ML20205H583
| ML20205H583 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/30/1976 |
| From: | Karen Chapman NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Gilinsky V, Kennedy R, Mason E, Rowden M, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904080311 | |
| Download: ML20205H583 (5) | |
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MEMORAt!D'JM FOR: Chain.:an Rowden Connissioner 'asen hay @
Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy _
FROM: Kenneth R. Chapmcn, Director Office of !!uclear Meterial Safety and Safeguards THRU: L. V. Gossich (54"o ua v. u.A Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
SAFEGUARDS DESIGN OBJECTIVES, SUMARY OF RECENT DISCUSSI0tlS
Background
In January we began our first round of safeguards assessments at 15 fuel cycle facilities. Licensee safeguards are all structured in compliance with existing regulations which presently do not prescribe specific threat-related design objectives. Nevertheless, the staff detennined that each licensee should have the practical capability to protect weapons-usable nuclear material against an internal threat posed by a single employee and an external threat consisting of three well-armed (legally obtainable weapons), well-trained persons acting with or without insider knowledge or assistance. The attackers could be assisted by one employee occupying any position.
During the onsite assessments in early 1976, 8 of the 15 facilities were judged able to defend against the specified threat criteria.
I This reinforced the staff view that these threat criteria constituted a safeguards system design base that night be reasonably inferred from the existing body of safeguards regulations. Action was taken to .
I correct deficiencies at the other 7 fccilities and to ensure that safe-guards at all 15 facilities would be mintained at least capable against the threat criteria specified for the site reviews.
Since the NRC safeguards site assessuent criteria were defined in letters to Congressman Udall and to the JCAE, the staff has in effect instituted a minimum threat-related Msic.n objective for safeguards against theft of weapons-usable nuclear materials.
The Builder Task Force Supplementing staff actions concerning current safeguards, the Builder Task Force Report was designed to lay to rest issued of " adequacy" and
Contact:
R. A. Erickson,flMSS/SG 49-27080 M *h. _.D 9904000311 761130 -
PDR COMMS hECC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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"ratcheting" by determining long-ter.a safeguards objectives. The Report also suggested " interim" measures that night be taken. But there are some subtle differences between the builder Task Force Report and events as they actually developed during and af ter its writing. ,For example, the Task Force Report states that current safe- )
guards regulations provide protection against what might be loosely I characterized as " professional armed robbery." The Builder Report then maps out a plan of action leading in two to four years to pro- l tection against a much more robust design threat characterized as l
" determined violent assault." As part of its proposed plan, the report recommends as an intermediate (6 month) objective, that NRC
" ensure that all licensees have sufficient numbers of guards to defend against attempted robbery by groups of up to six persons with legally obtainable weapons."
Interim Safeguards Objectivas The Builder Task Force interim objective has caused some confusion because it does not seem demanding enough when one considers that the staff has already completed licensing actions to ensure protec-tion of weapons-usable nuclear materials against a design threat of determined violent assault t,y three assailants (plus one insider) whose motivation and training transcend that of " professional armed robbers."
Accordingly, licensees might be expected to achieve this interim Builder Task Force benchmark of defending against 6 armed robbers, without great difficulty. The precise requirements would vary from site to site. After upgrading the arms and training of guards, as recommended in the Guilder Report and SECY-76-416B, some licensees might also have to increase their guard numbers somewhat Some licensees would require no additional guards. Measures to achieve the task force's interim goal of defense against 6 anned robbers could be completed within 6 months.
On the other hand, if a more demanding interim objective is to be sought, it will require considerably more resources and time for licensees to achieve. For example, licensees might be required to achieve an interim capability to protect against an internal design threat involving any single insider and against an external design threat involving determined assault by about 6 well-trained assailants armed with legally obtainable weapons. As a practical matter, since semiautomatic rifles can be obtained legally and modified, safeguards structured against such an external design threat would have to protect equally well against assailcnts armed with hand-held automatic weapons or other armament short of team-portable weapons such as recoilless rifles and mortars. In fact, this level of external design threat could be characterized as detennined assault by 6 well-trained
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. The Consnissioners .i assailants armed with hand-held autanic traapcns and assisted by an insider. .
Interim Measures ,
In many cases, increases in ar.ns, training and numbers of guards would be less than an adequate solution to meet the higher order interim level of design threat. Upgrading of safeguards might, on a site specific basis, involve a number of other measures, as well. The following are examples:
(a) Require and install undefeatable effsite conmunication systems.
. e.g. , " hotline" between the facility and LLEA which would clearly signal any attempts to tamper with it. Multiple terminals onsite
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would be required with arrangements made for non-recallable response in the event the line was cut. l (b) Arrange effective procedures for deployment of guard personnel j and the pre-selection of defensive positions.
These measures along with additional guards, guard training, and semi-automatic arms might be implemented in a 6- to 9-month period. It would be more realistic to expect that 12 to 18 months would be requi red.
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Costs t The staff estimates that such interim upgrading at 13 affected fuel cycle facilities would cost about $400 to $500 thousand initially and would increase operating expenses by about $2 to $3 million annually (mostly for guard's wages). A cost summary is shown in Table 1. .
Long-Term Internal Design Threats The next step beyond an external design threat of 6 terrorists assis-I ted by one insider and an internal design threat of a single employee, involves an increased internal design threat, from one insider to two insiders. This triggers Personnel the requirement to safeguard clearances provide one against conspiracy and collusion.
means of reducing the likelihood nf employee collusion. Ilowever, I beyond that, systems and procedures uhich might he developed to protect against internal conspiracies would p.cobably require more people, possibly interfere with process operations and perhaps necessitate facility or equipment changes in some plants. Finally, it may be extremely difficult to design systems that are absolutely effective against l
conspiracies involving key management and security personnel.
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The Conmissionces -L-TAOLE 1 COST S EMARYO Initial Annual AdditionalGuardsW $ 39,000 $2,600,000 Seini-Auto Rifles $ 27,300 $ 2,730 l Training $ 91,000 $ 18,200 Add Hotline $ 9,000 $ 16,200 Construct Guard Deployments $ 25,000 ---
, l Construct Defensive Positions $140,000 ---
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Increase Protection of Primary Central Alarm Station $ 57,400 $ 5,740 Harden Secondary Alarm Station. $ 70,000 $ 7,000 TOTAL $458,700 $2,649,870 8I
- Rough estimate of costs to upgrade physical security at 13 licensed fuel cycle facilities to protect against determined assault by six persons armed with legal weapons and assisted by an inside . Possession of hand-held automatic weapons by the assault team would not significantly alter these estimates.
Y An average of 2 additional guard posts would be established at each of the 13 facilities currently possessing significant quantities of weapons-usable neclear material. In order to man each new guard post around the clock in a 3-shift operation and allow for sickness, and leave, the licensee must hire an average of 4.5 new guards for each new guard post at an estimated annual cost of $100,000 per guard post.
Initial costs associated with guard employment would involve such things l as personnel processing, unifonos, personal equipment, etc.
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' The Conmissioners -4 Long-Term External Design Thn e_ts,
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Adversary weapons and equipa:ent are primary considerations with regard to the long-term upgrading of the ex erral design threat. There is little practical difference between tho measures required to protect against semiautomatic and fully auto:.atic rifle fire. Fireanus become more significant when transitions are expected from man-portable weapons to team-portable vieapons such as light mortars and recoilless rifles and from team-portable weapons to heavy weapons i such as artillery pieces, tanks, and heavy cannons. However, the acquisition and use of heavy weapons for a surprise attack against private industry generates so many preparatory, logistical, and secrecy problems for would-be attackers that it does not warrant serious safeguards design consideratica under a presun'ption of civil order.
In the '.'ong-tenn design of safeguards against external assault, the ,
hardness and positioning of barriers, shelters, and critical lines of l communications and movement depends upon the weapons and explosives they must withstand. Fortifications adequate to withstand attack by portable shaped charges and other breaching explosives might be expected to ~ provide significant protection against the effects of stand-off fire from medium calibre, tean-portable, hand-carried weapons 'such as light mortars and recoilless rifles. Thus, safeguards j structured to meet a long-tena cbjective of providing high confidence protection against deter, mined violent assaults by attackers equipped with man-portable automatic weapons and breaching explosives would also, as indicated in the Builder Report, provide significant pro-tection against larger threats which uculd clearly challenge the existence of civil order.
Achieving the Long-Tenn Goals According to the Builder Report, it might require about 2-4 years to achieve the overall long-tenn goal of providing high confidence protec-tion against detennined violent assault and internal conspiracy. To counter these design threats, most licensees would prefer to redesign their facilities. The Builder Report states that this would involve such things as ". . . modifications of buildings and process areas and the installation of surveillance and detection equipment. . ."-
The Joint ERDA-f!RC Task Force esembled rough cost figures from industry proposals which indicated that proposed upgrading of safeguards to improve protection against internal conspiracy and determined violent p.
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$15 million in annual operating exp., es
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.e Kenryeth R. Chapman, Director Of fice of fluclear flaterial Safety and Safeguards l i
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