05000321/FIN-2017002-04: Difference between revisions

Finding

Title

Licensee-Identified Violation

Description

TS 3.6.4.1 requires secondary containment be operable in Mode 1 and during movements of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Contrary to the above, on February 8 at 1035, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent RTP and Unit 2 conducting refueling operations, secondary containment was made inoperable when Unit 2 reactor building containment was breached for a scheduled refueling outage and a configuration control error on the Unit 2 standby gas treatment system provided a uncontrolled opening into the secondary containment for the Unit 1 reactor building and the common refueling floor. A temporary blind flange had been incorrectly installed on the upstream side vice downstream side of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment inlet isolation valve when the valve had been removed from the system for testing. This configuration rendered secondary containment for the Unit 1 reactor building and the common refueling floor inoperable. A senior reactor operator performing a plant tour noted the incorrect flange configuration and at 2017 on February 17, the blind flange was moved to the downstream side of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment inlet isolation valve to restore compliance. Inspectors screened the finding in accordance with IMC 609 Appendix A The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power. The finding screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the questions in Appendix A Exhibit 3 for Control Room, Auxiliary, Reactor, or Spent Fuel Pool Building, were answered no. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as CR 10332592.

04
Site:	Hatch
Report	IR 05000321/2017002 Section 4OA7
Date counted	Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	No Cornerstone
Identified by:	Licensee-identified
Inspection Procedure:
Inspectors (proximate)	D Hardage D Retterer J Montgomery P Braaten J Munday
Violation of:	Technical Specification
INPO aspect
'
v • d • e

Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2017002

1(3)2(4)3(1)5(0)7(0)8(0)9(1)301(0)403(0)404(0)405(0)502(1)4(1)8(0)

IR 05000321/2017002: 1 3 4 2

Finding List (Hatch) @ 2017Q2

CCA Matrix: 2017Q2

	Q	CCA	Title
05000321/FIN-2016003-01	2016Q3	P.3	Unit Downpower Caused by RFP Vent Line Failure
05000321/FIN-2016003-02	2016Q3	H.13	Failure to Ensure Work Hours are Within Work Hour Limits
05000321/FIN-2016404-01	2016Q3		Security
05000321/FIN-2016004-01	2016Q4	P.1	Failure to Establish Icing Controls on CAD Subsystem
05000366/FIN-2017001-01	2017Q1	H.1	Failure to Identify Abnormal Condition on 2C EDG Cross Drive Assembly
05000321/FIN-2017002-01	2017Q2		Hardened grease prevents 1RHRSW pump breaker operation
05000366/FIN-2017002-02	2017Q2		Performance of Operations with Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment
05000321/FIN-2017002-03	2017Q2		Noncompliance for Providing Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown

Self-Identified List (Hatch)

	Q	Title
05000321/FIN-2017001-02	2017Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000321/FIN-2017001-03	2017Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000321/FIN-2017002-04	2017Q2	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Hatch Findings full list]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{finding
-| title = LICENSEE-IDENTIFIED Violation
+| title = Licensee-Identified Violation
 | docket = 05000321, 05000366
 | inspection report = IR 05000321/2017002

05000321/FIN-2017002-04: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 11:56, 30 May 2018

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05000321/FIN-2017002-04: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 11:56, 30 May 2018

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