NRC Generic Letter 1980-92: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I631 PARK AVENUEKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406November 6, 1980G9&- 4o -F74Docket Nos. 50-0350-247C-,* C: ')rConsolidated Edison Company ofNew York, Inc.ATTN: Mr. Peter ZarakasVice President4 Irving PlaceNew York, New York 10003Gentlemen:., .f .1- I a:a..; Ii-10so-CFir7'U)2--0041-0-The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21, "Valve Yokes Supplied by MaTcolm FoundryCompany, Inc.," is forwarded to you for action. A written response is required.In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/impact of each Bulletin onlicensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpowerexpended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report(s) required bythe Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with correctiveactions following identification of problems through the Bulletin.If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contactthis office. | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I631 PARK AVENUEKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406November 6, 1980G9&- 4o -F74Docket Nos. 50-0350-247C-,* C: ')rConsolidated Edison Company ofNew York, Inc.ATTN: Mr. Peter ZarakasVice President4 Irving PlaceNew York, New York 10003Gentlemen:., .f .1- I a:a..; Ii-10so-CFir7'U)2--0041-0-The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21, "Valve Yokes Supplied by MaTcolm FoundryCompany, Inc.," is forwarded to you for action. A written response is required.In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/impact of each Bulletin onlicensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpowerexpended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report(s) required bythe Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with correctiveactions following identification of problems through the Bulletin.If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contactthis office.SincerelyA,pi/.GrierEnclosures:1. IE Bulletin No. 80-212. List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins | ||
SincerelyA,pi/. | |||
1. IE Bulletin No. 80-212. List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins | |||
==CONTACT== | ==CONTACT== | ||
: L. E. Tripp(215-337-5282)cc w/encls:L. 0. Brooks, Project Manager, IP NuclearW. Monti, Manager -Nuclear Power Generation DepartmentM. Shatkouski, Plant ManagerJ. M. Makepeace, Director, Technical EngineeringW. D. Hamlin, Assistant to Resident ManagerJ. D. Block, Esquire, Executive Vice President -AdministrationJoyce P. Davis, Esquire8012120080Q SSINS No.: 6820Accession No.:8008220246IEB 80-21 UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555November 6, 1980IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21: VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY MALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPANY, INC. | : L. E. Tripp(215-337-5282)cc w/encls:L. 0. Brooks, Project Manager, IP NuclearW. Monti, Manager -Nuclear Power Generation DepartmentM. Shatkouski, Plant ManagerJ. M. Makepeace, Director, Technical EngineeringW. D. Hamlin, Assistant to Resident ManagerJ. D. Block, Esquire, Executive Vice President -AdministrationJoyce P. Davis, Esquire8012120080Q | ||
SSINS No.: 6820Accession No.:8008220246IEB 80-21 UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555November 6, 1980IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21: VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY MALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPANY, INC. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | ==Description of Circumstances== | ||
:On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company notified IE Region I thatcracks had been discovered in the yokes of a number of valves in the residualheat removal (RHR) system at their Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. Thepotential for common-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant,safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode whereby allRHR functions could be simultaneously lost. Specifically, the cracks werelocated in the radii at the yoke mounting flange-to-yoke vertical sectioninterface.An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performedby the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company. They concluded thatthe cracking was not due to casting defects, but rather was due to the yokematerial not having the proper mechanical properties. Purchased as ASTM A-216,Grade WCB material, the actual valve yoke material had tensile and yieldstrengths below the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.The cracked valve yokes were all cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., ofNewark, New Jersey. The foundry is no longer in business.Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of theother valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves atSusquehanna. To date, approximately half of the valve yokes have been tested.Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significantly below the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-mate relationship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM.Specification A-370. These additional valve yokes are on a wide range ofvalve sizes and are from a number of different purchase orders placed withMalcolm over a period of at least ten months during 1974 and 1975. Thus, itappears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to oneshort time period. Anchor Darling intends to replace the defective valveyokes at Susquehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear powerplants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm havebeen | :On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company notified IE Region I thatcracks had been discovered in the yokes of a number of valves in the residualheat removal (RHR) system at their Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. Thepotential for common-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant,safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode whereby allRHR functions could be simultaneously lost. Specifically, the cracks werelocated in the radii at the yoke mounting flange-to-yoke vertical sectioninterface.An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performedby the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company. They concluded thatthe cracking was not due to casting defects, but rather was due to the yokematerial not having the proper mechanical properties. Purchased as ASTM A-216,Grade WCB material, the actual valve yoke material had tensile and yieldstrengths below the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.The cracked valve yokes were all cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., ofNewark, New Jersey. The foundry is no longer in business.Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of theother valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves atSusquehanna. To date, approximately half of the valve yokes have been tested.Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significantly below the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-mate relationship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM.Specification A-370. These additional valve yokes are on a wide range ofvalve sizes and are from a number of different purchase orders placed withMalcolm over a period of at least ten months during 1974 and 1975. Thus, itappears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to oneshort time period. Anchor Darling intends to replace the defective valveyokes at Susquehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear powerplants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm havebeen provided. | ||
IEB 80-21 Since Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., is no longer in business, the NRC staffcannot determine directly if Malcolm has provided valve parts to other valvemanufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.Actions To Be Taken by | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
:For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits the followingactions are required:1. Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm FoundryCompany, Inc. If no valves are identified as having potentially faultymaterial, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remainingquestions.2. Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faultymaterial shall immediately visually inspect for cracks all normallyaccessible valve parts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reactoroperation). -3. Licensees or permit holders having active safety-related valves withpotentially faulty material shall identify the manufacturer(s) of thesevalves and either:a. Verify that all valve parts cast by Malcolm have mechanicalproperties in accordance with the ASTM material specification; ifsuch is not the case, then comply with either b. or c. below also.b. Replace the defective materials and/or valves.c. Identify any other corrective actions that may be exercised and thebasis for such actions.For plants with an operating license, the results of your initial determination(item 1), visual inspection results (item 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, your planned action (item 3), and the schedule for accomplishingthis action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletinto the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to theNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor ConstructionInspection, Washington, DC 20555.For plants with a construction permit, the results of your initialdetermination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer(s), your plannedaction (item 3) and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall bereported within sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of theappropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office ofInspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection,Washington, DC | :For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits the followingactions are required:1. Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm FoundryCompany, Inc. If no valves are identified as having potentially faultymaterial, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remainingquestions.2. Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faultymaterial shall immediately visually inspect for cracks all normallyaccessible valve parts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reactoroperation). -3. Licensees or permit holders having active safety-related valves withpotentially faulty material shall identify the manufacturer(s) of thesevalves and either:a. Verify that all valve parts cast by Malcolm have mechanicalproperties in accordance with the ASTM material specification; ifsuch is not the case, then comply with either b. or c. below also.b. Replace the defective materials and/or valves.c. Identify any other corrective actions that may be exercised and thebasis for such actions.For plants with an operating license, the results of your initial determination(item 1), visual inspection results (item 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, your planned action (item 3), and the schedule for accomplishingthis action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletinto the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to theNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor ConstructionInspection, Washington, DC 20555.For plants with a construction permit, the results of your initialdetermination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer(s), your plannedaction (item 3) and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall bereported within sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of theappropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office ofInspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection,Washington, DC 20555. | ||
IEB 80-21 Compliance with this bulletin by the licensees does not relieve the affectedvalve manufacturers from the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact theappropriate IE Regional Office.Approved by GAO, 8180225Approval was given undergeneric problems.(R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980.a blanket clearance specifically for identified IE BulletinNovember-6,No. 80-211980Enclosure 2RECENTLY ISSUEDIE BULLETINSBulletinNo.80-22SubjectAutomation Industries,Model 200-520-008 Sealed-Source ConnectorsBoron Loss fromBWR Control BladesDate Issued9/12/808/29/80Issued ToAll holders of aradiography licenseAll holdersof a BWR powerreactor OLRevision 1to 79-26Revision 1to 80-19Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays inReactor ProtectiveSystems of OperatingNuclear Power PlantsDesigned by CombustionEngineering8/15/80All holders of apower reactorOL or CP80-2080-19Failures of WestinghouseType W-2 Spring Return toNeutral Control SwitchesFailures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays inReactor Protective Systemsof Operating Nuclear PowerPlants Designed by CombustionEngineeringMaintenance of AdequateMinimum Flow ThruCentrifugal Charging PumpsFollowing Secondary Side HighEnergy Line Rupture7/31/807/31/807/24/80All holders of apower reactor OLor CPAll holders of apower reactor OLor CPAll holders of aPWR power reactorOL or CP80-18Supplement 3 Failure of Control Rodsto 80-17 to Insert During aScram at a BWRSupplement 2 Failure of Control Rodsto 80~-17 to Insert During a Scramat a BWRSupplement 1 Failure of Control Rodsto 80-17 to Insert During a Scramat a BWR8/22/807/22/807/18/80All holders of aBWR power reactorOL or CPAll holders of aBWR power reactor OLAll holders of a BWRpower reactorOL or CP | |||
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Revision as of 17:37, 6 April 2018
| ML031350463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/06/1980 |
| From: | Grier B H NRC Region 1 |
| To: | |
| References | |
| BL-80-021 GL-80-092, NUDOCS 8012120080 | |
| Download: ML031350463 (5) | |
UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I631 PARK AVENUEKING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406November 6, 1980G9&- 4o -F74Docket Nos. 50-0350-247C-,* C: ')rConsolidated Edison Company ofNew York, Inc.ATTN: Mr. Peter ZarakasVice President4 Irving PlaceNew York, New York 10003Gentlemen:., .f .1- I a:a..; Ii-10so-CFir7'U)2--0041-0-The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-21, "Valve Yokes Supplied by MaTcolm FoundryCompany, Inc.," is forwarded to you for action. A written response is required.In order to assist the NRC in evaluating the value/impact of each Bulletin onlicensees, it would be helpful if you would provide an estimate of the manpowerexpended in conduct of the review and preparation of the report(s) required bythe Bulletin. Please estimate separately the manpower associated with correctiveactions following identification of problems through the Bulletin.If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contactthis office.SincerelyA,pi/.GrierEnclosures:1. IE Bulletin No.80-212. List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins
CONTACT
- L. E. Tripp(215-337-5282)cc w/encls:L. 0. Brooks, Project Manager, IP NuclearW. Monti, Manager -Nuclear Power Generation DepartmentM. Shatkouski, Plant ManagerJ. M. Makepeace, Director, Technical EngineeringW. D. Hamlin, Assistant to Resident ManagerJ. D. Block, Esquire, Executive Vice President -AdministrationJoyce P. Davis, Esquire8012120080Q
SSINS No.: 6820Accession No.:8008220246IEB 80-21 UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555November 6, 1980IE BULLETIN NO. 80-21: VALVE YOKES SUPPLIED BY MALCOLM FOUNDRY COMPANY, INC.
Description of Circumstances
- On June 17, 1980, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company notified IE Region I thatcracks had been discovered in the yokes of a number of valves in the residualheat removal (RHR) system at their Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. Thepotential for common-mode failure of the yokes on several valves in redundant,safety-related trains of the RHR system constitutes a failure mode whereby allRHR functions could be simultaneously lost. Specifically, the cracks werelocated in the radii at the yoke mounting flange-to-yoke vertical sectioninterface.An analysis and evaluation of the most severely cracked valve yoke was performedby the valve manufacturer, Anchor Darling Valve Company. They concluded thatthe cracking was not due to casting defects, but rather was due to the yokematerial not having the proper mechanical properties. Purchased as ASTM A-216,Grade WCB material, the actual valve yoke material had tensile and yieldstrengths below the minimum values listed in the ASTM material specification.The cracked valve yokes were all cast by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., ofNewark, New Jersey. The foundry is no longer in business.Anchor Darling has begun a program of verifying the tensile strengths of theother valve yokes cast by Malcolm and used on Anchor Darling valves atSusquehanna. To date, approximately half of the valve yokes have been tested.Of those tested, over 25 percent of the valve yokes have revealed Brinell hard-ness values significantly below the appropriate value obtained from the approxi-mate relationship of Brinell hardness to tensile strength included in ASTM.Specification A-370. These additional valve yokes are on a wide range ofvalve sizes and are from a number of different purchase orders placed withMalcolm over a period of at least ten months during 1974 and 1975. Thus, itappears that the problem is not isolated to one heat of material or to oneshort time period. Anchor Darling intends to replace the defective valveyokes at Susquehanna and to begin a testing program at other nuclear powerplants under construction where valves with valve yokes cast by Malcolm havebeen provided.
IEB 80-21 Since Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc., is no longer in business, the NRC staffcannot determine directly if Malcolm has provided valve parts to other valvemanufacturers for use in nuclear power plants.Actions To Be Taken by
Addressees
- For all power reactor licensees or holders of construction permits the followingactions are required:1. Determine if any of the active valves in use or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility have valve parts cast by Malcolm FoundryCompany, Inc. If no valves are identified as having potentially faultymaterial, indicate that this is the case and ignore the remainingquestions.2. Licensees having active safety-related valves with potentially faultymaterial shall immediately visually inspect for cracks all normallyaccessible valve parts (i.e., those which can be inspected during reactoroperation). -3. Licensees or permit holders having active safety-related valves withpotentially faulty material shall identify the manufacturer(s) of thesevalves and either:a. Verify that all valve parts cast by Malcolm have mechanicalproperties in accordance with the ASTM material specification; ifsuch is not the case, then comply with either b. or c. below also.b. Replace the defective materials and/or valves.c. Identify any other corrective actions that may be exercised and thebasis for such actions.For plants with an operating license, the results of your initial determination(item 1), visual inspection results (item 2), a list of affected valve manu-facturers, your planned action (item 3), and the schedule for accomplishingthis action shall be reported within thirty days of the date of this bulletinto the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to theNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor ConstructionInspection, Washington, DC 20555.For plants with a construction permit, the results of your initialdetermination (item 1), a list of affected valve manufacturer(s), your plannedaction (item 3) and the schedule for accomplishing this action shall bereported within sixty days of the date of this bulletin to the Director of theappropriate NRC Regional Office with a copy sent to the NRC Office ofInspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection,Washington, DC 20555.
IEB 80-21 Compliance with this bulletin by the licensees does not relieve the affectedvalve manufacturers from the reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact theappropriate IE Regional Office.Approved by GAO, 8180225Approval was given undergeneric problems.(R0072); clearance expires November 30, 1980.a blanket clearance specifically for identified IE BulletinNovember-6,No. 80-211980Enclosure 2RECENTLY ISSUEDIE BULLETINSBulletinNo.80-22SubjectAutomation Industries,Model 200-520-008 Sealed-Source ConnectorsBoron Loss fromBWR Control BladesDate Issued9/12/808/29/80Issued ToAll holders of aradiography licenseAll holdersof a BWR powerreactor OLRevision 1to 79-26Revision 1to 80-19Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays inReactor ProtectiveSystems of OperatingNuclear Power PlantsDesigned by CombustionEngineering8/15/80All holders of apower reactorOL or CP80-2080-19Failures of WestinghouseType W-2 Spring Return toNeutral Control SwitchesFailures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays inReactor Protective Systemsof Operating Nuclear PowerPlants Designed by CombustionEngineeringMaintenance of AdequateMinimum Flow ThruCentrifugal Charging PumpsFollowing Secondary Side HighEnergy Line Rupture7/31/807/31/807/24/80All holders of apower reactor OLor CPAll holders of apower reactor OLor CPAll holders of aPWR power reactorOL or CP80-18Supplement 3 Failure of Control Rodsto 80-17 to Insert During aScram at a BWRSupplement 2 Failure of Control Rodsto 80~-17 to Insert During a Scramat a BWRSupplement 1 Failure of Control Rodsto 80-17 to Insert During a Scramat a BWR8/22/807/22/807/18/80All holders of aBWR power reactorOL or CPAll holders of aBWR power reactor OLAll holders of a BWRpower reactorOL or CP