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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000413/LER-2013-002]]
| number = ML14050A128
| issue date = 02/10/2014
| title = LER 13-002-00 for Catawba, Unit 1, Regarding Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (Lcos) 3.6.3 and 3.7.3 Were Violated Due to the Isolation of Nitrogen Supply to Two Unit 1 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves
| author name = Henderson K
| author affiliation = Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000413
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = CNS-14-014
| document report number = LER 13-002-00
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 9
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Kelvin Henderson DUKE Vice President ENERGY. Catawba Nuclear StationDuke EnergyCN01VP I 4800 Concord RoadYork, SC 29745o: 803.701.4251 f: 803.701.3221 CNS-14-014 February 10, 2014U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control DeskWashington, D.C. 20555
 
==Subject:==
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1Docket No. 50-413Licensee Event Report (LER) 413/2013-002-0 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and (d), attached is LER 413/2013-002-0,
: entitled, "Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.6.3 and 3.7.3 Were Violated Due tothe Isolation of Nitrogen Supply to Two Unit 1 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves".This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its attachment.
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of thepublic.If there are any questions on this report, please contact Paul Simbrat at (803) 701-3424.
Sincerely, Kelvin Henderson Vice President, Catawba Nuclear StationPS/sAttachment Document Control DeskPage 2February 10, 2014xc (with attachment):
V.M. McCreeRegional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Region IIMarquis One Tower245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 J.C. Paige (addressee only)NRC Project ManagerU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8-G9A11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852-2738 G.A. Hutto, IIINRC Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear StationINPO Records Center700 Galleria PlaceAtlanta, GA 30339-5957 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
01/31/2017 (01-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by.LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and(See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DCdigits/characters for each block) 20503. Ifa means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMBcontrol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, theinformation collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGECatawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 1 OF 74. TITLETechnical Specification LimitingConditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.6.3 and 3.7.3 Were Violated Due to theIsolation of Nitrogen Supply to Two Unit 1 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves.5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVEDI FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBERMONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR INUMBER NO1FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER12 16 2013 2013 -002 -00 02 10 2014 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)[] 20.2201(b)
[] 20.2203(a)(3)(1)
Ej 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 1 20.2201(d)
E] 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
[ 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
[1 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
: 10. POWER LEVEL LI 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
[] 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
[j 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100% El 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[ 50.36(c)(2)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[] 73.71(a)(4)
EJ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
LI 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[] 73.71(a)(5)
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[ OTHER20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract belowor in NRC Form 366A12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LERFACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)Paul Simbrat, Regulatory Affairs (803) 701-342413. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORTCAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE I I I FACTURER TO EPIXA SJ ISV B350 Y14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTEDLI YES (If yes, complete
: 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)On December 16, 2013, following the completion of an engineering evaluation, it was determined that mainfeedwater isolation valves (MFIVs) 1 CF42 and 1 CF60 had been unknowingly inoperable since the completion ofthe last Unit 1 refueling outage in December of 2012. The MFIVs have the possibility of becoming thermally boundor pressure locked following heat up of the feedwater system. To aid in opening the valves, they are procedurally "soft seated" by reducing the nitrogen pressure in the system. After the MFIV is opened, the nitrogen system isrestored to its normal pressure.
Following maintenance work to "soft seat" MFIVs 1CF33, 1CF42, 1CF51 and1 CF60 near the end of refueling outage 1 EOC20, the nitrogen supply to 1 CF33, 1 CF42 and 1 CF60 remainedpartially isolated.
This condition went undetected until subsequent maintenance activities in November 2013identified the issue. A review for the periods of time that the partial isolation existed identified that 1 CF33 remainedoperable;
: however, during the time period of 7/13/13 -11/8/13, 1CF-42 nitrogen accumulator pressure was belowthe operability limit for operation with the remote accumulator isolated and from 1/19/13 -10/25/13, lCF-60nitrogen accumulator pressure was below the same limit. The cause is attributed to human errors related toinadequate job preparation and procedure use and adherence.
The pre job brief was deficient and steps wereinappropriately marked "not applicable" in the procedure.
Planned corrective actions include updating model workorders used to plan this work to include a requirement to review corrective action program documents related tothis event prior to performing this work and including this issue in the 2014 training covering operating experience for the Maintenance organization.
There was minimal safety significance to this event. The closed systemprovided an inside containment isolation and the ability to perform at least one method of main feedwater isolation was maintained, therefore, this event did not affect the health and safety of the public.NRC FORM 366 (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
01/31/2017 (01-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:
80 hours.Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or... LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office ofCONTINUATION SHEET Information and Regulatory
: Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104),
Office of Management andBudget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection doesnot display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, anda person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVCatawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 Y NUMBER NO 2 OF 72013 -002 00NARRATIVE BACKGROUND This event is being reported under the following criteria:
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),
any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications (TS).Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 is a Westinghouse four-loop Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) [EIIS: RCT].The main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs) [EIIS: ISV] isolate main feedwater
[EIIS: SJ] flow to the secondary side of the steam generators
[EIIS: SG] following a high energy line break (HELB). The safety related function ofthe main feedwater control valves (MFCVs) [EIIS: FCV] is to provide the second isolation of main feedwater flowto the secondary side of the steam generators following an HELB. Closure of the MFIVs and associated bypassvalves or MFCVs and associated bypass valves terminates flow to the steam generators, terminating the event forfeedwater line breaks (FWLBs) occurring upstream of the MFIVs or MFCVs. The consequences of eventsoccurring in the main steam [EIIS: SB] lines or in the main feedwater lines downstream from the MFIVs will bemitigated by their closure.
Closure of the MFIVs and associated bypass valves, or MFCVs and associated bypass valves, effectively terminates the addition of feedwater to an affected steam generator, limiting the massand energy release for steam line breaks (SLBs) or FWLBs inside containment, and reducing the cool downeffects for SLBs. The MFIVs also function to provide containment isolation.
The MFIVs and associated bypass valves isolate the nonsafety related portions of the main feedwater systemfrom the safety related portions.
In the event of a secondary side pipe rupture inside containment, the valves limitthe quantity of high energy fluid that enters containment through the break, and provide a pressure boundary forthe controlled addition of auxiliary feed water [EIIS: BA] to the intact loops.One MFIV and associated bypass valve, and one MFCV and its associated bypass valve, are located on eachmain feedwater line, outside but close to containment.
The MFIVs and MFCVs are located on different supplylines from the auxiliary feedwater injection line so that auxiliary feedwater may be supplied to the steamgenerators following MFIV or MFCV closure.The MFIVs are gate valves with pneumatic-hydraulic actuators.
Thrust is delivered to the gate valve from a pistoncylinder assembly connected to the valve stem. The actuator nitrogen system delivers high pressure nitrogen tothe closing (top) side of the piston. The hydraulic system delivers high pressure hydraulic fluid to the opening(bottom) side of the piston. The hydraulic system utilizes solenoid valves in conjunction with a hydraulic pump tocharge or vent the hydraulic system. The nitrogen system is a passive accumulator system consisting of twonitrogen accumulators and a pressure transmitter with their associated isolation valves. The nitrogen system isalways in contact with the piston cylinder such that a loss of hydraulic system pressure will result in valve closure.The nitrogen system provides the safety related closing force for the feedwater isolation valves.Based on operating experience, the MFIVs have the possibility of becoming thermally bound or pressure lockedfollowing heat up of the feedwater system. To aid in opening the valves, the valves are procedurally "soft seated"by reducing the nitrogen pressure in the system. After the MFIV is opened, the nitrogen system is restored to itsnormal alignment and pressure.
NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)
CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVCatawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 NUMBER NO 3 OF 72013 -002 -00NARRATIVE TS 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves" includes requirements for the containment isolation function provided byeach MFIV. Each containment isolation valve is required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Condition C isapplicable to each MFIV based on the system configuration (one containment isolation valve (the MFIV) outsidecontainment and a closed system inside containment).
With one or more penetration flow paths with onecontainment isolation valve inoperable the affected penetration flow path must be isolated by use of at least oneclosed and de activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange within 72 hours (Required ActionC.1) and the affected penetration flow path must be verified isolated once every 31 days (Required Action C.2). Ifany of these Required Actions are not accomplished within their specified Completion Times (Condition F), theaffected unit must be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours (Required Action F.1) and in Mode 5 within 36 hours(Required Action F.2).TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs),
Main Feedwater Control Valves (MFCVs),
Associated Bypass Valves and Tempering Valves" delineates requirements for the main feedwater isolation valves. FourMFIVs are required to be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3 except when a MFIV, the associated bypass valve, ortempering valve is closed and de activated or isolated by a closed manual valve. With one or more MFIVsinoperable (Condition A), the inoperable MFIV must be closed or isolated within 72 hours (Required Action A.1)and the inoperable MFIV must be verified closed or isolated once every 7 days (Required Action A.2). If twovalves in the same flow path are inoperable (Condition D), the affected flow path must be isolated within 8 hours(Required Action D.1). If any of these Required Actions are not accomplished within their specified Completion Times (Condition E), the affected unit must be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours (Required Action E.1) and in Mode4 within 12 hours (Required Action E.2).On December 16, 2013 when this issue was determined to be reportable, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power.Unit 1 remained in Mode 1 throughout the periods of time that the MFIVs were determined to be inoperable.
During the period that the MFIVs were determined to be inoperable no other structures,
: systems, or components were out of service that would have prevented at least one method of main feedwater isolation from providing therequired safety function.
During this period the main feedwater closed system inside containment remained intactas evidenced by confirmation of no primary to secondary
: leakage, ensuring an inside containment isolation existed.EVENT DESCRIPTION Date/Time Event(Some event times are approximate.)
12/19/12 Nitrogen pressure was reduced on the four main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs) on Unit1 near the end of refueling outage 1 EOC20 to "soft seat" the valves. Work Orders 2020362(1 CF33), 2020363 (1 CF42), 02020364 (1 CF51) and 2020365 (1CF60) were performed toreduce nitrogen pressure.
The Maintenance technicians performing the venting stopped atthe request of Operations personnel on the procedure step that established the necessary nitrogen pressure on each valve. Steps to restore the isolated remote nitrogen accumulator tank on each valve were not performed at this time.12/28/12-12/29/12 MFIVs 1CF33, 1CF42, 1CF51 and 1CF60 were opened by Operations.
The OutageCommand Center (OCC) notified Maintenance to close out the paperwork for the valves.The Maintenance technicians performing the work were told by Operations personnel thatthe MFIVs were open and that the nitrogen pressure on each valve was satisfactory, exceptfor 1 CF51. A technician from another Maintenance team was used to perform the chargingNRC FORM 366A (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)
CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR I SEQUENTIAL REVCatawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 1 NUMBER NO 4 OF 712013 -002 00NARRATIVE of the nitrogen supply for 1CF51. The nitrogen supply for 1CF51 was charged to anacceptable pressure and this technician was released back to his crew. The technicians originally assigned the task determined they could close out the work orders since all thenitrogen pressures were now satisfactory.
All four W/O packages were closed out with nofurther actions performed.
Charging of the nitrogen supply to 1CF51 restored the remotenitrogen accumulator tank, however it was unrecognized at this time that the remotenitrogen accumulator tanks on 1 CF33, 1 CF42 and 1 CF60 remained
: isolated, reducing thevolume of nitrogen available to assist with closing of these valves.11/08/13/1453 11/08/13/1645 11/21/13/1830 11/24/13/1947 11/26/13
-12/17/1311/08/13
-12/16/13Maintenance work under work order 2125269 was initiated to charge the nitrogenaccumulators associated with MFIV 1 CF42 due to an existing slow leak.Problem Investigation Process (PIP) C-13-10910 was generated.
This PIP was written todocument that Maintenance found valve 1CFIV0421 for the remote nitrogen accumulator tank closed on the MFIV 1CF42. The expected position for 1CFIV0421 was open.Operations Shift Manager implemented the management procedure for Operational Response to Acts Directed Against Plant Equipment and determined this valve misposition to be an inadvertent/accidental act. 1 CFIV0421 was returned to the open position.
Anextent of condition was performed for the same valves associated with MFIVs for the otherthree steam generators on Unit 1 and all four steam generators on Unit 2. One otherremote nitrogen accumulator, for MFIV 1CF33, was found isolated.
PIP C-13-10913 waswritten to document the 1CF33 issue.During engineering staff review of nitrogen pressure trends for all Unit 1 main feedwater isolation valves, it was identified that the remote nitrogen accumulator tank on MFIV 1 CF60may have been isolated by valve 1CFIV0601 around the same time that the remotenitrogen accumulator tanks were isolated to MFIVs 1 CF33 and 1 CF42 in December 2012. Itwas further determined that 1 CF60 had its nitrogen system recharged on 10/25/13 underW/O 2123343.
The procedure steps involved directed the technicians to ensure1 CFIV0601 was OPEN prior to charging the system. Potentially the remote nitrogenaccumulator tank valve could have been put into the correct position during this activity.
PIPC-1 3-11492 was written to document this possibility.
Maintenance staff discussion with the maintenance technicians that performed the workunder W/O 2123343 found that it was plausible that the remote nitrogen tank accumulator valve was found closed and repositioned open during the work. The technicians remembered opening a valve they had found closed during the work, but were unsure as towhich valve. PIP C-13-11538 written.Cause analysis performed for PIP C-13-11538.
Cause analysis documented that aqualified maintenance technician found 1 CFIV0601 closed during work on 10/25/13 andutilized a procedure step to ensure it was open.Engineering and Regulatory Affairs continued to review this issue and determined that itwas LER reportable.
The remote nitrogen accumulators were installed in 2000 under CN-11393/00.
With the remote tank being isolated on 1 CF33, 1 CF42 and 1 CF60, thiseffectively reverted the nitrogen system back to its pre modification configuration of a singlenitrogen accumulator.
Calculation CNC-11205.41-00-0005 references an operability NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)
CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVCatawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 NUMBER NO 5 OF 72013 002 -00NARRATIVE evaluation performed in PIP C-97-2212 for design basis margin prior to the implementation of the modification.
Through this PIP, testing on the spare actuator was performed andcompared to required thrust calculation.
This determined an operability pressure of 2050psig was to be used when considering just the small accumulator volume. Once thepressure dropped below 2050 psig in the accumulator system, the valve would be outsidethe conditions set forth in the calculation.
A review of nitrogen pressure for the periods oftime that the remote nitrogen accumulators were isolated for 1 CF33, 1 CF42 and 1 CF60identified that 1CF33 remained operable;
: however, during the time period of 7/13/13 -11/8/13, 1 CF-42 nitrogen accumulator pressure was below the operability limit for operation with the remote accumulator isolated and from 1/19/13 -10/25/13, 1CF-60 nitrogenaccumulator pressure was below the operability limit for operation with the remoteaccumulator isolated.
CAUSAL FACTORSThe apparent cause team concluded that the supervisor and technicians did not exhibit the characteristic traits of an engaged thinking organization:
: 1. A review of the procedure and the actions to be completed in the procedure should have beendiscussed during the pre-job brief and therefore, the technicians would have understood the actionsnecessary to be performed in order to complete the task successfully.
The pre-job brief was led bythe supervisor.
: 2. Neither the individual assigned to perform the procedure nor the verifier reviewed the procedure toidentify what actions were necessary to complete the procedure prior to performing the work. Theindividuals inappropriately marked as not applicable (N/A) both the conditional and non-conditional steps in the procedure and only focused on the "Follow Up Section" of the procedure.
The involvedindividuals removed pages in the procedure that contained steps that should have been performed.
: 3. The technicians, both the performer and the verifier assigned to this task, failed to review theprocedure to verify/validate the necessary steps to be performed prior to performing the task.CORRECTIVE ACTIONSImmediate:
: 1. An extent of condition was performed for all other main feedwater isolation valves on Unit 1 and Unit2 to verify the nitrogen supply was not isolated.
The nitrogen supply to main feedwater isolation valve 1 CF33 for the 1 A steam generator was also found to be isolated.
The nitrogen supply wasopened for valve 1 CF33.Subsequent:
: 1. Work was completed to recharge the nitrogen supply to the main feedwater isolation valve 1 CF42 forthe 1 B steam generator.
Planned:1. Administer appropriate level corrective action for involved individuals.
NRC FORM 366A (01 -2014)
NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)
CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR SEQUENTIAL REVCatawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413 NUMBER NO 6 OF 72013 -002 -00NARRATIVE
: 2. Update model work orders used to plan this work to include requirement to review corrective actionprogram documents related to this event prior to performing this work.3. Include this issue in the 2014 training covering operating experience for the Maintenance organization.
There are no NRC commitments contained in this LER.SAFETY ANALYSISThere was minimal safety significance to this event. The feedwater isolation arrangement includes three meansfor stopping feedwater flow. In addition to isolation by the main and bypass feedwater control valves in each loop,a redundant safety grade feedwater isolation valve is required in series with the feedwater control valves. Thethird means for stopping flow consists of tripping all main feedwater pumps. Normally, two means are required foraccomplishing a safety related function in order to meet the single failure criterion.
: However, three means arerequired to accomplish feedwater isolation in the standard Westinghouse arrangement discussed above becausefailure of one of the means for isolating feedwater is postulated as the initiating event for one of the accidents considered.
As failure of one of the above means is assumed to be an initiating event, a review of TSAIL (Tech Spec ActionItem Log) was performed during the period which nitrogen pressure was below the operability limit for valves1CF42 and 1CF60 to ensure a means of feedwater isolation existed.
No entries documenting loss of functionwere identified.
It is expected that the equipment would operate as desired/designed during an event requiring feedwater isolation.
This is a reasonable assumption based on equipment performance as well as outage testing.Engineering staff reviewed the most recent outage testing of the feedwater isolation function and confirmed thatall acceptance criteria were met.A review of primary to secondary leak rate calculations performed during the period the MFIVs were inoperable was completed.
The main feedwater closed system inside containment remained intact as evidenced byconfirmation of no primary to secondary
: leakage, ensuring an inside containment isolation existed.Therefore, this event is considered to have no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Within the previous three years, the following LERs were submitted which have been evaluated against thisLER for recurring event similarity:
LER 413/2011-003, Revision 0, "Technical Specification Required Shutdown of Unit 1 and Unit 2 andAssociated Technical Specification Violation Involving Notice of Enforcement Discretion Due to TwoInoperable Trains of the Control Room Area Chilled Water System".
One of the root causes of this event wasdetermined to be insufficient maintenance procedural guidance for alignment of a chilled water pump.LER 413/2012-001, Revisions 0 and 1, "Unit 1 Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Faulted Reactor Coolant PumpMotor Cable Resulted in Zone G Relay Lockout and Subsequent Loss of Offsite Power and Emergency DieselGenerator Automatic Start for Both Units". One of the root causes of this event was determined to beinadequate design input specification and insufficient control over vendor outsourcing in conjunction with aZone G relay modification.
NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)
NRC FORM 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (01-2014)
CONTINUATION SHEET1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEYEAR I SEQUENTIAL REVCatawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 05000413Y NUMBER NO 7 OF 72013 -002 00NARRATIVE LER 414/2012-001, Revision 0, "Diesel Generator (DG) 2B Was Unknowingly Inoperable from 09/28/12 to10/23/12 Due to Failed Tachometer Relay Power Supply'.
The root cause of this event was determined to bean inadequate technical evaluation following a DG 2B engine tachometer malfunction.
LER 413/2012-003, Revision 0, "Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) 3.0.4 and3.7.5 Were Violated due to Unit 1 Entering Mode 3 with Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) PumpUnknowingly Inoperable".
The cause of this event was determined to be human performance error. In addition, aprocedure was deficient in that it lacked detail concerning the required orientation of the drive coupling whenperforming the installation
: process, which resulted in this task being performed as "skill of the craft".LER 413/2013-001, Revision 0, "Each Diesel Generator (DG) Was Determined to be Unknowingly Inoperable During its Monthly Surveillance Test Due to Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.17not being Met". The cause of this event was determined to be an inadequate original design.These events all involved entering or operating in a plant mode with an inoperable TS required component.
LER413/2012-003 was determined to be caused by a human performance error. The human performance error wasrelated to the failure to match mark components for reassembly whereas the human errors being reported in thisLER are related to inadequate job preparation and procedure use and adherence.
The pre job brief was deficient and steps were inappropriately marked "not applicable" in the procedure.
The specifics of the root causes andcorrective actions associated with the other events were also different.
Therefore, Duke Energy concludes thatthe event being reported in this LER is considered to be non-recurring in nature.Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [EIIS: XX]. This event isconsidered reportable to the INPO Consolidated Event System (ICES) (formerly called the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program).
This event is not considered to constitute a Safety System Functional Failure.
There was no release ofradioactive
: material, radiation overexposure, or personnel injury associated with the event described in this LER.NRC FORM 366A (01-2014)}}

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