ML17334B364

Responds to NRC 900301 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-315/89-31 & 50-316/89-31.Corrective Actions:Reliability Centered Maint Program Initiated

ML17334B364
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/11/1990
From:	ALEXICH M P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	DAVIS A B NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
AEP:NRC:1125A, NUDOCS 9004200632
Download: ML17334B364 (38)

See also: IR 05000315/1989031

Text

\rIndiana'Achrga~PowerCompany~~080c'.663'Nl7lAMA

NTCHIGANPOWERAEP:NRC:1125A

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74NRCINSPECTION

NOS.50-315/89031

AND50-316/89031:

RESPONSETOVIOLATION

U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,

D.C.20555Attn:A.B.Davi.sAprilll,1990DearMr.Davis:ThisletterisinresponsetoMr.H.J.Miller'sletterdatedMarch1,1990,whichforwarded

thereportonthespecialmaintenance

teaminspection

conducted

byMr.Z.Falevitsandothersofyourstaff.Thisinspection

wasconducted

fromDecember4through8,andDecember18through22,1989,onactivities

attheCookNuclearPlantassociated

withthesupportandimplementation

ofmaintenance

toensurethatplantstructures,

systemsandcomponents

reliablyperformondemand.TheNoticeofViolation

attachedtoMr.Miller'sletteridentified

sixweaknesses

andfourSeverityLevelIVviolations

relatingtoourmaintenance

program.Theweaknesses

areaddressed

inAttachment

1tothisletter.Theviolations

areaddressed

inAttachment

2tothisletter.A14-dayextension

forourresponsewasgrantedonMarch15,1990'hisdocumenthasbeenpreparedfollowing

Corporate

procedures

thatincorporate

areasonable

setofcontrolstoensureitsaccuracyandcompleteness

priortosignature

bytheundersigned.

Sincerely,

M.P.AlichVicePresident

ldpAttachments

~)g4QOCk&2

900411pggADQcKo>oog+~~~Ipp1/00

Mr.A.B.DavisAEP:NRC:1125A

cc:D.H.Williams,

Jr.A.A.Blind-BridgmanR.C.CallenG.CharnoffNRCResidentInspector

-BridgmanNFEMSectionChief

ATTACHMENT

1TOAEP:NRC:1125A

RESPONSETONRC-IDENTIFIED

WEAKNESSES

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page1NRC-Identified

Weakness(1)"Lackoforineffective

actiontocorrectnumerousselfidentified

maintenance

problemsidentified

inFebruary1988,manyofwhichwereidentified

bytheteamduringthisinspection."

ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective

ActionsTakenAsaresultofthe1988Maintenance

Self-Assessment

Report,AEPSCcontracted

IMPELLtoassistinidentifying

andformulating

appropriate

corrective

actionstoaddresstheself-identified

deficiencies.

Theresultsofthi,seffortareinadocumententitled,

D.C.CookPlantPMProramUradeStrateDocument,

datedNovember1988.Thisstudycontained

astrategyforAEPtoaccomplish

aplannedupgradeofthePreventive

Maintenance

(PM)ProgramattheCookNuclearPlant.Itidentified

reasonable

goalsandachievable

objectives

forthePMUpgradeProgrambasedonAEPSC/Cook

NuclearPlantphilosophy,

resources

andcapabilities.

Thespecificimplementation

tasksandstrategic

considerations

werepresented

forobtaining

thedesiredupgraderesults.Thiseffort'ot

onlyaddressed

improvements

inthePMProgramitself,butalsoexaminedrelatedorganization

andautomation

requirements

tosupporttheimprovedPMProgram.Basedontheresultsofthisstudy,numerouscorrective

actionswereinitiated

inJanuary1989.Thefirstwastheinitiation

ofareliability-centered

maintenance

(RCM)program.Thismajortaskhastwophases:analysisandimplementation.

AEPSChasbeenworkingcloselywithGeneralPhysicsontheanalysisportionthatwillformthefoundation

oftheRCMprogram.Thisworkincludes:

definingsystemboundaries

andfunctions

identifying

dominantfailuremodesdetermining

criti.cal

failuremodesandcriti.cal

components

identifying

applicable

andeffective

preventive

maintenance

taskstopreventfailurescompleting

analysisofselectedplantsystems

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page2Implementation

oftheRCMProgrambeganinAugust1989withthedevelopment

ofplantprocedures,

identification

ofsystemboundaries,

andestablishment

ofanRCMdatabase.

Thefirstsyst:emanalysiswascompleted

inFebruary1990onthefeedwater

system.Analysisof22additional

plantsystems/functional

areaswilltakeplaceoverthenextthreeyears.Anotheroutgrowth

oftheMaintenance

Self-Assessment

ReportandtheAEPSC/IMPELL

studywasthedevelopment

oftheSystemEngineerProgram.ThegoaloftheSystemEngineerProgramistoprovidetrainingtoenableindividuals

toprovidetheengineering

expertise

requiredforsafe,efficient

andreliableoperation

ofsystemsforwhichtheyareresponsible.

TheSystemEngineerdischarges

thisresponsibility

byperforming

assignedtasks,andmaintaining

cognizance

ofallworkassociated

withtheassignedsystem(s).

Inaddition,

AEPSCcontracted

TENERASystemsandSoftwaretoprovideacomputerized

maintenance

management

information

system.Thissystem,referredtoastheNuclearPlantMaintenance

Module(NPM)System,discussed

inmoredetailinourresponsetoweakness(3),willallowplantstafftoinitiate,

issue,prioritize

andtrackallmaintenance

workattheplant.Thissamesoftwareiscurrently

beingusedatPacificGasandElectric's

DiabloCanyon,andPublicServiceElectricandGas'sSalemandHopeCreekGenerating

Stations.

Inaddition,

itwasrecentlychosenbyElectricite

deFranceforuseinallfiftyofitsnuclearplants.Thesethreeprograms,

RCM,SystemEngineerandNPM,arejustpartoftheactionsthatarebeingtakentorespondtotheSelf-Assessment.

TheNovember1989reorganization

ofCookNuclearPlant'smanagement

isanotherimportant

elementintheupgradeofourmaintenance

program.Theintentoftheneworganization

istoplaceemphasisonmaintenance,

outages,andhuman'resources,

Otheractions,whichhaveorarebeingtakenareasfollows:oAnAEPandCookNuclearPlantpolicyonmaintenance

wasdeveloped

andapprovedinDecember1989byAEPseniormanagement.

Anadditional

plant-specific

maintenance

policyestablished

inaccordance

withINPOguidelines

isbeingdeveloped

toclarifymaintenance

philosophies

andresponsibilities

forallmaintenance

groups

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page3oCorporate

reviewshavebeenconducted,

whichhaveresultedinimprovements

beingmadetoshopareasusedbythemaintenance

groupsoStaffingstudiesarebeingperformed,

whichhavealreadyresultedinanincreaseinthenumberofengineers

andradiation

protection

technicians

onsite.oOtherprogramsofnotethataddressmaintenance

self-assessment

findingsincludethemaintenance

procedure

rewrite(SeeWeakness(6)),thelong-range

planandtheoutageguideline

development

plan.(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedFromCorrective

ActionsRCM,theSystemEngineerProgramandNPMwereinitiated

toaddressmanyoftheMaintenance

Self-Assessment's

identified

deficiencies.

Whenallofoureffortshavebeencompletely

implemented,

eachofthemajorfindingsoftheselfassessment

willhavebeenaddressed.

,Asaresultofthesecorrective

actions.weanticipate

havingastateoftheartmaintenance

programwhichwillresultinimprovedplantsafety,reliability

andaccountability.

(3)DateWhenBenefitsVillBeRealizedAspreviously

stated,westartedtheRCMPrograminAugust1989.However,weanticipate

thattheprogramwillnotbecompletely

implemented

forallthecriticalplantsystemsuntiltheendof1992.Aseachsystemisanalyzed,

benefitswillberealizedsothatwhenthisprogramiscompleted

wewillhaveafullyintegrated

preventive

maintenance

program.TheSystemEngineerProgram,likeRCM,isstillintheearlystagesofimplementation.

Adocumentwhichclearlydelineates

theresponsibilities

oftheengineers

iscurrently

inthefinalstagesofreviewandapproval.

AEPSC'sacquisition

ofTENERA'sNPMsystemwasapprovedinDecember1989.However,itwillnotbeinplaceandoperational

untilAugust1990,whendatawillbeentered.Vewillbeconducting

QAauditsorsurveillances

toaccessthestatusandeffectiveness

ofsomeofourcorrective

actionsastheydevelop.Inaddition,

theMaintenance

Improvement

Planwillreviewandresolve,asappropriate,

theMaintenance

Self-Assessment

items'heImprovement

Planincludesmilestones

andabuilt-inmechanism

thatrequiresregularre-evaluation.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page4Whilewearealreadyrealizing

benefitsfromourefforts,wedonotanticipate

thefullbenefitforseveralyears.Inordertoeffectively

implement

programsasencompassing

andcomprehensive

asthese,significant

analysis,

planningandcoordination

areneeded.Asaresult,theirbenefitswillnotbefullyrealizeduntilmid1993.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page5NRC-Identified

Weakness(2)"Anineffective

preventive

maintenance

programthatresulted,

forexample,infailuresof4KVcircuitbreakers"

ResponsetoWeaknessWeconcurthatthePreventive

Maintenance

Programcanbeimprovedand,aspreviously

discussed,

wearetakingstepstodoso.However,CookNuclearPlant'savailability

in1989isevidencethatthepresentpreventive

maintenance

programiseffective.

During1989,CookNuclearPlantgenerated

12millionnetMWHRS,themostsince1984.The69.3%availability

forUnit1in1989contributed

toanaverageavailability

of79.4%since1985'lthoughUnit2overallavailability

hasnotbeenashighduetosteamgenerator

tubedegradatidn,

its74.4%availability

in1989wasthehighestsince1983.OnDecember8,the111-dayrecordforthelongestrunwithbothunitsoperating

wasbroken.Thisrecordwasextendedto140dayswhenUnit2wasbroughtoff-lineforasurveillance

outageonJanuary6,1990.Unit1ended1989withitslongestrunof175daysandcontinued

operating

untilMarch17,1990(aCookNuclearPlantrecordrunof251days)whentheunitwasbroughtofflineforaplannedsurveillance

outage.Asdiscussed

inourresponsetoNRCviolation

(2)oftheinspection

report,the4KVcircuitbreakersfailurewasdetectedduringpreventive

maintenance

testing.Asaresult,appropriate

corrective

actionwas.subsequently

takenwhichresultedinimprovements

toour4KVbreakers.

Also,wenotifiedtheindustryoftheproblemviaaPart21report.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page6NRC-Identified

Veakness(3)"Anextensive

backlogofnon-outage

corrective

maintenance

joborderspartlycausedbylackofintegrated

planningandscheduling

methodology."

ResponsetoWeakness"Maintaining

theCookNuclearPlantinvolvesthecompletion

ofapproximately

20,000JobOrdersannually.

Therelativepriorities

ofjobschangefrequently

duetoanumberoffactors,theprimaryreasonbeingplantconditions.

Managingtheinformation

contained

withinthebacklogofyet-to-be

completed

JobOrderscanbecriticaltoplantavailability

andreliability.

Theseeffortsarepresently

hamperedbythelogistics

ofpaperfilingsystemsandcomputertrackingsystemsthatlackneededflexibility

inhardwareandsoftware.

(1)Corrective

ActionsTakenTheCookNuclearPlantInformation

Management

System(IMS)plan,approvedfordevelopment

inFebruaryof1989identified

ninecomputersystemmodulesthat,whencompleted,

willformasingle,integrated

information

management

system.Thisautomated

information

systemwillbeusedbybothplantsiteandcorporate

personnel

tosupportplantoperation

andmaintenance.

Itwillprovideforthescheduling

andinitiation

ofmaintenance

tasksandsupporttheassignment

ofresponsibilities

andaccountabilities

forthesetasks.Specifically,

formaintenance,

theNuclearPlantMaintenance

Module(NPM)oftheCookNuclearPlant'sIMSplanwillallowplantstafftoinitiate,

issue,prioritize,

andtrackallmaintenance

workattheplant.TheNPMmoduleoftheIMSplanwillalsomaintainahistoryofmaintenance

work.Theprimaryobjectives

oftheNPMmodulearetoimproveplantavailability

andtooptimizetheuseofplantresources

withtheoverallgoalofreducingplantmaintenance.

TheNPMsystemisdesignedtoallowanyNPMusertoinitiateastructured

requestthattheuserbelievesshouldbereviewedand,ifwarranted,

actedupon.Thisactionrequestfeatureprovidesaprocessforscreening

thoseactionsrequiring

work,andwillserveasafocalpointforinitiating

andtrackingJobOrders.Plantpersonnel

willenterdataintotheNPMsystemdefiningthecomponent

thatneedsworkandbrieflydescribing

thatwork.Thesystemisdesignedtoeliminate

allpaperinthisprocessexcepttheactualJobOrderitself.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page7ThereviewsthattakeplaceintheJobOrdersystemareperformed

on-line.Thison-linecapability

allowsforpendingJobOrderstobesortedinvariouswaysandthereviewing

individuals

have'mmediate

accesstothisinformation.

Oncereviewsareperformed

theactualJobOrderscanbeprintedfortheworktobeperformed.

OnceaJobOrderhasbeeninitiated,

startingfromtheveryfirstentryintothesystemandnotjustfromthetimeitgetsprinted,theJobOrderprocessing

systemcantrackthestatusoftheJobOrder.Thisisaccomplished

throughtheuseofstatuscodefields.Someofthecodesrepresent

situations

suchaswaitingformaterials,

orwaitingforapprovalofthereviews,orothertypesofconditions.

Thisfeatureisveryhelpfulforplanningandscheduling

themanyJobOrdersinthesystem.TheNPMsystemwillpermittheplantstafftoassignspecificJobOrders,attheactivitylevel,toascheduled

date,crewandsupervisor.

Uponcompletion'f

thecrewassignments

andconfirmation

ofpermitrequirements,

thesystemproducesasupervisory

assignment

reportandprintstheJobOrder.Thecompleted

workpackageincludestheJobOrder,equipment

descriptions,

partslist,andtestingformsalongwithotherneededdocuments.

OncetheworkrelatedtoaJobOrderhasbeencompleted

andtested,theJobOrderisreviewedandclosedout,on-line.TheNPMsystemmaintains

acompletehistoryofallcompleted

andclosed-out

JobOrders.ThisfeatureallowsforrapidaccesstoallhistoryonJobOrders.TheNPMsystempreventsaJobOrderfrombeingclosed-out

untilallreviewsandtestshavebeencompleted.

Znaddition,

theNPMsystemwillbearepository

forpreviousrepetitive

tasks.Thisfunctioneliminates

theneedforindividuals

torecreateJobOrdersthatarerepetitive

innature,TheNPMsystemwillautomatically

generatetheJobOrders,,according

totheappropriate

duedates,orasdirectedbyaplanner.TheNPMsystemwillalsoprovideforcontinuous

monitoring

ofsurveillance

testsandpreventive

maintenance

worktomeetregulatory

orplantrequirements.

Oncetherepetitive

orpreventive

maintenance

JobOrdersarecreated,theyareavailable

forreviewsandexecutions

inthesamemannerasanyoftheotherJobOrders.ThissystemwillalsobeusedtodevelopJobOrdersforplannedoutagessuchasrefueling

outages.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page8(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedFromCorrective

ActionsThedataenteredintotheNPMsystem,andtheprocessing

thatthesystemdoeswiththisdata,willeliminate

themultiplemanualdataentrystepsofourpresentprocess.Eliminating

redundant

manualsystemsisofsignificance

itself.However,moreimportantly

aretheanticipated

improvements

inplantavailability

andlaborproductivity.

Alongwithimprovedabilitytoplanandscheduleworkcomesanincreased

amountoftimeavailable

formorecarefulconsideration

ofotheraspectsoftheworktobeperformed,

forexample,personnel

safety.Improvements

canbeexpectedandwillcertainly

bestrivedfor.TheNPMsystemwillalsoidentifyandcoordinate

maintenance

onrelatedequipment

andsystems,thusdecreasing

downtimeoncomponents

removedfromservice.Quickaccesstotheinformation

intheNPMdatabasesmakesthesupervisors

inboththeoperations

andmaintenance

areasmoreawareofJobOrderprogress.

Itisanticipated

thattheNPMsystemw'illhelpusrealizeourgoalofanon-outage

corrective

maintenance

joborderbacklognotinexcessof90days.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeAchievedWecurrently

anticipate

havingthecomputerized

automated

maintenance

systeminplaceandoperational

byAugust1990.Atthattime,datavalidation

andloading,procedure

changesandtrainingofpersonnel

willbegin.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page9NRC-Identified

Weakness(4)"Poormaterialcondition

especially

asevidenced

bythehighnumberofoil,steamandwaterleaks."ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective

ActionsTakenWhileitisAEPSC'spolicytokeepallofitsfacilities,

ingoodmaterialcondition,

werecognize

theneedforimprovement

inthisarea.Asaresult,themanagement

oftheCookNuclearPlanthaslaunchedaconcerted

efforttoimproveplantmaterialcondition.

Thisisevidenced

bytheallocation

offundstosupportthefollowing

physicalimprovements

thatarecurrently

takingplace:oAuxiliary

buildingpaintingoContaminated

equipment

storageareaexpansion

IoDecontamination

arearedesignoImprovedlightingoInstallation

of18personnel

wholebodycontamination

monitorsItisCookNuclearPlantpolicythatnoleakisconsidered

acceptable.

Consequently,

duringthe1988/1989

refueling

outageswerefurbished

about1,780valvesandpackedthemwithChesterton

packing.Abreakdown

ofthiseffortisasfollows:Unit1Unit2TotalAuxiliary

BuildingContainment

TurbineHallMiscellaneous

254130225211502807009255071250504Nevertheless,

asubstantial

numberofleaksstillexistintheauxiliary

building,

rangingfromsmalltracesofdriedboricacidtodripping.

Theseleakshavebeenenteredintoacomputerdatabase,havebeenchalkeddown,andjobordershavebeenwritten.Theleaksarecurrently

beingprioritized

andeffortswillbemadetorepairthemduringthenextrefueling

outage,ifnotbefore.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page10Theplantmanagerhasreaffirmed

hiscommitment

togoodplantmaterialcondition

andpersonalaccountability

bysendingamemorandum

toeachemployee.

Thiscommitment

hasbeensupported

bycontinued

radiation

workerawareness

training,

andoperatortrainingonventinganddraining.

Inaddition,

decontamination

effortscontinue,

whichhavealreadyreducedthecontaminated

areafromapproximately

45,000feetin1986tothecurrent25,000feet(excluding

laydownareas).Ourgoalistoreducethesecontaminated

areasto20,000squarefeetin1990and10,000squarefeetpriortotheoutagein1991.(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrective

ActionsTherearenumerousbenefitsgainedfromhavingtheplantingoodphysicalcondition,

themostimportant

ofthesebeingincreased

plantsafetyandreliability.

Arelatedbenefitisimprovedradiation

protection

andworkersafety.However,anotherimportant,

butlessquantifiable

benefitistheimprovement

toworkermorale.(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedWhilemaintaining

theplantingoodphysicalcondition

isanongoingprocess,weanticipate

majorimprovements

withinthenextyear.Therefueling

outagewillfacilitate

therefurbishment

ofvalises,aswellasotherrepairsandmodifications.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page11NRC-Identified

Weakness(5)"Inadequate

trending,

rootcauseanalysisandactiontocorrect,forexample,numerousleakingsafetyreliefvalves."ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective

ActionsTakenThisweaknessisbeingaddressed

bythreeprograms:

theNPMsystemwhichisdiscussed

indetailinourresponsetoweaknesses

(1)and(3),theSystemEngineerProgram,discussed

inourresponsetoweakness(1),andtheRCMProgramdiscussed

inourresponsetoweakness(1).(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrective

ActionsTheNPMsystemwillprovideforacompletecomponent

history.Thecomponent

historywillprovideachronological

listingofwork,modifications

orinspections

thathavebeenperformed

onaparticular

component.

Thisprocesscreatesanindexedhistorical

recordforcomponents

orfunctional

equipment

groupsandcatalogscompletion

dates,failurecodes,as-foundandas-leftconditions,

partsreplaced,

testresults,etc.TheSystemEngineers

areexpectedtoidentifyandtrendappropriate

systemparameters,

withthegoalofobtaining

pertinent

dataforsystemperformance

andreliability

monitoring.

Theparameters

trendedshallbeperiodically

reviewedandapprovedtoallowtimelypreventive

orcorrective

actionstobeimplemented.

Basedonthetrendeddata,theSystemEngineerisexpectedtorecognize

significant

system/component

degradation

orabnormaloperating

conditions

frombothahistorical

basis,aswellascurrentstatus.TheSystemEngineermayrequirethesupportoftechnical

expertstoanalyzespecificareasofconcernandwillworkcloselywithourCorporate

NuclearEngineering

Divisionengineers

inthisregard.TheSystemEngineers

areexpectedtoperformrootcauseanalysesonthesystemsassigned.

Consequently,

theSystemEngineers

willbetrainedinrootcauseanalysis.

Inaddition,

theSystemEngineerisexpectedto:Evaluatesystem/component

failureimpactonplantsafetyandunitpoweroperations

Prepareandperformspecialsystem/component

performance

tests.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page12TheRCMProgramwt.llcontribute

toresolving

thisissuebyidentifying

dominantfailuremodesandcriticalcomponents.

(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedAspreviously

stated,weexpecttheNPMsystemtobeinplaceandoperational

inAugust1990.Atthattime,personnel

traininganddataloadingwillbegin.Severalsystemengineers

havebeenassignedatCookNuclearPlantandbenefitshavealreadybeenrealizedfromthisprogram.Aneffortiscurrently

beingmadetorecruitSystemEngineers.

However,weanticipate

itwilltakeatleastayearbeforetheprogramisfullystaffed.

Attachment

1toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page13NRC-Identified

Weakness(6)"Inseveralinstances

procedures

werenotfollowed,

werepoorordidnotexistespecially

inthebalanceofplantarea."ResponsetoWeakness(1)Corrective

ActionsTakenKeytothesafeandefficient

operation

ofanynuclearpowerplantisstrictadherence

toprocedures.

Assuch,employees

areshownduringtheNuclearGeneralEmployeeTraining(NGET)classes,avideotape

ofDavidWilliams,

Jr.,SeniorExecutive

V.P.,Engineering

andConstruction,

mandating

theadherence

toprocedures.

ItisAEPSC'slong-standing

policythatfailuretofollowprocedures

willresultindisciplinary

action.Inorderforthispolicytohaveanybenefit,well-written

andaccurateprocedures

mustbeinplace.Consequently,

AEPSCispurchasing

PRONETandtheservicesofconsultant

procedure

writerstoupgradeorwrite690maintenance

procedures

(268maintenance,

422I&C).Criticalbalanceofplantcomponents

willbeaddressed

astheyariseintheRCMprogram.TheMaintenance

Improvement

Planprovidesguidancethatclearlydefineswhatprocedure

compliance

is.Inaddition,

aprocedure

writer'/user's

guidewilladdressthecircumstances

forchangingaprocedure

toensureprocedural

compliance.

(2)BenefitsToBeDerivedfromCorrective

ActionsPRONETisastateoftheartcomputersystemthatintegrates

writer'sguidelines,

wordprocessing,

graphicsanddatabasefunctions

intoacentralized

procedure

management

system.Development,

commitment,

scheduling

andreporting

functions

willbecontrolled

bythismenu-driven

network.Thisintegrated

approachwillresultinaprogramthatreducesdevelopment

timeandprovidesefficient

long-term

procedure

maintenance

andcommitment/reference

tracking.

(3)DateWhenBenefitsWillBeRealizedAlthoughaconsultant

willtrainplantstaffontheuseofPRONET,thebulkoftheprocedure

upgradeworkwillbeperformed

byconsultant

personnel.

Byusingcontractworkerswewillnotimpacttheplantstaff.Iftheexistingstaffwereused,itisanticipated

thattheeffortwouldtakefourtofiveyears.Thisisconsidered

tobeanunacceptable

timeframeforthiswork.Byusingcontractworkers,wewillobtainprofessionally

preparedprocedures

inareasonable

timeframe.Theeffortisscheduled

tobecompleted

byDecember1991.

ATTACHMENT

2TOAEP:NRC:1125A

RESPONSETONRC-IDENTIFIED

VIOLATIONS

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page1NRCViolation

1"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

V,asimplemented

bySection1.7.5oftheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantOperational

QualityAssurance

Programrequiresthatactivities

relatedtoqualitybeprescribed

bydocumented

instructions,

procedures,

anddrawings,

thatthoseactivities

beaccomplished

inaccordance

withthoseinstructions,

procedures

anddrawings,

andthatinstructions,

procedures

ordrawingsincludeappropriate

quantitative

orqualitative

acceptance

criteriafordetermining

thatimportant

activt,ties

havebeensatisfactorily

accomplished.

a~Procedure

PMI-2290,

"JobOrders,"Revision8,requiredinSections4.4.8and4.4.8.3thatuponcompletion

ofthephysicalwork,thejobordertagsberemovedanddiscarded.

Contrarytotheabo~e,tags15119,029643,B012209,B016950,B016832,andB017240werenotremovedalthoughthejoborderswerecancelled

orcompleted.

Asaresult,statusofequipment

condi.tion

remainedindeterminate

(315/89031-01A;

316/89031-01A)

~b.RequestForChange12-2180requiredinstallation

of200%overloadmotorprotection

andthatthethermaloverloadbesetatthelowtripcurrentrating.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember19,1989,theinspectors

observedthatthethermaloverloadheaterassociated

withresidualheatremovalloopisolation

motor-operated

valveICM-111wassetatthehightripcurrentrating.Numerousadditional

thermaloverloads

inthedieselgenerator

motorcontrolcenterwerealsoobservedtobethewrongsizeorsetatthewrongcurrentrating,whichwillresultinpremature

removalofoperating

voltagefromthemotors(315/89031-01B;

316/89031-01B)

~c~Procedure

PMI-2030,

"Document

Control,"

Revision10,failedtoincluderequirements

fortheMasterDrawingIndexestobereviewedbyintendedusersforthelatestasbuiltdrawingslocatedintheplantmasterfile.Consequently,

drawingsissuedbythedocumentcontrolcenterforfieldverifications

werenotthelatestasbuiltdrawingsorrevisions

(315/89031-01C;

316/89031/01C).

The"PumpOperator's

Data"manualandthevendormanualfor'heAuxiliary

Feedwater

(AFV)pumprequiredthatthepumppackingbeadjustedwhilethepumpisoperating.

Contrarytotheabove,thisrequirement

wasnotincorporated

intotheAFVmaintenance

procdures

[sic).Althoughnoproblemswerenoted,inadequate

attention

tothisrequirement

couldresultinrotorseizure,scoredshaftsleeves,orburnedpacking(315/89031-01D;

316/89031-01D).

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page2Procedure

12THP6030IMP.014"Protective

RelayCalibration",

Revision8,Step8.1.2-2specified

thatblackelectrical

tapebeusedwhencleaningthediskanddragmagnetmechanism

onTimeOvercurrent

(IAC)relays.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember5,1989,atechnician

wasobservedusinganunusedcalibration

stickertocleanthe2ABEDGTimeOvercurrent

testrelay.Asaresult,cleanliness

ofthecontactswasquestionable

(315/89031-01E;

316/89031-01E).

f.Procedure

PMI-2010"PlantManagerandDepartment

HeadInstructions,

Procedures

andIndex,"Revision17,PolicyStatement

3.1,Section3requiredthat"doubleasterisked"

procedures

forplantactivities

be"in-hand"

whenimplementing

theprocedure.

Contrarytotheabove,onDecember6,1989,theinspector

observedanoperatorrackin"2A"TrainReactorTripBypassBreakerwithouthaving"inhand"doubleasterisked

procedure

~12-OHP4021.082.018

"RackingInandOutReactorTrip,ReactorTripBypassandMGSetOutputBreakers,"

Revision2.Eventhoughnoadverseaffectswerenoted,inthepastundersimilarcircumstances,

areactortripoccurred(315/89031-01F;

316/89031-01F).

Procedure

PMI-2010,

"PlantManagerandDepartment

HeadInstructions,

Procedures

andIndex,"Revision17,requiresinSection3.14.1thatalleffective

instructions

andprocedures

bereviewednolessfrequentthanonceeverytwoyears.Contrarytotheabove,maintenance

procedure

MHI2070,MHI7090,PMI4050,12THP6030IMP~071,and12THPIMP.062werenotreviewedinthelasttwoyears.Asaresult,theprocedures

werenotupdatedtoreflectfeedbackandchangestopreventive

maintenance

activities

(315/89031-01G;

316/89031-1G)."

ResponsetoViolation

laPlantprocedure

PMI-2290requiresthattagsplacedatornearequipment

needingrepairberemovedwhentheitemisrepairedoriftheJobOrderiscancelled.

Asnotedinthetext,sixJobOrdertagswerefoundintheplantforworkthathadbeencancelled

orcompleted

whichconstitutes

failuretofollowprocedure.

Theconclusion

madeinInspection

Report89031wasthatequipment

statuswas"indeterminate."

WhilethepresenceofJobOrdertagswascontrarytotherequirements

ofPMI-2290,

thestatusofequipment/components

involvedwouldnotbeaffected.

Theinformation

placedonatagidentifies

topersonnel

1)thataJobOrderhasbeenwrittenforrepairwithnumbernoted,2)thenatureofrepairs/adjustments

requiredasdetermined

bythepersoninitiating

theJobOrderand3)helpslocatethespecificcomponent.

Byitself,aJobOrdertaghasnoimpactonsystemorequipment

operability,

does

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC.:1125A

Page3notindicatethatequipment

hasbeentaggedout,anddoesnotdirectanyotheractivityinvolving

theequipment.

Othersystemssuchastheclearance

permitsystemlogsandthedeficiency

logsindicatetheequipment

status.(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedJobOrdertagsidentified

duringtheinspection

weresubsequently

removedtoachievecompliance

withapplicable

sectionsofPMI-2290.

(2)Corrective

ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation

ThePlantManagerwilli.ssueamemoonprocedural

compliance

toensurethatallpersonnel

arefullyawareofthemeaningofcompliance,

consequences

offailureandwhatactionstotake~whenaprocedure

cannotbefollowedaswritten.TheMaintenance

Improvement

Planincludesissuanceofadepartment

policyonprocedure

compliance.

Includedwillbeguidanceonthemonitoring

oftheeffectiveness

ofprocedure

compliance.

Alsoaprocedure

writer'/user's

guidewilladdressthecircumstances

forchangingaprocedure

toensureprocedural

compliance.

(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedThefinaldraftofthepolicywillbeissuedonJuly15,1990.Guidanceontheeffectiveness

monitoring

willbeissuedonAugust15,1990.ThePlantManager's

memowillbeissuedonMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolation

lbTheNoticeofViolation

identified

thatthermaloverloads

intheplanthadbeeninstalled

atanincorrect

tripcurrentrating.Asaresultoftheinspection,

plantpersonnel

investigated

theproblemandaddressed

itinProblemReport90-81.(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheimproperpositioning

and/ormis-sizing

oftheoverloadheatersresultedfromerrorsmadeduringinitialinstallations.

Twentyoverloads

wereinspected

andevaluated

byplantandAEPSCengineers.

Elevenwerefoundtob'ecorrect.Onewasfoundonabreakerforaresistive

heaterwhereoverloadprotection

wasnotconsidered

criticalasmoldedcasecircuitbreakersprotection

wasprovided.

Onfourbreakers(including

ICM-111)theas-foundheatersizeagreedwiththecalculated,

butarrowpositiondidnotagree.Fullloadampswasatthedividingpointforselecting

upordownposi.tion.

Slightchangesinmotorprotection

resultedbutdidnotaffecttheoperability

ofload.FourfeedersonBOPwerefoundtobemis-sized.

Ofthosefour

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

-Page4onewasmis-sized

toadegreethatreplacement

wasneededtoensureadequateprotection.

Ofthethreeotheroverloadheaters,thoughimproperly

set,wouldhaveprovidedthermaloverloadprotection

forequipment.

JobOrderstocorrectthesesettingsbyOctober30,1990,havebeenwritten.(2)Corrective

ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation

Inthecourseoftheplant'sinvestigation

itwasdetermined

thatthemis-sizing

and/ormispositioning

ofthethermaloverloads

hadoccurredduringinitialinstallation

in1977and1978.Lackingvendorinformation,

calculations

weremostlikelydeveloped

byplantpersonnel

forpositions/sizes

whichinsomeofthecases,provedincorrect.

Thedesignchangeprocesshasevolvedsincethattimetoalevelthatreasonably

ensuresthatrepetition

ofasimilarcondition

willnotoccur.Specifically,

generalprocedures

nowrequirethatdesigncalculations

beverifiedanddocumented

byqualified

personnel.

(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedBasedontheengineering

evaluation

completed

January15,'990,thedeficiencies

inthethermaloverloadheatersettingswouldnothaveaffectedtheoperability

oftheICM-111breaker.Otherdeficiencies

didnotdegradethethermaloverloadprotection

oftheequipment

breakers.

Currentprocedures/practices

shouldpreventrecurrence

ofthisproblem.ResponsetoViolation

lcInthecourseoftheinspection

itwasfoundthataplantinstruction

utilizedfordocumentcontrol(drawings)

contained

noprovision

mandating

thattheuseroftheindexverifythatitwasthemostrecentupdate.Weconcurwiththeinspector's

conclusion

thataninstruction

tousersoftheMasterDrawingIndextoensurethatitreferences

up-to-date

as-builtdrawingsshouldbeincludedinprocedures.

(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedAsaresultoftheinspection,

PMI-2030,

"Document

Control,"

wasrevisedtoinstructaMasterDataIndexusertoensurethatitreflectsthelatestas-builtdrawingslocatedintheplant'smasterfile.(2)Corrective

ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation

Revision11toPMI-2030isbeingroutedforapprovalfromplantmanagement.

Therevisionaddresses

theinspector's

concernnotedintheNoticeofViolation.

IAttachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page5(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedTherevisedversionofPMI-2030willbeeffective

byMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolation

ldProcedural

revisiontoincorporate

adirection

torunapumpinordertoproperlyadjustpackingisnotviewedasnecessary.

Personnel

performing

packingadjustments

meettherequirements

ofANSIStandardN18-1(4.5.3).Consistent

withthatstandard,

maintenance

personnel

receiveformaltraininginsubjectsassociated

withtheirposition.

Includedintheplant'strainingisacourseonpumpsthatdirectlyreferences

thecorrectmethodology

foradjusting

thepackingonpumps.Thisteachesmaintenance

personnel

thatadjustments

willonlybemadetopackingwhenthepumpisoperating.

AsrequiredbyANSIStandardN18-7,Section4.1(2),plantprocedures

aredeveloped

withtheobjective

ofproviding

adequateinformation

topersonnel

involvedinagiventaskconsidering

theskilltheyareprovidedthroughthetrainingprogram.(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedThosepersonswhowouldbeinvolvedinpumppackingworkarehiredandtrainedconsistent

withANSIN18-1.(2)Corrective

ActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation

Thehiringpractices

andtrainingprogramshaveprovenadequatetopreventproblemsduetopumppacking(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolation

occurredaspractices

areinaccordance

withN18-1andpersonnel

arefullyqualified.

ResponsetoViolation

leWhiletheintentofStep8.1.2-2ofmaintenance

procedure

12THP6030.IMP.014

wastoensurethattechnicians

performing

cleaningwouldutilizetapeorsimilaradhesive-backed

material.

Blackelectrical

tape,wasspecified

becauseitisacommonlyavailable

item.However,useofacalibration

stickerdid-constitute

aviolation

oftheprocedure

aswritten.(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedMaintenance

supervision

reviewedtheneteffectofutilizing

thestickerinthecourseofcleaninganddetermined

thatsatisfactory

resultswereobtained.

Nore-cleaning

wasdeemed

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page6necessary.

12THP6030.IMP.014

hadbeenrevisedviaachangesheetinitiated

April2,1990,toremovereference

toblackelectrical

tape.(2)Corrective

ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation

ThePlantManagerwillissueamemoonprocedural

compliance

toensurethatallpersonnel

arefullyawareofthemeaningofcompliance,

consequences

offailureandwhatactionstotakewhenaprocedure

cannotbefollowedaswritten.TheMaintenance

Improvement

Planincludesissuanceofadepartment

policyonprocedure

compliance.

Includedwillbeguidanceonthemonitoring

oftheeffectiveness

ofprocedure

compliance.

Alsoaprocedure

writer'/user's

guidewilladdressthecircumstances

forchangingaprocedure

toensureprocedural

compliance.

(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedThefinaldraftofthepolicywillbeissuedonJuly15,1990.Guidanceontheeffectiveness

monitoring

willbeissuedonAugust15,1990.ThePlantManager's

memowillbeissuedonMay1,1990.ResponsetoViolation

lf(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheAuxiliary

Equipment

Operator(AEO)involvedinthiseventhadreceivedtrainingontheoperation

ofreactortripbreakersandtheexistence

oftheprocedure

priortothisevent.TheAEO,however,overlooked

thereactortripbreakerprocedure

wasrequiredtobe"inhand"wheneverperforming

rackingoperations.

Althoughtherackingevolution

wasdoneinaccordance

withthe.procedure

requirements,

thiseventwasaviolation

becausetherequirement

tohavetheprocedure

"inhand"wasnotsatisfied.

Amemorandum

wasissuedtoOperations

personnel

onJanuary19,1990,toremindthemofthe"inhand"requirement

forthereactortripbreakerprocedure.

(2)Corrective

ActionToBeTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation

Theroutinesurveillance

procedures

forreactortripbreakertestingwererevisedonDecember13,1989,toreference

therequirement

forhavingthereactortripbreakerrackingprocedure

"inhand"fortherackingevolutions.

Thestartupsurveillance

procedures,

whichrequirerackingofthereactortripbreakers,

willberevisedbyJune4,1990,toreference

therequirement

forhavingthereactortripbreakerprocedure

"inhand."

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page7Duringtheconcluded,

procedures

Therefore,

pasttwoyears,QAaudits/surveillances

haveexceptfora"fewisolatedcases,"doubleasterisked

haveinfactbeen"inhand"whenrequired.

nogenericprogrammatic

problemexists.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance

wasachievedonDecember6,1989,whenthe'involved

AEOwasreinstructed

ofthe"inhand"procedural

requirement.

ResponsetoViolation

lgFiveprocedures/instructions

werecitedintheNoticeofViolation

asnothavingbeenreviewedwithinthetwo-yearlimitestablished

inplantprocedure

PMI-2010.

However,ineachcasethedocuments

hadbeenreviewedanddocumentation

tothateffectwasonfile.Uponrequestoneoftheinspectors

wasprovidedwithbiannualreviewdocuments

forIMP.071andIMP.062.Theinstruction

doesnotrequireanapprovedrevisionwithintwo.years,onlyareviewpriortosuchrevision.

Thisinformation

maynothavebeenadequately

communicated.

(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedFurtherreviewoftheNoticeofViolation

bytheplantidentified

thatprocedures/instructions

notedhadreceivedreviewasrequiredbyPMI-2010,

Rev.17.(2)Corrective

ActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation

Trackingandreviewofprocedures

ispresently

adequate.

(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolation

occurred.

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page8NRCViolation

2"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

VIII,asimplemented

bySection1.7.8oftheDonaldCDCookOperational

QualityAssurance

Programrequiredthatmeasuresbeestablished

fortheidentification

ofmaterials,

partsandcomponents

suchasbypartnumber,serialnumber,orotherappropriate

meansontheitemorrecordstraceable

totheitemthroughout

fabrication,

installation

anduseoftheitem.""Contrary

totheabove,identification

ofmaterials

andcomponents

fortraceability

wasnotaccomplished

forcableextension

portionsandaluminumsplicingsleevesforconnections

toseveralsafety-related

motorcontrolcentersinstalled

undertheRequestForChange1482modification

(315/89031-02;

316/89031-02)."

ResponsetoViolation

2RFC-1482installed

transition

pieces(sleeves)

tosplicecoppertoaluminumcablesinvariousmotorcontrolcenters.PerRFCinstructions,

thetransition

piecesweretobeinstalled

inaccordance

withEngineering

DesignSpecification

(EDS)607andEDS608'heinstallation

tookplacebetweenJuneof1979andSeptember

of1981whenthefinalsummarywasissued.Asearchofthecompleted

RFCpackage(including

installation

joborders)andofthemicrofilm

ofthecompleted

joborderpackagesrevealednodocumentation

oftheparts(sleeves)

usedfortheinstallation.

Individuals

whowereinvolvedwiththeMaintenance

Department

atthattimestatedthatpersonnel

wouldhaveinstalled

thetransition

piecespertheEDSasstatedintheRFC.Inadequate

documentation

ofmaterialinstalled

byaJobOrderduringthedesignchangeprocesswastherootcauseofthisviolation.

Additionally,

therewereinadequate

reviewofthecompleted

jobordersandthedesignchangepackageuponcompletion.

(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstallation

tookplaceapproximately

10yearsagoandwasperformed

inaccordance

withEDS608,whichwasreferenced

intheRFCpackage.Actualapplication

forthepasttenyearshasfunctionally

demonstrated

theadequacyofsubjectmaterials'

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page9(2)Corrective

ActionTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation

Currentprocurement/dedication

practices

ensureproperdocumentation

isdeveloped

todemonstrate

controloverthesuitability

ofmaterial,

partsandcomponents.

(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedCurrentprocedures/practice's

shouldpreventrecurrence

ofthisproblemandensurefuturecompliance.

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page10NRCViolation

3"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

XI,asimplemented

bySection1.7.11oftheDonaldC.CookOperational

QualityAssurance

Programrequiredthatatestprogrambeestablished

toassuretestingtodemonstrate

thatsystemsandcomponents

willperformsatisfactorily

inserviceinaccordance

withtestprocedures

whichincorporate

requirements

andacceptance

limitscontained

inapplicable

designdocuments,

andthatadequatetestinstrumentation

wasavailable

andused.""Contrary

totheabove,testinstruments

werenotsensitive

oraccurateenoughtoverifythecalibration

oftheundervoltage

relaysthatactuatetheEmergency

DieselGenerators.

Procedure

2THP6030IMP.250,"4kVDieselStart,4kVESSBusUndervoltage

RelayCalibration,"

Revision7,Section3.0,requiredtheuseofaWestinghouse

typePA-161ACanolog[sic]voltmeter

oritsequivalent

withequalorbetteraccuracyandadequaterangetomeasurethedesiredparameters.

However,thevoltmeter

hadatolerance

of+1.5voltsthatwasnotsufficiently

accuratetomeasurethedesiredparameter

of90.3to91.8voltsspecified

inTechnical

Specification

3.3.2.Inaddition,

thevoltmeter

indicated

tothenearestwholevoltanddidnothavedivisionmarkingsbetweenthenumbers.Technicians

hadtointerpolate

resultsandrecordvaluestothenearesttenthofavoltwhilethevoltmeter's

dialindicator

wasmovingintheincreasing

ordecreasing

direction.

Furthermore,

thetechnicians

usedhandsignalstocommunicate

themomenttheundervoltagerelayoperated.

Basedontheinaccuracy

andinsensitivity

ofthevoltmeter,

andpoortestingtechnique,

resultsoftheundervoltage

testwerenotconclusive

(315/89031-03;

316/89031-03)."

ResponsetoViolation

3Themeterusedwasfirstspecified

intheoriginalprocedure

developed

beforeinitialplantstart-up.

Thespecificreasonsforusingthismetercouldnotbedetermined.

However,itisbelievedthatthiswasthelimitoftheavailable

technology

atthattime.Theonlyothermeteravailable

wasabasicdigitaltype,whichcouldnotbeusedduetotheinherently

slowresponseandupdatetime,causingagreateruncertainty

ofspecificsetpointvaluethantheanalogmeter.

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page11(1)Corrective

ActionsandResultsAchievedZ&CnowusestheFlukeModel45digitalmeterduringtestingofthe4KVdieselstartand4KVESSbusundervoltage

relays.Recentdevelopments

indigitalmeterswhichincludefasterresponsetimesandupdatetimesandminimum/maximum

modifierfeatureshasmadetheiruseacceptable.

Thedigitalmetercurrently

beingusedhasanaccuracyof+0.3percent.Theprevioustestmethodprovidedacceptable

results,basedontheas-foundvaluesonthefirstuseofthedigitalmetersbeinginspecification

bycomparable

percentages.'2)

Corrective

ActionsTakenToAvoidFurtherViolation

Thecalibration

procedures

whichcurrently

allowuseofeitheranalogordigitalmeterswillbechangedtospecifytheuseoftheFlukeModel45digitalmeter,oritsequivalent,

toensureconsistent

useofadigitalmeter.(3)DateWhenFullComlieneeWillBeAchievedTheprocedure

changeswillbecompleted

beforeApril30,1990.

~~

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page12NRC.Violation

4"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

XVI,asimplemented

inSection1.7.16oftheDonaldC.CookOperational

QualityAssurance

Programrequiredthatmeasuresbeestablished

toassurethatconditions

adversetoqualitywerepromptlyidentified

andcorrected.

Inthecaseofsignificant

conditions

adversetoquality,themeasuresshallassurethatthecauseofthecondition

wasdetermined

andcorrective

actiontakentoprecluderepetition.

"Contrary

totheabove:ThePlantAssessment

GroupCommittee's

reviewinMarch1989forProblemReport89-245,concerned

withtheFebruary1989failureoftwosafety-related

4kVbreakersT-11D6andT-1104tocloseondemandduringtestsduetolubrication

hardening,

failedtospecifycorrective

actiontopreventrecurrence.

Furthermore,

noactionwastakentoinspectother4kVbreakersforcommonmodefailure.Consequently,

inMarchandAprilof1989sevenadditional

safetyrelatedandbalanceofplantbreakersfailedtocloseduringtesting,whichwasalsocausedbyhardening

ofthelubricant

onthebreakerlinkage(315/89031-04A;

316/89031-04A).

b.Corrective

actionwasneitherpromptnoradequatetocorrectmaintenance

related'roblems

identified

bythelicenseeinFebruary1988.InDecember1989,36ofthese71selfidentified

findingsandrecommendations

werereopened.

Duringthisinspection

manyofthesameproblemswereidentified

thatreflectasignificant

weaknessinthecorrective

actionsystem(315/89031-04B;

316/89031-04B)."

ResponsetoViolation

4aBasedonreviewofProblemReport89-245,whichwasaddressed

intheNoticeofViolation

itisourpositionthatnoactualviolation

occurred.

TheFebruary27,1989,condition

wasidentified

duringscheduled

'preventive

maintenance

workandresultedintheproblemreport.Thatdiscovery,

coupledwithasimilarcondition

alsofoundduringpreventive

maintenance,

resultedinaPart21report.ThePart21investigation

revealedthatvendor-specified

information

contained

noinstruction

forperiodiclubrication

ofthebreakers.

Similarbreakersusedintheplanthad,untilthattime,passedtestrequirements'he

plant'sactionswhichweretakenpromptly,

includedrevisionoftheprocedure

basedonnewinputfromthemanufacturer,

initiation

ofJobOrderstoinspectallothersimilarbreakersinstalled

inbothunits,andestablishment

ofscheduled

inspections

toidentifypossiblerepetition

ofthe

C.I1

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page13condition

inthefuture.TheNoticeofViolation

incorrectly

concluded

thatnoactionwastakentoinspectadditional

breakersordevelopcorrective

action.Twosubsequent

problemreportswereinitiated

asaresultofdeficiencies

foundintheinspections

andtestscoveredbyourexpandedactionforProblemReport89-245andtheassociated

Part21review.Thosereportswereinitiated

todocumentthesimilarconditions

onthenotedbreakers.

WithintwomonthsoftheMarch1,1989,Part21reporttotheNRC,theplanthadcompleted

theinspections,

cleanedandrelubricated

thebreakersinbothunitsasrecommended

bytherevisedvendorinformation,

anddocumented

eachcasewhenasimilarcondition

wasfound.(1)Corrective

ActionTakenandResultsAchievedTheresultofProblemReport89-245,whichwasreviewedbythePlantAssessment

GrouponMarch17,1989,wastoinspect,cleanandlubricate

similarbreakersinbothunitsanddocumenttheresults.(2)Corrective

ActionTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation

Procedure

changesandinspections

werescheduled

asaresultofaddressing

theproblemreportedinProblemReport89-245onsimilarbreakers.

Theseactionsgenerated

additional

JobOrdersandcondition

reportswhichwerereferenced

intheinspection

report.(3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedNoviolation

occurred.

ResponsetoViolation

4bAsdiscussed

inourresponsetoWeakness(1),AEPhastakennumerouscorrective

actionstoaddresstheproblemsidentified

bytheMaintenance

Self-Assessment.

Theseactionsinclude:othedevelopment

ofaRCMProgramotheacquisition

oftheNuclearPlantMaintenance

(NPM)Moduleothedevelopment

ofaSystemEngineerProgramotheacquisition

ofNUS'sPRONETandtheservt.ces

ofNUS'sprocedure

writers.

Attachment

2toAEP:NRC:1125A

Page14Inordertoeffectively

implement

programsasencompassing

andcomprehensive

asthese,significant

analysis,

planningandcoordination

areneeded.Assuch,itwilltakeseveralyearstocompletely

implement

someofthecorrective

actionswehaveinitiated.

(1)Corrective

ActionsandResultsAchievedMaintenance-related

problemsidentified

intheMaintenance

Self-Assessment

willbereviewedandresolvedasappropriate,

withimplementation

oftheMaintenance

Improvement

Plan.(2)Corrective

ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolation

TheImprovement

Planincludesmilestones

andabuilt-inmechanism

thatrequiresregularre-evaluation

oftheplanandmonitoring

ofitseffectiveness

toensurethatitisproviding

thedesiredresultsandthatthereiscontinuing

improvement

inallmaintenance-related

areas'3)DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedResolution

anddocumentation

oftheidentified

itemswillbecompleted

byJune1,1991.