THffg~TIIhfinIninnini1.Bombthreat2.Attackthreat3.Civildistutbance 4.Protected AreaIntrusion 5.Sabotageattempt8.Internaldisturbance 7.Vitalareaintrusion 8.Securityforcestrike/RNRCEP3I43-16St.Lucie,Rev.NRCDRAFT