ML20148G275

Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents Re 2.206 Petition Submitted by Gap Alleging Deficiencies Re Detroit Edison Co Safeteam Program.Forwards App B Document.Apps a & B Documents Available in PDR

ML20148G275
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/22/1988
From:	Grimsley D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
To:	Bauman L GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
References
FOIA-87-871 2.206, NUDOCS 8801260459
Download: ML20148G275 (3)

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PARTI.-RECORDS RELEASED OR NOT LOCATED (See en caed e bones)

No agency records subrect to the roovest have been located.

No additonal agency recoros subpect to the request have been located Agency records subst to the regwost that are ioentded in Appendim _ are already avastable for pubhc rupecte and copyeg in the N RC Pubt<: Doewinent Room.

1717 H Street. N W , WasNng on. OC n

Agency records sv%ect to the raquest thrt are dentrfed in Appendia are being made ava4able for pubR inspecton and copyeg m the NRC Pubic Document Room.1717 H Street. N W . Washegton, DC, an a foeder under tNs 7DIA number and reqwester name r

The nonpropretary version of the proposaus) that yes agreed to accept e a teiephone conversation wth a member of my sta'f e now bemg made ave &able for putdic inspecton and coyeg at the NRC Pwbt.c Document Room 1717 H Street. N W , Washegion, DC. m a foder under tNs FOIA number and requester name.

Enclosed is eformaton on how you may ottam access to and the charges for conveg records p3 aced in tne NRC Pubhc Document Room.1717 H Street. N W., WasNngton, DC.

Agency recoe:s siMrect to the request are enclosed Any apphcable charge for copes of the records p'ovded and payment procedures are noted in the comments secton.

Records subpect to the request have been retened to another Fede sl agencviesi for review and direct sesoonse to you in vow of NRC's response to tNs roovest. no further acton a being taten on appeal tener cated PART ll A-INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PtJBLIC DISCLOSURE Certam informaton in t% reowested records e beirg vothheid from public discloswr e puissant to t*, FOtA esemptons descreed e and for the reasons stated e Part 11, sec-tons 8. C. and D. Any ro6 eased portons of the oocuments for *Nch only part of the record e be+g *>thheid s's be>ng made avadabie for putdic rapecton and copyeg m the NRC Pwbhc Document Room,1717 H Street. N W., Washegton. DC. m a fonder under the FOIA n mber u and requester name.

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+, .....p Hay 27, 1987 MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Jack R. Goldberg, Acting Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT:

PETITION PURSUANT TO 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT-ABILITY PROJECT ALLEGING DEFICIENCIES WITH RESPECT TO DETROIT EDISON COMPANY'S SAFETEAM PROGRAM On May 7, 1987, the Government Accountability Project (Petitioner) filed with the Commission on behalf of the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan and the Sisters, Servants of the immaculate Heart of Mary Congregation, a petition pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 (enclosed) which requests:

(1) that NRC take possession of all SAFETEAM b files and review the allegations for all potential safety related deficiencies, and make these concerns public.

(2) that the NRC require that all SAFETBAM allegations are processed by the utility in accordance with 10 C . F. R . Part 50, Appendix B, and (3) that the NRC require that all utility employees are fully informed about the SAFETEAM program before they make a choice between submitting information to the SAFETBAM or the NRC.

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-1/ Petitioner describes SAFETEAM as the "employee concern" program begun by the Detroit Edison Company in 1983.

CONTACT:

Henry J. McGurren x 27267 9

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l in the alternative , the Petitioner requests that the NRC institute a proceeding to modify, suspend or revoke Detroit Edison Compuny's (the licensee) license.

The Petitioner asserts as basis for the relief requested (1) that workers who turned over allegations to SAFETEAM were harassed, fired or other-wise discriminated against, (2) that the SAFETEAM was not being properly implemented and was ineffective , (3) that SAFETEAM interviewers are inadequately trained, (4) that deficiencies reported to SAFETEAM are not recorded on non-conformance reports and are not evaluated by the site quality assurance / quality control staff, and (5) that there is no quality check or accountability for the SAFETEAM program.

I have enclosed drafts of a letter of acknowledgement to the Petitioner for your signature and a Notice of Receipt of the Petition for publication in the Faderal Register. If you want the licensee to respond regarding these matters, we will assist your staff in drafting an appropriate letter.

Please inform my staff of the technical staff contact who will be involved in preparing a response to the Petition. Pltase ensura that I am provided copies of all correspondence ralated to the Petition and that I am asked to concur on au staff correspondence.

/s/

Jack R. Goldberg, Acting Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement Office of the General Counsel

Enclosures:

1. Copy of Petition

2. Draft Letter of Acknowledgement

3. Draft Federal Register Notice cc w/ encl: J. Lieberman, OE W. Olmstead, OGC B. Davis, RITI B. Berson, RI!!

DISTRIBUTION:

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s Billie P. Garde Government Accountability Project Oear Ms. Garde:

This letter is to ackncwledge receipt of your Petition dated May 7,1987, on behalf of the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan and the Sisters, Servants of the immaculate lleart of Mary Congregation. Your Petition sets forth several requests concerning alleged deficiencies of the SAFETEAM program es!ablished at Detroit Edison Company's Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant. As bases for the requested relief, you assert (1) that workers who turned over allegations to SAFETEAM were harassed, fired or otherwise discriminated against. (2) that the SAFETEAM was not being properly implemented and was ineffective.

(3) that SAFETEAM interviewers are inadequately trained. (4) that deficiencies reported to SAFETEAM are not recorded on non-conformance reports and are not evaluated by the site quedity assurance / quality control staff, and (5) that there is no quality check or accounte.bility for the SAFETEAM program.

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Your Petition has been referred to the Staff for action pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. As provided by section 2.206, action will be taken on your request within a reasonable time. I have enclosed for your information a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely, Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl.: Detroit Edison Co.

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No. 50-341 DETROIT EDISON COMPANY FERMI !! NUCLEAR POWER PLAS T (License No. )

RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.P.R. I 2.206 Notice is hereby given that by a Petition dated May 7, 1987, the Government Accountability Project (Petitioner), on behalf of the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan and the Sisters, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary Congregation, requested that the Commission take certain actions with regard to Detroit Edison Company's (Licensee) "employee concern" program entitled SAFETEAM at Fermi !! Nuclear Power Plant or in the alternative modify, suspend or revoke the facility's operating i

license. The actions Petitioner has requested the Commission to take with regard to SAFETEAM include (1) taking possession of all the SAFETEAM files, reviewing the safety related allegations, and making these concerns public; (2) requiring that all SAFETEAM allegations be processed by the Licensee in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B; and

(3) requiring the Licensee to inform all its employees about the SAFETEAM program before the employees chose to submit information to the program rather than submitting information to the Commission, i As bases for these requests, the Petitioner asserts (1) that workers who turned over allegations to SAFETEAM were harassed, fired or other-i wise discriminated a gainst , (2) that the SAFETEAM was not being

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. B properly implemented and was ireffective, (3) that SAFETEAM interviewers are inadequately trained, (4) that def;ciencies reported to SAFETEAM are not recorded on non-conformance reports and are not evaluated by the site quality assurance / quality control staff, and (5) that there is no quality check or accountability for the SAFETEAM program.

The Petition is being treated pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 of the Commission's regulations and, accordingly, appropriate action will be taken on the request within a reasonable time. A copy of the Petition is available for inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, and at the Local Public Document Room for Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant at .

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this day of , 1987.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Thomas E. Murley, niractor, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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In the Matter of )

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Detroit Edison Company ) Petition Pursuant

) to 10 C.F.R. $2.206 Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant )

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PETITION OF THE SAFE ENERGY COALITION OF MICHIGAN AND THE SISTERS, SERVANTS OF THE IMMACULATE HEART OF MARY CONGREGATION 9

Prepared by the Government Accountablity Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue N.W.

Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 232-8550 Dated: May 7, 1987

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Table of Contents Page I.

INTRODUCTION.......................................... 1 II. ISSUES PRESENTED...................................... 1 III.

FACTS................................................. 1 IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS........................................ 8 A.

The NRC'S First Priority Must Be To Ensure the Protection of the Public's Health and Safety..... 8 B.

The NRC Must Require that SAFETEAM Process All Allegations In Accordance wi 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B..................th

..................... 11 C. The NRC Must Process the Allegations in the SAFETEAM Files In Accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0517. 14 D.

SAFETEAM Must Be Required To Advise Employees About the Limitations of the Program............. 17 V.

CONCLUSION............................................ 20 VI. RELIEF REQUESTED...................................... 21

I. INTRODUCTION On behalf of the Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan (SECOM) and the Sisters, Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary Congregation (SSIRM) the Government Accountability Project (GAP) is filing this petition pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.206. SECOM and the SSIRM request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) institute a proceeding to modify, suspend or revoke Detroit Edison's license, or take such other action pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.206 as is appropriate and consistent with the relief requested herein.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED (1) Whether the NRC must take possession of utility-controlled allegation management programs, files such as SAFETEAM, and process the allegations contained therein in accordance with the Manual Chapter 0517?

(2) Whether the NRC must require that utility-controlled allegation management programs, such as SAFETEAM, process all allegations received pursuant to 10 C.F.R. SSO Appendix B?

(3) Whether utility-controlled allegation management programs, such as SAFETEAM, must advise employees prior to the time they make a disclosure that their allegations will be disclosed to senior utility managers, and that there is no guarantee that their allegations will be addressed?

III. FACTS In 1983 the Detroit Edison Company (DECO) began the first "employee concern" program commonly known as the 'SAFETEAM' program. The program was instituted to avoid the last minute "flood" of allegations that was presenting serious difficulties for two other Region III projects, the Zimmer nuclear power plant in Ohio and the Midland nuclear power plant in Midland, Michigan.

Both plants have since been cancelled when skyrocketing costs made the price of continued construction prohibitive.

Since the inception of the SAFETEAM program SECOM, SSIRM, and GAP have received numerous allegations f rom workers who felt that they were betrayed by SAFETEAM. Many workers have confirmed that once their allegations were turned over the site management, they were harassed, pressured, forced to quit, fired, or otherwise discriminated against. Given this experience it is clear that SAFETEAM is more of a tool for management to eliminate dissent, than a tool for identifying and resolving allegations in a timely manner.

The NRC has taken the position that employee allegation programs are "company-initiated" projects wnich the NRC should not interfere with,because such interference could discourage industry' initiatives.

Despite its support for the concept of a SAFETEAM program, the NRC admitted that there were significant problems with the program at Fermi.

The most detailed analysis of the SAFETEAM program at Fermi was done by the NRC's Office of Investigation (OI) during the summer and fall of 1985. Numerous interviews were conducted and SAFETEAM files were reviewed by the investigators. The results

of the investigation indicated that the SAFETEAM program was not being properly implemented and, in fact, was improperly processing the allegations of wrongdoing.

On OctobSr 4, 1985 OI forwarded its report to the NRC staff.

After its programatic review of the SAFETEAM program the staff concluded that:

...(I)t was determined that the Fermi Safeteam Program was not staffed or supervised by experienced investigative cases, lacked sufficient information because of this apparent inexperience. OI bases this conclusion on the fact that the interviews which were reviewed in the investigative files could not provide information what, concerning basic questions such as who, where, when, how and why. The Fermi Safeteam Program therefore did not exhibit the characteristics normally attributed to an investigative activity.

In fact, the OI investigators who prepared the report irself had a stronger conclusion.

They concluded that the SAFETEAM was "an audit program which failed as an effective investigatory program." (OI Report at 2).

More important than what OI concluded about the SAFETEAM is what OI did not even consider. OI did not analyze the safety significance of the investigative shortcomings of the SAFETEAM program. (See OI Report at 2).

Furthermore, the OI investigation did not endeavor to determine the significance, or potential significance, of any of the allegations in the SAFETEAM file in relation to the safety of the Fermi facility.

Additionally, three Region III inspection reports address

I the SAFETEAM in some manner.

The first report was issued July 29, 1985, IER No. 50-341/

85029(DRP) and addressed findings of the SAFETEAM on pages 7-8.

The report confirms that there was an OI audit of the Fermi SAFETEAM, and a task force investigation of some of the SAFETEAM concerns which was undertaken for the purpose of determining the technical merit of the SAFETEAM program findings, and to compare the program with another utility.

The task force reviewed some of the safety-related concerns from the SAFETEAM files. However, the task force did not assess the technical adequacy of SAFETEAM investigations, or the resolution of safety-related problems.

IER No. 50-341/85037, issued November 9, 1985, reported that NRC inspectors reviewed over 10% or the total hardware and software safety-related concerns identified to the SAFETEAM. The report also indicates that Deco did a major review of over half of the safety related concerns and half of the non-safety related concerns.

As a result of this overview effort the SAFETEAM system was determined to have some programmatic deficiencies which are listed in the inspection report as:

Inadequate interviews (unable to channel the program; vague generic concerns)

- Packages did not address the whole concern

- Packages should have been provided with additional closure

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- Investigators unable to receive engineering support.

IER No. 50-341/85042, issued December 31, 1985, also addresses the SAFETEAM program on pages 2-3. This report briefly mentions a review of 53 SAFETEAM interviews made since February 5, 1985.

The IE report also addresses one specific concern (No.

694).

Finally, IER No. 50-341/85048 was issued January 28, 1986.

It addresses the confrontation between the NRC, SRI, and SAFETEAM management about why the SAFETEAM was not following its own procedures regarding the notification of the NRC when presented with a serious concern. The NRC report states that the Corporate General Auditor had initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the reported failure to follow instructions. The results of that investigation have never been publicly released.

Notwithstanding the NRC's acceptance of the SAFETEAM program 4

at Fermi, SECOM and the SSIRM have no confidence in the implementation of the program to achieve the resolution of safety-related concerns.

Almost every employee GAP interviewed about the SAFETEAM program had negative comments about their experience, and about the program's intentions and capabilities to do an independent .

and competent investigation of technical safety concerns. The majority of the employees we interviewed had been to SAFETEAM at least once, and some had a long history of interaction with SAFETEAM over their concerns. But none of the employees GAP interviewed believed that SAFETEAM adequately understood their allegations, or had properly investigated their concerns.

In short, the SAFETEAM system fails because, investigations into worker allegations stop when management provides any explanation for the concern.

This occurs even if the management explanation appears to be exactly the same explanation that was given to the employee in the first place. The fact that management's initial explanation of events is what caused the employee to complain to SAFETEAM is not considered.

Another basic problem with the SAFETEAM system results from the inadequate training SAFETEAM interviewers receive in the areas of allegation investigation, and nuclear power plant regulation. Therefore, the only real expertise for evaluating concerns continues to lie with the utility. As a result, it is not surprising that the SAFETEAM probes stop when explanations are provided by the utility.

This is even more understandable when one considers that whatever explanations are provided to a concerned employee must pass through an edit by a senior staff attorney who is responsible for getting the plant licensed, as well as a senior public relations official who is worried about b

having to face the SAFETEAM letter in the next day's newspaper.

The SAFETEAM is not honest with the work force about what it can or will do with their allegations. Allegers are not informed that corporate officials will directly investigate many types of concerns. The SAFETEAM does not investigate allegations of harassment and intimidation at all. Those allegations are supposed to be immediately turned over to the corporate security.

The employees are not informed that their allegations and the responses to them will be reviewed by a senior corporate management review team prior to issuance.

The SAFETEAM program is not a company initiative to determine the existence of unresolved safety concerns by workers.

On the contrary, it is a program which is designed and operated to recruit safety concerns from the work force, eliminate those problems by explanation and reliance on the very personnel or procedures that permitted the problems to begin with, and identify to senior management those employees who are potential public whistleblowers so they can be terminated, laid-off or otherwise discriminated against.

The SAFETEAM program has not earned nor is it entitled to i

the protection and nurturing it has been given by the NRC. The NRC's efforts to "bend over backwards" to encourage industry initiatives must stop short of abdicating its responsibility for the safety of the Fermi facility. The SAFETEAM program has been I i

found to be inadequate, and worse, at both Fermi and Comanche Peak, its performance marred by instances where utility officials refused to acknowledge the s'etiousness of either safety or wrongdoing issues.

Furthermore, at Fermi, a plant that has been plagued with the manifestation of previously unknown safety-related problems, there is no justification for ignoring any clues to the problems which are contained in the reports and complaints of the workforce from the beginning of the SAFETEAM program.

The NRC has provided the SAFETEAM with a mechanism to avoid regulatory accountability for violations of federal requirements.

The program does not even attempt to comply with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B criteria.

That is, the deficiencies reported to SAFETEAM are not recorded on non-conformance reports or other site controlled deficiency paper. The problems are not evaluated by the site quality assurance / quality control staff. This loophole allows large numbers of safety-related deficiencies to exist in the files of the utility without requiring compliance with federal regulations.

If these deficiencies were controlled through the site QA/QC program a completely different result might ensue from the workers reporting their safety allegations.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS A.

The NRC's First Priority Must Be To Ensure the Protection of the Public's Health and Safety The NRC has broad discretion to revoke, suspend, or modify the construction permit of an NRC licensee. 42 U.S.C. $2236 states that:

Any. license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application or any statement of fact required under section-2232 of this title, or because of conditions revealed by such application or statement of fact or any report, record, or inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application, or for failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or license or the technical specifications in the application, or for violation of, or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of this chapter or of any regulation of the Commission.

See, also, 42 U.S.C. SS2133, 2134.

The same criteria for the revocation, suspension, or modification of a construction permit exist under NRC regulations. See, 10 C.?.R. 50.100 (1986).

"(P]ublic safety is the first, last, and permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility." Power Reactor Development Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402 (1961) See, also, Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, 7 NRC 400, 404 (1978).

The NRC has a mandatory duty to exercise this authority when necessary. The foremost priority for the NRC is to determine that there will be adequate protection of the health and safety 4

of the public. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 528 F.2d 166 (2nd Cir. 1978) The issue of safety must be resolved before the Commission issues a construction permit. Porter City Ch. of Izaak Walton League v.

Atomic Energy Commission, 515 F.2d 513, 524 (7th Cir. 1975).

It is obviously well established that the NRC's paramount consideration in any decision must be protection of public health and safety.

The failure of the NRC to take control of the numerous allegations in the possession of DECO's SAFETEAM program raises substantial health and safety questions about the Fermi II facility. What types of concerns are in the SAFETEAM files?

Were they investigated properly? Were any deficiencies adequately corrected? Were issues of wrongdoing brought to the attention of the NRC? None of these questions can be answered satisfactorily. The fact that approximately 2,000 SAFETEAM files pertaining to the condition of the Fermi II facility have not undergone rigorous regulatory review is frightening. Petitioners are concerned even more by the prospect that in all likelihood the best SAFETEAM review of an allegation was inadequate. (See, OI Report).

These are clearly circumstances in which a show cause order must be issued. Where substantial health and safety issues are raised a show cause order is required. In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Co., 2 NRC 173, 176 (1975); In the Matter of i

Washington Public Power Supply System, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984).

B. The NRC Must Require that SAFETEAM Processes All Allegations in Accordance with 10 C.P.R. 50, Appendix B The Code of Federal Regulations governing the regulation of the nuclear industry sets forth certain quality assurance requirements for nuclear power plants. These are set out in 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B, Criteria I-XVIII.

The introduction to this section states that:

The pertinent requirements of the appendix apply to all activities affecting the safety related functions of those structures, systems, and components...

The introduction goes on to state that the term "... quality assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service."

(emphasis added)

The SAFETEAM program actively recruits information from workers concerning their knowledge and confidence that a specific structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service. Additionally, workers report instances of deliberate {

wrongdoing and of harassment and intimidation which have an impact on the assurance of the safety of the plant. In the Matter of Duke Power Co., 21 NRC 1959 (1985). By receiving these allegations the utility believes that it is adding an extra measure of assurance of safety to the project.

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However, in practice, the SAFETEAM sets up a program of The SAFETEAM is not required to operate under federal immunity.

regulations which require reporting of certain types of allegations of nuclear safety related deficiencies to the NRC.

As a result the SAFETEAM allegations are not processed under any federal requirements. There is no quality check of the SAFETEAM program, nor accountability of the actions of the SAFETEAM investigators or interviewers to site specifications or federal requirements. The SAFETEAM manual indicates that nonaccountability is a benefit.

Freedom To Act - The SAFETEAM operation is a function outside of the license of the NRC and concerns can be investigated without procedures reviewed by the NRC.

No reports to the NRC are required until and unless investigation shows a violation of procedures, etc.

However, wrongdoing must be reported to the resident NRC inspector as soon as reported-stamped "2.790(d)

(emphasis material withheld from public disclosure."

added) allegations, such The consequences of this loophole is that as the over 2,000 worker concerns contained in DECO's SAFETEAM files, are never subjected to the requirements or findings which to would have occurred had the deficiency been processed pursuant Therefore there is no way to appropriate regulatory channels.

ever determine if, for example, all of the information known to the workforce and reported outside of the normal QA/QC channels This is has been incorporated into the site records.

particularly dangerous when the issues that are escaping review 12 -

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l l

are those that workers felt strongly enough about to report to  !

l someone. At the Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar plant the worker allegation program determined that over 50% of the worker l

allegations had merit and required some type of corrective action. At Comanche Peak the worker allegations given to GAP and  !

the NRC prior to the beginning of the SAFETEAM program had between 30 and 50 percent verification rate. At Fermi, one of the most troubled reactors in the country right now, the SAFETEAM program would have us believe that virtually none of the 2,000 worker allegations had any serious implications. Such an explanation is simply not credible.

The NRC has given its blessings to this loophole by its continued refusal to require worker allegation programs to be subject to the requirements of federal regulations. The Commission articulated that position at a closed meeting last year regarding the Wolf Creek nuclear power plant allegations, and again regarding the TVA program; and Mr. Keppler has continued that policy in regards to the SAFETEAM program.

(See, Statement of Mr. Keppler at public meeting in July 1986 regarding Fermi Restart.)

The NRC's exemption of SAFETEAM records from the 10 C.F.R.

$50, Appendix B process amounts to a failure to follow its own regulations. It is well established that an agency is legally bound to follow its own rules and regulations. See, Accardi v.

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_ _ ~ - . _ ,,. ___ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ __ __ _ _ - _ ____--

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Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Yellin v. U.S., 374 U.S.

109 (1963); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 613 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pearce v.

Director, Office of Worker's Compensation, 647 F.2d 716 (7th Cir.

1981). Furthermore, the NRC must act to ensure the public health and safety. The public health and safety is not protected when allegations are purposely exempted from rigoroes review.

C. The NRC Must Process the Allegations in the SAFETEAM Files In Accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0517 NRC Manual Chapter 0517, entitled "Management of Allegations", describes the NRC's policies and procedures for processing allegations pertaining to any NRC licensee. Two of the objectives of NRC's allegation management policy are:

1. To assure that individuals making allegations to the NRC are properly treated, provided confidentiality when necessary, appropriate and possible, and notified of the resolution. NRC-0517-022.

2. To assure that issues are promptly and adequately investigated. NRC-0517-023.

From a regulatory standpoint the benefits of these objectives are obvious. When properly implemented these policy objectives allow the free flow of information from concerned individuals to the NRC. This allows the NRC to engage in a thorough analysis of its licensees. Furthermore, maintaining the strict confidentiality of vulnerable sources, and following through with competent investigations inspires confidence in the regulatory process.

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In its current form the SAFETEAM program does not, because it cannot, maintain confidentiality of sources or engage in thorough and competent investigations of the allegations it receives.

It fails primarily because the utility uses the program to ensure licensing and eliminate any possible friction with the NRC or the public.

DECO does not intend to objectively regulate itself through the implementation of the SAFETEAM program.

Any assumptions to the contrary would be naive.

Therefore, reliance on the SAFETEAM program to manage and process allegations in a manner comparable to the NRC is clearly unacceptable.

An additional comparison of NRC policy with SAFETEAM practice will help prove the point. The NRC's allegation management policy states:

For allegations involving a potentially significant and immediate impact on the public health and safety, the affected organization should be promptly informed to assure proper and timely action. For other allega-

• tions, once information from allegers is received and understood by the Office / Region and if it is deemed l appropriate by the Office Director / Regional l Administrator, the licensee / vendor should be advised l specifically by letter of the area of concern and should be requested to address it, subject to.further audit by NRC, in order to minimize the expenditure of NRC resources. In all instances, however, confi-dentiality must not be breached and the effectiveness of investigations / inspections should not be com-promised, such as by prematurely releasing or appearing to release an NRC inspection report. The alleger must be informed that this is not handing a matter over to the affected organization, but that NRC will review and evaluate the actions of the affected organization and perform independent activities as necessary. The affected organization should be informed regarding the resolution of the allegation if appropriate....

There are two exceptions to the above. The first 1

.~ .

exception is where the information cannot be released in sufficient detail to be of use to the licensee or vendor without compromising the identity of the con-fidential source. In such cases release should nor-mally not be made unless the release is necessary to prevent an imminent threat to the public health and l safety.  !

The EDO shall be consulted in all cases where t it appears there is a need to release the identity of a confidential source. The second exception is where a licensee / vendor could compromise an investigation /

inspection because of knowledge gained from the release l of information, especially if wrongdoing is involved. i The Regional Administrator for inspections and the Director of the office of Investigations for investi-gations shall decide whether or not to release the information to avoid compromising NRC action. Release of information to a licensee / vendor is expected to be the exception for OI investigations....

NRC-0517-58. Under this policy the NRC takes information from concerned individuals and requires that the utility respond to the allegation. This process is subject to further audit and review by the NRC. In addition, information from allegers, utility responses to NRC inquiries, and subsequent NRC inspections, audits, or reviews are all matters which become part of the public record.

Internally controlled SAFETEAM files and documents rarely, if ever, find their way into the public record, thereby avoiding public review and comment.

In addition, SAFETEAM does not engage in the type of objective audit and review of allegations that NRC policy requires. Understandably, SAFETEAM's goals as an organization controlled by the licensee are inapposite to the NRC's goals as a licensor and regulator. This difference alone explains why the NRC must review all SAFETEAM 16 -

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ie controlled allegations pertaining to the Fermi II facility in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0517.

D.

SAFETEAM Must Be Required To Advise Employees About the Limitations of the Program The SAFETEAM program represents itself to the workforce as an "outside" concern. It emphasizes that the interviewers and investigators are independent consultants. The program includes repeated promises of confidentiality.

Yet under this facade is the reality that the utility manages the SAFETEAM project, that the SAFETEAM director is a utility employee, that many categories of concerns are immediately forwarded to the company for investigation, and that each and every SAFETEAM allegation and report is reviewed by a management team made up of corporate officials from the legal department, public relations department, and the site quality assurance staff.

If workers were aware of these facts from the outset it is highly unlikely that they would choose to inform SAFETEAM of their concerns, rather than the NRC.

According to the SAFETEAM manual the interviewers are instructed to solicit each and every concern that theu have about the project by promising anonymity and thorough investigations into those concerns.

Reassurance: Anonymous Investigation Reply - After the film, anyone in the audience who has a safety concern is invited to request an interview.

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Reassurance is given that the process keeps them completely anonymous - and their concerns will be identified only by coded numbers - and that they need not fear retribution. They are also promised that their concerns will be they will receive a rep. thoroughly investigated ly as to what action has and beenthat taken. (Manual at 27).

SECOM and the SSIRM believe that the SAFETEAM program actively misleads workers into trusting the program, and fails to inform the workers of the procedures and accountabilities that the SAFETEAM has to the utility owner.

Consequently, the SAFETEAM program is not based on a serious commitment to confidentiality. Each allegation is, in fact, investigated by contacting the very supervisors and management personnel who inadequately resolved the original concerns. This action identifies the concernee to anyone who has the ability to master the skill of simple deduction. More importantly those allegations which are not investigated by the SAFETEAM but are turned over to the utility for investigation have no protection from identification. Finally, each and every allegation is given to the utility owner review committee. This committee consists of a representative from the Public Relations department, a senior licensing attorney, and the Manager of Quality Assurance. I These individuals have access to the identity of each concernee.

Since it is undisputed that confidentiality is the cornerstone to an effective program (SAFETEAM Brochure at 1-2) it is critical that confidentiality in any program be strictly i

4 adhered to by the employee allegation program.

This must be more than lip service to a principal, it must be an honest commitment' to protecting those employees who have a reason to need anonymity in exchange for the disclosure. Once the program has a reputation that there is no real prctection the credibility of the program evaporates.

This has apparently happened at Fermi, and at Comanche Peak and at the South Texas Project. The SAFETEAM programs cannot guarantee confidentiality because the programs are not truly dedicated to a resolution of concerns instead of identification.

It is a deceptive program that does not explain to the employee just how a concern is investigated, who investigates it, who reviews it, and the procedures by which his/her identity will be protected.

An additional, but unadvertised limitation of the SAFETEAM program is that it does not investigate all reported concerns.

The SAFETEAM only investigates those concerns which are in some way nuclear safety-related.

This excludes all concerns of potential wrengdoing, i.e., harassment and intimidation, falsification of records, destruction of records, pressure to approve faulty work, etc.

Those concerns are to be forwarded to the Nuclear Security force of DECO. Nonetheless, according to the OI investigation only three allegations of wrongdoing were forwarded to Nuclear Security for investigation by the SAFETEAM.

The remaining "wrongdoing" allegations were retained in the SAFETEAM files. The OI investigators concluded that there was a completely unreliable effort made to determine the extent of the wrongdoing reported by various workers, and virtually no effort to determine the scope of the problems or the cause of them. This convinced the OI team that the SAFETEAM program had failed as an investigatory program substitute.

This conclusion is not surprising. The program has no independence from the utility it serves. The program is supposed to be a tool of the utility to ease the licensing path, not to identify problems that have the potential of slowing down the process and exposing actual wrongdoers.

Additionally, the SAFETEAM collects, but does not investigate the concerns relating to the following areas:

industrial safety, security, harassment and intimidation, and miscellaneous personnel matters. Each of these areas is also directly referred to the utility for investigation and resolution by in-house personnel.

V. CONCLUSION The SAFETEAM program at Fermi II is not designed or intended to rigorously review or investigate allegations. The NRC has acknowledged that the SAFETEAM program is inadequate. Despite these problems, the NRC does not require the SAFETEAM program to

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comply with regulations. 10 C.F.R. 50, Appendix B. Nor has the NRC taken the initiative to review all the allegations in the SAFETEAM files in accordance with its own allegation management policies. NRC Manual Chapter 0517.

The result is that the NRC is regulating the Fermi II facility without the benefit of significant amounts of information. This creates a substantial threat to the public's health and safety, and destroys the credibility of the nuclear regulatory process. Immediate steps consistent with the relief requested in this petition must be taken to ensure the safe operation of the Fermi II facility.

VI. RELIEF REQUESTED SECOM and SSIHM respectfully request that the following relief be granted:

l (1) The NRC must take possession of all SAFETEAM files and review the allegations for all potential safety related l deficiencies, and make these concerns public; 1

(2) The NRC must require that all SAFETEAM allegations are processed by the utility in accordance with 10 C.F.R.

S50, Appendix B; (3) The NRC must require that all utility employees are I

fully informed about the SAFETEAM program before they l

make a choice between submitting information to

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SAFETEAM or the NRC; (4) All such other relief consistent with this petition which is deemed just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted, 3df1 P. &&. Cby Rd Billie P. Garde Director - GAP Midwest Office N o Richard E. Condit Staff Attorney Dated: May 7, 1987 060a01

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