ML17331A707

Forwards Second Quarterly Rept on Hydrogen Mitigation & Control & Technical Rept Re Limiting Internal Uniform Pressure Capacity

ML17331A707
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/24/1981
From:	HUNTER R S INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	DENTON H R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17326A884	List: ML17326A883 ML17331A707 ML17331A708
References
AEP:NRC:00500A, AEP:NRC:500A, NUDOCS 8104290515
Download: ML17331A707 (3)

Text

'[NDIANALMICHIGANELECTRICCOMPANYP.OaBOX18BOWLINGGREBMSTATIOHNEWYORK,H.Y.1000iApril24,1981AEP:NRC:00500ADonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNos.1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316.LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74'econdquarterlyReportonHydrogenMitigationandControlMr.HaroldR.Denton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryComIissionWashington,D.C.20555g~~=L

DearMr.Denton:

Thisletteranditsattachmentsconstituteoursecondquarterlyreportonhydrogen..mitigationandcontrolfortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnit[los.1and2.Thisreportisb'eingsubmittedinfulfillmentofthecommitmentmadeinourAEP:NRC:00476submittaldatedOctober7,1980andsupplementstheinformationpreviouslytransmittedtotheCommission.viaourfirstquarterlyreport,AEP:NRC:00500,datedJanuary12,1981.Asstatedinourfirstquarterlyreport,installationofthein-containmentportionofaDistributedIgnitionSystem(DIS)isscheduled-duringthe1981refuelingoutagesforUnitNos.1and2oftheCookPlant.Detailedinformationconcerningthein-containmentportionoftheDISisprovidedinAttachmentNo.2tothisletterasrequestedbymembersofyourStaff.Designoftheoutside-containmentportionoftheDIShasbeencompletedandthenecessarymaterialordersplaced.OureffortsaredirectedtowardhavingtheDISoperationalinUnitNo.2byJune1,1981.Theattachmentstothisletteraddressthevarioustopicsassociatedwithahypotheticaleventresultinginthegenerationofsub-stantiveamountsofhydrogen.Thisinformationisprovidedintheattachmentsasfollows:

Mr.HaroldR.DentonAEP:NRC:00500AAttachmentNo.-~ToicContainm'entStructuralEvaluation213DistributedIgnitionSystemDesignInadequateCoreCooling/f{ydrogenControlEquipmentEquipmentSurvivabilityResearchProgramStatusCoreCoolingCapabilitySubsequent=to@drogenCombustionPreliminarySafetyEvaluationAs'statedinSection2.0oftheenclosuretoourAEP:NRC:00500submittal,AEPisinvestigatingvariouscandidatehydrogencontrolmethodsinconjunctionwithDukePowerCompanyandtheTennesseeValleyAuthority.Anevaluationo'fthestudiesperformedtodatewithregardtoHaloninerting,=Electro-magneticinterferenceemissionsfromsparkdischargeigniters,andtheuseofcatalyticcombustorswillbeforwardedtotheNRCinournextsub-mittalonthistopic.Testing.performedbyAEP/TVA/Duke/WestinghouseatFenwalIncorporatedverifiedtheabilityoftheglowplugigniterutilizedintheDIStoreliablyigniteleanhydrogen/air/steammixturesinthepresenceofwatersprayandfans.Confirmatorytests.performedbytheLawrenceLivermoreLaboratory(UCRb-84167)furthersubstantiatedourconclusions.withregardtotheFenwaltestresults;thatis,theglowplugigniterisareliableignitionsourceunderavarietyofadverseconditions.ThecontaihmentpressureandtemperatureresponsestohydrogencombustionhavebeenconservativelyestimatedusingtheCLASIXcomputercode.The=resultsoftheCLASIXanalysesshowthatde-liberateignitionofhydrogenwouldnotposeathreattocontainmentintegrityandwouldnotresultinenvironmentalconditionsmoreseverethanthecon-ditionstowhichmostofthenecessaryequipmenthasbeenqualifiedto.Basedontheresultsof.theaforementionedtestingandanalyses,wehaveconcludedthattheDISwouldservetoreducetheconsequencesofhypo-theticaleventssimilarinnaturetotheTMI-2accidentinvolvingthegener-ationofsubstantiveamountsofhydrogen.Theresearchanddevelopmentprograms,describedinAttachmentNo.5tothisletter(beingfundedbyAEP/TVA/DukeinconjunctionwiththeE1ectricPowerResearchInstitute},areex-pectedtoprovideconfirmatoryinformationinsupportoftheDISmitigationconcept.Themeritsofanypotentialmodification.tothepresentDISdesignuncoveredduringtheresearchprogramwillbedulyconsidered.

Mr.HaroldR.Denton3AEP:NRC:00500AAhypotelcasma~tht1smal'lbreakloss-of;coolantaccident.withfailedECCSinjection'{S2D)hasbeenanalyzedandtheacceptabslityoftheDISmitsationconceptshownforthehydrogengenerationassociatedwith-aroximately80weightpercentzircohiumcladdingoxidation;amorefhydrogencontrolstandpointthantheTMI-2accident.Inlightoftheknowledgegainedfromtheabovementioned,testginandanalyses,assupplementedbyourcontinuedawarenessoftheissues'dis-cussedbytheNRCStaffwithregardstotheSequoyahandMcGuireNuclearlants,itisourpositionthattheDISdescribedinAttachmentNo.2to1t'llostitutethefinalhydrogencontrolsystemfortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantpendingcompletionofthegeneg~~ricderadedcorerulemasng.vsoukIturbeliefthatconsiderationofadditionaleventsequences,beyondS2Disnotwarrantedatthistime.Indiana8MichiganElectricCompany.interprets10CFR170.22asrequiringthatnofeeaccompanythissubmittal.Verytrulyyours,hYR.S.HunterVicePresidentcc:DohnE.Dolan-ColumbusR.C.Callen,G.Charno'ffD..V.Shaller-'ridgmanR.M.JurgensenRegionIIISite-Inspector