ML17220A065: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000293/LER-2017-001]]
| number = ML17220A065
| issue date = 07/17/2017
| title = LER 17-001-01 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate
| author name = Perkins E P
| author affiliation = Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000293
| license number = DPR-035
| contact person =
| case reference number = 2.17.051
| document report number = LER 17-001-01
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 6
}}
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:*
July 17, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360
 
==SUBJECT:==
Licensee Event Report 2017-001-01, Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 Renewed License No. DPR-35 LETTER NUMBER: 2.17.051
 
==Dear Sir or Madam:==
The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2017-001-01, Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate, is submitted in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations
: 50. 73. Revisions to the previously submitted LER will be annotated by a vertical bar to the right of the wording changes. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (508) 830-8323.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Sincerely, EPP/sc
 
==Attachment:==
 
Licensee Event Report 2017-001-01, Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate (3 Pages)
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station cc: Mr. Daniel H. Dorman Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2100 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 Mr. John Lamb, Senior Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8C2A Washington, DC 20555 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Letter No. 2.17.051 Page 2 of 2 L Attachment Letter Number 2.17.051 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-01 Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate (3 Pages)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)
..
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours . ! . '?.... Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
;;, Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections
\ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by ..... internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 13. PAGE Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 1 OF 3 4. TITLE Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR N/A N/A 01 16 2017 2017 -001 -01 07 17 2017 FACILITY NAME N/A DOCKET NUMBER N/A 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR S: fCheck all that ann/vJ D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
N D 20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D so.13(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
: 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 13.11(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D so.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.11(a)(s)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.46(a)(3)(ii)
IRJ 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 13.11(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
IRJ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
IR] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 13.11(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT 'TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Mr. Everett P. Perkins, Jr. -Regulatory Assurance Manager 508-830-8323
: 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT MANU-REPORTABLE I MANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TOEPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TOEPIX D NG CDMP P014 y 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH I DAY I YEAR n YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) lxl NO SUBMISSION I I nATS: ABSTRACT On January 16, 2017, with the reactor at 100 percent power and the mode switch in RUN, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was performing surveillance testing of secondary containment isolation dampers when dampers IAO-N-82 and AO-N-83, refueling floor supply isolation dampers, failed to fully close when the control switches !Were taken to close. IThe failure of dampers AO-N-82 and AO-N-83 to fully close resulted in a loss of safety function for secondary containment, causing immediate entry into Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement (AS) 3.7.C.2.a, at 1155 hours. This LCO AS was exited at 1206 hours when the dampers were verified closed. !An 8-hour non-emergency notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), any event or condition that at the time discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
In addition, this notification is being conservatively made by PNPS in accordance with 1 O CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition that was prohibited by Technical Specifications.
The reactor building isolation dampers were cleaned, lubricated and post-work tested. PNPS has returned the dampers to operable status. Planned action to prevent recurrence is to revise the preventive maintenance strategy.
There was no impact to public health and safetv from this condition.
NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported t>*it.e., lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send .. (}' ':\. \¥) comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to ..... lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 2017 001 01 NARRATIVE BACKGROUND he Reactor Building Isolation and Control System (RBIS) safety objective is to limit the release to the nvironment of radioactive material so that offsite doses from a postulated design basis accident will be below he guideline values stated in 10 CFR 100_ The RBIS shall trip the Reactor Building supply and exhaust fans, isolate the normal ventilation system, and provide the initiation signals for the Standby Gas Treatment System in the event of a postulated Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in the drywell or a postulated fuel handling ccident in the Reactor Building.
he Reactor Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System includes the RBIS subsystem, hich supports the secondary containment function by automatically closing HVAC-related openings in econdary containment in the event of high drywell pressure, low reactor pressure vessel water level, or high irborne radiation levels in the refuel floor area, and Equipment Area Cooling System components, which upply supplemental cooling to the Core Standby Cooling Systems spaces within the reactor building and reject heat to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) was performing surveillance testing for the secondary containment isolation supply dampers. During the performance of this test the refuel floor supply isolation dampers showed ual indication when the control switches were taken to close. This is indicative of a failure of dampers to close. EVENT DESCRIPTION On January 16, 2017, with the reactor at 100 percent power and the mode switch in RUN, PNPS was performing surveillance testing of secondary containment isolation dampers when dampers AO-N-82 and O-N-83, refueling floor supply isolation dampers, failed to fully close on demand as revealed by dual indication in the Control Room. n 8-hour non-emergency notification was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or ondition that at the time discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or ystems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences f an accident.
he dampers were manually closed. The reactor building isolation dampers were then cleaned and lubricated.
he dampers were then cycled five times with satisfactory closure time results. PNPS has returned the ampers to operable status. he root cause of this event is that the preventative maintenance strategy was inadequate for secondary ontainment isolation supply dampers AO-N-82 and AO-N-83 and was not sufficiently structured to prevent repetitive failures of high critical components.
This caused the condition, since preventative maintenance ctions (which are intended to prevent repetitive failures of high critical components) were not adequate to ro erl maintain these com onents, resultin in a loss of safet function for seconda containment.
NRc FORM 366 (06-2016)
Page 2 of 3 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported ...
lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send #' '"<.
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 -... \ 7.1* LICENSEE EVENT REPORT F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to ..... lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 2017 001 01 NARRATIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The immediate corrective action was for the reactor building isolation dampers to be cleaned and lubricated and post-work tested and the dampers were then cycled five times with satisfactory closure time results. PNPS used compensatory measures to restore the dampers to operable status. The Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence addresses revising the preventative maintenance strategy for secondary containment supply and exhaust isolation dampers as follows: Refurbish damper actuators in accordance with vendor recommendations; Perform annual inspection and maintenance of secondary containment dampers; and bench test and record torque values to verify the adequacy of the actuators prior to installation and after they have been removed and replaced.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES There were no consequences to the safety of the general public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, and radiological safety due to this event. The actual consequences were a loss of safety function for secondary containment and entry into Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.7.C.2.a.
Per the guidance in NUREG-1022, Section 5.2.2 the event date is the date of discovery, January 16, 2017, since there is no firm evidence, based on a review of relevant information that the issue existed previously.
The Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement was entered at 1155 hours on January 16, 2017 and exited at 1206 hours on the same day. As such, the loss of safety function for secondary containment existed for a total duration of 11 minutes. There was no adverse impact on the public health or safety. REPORT ABILITY This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR .50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Subsequent to submission of the initial LER, based on NRC questions, it was concluded that this notification should also be conservatively made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition that was prohibited by Technical Specifications.
PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of PNPS Licensee Event Reports for the past five years did not identify any loss of safety function due to isolation dampers failing to isolate. REFERENCE CR-PNP-2017-00494 NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)
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