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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000461/LER-2013-004]]
| number = ML13304A502
| issue date = 10/11/2013
| title = LER 13-004-00 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Regarding Loss of Emergency Diesel Room Ventilation Due to Damper Hydramotor Failure
| author name = Taber B K
| author affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000461
| license number = NPF-062
| contact person =
| case reference number = SRRS 5A.108, U-604140
| document report number = LER 13-004-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 5
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:'- ,EExelon Generation, Clinton Power Station8401 Power RoadClinton, IL 61727U-604140October 11, -201310 CFR 50.73SRRS 5A.108U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, D. C. 20555-0001 Clinton Power Station, Unit 1Facility Operating License No. NPF-62NRC Docket No. 50-461
 
==Subject:==
Licensee Event Report 2013-004-00 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2013-004-00:
Loss of Emergency DieselRoom Ventilation Due to Damper Hydramotor Failure.
This report is being submitted inaccordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report.Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Ms. Kathy Ann Baker,Regulatory Assurance
: Manager, at (217)-937-2800.
Respectfully, B. Keith TaberSite Vice President Clinton Power StationRSF/blf
 
==Enclosure:==
 
Licensee Event Report 2013-004-00 cc: Regional Administrator
-NRC Region IIINRC Senior Resident Inspector
-Clinton Power StationOffice of Nuclear Facility Safety -IEMA Division of Nuclear Safety NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
10/31/2013 (10-2010)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into thelicensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burdenestimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by intemet e-mail toinfocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) and Regulatory
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management andBudget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information (See reverse for required number of collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC maysfor each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, thedigits/characters finformation collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGEClinton Power Station, Unit 1 05000461 1 OF 44. TITLELoss of Emergency Diesel Room Ventilation Due to Damper Hydramotor Failure5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDT FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERMONTH DAY Y YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER08 15 2013 2013 004 -00 10 11 2013 050009. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMI'rrED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)[1 20.2201(b)
[l 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 10 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
: 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0l 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
[I 50,73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4) 092 El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[E OTHEREl 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
ED 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract belowor in NRC Form 366A12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERFACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (IncudeArea Code)Kathy Ann Baker, Regulatory Assurance Manager 217-937-2800
: 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTMANU- REPORTABLE MANU- REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TOEPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT X Vd HOVA 1106 Y14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
: 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEARSUBMISSION El YES (If yes, complete
: 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATEABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On 8/15/13, maintenance personnel were performing planned performance testing of the Division 3Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Room Ventilation System and noticed the supply air damper did notopen when the EDG room ventilation fan started, and noticed the flow data results were not consistent withprevious testing data. The damper is required to stroke to full open and then modulate with the fan running ifsupply air temperature is above 70 degrees.
Operators restarted the fan with the temperature controller setat 70 degrees and actual air temperature reading 84 degrees, but the damper again failed to open.Operators immediately declared the Division 3 EDG and the supported High Pressure Core Spray Systeminoperable based on low confidence that the ventilation system was capable of controlling EDG roomtemperature to support the EDG mission time and entered the required Technical Specification actions.Troubleshooting found that the internal hydraulic pump in the damper's hydramotor had failed. The cause ofthis event is that the damper hydramotor experienced an end-of-life failure due to being installed beyond itsrecommended service life. Corrective actions include replacing the hydramotor that failed and identifying theextent of hydramotors installed beyond the recommended life and replacing them.NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEY SEQUENTIAL REVIYEAR NUMBER NO.Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 05000461 J 2 OF 42013 004 -00NARRATIVE PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION General Electric
-- Boiling Water Reactor, 3473 Megawatts Thermal Rated Core PowerEnergy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in test as [XX].EVENT IDENTIFICATION Loss of Emergency Diesel Room Ventilation Due to Damper Hydramotor FailureA. Plant Operating Conditions Before the EventUnit: 1 Event Date: 8/15/13 Event Time: 0915 hours CDTMode: 1 Mode Name: Power Operation Reactor Power: 92 percentB. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTOn 8/15/13, component maintenance personnel were performing planned performance testing of the Division3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) [EK] Room Ventilation System [VJ]. At 0850 hours Operations placedthe Division 3 EDG ventilation fan into service.
At about 0915 hours, the component maintenance personnel noticed the supply air damper [DMP] did not demonstrate the expected behavior of opening when the Division3 EDG room ventilation fan [FAN] started, and noticed the flow data results were not consistent with previoustesting data.Operators suspected that the cause of the damper not opening was that outside air temperature was belowthe damper setpoint of 70 degrees Fahrenheit (F), determined that the test should be run again later in theday when intake air temperature would be higher, and initiated Issue Report 1546973 to document theirconclusion.
At about 1400 hours, operators restarted the fan with the temperature controller set at 70degrees F and actual air temperature reading 84 degrees F, but the damper again failed to open. At about1420 hours, operators secured the fan and declared the Division 3 EDG and the supported High PressureCore Spray System [BG] inoperable based on low confidence that the VJ system was capable of controlling EDG room temperature to support the EDG mission time, and entered the required Technical Specification actions.The Clinton Power Station Updated Safety Analysis Report sections 9.4.5.1.1.2.b and d state that the EDGventilation system is designed to limit the maximum EDG room temperature to 130 degrees F. Duringextreme weather conditions EDG room temperatures may rise to 140 degrees F maximum for 12 hours.The supply air damper/hydramotor
[HOVA] assembly is designed to fail closed. The damper control isdesigned to fully open and then modulate the damper to maintain supply air temperature at a setpoint of 70degrees F on fan start if supply air temperature is greater than 70 degrees F. During troubleshooting thedamper did not open when temperature reached the 70 degrees F setpoint and failed to stroke open ondemand.This event was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D),
as an event orcondition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences ofan accident.
The station notified the NRC of this event via Emergency Notification 49286 at 1653 hours on8/15/13.
Issue Report 1547294 was initiated to investigate this event.NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEI SEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 05000461 3 OF2013 -004 -00NARRATIVE C. CAUSE OF EVENTBased on review of the hydramotor maintenance history and failure analysis from the vendor, the apparentcause of the supply air damper failure to open was that the damper hydramotor experienced an end-of-life failure due to being installed beyond its recommended service life. The hydramotor failed as result of normalage-related degradation of the internal hydraulic pump [P]. The hydramotor had been installed for about 26years and the recommended service life is 10 years.The hydramotor was never replaced due to a significant change in hydramotor preventive maintenance (PM)scope in 2005 which should have treated the change as a first-time PM and revised the due date accordingly.
: However, the change to the PM retained the original scheduling date and allowed the hydramotor to remain inthe system beyond the recommended service life.D. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES This event had no actual consequences.
The Division 3 EDG was in its normal standby lineup at the time ofthis event. A failure of the supply air damper to open limits the amount of outside air that can be introduced into the EDG engine and fuel storage rooms to maintain room temperature and remove heat loading from theEDG operation.
If an event occurred requiring the Division 3 EDG to run at full load, the EDG could haveexceeded the analyzed heat load for the Division 3 EDG room prior to completion of the system's missiontime. During this event, the recirculation damper was open and allowing recirculation air flow; therefore, somecooling and heat removal was occurring.
Additionally, there is some inlet airflow due to seal leakage aroundthe damper blades and door seals in the fan room, but the amount of cooling this may provide is unknown.Prior to the event, on 8/14/13, the Division 3 EDG was satisfactorily started for Technical Specification surveillance testing at 0924 hours and run for approximately two hours without any evidence of damperfailures and no unexpected room temperature or pressure conditions noted.At the time of this event the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System [BN] was operable and all Emergency Core Cooling Systems (with the exception of HPCS) were operable as well as AC power, including Divisions 1 and 2 EDGs. Although HPCS was declared inoperable, HPCS was available with offsite power.E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONSThe failed hydramotor was replaced, post maintenance testing was completed and functionality/operability was restored on. 8/17/13.An evaluation determined that critical, non-EQ hydramotors have the correct 10-year frequency PMestablished.
(EQ hydramotors have established PM strategies based on their EQ analyses and are notaffected by the cause of this event.)Ten additional hydramotors have been identified as being installed beyond the 10-year recommended lifeand will be replaced.
Applicable Engineering and Work Management staff will receive a tailgate on the failure to treat thesignificant change in PM scope as a new PM task.NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)
NFRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGESEQUENTIAL REVYEAR NUMBER NO.Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 05000461 4 OF2013 -004 -00NARRATIVE F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES A review for previous occurrences did not identify similar events at Clinton Power Station.G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATAComponent
 
==
Description:==
 
Modulating Air Damper Hydramotor/Actuator Manufacturer:
ITT General ControlsModel: NH91NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)}}

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