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{{#Wiki_filter:( )) ES-401 '                      Site-Specific SRO Written Examination Cover Sheet Form ES-401-8 u.s.
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Site-Specific SRO Written Examination Applicant Information Name:
Date:                                              Facility/Unit:    Va T(_-
YOG7Lk:.
Region:        II 0, II  ~ III Ill 0 IV 0          Reactor Type: W  W~CE  CE  0    BWDGE D BWDGED
                    ~            .,
Start Time:                                        Finish Time:
Instructions Use the answer sheets provided to document your answers. Staple this cover sheet on top of the answer sheets. To pass the examination you must achieve a final grade of at least 80.00 percent overall, with 70.00 percent or better on the SRO-only items if given in conjunction with the RO exam; SRO-only exams given alone require a final grade of 80.00 percent to pass. You have 8 hours to complete the combined examination, and 3 hours if you are only taking the SRO portion.
Applicant Certification All work done on this examination is my own. II have neither given nor received aid.
Applicants Signature Applicant's Results RO/SRO-Only!Total Examination Values RO/SRO*OnlylTotal                                              7S" 7-5 // 2,S"/
: 2. / -  100
                                                                                          -  Points Applicants Applicant's Scores                                            -- / -- / --            Points Applicants Applicant's Grade                                            -- / -- / --              Percent ES-401, Page 31 of 33
: 1. 001AA2.01 001 001AA2.01 The RO withdraws control rods 3 steps, upon release of the IN-HOLD-OUT switch, rods continue to withdraw and cannot be stopped.
(          Which ONE of the following reactor trips is based on this event and would result in the reactor trip breakers opening to mitigate the event without any operator action?
(Assume all appropriate procedural actions have been performed to this point)
A. SR Hi Flux reactor trip, power at the point for taking critical data.
B~
B  IR Hi Flux reactor trip, power at 4% just prior to entering Mode 11..
c.
C. PR Low Setpoint Hi Flux reactor trip, power at 18% power during swap to MFRVs.
D. PR Positive Rate Trip, power near 100% power performing rod operability testing.
l Page:
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KIA 001    Continuous Rod Withdrawal AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal.
Reactor tripped breaker indicator K/A MATCH ANALYSIS KIA Question gives a plausible scenario where an uncontrolled rod motion occurs after the RO releases the reactor trip breakers. The candidate has to pick which Reactor Trip setpoint is based on this event and power level.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria item 2 - Facility operating limits in Tech Specs Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                      -
and their bases.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may know the bases for SR Hi Flux is uncontrolled rod withdrawal but the trip is blocked above P-6 when critical data is taken.
B. Correct. IR Hi Flux based on uncontrolled rod withdrawal and would not be blocked at this power level.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may know the bases for PR Low Setpoint Hi Flux is for an uncontrolled rod withdrawal but this trip should be blocked per UOP actions P-1O is received, far below the current power level stated in the question.
when P-10 D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may confuse the bases for PR High Positive Rate reactor trip which is an ejected rod event with uncontrolled rod motion.
REFERENCES Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and Bases for Reactor Trip Instrumentation.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-39207-02, Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.3 are exceeded.
Page:
Page: 22of48 of 48                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
                                                  &fc                                              O          I 4rO /
Number            Text LO-LP-39206-08    Define nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor.
LO-LP-39206-09    Define quadrant power tilt ratio. State the required action for exceeding the limit at various power levels.
LO-LP-39207-O1 LO-LP-39207-01    For any given item in section 3.3 of Tech Specs, be able to:
LCO.
LiState the LeO.
: a. OState b.OState b.LiState anyone any one hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-39207-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
a.DWhether any Tech Spec LeOs a.OWhether                    LCOs of section 3.3 are exceeded.
LCOs.
b.OThe required actions for all section 3.3 LeOs.
LO-LP-39207-03    For any given item in section 13.3 of the Technical Requirements Manual, be able to:
a.OState aLlState the Technical Requirement (TR) for operation.
b.OState    any one hour or less required actions.
b.uState anyone LO-LP-39207-04 LO-LP-39207 -04    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.3.
LO-LP-39207-05 LO-LP-39207 -05    Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. DWhether any TR of section 13.3 has been exceeded.
a.DWhether
(,                    b. OThe required actions for all section 13.3 TRs.
b.EJThe LO-LP-39207-06 LO-LP-39207 -06    State the values for the Limiting Safety System Settings.
LO-LP-39208-O1 LO-LP-39208-01    For any given item in section 3.4 of Tech Specs, be able to:
: a. DState      LCD.
ZState the LeO.
: b.          any one hour or less required actions.
DState anyone bzlState LO-LP-39208-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. OWhether any Tech Spec LeOs a.LiWhether                    LCO5 of section 3.4 are exceeded.
b.OThe                                        LCOs.
b.LiThe required actions for all section 3.4 LeOs.
LO-LP-39208-03    For any given item in section 13.4 of the TRM, be able to:
a.Li State the TR for operation.
a.OState b.OState    any one hour or less required actions.
b.LlState anyone LO-LP-39208-04    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.4.
LO-LP-39208-05    State why the mode 5 ReS                                                      ioops filled vs. loops not RCS loops and coolant circulation specifications for loops RI-IR trains required and steam generator aVailability.
filled vary with regard to the number of RHR                                        availability.
LO-LP-39208-06 LO-LP-39208-06                                        RCS specific activity.
State the reason for limiting the ReS Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                Page 42 of 165 ReFer:vN'ct Re                                    lZ:-lL 00
                                                                              °°/I !1-i/2,() Ii    -
 
U      M*ioj
                                  / ee                                                RTS c- ~B_A~S_ES~
BASES _____________________________________________________
APPLICABLE APPLICABLE                          a.
: a. Power Range Power            Neutron Flux Range Neutron      Flux -  High High SAFETY ANALYSES, SAFETY LCD, and LCO,                                  The Power The  Power Range Range Neutron Neutron Flux FluxHigh
                                                                                - High trip trip Function Function APPLICABILITY                          ensures that protection is  is provided, from all power power levels, levels, (continued)                                              reactivity excursion leading against a positive reactivity                leading to DNB power operations. These during power                    These can bebe caused by  by rod rod withdrawal or withdrawal    or reductions reductions in in RCS RCS temperature.
LCD requires all four of the Power Range The LCO                                        Range Neutron Flux - High channels to be OPERABLE.
In MODE 1I or 2, when a positive reactivity excursion could occur, the Power Range Neutron Flux          - High trip must be FluxHigh OPERABLE. This Function will terminate the reactivity excursion and shut down the reactor prior to reaching a power level that could damage the fuel. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the NIS power range detectors cannot detect neutron levels in this range. In these MODES, the Power Range FluxHigh Neutron Flux    - High does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down and reactivity excursions unlikely. Other RTS into the power range are extremely unlikely.
Functions and administrative controls provide protection against reactivity additions when in MODE 3, 4, 5,        5, or 6.
: b. Power Range Neutron Flux -          Low The LCO LCD requirement for the Power Range Neutron Function ensures that protection is Flux - Low trip Function I      provided against aa positive positive reactivity excursion from low power or subcritical conditions.
The LCD LCO requires all four of the Power Range Neutron Flux - Low channels to be OPERABLE.
R. lit k) ft          -
Ovtr ~ InIn MODE MODE I, 1, below setpoint), and setpoint),
below the Power and inin MODE MODE 2, Power Range Neutron 2, the the Power Neutron Flux Power Range Flux (P-IC Range Neutron (P-10 Neutron Flux Flux -
({ f)        l (r      Low Low trip must must be be OPERABLE.
OPERABLE. This  This Function Function maymay be be manually manually
                      \...:...,          blocked byby the the operator    when two operator when    two out out of of four power power range channels areare greater greater than than approximately 10%  10% RTP RTP (P-IC (P-10 f-rL 00144 2                              Jontinued)
Vogtle Vogtle Units    and 22 Units I1 and                          BB 3.3.1-12 3.3.1-12                                    Revision No.
Revision  No. 00
 
Dr.....      f)                J::o f\.-, 00  0 (M,-,rO        RTS I1 RTS Instrumentation 1\
                      \e~r.:-eI\f'C.fL, 2
                      /      e                        1  c                                              B 3.3.1 BASES BASES APPLICABLE                          b.
: b.      Power Range Power              Neutron Flux Range Neutron        Flux -  Low Low (continued)
(continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, SAFETY LCO, and LCO,                                      setpoint). This    Function is This Function        automatically unblocked is automatically    unblocked when APPLICABILITY APPLICABILITY                              three out of four power power range channels are    are below the P-10 P-i 0 setpoint. Above the P-10  P-b setpoint, positive positive reactivity reactivity additions are mitigated by    by the Power Power Range Range Neutron Neutron Flux - High trip Flux                Function.
trip Function.
MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the Power In MODE In                                Power Range Range Neutron Flux-  Flux Low trip Function does not have to be        be OPERABLE because the reactor is shut down and the NIS power range because detectors cannot detect neutron levels in this range. Other RTS trip Functions and administrative controls provide protection against positive reactivity additions or power excursions in MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6.
: 3. Power Range Neutron Flux -            High Positive Rate The Power Range Neutron Flux - High Positive Rate trip uses the same channels as discussed for Function 2 above.
The Power Range Neutron Flux - High Positive Rate trip Function ensures that protection is provided against rapid I~) \A(ej  (          increases in neutron flux that are characteristic of an RCCA
: i. _5          drive rod housing rupture and the accompanying ejection of the RCCA. This Function compliments the Power Range Neutron Oqr
()                Flux - High and Low Setpoint trip Functions to ensure that the criteria are met for aa rod ejection from the power range.
D\ \
1(It ITh The LCO requires all four of the Power Range Neutron      Neutron Flux -
High Positive Positive Rate channels to be OPERABLE.OPERABLE.
bV\ f-                In In MODE MODE I1 or or 2, 2, when there there isis aa potential to add add aa large large amount amount f ("'' - ~,' bl 'C of positive reactivity from aa rod ejection of Power Range Neutron Power ejection accident (REA), the Neutron Flux - High Positive Rate trip must be the OPERABLE.
OPERABLE. In      In MODE MODE 3, 3, 4, 4, 5, 5, or or 6, the the Power Power Range NeutronNeutron Flux - High High Positive Positive Rate triptrip Function does does not not have have to to be be Rett",-eNC~
e    .
felL-            001        tht ~cJ I    (continued)
(continued)
Vogtle Units I1 and Vogtle Units      and 22                          BB 3.3.1-13 3.3.1-13                                      Revision No.
Revision    No. 00
 
TSlnsumentation B 3.3.1 BASES BASES APPLICABLE APPLICABLE                  3.
: 3. Power Range Power              Neutron Flux Range Neutron      Flux -  High High Positive Positive Rate Rate (continued)
(continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, SAFETY    ANALYSES, LCO, and LCO,  and                      OPERABLE because OPERABLE                    other RTS because other    RTS trip    Functions and trip Functions  and APPLICABILITY                                      controls will provide protection administrative controls                    protection against against positive reactivity additions. In reactivity                In MODE MODE 6, no  no rods rods are are withdrawn and the the SDM is    increased during is increased    during refueling operations. The reactor reactor vessel head is also removed or      or the closure bolts areare preventing any detensioned preventing        any pressure buildup.
buildup. In In addition, the NIS power range NIS            range detectors cannot detect neutron neutron levels levels present present in this mode.
: 4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Intermediate The Intermediate Range Neutron Flux (NI-035B, D, & E, 41\/.,
If            /J  (1,
(( 0lNfJ(tL-(1J NI-036B, D, & G) trip Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup. This trip
                          \    Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range FluxLow Neutron Flux    - Low Setpoint trip Function. The NIS intermediate range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core. The NIS intermediate range detectors do not provide any input to control systems. Note that this Function also provides a signal to prevent automatic and manual rod withdrawal prior to initiating a reactor trip.
The LCO requires two channels of Intermediate Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE    OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.
Because this trip Function Function is important important only during startup, startup, there is generally no no need to disable channels for testing while the Function Function is is required to bebe OPERABLE.
OPERABLE. Therefore, Therefore, aa third third channel is unnecessary.
unnecessary.
In In MODE MODE I1 below the P-1O  P-10 setpoint, and and in in MODE MODE 2, 2, when there there is is aa potential potential for an an uncontrolled uncontrolled RCCA RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident accident during during reactor startup,    the Intermediate startup, the  Intermediate Range Range Neutron Neutron Flux trip must Flux      must be be OPERABLE.
OPERABLE.
                                                                                /4          (continued)
Vogtle  Units I1 and Vogtle Units    and 22                        BB 3.3.1-14 3.3.1-14                                    Revision No.
Revision  No. 00
 
RTS Instrumentation o&          OO(Pr2o
(
BASES APPLICABLE                      4. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux (continued)
Intermediate                          (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and LCO,                                            P-1O setpoint, the Power Range Above the P-10                          Range Neutron Neutron APPLICABILITY                        FluxHigh Flux  - High Setpoint trip and the Power Range Neutron Neutron Flux-Flux High Positive Rate trip provide core protection for a rod withdrawal accident. In MODE 3, 4, or 5, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip does not have to be OPERABLE because the reactor cannot be started up in this condition. The core also has the required SDM to mitigate the consequences of a positive reactivity addition accident. In MODE 6, all rods are fully inserted and the core has a required increased SDM. Also, the NIS intermediate range indication is typically low off-scale in this MODE.
: 5. Source Range Neutron Flux
                ,atI    u c, Cf lit C(        bk...
l \ 2 The c      The LCO requirement for the Source Range Neutron Flux trip (Nl-0031 B, 0, (NI-0031      D, &              D, &
Nl-0032B, 0,
                                                      & E, NI-0032B,    & G) Function ensures that protection is provided against an uncontrolled RCCA bank rod withdrawal accident from a subcritical condition during startup.
This trip Function provides redundant protection to the Power Range Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip Functions. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, administrative controls also prevent the uncontrolled withdrawal of rods. The NIS source range detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and measure neutrons leaking from the core.
The NIS source range detectors do not provide any inputs to systems. The source range trip is the only RTS control systems.
automatic protection function required in MODES 3, 4, and 5.
Therefore, the functional capability at the specified Trip Setpoint is assumed to be available.
The LCO requires two channels of Source Range Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE. Two OPERABLE channels are sufficient to ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.
Function.
The LCO also requires two channels of the Source Range Neutron Neutron Flux to be OPERABLE OPERABLE in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with RTBs closed.
The Source Range Neutron Flux  Flux Function provides protection for control rod withdrawal from
                              /E            ec              fc          0014*
Vogtle Units I and 2 Units 1                                  BB 3.3.1-15                                Rev. 1-3/99
 
1 2
Z/r7tll/flt ~rO )
                        ,zL\eef ~ c-£ rJ' (L        -f cft/Cf\.../
(;V RTS Instrumentation RTS B 3.3.1 BASES APPLICABLE                    5. Source Range Neutron Flux (continued)
SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and                          subcritical, boron dilution (see LCO 3.3.8) and control APPLICABILITY APPLICABI LlTY                    rod ejection events. The Function also provides visual neutron flux indication in the control room.
20 r Ir~ c.. 0--l J.-Inn MODE 2 when below the P-6 setpoint during a reactor A                .
V" l5
          / \\.Lt  LJ        L..t'\ startup, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be
('tt \      ~ \
OPERABLE. Above the P-6 setpoint, the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip and the Power Range Neutron Flux - Low Setpoint trip will provide core protection for reactivity accidents.
Above the P-6 setpoint, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip is blocked.
In MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the reactor shut down, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip Function must also be OPERABLE. If the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal, the Source Range Neutron Flux trip must be OPERABLE to provide core protection against a rod withdrawal accident. If the Rod Control System is not capable of rod withdrawal, the source range detectors are not required to trip the reactor. Source range detectors also function to monitor for high flux at shutdown. This function is addressed in Specification 3.3.8. Requirements for the source range detectors in MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.3.
: 6. Overtemperature AT  ~T The Overtemperature AT    ~T trip Function (TDI-0411C, TDI-0421C, TDI-0431 TDI-0431C,    TDI-0441 C, TDI-041 C, TDI-0441C,            IA, TDI-0421A, TDI-0431A, TDI-0411A, TDI-044IA)
TDI-0441A) is provided to ensure that the design limit DNBR is met.
This trip Function Function also limits the range over which the Overpower
                                    ~T trip Function must provide protection. The inputs to the AT Overtemperature AT  ~T trip include pressure, coolant temperature, axial power distribution, and reactor power as indicated by loop
                                    ~T assuming full reactor coolant flow. Protection from violating the AT DNBR limit is is assured for those transients that are are slow with respect to delays from the core to the measurement system.
system. The Function monitors both variation in  in power and flow since aa decrease decrease in in flow r
                                                                          &1
~/                                                                                              (continued)
(continued)
Vogtle Units Units I1 and and 22                        BB 3.3.1-16 3.3.1-16                                Rev. 1-3/99 1-3/99
: 2. 002A2.04 001 Given the following conditions:
r            -Crew is performing the actions of 19231-C, "Loss
              -                                              Loss of Heat Sink" Sink due to a prolonged
\.. _          loss of feedwater.
              - RCS Bleed and Feed has been initiated.
              - SG WR levels are all approximately 15%.
              - Containment pressure is 0.2 psig
              - RE-002 and RE-003 are in INTERMEDIATE alarm
              - AFW flow has just been restored to a single Steam Generator Which ONE of the following is CORRECT?
A. Containment pressure will remain stable, immediately transition to 1901 19010-C, O-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
overtime, B. Containment pressure will rise over  time, immediately transition to 19010-C, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
C. Containment pressure will remain stable, remain in 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink to perform further actions.
D~
D                                  overtime, Containment pressure will rise over time, remain in 19231-C, 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink to perform further actions.
Page: 3 of 48                                                                              6/6/2007
 
KIA 002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS).  (RCS).
A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Loss of heat sinks.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Questions gives a scenario during a large break LOCA where the crew is required to transition to address RWST level lowering with inadequate containment sump level.
The candidate must determine the correct transition flow path to address the problem.
Question meets 11 OCFR55.43(b) criteria item # 5 - Assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.
Therefore, the question is SRO only.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may not recall PORVs open causing containment pressure to rise but rad monitors indicate PRT ruptured. 19010 is improper due to PORVs must be sequentially closed before the transition.
lncorrect.Plausible the candidate may recognize PORVs cause containment B. Incorrect.Plausible pressure to rise and think transition to 19010 is appropriate and not think of terminating feed and bleed.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may not recall PORVs open causing containment pressure to rise but rad monitors indicate PRT ruptured. Remaining in 19231 19231 to terminate SI is correct.
D. Correct. Containment pressure should rise and remain in 19231 is correct.
REFERENCES 19231-C, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink pages 21 -24, 19231-C,                                              - 24, and 31 - 36.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-37051-08, Using EOP 19231  19231 as a guide, guide, briefly describe how each major step is accomplished. Describe the bases for each. (commitment)
LO-LP-37051-10, State all conditions when the procedure 19231, 19231, Response to Loss of
( .. ;          Secondary Heat Sink, would be terminated.
Page:
Page: 440f48 of 48                                                                                6/6/2007
 
                                                                                            -                oo-7,,QL r
LO Cluster 37 Loss ofHeat                          of Heat Sink Objectives LO-LP-37051-01 LO-LP-37051-01        Cite potential Cite potential events      that could events that      could lead lead to      loss of to aa loss  of secondary secondary heatheat sink.
sink. (commitment)
(commitment)
LO-LP-37051-02 LO-LP-37051-02        State the State  the reason reason forfor tripping tripping RCPsRCPs early earty in    the transient.
in the  transient.
LO-LP-37051-03 LO-LP-37051-03        State RCS State  RCS temperature temperature and  and pressure response to                loss of to aa loss of secondary secondary heat      sink (LOSHS) heat sink  (LOSHS) withwith and and without required required operator        actions. (commitment) operator actions.
LO-LP-37051-04 LQ-LP-37051-04        State time State  time considerations on    on initiation initiation of  bleed and of bleed    and feed. (commitment)
(commitment)
LO-LP-37051-05 LO-LP-37051-05        State the precautions which should be taken in State                                                                              dry steam generator following recovery in feeding aa hot, dry from a loss ofof heat sink sink accident.
LO-LP-37051-06        Interpret the CSFST for aa challenge to the heat sink safety function. (19200, F.0 Heat Sink).            -
LO-LP-37051-07        State the intent intent of 19231,      Response to Loss 19231, Response                Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Sink.
LO-LP-37051-08 P-37O51-08            Using EOP 19231 as a guide, briefly describe how each major step is accomplished. Describe the bases for each. (commitment)
LO-LP-37051-09        Given a NOTE or CAUTION statement from the EOP,                    EOP, state the bases for that NOTE or CAUTION statement.
LO-LP-37051-10 LO-LP-37051-10      State all conditions conditions when the procedure 19231,        19231, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, would be terminated.
LO-LP-3705-LO-LP-370511-11      Define loss of of secondary heat sink in        in accordance with  with 19231,    Response to Loss of Secondary Heat 19231, Response Sink, requiring immediate initiationinitiation of bleed bleed and feed control.        (commitment) control. (commitment)
LO-LP-37051 - 12 LO-LP-37051-12        Discuss    SOER-86.001 with regard Discuss SOER-86.001                  regard to failure of the              System and the AFW System        and the potential potential for sustained      loss of sustained loss AFW AFW capability capability due due toto equipment equipment malfunction malfunction or      operator error.
or operator  error. (commitment)
(commitment)
LO-LP-37051-13 LO-LP-37051-13        Describe Describe how how toto operate operate the  the turbine-driven turbine-driven AFW          pumps turbine AFW pumps'                trip and turbine trip  and throttle    valve after throttle valve    after aa mechanical mechanical overspeed trip    trip with with or without        electrical power without electrical      power toto the          motor. (commitment) valve motor.
the valve            (commitment)
LO-LP-37051-14 LO-LP-37051-14        State State the  consequences of the consequences          of failure failure to    establish an to establish    an alternate alternate heat    sink ifif AFW heat sink      AFW isis lost.
lost. (commitment)
(commitment)
Wednesday, Wednesday, June June 06, 06, 2007 2007                                                                                                                          Page 11 ofl Page    of I eetce                                      -R- oo,42 09
 
PROCEDURE NO.
PROCEDURE  NO.                            REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                          PAGE PAGE NO .
NO.
VEGP VEGP              19231C 19231-C                                      29 29                                21 21 of of 45 45 Rfc@(%Q-t<          Ai        00 k2oI-k ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE    RESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT      NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION:
CAUTION:                  flow rates Feed flow Feed            rates shouldshould be be controlled controlled to          to prevent prevent excessive RCS excessive      RCS cooldown.
cooldown.
        *47
        *47.      Try to Try      to establish establish IIDAFW NDAFW flow  flow to at to    at least least oneone SG:
SG:
a.
: a.      Check MDAFW Check              Pump MDAFW Pump                            a.
: a.      Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
AVAILABLE:
                          - AVAILABLE:
0-O
* Initiate Initiate actions actions to to o0.-      Power available Power    available                                        restore restore aa MDAFW MDAFW Pump.
Pump.
o0.-      Suction pressure Suction    pressure o0.-    Discharge pressure Discharge      pressure                        0-O
* WHEN WHEN MDAFW MDAFW Pump Pump isis started, started, THEN THEN go go to to Step Step 47b.
47b.
0-
: 0.      Go Go to to Step Step 51.
51.
b.
: b.      Select SG(s)
Select      SG(s) to      feed:
to feed:                    b.
: b.      Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
oO 1)1)    All SG All    SG  WR levels WR    levels                        o0 -*    Restore Restore feedfeed flow flow to to
                                  -  LESS
                                  - LESS    THAN THAN 9%  9%                                  Non-Dry Non-Dry SG(s)SG(s) byby going going (31%
(31%  ADVERSE)
ADVERSE)                                      to to Step Step 48.
48.
oO c.c. Check Core Check      Core Exit Exit TCs  TCs                oQ c.c. Do Do NOTNOT limit limit feed feed flow flow to to
                          -  STABLE OR
                          - STABLE      OR LOWERING LOWERING                              the the selected selected SG SG if if Core Core Exit Exit TCs  TC5 are are rising rising andand go go to  to step step 47f.
47f.
d.
: d.      Restore feed Restore      feed flow flow to  to selected SG selected      SG - BETWEEN
                                              -  BETWEEN 30 GPM 30    GPM ANDAND 100 100 GPM:
GPM:
oO -*    IPC Point IPC    Point - UF5403
                                                -  UF5403 oO e.      Check Dry  Dry SGSG WRWR level                  0 e.
De.        WHEN WHEN Dry SG    SG WR level is  is GREATER THAN
                          - GREATER
                          -              THAN 9%  9%                              greater greater than  than 9%
9% (31%
(31%
(31%
(31* ADVERSE)                                        ADVERSE)
THEN raise feed    feed flow flow to restore NR level greater than 10%    10* (32% ADVERSE)
ADVERSE)..
DGo OGo to Step 68.
Q f.
Of.        Raise feed Raise            flow to feed flow        to . ~
restore NR level grea ee r than 10% (32% ADVERSE)
(~                        and go to Step 68.
C&_, OC17k1rO4
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                        PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                                29 29                                22 22 of of 45 45
                                    ,ZefvLflVCC fGlL- 001.,..,fr      OOtJ/2OE        2r~ 0 U ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAI~D OBTAI    D 48.
: 48.      Verify MDAFW Verify    MDAFW Pump Pump throttle throttle          48.
: 48. Perform Perform the    the following following as as valves valves openopen for for selected selected                    necessary necessary to        to establish establish MDAFW MDAFW SG (s) ::
SG(s)                                              feed feed flow:
flow:
D D
0 O
HV-5139 MDAFW HV-5139    MDAFW to to SG HV-5l37 MDAFW HV-5137 SG MDAFW Pump Pump 11 Pump Pump AA A A
                                                                  -*  Open Open MDAFW valves:
valves:
MDAFW Pump Pump crosstie crosstie to to SG SG  44                          0 a.
Da.        1302-U4-055 l302-U4-055 DO        HV-5l32 MDAFW HV-5132    MDAFW    Pump Pump      BB to to SG SG  22                          Ob.
Db.        1302-U4-056 l302-U4-056 D0        HV-5134 MDAFW HV-5134    MDAFW    Pump Pump      BB to to SG SG  33                      D-0
* Limit Limit flow    flow rate rate toto avoid avoid pump pump runoutrunout
                                                                        - LESS
                                                                        -  LESS THAN THAN 600600 GPM GPM D049.
: 49.      Verify Verify adequate adequate feed feed flow flow toto    49.
: 49. IF IF feed feed flow  flow to  to at at least least one one raise raise SG  SG levels.
levels.                              SG SG verified, verified, THEN THEN perform perform the    the following:
following:
0 a.
D  a. Maintain Maintain flow    flow toto restore restore NR level NR    level to  to greater greater than than 10%
10% [32% [32% ADVERSE]
ADVERSE] .
Db.
Ob.      Go Go to to Step Step 68.68.
D O IF IF feed feed flow  flow to  to at at least least one one SG SG can can NOT  NOT be  be verified, verified, THEN THEN go  go to to StepStep 51.
51.
D  50.
050.        Go Go to to Step Step 68.
68.
R                                          ooko9
 
PROCEDURE NO.
PROCEDURE  NO.                              REVISION NO.
REVISION  NO.                          PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              19231-C 19231-C                                        29 29                                23 of 23  of 4545 c(fter4-cL        f
(            ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE ACTION/EXPECTED            RESPONSE                        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT    NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION:
CAUTION:          Feed flow Feed    flow ratesrates shouldshould be be controlled controlled to      to prevent prevent excessive RCS excessive        RCS cooldown.
cooldown.
      **51.
: 51.      Try to Try    to establish establish TDAFW  TDAFW flow  flow to at to        least one at least        one SG:SG:
a.
: a. Check TDAFW Check      TDAFW Pump Pump                          a.
: a. Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
AVAILABLE:
                        - AVAILABLE:
0-O
* Initiate Initiate 13610, 13610, 0.
D-        Steam admission Steam    admission valve    valve                        AUXILIARY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FEEDWATER HV-5106 - OPEN HV-5106      -  OPEN                                      SYSTEM SYSTEM to  to operate operate 0.
O-      Trip &
Trip    & Throttle Throttle valve    valve                        TDAFW TDAFW Pump Pump as as PV-15129 - OPEN PV-15129        -  OPEN                                    necessary.
necessary.
(HS-15111)
(HS-l5lll) 0
* 0-      Governor valve Governor        valve                            0-0
* WHEN WHEN TDAFW TDAFW Pump Pump is is SV-15133 - OPERATING SV-15133        -  OPERATING                              started, started, PROPERLY (PDIC-5180A)
PROPERLY        (PDIC-5180A)                              THEN THEN go go toto Step Step SIb.
Sib.
o0.-      Go to Go    to Step Step 55.55.
                                                                        \
b.
: b. Select SG(s)
Select      SG(s) to  to feed:
feed:                b.
: b. Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
o0 1)1)    All SG All  SG WRWR levels levels                        o0 -*    Restore Restore feed Non-Dry Non-Dry SG(s) feed flow flow to SG(s) by to
                                - LESS
                                -  LESS THAN THAN 9%    9%                                                        by going going (31%
(31% ADVERSE)
ADVERSE)                                      to to Step Step 52.
(              0 c.
Dc.        Check Core Check              Exit TCs Core Exit          TCs                b  c. Do Do NOT NOT limit 52.
limit feed feed flow flow to to
                          -  STABLE OR
                        - STABLE      OR LOWERING LOWERING                            the the selected selected SG  SG ifif Core Core Exit Exit TCs  TC5 are are rising rising and and go go to  to 51f.
51f.
d.
: d. Restore feed Restore      feed flow flow to  to selected SG selected                  BETWEEN SG - BETWEEN 30 GPM 30    GPM ANDAND 100100 GPM:GPM:
o0 -*    IPC Point IPC    Point - UF5403
                                                -  UF5403 O e.
De.        Check Dry Check      Dry SG SG WR WR level level              De.      WHEN WHEN Dry  Dry SG SG WRWR level level is  is GREATER THAN
                        - GREATER
                        -                THAN 9%                                  greater greater than  than 9%9% (31%
(31%
(31%
(31% ADVERSE)                                        ADVERSE)
THEN THEN raise feed    feed flow flow to restore NR level    level greater than 10%    10% (32% ADVERSE)
ADVERSE)..
DGo OGo to Step 68.
DO f. Raise feed flow    flow to restore NR level restore            level greategreatei/
than 10%  10% (32%
(32% ADVERSE) and go to Step  Step 68. 68.
ftee                              aO/-            1oL\
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                    REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                          PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                                  29 29                            24 24 of of 45 45 iZec f otO-k
{'          ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 52.
: 52.      Verify Verify TDAFW TDAFW pump pump throttle throttle valves open valves    open for for selected selected SG (s) :
SG(s)
DO      HV-5122 HV-5122  TDAFW TDAFW  Pump Pump      to to  SG SG 11 0O      HV-5125 HV-5l25  TDAFW TDAFW  Pump Pump      to to  SG SG 22 00      HV-5127 HV-5l27  TDAFW TDAFW  Pump Pump      to to  SG SG 33 D0      HV-5120 HV-5120  TDAFW TDAFW  Pump Pump      to to  SG SG 44 D0 53.
: 53.      Verify Verify adequate adequate feed feed flow flow to  to    53.
: 53. IF feed feed flowflow toto at at least least one one raise raise SG SG levels.
levels.                                  SG SG verified, verified, THEN THEN perform perform the  the following:
following:
D0 a.
: a. Maintain Maintain flow  flow toto restore restore NR NR level level to to greater greater than than 10%
10% [32% [32% ADVERSE]
ADVERSE] .
Db.
Oh. Go to Go    to Step Step 68.
68.
D IF feed QIF    feed flowflow toto at at least least one one SG SG can can NOT NOT be  be verified, verified, THEN THEN go go to to Step Step 55.
55.
(    054.
D  54.      Go Go to to Step Step 68.
68.
        *55
        *55.      Try Try toto establish establish main main FW  FW flow flow to to at at least least one one SG:
SG:
D0 a.
: a. Check Check condensate condensate systemsystem              0 a.
D a. Place Place condensate condensate system system
                        - IN
                        -  IN SERVICE SERVICE                                        in in service service by  by initiating initiating 13615, 13615, CONDENSATE CONDENSATE ANDAND FEEDWATER FEEDWATER SYSTEM.
SYSTEM.
o0 WHEN WHEN Condensate Condensate    system system inin service, service, THEN THEN go  go to to Step Step 56.
56.
0 Return to DReturn        to Step Step 47.
47.
56.
: 56.      Verify Verify thethe following:
following:
0
* D.      MFRVs MFRVs CLOSED CLOSED AND AND CONTROLLERS CONTROLLERS AT AT 0%0% DEMAND DEMAND IN IN MANUAL MANUAL 0
* D.      BFRVs BFRV5 CLOSED CLOSED AND AND
(                      CONTROLLERS CONTROLLERS AT AT 0%0% DEMAND DEMAND
~I                    IN MANUAL IN MANUAL                                      KeFer&rct CO14?F(QL(
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE 110.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                          PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                                    29 29                                31 31 of of 45 45 RfF-ectfrLd                  OMt&deg;4
(          ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 64.
: 64.      Depressurize Depressurize selected selected SG    SG        0 64.
064.      Actuate Actuate Main  Main Steamline Steamline to to less less thanthan 550 550 psig:
psig:                          Isolation.
Isolation.
DO a.
: a. Check Check MSIVs MSIVs and and BSIVs BSIV5                  0 Dump steam DDump      steam usingusing selected selected SGSG
                      - ANY
                        -  INY OPEN OPEN                                    ARV.
ARV.
Db.
Ob. Close Close allall MSIVs MSIVs and and BSIVs BSIVs        oOIIF unable unable      to to dump dump steam, steam, except except on on selected selected SG. SG.              THEN THEN return return to    to Step Step 47.
47.
D0 c.
: c. Depressurize Depressurize selected selected SG      SG using using Steam Steam Dumps.
Dumps.
O 65.
D  65.      Open Open Main Main Feed Feed Pump Pump                  o0 65.
: 65. IF discharge discharge valves valves cancan NOT NOT discharge discharge valves.
valves,                                be be opened, opened, THEN THEN locally locally open  open MFP MFP bypass bypass valve valve 1305-U4-655.
l305-U4-655.
(TB-Lvl (TB-Lvl 2)  2)
O 66.
D  66.      Open Open BFIV BFIV for for selected selected SG. SG. D0 66.
: 66. Open Open MFIV MFIV on    on selected selected SG.SG.
D0 IF IF MFIV MFIV will will NOT NQT open, open, THEN THEN dispatch dispatch an    an operator operator toto
(                                                                        locally locally open open the  the selected selected BFIV.
BFIV.
o0 IF IF  neither neither BFIV  BFIV or or MFIV MFIV will will open, open, THEN THEN return return to    to Step Step 47.
47.
O 67.
D  67.      Slowly Slowly openopen BFRV BFRV for for thethe          D0 67.
: 67. Open Open MFRV MFRV for  for the the selected selected SG.SG.
selected selected SG  SG to to establish establish feed flow.
feed    flow.                                      o0 IF  MFRV MFRV will will NOT open, open, THEN THEN dispatch dispatch an    an operator operator toto locally locally open open the the BFRV.
BFRV.
o0 IF IF  neither neither BFRV  BFRV or or MFRV MFRV will will open, open, THEN THEN return return to    to Step Step 47.
47.
68.
: 68.      Check Check forfor adequate adequate secondary secondary heat heat sink:
sink:
o0 a.
: a. NR NR level level in in at at least least one  one          o0 a.a. IF IF feed feed flowflow toto at at least least SG SG - GREATER
                            -  GREATER THAN THAN 10%  1O                        one one SG SG verified, verified,
[32%
[32% ADVERSE]
ADVERSE]                                      THEN ThEN do  do NOTNOT continue continue until NR level  level is is restored restored to    to greater greater than 10%
10% [32%[32% ADVERSE]
ADVERSE] .
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                      PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                                29 29                            32 32 of of 45 45 CQvktoLk
(          ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                    RESPONSE RESPONSE NOTNOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 69.
: 69.      Check Check RCS RCS temperatures:
temperatures:                D 69.
069.      Return Return to  to Step Step 47.
47.
oQ -*    Core exit Core  exit TCs TC5 - LOWERING
                                        -  LOWERING
(
o -*    RCS WR RCS  WR hot    leg hot leg temperatures temperatures - LOWERING
                                      -  LOWERING 70.
: 70.      Verify Reactor Verify  Reactor Head Head VentVent Valves Valves - CLOSED:
                          -  CLOSED:
C
* 0-      HV-8095A HV-8095A - RX
                                  -  RX HEAD HEAD VENT VENT TO TO LETDOWN ISOLATION LETDOWN  ISOLATION VLV  VLV C
* 0-      HV-8095B - RX HV-8095B    -  RX HEAD HEAD VENT VENT TO TO LETDOWN LETDOWN ISOLATION ISOLATION VLV  VLV C
* 0-      HV-8096A HV-8096A - RX
                                  -  RX HEAD HEAD VENT VENT TO TO LETDOWN LETDOWN ISOLATION ISOLATION VLV  VLV C
* 0-      HV-8096B HV-8096B - RX
                                  -  RX HEAD HEAD VENT VENT TO TO LETDOWN LETDOWN ISOLATION ISOLATION VLV  VLV C
* 0-      HV-0442A HV-0442A - REACTOR
                                  -  REACTOR HEAD  HEAD VENT VENT TOTO PRT PRT C
* 0-      HV-0442B - REACTOR HV-0442B    -  REACTOR HEAD  HEAD VENT VENT TOTO PRT PRT NOTE:
NOTE:        The The following following step    step will will prevent prevent an an unwanted unwanted SI  SI actuation from actuation    from occurring occurring when when securing securing RCS    RCS bleed bleed and and feed.
feed.
oC 71.
: 71.      Check Check SGSG pressures pressures - GREATER
                                            -  GREATER      71.
: 71. Bypass Bypass the the SG SG LOW LOW PRESS PRESS THAN THAN 585 585 PSIG PSIG                                    inputs inputs for for 22 channels channels of of any any depressurized depressurized SG    SG by by initiating initiating 13509-C, 13509-C, BYPASS BYPASS TEST TEST INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENTATION {BTI}  (BTI)
PANEL PANEL OPERATION:
OPERATION:
oC      SG1:PB514A, SG1:PB514A,        PB515A, PBS15A,  PB516A PBS16A oC      SG2:PB524A, SG2:PB524A,        PB525A, PB52SA,  PB526A PBS26A oC      SG3:PB534A, SG3:PB534A,        PB535A, PBS35A,  PB536A PB536A oC      SG4:PB544A, SG4:PB544A,        PB545A,  PB546A PB546A
(
RePefL?.rc                      CQ4 t&deg;4
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE 110.
NO.                          REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                        PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                                    29 29                                33 33 ofof 45 45 c,0i4 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE                        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED NOTE:
NOTE:          After After closing closing aa PRZR    PRZR PORV, PORV, itit may may be be necessary necessary to    to wait wait for for RCS RCS pressure pressure to    to rise rise before before determining determining if      if ECCS ECCS flow flow can  can be  be terminated.
terminated.
72.
: 72.      Check Check if if ECCS ECCS flow flow can  can be  be terminated:
terminated,                                ~
DD a.
: a. RCS RCS subcooling subcooling - GREATER
                                              -  GREATER            D a.
: a. Go Go to  to StepStep 73. 73.
THAN THAN 24&deg;F 24&deg;F [3S0F
[38&deg;F ADVERSE]
ADVERSE]
Db.
Db.      Check Check RVLIS RVLIS fullfull rangerange            Db.
Ob. Go to Go    to StepStep 73. 73.
indication indication - GREATER
                                      -  GREATER THAN  THAN 0
62%
Dc.
r                                        oiZVs Dc.      Go Goto to Step Step 74.
74.
I
                                                              ,                                        fuLt5L1.Q 73.
: 73.      Check Check RCSRCS bleed bleed pathpath status:
status:
f...
DD a.
: a. PRZR PRZR PORVs PORVs and and associated associated            Q a.
D  a. Go Go to  to 19010-C, 19010-C, E-l  E-l LOSS LOSS block block valves valves - ANY-  ANY BLEEDBLEED                OF OF REACTOR REACTOR OR      OR SECONDARY SECONDARY PATH PATH OPEN OPEN                                          COOLANT.
COOLANT.
b.
: b. Close Close ONEONE PRZR PRZR PORV: PORV:                Db.
Ub. Close Close its    its associated associated block block valve. valve.
Q l}
D  1)    Block Block one one traintrain of  of COPS.
COPS.                                          D U IF IF block block valve  valve can can NOT NOT be be closed, closed, U 2}
D  2)    Place Place associated associated PRZR      PRZR              THEN THEN go    go to to 19010-C, 19010-C, E-lE-l PORV PORV inin AUTO.
AUTO.                              LOSS LOSS OF    OF REACTOR REACTOR OR  OR SECONDARY SECONDARY COOLANT. COOLANT.
Q 3}
D  3)    Verify Verify proper proper
                                                                                    .. ke~          t++~
operation operation of    of PORV.
PORV.                                  /            A
                                                                            /VVe 3
                                                                            ;1!l                    ft+
Q c.
Dc.      Return Return to to Step Step 72. 72.
74.
: 74.      Stop Stop ECCS ECCS Pumps:
Pumps:
r:
P(Cj '> i/o (e...
LA.
O
* D-O
* D-SI SI Pumps All Pumps All but but one one cCP CCP
                                                                              ~ ... +-f      yO"t 7
                                                                                                /o      4<"<A(~
tcz,t (c(
4
                                                      /                          'Ok"" +-            3 poRV po  R. (/5 J-/vcp hqr~
w7v e                                C)O L4 Z OLf
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                    REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                        PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                              29 29                              34 34 of of 45 45 fec4-                          CLAL ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                    RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 75.
: 75.      Check RCS Check    RCS bleed bleed path path status:
status:
DQ a.a. PRZR PRZR PORVs PORVs and and associated associated            D a.
: a. Go to Go    to Step Step 76.
76.
block block valves valves - ANY
                                        -  ANY BLEED BLEED PATH PATH OPEN OPEN b.
: b. Close Close all all but but ONE ONE PRZRPRZR            Db.
Qb. Close Close associated associated PORV PORV PORV:
PORV:                                            block block valve. valve.
D0 1)
: 1)  Block Block one one train train of  of                DU IF IF block block valve valve can can NOT NOT be be COPS.
COPS.                                        closed, closed, THEN THEN go    go to to 19010-C, 19010-C, E-1 E-l
            /
  \V D0 2)
: 2)  Place Place associated associated PRZR  PRZR                LOSS LOSS OF    OF REACTOR REACTOR OROR
          /                  PORV PORV in in AUTO.
AUTO.                              SECONDARY SECONDARY COOLANT.
COOLANT.
DO 3)
: 3)  Verify Verify proper proper                                                      /      / /
operation operation of of PORV.
PORV.
5                  (
O 76.
D  76.      Check Instrument Check    Instrument Air Air              0 76.
D  76. Establish Establish Safety  Safety Grade Grade
                  - AVAILABLE
                  -  AVAILABLE                                    Charging Charging by    by initiating initiating 13006, 13006, r                              CHEMICAL CHEMICAL AND SYSTEM.
SYSTEM.
AND VOLUME VOLUME CONTROL CONTROL
                                \///f
(
7?                                    00          ki
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                            REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                        PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                                      29 29                            35 35 of of 45 45 Re~e(Lfrrct.,
ReeQf                ~"-' COZ,A
                                                                      -      CC2tft 2.,rOt OL
(          ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE  RESPONSE                        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 77.
: 77.      Establish Establish charging charging flow:  flow:
a.
: a. Open Open CCPCCP normal normal miniflow minif low isolation isolation valves:
valves:
El
* O.        HV-SlllA HV-8111A - CCP-A
                                            -  CCP-A MINI FLOW MINIFLOW El
* O.        HV-SlllB HV-8111B - CCP-B
                                            -  CCP-B MINI MINIFLOW FLOW El
* O.        HV-Sll0 HV-8110 - CCP
                                          -  CCP A&BA&B COMMON COMMON MINI      FLOW MINIFLOW b.
: b. Close Close CCPCCP alternate alternate miniflow minif low valves:
valves:
El
* O.        HV-S50SA HV-8508A - CCP-A
                                            -  CCP-A RV  RV TO TO RWST RWST ISOLATION ISOLATION O
* O.        HV-S50SB HV-8508B - CCP-B
                                            -  CCP-B RV  RV TO TO RWST RWST ISOLATION ISOLATION c.
: c. Verify Verify white white Pressure Pressure Control Control Mode Mode light light
                        - NOT
                          -  NOT LIT:
LIT:
El
* O.        HV-S50SA HV-8508A - CCP-A
                                            -  CCP-A RV  RV TO TO RWST RWST ISOLATION ISOLATION El
* O.        HV-S50SB HV-8508B - CCP-B
                                            -  CCP-B RV  RV TO TO RWST RWST ISOLATION ISOLATION d.
: d. Perform Perform the the following:
following:                  El d.
Od.      Close Close associated associated PORV PORV Block Block Valve.Valve.
oO 1)1)    Block Block remaining remaining train    train of of COPS.
COPS.                                      El IF D  IF block block valve valve can can NOT NOT be be closed, closed,                  ---
oEl 2}2)  Place Place associated associated PRZR      PRZR                THEN THEN go  go to to 19010-C, 19010-C, E-l E-l PORV PORV in in AUTO.
AUTO.                                LOSS LOSS OF  OF REACTOR REACTOR OR OR SECONDARY SECONDARY COOLANT.
COOLANT.
oEl 3}3)  Verify Verify proper operation proper operation of    of PORV.
PORV.
El e.
De.        Set Set SEAL SEAL FLOW FLOW CONTROL CONTROL HC-1S2 HC-182 to  to maximum maximum seal    seal flow flow {HV-01S2 (HV-0l82 CLOSED}.
CLOSED).
f.
: f. Close Close BIT BIT DISCH DISCH ISOLATION ISOLATION valves:
valves:
0.
O.        HV-SS01A HV-8801A El O.        HV-SS01B HV-8801B g.
: g. Open Open CHARGING CHARGING TO    TO RCS RCS ISOLATION ISOLATION valves:
valves:
El
* O.        HV-Sl05 HV-8105 El
* O.        HV-Sl06 HV-8106 oEl *7S.
      *78.      Maintain Seal Maintain              Injection flow Seal Injection            flow
(                to to allall Reps RCPs - 88 TO
                                      -      TO 13 13 GPMGPM OQL42oLf
 
PROCEOURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                      PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19231-C 19231-C                                29 29                          36 36 of of 45 45
                                      &ee
(          ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED
        *79 D *79.        Check Check RCSRCS Bot Hot Leg Leg                  D  *79*
Q *79. Control Control feed feed flow flow and and dump dump temperatures temperatures - STABLE
                                  -  STABLE OR  OR                steam steam asas necessary necessary to to LOWERING.
LOWERING,                                          establish establish stablestable RCS RCS Hot Hot Leg Leg temperatures.
temperatures.
80.
: 80. Check Check if if RHR RHR pumps pumps should should be be stopped:
stopped:
D 0 a.
: a. RHR RHR Pumps Pumps - ANY
                                    -  ANY RUNNING RUNNING            0 a.
D  a. Go Go to to step step 81.
81.
WITH WITH SUCTION SUCTION ALIGNED ALIGNED TO    TO RWST RWST b.
: b. RCS RCS pressure:
pressure:                            Db.
Ob. Go Go to to 19010-C, 19010-C, E-1 E-1 LOSS LOSS OF OF REACTOR REACTOR OR OR SECONDARY SECONDARY D  1)
[]l)    Greater Greater than than 300 300 psig.
psig.              COOLANT.
COOLANT.
D 0 2)
: 2)  Stable Stable or or rising.
rising.
D 0 c.
: c. Stop Stop RHR RHR pumps.
pumps.
D    *81.
O *81.      Control Control charging charging flowflow to to maintain maintain PRZR PRZR level level at  at 25%.
25%.
(
DO 82.
: 82. Go Go toto 19011-C, 19011-C, ES-1.1 ES-l.l SI  SI TERMINATION, TERMINATION, StepStep 14. 14.
END END OF OF PROCEDURE PROCEDURE TEXT TEXT
(
: 3. 007G2.4.6 001 007G2.4.6001 100% power when a lightning strike causes a fault on 13.8 Kv The unit trips from 100%                                                            Ky bus 1NAB.
(          - The other 13.8Kv bus, 11 NAA fails to fast bus transfer but is capable of being re-energized.
            --4160  non-1E 4160 non-1  E buses 11NAO1, NA01, 11NAO4, NA04, and 11NAO5 NA05 are still energized.
19001-C, "Reactor
            - The crew is performing the actions of 19001-C,
            -                                                  Reactor Trip Response.
Response.
            - Control bank D (CDB) rod M12 indicates 18 steps on DRPI.
            - CST # 11 level is 52% and slowly lowering.
            - CST # 2 level is 74% and stable.
            - Letdown isolates post Rx. trip, attempts to re-establish are unsuccessful because LV-460 will not re-open.
Which ONE of the following would be the CORRECT actions to take?
A Re-energize 11 NAA per 13420-1, "13.8Kv A'!                                  13.8Kv Electrical Distribution System" System and start RCP ##4                            A, "Starting 4 per 19001-C Attachement "A",    Starting a Reactor Coolant Pump".
Pump.
SOP-i 3009-1/2, B. Perform an Emergency Boration of the RCS in accordance with SOP-13009-1/2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System and perform a Shutdown Margin.
C. Perform the actions of AOP-i    8007-C, section A for Loss of Letdown and place AOP-18007-C, Chemical Volume Control System".
Safety Grade Letdown in service per 13006, "Chemical                        System.
D. Immediately swap AFW pump suctions to CST # 2 per 13610-1, "Auxiliary  Auxiliary System and transition to 19002-C, "Natural Feedwater System"                                Natural Circulation Cooldown".
Cooldown.
Page:
Page: 5S of of4848                                                                                  6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
KIA 007 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery
(          G2.4.6 Knowledge of Symptom based EOP mitigation strategies KIA MATCH ANALYSIS reactor trip with several malfunctions, the Question gives a plausible scenario post reactor candidate must choose the correct action / procedure to respond to the symptoms.
0CFR55.43(b) item # 5 - Assessment of facility conditions and Question meets 11 OCFR55.43(b)              -
selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. 13.8 Kv Ky bus should be re-energized and RCP ##4  4 started.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may consider this action but the emergency boration is only required for 2 or more stuck rods. Shutdown margin is required.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate would consider performing the actions for the Loss of Letdown AOP in parallel, however, Excess Letdown would be placed in service versus Safety Grade Letdown which is used on a loss of instrument air.
Safety Grade Letdown is mentioned in notes and cautions of 19001-C.
D. Incorrect. AFW suctions should only be swapped when one CST level lowers to less than 15%, there would be no reason to go to 19002 for Natural Circ cooldown when it is possible to start an RCP and CST levels are not a problem.
REFERENCES 19001-C, "Reactor 19001-C,    Reactor Trip Response".
Response.
18007-C, "cvcs CVCS Malfunction section A for Loss of Letdown."
Letdown.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-3701 1-03, State the bases for the Reactor LO-LP-37011-03,                              "Reactor Trip Recovery Recovery" procedure.
LO-LP-3701    1-04, State and describe the major action categories of 19001, LO-LP-37011-04,                                                        19001, Reactor "Reactor Trip Recovery.
Recovery".
Page: 66 of 48                                                                                6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
f Qo7 Number              Text LO-LP-3701 1-02 LO-LP-37011-02      State how the following control systems are employed to automatically stabilize the plant after a reactor trip:
: a. steam dumps
: b. feedwater
: c. pressurizer level and pressure
: d. auxiliary feedwater LO-LP-3701 1-03 LO-LP-37011-03                                              Recovery procedure.
Reactor Trip Recovery" State the bases for the "Reactor LO-LP-3701 1-04 LO-LP-37011-04                                                                  Reactor Trip Recovery."
State and describe the major action categories of 19001, "Reactor          Recovery.
LO-LP-37011-05      State the bases for the "Reactor                  lnjection procedure.
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" LO-LP-3701 1-06 LO-LP-37011-06      State from memory the immediate action steps form 19000. Include substeps and RNO actions.
LO-LP-37011-07                                        stable as used in the EOPs.
State the definition for the term "stable" LO-LP-3701 1-08 LO-LP-37011-0B      State why the control of AFW is so important following a reactor trip.
LO-LP-3701 1-09 LO-LP-37011-09      Of multiple reactor trip alarms showing on the annunciator panel, state how the operator would be able to recognize which was the first one to be received.
LO-LP-3701 1-10 LO-LP-37011-10      List the most common reasons for a reactor trip at a PWR. Give three root causes for each type of trip (if applicable).
LO-LP-37011-11 LO-LP-3701 1-11    State how the operator participates in the industry-wide reactor trip reduction program. State the operators responsibility in reducing the number of trips that may occur at Plant Vogtle.
operator's
(      LO-LP-37011-13 LO-LP-3701 1-13    List the parameters used to verify NC flow in accordance with Attachment 0    D of EOP 19001.
LO-LP-37011-14      Given a scenario requiring the use of the foldout page, state the actions that the operator would be required to take.
LO-LP-3701 1-15 LO-LP-37011-15      Given a NOTE or CAUTION statement from the EOP, state the bases for that NOTE or CAUTION statement.
LO-LP-3701 1-16 LO-LP-37011-16      State the importance of verifying the turbine tripped after a reactor trip. (commitment)
LO-LP-37012-01                  immediate and long-term effect on the Primary System of State the immediate a loss of forced coolant flow.
LO-LP-37012-02      State the natural circulation cooldown transient performed at the St. Lucie Plant in 1980 and the pressurizer level anomaly which occurred. (commitment)
LO-LP-37012-03      State the operational guidelines used to establish a controlled cooldown using natural circulation.
LO-LP-37012-04                            Natural Circulation Cool State the bases for "Natural              Cooldown&deg; down" procedure.
LO-LP-37012-05                      19003, and 19004 Using 19002, 19003,        19004 as guides, summarize the actions of these emergency procedures which guide operator response in a natural circulation condition.
C.  ~.'
Friday, June 01, 0.1, 2007                                                                                              Page 28 of 165 Oft              007
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                            REVISION REVISION NO.
MO.                      PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              18007-C 18007-C                                        19 19                          77 of of 17 17 A.
A.      TOTAL TOTAL LOSS LOSS OF OF LETDOWN LETDOWN FLOW  FLOW
(              ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE    RESPONSE                        RESPONSE NOT RESPONSE      NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED A6.
A6. Identify Identify and and correct correct cause  cause for for loss loss of of letdown:
letdown:
Da.
Da.      Check Check for for letdown letdown path  path valve valve failures failures or    or mispositions.
mispositions.
b.
: b. Check Check instrumentation:
instrumentation:
0-
: 0.      PI-131A PI-l3lA 0-
: 0.      TI-130 TI-130 Dc.
Dc.      Check Check PIC-131.
PIC-131.
Dd.
Od.      Check Check for for other other causes.
causes.
DA7.
DA7. Check Check normal normal letdown letdown -      -                A7.
A7. Perform Perform the  the following:
following:
AVAILABLE AVAILABLE
                                                      ~----~            Da.
Da. Establish Establish ExcessExcess Letdown Letdown
                                                                ?""              by by initiating initiating 13008, 13008,
(/Cr If (7    1      \
I\,f\.f c i \
IVc dait,i..ec)
((/1/c CHEMICAL CHEMICAL AND CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM AND VOLUME VOLUME SYSTEM EXCESS EXCESS LETDOWN.
LETDOWN.
                      &#xa3;",Jr-c j-Cec,  e5S Lt-J4
(-J    if (1/    ~-l 9~e&#xa3;
                                                    ,4/T        feL      0Db.
: b. Go Go to  to Step Step A9.
A9.
DAB. Restore DA8.      Restore normal initiating normal letdown initiating 13006, letdown by 13006, CHEMICAL CHEMICAL by    ~~oe~
AND AND VOLUME VOLUME CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM.
SYSTEM.
DA9.
0A9. Initiate Initiate the  the Continuous Continuous Actions Actions Page.Page.
D*AlO. Verify D*A10.          Verify PRZR PRZR level level - TRENDING
                                                -  TRENDING        *AlO. IF
                                                                      *A10. IF PRZR PRZR levellevel can can NOT NOT be be PROGRAM TO PROGRAM TO                                                        maintained, maintained, THEN THEN isolate isolate charging charging by by performing performing the    the following:
following:
Da.
Da. Adjust Adjust FV-121FV-12l while while closing closing HV-182 HV-l82 toto maintain maintain seal  seal injection injection 8S toto 13 13 gpm.
gpm.
Db.
Db. Close Close HV-8106.
HV-8l06.              I Dc.
Dc. Notify Notify Engineering Engineering of of charging nozzle charging      nozzle thermal thermal
  ,                                                                              cycle.
cycle.
(
I Kefe,{l-fNCt- fo~ 00                007      7 e- &( z, (it.t.p
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE 110.
NO.                    REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                          PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19001-C 19001-C                                    29 29                              10 10 of of 20 20
(          ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                            RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED
        *10
      *10.      Check Check PRZR PRZR level level control:
control:
DD a.
: a. Instrument Instrument Air Air                                  a.
: a. Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
                      - AVAILABLE
                      - AVAILABLE D
D 1)
: 1)    Establish Establish Safety Safety Grade Grade Charging Charging by  by rr                                        initiating initiating 13006,13006,
((      /                      CHEMICAL CHEMICAL AND  AND VOLUME VOLtJNE
                                                                        /
(              I                      CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM.
SYSTEM.
f25(f9fi          2)      Establish Establish Safety Safety Grade Grade Letdown:
Letdown:
                                                          /
11 Erc  j..              a) a)    Open Open RXRX HEAD HEAD VENT VENT I cI                      TO TO LETDOWN LETDOWN ISOLATION ISOLATION VLVs:
VLV5:
B:
Q.
O
* D-0
* HV-8095A HV-8095A HV-8096A HV-8096A HV-8095B HV-8095B D-0
* HV-8096B HV-8096B b) b)      Open Open REACTOR REACTOR HEADHEAD VENT VENT TOTO PRT PRT flow flow control control valves valves as  as necessary:
necessary:
O -*
D      HV-0442A HV-0442A O -*
D      HV-0442B HV-0442B 0 3)
D 3)      Go Go to to Step Step 10d.
lOd.
Db.
Ob. PRZR  Level - GREATER PRZR Level    -  GREATER THAN    THAN          b.
: b. Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
17%
0 1)
D 1)      Verify Verify letdown letdown isolated.
isolated.
0 2)
D 2)      Verify Verify PRZRPRZR Heaters Heaters de-energized.
de-energized.
O 3)
D 3)      Control Control charging charging to  to restore restore PRZR PRZR level level to to greater greater than than 17%.
17%.
O 4)
D 4)      WBBN WHEN PRZR PRZR level level greater greater than than 17%,
17%,
THEN THEN place place letdown letdown in  in service service and  and energize energize PRZR PRZR Beaters Heaters as as necessary.
necessary.
O 5)
D 5)      Go Go to to Step Step 10d.
lOd.
0 c.
Dc. Charging Charging and and letdown letdown                      0 c.
Dc. Place Place charging charging and and
                      - IN
                      -  IN SERVICE SERVICE                                        letdown letdown in      in service service by  by initiating initiating 13006,  13006, CHEMICAL CHEMICAL AND      AND VOLUME VOLUME CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM. SYSTEM.
0 d.
Dd. Maintain Maintain PRZR PRZR level level at    at C                    25%.
25%.
Jerc                          f& 7G-244
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                    PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19001-C 19001-C                                  29 29                          14 14 of of 20 20 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 14.
: 14.      Transfer Transfer Steam Steam Dumps Dumps to    to STEAM STEAM PRESSURE PRESSURE mode:
mode:
D0 a.
: a. Check Check Condenser Condenser                        DQ a.
: a. Use Use SG  SC ARVs.
ARVs.
                    - AVAILABLE
                      - AVAILABLE DGo OGo to  to Step Step 15.
15.
Db.
Ob. Place Place PIC-507 PIC-507 in  in Manual.
Manual.
DQ c.
: c. Match Match demand demand on on SG SG header header pressure pressure controller controller PIC-507 PIC-507 and and SDSD demand demand meter meter UI-500.
UI-500.
0 d.
Dd.      Transfer Transfer Steam Steam DumpsDumps to  to STM STM PRESS PRESS mode.
mode.
e.
: e. Control Control Tavg:
Tavg:
0 D      Manual Manual control control
                                -OR-
                                - OR -
Q D      Auto Auto control control 15.
: 15.      Check Check RCP RCP status:
status:
0 a.
D  a. RCPs RCPs - ALL
                          -  ALL STOPPED STOPPED                    D0 a.
: a. Go to Go    to Step Step 16.
16.
0 b.
Db.      Start Start anan RCP RCP using using                  Db.
0 b. IF IF an an RCPRCP can can NOT NOT be be ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT A. A. (RCP(RCP 44 or  or              started, started, RCP RCP 11 preferred) preferred)                                THEN THEN verify verify natural natural circulation circulation using  using ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT B. B.
3wL                fl                    D IF natural circulation OIF NOT established, THEN THEN raise raise rate rate of of dumping dumping steam steam using using Steam Steam Dumps.
Dumps.
D O IF IF Steam Steam Dumps Dumps not not available, available, THEN THEN dump dump steam steam using using SGSC ARVs.
ARVs.
                                                              -F&      cr7-1,
 
PROCEDURE NO.
PROCEDURE  NO.                    REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                PAGE PACE NO .
NO.
VEGP VEGP              19001C 19001-C                          29 29                            77 of of 20 20 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE              RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 07.
Q 7.      Check all Check    all Rods Rods                  D 7. IF two two or  or more more Rods Rods NOT iQ fully fully
                  - FULLY
                  -  FULLY INSERTED INSERTED                        inserted, inserted,
                                              -            THEN THEN EMERGENCY EMERGENCY BORATEBORATE 154154 ppm ppm for for each each Rod  Rod not not fully fully inserted inserted by    by initiating initiating 13009, 13009, evcs CVCS REACTOR REACTOR MAKEUP MAKEUP CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM.
SYSTEM.
oQ Verify Verify adequate adequate      shutdown shutdown margin margin as  as required required by by Technical Technical Specification Specification SR  SR 3.1.1.1.
3.1.1.1.
(_1 I        \II hF            icO c                              Rec
 
PROCEDURE NO PROCEDURE  NO.
                .                            REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                    PAGE PAGE NO .
NO.
VEGP VEGP                19001-C 19001-C                                        29 29                            16 16 of of 20 20 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE    RESPONSE                        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED
        *19.
      *19.        Maintain stable Maintain        stable plantplant conditions:
conditions:
O.
D
* pressure - AT PRZR pressure PRZR                    -    AT 2235 PSIG 2235    PSIG O.
O
* PRZR level PRZR    level - AT-  AT 25%  25%
O.
O
* SG NR SG  NR levels levels          BETWEEN 10%
                                              - BETWEEN
                                              -                10%
AND 65%
AND    65%
                  **    RCS temperature:
RCS  temperature:
o0        With RCP(s)
With    RCP(s) running  running RCS AVERAGE
                              - RCS
                              -        AVERAGE TEMPERATURE AT TEMPERATURE            AT 557&deg;F 557&deg; F
                                        - OR
                                        -OR-  -
o0        Without Without RCP(s) RCP(s) running running
                              - RCS
                              -  RCS WRWR COLD COLD LEG    LEG TEMPERATURES AT TEMPERATURES            AT 557&deg;F 557&deg; F
(        20.
: 20.      Check if Check cooldown natural circulation if natural cooldown is        required:
is required:
circulation o0 a.a. Any Any RCP          RUNNING RCP - RUNNING o0 a.
: a. Go Go to  to Step Step 20c.20c.
Db.
Oh.        Go to Go        12006-C, RCS to 12006-C,              RCS COOLDOWN TO COOLDOWN      TO COLD COLD SHUTDOWN.
SHUTDOWN.
Dc.
Oc.            leas~ne CS~
At least one CST At GREATER THAN leve            Dc.
Dc. Go Go to  to 19002-C, 19002-C, ES-0.2 NATURAL CIRCULATION ES-0.2 GREATER    THAN 66%  66%                            NATURAL        CIRCULATION
                                      .1..    / c::, J                          COOLDOWN.
LDOWN.
(r          (I f ,.
d.
: d.      Perform one Perform following:
following:
one of  of the  the Dip {etc.. 7 t'b It o0        Maintain Maintain hot    hot standby standby conditions by returning to      tStep Step 19.19.              b + {IN'C ()lL/2...e c. +
vt (I
I
                                        - OR
                                        -OR-  -
oO        Go Go to 19002-C, 19002-C, ES-0.2 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN based on RCP(s) restart status.
END OF PROCEDURE TEXT Retce                                    007 &lcL&
 
PROCEDURE NO.
PROCEDURE  NO.                      REVISION NO REVISION    .
NO.                    PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              19001-C 19001-C                                29 29                          20 20 of of 20 20 c  1.            ACTUATION CRITERIA SI ACTUATION      CRITERIA FOLDOUT FOLDOUT PAGE  PAGE
: 1. SI Actuate SI Actuate      SI and and gogo to  Procedure 19000-C, to Procedure          19000-C, E-O E-0 REACTOR REACTOR TRIP  TRIP OR OR SAFETY      INJECTION, if SAFETY INJECTION,        if EITHER EITHER condition condition listed listed below below occurs:
occurs:
          **      RCS subcooling RCS  subcooling - LESS
                                    - LESS THAN THAN 24&deg;F.
24&deg;F.
          **    PRZR  level - CANNOT PRZR level  -  CANNOT BE  BE MAINTAINED MAINTAINED GREATER GREATER THAN THAN 9%. 9*.
3.
: 3.      AFW SUPPLY AFW              SWITCHOVER CRITERION SUPPLY SWITCHOVER      CRITERION Switch to Switch          alternate CST to alternate    CST by  by initiating initiating 13610, 13610, AUXILIARY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FEEDWATER      SYSTEM when when CSTCST level level lowers lowers to to less less than than 15%.
15%.
(
(                                                              fc
: 4. 008AA2.15 001 00SAA2.15 Given the following plant conditions with both units at 100%
100% power:
(          - Unit 1
          -      1 has one Block valve closed and de-energized to isolate a PORV that is partially stuck open.
          - Unit 2 has both Block valves closed and still energized to isolate both PORVs which have excessive seat leakage.
Which ONE of the units would be required to shutdown due to INOPERABLE PORV I/ Block valve status per Tech Specs and what is the CORRECT bases?
A. Unit 1  1 - both PORVs are required to be capable of automatically cycling to limit RCS pressure following the blowdown of a faulted Steam Generator.
B. Unit 2 - both PORVs are required to be capable of automatically cycling to mitigate events such as a Steam Generator Tube Rupture or Loss of Heat Sink.
C~ Unit 1 C        1 - both PORVs
                        -      PORV5 are required to be capable of being manually cycled to mitigate events such as a Steam Generator Tube Rupture or Loss of Heat Sink.
D. Unit 2 - both PORVs are required to be capable of being manually cycled to limit RCS pressure following the blowdown of a faulted Steam Generator.
l Page: 7 of 48                                                                              6/6/200 7 6/6/2007
 
K!A 008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident AA2.15 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident.
ESF control board, valve controls, and indicators KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario where both units have PORVs closed to due either PORV5. The candidate must determine which excessive seat leakage or stuck open PORVs.
unit is required to shutdown per Tech Specs and the Tech Spec bases.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria for item ##22 - Facility operating limits in Tech Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                            -
Specs and their bases.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think both PORVs PORV5 have to automatically cycle and this is not a correct bases.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think both PORVs have to automatically cycle and this is the correct bases.
(        C. Correct. Both PORVs must be capable of being manually cycled and this is a correct bases.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may know both capable of manually cycling but this is an incorrect bases.
REFERENCES Technical Specification 3.4.11 and bases for PORVs and Block Valves VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-39208-02, Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.4 are exceeded.
Page: 8of48 8 of 48                                                                                    6/6/2007
 
0 o    /MZ 1
( Number Number            Text LO-LP-39206-08 LO-LP-39206-08      Define nuclear Define      nuclear enthalpy enthalpy rise      hot channel rise hot    channel factor.
factor.
LO-LP-39206-09 LO-LP-39206-09      Define quadrant Define    quadrant powerpower tilttilt ratio.
ratio. State    the required State the              action for required action        exceeding the for exceeding  the limit  at various limit at  various power power levels.
levels.
LO-LP-39207-01 LO-LP-39207-O1      For any For    any given given item item in in section section 3.3 3.3 ofof Tech Tech Specs, Specs, be be able able to:
to:
: a. OState the aLlState      the LCO.
LeO.
b.OState any b.ElState      anyone      hour or one hour          less required or less    required actions.
actions.
LO-LP-39207-02 LO-LP-39207-02    Given aa set Given        set ofof Tech Tech Specs Specs and  and thethe bases,    determine for bases, determine      for aa specific specific set of set    of plant plant conditions, conditions, equipment            availability, and equipment availability,          and operational operational mode:
mode:
: a. LIDWhether
: a. Whether any  any Tech Tech SpecSpec LCOsLeOs of  of section section 3.33.3 are are exceeded.
exceeded.
b.OThe required actions b.LIThe                  actions for for all all section    3.3 LCOs.
section 3.3    LeOs.
LO-LP-39207-03 LO-LP-39207-03    For any For    any given given item in  in section section 13.313.3 ofof the Technical Requirements Manual,                able to:
Manual, be able    to:
: a. DState the a.ElState                          Requirement (TR) for operation.
the Technical Requirement
: b. DState any b.ElState    anyone      hour or less one hour                required actions.
less required      actions.
LO-LP-39207-04 LO-LP-39207-04    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec                Spec inin section section 3.3.
LO-LP-39207-05    Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. DWhether any aZWhether          any TR of section section 13.3 13.3 has beenbeen exceeded.
: b. OThe required actions for all section 13.3 TRs.
bzThe                                                          TR5.
LO-LP-39207-06    State the values for the Limiting Safety System Settings.
LO-LP-39208-01 LO-LP-39208-O1    For any given item in section 3.4 of Tech Specs, be able to:
: a. ElState the LeO.
a.OState            LCO.
b.OState b.LlState anyone any one hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-39208-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
mode:
a.
: a. DWhether El Whether any  any Tech Spec LeOs    LCOs of section 3.4 are exceeded.
: b. OThe required b.OThe      required actions for all section 3.4 LeOs.        LCOs.
LO-LP-39208-03    For any givengiven item in section          13.4 of the TRM, be section 13.4                        be able able to:
a.OState
: a. LlState the the TRTR for for operation.
operation.
b.OState b.LIState anyone any one hourhour or or less less required      actions.
required actions.
LO-LP-39208-04 LO-LP-39208-04    Describe Describe the  the bases bases for for any any given Tech Spec in                    3.4.
in section 3.4.
LO-LP-39208-05 LO-LP-39208-05    State State whywhy thethe mode mode 55 ReS        loops and RCS loops        and coolant coolant circulation      specifications for loops circulation specifications                filled vs. loops loops filled              not loops not filled  vary with filled vary    with regard regard to    the number to the    number of  of RHR RHR trains    required and trains required    and steam steam generator      availability.
generator availability.
LO-LP-39208-06 LO-LP-39208-06    State State thethe reason reason forfor limiting limiting the      RCS specific the ReS      specific activity.
activity.
( Friday, June Friday, June 01, 2007 01, 2007                                                                                                                          Page  42 of Page 42  of165 165 t
Reerc                                        fc              O&deg;4 2 1
 
                                              /) re      JI  0 f"\ E',e'fl...-{" lire ~    f 00 %,A..Jl n !?cl\.l
                                                                        -, (
Pressurizer PORVs I rr l,r I )
PORVs 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
LCO 3.4.11              Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.
OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:          MODES 1, 1,2, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS NOTE--
              -------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.
CONDITION                          REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME UIIIJ-r    A. One or more PORVs inoperable and capable A.1          Close and maintain power to associated block valve.
1 1 hour              () vl1-
                                                                                                                        /f1f
        ~
2-          of being manually                                                                          ~lll(      O(1t 5f-,'*
5f* (  (        cycled.
eN.l ~ pne    r---PORV inoperable f ~
ooenePORnoPer                                  B.1          Close associated block        1 1 hour
: 4.                nd not capable of being
                    /'and manually cycled.
manually  cycled.
bein AND valve.
U('vfJt-            l w
4  N7W~
A-      i-~
B.2          Remove power from            1 1 hour
        ~lf associated block valve.
(
AND (d-.. f V"'~A....
        -I i1vt~
5~v+JfJ wrJ 1 --L 1i      hctse) 5e 7                    B.3          Restore PORV PORVto OPERABLE status.
to            72 hours f{~\1                  eCT C O(hqc COI\.I\
(continued)        hCt 'JC) h4  5c J CU/\,cL1'c.rJ 8 IIIpt" (t&#xa3;~-f."RJ cP~f+/~tJ Jf D                            5~,,-fjcvV,J D --:; 54c l              Vogtle Units Units I1 and 22                            3.4.11-1              Amendment No.
Amendment Amendment No.
Amendment No. 137 137 (Unit No. 116 116 (Unit (Unit 1) 1)
(Unit 2)
 
Lt ~(15    i5 00 ~ f1;r              Pressurizer PORVs Pressurizer 3.4.11
(
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION              REQUIRED ACTION                COMPLETION TIME C. One block valve          C.1  Place associated PORV        11 hour inoperable, inoperable.                  in manual control.
AND C.2  Restore block valve to        72 hours OPERABLE status.
D. Required Action and      D.1  Be in MODE 3.                6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, B,  AND or C not met.
D.2  Be in MODE 4.                1212 hours E. Two PORVs inoperable    E.1  Close associated block        1 1 hour and not capable of being      valves.
manually cycled.
AND E.2            powerfrom Remove power    from        11 hour associated block valves.
valves.
AND E.3  Be in MODE 3.                6 hours AND E.4  Be in MODE 4.                  12 hours F.
F. More More than one one block    F.1  Place associated associated PORVs      11 hour valve inoperable, inoperable.            in manual control.
in AND (continued)
: c.        Units I1 and 22 Vogtle Units                        3.4.11-2 3.4.11-2                Amendment No.
Amendment No.
Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
No. 74 74 (Unit 1)
(Unit 2) 4fC    OOdDk7lr 2 15
 
Pressurizer PORVs O&deg; 1      4kz. i5                          3.4.11
(
ACTIONS CONDITION                          REQUIRED ACTION                    COMPLETION TIME F.  (continued)                    F.2        Restore one block valve          2 hours to OPERABLE status.
AND F.3      Restore remaining                72 hours block valve to OPERABLE status.
G. Required Action and            G.1        Be in MODE 3.                    6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition F not        AND met.
G.2        Be in MODE 4.                    12 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE                                        FREQUENCY SR 3.4.11.1                                  NOTE
                      --------------------------NOTE--------------------------------
Not required to be performed with block valve closed in accordance with the Required Action of Conditions A, B, or E.
Perform a complete cycle of each block valve.                  92 days SR 3.4.11.2        Perform a complete cycle of each PORV.                        18 months 18 R efec
(              1 and 2 Vogtle Units 1                                  3.4.11-3                      Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
 
Pressurizer PORVs QOPifr              5                              B 3.4.11 c  B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
B 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
BASES BACKGROUND            The pressurizer is equipped with two types of devices for pressure relief pressurizer safety valves and PORVs. The PORVs are safety-related DC solenoid operated valves that are controlled to open at a specific set pressure when the pressurizer pressure increases and close when the pressurizer pressure decreases. The PORVs may also be manually operated from the control room.
Block valves, which are normally open, are located between the pressurizer and the PORVs. The block valves are used to isolate the PORVs in case of excessive leakage or a stuck open PORV. Block valve closure is accomplished manually using controls in the control room. A stuck open PORV is, in effect, a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). As such, block valve closure terminates the RCS depressurization and coolant inventory loss.
The PORVs and their associated block valves may be used by plant operators to depressurize the RCS to recover from certain transients if
(                        normal pressurizer spray is not available. Additionally, the series arrangement of the PORVs and their block valves permit performance of surveillances on the block valves during power operation.
The PORVs may also be used for feed and bleed core cooling in the b                      case of multiple equipment failure events that are not within the design basis, such as a total loss of feedwater.
104 5e3              The power supplies to the PORVs, their block valves, and their controls are Class 1 I E. Two PORVs and their associated block valves c                    are powered from two separate safety trains (Ref. 1).
The plant has two PORVs, each having a relief capacity of
    ,.f  (                        lb/hr at 2385 psig. The functional design of the 210,000 Ib/hr PORVs is based on maintaining pressure below the Pressure High reactor trip setpoint up to and Pressurizer Pressure-including the design step-load decreases with steam dump.
In addition, the PORVs minimize challenges to the pressurizer PeQ/ce1ce                    QOAr,7L5
: c.                                                                                        (continued)
I and 2 Vogtle Units 1                              B 3.4.11-1                                      No.00 Revision No.
 
Pressurizer PORVs Pressurizer  PORVs B 3.4.11 c BASES OOfr BACKGROUND              safety valves and also may be used for cold overpressure (continued)          protection. See LCO 3.4.12, "Cold  Cold Overpressure Protection System (COPS).
(COPS)."
APPLICABLE                Plant operators may employ the PORVs to depressurize the RCS SAFETY ANALYSES          in response to certain plant transients if normal pressurizer spray is not available. For the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) event, the safety analysis assumes that manual operator actions are required to mitigate the event. A loss of offsite power is assumed to accompany the event, and thus, normal pressurizer spray is unavailable to reduce RCS pressure. The PORVs or auxiliary pressurizer spray may be used for RCS depressurization, which is one of the steps performed to equalize the primary and secondary pressures in order to terminate the primary to secondary break flow and the radioactive releases from the affected steam generator.
f ~ ,,-,1'1(e.-
2(Gt In addition, in the event of an inadvertent safety injection actuation at fQtVA-+D T T(
power, the potential for pressurizer filling and subsequent water relief power, via the pressurizer safeties (PSVs) is evaluated (FSAR section 15.5.1).
    ?i,.,J \ct(V          Operator action to make one PORV available is credited in the analysis to mitigate this event. If the PORV is available for automatic actuation, the event consequences would be mitigated directly by preventing water PSVs. However, automatic actuation is not required relief through the PSVs.
to mitigate this event. The analysis includes an acceptable delay for the operator to open a block valve and to manually control the PORV if necessary.
The PORVs also provide the safety-related means for reactor coolant 5          system depressurization to achieve safety-grade cold shutdown and to mitigate the effects of a loss of heat sink or an SGTR. They are
(?2 +-C..,    modeled in safety analyses for events that result in increasing RCS pressure for which departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) criteria, pressurizer filling, or reactor coolant saturation are critical (Ref. 2). By assuming PORV actuation, the primary pressure remains below the high high pressurizer pressure trip setpoint, thus the DNBR calculation is more conservative. As such, such, automatic actuation is required to mitigate these events, and PORV automatic operation is, is not is, f-
                                                                                                          .f_ I~II\ lee..J therefore, not an assumed assumed safety function. Events Events that assume assume this        ovtt- fI-.."..,J; condition include a turbine trip, loss loss of normal normal feedwater, and and feedwater line break (Ref. 2).
Pressurizer PORVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10  10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).
c                                                                                              (continued)
Vogtle Units Units 11 and 22                        B B 3.4.11-2                                  Rev. 3-10/01 Rev.
                          /Sece O&deg;1k2                                    (5
 
Pressurizer PORVs Pressurizer  PORVs oo                                                        B  3.4.11 B3.4.11 c BASES LCO                              requires the PORVs The LCO requires          PORVs and their associated block valves to  to be be OPERABLE for manualmanual operation to mitigate mitigate the effects associated with an SGTR, or loss of heat sink, and to achieve safety grade cold shutdown. The PORVs are considered OPERABLE OPERABLE in either the manual or automatic mode. The PORVs (PV-455A  (PV-455A and PV-456A)
PV-456A) are powered from 125 V MCCs 1I2AD1M 1/2AD1M and 1/2BD1M, respectively. If either or both of these MCCs become inoperable, the affected PORV(s) are to be considered inoperable.
By maintaining two PORVs and their associated block valves OPERABLE, the single failure criterion is satisfied satisfied..                  [.t5 An OPERABLE PORV is required to be capable of manually opening and closing, and not experiencing excessive seat leakage. Excessive seat leakage, although not associated with a specific criteria, exists when conditions dictate closure of the block valve to limit leakage.
An OPERABLE block valve may be either open and energized, or closed and energized with the capability to be opened, since the required safety operation.. Although typically open to function is accomplished by manual operation allow PORV operation, the block valves may be OPERABLE when closed to isolate the flow path of an inoperable PORV that is capable of being manually cycled (e.g., as in the case of excessive PORV leakage).
Similarly, isolation of an OPERABLE PORV does not render that PORV or block valve inoperable provided the relief function remains available with manual action. Satisfying the LCO helps minimize challenges to fission product barriers.
APPLICABILITY        The PORVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 for manual actuation to mitigate a steam generator tube rupture event, an inadvertent safety injection, and to achieve safety grade cold shutdown. In addition, the block valves are required to be OPERABLE to limit the potential for a small break LOCA through the flow path. The most likely cause for a PORV small break LOCA is a result of a pressure increase transient that causes the PORV to open. Imbalances in the energy output of the core and heat heat removal by the secondary system can cause the RCS pressure to increase to the PORV opening setpoint. The most rapid increases will occur at the higher operating power power and pressure conditions of MODES 1    I and 2. Pressure increases are less prominent in MODE 3 because the core input energy is reduced, but the RCS pressure is high.
Therefore, the LCO is applicable in MODES 1,      1, 2, and 3. The LCO is not applicable in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place when both pressure and core energy are decreased and      and the pressure surges become much      less significant. LCO 3.4.12 addresses the PORV much less (continued)
Vogtle      1 and Vogtle Units 1 and 2                      BB 3.4.11-3 3.4.11-3                                  Rev. 1-2/00 Rev. 1-2/00 R              PArCL      d(i AA7 I
 
Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11
(                Reeorce OO6(7r 2( 5 BASES APPLICABILITY            requirements in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place.
(continued)
ACTIONS                A Note has been added to clarify that all pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion Time is on a component basis).
(Le.,
A.1 PORVs may be inoperable and capable of being manually cycled (e.g.,
excessive seat leakage, instrumentation problems, or other causes that do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA).
LOCA). In this condition, either the PORVs must be restored or the flow path isolated within 11 hour.
hour. The associated block valve is required to be closed, but power must be maintained to the associated block valve, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperable. The PORVs may be considered              ((\..il j ec,              l-OPERABLE in either the manual or automatic mode. This permits                            6't..
operation of the plant until the next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that        Pr &#xa2;-    '5D maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the problem condition.
Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on plant operating experience that has shown that 1
minor problems can be corrected or closure accomplished in this time period.
B.2, and B.3 B.1, B.2.
If one PORV is inoperable it must must be inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, be either restored restored or isolated by closing the associated block
('c    v I
valve and removing the power to the associated block valve.valve. The        a  IV 5ve&J 6 v  )LvefU Completion Times of 11 hour hour are reasonable, based on challenges to the PORVs during this time period, and provide the operator adequate time to correct the situation. If the inoperable inoperable valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, itit must be isolated within the specified time. Because there is at least one PORVPORV that remains OPERABLE, an additional 72 hours is provided provided to restore the inoperable PORV to (continued) and 22 Vogtle Units I1 and                          BB 3.4.11-4                                Rev. 22 - 6/05 Rev.
RePc                        OftV
 
Pressurizer PORVs PORVs B 3.4.11 Reect                      OoM5 BASES ACTIONS                B.1, B.2.
B.1. B.2, and B.3 (continued)
OPERABLE status. If the PORV cannot be restored within this plant must be brought to a MODE in additional time, the plant                                  in which the LCO does not apply, as required by Condition D.      D.
C.1 and C.2 If one block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time of 11 hour or place the associated PORV in manual control. The prime importance for the capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 1      1 hour, the Required Action is to place the PORV in manual control to preclude its automatic opening for an overpressure event and to avoid the potential for a stuck open PORV at a time that the block valve is inoperable. The Completion Time of 11 hour is reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time period, and provides the operator time to correct the situation. The time allowed to restore the block valve is based upon the Completion Time for restoring an inoperable PORV in Condition B since the PORV may not be capable of mitigating an event if the inoperable block valve is not fully open. If the block valve is restored within the Completion Time of 72 hours, the PORV may be restored to automatic operation. If it cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply, as required by Condition D.
D.1 and D.2 D.1 IfIf the Required Action of Condition          C is not met, then the plant Condition A, B, or C must be brought to a MODEMODE in which the LCO does not    not apply. To achieve achieve this status, the the plant must be            to at least be brought to    least MODE 33 within 66 hours and toto MODE 44 within 1212 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant plant systems. In MODES 4,    4, 5,
5, and 6, maintaining PORV OPERABILITY may      may be required. See See LCO LCO 3.4.12.
(continued)
Vogtle Units    and 22 Units I1 and                          B B 3.4.11-5 3.4.11-5                                    Rev.
Rev. 1-2/00 1-2/00 Rjtwre. OOArl
 
Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11
( BASES Ieeece OQMl ACTIONS              E.1, E.2.
E.1.      E.3, and E.4 E.2, E.3.
(continued)
If more than one PORV is inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, it is necessary to either restore at least one valve within the Completion Time of 11 hour or isolate the flow path by closing and removing the power to the associated block valves. The Completion Time of 1  1 hour is reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provides the operator time to correct the situation. If one PORV is restored and one PORV remains inoperable, then the plant will be in Condition B with the time clock started at the original declaration of having two PORVs inoperable. If no PORVs are restored within the Completion Time, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO  LCD does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, maintaining PORV OPERABILITY may be required. See LCO LCD 3.4.12.
F.1, F.2.
F.1. F.2, and F.3 If more than one block valve is inoperable, it is necessary to either restore the block valves within the Completion Time of 11 hour, or place the associated PORVs in manual control and restore at least one block valve within 2 hours and restore the remaining block valve within 72 hours. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provide the operator time to correct the situation.
G.1 and G.2 If the Required Actions of Condition F are not met, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO  LCD does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, 12 based on operating experience, to reach the required plant
(                                                                                      (continued)
I and 2 Vogtle Units 1                          B 3.4.11-6                                        No.0a Revision No.
1p
(
9        Q
 
Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11
( BASES CA
                                                    +
7            -L ACTIONS              G.1 and G.2 (continued) conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, maintaining PORV OPERABILITY may be required. See LCO 3.4.12.
SURVEILLANCE        SR 3.4.11.1 REQUIREMENTS Block valve cycling verifies that the valve(s) can be closed if needed.
The basis for the Frequency of 92 days is the ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 2). The Note modifies this SR by stating that it is not required to be performed with the block valve closed, in accordance with the Required Actions of Conditions A, B, or E.
SR 3.4.11.2 SR 3.4.11.2 requires a complete cycle of each PORV. Operating a PORV through one complete cycle ensures that the PORV can be manually actuated for mitigation of an SGTR. The Frequency of 18 months is based on a typical refueling cycle and industry accepted practice.
REFERENCES          1. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
: 2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. Xl.
c                                                        C(/6 Iht    fM-i    2-( {5 Vogtle Units 1 I and 2                      B 3.4.11-7                            Revision No. 0
: 5. 015/017G2.4.4 001 0151017G2.4.4 Unit 2 is at 25% power when the following annunciators are received.
ALBO8 window B05 for RCP ##33 CONTROLLED LKG HI!
          - ALB08                                                    HI / LO FLOW
(          -
ALBO8 window B04 for RCP #
          - ALB08
          -                                #33 NO.2 NO. 2 SEAL LKOF HI FLOW The RO reports the following indications:
          - RCP # 3 seal leakoff flow Hi Range meter is 6.0 gpm.
          - RCP # 3 seal injection flow is 7.9 gpm.
          - RCP # 3 Seal Water Inlet temperature is 223 degrees F and stable.
Which ONE of the the following is the CORRECT procedurally directed action(s) for the SS to take?
UOP-l 2004-C, "Power A. Per UOP-12004-C,        Power Operations (Mode 1)",
I), commence a unit shutdown to be in Mode 3 in 8 hours.
By Trip the reactor and enter E-O, B:o'                            E-0, "Reactor Reactor Trip and Safety Injection",      SOP-i 3003, Injection, per SOP-13003, RCP Operation",
                "RCP  Operation, stop RCP # 3 and close sealleakoff seal leakoff valve HV-8141C.
HV-81 41 C.
C. Per SOP-13003, stop RCP #      #3,        seal leakoff valve HV-8141 3, close sealleakoff        HV-814iC,C, enter AOP-18005,    Partial Loss of RCS Flow",
AOP-i 8005, "Partial                Flow, commence unit shutdown per UOP-12004.
UOP-1 2004.
UOP-i 2004, maintain reactor power at 25%, monitor the RCP per SOP-13003 D. Per UOP-12004,                                                                SOP-i 3003 Pump                            Abnormality, contact Duty Engineering.
section 4.2.1 "Pump Operation With A Seal Abnormality",
(
Page: 9 of 48                                                                                  6/6/200 7 6/6/2007
 
K/A 015 I 017 RCP Malfunctions 015/017
(            G2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS KIA Question gives a plausible scenario with indications of an RCP # 3 seal failure.
Candidate must choose the correct procedural actions to address the failure.
Question meets 11 OCFRSS.43(b)
OCFR55.43(b) criteria item # S  5 - Assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
ANSWER 1    I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may not recognize the sealleakoff seal leakoff indications of
                >5.5
                >S.S  gpm  require an  immediate  RCP  shutdown    and a normal shutdown desired.
SOP-i 3003 and AOP-1800S B. Correct. per SOP-13003            AOP-1 8005 if reactor power> 1S% 15% and an RCP is to E-0. RCP should be stopped be tripped, correct action is to trip reactor and go to E-O.
lOAs of E-O after IOAs                seal Ieakoff valve closed.
E-0 and sealleakoff C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may recognize the plant is <      < P-8 and recognize an AOP-1 8005-C Partial Loss of Flow entry auto reactor trip would not occur and think AOP-1800S-C SOP1 3003 and 1800S is appropriate. SOP13003          18005 both state if reactor power> 1S% 15% trip the E-0.
reactor and enter E-O.
D. Incorrect. Immediate trip criteria for RCP is exceeded due to excessive sealleakoff.
seal leakoff.
Plausible the candidate may not recognize the immediate trip criteria and know that Duty Engineering would be contacted.
REFERENCES AOP-1              Partial Loss of RCS Flow".
8005-C, "Partial AOP-1800S-C,                              Flow.
SOP-i    3003-1/2, Reactor SOP-13003-1/2,      "Reactor Coolant Pump Operation" Operation Precautions and Limitations, and section 4.2.1 for Operation With a Seal Abnormality with the appropriate Decision Decision Tree Flow Chart (figure).
ARP-17008-1/2 windows C05      COS and C04 for RCP #3  # 3 Controlled Leakage Hi  Hi!I Lo Flow and # 3 Seal Leakoff Hi Flow.
Farley December 2004 NRC SRO Exam question #4.            # 4.
c=..        VEGP VEGP learning objectives:
LO-PP-16401-03, Describe the control room indications for a failure of an RCP seal.
Page: 10 of Page: 10 of 48                                                                                      6/6/2007
 
ftee                                  1 (01]                  Z(
NO NOOBJOBI        TXTX_OBJ OBI
( LO-PP-16302-0 Compare and contrast hot and cold calibrated Pressurizer level indications under various PZR operating conditions using the PTDB.
LO-PP-1 6302-0 State the LCO, applicability, bases, and the 11 hr or less actions for each of the following:
LO-PP-16302-0
: a. 3.3.1 Function 9 Pressurizer Water Level-High
: b. 3.3.3 Function 6 Pressurizer Level
: c. 3.3.4 Function 8 Pressurizer Level LO-PP-i 6303-0 Describe the response of the pressurizer pressure control system to variations in pressurizer pressure I/
LO-PP-16303-0 level.
LO-PP-1 6303-0 Describe how the response of pressurizer pressure control to the following failures:
LO-PP-16303-0
: a. controlling (primary &
                                            & secondary) channel fails low
: b. controlling (primary &
                                            & secondary) channel fails high
: c. controller high or low failure
: d. stuck open PORV
: e. stuck open spray valve LO-PP-1 6303-0 State the reactor trips and SI actuation signals, including LO-PP-16303-0                                                      including set points and coincidences associated with pressurizer pressure protection channels.
LO-PP-16303-0 LO-PP-1 6303-0 Describe the permissives associated with pressurizer pressure including set point and coincidences and what it provides.
LO-PP-16303-0 State the set point, coincidence, and protective actuations associated with the low pressurizer PORV interlock.
LO-PP-1 6303-0 State the LCO, applicability, bases, and the 11 hr or less actions for each of the following:
LO-PP-16303-0
: a. 3.3.1 Function 6 OTDT (Rx Trip)
: b.                  Ba. Pressurizer Pressure 3.3.1 Function 8a.                      Low (Rx Trip)
: c. 3.3.1 Function 8b. Pressurizer Pressure  High (Rx Trip)
: d.                  id. Pressurizer Pressure 3.3.2 Function 1d.                      Low (SI)
: e.                  Bb. Pressurizer Pressure 3.3.2 Function 8b.                      P-i 1 P-11 LO-PP-16401-0 Explain the function of the following RCP components:
: a. Thermal Barrier
: b. Pump Seal Package
: c. Thrust bearing
: d. Motor Flywheel
: e. Anti Rotation Device 1.f. Oil Lift pump LO-PP-1 6401-0 Describe the function of RCP seals 1, 2, and 3 including DP across each seal and expected flow rate.
LO-PP-16401-0 LO-PP-16401-0 Describe the control room indications for a failure of a RCP seal.
LO-PP-i 6401-0 State what the effect of closing the #1 seal leak off valve.
LO-PP-16401-0
( Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                              Page 22 of 68 (eecL Oi3(&deg;i7L,,
 
Approved By C. H. Williams, Jr.              Vogtle Electric Generatin~
Generating Plant        A              Procedure Number Rev 17008-1      13.3 Date Approved                ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURES FOR ALB 08 ON                      Page Number 1/1/2004 1/1 /2004 c                                                    PANEL 1A2 ON MCB                                    24 of 46 WINDOW C04 ORIGIN ORIGIN SETPOINT SETPOINT RCP3 1-FIS-0192                          0.9 gpm                      NO. 2 SEAL LKOF NO.2 HI FLOW 1.0                PROBABLE CAUSE
: 1.      Number 2 Seal failure.
: 2.      Sudden reduction in RCDT level or pressure.
2.0                AUTOMATiC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC NONE 3.0                INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS
: 1.                                  1 -PISL-9699 (QPCP) 3 psig or greater.
Check RCDT pressure on 1-PISL-9699
(                    2.      Dispatch Operator to check RCDT pressure and level at PLPP:
: a. Pressure 2-3 psig,
: b. Level 20-75%.
: 3.                                                                Reactor Coolant Pump IF RCDT pressure and level are normal, Go To 13003-1, "Reactor Operation for instructions covering RCP operation with seal malfunctions.
Operation" 4.0                SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONSS NONE 5.0                COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE END OF SUB-PROCEDURE
 
==REFERENCES:==
1X4DB114, 1X6AB09-119, 1X6ABO9-119, PLS
                                              /ZJe"-tifC~            015/ 00&-2.,.,'+, 4 oI 6,2007 Printed June 6, Pnnted                  1:16 2007 at 1.16
 
Approved By Approved H. Williams, Jr.
C. H.              Jr.              Vogtle Electric Generating Plant                .A              Procedure Number Procedure Number Rev 17008-1 13.3 Rev Date Approved Date                          ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURES  PROCEDURES FOR ALB 08 ON              Page Number Page Number 1/1/2004                                              PANEL1A2ONMCB PANEL  1A2 ON MCB                                    25 of 46
(
WINDOWC05 WINDOW C05 ORIGIN ORIGIN SETPOINT SETPOINT RCP3 1-FT-0159                            4.8 gpm                        CONTROLLED LKG 1-FT-0155 1-FT-0155                            0.8 gpm                        HIILO HI/LO FLOW FLOW 1.0                PROBABLE CAUSE
: 1.        High Flow:
: a.      Flashing in the Seal Leakoff Line due to loss of seal injection flow or high seal injection temperature,
: b.      Failure of Number 11 Seal.
: 2.        Low Flow:
: a.      Low differential pressure across Number 11 Seal,
: b.      High Volume Control Tank (VCT) pressure,
: c.      Excess letdown in service,
: d.      Failure of Number 2 2 Seal.
2.0                AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 3.0                INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE RCP 33 No. 1  1 seal water leakoff high range flow may be monitored using computer point F0159.
1.
: 1.        Observe seal injection flow and seal  leakoff flow, as well as excess letdown sealleakoff temperature and pressure for indication of an actual seal anomaly.
: 2.        IF aa seal problem is indicated, Go To 13003-1,  "Reactor Coolant Pump 13003-1, Reactor Operation..
Operation"
: 3.        IF    instrument problem is indicated, initiate maintenance as required.
IF an instrument
(
Punted Pnnted June June 6,2007 6, 2007 at at 1:16 1: 16
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                        REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                    PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              18005-C 18005-C                                10 10                            33 of of 44 Rect                o)5/0i]l
(            ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED D 1. Check
: 01.      Check Reactor Reactor power power - LESS
                                              -  LESS          1.
: 1. Perform Perform the  the following:
following:
THAN THAN OR OR EQUAL EQUAL TOTO 15%
15%
D  a.
Oa. Trip Trip the the Reactor.
Reactor.
Oh.
Db. Go Go to to 19000-C, 19000-C, E-OE-0 REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP OR OR SAFETY SAFETY INJECTION.
INJECTION.
I D 2. Stop
: 02.      Stop any any power progress.
progress.
power changes changes in    in                  [(V5(,VeIL            ti 03.
D  3. Initiate Initiate the Actions the Continuous Actions Page.
Page.
Continuous                                          o D
0*
* Check affected
: 4. Check
: 4.            affected loop loop SG  SG NR NR    0*
D
* 4.
: 4. Control Control feed feed flow flow to to Level Level - TRENDING
                        -  TRENDING TO TO 65%65%                  maintain maintain affected affected looploop SG SG NR NR level level between between 60% 60% and and 70%.
70%.
05.
D  5. Check Check Tavg Tavg - TRENDING
                                -  TRENDING TO    TO          05.
D 5. Adjust Adjust control control rodsrods toto PROGRAM PROGRAM                                            restore restore Tavg.Tavg.
(      D06.6. Verify Verify PRZR PRZR level level - TRENDING
                                          -  TRENDING TO TO PROGRAM PROGRAM D07.7. Verify Verify PRZR PRZR pressure pressure -    -
TRENDING TRENDING TO TO 2235 2235 PSIG PSIG D08.
: 8. Check Check RCP RCP 11 andand RCP RCP 44 -    -            8.
: 8. Close Close thethe affected affected loop ioop RUNNING RUNNING                                            spray spray valve:
valve:
D0    Loop Loop 1:  1: PIC-0455C PIC-0455C D0    Loop Loop 4:  4: PIC-0455B PIC-0455B D09.9. Initiate Initiate shutdown shutdown to  to Mode Mode 33 by by initiating initiating 12004-C, 12004-C, POWER  POWER OPERATION OPERATION {MODE (MODE 1}.
1).
{TS (TS 3.4.4}
3.4.4)
D  10. Determine 010.      Determine andand correct correct the  the cause cause ofof the the pump pump trip.
trip.
D  11. Check 011.      Check shutdown shutdown to to Mode Mode 33 -          D  11. Return 011. Return to  to Step Step 9.9.
(
COMPLETE COMPLETE t$
 
Approved By S A.
S. A Phillips                                    Vogtle Electric VogtJe          Generating Plant Electric Generating Plant  A                      Procedure Number Procedure 13003-1 13003-1 35 Number Rev Rev Date Approved C 3-8-2007 Date 3-8-2007 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION                                        Page Number Page Number 11 of 32 INITIALS 4.2 4.2.1 SYSTEM OPERATION Pump Operation With A Seal Abnormality IZe'h?~ce-
                                                                  /eLc GiS                oi/oi7  I 0/7 &-Lrl.{-, ~
4.2.1.1          IF the Plant Computer is available, trend the computer data points listed in Table 2.
4.2.1.2          IF the Plant Computer is NOT available, perform the following:
: a.      Monitor the QMCB indication listed in Table 2 at least hourly for the next 8 hours.
: b.      IF NO further seal degradation exists after 8 hours, consult with the Shift Supervisor (55)              (SS) for less frequent monitoring.
4.2.1.3          Monitor the No. 11 seal for further degradation using Figure 1                    1 and RCP Trip Criteria as follows:
: a.      Evaluate the monitored indications using Figure 1, "RCP                RCP Seal Abnormalities Tree".      Tree.
: b.      IF evaluation of the monitored indications using Figure 1 jf                                                                          1 requires immediate pump shutdown, Go To Step 4.2.1.4.
: c.      IF any of the following RCP Trip Criteria is exceeded, Go To Step 4.2.1.4 for immediate RCP shutdown.
RCP TRIP CRITERIA Motor bearing temperature                                        >195&deg;F Motor stator-winding temperature                                  >311&deg;F
                                                                                                  >311 &deg;F W~ ,'N f_Il Seal water in    inlet let temperature                              >230 0 FF
                                                                                                  >230&deg;                  Wfl&    V RCP shaft vibration                                              =20 mils                U\ ~(ct-)
tij RCP Frame vibration                                                =5 mils              3f-f fV\..
                              ~#_1_s_e_a_I_D_iff_e_ffi_n_t_ia_I_P_re_s_su_r_e
                                #1 seal Differential Pressure________~___                        <200  ps_i_d____~ ~vke(
psid
                                                                                                <_2O_O__
Total loss of ACCW for aa duration of 10                10 minutes                                J
(
                                                    /eer O15/diSl Printed Pnnted June 6, 2007 at 6,2007  at 1:14 1:14
 
Approved ByBy                                                                                                          Procedure Number Procedure  Number Rev Rev S A.
S. A Phillips                                              Vogtle Electric Generating VOgtie          Generating Plant Plant                        13003-1 35 Date Approved                                                                                                          Page Number Number REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION 3-8-2007                                                                                                                      29 of 32
(  FIGURE 11 - RCP SEAL ABNORMALITIES DECISION TREE No- -- - - - - ,
CHECK NO. 2 SEAL LEAi<OFF FLOW Yes Yes No Yes      No              r              No                                                Yes          No No N&deg;'4-_ _ _ No                  No                                                Yes          Yes FAILURE OF NO. 3 No      OUTER DAM No                                          No Yes NOl1FY DUTY ENG TO CONSULT PLANT        Yes MANAGEMENT FOR        Note 1 AC110 NS FAILURE OF NO. 2                No SEAL NO                                      No MANAGEMENT ADVI SES PUMP BE      No                      Note 2 SHUTlXllMl Yes                                                              Yes Note 2      REPAIR AT NEXT Yes                                                              OUTAGE SHUTDOlMI WITHIN e HOURS PER 42.1      No
                                                    . . - - -Yes - - - - - '
L_____
Note Note 1:1: Abnormal Operating Range of Figure                Figure 22
(  Note Note 2: Non-operating Range of Figure 22 Note Note 3:3: ALBO8 ALB08 A-04, B-04, C-04 or D-04                0-04 iReArce_ cS /017 Printed Printed June June 6, 6, 2007 2007 at at 1:15 1:15
 
Approved By Approved                                                                                                        Procedure Number Procedure Number Rev Rev S. A. Phillips S.                                                  Vogtle Electric Generating Plant                            13003-1 35 13003-1 C Date Approved 3-8-2007 3-8-2007 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION                                        Page Number Page 30 of 32 FIGURE 2 NO. 1I SEAL NORMAL OPERA          OPERATING  liNG RANGE ic /l/AJo/A+Q%..
0 0
                        -J NORMAL G)                                        OPERATING RANGE U) o0 zz                                                                                NOTE I 0.8 NOTE 2
                      '\.
2 NO.
0  [
0 200      500          1,000          1,500          2,000  II 2,500 2,250 No. 1I Seal Differential Pressure (PSI)              NOTE 3 3
1      [      1.        If the No.1 No. I seal leak rates are outside the normal (1.0-5.0 gpm) but within the (3
{ \ VI.,  -e5  oV\:~perating o      jperating limits <<0.8-5.5
((0.8-5.5 gpm), continue pump operation. VERIFY that seal II: +- 0(
4_      ,_
injection flow exceeds No. 1    I seal leak rate for the affected RCP. Closely monitor pump and seal parameters and contact Engineering for further instructions.
: 2.        Minimum startup requirements are 0.2 gpm      gpm at 200 PSID differential across the No.
No.11 seal. For startups at differential pressures greater than    than 200 PSID, the minimum No. 1  1 seal leak rate requirements are defined in      in the NO. 11 SEAL NORMAL OPERATING RANGE (e.g., at 1000              1000 psi differential differential pressure, do do not Qiv5 ie                  start the RCP with less than 0.5 gpm).
: 3.        No.1 Seal Differential No.1                              =
Differential Press = RCS WR Press - VCT Press.
(
oi5/i Printed Printed June June 6,2007
: 6. 2007 at at 1:15 1:15
 
Approved By S A.
S.
By A Phillips Phillips                                Vogtie Electric Vogtle Electric Generating Generating Plant  A.                    Procedure Procedure Number Number Rev 1 3003-1 35 13003-1 Rev Date Approved Date                                                                                                      Page Page Number REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION 3-8-2007                                                                                                        12 of 32 12
(                                                                                                            INITIALS
: d.          WHEN directed by Figure 1, stop the affected RCP within 8 hours as follows:
(1)    Establish 9 gpm or greater seal injection flow to the affected pump.
(2)    Stop the affected RCP by continuing with step 4.2.1.4.
4.2.1.4          WHEN directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
: a.          Start the RCP Oil Lift Pump for affected RCP, if available.
: b.          IF Reactor Power is greater than 15%      15% Rated Thermal
      .4-1\!,we~                  Power:
Power:
('; 0-.. ((                (1)    Trip the Reactor and initiate 19000-C, "E-O        E-O
      ,/ LJ                                                              Injection.
Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection".
(2)      WHEN the immediate operator actions of 19000-C are complete, Go To Step 4.2.1.4.d. 4.2.1 .4.d.
: c.          IF Reactor Power is less than 15%    15% Rated Thermal Power, 18005-C, Partial initiate 18005-C,    "Partial Loss Of Flow". Flow.
: d.          Stop the RCP by placing the RCP Non-1          Non-i EE Control Switch in STOP and then placing the RCP 1            IE E Control Switch in STOP:
RCP        Non-i Non-1 E E Control Switch          1 1E E Control Switch
                                **        Loop 11          i-HS-0495B 1-HS-04958                    1-HS-0495A 1-HS-0495A
                                  **      Loop 2          1-HS-0496B 1-HS-04968                    i-HS-0496A 1-HS-0496A
                                **        Loop 3          1-HS-0497B 1-HS-04978                    i-HS-0497A 1-HS-0497A
                                **        Loop 4          1-HS-0498B 1-HS-04988                    i-HS-0498A 1-HS-0498A l
e        ecQ oi 5/017 Printed Pnnted June  6, 2007 June 6, 2007 at at 1:14 1: 14
 
Approved By S A.
S. A Phillips                              VogUe Electric Vogtle Electric Generating Generating Plant A        Procedure Number Procedure 13003-1 Number Rev 1 3003-1 35 Rev C Date Approved Date 3-8-2007 3-8-2007 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION                    Page Number Page Number 13 of 32 INITIALS CAUTION If RCP #1 or #4 is stopped, the associated Spray Valve is placed in manual and closed to prevent spray short cycling.
: e.        IF RCP #1 OR #4 is stopped, verify its associated spray valve is placed in MANUAL AND closed.
* RCP 1:    1-PIC-0455C
* RCP 4:    1-PIC-0455B
: f.        WHEN the RCP comes to a complete stop (as indicated by reverse flow), close the RCP Seal Leakoff Isolation valve for the affected pump.
* RCP1:
RCP  1: 1-HV-8141A
(                              **      RCP2:
RCP  2: 1-HV-8141B
                              **                1-HV-8141C RCP 3: 1-HV-8141C
* RCP4:
RCP  4: 1-HV-8141D
: g.      Secure the associated RCP Oil Lift Pump.
: h.        IF RCP shutdown was due to loss of RCP seal cooling, review Limitation 2.2.11 for recovery action.
(                                    3 Of::)
Printed Pnnted June June 6, 2007 at 6,2007  at 1:14 1:14
: 1. 015/017AA2.08 001              o( /017 You are the Unit 2 SRO. Unit 2 is at 100% steady-state power. All systems are in c          automatic and functioning properly.
The following annunciators are received:
DC1 "RCP
                  - DC1,
                  -      RCP #1 SEAL LKOF FLOW LO"      LO 2A RCP #2 SEAL LKOF FLOW HI"
                  - DA5, "2A
                  -                                            HI The plant operator reports the following parameters:
RCP                                                  2A                2B              2C
            #1 seal injection flow (gpm)                  7.4 stable          7.3 stable      7.4 stable
            #1 seal leakoff flow (gpm)                    0.0 stable          4.0 stable    4.0 stable
            #1 seal DIP (psid)                            >400 stable        >400 stable    >400 stable o
RCP lower seal water brg. temp ((&deg;F)  F)      190 increasing      124 stable    123 stable Which ONE of the following is the most probable cause of these indications and the required actions?
A. 2A RCP #1 seal failure, trip the reactor, and secure the RCP.
B. 2A RCP #1 seal failure, perform a controlled shut down to Mode 3 in 6 hours.
C~ 2A RCP #2 seal failure, trip the reactor, and secure the RCP.
C D. 2A RCP #2 seal failure, monitor 2A RCP parameters for further degredation, contact Westinghouse for further guidance.
Source: Modified from Farley Exam Bank Question #RCP SEAL-52522A03 This question satisfy the criteria in 10CFR55.43(b)(5).
10CFR55.43(b)(5).
A - Incorrect, Flow into the #1 seal is satisfactory. D/P
              -                                                    DIP across the #1 seal is satisfactory.
Correct action for a failed #1 seal.
B B - Incorrect, Flow into the #1 seal is satisfactory. DIP across the #1 seal is satisfactory.
Action is is the required TS action for one RCS loop becoming inoperable.
C - Correct, Evidenced mostly be the #1 seal
              -                                              leakoff flow at 0.0 which shows that all the sealleakoff flow is going through the #2 seal indicating its failure. Annunciator DA5, 1A    1A RCP #2 SEAL LKOF FLOW HI, confirms this failure, along with the slighty elevated RCP radial brg temp. RCP radial bearing not being stable is annunciator DC1 criteria for tripping the reactor and securing the RCP.
D    Incorrect, #2 seal failure is D - Incorrect,
              -                              indicated. Action is is indicated.          is for stable nondegrading nondegrading parameters.
l fqCG(ey                I/ec- 7ft If: So ie                          srco      :~
Page:
Page: 11                                                                                          6/6/2007 O[    S j(j/7G-2-(i+c L\
: 6.            001 025AA2.03 001 Given the following conditions:
(            - Unit 11 cooldown for refueling outage in progress.
            - RCS temperature is 185 degrees F.
            - Charging and letdown flows are balanced.
            - RHR pump 1B
            -              lB is operating in shutdown cooling mode, RHR pump 1A is in standby.
The following occurs:
            - Containment sump levels begin to rise with radiation alarms received on RE-002 and RE-003.
            - PRZR level is 90% and continuing to lower.
The Unit SS should implement which ONE of the following:
A 18004-C, RCS Leakage, section C for RCS Leakage (Mode 5).
At!
B. 18004-C, RCS Leakage, section B for RCS Leakage (Mode 3 <      < 1000 psig and 4).
C. 18019-C, Loss of RHR, section A for Loss of RHR capability in Mode 4 or Mode 5 with PRZR Level in the IR.
18019-C, Loss of RHR section B for Loss of RHR in Mode 5 or 6 Below PRZR IR or D. 18019-C, SG Nozzle Dams Installed.
c~
Page:
Page: 11 11 of of 48                                                                            6/6/2007
 
KIA 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System.
Increasing reactor building sump level.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS KIA Question gives a plausible scenario where Containment sump levels, radiation, and PRZR level indicate an RCS leak in Containment. The candidate must determine the plant Mode from the given conditions and select the apppriate section of 18004 for RCS Leakage or 18019 for Loss of RHR to enter.
Question meets 1    1 OCFR55.43(b) criteria for item # 5 - Assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. 18004-C, section C should be used for this condition.This is a new section and a recent change to our procedures B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may not properly recognize the plant mode and think section B of 18004 is appropriate.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may select this section of 18019-C since the description fits the plant conditions, section A is just for loss of capability, not leakage.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may select this section of 18019-C since there is an RCS leak while on RHR, however PRZR level rules out this section.
REFERENCES 18004-C, RCS Leakage 18004-C, 18019-C, Loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 18019-C, VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-60304-08, Given conditions and/or indications, determine the required AOP to enter (including subsections, as applicable). (18004 objective) objective)
LO-LP-60314-04, Given conditions and/or indications, determine the        the required AOP to c        enter (including subsections, as applicable). (18019
( 18019 objective)
Page:
Page: 12 11 of of 48 48                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
FecL4 oi kk2O3 Number Number              Text Text LO-LP-S0303-12 LO-LP-60303-1  2    State the State  the immediate Immediate operator operator actions        required for actions required          an uncontrolled for an                    continuous rod uncontrolled continuous              motion. Include rod motion.      Include RNO and RNO    and substeps substeps of  of the    immediate action.
the immediate          action.
LO-LP-S0303-14 LO-LP-60303-1  4    Describe how Describe    how thethe retrieval retrieval of        misaligned rod of aa misaligned      rod can            the power affect the can affect                                  limits of distribution limits power distribution              of the the core.
core.
Include aa effects Include      effects on on why why Reactor        Engineering must Reactor Engineering            must be be consulted        the rod consulted ifif the        has been rod has            misaligned for been misaligned          for longer than longer    than one one hour.
hour.
LO-LP-S0303-15 LO-LP-60303-15      Describe the Describe    the effects effects of of failing failing toto reset reset thethe P/A    converter (Bank PIA converter                Demand Position (Bank Demand                    Display) following Position Display)        following aa misaligned misaligned rod rod recovery.
recovery.
LO-LP-S0303-1S LO-LP-60303-1  6    Describe how Describe    how thethe radial radial flux flux profile    may be profile may          affected by be affected      by aa misaligned misaligned rod.rod.
LO-LP-60303-17 LO-LP-60303-17      Describe why Describe    why reactor        power must reactor power        must be be less    than 65%
less than    65% or    10% below or 10%            most limiting below most                power distribution limiting power    distribution restriction prior restriction          to commencing aa realignment of prior to                                                  control rod.
of aa control    rod.
LO-LP-60303-18 LO-LP-60303-1  8    Given conditions Given    conditions and/or        indications, determine and/or indications,                              required AOP to determine the required                            (including subsections, enter (including to enter                  subsections, as applicable).
as  applicable).
LO-LP-S0303-19 LO-LP-60303-19      Given the entire Given        entire AOP, AOP, describe:
describe:
: a. Purpose of selected steps
: b. how and why why the step is    is being pertormed performed
: c.                                          plantlparameter(s) for the step Expected response of the plant/parameter(s)
LO-LP-60303-20      Describe the required operator actlon(s)    action(s) if two or more. more rods drop.
LO-LP-60303-21      Given power level, QPTR and/or AFD conditions, describe ail                          all Tech Spec required actions of 1          1 hour or less.
LO-LP-60304-01      State the allowable limits for Reactor Coolant System leakage, as defined in Technical Specifications.
LO-LP-60304-02      Describe how leakage into containment from the RCS will affect the containment pressure, temperature, humidity, and        and activity.
LO-LP-60304-03      State State the Immediate immediate operator action required for              for Reactor Coolant System  System leakage within RCS makeup capabilities.
capabilities. Include RNO and substeps of the immediate action.                    action.
LO-LP-60304-04 LO-LP-60304-04      Given the symptoms symptoms of    of RCS      leakage into RCS leakage          into an area or                            identify the leakage system, correctly identify or system,                                leakage area area or system.
system.
LO-LP-60304-05 LO-LP-60304-05      State State the setpoint setpoint at  at which which the      charging pump the charging      pump suction shifts shifts to  RWST on to RWST          low VCT level.
on low          level.
LO-LP-60304-06 LO-LP-60304-06      Describe Describe whywhy the the actions      required for actions required        for inability  to maintain inability to              pressurizer level maintain pressurizer                are different level are                depending different depending on on whether whether you you areare in in the the procedure procedure for  for *RCS      leakage within RCS leakage                  RCS makeup within RCS                capabilities or makeup capabilities*            in the or in  the procedure procedure for  for *RCS RCS leakage          greater than leakage greater                RCS makeup than RCS                                  while in capabilities while makeup capabilities                    modes 44 or in modes        or 5.*
5.
LO-LP-60304-0B LO-LP-60304-08      Given Given conditions conditions and/or and/or indications,        determine the indications, determine          the required required AOPAOP toto enter    (including subsections, enter (including      subsections, as as applicable).
applicable).
LO-LP-60304-09 LO-LP-60304-09      Given Given the the entire entire AOP, AOP, describe:
describe:
a.
: a. Purpose Purpose of  of selected selected steps.
steps.
b.
: b. How How andand why why thethe step step is is being being performed.
performed.
c.
: c. Expected Expected response response of    of the    plant/parameter(s) for the plantlparameter(s)          for the  step.
the step.
LO-LP-60304-10 LO-LP-60304-1 0    Given Given conditions conditions and/or        indications of and/or indications        of leaks leaks identified        Table 11 of identified inin Table          AOP 118004-C, of AOP                  determine the B004-C, determine          the probable probable location location of  of the the leakage leakage per  per 118004-C.
B004-C.
LO-LP-60304-11 LO-LP-60304-1 1    Explain Explain what what isis meant meant by  by 'RCS RCS leakleak before before break      criteria.
break criteria.
: Friday, Friday, June June 01, 01, 2007 2007                                                                                                                                    Page  71 of Page 71  of165 165 eec a 3 k Z( C
 
Number Number                Text Text LO-LP-60314-01 LO-LP-60314-01      Given that Given      that the the operator operator does does notnot adjust adjust turbine turbine load,      describe how load, describe    how andand why    the following why the    following parameters change parameters        change subsequent subsequent to    to aa loss loss ofof two two strings strings of  feedwater heaters.
of feedwater                          direction of Indicate direction heaters. Indicate              of change only.
change      only.
: a. reactor
: a. reactor power power
: b. indicated
: b. indicated turbine turbine load load (pimp)
(pimp)
: c. generator
: c. generator output output (MW)
(MW)
: d. Tavg
: d. Tavg
: e. Tc
: e. Tc f.f. Th Th LO-LP-60314-02 LO-LP-60314-02      Describe the Describe      the operator operator actions        required ifif during actions required                  the performance of during the                        AOP 18016-C of AOP    18016-C Condensate
                                                                                                                                      *Condensate and Feedwater and      Feedwater Malfunction Malfunction* aa lossloss ofof SG SG level level is is imminent.
imminent.              .
LO-LP-60314-03 LO-LP-60314-03      State actions State    actions required required on on loss loss of of both both SGFPs      with power SGFP's with      power>    20% and
                                                                                                        >20%          power <20%.
and power      < 20%.
LO-LP-60314-04 LO-LP-60314-04      Given conditions Given      conditions and/or and/or indications, indications, determine determine the the required    AOP to required AOP    to enter  (including subsections, enter (including    subsections, as applicable).
as    applicable).
LO-LP-60314-0S LO-LP-60314-05      Given the entireentire AOP, AOP, describe:
describe:
a.
: a.      Purpose of selected steps
: b.      How and why the step    step is being performed performed c.
: c.                                          plantlparameter(s) for the step response of the plant/parameter(s)
Expected response LO-LP-6031S-01 LO-LP-60315-01      Describe factors that can lead      lead to a loss of RHR. RHA.
LO-LP-6031S-02 LO-LP-6031 5-02    State the possible consequences of a sustained loss of RHA.                    RHR.
LO-LP-6031S-03 LO-LP-60315-03      Given figures 1-S                    18019-C, determine minimum ECCS flow, 1-5 of AOP 18019-C,                                              flow, time to saturation, time to
(/                    core uncovery, and heatup rate.
LO-LP-6031S-04 LO-LP-6031 5-04    Given the entire AOP, describe:
: a.      Purpose of selected steps
: b.      How and why the step is being performed
: c.      Expected response of the plantlparameter(s) plant/parameter(s) for the step LO-LP-6031S-0S LO-LP-60315-05      Given conditions and/or indications, determine the required AOP to enter (including subsections, as applicable).
LO-LP-6031S-06 LO-LP-60315-06      Given the CAUTIONs or NOTEs from AOP 18019-C, explain the reason for specific ones.
LO-LP-60316-02 LO-LP-6031 6-02    Describe Describe how  how aa CCW heat exchanger plugging or fouling problem may be indicated.                indicated, Include the following:
following:
: a. higher higher than normal pressurepressure drop
: b. lower lower than than normal flow  flow rate rate c.
: c. lower lower than normal normal temperature rise    rise in in the the cooling waterwater LO-LP-60316-03 LO-LP-6031 6-03    Given Given conditions conditions and/or and/or indications, indications, determine determine the the required              enter (including required AOP to enter                    subsections, (including subsections, as as applicable).
applicable).
LO-LP-60316-04 LO-LP-60316-04      Given Given the the entire entire AOP, AOP, describe:
describe:
a.
: a. Purpose Purpose of  of selected selected steps b.
: b. How How and and whywhy the step step is is performed performed c.
: c. Expected Expected response response of  of the the plantlparameter(s) plant/parameter(s) for    for the the step step LO-LP-60316-0S LO-LP-6031 6-05    Given Given the the CAUTION(s)
CAUTION(s) or      or NOTE(s)
NOTE(S) fromfrom AOP      18020-C, explain AOP 18020-C,                      reason for the reason explain the            for specific  ones.
specific ones.
LO-LP-60317  -01 LO-LP-60317-01      Describe Describe howhow thethe loss loss ofof NSCW NSCW SystemSystem affects        the operation affects the    operation of  the diesel of the          generators.
diesel generators.
: c. Friday, Friday, June June 01, 01, 2007 2007                                                                                                                          Page  75of165 Page 75 of 165
 
Approval Approval                                                                        Procedure Procedure 110.
No.
VogtJe  Electric Generating Vogtle Electric                Plant Generating Plant                                    18004-C 18004-C Dlte Date NUCLEAR NUCLEAR OPERATIONS OPERATIONS A.        Revision Revision 110.
No.
21.1 21.1 C                        Unit  COI240N Unit COMMON Plge Page 110.
No 11 of of 7777 Abnormal Abnormal Operating Operating Procedures Procedures REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE PURPOSE PURPOSE                                                      PRB PRB REVIEW REVIEW REQUIRED REQUIRED Section A Section  A specifies specifies the  the actions actions to to be be taken taken forfor Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant System System leakage leakage during during Modes Modes 1,1, 2,2, and and 33 with with RCSRCS pressure pressure greater greater than than 1000 1000 psig.
psig.
Section B Section  B specifies specifies the  the actions actions to to be be taken taken for for Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant System System leakage leakage during during Mode Mode 33 with with RCS RCS pressure pressure less less than than 10001000 psig,psig, and and Mode Mode 4.
4.
Section C Section      specifies the C specifies      the actions actions to to be be taken taken for for Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant System System leakage      during Mode leakage during      Mode 5.5.
1)
SYMPTOMS SYMPTOMS                                                c:7
          **  Unexplained change Unexplained      change in in charging charging flow.
flow.
          **  A rise A  rise in in VCT VCT makeup makeup frequency.
frequency.
          **  Unexplained lowering Unexplained      lowering of of PRZR PRZR level level and and pressure.
pressure.            5 o i.4(e
          **  PRT temperature, PRT  temperature, pressure pressure or  or level level rising.
rising.                      It
          **  CNMT CNNT moisture moisture alarm alarm or or activity activity rising.
rising.
No+-
11/c1 c'tv  (4 McJ/1/
                                                                                                            ~
          **  CNMT CNI4T sump sump level level rising.
rising.
          **  CNMT CNNT Air Air Cooler Cooler condensate condensate flowflow rising rising alarm.
alarm.
3    OA-  If
                                                                                          ,') e,,-,  I-e
          **  Transition Transition fromfrom 18019-C, 18019-C, LOSS LOSS OFOF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL..            S    '\
c                                                                                ,o3
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                          REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                      PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              18004-C 18004-C                                  21.1 21.1                            51 51 of of 77 77 CC RCS RCS LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (MODE (MODE 5)  5)
ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT    NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED C1.
Cl. Check Check plant plant conditions:
conditions:
Oa.
Da.      In In Mode Mode 5. 5.                                  a.
: a. Go Go to to thethe appropriate appropriate section section of    of this this procedure:
procedure:
0El        SECTION SECTION A,  A, RCS RCS LEAKAGE (MODE LEAKAGE      (MODE 1,1, 2, 2,
AND AND 33 WITH WITH RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE >> 10001000 PSIG)
PSIG)..
                                                                                            -OR-OR OEl        SECTION SECTION B,  B, RCS RCS (7                                    LEAKAGE (MODE LEAKAGE
                                                                                    <1000
                                                                                    <1000 PSIG (MODE 33 PSIG AND AND 4)
: 4) .
b.
: b. Both Both of of the the following:
following:                  Db.
Db.      Go Go to to 18019-C, 18019-C, LOSS LOSS OFOF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT  HEAT REMOVAL.
REMOVAL.
0-
[I. RCS RCS inventory inventory - IN  -  IN PRZR PRZR INDICATION INDICATION RANGE  RANGE
                                -AND-
                                  -AND -
0-
: 0. SG SG nozzle nozzle dams dams - NOT-  NOT INSTALLED INSTALLED OC2.
0C2. InitiateInitiate 91001-C, 91001-C, EMERGENCY EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CLASSIFICATION AND  AND IMPLEMENTING IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.
INSTRUCTIONS.
C3.
C3. CheckCheck RCSRCS drainage drainage path path isolated:
isolated:
Oa.
Da.        Check Check HV-8716A HV-8716A RHR  RHR TRAIN TRAIN        Oa.
Ela. Close Close HV-8716A.
HV-8716A.
A TO A  TO HOT HOT LEG LEG CROSSOVER CROSSOVER ISO ISO - CLOSED
                            -  CLOSED Ob.
Db.        Check Check HV-8716B HV-8716B RHR  RHR TRAIN TRAIN        Db.
Elb. Close Close HV-8716B.
HV-8716B.
B TO B  TO HOT HOT LEG LEG CROSSOVER CROSSOVER ISO ISO - CLOSED
                            -  CLOSED Dc.
Dc.        Check Check 1205-U6-027 1205-U6-027 or      or              Dc.
Dc.      Dispatch Dispatch operator operator to  to 1205-U4-226 1205-U4-226 RHR  RHR TESTTEST                          close close valves.
valves.
RECIRC    ISOL TO RECIRC ISOL      TO RWST RWST -    -                    [Located
[Located in    in Aux Aux Bldg Bldg CLOSED CLOSED                                                D48 D48 (UNIT(UNIT 1)1)
D22 D22 (UNIT(UNIT 2)2) .]
                                                                                                .1
                                  /Pec O
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                        REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                        PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              18004-C 18004-C                              21.1 21.1                                10 10 of of 77 77
  *c* l I
ACTION/EXPECTED BB ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RCS
 
===RESPONSE===
RCS LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (MODE (MODE 33 <1000
                                                                              <1000 PSIG
 
===RESPONSE===
RESPONSE NOT PSIG ANDAND 4)
NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 4)
NOTE:
NOTE:        RCS RCS depressurization depressurization steps      steps should should be  be initiated initiated as  as necessary necessary to    to maintain maintain RCS RCS toto PRZR PRZR liquid liquid differential differential temperature temperature less  less than than 270&deg;F270&deg; F andand meet meet RCS RCS leak leak before before breakbreak criteria.
criteria.
B1.
Bi. Check Check plant plant conditions:
conditions:                      B1.
Bi. Go Go to to the the appropriate appropriate section section of    of this this procedure:
procedure:
D 0        In In Mode Mode 33 with with RCS RCS pressure pressure less less thanthan 10001000            D El    SECTION SECTION A,    A, RCS RCS LEAKAGE LEAKAGE psig.
psig.                                                (MODE (MODE 1,  1, 2,    AND 33 WITH 2, AND      WITH RCS RCS PRESSURE PRESSURE >> 1000 1000
                                  -OR-
                                  -OR-                                          PSIG)
PSIG)..
D Q        In In Mode Mode 4.
: 4.                                                      -OR-
                                                                                              - OR -
D El    SECTION SECTION C,      C, RCS RCS LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (MODE (MODE 5)  5)..
                                                ;1t1 ",ttl e.5 ()-3-e eflv Sf-e 0B2. Initiate DB2.      Initiate 91001-C, 91001-C, EMERGENCY EMERGENCY      (-            ~
CLASSIFICATION CLASSIFICATION AND AND IMPLEMENTING IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.
INSTRUCTIONS.
DB3.
0B3. Initiate Initiate the the Continuous Continuous Actions Actions Page.
Page.
ee c                    0 $4 r 03
(
 
Approval Approval                                                                            Procedure Procedure 110.
No.
Vogtle Electric Vogtie  Electric Generating Generating Plant Plant                                  18019-C 18019-C Date Date NUCLEAR NUCLEAR OPERATIONS OPERATIONS A.        Revis10n Revision 110.
No.
25 25 C                                  Unit  COON Unit COMMON Page Page No.
No.
11 of of 60 60 Abnormal Abnormal Operating Operating Procedures Procedures LOSS LOSS OFOF RESIDUAL RESIDUAL HEAT HEAT REMOVAL REMOVAL PURPOSE PURPOSE                                                        PRB PRB REVIEW REVIEW REOUIRED REQUIRED L
!lI~~        Section Section    AA ofof this this procedure procedure specifies specifies actions actions toto be be taken taken for for aa Q  ~~    r~          of of    RI-IR  capability RHR capability while    while in:
in:
      -)
    ~        **  Mode Mode 44 or, or,
              **  Mode Mode 55 withwith RCSRCS level level within within the the PRZR PRZR indication indication range range and and withwith no no SG SG nozzle nozzle dams dams installed.
installed.
A " ,1-,
_-      Section Section B    B ofof this this procedure procedure specifies specifies actions actions toto be be taken taken for for aa
! Ll c1ll      loss loss of of RHR RHR capability capability or  or imminent imminent loss loss ofof RHR RHR due due to to RCS RCS leakage leakage l(  :1-' 5
      ~ ((      while in (1 while o w~th with SG Mode 55 or in Mode          or 66 with nozzle dams SG nozzle with RCS RCS level dams installed.
level below installed.
below the    PRZR indication the PRZR  indication range  range
        ~~ct10n  ection    CC ofof this this procedure procedure specifies specifies actions actions toto be be taken taken for for aa loss loss ofof RHRRHR capability capability while while the the RxRx head head isis removed, removed, RxRx cavity cavity flooded, flooded, and  and transfer transfer canal canal open open..
Section Section D    D ofof this this procedure procedure specifies specifies actions actions toto be be taken taken for for aa loss of RHR capability while loss  of    RHR    capability    while the the RCS RCS is is under under vacuum vacuum pressure pressure conditions conditions (while  (while performing performing 12009, 12009, ReS RCS Vacuum Vacuum Refill)
Refill)..
SYMPTOMS SYMPTOMS
              **    Unexplained change Unexplained          change inin RHR RHR flow flow oror discharge discharge pressure.
pressure.
              **  Any Any unexplained unexplained rise    rise in in RCS RCS temperature temperature while while RHR RHR is is inin operation.
operation.
              **    Any observed Any    observed loss  loss ofof RHR RHR system system capability capability while while RHR RHR isis in in operation operation..
              **  RHR    motor amps RHR motor        amps fluctuating fluctuating (C40mputer (C4omputer Points Points J9623 J9623 or or J9624)
J9624)
              **  From    18004-C on From 18004-C        on imminent imminent loss loss ofof RHR RHR cooling cooling due due to to RCS RCS leakage leakage during during reduced reduced inventory inventory operations operations or  or during during operation operation with  with nozzle nozzle damsdams installed.
installed.
              **            alarm on:
SPDS alarm SPDS              On:
                    ** RHR    pump current RHR pump        current (core (core cooling cooling CSFST CSFST - Computer
                                                      -  Computer Points Points UD4623 1JD4623 or or UD4624)
UD4624)
                    ** Both Both RHR RHR loops loops notnot operating operating (core (core cooling cooling or or heat heat sink sink CSFST CSFST - Computer
                                                                      -  Computer Point Point UM5626)
UM5626)
                    ** RHR    trouble RHR trouble (core (core cooling cooling CSFST CSFST - Computer
                                                      -  Computer Point Point UD0626)
UD0626)
                                                /                                    k(o
: 7. 026G2.2.25 001 The Containment Spray System is      is designed to reduce containment pressure during a LOCA or a          (1)      . In addition, the Containment Spray System is designed to c
retain          (2)      in water solution.
A (1) Main Steamline Break IRC, (2) Iodine A"!
Steam line Break IRC, (2) Cesium B. (1) Main Steamline Feedwater Line Rupture IRC, (2) Iodine C. (1) Main Feedwater                              Iodine D. (1) Main Feedwater Line Rupture IRC (2) Cesium
(
Page: 13 13 of 48                                                                              6/6/2007
 
KIA 026 Containment Spray.
G2.2.25 Knowledge of bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question asks which DBA event will produce the highest peakpeak containment temperature and the purpose of the Containment Spray Test Line.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria for item ##2 Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                        2 - Facility operating limits in Tech Specs and their bases.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. DBA event is correct and iodine is the proper isotope to remove.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think a SLB is the proper event and Cesium is to be removed as it is one of the most common radioisotopes in radwaste.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think that a FLB produces a high pressure and iodine is the correct isotope.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think a FLB produces high pressure and Cesium is to be removed as it is one of the most common radioisotopes in radwaste.
REFERENCES Technical Specifications 3.6.6 and bases for Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.
LO-PP-15101-01-001, Vogtle LO Active Exam Bank.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-PP-1 5101-08, State the LCO, applicability, and the bases of all Containment Spray LO-PP-15101-08, related technical specifications.
Page:
Page: 14 14 of 48                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
                                                  /ee1c NO OBI NO_OBJ              TX OBI TX_OBJ LO-PP-14310-0 Describe LO-PP-14310-0      Describe howhow generator generator sealseal oil    temperature and oil temperature      and quality        maintained under are maintained quality are                underthe    following conditions:
the following    conditions:
a.a. Normal Normal operation operation withwith the the Main Main SealSeal Oil Oil Pump    (MSOP) inIn service Pump (MSOP)          service b.b. Operation Operation with with the the Emergency Emergency Seal  Seal Oil  Pump (ESOP)
Oil Pump    (ESOP) in in service  and the service and    the Main  Seal Oil Main Seal    Oil Pump Pump (MSOP) shutdown (MSOP)        shutdown LO-PP-14310-0 For LO-PP-14310-0    For the the following following conditions conditions describe describe the the system                effect on response, effect system response,              on generator    operation, and generator operation,      and any any manual actions manual      actions that that must must taken.
taken.
a.a. Failure Failure ofof the the Main Main Seal Seal Oil  Pump (MSOP)
Oil Pump      (MSOP)
: b. Failure
: b. Failure ofof both both the the Main Main Seal Seal Oil 011 Pump              and the (MSOP) and Pump (MSOP)                  Emergency Seal the Emergency      Seal Oil  Pump (ESOP)
Oil Pump    (ESOP)
: c. Failure
: c. Failure ofof Differential Differential Pressure          control valve Pressure control              PDV 6870 valve PDV    6870
: d. Failure
: d. Failure ofof Seal Seal Oil Oil Float Float Trap Trap Valve      LCV 6871 Valve LCV    6871 LO-PP-15101-0 List LO-PP-15101-0    List the two two main main functions of      the Containment of the                    Spray system Containment Spray      system and and how  each function is how each              is accomplished.
accomplished.
LO-PP-15101-O    Describe what LO-PP-15101-0 Describe        what will actuate actuate the Containment Spray System,    System, including coincidence and set point. point.
LO-PP-15101-0 Describe the Containment LO-PP-15101-0                      Containment Spray Systems normal        normal standby alignment.
alignment.
LO-PP-1 5101-0 List all components that receive a Containment Spray Actuation signal and their change in status.
LO-PP-15101-0 LO-PP-1 5101-0 Describe how and when the transition from normal flow path LO-PP-15101-0                                                                              path to the recirculation flow path is performed.
LO-PP-15101-0 LO-PP-15101-0 State the reason for a minimum required time the Containment Spray system is left on recirculation following a LOCA.
LO-PP-15101-0 Describe how the Containment Spray pumps are provided minimum flow protection during test.
LO-PP-15101-0 State the lCO, lO-PP-15101-0                  LCO, applicability, and  and the bases of all Containment Spray related    related technical specifications.
lO-PP-16001-0 LO-PP-1 6001-0 Indicate Indicate the values for  for the following RCS        parameters:
RCS parameters:
: a. Normal Normal operating pressure pressure b.
: b. No No load Load Tavg.
Tavg.
c.
: c. Full load Full  Load Tavg.
Tavg.
d.
: d. Reactor Reactor thermal thermal power power output output e.
: e. RCP RCP power power output output f.f. RCS RCS total total flow flow g.
: g. Flow Flow from from each each RCPRCP lO-PP-16001-0 LO-PP-16001-0 Define Define the the following following terms      related to terms related        to RCS    leakage:
RCS leakage:
a.
: a. Pressure Pressure boundary boundary leakage leakage b.b. Unidentified Unidentified leakage leakage c.c. Identified Identified leakage leakage lO-PP-16001-0 LO-PP-16001-0 State State the the safety safety limit, limit, the the applicability, applicability, bases,            the action and the bases, and        action as          in the found in as found      the Safety  Limits section Safety Limits            of section of Tech Tech Specs Specs for:
for:
a.a. Reactor Reactor CoreCore b.b. Reactor Reactor Coolant Coolant System System pressure pressure Fnday,JuneO~2007 Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                                        Page18 Page    of68 18 of 68 1 eet C
 
f}      ~  .n  ()                      Containment Spray and Cooling Systems AEn/CC OZ,GG-2,f~r ~5 f\e\t..-i-rtVCc...                                                          B3.6.6 B3.6.6 BASES BACKGROUND                  Containment Cooling System (continued)
During normal operation, four fan units are operating. The fans are normally operated at high speed with NSCW supplied to the cooling coils. The Containment Cooling System, operating in conjunction with the Containment Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems, is designed to limit the ambient containment air temperature during normal unit operation to less than the limit specified in LCO 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature."
                                            "Containment        Temperature. This temperature limitation ensures that the containment temperature does not exceed the initial temperature conditions assumed for the DBAs.
In post accident operation following an actuation signal, the Containment Cooling System fans are designed to start automatically in slow speed if not already running. If running in high (normal) speed, the fans automatically shift to slow speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent motor overload from the higher mass atmosphere. The temperature of the NSCW is an important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan units.
APPLICABLE                  The Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System SAFETY ANALYSES              limit the temperature and pressure that could be experienced
                                      \.. following a DBA. The limiting DBAs considered are the loss of coolant S.
R 1< ee.5 V\;
(
r----7 0\.1\.'-
                                    -;?
accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No DBAs C- +-  f D are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The C              j                      postulated DBAs are analyzed with regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESF bus, which is the worst case single active failure and results in one train of the Containment Spray
(, fW 8 ,/'J ~ Of., I-I- \
8                                  J ijg,                                System and Containment Cooling System being rendered inoperable.
C e&#xed;.Aj 0
ev ~ .f 0 0 (1. ') q 0(
I (,( llO Ie. ) The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case If /    The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case J  scenario, the highest peak containment pressure is 36.5 psig scenario, the highest peak containment pressure is 36.5 psig (experienced during a LOCA). The analysis shows  shows that the peak containment    temperature is containmenttemperature        303.1 of (experienced during is 303.1&deg;F                during an SLB). Both results meet the intent SLB).                                        design basis. (See the intent of the design Bases for LCO 3.6.4A, 3.6.4A, Containment "Containment Pressure, Pressure," and c              Vogtle Units I1 and and 22                          B B 3.6.6-3 3.6.6-3 (continued)
(continued)
No. 00 Revision No.
 
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B
B 3.6.6 c BASES c 0                        C APPLICABILITY            In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these (continued)          events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.
ACTIONS With one containment spray train inoperable, the inoperable containment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray and                /J It cooling trains are adequate to perform the iodine removal and              n
                                                                                                      / N5wl'(L/
containment cooling functions. The 72 hour Completion Time takes                    LL \. (
(r A
                                                                                                                    .1 into account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by the                11 Containment Spray System, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.                                    r
[R..(e3 The 6 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this Specification coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this 1.3, "Completion time. Refer to Section 1.3,  Completion Times,"
Times, for a more detailed from discovery of failure to meet the discussion of the purpose of the "from LCO portion of the Completion Time.
LCO"                                                          I Ce  SI 'lAfW\      f le lc,,,- sl'ble S/,,{
ic      e.-
                          !U.                                  tn1
                                                              )2+            IfI\ C~ vf' /5 v7 -t f "ti(i-fr          j 5
t  Q -h(1e    t'Jj 1IJ With one of the required containment cooling trains inoperable, the )      1... n            .
inoperable required containment cooling train must be restored to / C-k      ctX Wt; W    sf Q..
OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs. The 72 hour Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1I and 2                      B B 3.6.6-6                                Revision No. 0
(                              0
: 8. 034G2.1.32 001 Given the following conditions:
c        -
          - Unit 2 refueling outage core reload in progress.
          - Fuel reconstitution is being performed in the Unit 11 New Fuel Elevator.
          - The FH Machine has just placed a spent fuel assembly in the elevator.
          - The reconsitution crew wishes to raise the spent fuel assembly in the elevator.
Which ONE of the following is CORRECT regarding controls to minimize the possibility of personnel overexposure for this evolution?
A. The New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent raising the basket with the weight of a spent fuel asembly. The elevator must be hand cranked up using a handwheel.
B. The New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent raising the basket with the Fuel Handling Machine positioned over it. The elevator must be hand cranked up using a handwheel.
c~
C    The New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent raising the basket with the weight of a spent fuel asembly. A bypass interlock key switch on the elevator pendant controller is required to raise the assembly.
D. The New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent raising the basket with the Fuel Handling Machine positioned over it. A bypass interlock key switch on the elevator pendant controller is required to raise the assembly.
Page: 15 of 48                                                                            6/6/2007
 
KIA 034 Fuel Handling Equipment.
G2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario where a spent fuel assembly needs to be raised in the New Fuel Elevator for fuel reconstitution during an outage. The candidate must determine the proper interlock required to raise the assembly.
Question meets 11OCFR55.43(b)
OCFR55.43(b) criteria item ##77 - Fuel handling facilites and procedures.
Question meets 11 OCFR55.43(b) criteria item # 4 - Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situation, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. The interlock portion is correct. There is a manual handwheel for operation of the Fuel Transfer cart, not the elevator.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may confuse the interlocks with some of the transfer system interlocks which require the FH Machine to be moved away to allow operation. There is a manual handwheel for operation of the Fuel Transfer cart, not the elevator.
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may confuse the interlocks with some of the transfer interlocks which require the FH Machine to be moved away to allow operation. Key bypass portion is correct.
REFERENCES 93210-C, New "New Fuel Elevator Operating Instructions" Instructions Precaution and Limitations.
LO-OR-25101-09-002 LO-OR-251    01-09-002 from Vogtle LO Active Exam Bank LO-PP-25101-01-001 from Vogtle LO Active Exam Bank      Bank LO-PP-25101, LO-PP-25101 , Fuel Handling System and Refueling Power point slide 82,      82,83, 83, and 84 VEGP VEGP learning objectives:
(          LO-PP-25101-06, Identify the interlocks and bypasses associated with the following:
d.
: d. New Fuel Elevator Page: 16 Page: 16 of of 48 48                                                                                6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
NO  OBI          TX  OBI
( NO_OBJ            TX_OBJ LO-PP-251 01-0 State the function of the following:
LO-PP-25101-0
: a. New fuel storage pit
: b. Spent fuel pool
: c. Transfer canal/transfer tube
: d. Refueling cavity
: e. Fuel Handling Machine Bridge Crane
: f. New fuel handling tool
: g. Spent fuel handling tool
: h. New fuel elevator
                  . Refueling machine j.j. New RCCA Handling Tool
: k. RCCA Change Tool I. Thimble Plug Handling Tool LO-PP-251 01-0 Describe the operations of the refueling machine controls to include:
LO-PP-25101-0
: a. Bridge control
: b. Trolley control
: c. Mast control
: d. Auxiliary monorail hoist control
: e. Remote cameras and graphic display control LO-PP-251 01-0 Describe the operation of the following tools:
LO-PP-25101-0
: a. New fuel handling tool
: b. Spent fuel handling tool
: c. Control Rod Drive Shaft Unlatching Tool LO-PP-251 01-0 Explain the function of the components of the fuel transfer system to include:
LO-PP-25101-0
: a. Transfer carriage
: b. Upenders LO-PP-251 01-0 Identify the interlocks and bypasses associated with the following:
LO-PP-25101-0
: a. Spent Fuel Cask crane
: b. Fuel Handling Machine Bridge Crane
: c. Refueling machine
: d. New fuel elevator
: e. Fuel transfer system LO-PP-251 01-0 Describe how the pendant control system is used to manipulate bridge, trolleys, and hoists on the LO-PP-25101-0 following:
: a. Spent Fuel Cask Crane Machine Bridge Crane
: b. Fuel Handling Machine LO-PP-251 01-0 Describe the control functions the fuel transfer system consoles can perform:
LO-PP-25101-0
: a. Fuel Handling Building console
: b. Containment (Rx side) console LO-PP-251 01-0 Describe how a new fuel element moves through the fuel handling system from the new fuel receipt LO-PP-25101-0 area to the reactor core.
LO-PP-25101-1 LO-PP-251 01-1                                                          Inspection, and Storage of New Fuel Explain which operations are covered by the Unloading, Inspection, Procedure (93010-C).
LO-PP-251 01-1  Describe the radiological precautions that must be followed prior to unloading new fuel.
l Frida~JuneOl,2007 Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                            Page 38 of 68 Rec                                O3 1l3
 
ApprovedBy Approved J.J. B.
By Beasley, Jr.
B. Beasley,  Jr.                Vogtle Electric Vogtle    Electric Generating Plant Generating Plant      A              ProcedureNumber Procedure 93210-C 93210-C Number    Rev Rev 66 Approved DateApproved Date                                                                                          Page  Number PageNumber 8/5/96 8/5/96                              FUEL ELEVATOR FUEL  ELEVATOR OPERATING OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS                        lof6 1 of 6
(
I                      PRB PRB REVIEW REVIEW REQUIRED REQUIRED REFERENCE USE REFERENCE        USE PROCEDURE PROCEDURE 1.0 1.0              PURPOSE PURPOSE This This procedure procedure provides provides thethe operating operating instructions instructions for for the the fuelfuel elevators used at Vogtle. The East elevators      used  at  Vogtle. The  East (Unit (Unit 1)
: 1) elevator elevator isis now now usedused exclusively exclusively as    as aa fuel fuel reconstitution reconstitution basket.
basket. The The West West (Unit (Unit 2)  2) elevator elevator is    is used used asas the the new new fuel fuel elevator, elevator, which which is is used used to to wet wet new new fuel.
fuel.
2.0 2.0              PRECAUTIONS PRECAUTIONS AND    AND LIMITATIONS LIMITATIONS NOTE NOTE The The use use ofof the the word word "tool" tool inin this this procedure is procedure    is understood understood to to mean mean both both the the New New and and Spent Spent Fuel Fuel Handling Handling Tools Tools unless unless otherwise otherwise specified.
specified.
2.1 2.1              Care Care shall shall be be exercised exercised for for personnel personnel protection protection during during allall fuel fuel movement movement activities.
activities.
2.2 2.2              The The load load monitor monitor or  or spring spring scale scale shall shall be be monitored monitored during during all all fuel fuel assembly assembly insertion insertion and and withdrawal withdrawal operations operations toto detect detect possible possible binding.
binding.
2.3 2.3              Prior Prior to  to lifting lifting aa fuel fuel assembly, assembly, ensure ensure the the latching latching fingers fingers are  are in in thethe latched latched position position withwith the the handle handle inin the the down down position position and  and the the locking locking pin  pin in in the the operating operating handle.
handle.
2.4 2.4                If If thethe tool tool cannot cannot bebe unlatched unlatched from from aa fuel fuel assembly, assembly, the the fuel fuel handling handling operation operation shall shall bebe stopped stopped and and the the Fuel Fuel Handling Handling Coordinator Coordinator notified.
notified.
2.5 2.5                The The newnew fuel fuel elevator elevator keykey bypass bass switch switch is is for for use use only only in in abnormal abnormal situations, situations, or  or during during reconstitution, reconstitution, to to allow allow aa fuel fuel      ~  J1  ~r l/r ci assembly assembly to    to be be raised raised from from the the bottom bottom ofof the the Spent Spent Fuel Fuel Pool.
Pool.
2.6 2.6                Never Never attempt attempt to  to raise raise aa fuel fuel assembly assembly inin the the elevator    witho~n elevator withou\
the    permission of the permission        of both both the the Unit Unit Shift Shift Supervisor Supervisor and and the the Fuel Fuel        1\"", (( ~ a", I Handling Handling Coordinator.
Coordinator.                                                                            1 2.7 2.7                Complete Complete reliance reliance on  on limit limit switches switches andand indicating indicating lights lights to  to            r3 J-  0 protect protect the  the fuel fuel assemblies assemblies andand core core components components during during handling handling is is not not recommended.
recommended. VisualVisual observation observation during during the the handling handling of    of the the assemblies assemblies could could preclude preclude possible possible damage.
damage.
2.8 2.8                Be aware aware of of abnormal abnormal equipment equipment conditions.
conditions.
fteeArc                      oG-l (32-printed Pr~nted    June 6, June  6, 2007 2007 at  1:51 at 1:51
 
OVERLOAD OVERLOAD LIMIT BYPASS llMITaVPASS Lock Key Lock Key Light Light 0
Button Push Button Push o0 HOIST HOIST Push Button DOWN OFF    ON Push I Pull Button            0 Elevator controls, pull for on, push in to turn off. Up and down pushbuttons, Overload limit bypass key switch to allow raising an assembly. It is administratively controlled.
                                                  &deg;--      A-si b          (h 82 82
 
(
        ~\
I    OVERLOAD OVERLOAD LIMIT lIMJT  BYPASS S"tPASS
                                              ~ I 00
* D I
0 00 uP    I Mashing the up or down button will allow the operator to raise or lower an empty basket.
IF      HOIST I
II 00 DOWN DOWN    II Basket will not raise with the weight of an assembly due to an overload trip designed to prevent raising an irradiated assembly from out ofthe of the water.
D 10FF ONI Down to lower elevator, up to raise elevator. Have to bypass with key to raise if assembly in elevator.
(3D 4.
Feerc                                  01 L
7      E        &l( /3 83
 
OVRLOAO LIMIT BYPASS An overload overload trip will prevent prevent raising 0          an an assembly in the newnew fuel elevator.
elevator.
0          However, you can can bypass this trip with I    UP must be checked out, and a key that must 0HOIST administrative levels of supervision must approve use of this key. Light will illuminate when Inin bypass position.
I 0DO THERE ARE EXTREME CONSEQUENCES 10FF    ONI    FOR PULLING AN IRRADIATED ASSEMBLY OUT OF THE WATER III!  !!!!
Once again to raise the elevator with an assembly in it you have to check out an administratively controlled key. This would bypass the overload trip and allow raising the elevator with the weight of an assembly in it. However, pulling an assembly out of the water shielding would have fatal consequences for the operator and anyone else in the vicinity.
We NEVER raise the elevator with assemblies in it other than the dummy for testing the overload trip OR for fuel re-contstitution. During this evolution which is performed by Westinghouse personnel who are essentially rebuilding or replacing broken parts on assemblies, we allow the key to be checked out and the bypass used to raise aa spent assembly  assembly near near the surface where they can can work on it with long handled tools. However, we also put in a physical hard stop so that ifif the elevator raise button were to stick while in the bypass position it wouldnt wouldn't raise raise the assembly assembly out    out of of the water with fatal consequences for the the operating personnel.
personnel.
a3 i 3 84 84
 
1.
: 1. LO-PP-25101-O1 001 LO-PP-2SI01-01 Which of the following design interlocks reduces the possibility of personnel overexposure from spent fuel while operating with spent fuel in the New Fuel Elevator?
A~
A  The New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent inadvertantly raising the basket with the weight of a spent fuel assembly in it.
B. The Fuel Handling Machine is interlocked such that it cannot be positioned over the New Fuel Elevator while a spent fuel assembly is in the Elevator.
C. The New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent raising the basket with with the Fuel Handling Machine positioned directly over it.
D. A radiation monitor is located to sense increasing radiation levels in the New Fuel Elevator area and stop upward movement of the Elevator.
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Page: 11                                                                                    6/6/2007 6/6/2007
: 1. LO-OR-25101-09 LO-OR-25        002 101-09 002 possibility of personnel Which of the following correctly states how the possibility      personnel overexposure from spent fuel is minimized while operating with spent fuel in the New Fuel Elevator.
A Administrative controls and guidelines (Le.
A'I                                        (i.e. Fuel Handling Procedure restrictions) and the New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent raising the basket with the weight of a spent fuel assembly in it.
B. The Fuel Handling Machine is interlocked such that it cannot be positioned over the New Fuel Elevator with a spent fuel assembly in it.
c.
C. The New Fuel Elevator is interlocked to prevent raising the basket with the Fuel Handling Machine positioned directly over it.
D. A radiation monitor is located to sense increasing radiation levels in the New Fuel Elevator area and stop upward movement.
e fec                                        l /,3 Page:
Page: 11                                                                                    6/6/2007 6/6/2007
: 9. 039A2.03 001 The plant has experienced aa SGTR with the following radiation monitors in alarm:
c: -        - RE-I 2839, Condenser Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhaust Effluent Monitor RE-12839, RE-i 3121, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor for SG ##2
          - RE-13121,
            -                                                              2 read on the SRDC.
A reactor trip and manual SI were actuated and E-O,  E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection was entered.
          - Both MDAFW pumps are UNAVAILABLE.
          - The TDAFW pump is RUNNING.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture",
Prior to transitioning to 19030-C, "Steam                        Rupture, the BOP operator requests permission to isolate the steam supply to the TDAFW pump.
Which ONE of the following actions should the Unit SS take regarding the requested action?
early operator action    ?
A. Allow isolation of steam to the TDAFW pump only if S/G # 2 wide range level is > 29%.
is>
B. Allow the BOP to shut the Trip and Throttle Valve to the TDAFW pump to isolate the steam supply.
C. Do Not allow isolation of steam to the TDAFW pump because the ruptured S/G is not positively identified.
D~ Do Not allow isolation of steam to the TDAFW pump, this action will be performed D
after transition to 19030-C.
KIA 039 Main and Reheat Steam.
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Indications and alarms for main steam and area radiation.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario where a SGTR has taken place on SG        SC # 2. The BOP asks for permission to isolated the steam supply to the TDAFW pump. The candidate must determine determine the correct operator action.
This question meets meets 10CFR55.43(b)                      # 4 - Radiation hazards that may 10CFR55.43(b) criteria for item #4  -                        may arise during normal, abnormal, and situations, including maintenance activites and various contamination conditions. The SS has to make  make a decision on whether to Page:  17 of 48 Page: 17    48                                                                                  6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
perform early isolatation perform                      of the radiation release isolatation of                release to limit contamination.
This question meets 11 OCFR55.43(b) 0CFR55.43(b) criteria for item # 5 - Assessment of facility c
conditions and selections of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions. Per Vogtle Rules of EOP Usage procedure 10020-C, isolation would not be allowed until a transition to 19030-C has occurred. This implies a selection or transition of procedures must take place before the isolation is allowed.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may  may confuse this with the isolation of AFW I feed SIG which should not occur until S/G flow to the S/G                                  SIC level is  > 10% NR.
is>
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may choose this as it is method to shut down the TDAFW pump,however, it is an RNO action if the individual steam supply is not able Vogtles EOP Rules of to be closed. Early actions are not allowed per 10020-C, Vogtle's Usage Procedure.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may not feel there is enough information to identify the ruptured S/G, SIG, but with the given indications and the BOP requesting permission to isolate implies he has identified the SG that is ruptured. However, per our EOP Rules of Usage this action would not be allowed early and is the reason it cannot be perfomred.
SIC ##22 should NOT be isolated until procedurally directed per 10020-C, D. Correct. S/G EOP Rules of Usage".
              "EOP            Usage.
REFERENCES 19030-C, "Steam 19030-C,  Steam Generator Tube Rupture" Rupture steps # 7 and # 8 in particular.
10020-C, "EOP 10020-C,  EOP Rules of Usage" Usage steps 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 for early operator actions.
V. C. Summer October 2006 NRC SRO Retake Exam question # 40.
VEGP learning objectives:
Not applicable.
Page: 18 18 of 48                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
Approved Approved By By
* Procedure ProcedureNumber Number  Rev Rev D. R.
D. R. Vineyard Vineyard                      Vogtle Vogtle Electric Electric Generating Generating Plant Plant                      10020-C 10020-C          55 Date Date Approved Approved                                                                                            Page PageNumber Number 6/30/06 6/30/06                                    EOP AND EOP    AND AOP AOP RULES RULES OF  OF USAGE USAGE                            3 of 27 30f27
(  2.1.2 2.1.2            AOP AOP Numbering Numbering Example Example Numbering:
Numbering:
1818    033 033        -    CC I
I              +-------
                                                +              AOPs AOPs are are common, common, or or similar similar forfor Unit Unit II                            and  Unit 2 andUnit2 I
                                +----------------
                                  +                            Sequential Sequential NumberNumber
                        +---------------------
                        +                                      Indicates Indicates AOP  AOP 3.0 3.0              INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCTIONS FOR      FOR PERFORMING PERFORMING EOPs  EOPs ANDAND AOPs AOPs NOTE NOTE Sections Sections 3.1.0  3.1.0 through through 3.6.03.6.0 apply apply to  to both both EOPs EOP5 and and AOPs AOP5 unless unless specific specific EOP    EOP instructions instructions are    are given.
given. Section Section 3.7 3.7 applies applies to  to EOPs EOP5 only.
only.
3.1 3.1              GUIDELINES GUIDELINES FOR      FOR FOLLOWING FOLLOWING STEPS STEPS 3.1.1 3.1.1            Operators Operators shall    shall respond respond to  to abnormal abnormal and  and emergency emergency conditions conditions in    in aa methodical methodical manner,  manner, assessing assessing the  the event event andand utilizing utilizing thethe diagnostics diagnostics with      with DISCERNABLE DISCERNABLE PAUSE  PAUSE to  to ensure ensure that that "undue undue haste" haste does does notnot result result in  in misdiagnosis, misdiagnosis, misoperation, misoperation, or  or undesired undesired plantplant conditions.
conditions.
3.1.2 3.1.2            THIS THIS STEPSTEP SHALLSHALL BE  BE IMPLEMENTED IMPLEMENTED AS  AS THETHE "EXCEPTION" EXCEPTION NOT NOT "THE THE RULE" RULE TO TO NORMAL NORMAL PROCEDURAL PROCEDURAL RESPONSE RESPONSE TO  TO ABNORMAL ABNORMAL PLANT PLANT CONDITIONS CONDITIONS AND  AND SHOULD SHOULD ONLY  ONLY BE BE IMPLEMENTED IMPLEMENTED WHEN  WHEN PROCEDURAL PROCEDURAL DIRECTION DIRECTION REGARDING REGARDING RAPID RAPID RESPONSE RESPONSE TO    TO EITHER EITHER OF OF THE THE CONDITIONS CONDITIONS BELOW BELOW DOES DOES NOT NOT READILY READILY EXIST. Consistent EXIST.        Consistent with  with training training and  and knowledge, knowledge, operators operators are are expected expected to      to take take actions actions thatthat stabilize stabilize the  the plant plant and and mitigate mitigate consequences consequences of        of events events AFTER AFTER PERFORMING PERFORMING AOP  AOP OR OR EOP EOP IMMEDIATE IEDIATE OPERATOR OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTIONS when when thethe following following conditions conditions exist:
exist:
The The setpoint setpoint for  for actuation actuation is    is imminent imminent OROR exceeded exceeded andand automatic automatic actuation actuation does does notnot occur.
occur.
        ?c45                                                              OR OR System System or    or equipment equipment failures failures require require operator operator intervention intervention Pc4-b                  for for reactor reactor or  or personnel personnel safety.
safety.
OPERATORS OPERATORS SHALL    SHALL NOTIFY NOTIFY THETHE SS SS WHEN WHEN ACTIONS ACTIONS ARE ARE REQUIRED REQUIRED TO TO BE BE TAKEN TAKEN PER  PER THIS THIS GUIDANCE.
GUIDANCE.
Refeec O3O)
Pr~nted printed    June June 6, 6, 2007 2007 at at 2:10 2:10
 
Approved Approved By By
* Procedure Number Procedure  Number  Rev Rev D. R.
D. R. Vineyard Vineyard                    Vogtle Electnic Vogtle    Electric Generating Generatmg Plant  Plant                            10020-C 10020-C            55 Date Date Approved Approved                                                                                              Page Number Page  Number 6/30/06 6/30/06                                EOP AND EOP    AND AOP AOP RULES RULES OF    OF USAGE USAGE                                  40f27 4 of 27
(  3.1.3 3.1.3        The The following following actions actions havehave been been analyzed analyzed and      and may may be be taken taken prior prior to  to procedural procedural directiondirection following following thethe completion completion of      of immediate immediate operator operator actions.
actions. THESE  THESE ACTIONS ACTIONS SHALL SHALL ONLY ONLY BE  BE IMPLEMENTED IMPLEMENTED AFTER  AFTER REACTOR REACTOR TRIP  TRIP HAS HAS BEENBEEN VERIFIED VERIFIED AND  AND SHIFT SHIFT SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR PERMISSION PERMISSION HAS    HAS BEEN BEEN OBTAINED.
OBTAINED.
This This applied applied method method for for verifying verifying the  the Reactor Reactor is    is tripped tripped andand obtaining obtaining permission permission priorprior toto taking taking these these actions actions will will increase increase crew crew awareness awareness beforebefore actions actions are are taken taken andand remove remove "undue undue haste" haste from from the the evolution.
evolution.
These These actions actions are  are limited limited to to vital vital responses responses deemed deemed necessary necessary to    to protect protect plant  plant personnel personnel as  as well well asas thethe public.
public.
This This specific specific list list of of actions actions is is as as follows:
follows:                          fti,j(e, o 1 Isolate Main Isolate Throttle Aux Throttle Main Steam Steam Lines Aux Feed Lines on Feed Water Water for on aa Secondary for current Secondary fault.
current plant fault.
plant conditions.
conditions.
                                                                                                                  ,4-      (3
                    **        Isolate Aux Isolate            Feed Water Aux Feed    Water toto aa faulted faulted SG. SG.
                    **        Isolate Aux Isolate      Aux Feed Feed Water Water onon aa ruptured ruptured SG    SG after after required required level  level (adverse (adverse or  or non-adverse non-adverse containment containment considered)considered) is    is achieved.
achieved.
                    **      Control Control heatup heatup following following blowdown blowdown of      of faulted faulted SG. 5G.
3.1.4 3.1.4              EOPs (as EOPs      (as well well asas AOPs)
AOPs) are are entered entered based based on  on the the Entry Entry Conditions Conditions or or Symptoms Symptoms at  at the the beginning beginning of of thethe procedure.
procedure.          Operators Operators are  are expected expected to    to be be knowledgeable knowledgeable of    of these these without without referral.
referral.
3.1.5 3.1. 5          Initial Initial entry entry into into thethe EOPs EOPs will will be  be toto 19000-C, 19000-C, E-O  E-0 REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP OR OR SAFETY SAFETY INJECTION, INJECTION, unless unless both both emergency emergency AC    AC buses buses areare de-energized.
de-energized.          The The operator operator may may enter enter 19100-C, 19100-C, ECA-O.OECA-0.0 LOSS LOSS OF  OF ALL ALL ACAC POWER, POWER, directly directly based based onon symptoms.
symptoms.
3.1.6 3.1. 6          After After verifying verifying symptoms symptoms or  or entry entry conditions conditions upon  upon entering entering aa procedure, procedure, the    the operator operator should should go  go to to Step Step 11 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED
 
===RESPONSE===
RESPONSE (AER)  (AER) column column unless unless directed directed otherwise otherwise by    by the the procedure procedure just just exited.
exited.
(7 (Q,f                    0e 1
cttt  C I{ lA. 5{      ).A4        i
(\J.
(e(e) e A ,'f:'e)
Printed June Pr1nted    June 6,  2007 at 6, 2007      2:06 at 2:06
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                            PAGE PAGE NO .
NO.
VEGP VEGP              19030-C 19030-C                                35 35                                      66 of of 4646 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                        RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT    NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED oD 77.. Check Check atat least least one one MDAFW MDAFW Pump Pump    7.
: 7.      Perform Perf on the    the following:
following:
                - RUNNING
                -            AND CAPABLE RUNNING AND    CAPABLE OF    OF FEEDING FEEDING SG(s)
SG(s) NEEDED NEEDED FOR    FOR            oQ a.a. Maintain Maintain at        at least least oneone RCS  COOLDOWN RCS COOLDOWN                                              steam steam supply supply to  to the the TDAFW TDAFW Pump.
Pump.
b.
: b. Close Close ONLY  ONLY ONEONE TDAFW TDAFW Pump Pump Steam Steam Supply Supply Valve Valve asas necessary necessary to        to isolate isolate ruptured ruptured SG:      SG:
OHV-3009, QI-IV-3009, (SG      (SG 1)1) LP-1 LP-l MSMS SPLY SPLY TO  TO AUXAUX FWFW TD TD PMP-1 PMP-1
                                                                                        -OR-
                                                                                          - OR -
OHV-3019, QHV-3019, (SG        (SG 2)2) LP-2 LP-2 MSMS SPLY SPLY TO  TO AUXAUX FWFW TD TD PMP-1 PMP-1 oCc.
: c. Go Go to  to StepStep 9. 9.
8.
: 8. Close Close affected affected TDAFW TDAFW Pump Pump        oC 8.8. IF IF at at least least one  one MDAFW MDAFW Pump Pump Steam Steam Supply Supply Valve(s):
Valve(s):                            running, running, THEN THEN trip trip the  the TDAFW TDAFW Pump.
Pump.
OHV-3009 QHV-3009 (SG  (SG 1)
: 1) LP-1 LP-1 MS  MS SPLY SPLY TO TO AUX AUX FW FW TD TD PMP-1 PMP-l                            oC IF IF    TDAFW TDAFW Pump  Pump NOT NOT tripped, tripped, THEN THEN locally locally isolate isolate TDAFW TDAFW OHV-3019 EJHV-3019 (SG  (SG 2)
: 2) LP-2 LP-2 MS  MS SPLYSPLY              Pump Pump steamsteam supply supply from from TO TO AUX AUX FW FW TD TD PMP-1 PMP-l                                ruptured ruptured SG(s)    SG(s)..
oC 9.9. Verify Verify SG SG Blowdown Blowdown Isolation Isolation Valves Valves - CLOSED
                          -  CLOSED WITH WITH HANDSWITCHES HANDSWITCHES IN  IN CLOSE CLOSE POSITION POSITION d3    ?ft&deg; 3
: 1. 039 A2.03 001 1.039 plant has experienced a SGTR with the following annunciators in alarm:
The plant
* RM-A9 - CNDSR EXHAUST GAS ATMOS
(                        -
* RM-G19C - STMLN HI RNG GAMMA EOP-1.O, Reactor Trip/Safety A reactor trip and manual SI were actuated and EOP-1.0,                  Trip/Safety Injection Actuation, was entered.
* BOTH MDEFW pumps are UNAVAILABLE.
* The TDEFW Pump is RUNNING.
Prior to transitioning to EOP-4.0, EQP-4.O, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, the BOP operator requests permission to isolate steam to the TDEFP.
Which ONE (1) of the following actions should the Control Room Supervisor take?
A. Do Not allow isolation of steam to the TDEFP because the ruptured S/G is not positively identified.
B. Do Not allow isolation of steam to the TDEFP from either SG because the TDEFP is required to maintain secondary heat sink.
C. Allow isolation of steam from 'B' B and 'C' C S/Gs to the TDEFP only if S/G narrow range level isis>> 30%.
D~
D                                  C S/G only if the supply from 'B' Allow isolation of steam from 'C'                                B S/G to the TDEFP is open.
Student must identify C "C" SG as ruptured SG and apply OAP-103.4 OAP-1 03.4 EOP deviation (6.14.b.2) which allows isolation of steam from a ruptured SG to the TDEFP to minimize off-site releases if the steam supply from the non-ruptured SG is open.
A is incorrect because although the condenser exhaust does not identify the ruptured SG, the MSL monitor identifies C as the correct SG. B      B is incorrect because an exception is granted per the CAP.
OAP. C is incorrect; misapplication of ruptured Sg isolation. NR level >30% to throttle EFW flow, not steam supply from EFW.
Vc
(    0 Page:
Page: 11                                                                                          6/6/2007 6/6/2007
: 10. 040G2.2.22 001 Which ONE of the following describes the MOST restrictive condition assumed to ensure that the minimum shutdown reactivity of accident analysis is met during a
(          guillotine break of a main steam line inside containment?
A. At the beginning of core life, with Tavg at full load operating temperature.
B. At the beginning of core life, with Tavg at no load operating temperature.
C. At the end of core life, with Tavg at full load operating temperature.
D~
D  At the end of core life, with Tavg at no load operating temperature.
K/A 040 Steam Line Break - Excessive Heat Transfer G2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question asks the basis for the minimum shutdown reactivity accident analysis for Shutdown Margin during a main steam line break IRC. Candidate must choose the correct bases.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria item ##2 Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                        2 - Facility operating limits in Tech Specs and their bases.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS EOL, no load Tavg is bases.
A. Incorrect. EOl, EOL, no load Tavg is bases.
B. Incorrect. EOl, EOL, no load Tavg is bases.
C. Incorrect. EOl, D. Correct. Per bases of Tech Spec REFERENCES 3.1 .1, "Shutdown Technical Specifications and Bases for 3.1.1,      Shutdown Margin".
Margin.
Farley December 2003 NRC SRO Exam question # 8.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-39205-02, Given a set of Tech Specs and the Bases, determine for a specific lO-lP-39205-02, set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any Tech Spec lCOs  LCOs of section 3.1 are exceeded.
Page: 19 of 48                                                                                    6/6/2007
 
, Number LO-LP-39204-08 LO-LP-39204-08 Text State what State  what actions actions are    required ifif aa component are required          component is  is rendered                soley due inoperable soley rendered inoperable          due to to the the inoperability of inoperability        support system.
of aa support  system.
LO-LP-39205-01 LO-LP-39205-O1          any given For any For      given item item in  section 3.1 in section  3.1 of    Tech Specs, of Tech    Specs, be    able to:
be able  to:
: a. State
: a. State the the limiting  condition for limiting condition          operation (LCO),
for operation    (LCO), andand
: b. OState any bliState    anyone one hour              required actions.
hour or less required        actions.
LO-LP-39205-02                set of Tech Specs and the Bases, determine Given aa set                                            determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, equipment                    and operational availability, and  operational mode:mode:
: a. Whether any
: a.            any Tech Spec      LCO's of Spec LCDs          section 3.1 of section  3.1 are are exceeded.
exceeded.
: b. The required
: b.      required actions        all section actions for all  section 3.1.3.1. LCOs LCO's LO-LP-39205-03 LO-LP-39205-03    For  any given For any  given item in              13.1 of the TRM, section 13.1 in section                  TRM, be be able to:
Requirement (TR) for State the Technical Requirement
: a. State                                              for operation.
operation.
State any
: b. State  anyone one hour              required actions.
hour or less required LO-LP-39205-04    Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any TR of section 13.1      13.1 has been exceeded.
required actions for all
: b. The required                  all section 13.113.1 TRs.
LO-LP-39205-05    State the reason for having a shutdown margin State                                              margin in in all modes.
LO-LP-39205-06 LO-LP-392O5O6      State the reason for limitations on MTC.
LO-LP-39205-07 LO-LP-39205-07    State the reasons for maintaining rods above the RIL.
State LO-LP-39205-08    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.1.
LO-LP-39206-01 LO-LP-39206-O1    For any item in section 3.2 of Tech Specs, be able to:
a.LlState
: a. OState the LCO.
LCD.
: b. OState anyone b.EState    any one hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-39206-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. OWhether LI Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.2 are exceeded.
: b.        required actions for all section 3.2 LCOs.
OThe required b.EIThe LO-LP-39206-03    State the relationship between Relaxed Axial Offset Control and AFD.
LO-LP-39206-04 LO-LP-392O6O4      Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.2.
LO-LP-39206-05    Define AFD target band. State when it is used.
LO-LP-39206-06 LO-LP-39206-06    State the action required for being outside    outside the band at  at various power levels.
LO-LP-39206-07    Define  heat flux hot channel factor. State Define heat                                    State how the corecore height              factor curve is used.
height correction factor          used.
Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                              Page 41 of 165 O &l,
 
fl                                                            SDM (C      0 0                1Z (
SI
(
BASES (continued)
APPLICABLE            The minimum required SDM is assumed as an initial condition SAFETY ANALYSES        in safety analyses. The safety analysis (Ref. 2) establishes a SDM ensures specified acceptable fuel design limits are that ensures                                              are not exceeded normal operation and AOOs, with the assumption for normal                                      assumption of the highest rod stuck out worth rod          out on scram.
The acceptance criteria for the SDM requirements are that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded. This is done by ensuring that:
: a. The reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, transients, and Design Basis Events;
: b. The reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits (departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR), fuel centerline temperature limits for AOOs, and <  <200 200 cal/gm average fuel pellet enthalpy at the hot spot for the rod ejection accident); and
: c. The reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.
The most limiting accident for the MODES 1        1 and 2 SDM
    ,Ai(,jje /l              requirements is a guillotine break of a main steam line inside containment initiated at the end of core life with RCS average temperature at no-load operating temperature, as described in the accident analYSis analysis (Ref. 2). The increased steam flow resulting from a pipe break in the main steam system causes an increased energy removal from the affected steam generator (SG), and consequently the RCS. This results in a reduction of the reactor coolant temperature. The resultant coolant shrinkage causes a reduction in pressure. In the presence of a negative moderator temperature coefficient, this cooldown causes an increase in    in core reactivity. As RCS temperature decreases, the severity of an MSLB decreases decreases until the MODE 5 value is reached. The most limiting MSLB, MSLB, with respect to potential fuel damage before aa reactor trip occurs, is  is aa guillotine break of aa main main steam line inside inside containment containment initiated initiated at at the end of of core life life at no-load operating temperature. The positive reactivity addition from the moderator temperature decrease will terminate when the affected SG boils      boils dry, dry, thus (continued)
(continued)
Vogtle Units I1 and 22                      B B 3.1.1-2 3.1.1-2                                          No. 0 Revision No.0
: 1. 040AKl.05 O4OAK1.05 001 001 Which ONE of the the following describes describes the most restrictive restrictive conditions assumed to ensure that the minimum shutdown reactivity of accident analysis is met during a C        guillotine break of a main steam line inside containment?
A. At the begining of core life, with T avg at full load operating temperature.
Tavg B. At the end of core life, with T              load operating temperature.
avg at full load Tavg C. At the begining of core life, with T avg at no load operating temperature.
Tavg D~
D  At the end of core life, with T avg at no load operating temperature.
Tavg Source: Slightly modified from a Farley Bank Question #052302E01 005.
A. Incorrect, the conditions listed in Basis of TIS are EOl, EOL, No load Tavg.
B. Incorrect, the conditions listed in Basis of TIS TIS are EOl, EOL, No load Tavg.
C. Incorrect, the conditions listed in Basis of TIS are EOl, EOL, No load Tavg.
D. Correct. These are the conditions listed in the basis of TIS. T/S.
A//C        5AO 5,SO leece                              0              t Page: 11                                                                                        6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
II. 056AA2.24 001 11.
Given the following conditions:
LOSP on 2BA03 with DG2B tying to the bus.
        - The crew is in 18031-C due to an L05P
        - Various CCW Train Train B low flow and pressure alarms annunciate, then clear.
        - The crew notes 3 CCW train B pump red lights illuminated on the QMCB.
Which ONE of the following is CORRECT regarding CCW Train B and the actions the SS should take?
55 A. CCW pump locked rotor has occurred. Monitor pump amps on the QEAB to determine which pump to stop. Enter LCO 3.7.7 for CCW.
B. CCW pump locked rotor has occurred. Monitor pump amps on the QEAB to determine which pump to stop. Enter INFO LCO 3.7.7 for CCW.
C. CCW pump shaft shear has occurred. Monitor pump amps locally at 2BA03 to determine which pump to stop. Enter LCO 3.7.7 for CCW.
D CCW pump shaft shear has occurred. Monitor pump amps locally at 2BA03 to D!'
determine which pump to stop. Enter INFO LCO 3.7.7 37.7 for CCW.
Page: 20 of 48                                                                          6/6/2007
 
K/A 056 Loss Loss of Off-site Power
(        AA2.24 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power.
CCW pump ammeter, flowmeter and run indicator KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario during an LOSP on a class 11 E electrical bus which starts the DG and the bus is re-energized. Three CCW pumps will be running due to low pressure. The candidate must determine which pump to stop and if an LCO entry is required.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria for item ##2 Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                          2 - Facility operating limits in Tech Specs and their bases.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Locked rotor would result in a breaker trip. Pump amps not available on the QEAB. Plausible the candidate may think amps available on QEAB or an LCO entry is required.
B. Incorrect. Locked rotor would result in a breaker trip. Pump amps not available on the QEAB. Plausible the candidate may think amps available on QEAB and know an INFO LCO entry is required.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may know pump amps monitored at swgr and think an LCO entry is required.
D. Correct.
REFERENCES Tech Spec 3.7.7 for CCW and the Bases.
AOP-1    8031-C, Loss AOP-18031-C,                    1E "Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems Systems" section B for Loss of Power With DG Tying to Bus.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-39211-02, Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode.
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.7 are exceeded.
(        LO-LO-3921 LO-LO-39211-04,1-04, Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.7 Page: 21 of of 48 48                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
Number            Text LO-LP-39211-02 LO-LP-3921 1-02    Given aa set Given      set of        Specs and of Tech Specs      and the  bases, determine the bases,  determine for      specific set for aa specific    of plant set of plant conditions, conditions, eqiupment    availability, and eqiupment availability,          operational mode:
and operational    mode:
: a. LiOWhether
: a.                    Tech Spec any Tech Whether any                  LeOs of Spec LCOs          section 3.7 of section  3.7 are are exceeded.
exceeded.
required actions b.OThe required bLiThe                actions for  ali section for all  section 3.7 3.7 LCOs.
LeOs.
LO-LP-39211-03 LO-LP-3921 1-03    For any For  any given given item item in  section 13.7 in section  13.7 of  the TRM, of the TAM, be    able to:
be able  to:
: a. OState the TR a.EState        TA for operation.
: b. DState any b.LJState  anyone              less required actions.
one hour or less                actions.
LO-LP-39211-04 LO-LP-3921 1-04    Describe the bases Describe                          given Tech Spec any given bases for any                  Spec in  section 3.7.
in section  3.7.
LO-LP-39211-05 LO-LP-3921 1-05              five relief setpoints List the five List                                      steam generator safety valves.
setpoints of the steam LO-LP-39211-06 LO-LP-3921 1-06    Given the Given                determine for the TRM, determine        for a specific set set of plant  conditions, equipment plant conditions,  equipment availability, availability, and and operational mode:
operational    mode:
ElWhether any TR of section 13.7 a.DWhether
: a.                                          has been exceeded.
13.7 has          exceeded.
: b. OThe required actions for all section 13.7 bLiThe                                          13.7 TRs.
LO-LP-39212-01 LO-LP-3921 2-01    For any given item in section 3.8 of Tech Specs, be able to:
: a. State the LCO.
: b. State any
: b.              one hour or less required actions.
anyone LO-LP-39212-02 LO-LP-3921 2-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant          plant conditions, equipment availability, and and operational mode:
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.8                    exceeded.
3.8 are exceeded.
b.
: b. The required actions for all section 3.8 LeOs. LCOs.
LO-LP-39212-03 LO-LP-3921 2-03    For any item in section 13.8 of the TAM, be able to;
: a. State the TA for operation.
: b. State any 1  1 hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-39212-04    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.8.
LO-LP-39212-05                  TAM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, Given the TRM, equipment availability, and operational mode:  mode:
a.
: a. Whether any TR  TA of section 13.8 has been exceeded.
: b. The required actions for all section 13.8 TAs.
LO-LP-39213-01 LO-LP-3921 3-01    For any given item in section 3.9 of Tech Specs, be able to:
: a. State the LeO.
LCO.
: b. State anyone any one hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-39213-02 LO-LP-3921 3-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any any Tech Spec LeOs                              exceeded.
LCOs of section 3.9 are exceeded.
The required actions
: b. The                                              LCOs.
actions for all section 3.9 LeOs.
Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                          Page 44 of 165
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                          PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            18031-C 18031-C                                    22 22                              13 13 of of 26 26 BB    LOSS LOSS OF  OF POWER POWER WITH WITH DG DG TYING TYING TO  TO BUS BUS
(            ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                          RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT    NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED B1.
Bl. Perform Perform the the following following for    for the the affected affected bus:
bus:
Oa.
Eja. Verify Verify bus bus frequency frequency -        -
AT 60 AT  60 HZ HZ Db.
Db. Verify Verify bus bus voltage voltage -
AT AT 4160V 4160V AC AC oQB2.
B2. Check Check charging charging pumps pumps - ONLY
                                                -  ONLY          B2.
B2. Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
ONE OPERATING ONE  OPERATING oL:la.
: a. Start Start or    or stop stop pumps pumps asas necessary necessary to      to establish establish one one running running charging charging pump.
pump.
b.
: b. IF IF charging charging pumppump can can NOT be be started, started, THEN THEN perform perform the the following:
following:
01)
Dl)      Isolate Isolate normal normal letdown.
letdown.
02)
[]2)      Initiate Initiate 18007-C, 18007-C, CHEMICAL CHEMICAL ANDAND VOLUME VOLUNE CONTROL CONTROL SYSTEM SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.
MALFUNCTION.
OB3.
DB3. Check Check CCW CCW pumps pumps onon affected affected              B3.
B3. Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
train train - TWO
                        -  TWO RUNNING RUNNING Da. Start Start or    or stop stop pumps pumps asas
                                                      ,                      necessary necessary to      to establish establish oV                two two pumps pumps running running inin the the affected affected train. train.
Db. IF two two pumps pumps can can NOT bebe (iA  /)j            started, started, J                THEN THEN initiate initiate 18020-C, 18020-C,
[                    LOSS LOSS OF    OF COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING COOLING WATER. WATER.
(                                                                            %
 
CCW System B
B 3.7.7
(      BASES LCO                        A CCW train is considered OPERABLE when      when::
(continued)
: a. Two pumps and associated surge tank are OPERABLE; and fj--tVSWt'      J e !\..l      The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety
{Zv. I 1\(-1. [e related function are OPERABLE.
(
{(
r( DLl        The isolation of CCW from other components or systems not required for safety may render those components or systems
(}V\.1 inoperable but does not necessarily make the CCW System                      ilL C inoperable. Consideration should be given to the size of the load          IT ~
f)  V{ [0 (, (.-        I( 0, {( isolated and the impact it will have on the rest of the CCW system                \
5l""C~
1\      \...;  vt.,      C./    before determining OPERABILITY.                                                5C St',f'Ce,
      -ICe-      (Q~lt<!J (kJ ~                  Wc,,\    f)  3hcy -{-(LtJ(J U
{/~  h()",J '3 w~ h 1                IVc-t- ,t. "./
(V APPLICABILITY              In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CCW System is a normally operating system, which must be prepared to perform its post LccJ accident safety functions, primarily RCS heat removal, which is achieved by cooling the RHR heat exchanger.
In Modes 5 or 6, there are no TS OPERABILITY requirements for System.. However, the functional requirements of the the CCW System CCW System are determined by the systems it supports.
ACTIONS                    All Required Action A.1 is modified by a      a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS      RCS Loops - MODE 4, 4," be entered if an inoperable CCW train results in an inoperable RHR loop. loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.
If one CCW train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CCW train is        is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour  hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by    by the OPERABLE train, and and the low probability of aa DBA occurring during during this period.
l\eF~(l,J~r('LC O5Ckcl+                  oSC Ibt-t< 2.-t          (continued)
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 I and 22                    BB 3.7.7-3 3.7.7-3                                          1-8/05 Rev. 1-8/05
: 12. 063A2.02001 063A2.02 001 If the 125V DC class 11 E battery room fans were lost while the batteries were charging, the primary concern and actions you should take would be:
A. Battery room temperatures exceeding Tech Spec limits, perform 13405,    13405, "125V 125V DC System to stop the battery charge and close and lock the Electrical Distribution System" room doors to prevent personnel entry.
By Explosive Hydrogen gas could accumulate in the battery rooms, prop doors open BlI" 00310-C, per 0031        Standards for Use of Doors" O-C, "Standards              Doors and establish portable ventillation per 13302,  Control 13302, "Control Building ESF Ventillation Systems".
Systems.
C. Smoke purge function may be lost in the event of a battery room fire, place the battery rooms in the smoke purge mode per 13302, "ControlControl Building ESF Systems.
Ventillation Systems".
D. Toxic fume buildup could affect affect battery room habitability I personnel safety, Standards for Use of Doors" prop doors open per 00310-C, "Standards                  Doors and establish portable Control Building ESF Ventillation Systems".
ventillation per 13302, "Control                              Systems.
KIA 063 DC Electrical Distribution.
A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfuncitons or operations on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Loss of ventilation during battery charging.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS KIA Question gives a plausible scenario where the 11 E  E battery room fans are lost while the batteries are charging. The candidate must determine the primary concern and the correct actions to mitigate.
Question meets 1    1 OCFR55.43(b)
OCFR5S.43(b) criteria item # 55 - assessment
                                                                - assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
Question is also SRO only by KA Catalog # for SRO giving an importance factor rating of 3.1 while the RO importance importance factor rating is only 2.3.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausbile the candidate Incorrect. Plausbile      candidate may recall Tech Spec Spec limits limits on room temperature and consider stopping charging of the batteries. The room doors should be propped open,  not shut to prevent explosive H2 concentration.
open, not
(
B. Correct. Explosive Hydrogen Hydrogen gas is the main main concern        13302 gives direction concern and 13302          direction to establish portable ventillation and and to to prop open open room doors per 00310-C.
0031 O-C.
Page:
Page: 22 22 of of 49 49                                                                                  6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
C. Incorrect. Battery room ventillation fans do not perform a smoke purge function but plausible the candidate may consider the use of Smoke Purge Mode to remove c            hydrogen or fumes, smoke purge would not be used until after a fire is out to prevent feeding 02 to the fire.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may consider toxic fumes to be a personnel hazard and actions same as that for "B" B above but not the primary concern.
REFERENCES SOP-13302-112, CB ESF Ventillation Systems, Precautions 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 SOP-13302-1/2, 125V DC Electrical Distribution Systems" 13404-1/2, "125V                              Systems Precaution 2.1.3.
Doors.
Standard For Use of Doors".
00310-C, "Standard Vogtle October 2005 SRO Audit Exam question #    #21 21 modified to meet 10CFR55.43(b).
10CFR55.43(b).
VEGP learning objectives:
Not applicable.
(
(
Page: 23 of 49                                                                              6/6/2 007 6/6/2007
 
Approved By draft                                Vogtle Electric Generating Plant A                Procedure Number 13405A-1 i 3405A-1 Number    Rev 1.0 Date Approved Date                                                                                                  Page Number draft                              DC A TRAIN 11E 125V DC                ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM E ELECTRICAL                                                  3 of 40 30f40
(    1.0 1.0                PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for energizing, operating and de-energizing the Unit 11 125V 125V DC 1E Electrical Distribution System.
2.0                PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 2.1                Precautions 2.1.1              Batteries produce hydrogen. Smoking, using open flames, or operating space heaters is prohibited in the vicinity of the Batteries.
2.1.2 2.1 .2            Battery Room Ventilation Systems should be in operation to limit the buildup of A-fII,we~
hydrogen in the Battery Rooms.                                                                    v0 (I    q 2.1.3              If Battery Room Ventilation System is not available, doors to Battery Room should be propped open per 00310-C, "Standard Standard for Use of Doors."
Doors.
{("'\ h5-5 2.1.4              In MODE 5 or 6 when a battery must be removed from service for long periods such as                    O OL"'~ ;
for testing, it is preferable to transfer the 120V vital busses to their regulated AC power supply, provided the inverter is not required per Technical Specification 3.8.8.                    C. J..
Transferring the vital busses to the regulated source will reduce the potential for power losses due to 125V DC switchgear instabilities. (Tech Spec 3.8.7 and 3.8.8)
                                                                                                                              .\I  D 2.2                Limitations 2.2.1              The 125V DC 1    1E E Electrical Busses shall be OPERABLE in MODEs, 1,      1, 2, 3 and 4 per Technical Specification LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.9.
2.2.2              The 125V 125V DC 11E E Electrical Busses shall be OPERABLE in MODEs 5 and 6 per Technical Specification LCO 3.8.5 and LCO 3.8.10.
2.2.3            The DC Input Breaker to the 25kVA Inverters can not be closed until the Inverter Internal Capacitor Bank has been charged.
2.2.4            The Battery Charger 480V AC input    input voltage shall be 480V AC +/-10%
                                                                                            +/-10% (432V-528V).
2.2.5              If the electrical switchgear must be energized by the battery chargers alone (without battery breaker closed in), only one charger should be energized to supply the bus.
2.2.6            A 72-hour equalizing charge should be performed performed every six months on all 1  1E E batteries.
2.2.7              Removal of 1125V25V DC equipment from service may necessitate performance performance of 14235-1, 14235-1, On "On    Site Power Distribution Operability Verification, Verification," to document document that sufficient equipment equipment (batteries and chargers) remain OPERABLE to satisfy Technical Specifications SpeCifications LCO 3.8.10.
c.
Printed June 6, Pnnted June  6, 2007  at 2:36 2007 at  2:36 R sec                          0
 
Approved By Approved S E.
S.
By E Prewitt                VogUe Electric Generating Vogtle            GeneratingPlant Plant    A              Procedure Number Procedure Number Rev 13302-1 12.112 1 Rev Date Approved Date                                                                                    Page Page Number Number CONTROL BUILDING ESF VENTILATION SYSTEMS c  1-16-2006 1-16-2006 2.0          PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 30f23 3 of 23 2.1          PRECAUTIONS 2.1.1        The Control Building Safety Features Battery Room Exhaust Fans should be running any time the batteries are energized to prevent the accumulation of Rooms.
Hydrogen in the Battery Rooms.
2.1.2        If power is lost to Safety Features Battery Room Exhaust Fans and cannot be            ~v1. ."
restored in a timely manner, the Maintenance Department should be directed to                    t'.J provide portable ventilation within 48 hours to prevent hYQrogen hy&#xe7;lrogen buil9up.
buil&#xe7;lup.                        -t-O \.~Lt cp p/\v(J o(li'N\  ,%-t-          ci o tl:>{ f (Oc-k 0.105 (ock                              e.Q      u 2.1.3                                    should De Each ventilation system sho'uld  be operated as necessary to maintain the room              A
                                                                                                              &#xed;9 temperature of the areas being served below the temperature alarm setpoints.
2.1.4        Unless Emergency conditions exist, the Chemistry Foreman should be notified prior to initiating Smoke Purge Mode in the Control Building. This is necessary to determine the presence of any airborne activity. Based on the sample results, a Batch Release Permit may be required. If an emergency exists, the Chemistry Foreman shall be notified as soon as possible.
: 13. 067G2.1.33
: 13. 067G2.1.33 001 Given the following:
c          - The Unit is at 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP).
          - SIP "A"
          -      A inoperable, Tech Spec LCO 3.5.2 for ECCS - Operating in Effect
          -                  DG1B
          - A fire occurs at DG1 B
          - At 0400 LCO 3.8.1, A. C. Sources Operating is entered due to DG1 B inoperable.
Which ONE of the following is REQUIRED in accordance with Tech Specs?
A. Immediately take actions of LCO 3.0.3 (Motherhood)
B. No other LCO entry is required, LCO 3.8.1 addresses this condition.
Cw C~  By 0800 take actions of LCO 3.5.2 for both trains of ECCS inoperable.
D. Immediately take actions of LCO 3.5.2 for both trains of ECCS inoperable.
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Page:
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KIA 067 Plant Fire on Site G2.1.33 Ability to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry level conditions for Technical Specifications.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS KIA Question gives a plausible scenario where a fire at a DG has resulted in inoperable 10CFR55.43(b) criteria for item ##2 Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                        2 - Facility operating limits in Tech Specs and their bases.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible candidate may think motherhood is immediately required to be entered.
B. Incorrect. Plausible candidate may think no other LCOLCD required required.. SIP "A" A has to be declared inoperable at 0800.
C. Correct. At 0800 SIP "B"B would have to be declared inoperable.
D. Incorrect. Plausible candidate may think actions required for LCOLCD 3.5.2 but there is 4 hours to try to restore per 3.8.1.
REFERENCES Technical Specification 3.8.1 for A. C. Sources - Operating and the bases.
Technical Specification 3.5.2 for ECCS - Operating VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-39209-02, Given a set of Tech Specs and the Bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LCDs LCOs of section 3.5 are exceeded.
LO-LP-39212-02, Given a set of Tech Specs and the Bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.8 are exceeded.
(
Page: 25 25 of 49                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
Number              Text LO-LP-39208-07      Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
a.LIWhether
: a. OWhether anyanyTRTR of section 13.4 has been exceeded.
b.LiThe
: b. OThe required actions for all section 13.4 TRs.
LO-LP-39208-08      List the DNB parameters and the reason for these limits.
LO-LP-39208-09      State the reason for the limits on AFD and DNB parameters.
LO-LP-39209-01      For any given item in section 3.5 of Tech Specs, be able to:
: a. LiState the LeO.
a.OState        LCO.
b.LIState
: b.        any one hour or less required actions.
OState anyone LO-LP-39209-02      Given a set of the Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. LlWhether any Tech Spec LeOs a.OWhether                        LCOs of section 3.5 are exceeded.
b.LIThe required actions for all section 3.5 LeOs.
b.OThe                                          LCOs.
LO-LP-39209-03      Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.5.
LO-LP-39209-04    For any given item in section 13.5 of the TRM, be able to:
oU ElState the TR for operation
: a. OState b.EjState
: b.          any one hour or less actions.
OState anyone LO-LP-39209-05    Given the TRM,TAM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
oU
: a. UWhether any TR of section 13.5 has been exceeded.
a.OWhether oU bLiThe
: b.                                          13.5 TRs.
OThe required actions for all section 13.5 LO-LP-39210-01 LO-LP-3921 0-01    For any given item in section 3.6 of Tech Specs, be able to:
LCO.
: a. LiState the LeO.
a.OState b.LiState anyone b.OState    any one hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-3921 0-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a sepcific set of plant conditions, availability, and operational mode:
equipment aVailability,
: a. LI Whether any Tech Spec LeOs a.DWhether                        LCOs of section 3.6 are exceeded.
bLiThe required actions for all section 3.6 LeOs.
b.OThe                                          LCOs.
LO-LP-3921 0-03    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.6.
LO-LP-39211-01    For any given item in section 3.7 of Tech Specs, be able to:
: a. LlState the LeO.
a.OState        LCD.
b.OState    any one hour or less required actions.
b.UState anyone c Friday, June 01, 2007
                                                                                                  ...E7:Z Page 43 of 165 eeffcQ                          C7G-,                        (,3
 
Number Number            Text Text LO-LP-39211-02 LO-LP-3921 1-02    Given aa set Given      set of of Tech Tech Specs Specs and and the the bases,    determine for bases, determine              specific set for aa specific    of plant set of plant conditions, conditions, eqiupment availability, eqiupmerit    availability, and    operational mode:
and operational        mode:
azi a.OWhether Whether anyany Tech Tech Spec      LeOs of Spec LCOs            section 3.7 of section    3.7 are are exceeded.
exceeded.
b.OThe required bLiThe    required actions actions for for all all section    3.7 LCOs.
section 3.7    LeOs.
LO-LP-39211-03 LO-LP-39211-03    For any For  any given given item item inin section section 13.7 13.7 of    the TRM, of the  TRM, be    able to:
be able  to:
a.OState
: a.          the TR C. State the        for operation.
TR for  operation.
: b. OState any b.LlState    anyone    hour or one hour        less required or less    required actions.
actions.
LO-LP-39211-04 LO-LP-3921 1-04    Describe the Describe    the bases bases forfor any any given      Tech Spec given Tech      Spec in    section 3.7.
in section  3.7.
LO-LP-39211-05 LO-LP-3921 1-05    List the List  the five five relief relief setpoints setpoints ofof the    steam generator the steam                  safety valves.
generator safety      valves.
LO-LP-39211-06 LO-LP-39211-06    Given the TRM, determine Given                determine for          specific set for a specific      set of  plant conditions, equipment of plant                equipment availability, availability, and and operational mode:
operational a.DWhether a.Li  Whether anyany TR of section section 13.713.7 has has been exceeded.
exceeded.
bLiThe required actions for all section b.OThe                                                13.7 TR5.
section 13.7    TRs.
LO-LP-39212-01 LO-LP-39212-01    For any given item in section 3.8 of Tech Specs, be able to:
a.
: a. State the LCO.
: b. State anyone any one hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-39212-02    Given a set set of        Specs and the bases, determine of Tech Specs                            determine for a specific set of  of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
a.
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LeOs        LCOs of section 3.8 are exceeded.
: b. The required actions for all section 3.8 LeOs.
: b.                                                      LCOs.
LO-LP-39212-03 LO-LP-3921 2-03    For any item in section 13.8 of the TRM, be able to;
: a. State the TR for operation.
b.
: b. State any 11 hour or less required actions.
LO-LP-39212-04 LO-LP-3921 2-04    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.8.
LO-LP-39212-05    Given Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions,      conditions, eqUipment                          operational mode:
equipment availability, and operational              mode:
a.
: a. Whether any  any TR of section 13.8 has been        been exceeded.
: b. The required actions for
: b.                              for all section    13.8 TRs.
section 13.8 LO-LP-39213-01 LO-LP-39213-01    For For any any given given item item inin section section 3.93.9 of  Tech Specs, of Tech    Specs, be be able able to:
a.
: a. State    the LeO.
State the    LCO.
: b. State anyone
: b. State    any one hour hour or less      required actions.
less required LO-LP-39213-02 LO-LP-3921 3-02    Given Given a set set of of Tech Specs Specs and the bases, bases, determine for a specific set set ofof plant plant conditions, conditions, equipment          availability, and equipment availability,              operational and operational mode:
mode:
a.
: a. Whether Whether any any Tech Tech Spec Spec LeOs LCO5 of  of section    3.9 are section 3.9        exceeded.
are exceeded.
b.
: b. The The required required actions actions for for all  section 3.9 all section        LCOs.
3.9 LeOs.
: Friday, Friday, June June 01, 01, 2007 2007                                                                                                                Page 44 of Page 44 of165 165
                                    /ec                                                    Q7 l,1J 3
 
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1
(
3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER      POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.1                  The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
: a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 11 E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and
: b. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1I E power distribution subsystem(s).
Automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B ESF buses shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:              MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS
  --------------------------------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------------------------
3.O.4b is not applicable to DGs.
LCO 3.0.4b CONDITION                                REQUIRED ACTION                        COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite                A.1          Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for            1 1 hour circuit inoperable, inoperable.                            required OPERABLE offsite circuit.                  AND Once per 88 hours thereafter AND (continued)
ReFeec                                      O7l if 33 L Vogtle Units I1 and 22                                    3.8.1-1                  Amendment No.
Amendment No.
No. 137 No. 116 137 (Unit 1) 116 (Unit 2) 1)
2)
 
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION          REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME (continued)
A. (continued)        A.2  Declare required Declare  required feature( s) feature(s)  24 hours hours from no offsite power with no                        discovery of no offsite offsite available inoperable when      power to one train its redundant required        concurrent with feature(s) is inoperable.      inoperability of redundant required feature(s)
AND A.3  Restore required offsite      72 hours circuit to OPERABLE status.                        AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued) a                          ((3 Vogtle Units I1 and 22          3.8.1-2                            No.1 00 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.100              1)
Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
 
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1
(
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION                  REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME B.        DG inoperable.
One DG    inoperable. B.1      Perform SR 3.8.1.1 Perform      3.8.1.1 for  the forthe  11 hour hour required offsite circuit(s).
AND Once per 8 hours thereafter AND B.2    Verify SAT available.          11 hour AND Once per 1212 hours thereafter AND B.3    Declare required feature(s)    4 hours from 47vwek_
fti\l5wetL                    supported by the inoperable DG inoperable discovery of Condition B when its required              concurrent with (c
(?~\.(                      redundant feature(s) is        inoperability of inoperable.                    redundant required feature(s)
      ~ vt {es
[(e3            0'-1  t-  AND B.4.1  Determine OPERABLE DG          24 hours is not inoperable due to fJ    *-D                      common cause failure.
OR f-                B.4.2  Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG.
24 hours f{                  AND (continued) lZeF~etVc~ O7!c33                  7
()~ 6-2,,(                (\ 33 Vogtle Units 1 1 and and 22                  3.8.1-3                  Amendment No.
No.1100 00 (Unit 1)1)
Amendment No.
No. 78 78 Unit 2)2)
 
ECCS - Operating
                                                                                                - Operating 3.5.2 c 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.2              Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:        MODES 1, 2, and 3.
                        --------------------------------------N OTE----------------------------------------
NOTE In MODE 3, either residual heat removal pump to cold legs injection flow path may be isolated by closing the isolation valve to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1.
ACTIONS CONDITION                          REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME A. One or more trains              A.1        Restore train(s) to            72 hours inoperable.                                OPERABLE status.
AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.              '{vile)5          ovtc-(-      A- +D(rv +                  v J
B. Required Action and            B.1        Be in MODE 3.                  6 hours associated Completion Time not met.                  AND B.2        Be in MODE 4.                  12 hours 12 l33 Vogtle Units I and Units 1  and 22                            3.5.2-1 3.5.2-1                Amendment No. No. 136 136 (Unit 1) 1)
Amendment No. 115  115 (Unit (Unit 2) 2)
: 14. 078G2.1.32 001 The following annunciators I/ indications indications are present present in in the Unit 1I Control Control Room:
ALBO1 window B05 for "SERVICE
        - ALB01
        -                            SERVICE AIR CMPSR TROUBLE".
TROUBLE.
ALBO1 window C06 for "SERVICE
        - ALB01
        -                            SERVICE AIR HDR LO PRESS". PRESS.
        - Instrument air pressure is slowly decreasing as reasd on QMCB meter PI-9361.
        -Instrument                                                                        P1-9361.
        - All available compressors are running and the Turbine Building Operator (TBO) reports all compressors are loading and unloading properly.
        - The TBO reports and air dryer is malfunctioning.
Which ONE of the following is CORRECT actions for the Unit SS to take I direct?
SOP-I 3710-1, A. Direct the TBO to iimplement SOP-1371                Instrument Air System",
0-1, "Instrument        System, if an instrument air dryer malfunction, bypass the instrument air dryer by opening the air dryer bypass, then slowly close the air dryer outlet, then close the air dryer inlet.
AOP-1 8028-C, "Loss B. Enter AOP-18028-C,        Loss of Instrument Air",
Air, if a service air dryer malfunction, isolate control air to the service air dryer by manually closing the petcock valve located on the air regulator at the dryer inlet.
SOP-i 3711-I, "Service C. Direct the TBO to implement SOP-13711-1,            Service Air System",
System, if a service air dryer malfunction, bypass the service air dryer by bleeding off control air to the dryer by depressing the Sullicon controller pushbutton at the dryer inlet.
D~
D  Enter AOP-1    8028-C, "Loss AOP-18028-C,      Loss of Instrument Air, Air", if an instrument air dryer malfunction, place the instrument air dryer in the two chamber full flow mode by depressing the pushbutton at the front end of the dryer.
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K/A 078 Instrument Air System.
G2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS plausible scenario with either an instrument Question gives a plausible                              instrument or service air dryer malfunction. The candidate must pick the appropriate procedure and actions to mitigate the event.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible, isolate. Action is a correct action for a service air dryer.
Instrument air dryers do not have a bypass. 13710-1/2 is the correct procedure for normal instrument air evolutions.
B. Incorrect. Plausible, this is the old method for placing a service air dryer in 2 flow full chamber mode but no longer directed per procedure. Note in procedure says NOT to isolate control air to a dryer, an incorrect action. AOP-1B02B-C, AOP-1 8028-C, is the proper procedure to use.
C. Incorrect. Procedure directs placing in 2 chamber full flow mode by depressing button at front of dryer, not by bleeding off control air. This is method for causing a rotary air compressor to fully load. 13711-1/2 is the correct procedure for normal service air evolutions.
D. Correct. Placing air dryer in two chamber full flow mode by depressing the pushbutton at the front of the dryer is the proper response. AOP-1B02B-C AOP-l 8028-C is the proper procedure to use.
REFERENCES NOTE: This is a re-use question from Vogtle May 2006 NRC SRO Exam question #            #1515 with KA # (07BA2.01).
(078A2.01). This is the only question re-used from the last 2 previous SRO exams given at Plant Vogtle. This question will also fit KA # 07BG2.1.32 078G2.1 .32 as it tests system limits and precautions for instrument air dryers.
AOP-18028-C, AOP-1B02B-C, Loss "Loss of Instrument Air Air" SOP-i  371 0-1/2, Instrument SOP-13710-1/2,    "Instrument Air System.
System".
SOP-i3711-i/2,    "Service Air System.
SOP-13711-1/2, Service          System".
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-60321-06 Describe the operator actions required during normal full power operation when instrument air header header pressure falls to << 80 BO psig or << 70 psig.
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c,  Number LO-LP-60321-02 LO-LP-S0321-02 Text State the fail position of the following valves on loss of instrument air:
: a. extraction steam non-return valves
: b. feedwater heater high level dump valves HV-1 82 (charging flow control valve)
: c. HV-182
: d. containment instrument air header isolation valves MSIV5
: e. MSIVs 1.f. SGFP mini-flow valves
: g. FRV
: h. FRV bypass
                      .* RHR heat exchanger outlet valve j.j. RHR heat exchanger bypass valve
: k. CVCS letdown isolation valve I. Containment isolation valves
: m. CVI valves
: n. HV-128 (RHR to Letdown valve)
: o. FV-121 (Charging Flow Control valve)
LO-LP-60321 -03 LO-LP-S0321-03    Describe why a loss of instrument air precludes plant operation.
LO-LP-60321 -04 LO-LP-S0321-04    Describe why a plant cooldown from mode 3 to mode 4 should be delayed if a loss of instrument air occurs.
LO-LP-60321 -05 LO-LP-S0321-05    Describe why the RHR pump discharge should not be fully closed while throttling RHR flow to maintain RCS temperature during a loss of instrument air when in modes 4, 5, or S.      6.
LO-LP-S0321-0S LO-LP-60321 -06    Describe the operator actions required during normal full power operation when instrument air header pressure fails below 80 psig and/or below 70 psig.
LO-LP-S0321-08 LO-LP-60321-08    Describe the effects on RCS pressure due to a loss of instrument air while solid on RHR.
LO-LP-S0321-09 LO-LP-60321-09    Describe the effect on Fuel Transfer System gate seals on a Loss Of Service Air and what action(s) is required.
operator action(s}
LO-LP-S0321-10 LO-LP-60321-10    Given conditions and/or indications, determine the required AOP to enter (including subsections, as applicable).
LO-LP-60321-1 1 LO-LP-S0321-11    Given the entire AOP, describe:
: a. Purpose of selected steps
: b. How and why the step is being performed plant/parameter(s) for the step
: c. Expected response of the plantlparameter(s}
LO-LP-S0322-02 LO-LP-60322-02    Describe why you are cautioned in AOP 18030-C not to align the Spent Fuel Pool System to provide bleed to the RWST if spent fuel pool pooi level is less than 217 ft elevation.
LO-LP-60322-03 LO-LP-S0322-03    Describe the source of MlU M/U to SFP to makeup for leakage and why this source is used.
LO-LP-60322-04 LO-LP-S0322-04    Given conditions and/or indications,determine the required AOP to enter (including subsections, as applicable).
LO-LP-60322-05 LO-LP-S0322-05    Given the entire AOP, describe:
: a. Purpose of selected steps
: b. How and why the step is being performed plant/parameter(s) for the step
: c. Expected response of the plantlparameter(s}
LO-LP-60323-01 LO-LP-S0323-01    State the immediate operator action required on loss of 1      1 E Electrical Systems, AOP-18031.
AOP-1 8031.
Include RNO and substeps of the immediate action.
LO-LP-S0323-02 LO-LP-60323-02                                                generator must be tripped following a loss of one train of 1 Describe why the affected train diesel generator                                                      1E Electrical Systems.
c~,
Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                  Page 77 of 165 o&(3 o7C6        G- ~({ { 57."
: 1. 078A2.01
: 1. 078A2.01 002002 The following The    following annunciators annunciators II indications indications are are present present in in the the Unit Unit 11 Control Control Room:
Room:
c            *
            ** ALB01-C06, SERVICE AIR CMPSR ALBO1-B05, "SERVICE
* ALB01-B05, ALBO1-C06, "SERVICE SERVICE AIR CMPSR TROUBLE" AIR HDR HDR LO TROUBLE LO PRESS" PRESS Instrument air
* Instrument          pressure is air pressure    slowly decreasing is slowly  decreasing as as read read on on QMCB      P1-9361.
QMCB PI-9361.
            ** All available available compressors are running running and the the Turbine Building Operator (TBO) reports all reports    all compressors are are loading loading and unloading properly.
Building Operator (TBO) reports an air dryer is malfunctioning.
* The Turbine Building                                                      malfunctioning.
Which ONE of the following are CORRECT actions for the Unit SS to take I direct?
SOP-i 3710-1, "Instrument A. Direct the TBO to implement SOP-13710-1,              Instrument Air System",
System, if an instrument air dryer malfunction, bypass the instrument air dryer by opening the air dryer bypass, then slowly close the air dryer outlet, then close the air dryer inlet.
AOP-i 8028-C, "Loss B. Enter AOP-18028-C,          Loss of Instrument Air, if a service air dryer malfunction, isolate control air to the service air dryer by manually closing the petcock valve located on the air regulator at the dryer inlet.
SOP-i 3711-1, "Service C. Direct the TBO to implement SOP-13711-1,              Service Air System",
System, if a service air dryer malfunction, bypass the service air dryer by bleeding off control air to the dryer by depressing the Sullicon controller pushbutton at the dryer inlet.
D~
D    Enter AOP-18028-C, AOP-i 8028-C, "Loss Loss of Instrument Air, Air", if an instrument air dryer malfunction, place the instrument air dryer in the two chamber full flow mode by depressing the pushbutton at the front of the dryer.
Yd 4/&C S/to ZJr3 Page: 11 of Page:    of 22                                                                                          6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
KIA 078 Instrument Air System.
(          A2.01. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the lAS; and based (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
MATCH ANALYSIS KIA MATCH Question gives a plausible scenario with either an instrument or service air dryer malfunction. Candidate must pick appropriate procedure and actions to mitigate event.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible, isolate. Action is a correct action for a service air dryer.
Instrument air dryer does not have a byp~ss.13710-1/2 bypass.13710-112 is the correct procedure for normal instruement air evolutions.
B. Incorrect. Plausible, this is the old method for placing a service air dryer in 2 flow full chamber mode but no longer directed per procedure. Note in procedure says to NOT isolate control air to a dryer, an incorrect action. AOP-1 AOP-18028 8028 is the proper procedure to use.
C. Incorrect. Procedure directs placing in 2 chamber full flow mode by depressing button at front of dryer, not by bleeding off control air. This is method for causing      ---
a rotary air compressor to fully load. 13711-1/2 is the correct procedure for normal service air evolutions.
D. Correct. Placing air dryer in two chamber full flow mode by depressing the pushbutton at the front of the dryer is the proper response. AOP 18028-1/2 18028-1/2 is the proper procedure to use.
REFERENCES AOP-18028-C AOP-18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air ARP-1      7001-C, windows B05 and C06 ARP-17001-C,                                            VCJ f{~ ;Vl"Ly VOp                      d SOP-I "Instrument Air System SOP-13710-1/2, Instrument 3711-1/2, Service SOP-13711-1/2, System" "Service Air System System" tirzc
                                                                              \ 5R--O 70 iV VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-60321-06 Describe the operator actions required during    during normal full power operation when instrument air header pressure falls to << 80 psig and or << 70 psig.
(
Page:
Page: 22 of of2
              /Z~~
2    -Fuv- 0 77 cLC-t1 d
0uv V I    /
                                                          /
l ,'.J1- ~
I 6/6/2007
 
PROCEDURE NO.
PROCEDURE  NO.                    REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                    PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            18028-C 18028-C                            24 24                                33 of of 26 26 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                    RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT    NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED INITIAL ACTIONS INITIAL        ACTIONS
: 1. Check
: 1.      Check proper proper operation operation of    of all all available available air air compressors compressors on on affected affected unit:
unit:
Da.
Da. All All air air compressors compressors -        -        Da.
Da.      Start Start all    all available available air air RUNNING RUNNING                                        compressors compressors on        on affected affected unit.
unit.
Db.
Db. All All air air compressors compressors -        -          b.
: b. Dispatch Dispatch operator operator to  to PROPERLY PROPERLY LOADING LOADING AND  AND                      fully fully load  load anyany air air UNLOADING UNLOADING                                      compressor compressor not      not loading loading properly:
properly:
01)
Dl)      Reciprocating Reciprocating -        -
close close service service airair compressor compressor filter filter inlet inlet valves:
valves:
UNIT UNIT 11 (TB-A-T11)
(TB-A-Tll)
(                                                                            ***  1-2401-U4-627 l-2401-U4-627            }
* A-2401-U4-629 A-2401-U4-629 UNIT UNIT 22 (TB-A-T10)
(TB-A-Tb)
                                                                              **  22 --  2401-U4-627 2401-U4-627 2)
: 2)    Rotary Rotary Da)
Da)        Isolate Isolate instrument instrument air  air to to controllers controllers PY-19315A PY-l93l5A and/or and/or PY-19314A PY-l93l4A usingusing local local air air isolation isolation valves.
valves.
PI                        Verify Verify air  air pressure pressure is  is bled bled (I      i              off off by by depressing depressing water water drain drain pushbutton pushbutton bill. f-              on Sullicon
                                                                      ~~~~
JfLj C~nt~ollers at              at a1r 1nlet dampers.
dampers.
(
( 3~
3
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                    REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                        PAGE PAGE NO .
NO.
VEGP VEGP              18028-C 18028-C                                24 24                              44 of of 26 26
(              ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                          RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED CAUTION:
CAUTION:    Do Do NOT NOT isolate isolate control control airair toto instrument instrument or    or service service air air dryers dryers as as this this will will cause cause dryers dryers to    to blow blow down down continuously.
continuously.
02.
: 02. VerifyVerify proper proper operation operation of      of        02.
: 02. IFIF an an Instrument Instrument Air  Air Dryer Dryer Instrument Instrument Air Air dryers.
dryers.                            is is malfunctioning, malfunctioning, A                THEN THEN place place in  in two two chamber chamber If I N 5W-e IV
                                                  -tAI51A/EfLi local flow mode full flow full local pushbutton mode byby p,;!shing pushbutton sw~tch:
pushing in switch:
in Dryer Dryer A  A    HS-0746 HS-0746 Dryer Dryer B  B    HS-0747 HS-0747
: 03. Verify
: 03.        Verify proper proper operation operation of    of            3.
: 3. IF IF aa Service Service Air  Air Dryer Dryer isis Service Service Air Air dryers.
dryers.                                malfunctioning, malfunctioning, THEN THEN perform perform one  one ofof the the following:
following:
Bypass Bypass Service Service AirAir dryer:
dryer:
Oa.
Da.      Open Open 2401-U4-551 2401-U4-551 Service Service Air Air Dryer Dryer Bypass Bypass .
Db.
Ob.      Slowly Slowly close close 2401-U4-554 2401-U4-554 Service Service Air Air Dryer Dryer Outlet Outlet .
Dc.
Dc.      Close Close 2401-U4      -548 2401-U4-548 Service Service Air Air Dryer Dryer Inlet.
Inlet.
                      /\ tfe-c----e fife  fc u o0      Place
                                                                                        -OR-
                                                                                        -OR-Place service service airair dryer dryer
                                                        /)                  in in twotwo chamber chamber full full flow 6-I,rV)~
flow o7C6 C) /            /,,      f)    V
                                                          )                mode mode by local by depressing depressing local pushbutton HS-0745.
HS-0745.
pushbutton switch switch 04.
: 04. Initiate Initiate the the Continuous Continuous Actions Actions Page Page..
 
ApprovedBy Approved  By H. Williams, C. H.
C.      Williams, IrJr I
I            Vogtle Electric Vogtle  Electric Generating Generating Plant Plant  A                ProcedureNumber Procedure 13710-1 13710-1 Number  Rev Rev 34 34 DateApproved Date  Approved              I                        SERVICE AIR SERVICE          SYSTEM AIR SYSTEM PageNumber Page  Number
(
12312005 12-31-2005                  I                                                                                    520f66 52 of 66 4.4.9 4.4.9                Placing The Placing              Service Air The Service    Air Dryer Dryer In In The The Two Two Chamber Chamber Full Full Flow Mode Flow        Mode OfOf Operation Operation CAUTIONS CAUTIONS              ** Control Control AirAir to to aa Service Service Air Air  Dryer Dryer shall shall NOT NOT be be isolated, isolated, as    as this will cause the dryer to this  will  cause    the  dryer    to  blow blow down down continuously.
continuously.
                          **    Time Time  spent spent inin  Two Two  Chamber Chamber    Full Full FlowFlow Mode Mode should should bebe minimized minimized as      as this this  disables disables    the the  dryer's dryers    moisture removal moisture      removal capability.
capability.
                          **    Due Due toto the the configuration configuration and    and operational operational mode mode of of the the inlet-switching valve, the vessel in inlet-switching      valve,    the  vessel    in regeneration regeneration modemode will will slowly slowly pressurize pressurize and and isis anan expected expected result result inin placing placing the  the Service Service AirAir Dryer Dryer in in Two Two Chamber Chamber Full Full Flow Flow Mode.
Mode.
NOTES NOTES                  **    Placement Placement of of the the Service Service Air Air Dryers Dryers in in full full flow flow will will remove remove the the power power to to the the MEC MEC controller.
controller. When    When this this power power isis lost, lost, the  the common common trouble trouble alarm alarm (low (low air air pressure/dryer pressure/dryer trouble) trouble) on    on the the compressor compressor control control panel panel will will annunciate.
annunciate. ThereThere isis no no second second hit hit onon this this alarm alarm andand itit will will stay stay inin until until the the dryer dryer is  is placed placed back back inin service.
service.
    ,11/ 50 ~ It                  It isis preferable preferable to  to bypass bypass the the Service Service Air Air Dryer, Dryer, removing removing the    the
    ~v\.(e)~--/~~service
            ,& (e Service AirAir Dryer Dryer from from service service and  and operating operating thethe Service Service Air  Air
(-                        System System with with the the dryer dryer bypassed.
bypassed.
()V\. '"'\
4.4.9.1 4.4.9.1            ToTo placeplace Service Service AirAir Dryer Dryer in in the the TwoTwo Chamber Chamber Full Full Flow Mode of operation, perform the Flow      Mode  of  operation,      perform    the following:
following:
cr~ \.(          a.a.        Obtain Obtain SSSS permission permission to  to place place Service Service Air Air Dryer Dryer in in Two Two Chamber Chamber FullFull Flow Flow Mode Mode of of Operation, Operation,              (( ]I b.b.        De-energize De-energize controller controller by    by pushing pushing in  in 1-HS-0745 l-HS-0745 (located (located next next toto the the Service Service Air  Air Dryer Dryer skid),
skid),          ((1]
c.c.        Request Request the the Control Control RoomRoom to to enter enter the the time time and and reason reason why why the the Service Service Air Air Dryer Dryer waswas re-aligned re-aligned in in the the Unit Unit Control Control Log,Log,                                        ((1]
d.d.        If If operation operation in  in this this mode mode is is required required for for more more than than two two hours, hours, notify notify the the System System Engineer.
Engineer.              ((1]
4.4.9.2 4.4.9.2            ToTo remove remove Service Service AirAir Dryer Dryer from from TwoTwo Chamber Chamber Full Full Flow Flow Mode  Mode and and restore restore to  to normal normal operation, operation, perform perform the the following:
following:
a.a.        Verify Verify corrective corrective action action for for the the air air dryer dryer malfunction malfunction or  or abnormal abnormal indications, indications, as  as applicable, applicable, has has been been completed, completed,                                  ((1]
b.
: b.          Obtain Obtain permission permission from from the SS  SS toto restore restore the service service air air dryer to  to normal operation, operation,                        (( ]I o7 i3 June 6, Printed June Printed      6, 2007 2007 at at 3:03 3:03
 
Approved By C. H. Williams, Jr C.                Jr            Vogtle Electric Generating Plant A            Procedure Number Procedure 13711-1 Number Rev 13.1 Rev 13.1 Date Approved Date                                                                                            Page Number Page Number 1-16-2006                                    INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM                                    11 of 19
(                                                                                                  INITIALS 4.2.2              Placing The Instrument Air Dryer(s) In the Two Chamber Full Flow Mode Of Operation CAUTIONS
* Permission to place the Instrument Air Dryers in the Two Chamber Full Flow Mode of operation must be obtained from the Shift Supervisor (SS) or his designee.
* Do not isolate control air to an Instrument Air Dryer, as this will cause the dryer to blow down continuously.
* Since Two Chamber Full Flow Mode disables the dryer's  dryers moisture removal capability, time spent in this mode should be minimized. Notify the system engineer if operation in this mode is required for more than two hours. If only one air dryer is affected, it is preferable to remove the affected dryer from service and operate with the unaffected air dryer.
* If an air dryer is placed in Two Chamber Full Flow Mode due to a malfunction or abnormal indications, verify the condition is corrected prior to restoring the dryer to normal operation.
4.2.2.1            To place Instrument Air Dryer A in the Two Chamber Full Flow Mode of operation, perform the following:
: a.      Obtain permission from the SS to place Instrument Air A in the Two Chamber Full Flow Mode of operation, Dryer "A"
: b.      De-energize Instrument Air Dryer A  "A" controller by pushing in 1-HS-0746 1-HS-0746 located next to the Instrument Air Dryer A  "A" skid.
: c.      Direct the Control Room enter the time and reason why the Instrument Air Dryer A "A" was re-aligned in the Unit Control Log.
(                                    R Printed Pnnted June  6, 2007 June 6, 2007 at at 3:02 3:02
: 15. 079A2.01
: 15. 079A2.O1 001 001 Given the Given    the following following conditions:
conditions:
Unit 11 at
        - Unit
        -          at 100%  RTP and 100% RTP          Unit 22 at and Unit      at 55%
55% RTP.
RTP.
All Unit
        - All
        -    Unit 11 Air Air Compressors areare available.
available.
The "Swing'
        - The
        -      Swing Air compressor compressor hashas been been aligned aligned to to Unit Unit 22 and the air and the  air headers headers crosstied.
crosstied.
No Unit 2 air compressors are available.
        - No
        -                                      available.
pressure is 73 psig and slowly lowering, service air is
        - Unit 2 air pressure
        -                                                                        is isolated.
isolated.
        - Unit 11 air pressure is
        -                        is 78 psig and slowly lowering for both instrument and service air.
        - The Unit 11 SERVICE AIR LO PRESS annunciator is illuminated.
AOP-1 8028-C, "Loss
        - AOP-18028-C,
        -                    Loss of Instrument Air"Air section A for Mode 11 is in effect.
Which ONE of the following actions is CORRECT actions that should be performed?
A Per AOP-18028-C, Art      AOP-1 8028-C, isolate I separate the unit air headers and continue with actions of 18028-C, section A for Mode 1.
AOP-1 8028-C, verify Unit 1I service air isolates, maintain the unit air headers B. Per AOP-18028-C",
crosstied and continue with actions of 18028-C, section A for Mode 1.            1.
C. Per AOP-1      8028-C, isolate AOP-18028-C,      isolate!I separate the unit air headers, trip the Unit 2 Main Turbine and implement 18011-C, Turbine Trip Below P-9, continue with 18028-C.
AOP-1 8028-C, verify Unit 11 service air isolates, maintain the air headers D. Per AOP-18028-C, crosstied, trip Unit 2 enter and E-O,  E-0, perform AOP-18028-C AOP-1 8028-C section B    B for Mode 3.
Page: 28 of Page: 28 of 49 49                                                                                        6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
KIA 079 Station Air.
c        A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
Cross connection with lAS.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS KIA Question gives a plausible scenario where one unit has lost all available air compressors, the candidate has to determine if crosstie of headers is allowed and at what point to isolate the headers and trip the affected unit.
Question meets 11 OCFR55.43(b) criteria item # 5 - Assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. Air headers should be separated, Unit 2 trip criteria of 70 psig not met yet.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think verification of Unit 11 service air isolation should be verified to stabilize pressure. AOP directs isolation of air headers if Unit 11 pressure drops below 80 psig.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may feel a Unit 2 Turbine trip is imminent and entry into 18012 appropriate. Air headers isolated part is correct.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may feel reactor trip appropriate but Unit trip criteria of 70 psig not reached yet. Also, air headers should have been separated at 80 psig.
REFERENCES 18028-C, Loss 18028-C,    "Loss of Instrument Air Air" section A for Mode 1 operations.
I operations.
VEGP learning learning objectives:
LO-LP-60321-06 Describe the operator actions required during normal full power operation when instrument air header pressure falls to << 80 psig or << 70 psig.
c Page: 29 29 of of 49 49                                                                                  6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
Number            Text LO-LP-60321-02 LO-LP-60321 -02    State the fail position of the following valves on loss of instrument air:
non-return valves
: a. extraction steam non-retum
: b. feedwater heater high level dump valves HV-1 82 (charging flow control valve)
: c. HV-182
: d. containment instrument air header isolation valves
: e. MSIVs
: f. SGFP mini-flow valves
: g. FRV
: h. FRV bypass
                    . RHR heat exchanger outlet valve
: j. RHR heat exchanger bypass valve
: k. CVCS letdown isolation valve I. Containment isolation valves
: m. CVI valves
: n. HV-128 (RHR to Letdown valve)
: o. FV-121 (Charging Flow Control valve)
LO-LP-60321-03 LO-LP-60321 -03    Describe why a loss of instrument air precludes plant operation.
LO-LP-60321-04                            cooldown Describe why a plant cool    down from mode 3 to mode 4 should be delayed if a loss of instrument air occurs.
LO-LP-60321-05 LO-LP-60321-05    Describe why the RHR pump discharge should not be fully closed while throttling RHR flow to maintain RCS temperature during a loss of instrument air when in modes 4, 5, or 6.
LO-LP-60321-06 LO-LP-60321 -06    Describe the operator actions required during normal full power operation when instrument air header pressure fails below 80 psig and/or below 70 psig.
LO-LP-60321-08 LO-LP-60321 -08    Describe the effects on RCS pressure due to a loss of instrument air while solid on RHR.
LO-LP-60321 -09 LO-LP-60321-09    Describe the effect on Fuel Transfer System gate seals on a Loss Of Service Air and what operator action(s) is required.
LO-LP-60321-10                                indications, determine the required AOP to enter (including subsections, Given conditions and/or indications, as applicable).
LO-LP-60321 -11 LO-LP-60321-11    Given the entire AOP, describe:
: a. Purpose of selected steps
: b. How and why the step is being performed plant/parameter(s) for the step
: c. Expected response of the plantlparameter(s)
LO-LP-60322-02    Describe why you are cautioned in AOP 18030-C 18030-C not to align the Spent Fuel Pool System to provide bleed to the RWST if spent fuel poolpooi level is less than 217 217ffft elevation.
LO-LP-60322-03    Describe the source of M/U to SFP to makeup for leakage and why this source is used.
LO-LP-60322-04    Given conditions and/or indications,determine the required AOP to enter (including subsections, as applicable).
LO-LP-60322-05    Given the entire AOP, describe:
: a. Purpose of selected steps
: b. How and why the step is being performed plant/parameter(s) for the step
: c. Expected response of the plantlparameter(s)
LO-LP-60323-O1 LO-LP-60323-01    State the immediate operator action required on loss of 1    1 E Electrical Systems, AOP-1  8031.
AOP-18031.
Include RNO and substeps of the immediate action.
LO-LP-60323-02    Describe why the affected train diesel generator must be tripped following a loss of one train of 1 1E E
Electrical Systems.
( Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                Page 77 of 165 071 O7              A- 2.,0 a I/
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE 110.
NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                      PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              18028-C 18028-C                              24 24                                99 of of 26 26 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE                      RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT    NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 016. Check 016.        Check UNAFFECTED UNAFFECTED unit unit                  16.
: 16. Restore/isolate Restore/isolate UNAFFECTED    UNAFFECTED Instrument Instrument AirAir pressure pressure -        -            unit unit Instrument Instrument Air      Air as as GREATER THAN GREATER  THAN 8080 PSIG PSIG                ;7      follows:
follows:
a.
: a. Perform Perform one    one of  of the the ffN5wefL,                              following:
following:
00        IF    Unit 1 is IFUnitlis CTifU                                        selected selected for swing for the swing compressor, THEN THEN close the compressor, close 2-2401-U4-510.
2-2401-U4-510.
rzR VI. (.e)        o~1                O0        IF IFUni
                                                                                          -OR-Unit 2 is B'( -+ ({D            r li                    selected selected for    for the the swing swing compressor, compressor,
                              <f                                                THEN THEN close close 1-2401-U4-510.
1-2401-U4-510.
Oh.
Db.      Verify Verify swing  swing compressor compressor is is running running (TB-A-TC11)
(TB-A-TC11)..
CI    017. Identify 017.        Identify source source ofof leakage leakage and and isolate isolate ifif possible.
possible.
018.
018. Check  Check affected affected Unit Unit ModeMode -    -    18.
: 18. Perform Perform one    one of of thethe MODES MODES 11 OR OR 22                                  following:
following:
DO      IIFinMode3, F in Mode 3, THEN THEN go  go toto ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT A"        A,, LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR      AIR ININ MODE MODE 3. 3.
                                                                                      -OR-
                                                                                      - OR -
oO      IF IF in in Modes Modes 4,  4, 5, 5, or or 6, 6,
THEN THEN go  go toto ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT B" ATTACHMENT            B,, LOSS LOSS OF OF INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR      AIR ININ MODES MODES 4,
4, 5, 5, OR OR 6.6.
Reeic Q7(
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                            REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                  PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            18028-C 18028-C                                    24 24                              10 10 of of 2626 ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE    RESPONSE                  RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT    NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED Q* 19.
0*    19.              Instrument Air Check Instrument Check                        Air headerheader  ** 19.
: 19. Perform Perform the    the following:
following:
pressure - REMAINS pressure      -    REMAINS GREATER GREATER THAN THAN 7070 PSIG PSIG                                  o[Ja.
: a. Trip Trip the  the reactor.
reactor.
                                                \                    Db.
Ob. Initiate Initiate 19000-C, 19000-C, E-O  E-0 70                                            REACTOR REACTOR TRIP  TRIP OROR SAFETY SAFETY 7        ,          {#
(
INJECTION.
INJECTION.
U c.
Dc.      Go Go to  to ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT V      I5                            mJ 1                ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT A"      A,, LOSS LOSS OFOF
                                                          )
                                                        /
                    /\-1..              Ci                                INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT AIR    AIR ININ MODE MODE 3. 3.
020.
Q20. Check  Check header header pressure pressure -      -        20.
: 20. IF IF leakage leakage source source cancan NOT be be STABLE STABLE OR OR RISING RISING                                isolated, isolated, THEN THEN restore/isolate restore/isolate UNAFFECTED UNAFFECTED unit    unit Instrument Instrument Air Air asas follows:
follows:
(e                                    a.
: a. Perform Perform one  one ofof the the c___
1
(                                                following:
following:
0U        IF Unit  Unit 11 isis selected selected for for the the swing swing compressor, compressor, t    ,c          0                                        THEN THEN close close Q                              2-2401-U4-510.
2-2401-U4-510.
Id
( efIIHI\./        /1                                            -OR-
                                                                                              -OR I eta ((
OU        IF    Unit 2 is IFUnit2        is
                                    /I /Q (1                                          selected selected for for the the
                                        -        (                                swing swing compressor, compressor, THEN THEN close close
(}r1Vc/      /1 Db.
Ub. Verify 1-2401-U4-510.
l-2401-U4-5l0.
Verify swing  swing compressor compressor 777-fd  f--?
2            f-od is is running running (TB-A-TC11)
(TB-A-TC11)..
021.
U21. Check  Check Instrument Instrument Air    Air headerheader  021.
D21. GoGo toto Step Step 25. 25.
pressure pressure on  on PI-9361 P1-9361 -      -
GREATER GREATER THANTHAN 100  100 PSIG PSIG 022.
U22. Check  Check PV-9375 PV-9375 ServiceService Air    Air    022.
U22. IFIF PV-9375 PV-9375 is    is NOT NOT required required System System Trip Trip Valve Valve - OPEN
                                                  -  OPEN              to to isolate isolate leak,  leak, THEN THEN reset reset and  and open open PV-9375 PV-9375 by by initiating initiating 13710,  13710, SERVICE SERVICE AIR AIR SYSTEM.
SYSTEM.
(
U7                  rO I
: 16. }03A2.ol
: 16. 103A2.01 OO}
001 The following conditions exist on Unit 2 while at 100% power.
: c.        - The Shift Manager receives word that the containment air lock has failed the leakage rate surveillance test due to excessive air lock leakage.
          - The Containment overall leak rate is now being exceeded.
Which ONE of the following is the CORRECT required Tech Spec action(s)    action(s)??
Containment, restore Containment to operable status A. Apply Tech Spec 3.6.1, "Containment",
within 7 days or be in Mode 3 in the following 6 hours and in Mode 5 in 36 hours.
Containment Air Locks",
B. Apply Tech Spec 3.6.2, "Containment            Locks, within 11 hour close and lock at least 1I Air Lock door. Restore leakage within limits within 7 days or apply Tech Containment actions.
Spec 3.6.1 "Containment" C Apply Tech Spec 3.6.1, "Containment",
C,-.                            Containment, restore Containment to operable status within 1 1 hour or be in Mode 3 in the following 6 hours and in Mode 5 in 36 hours.
D. Apply Tech Spec 3.6.2, "Containment Containment Air Locks",
Locks, immediately close and lock both Air Lock doors. Restore leakage within limits within 7 days or apply Tech Spec 3.6.1 Containment actions.
                "Containment" K/A 103 Containment.
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Integrated Leak Rate Test KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario where Containment Air Lock doors cause Containment overall leak rate to exceed leakage limits. Note 3 of Tech Spec 3.6.2 states if Air Lock Leakage causes Containment Leakage to exceed limits, apply Tech Spec 3.6.1, Containment.
                          "Containment". Candidate must determine the correct Tech Spec actions.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria item #2 Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                      # 2 - Facility Operating limits in Tech Specs    and  their bases.
Question is also SRO due to KA # for SRO has an importance factor of 2.6 where the Question KA # for RD          has an importance factor of 2.0.
RO only has
(        ANSWER I DISTRACTOR DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS Page:
Page: 30 30 of of 49 49                                                                                  6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
Incorrect. Plausible A. Incorrect. Plausible since Condition A actions actions of 3.6.2 Air Locks, says to perform actions of 3.6.1 for Containment. Plausible Plausible could could be be a 77 day action.
c        B. Incorrect. Plausible since it is Condition B actions of 3.6.2 Air Locks, but is for interlock mechanisms and implies the plant can run in this condition for 7 days before applying LCO 3.6.1.
C. Correct. 3.6.1 for Containment must be applied and 11 hour to bring within limits or shutdown to Mode 3 in 6 hours and be in Mode 5 in 36 hours.
Incorrect. Plausible since it is close to Condition C actions of 3.6.2 Air Locks D. Incorrect.                                                                  Locks but implies Tech Spec 3.6.1 does not have to be applied for 7 days.
REFERENCES Containment and bases.
Tech Spec 3.6.1, "Containment" Containment Air Locks" Tech Spec 3.6.2 "Containment            Locks and bases.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-39210-02, LO-LP-3921    0-02, Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.6 are exceeded.
: b. The required actions for all sections 3.6 LCOs.
Page:
Page: 31 31 of 49                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
( Number              Text LO-LP-39208-07      Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. LI Whether any TR of section 13.4 a.DWhether                        13.4 has been exceeded.
bLIThe required actions for all section 13.4 TRs.
b.OThe LD-LP-39208-08 LO-LP-39208-08      List the DNB parameters and the reason for these limits.
LO-LP-39208-09      State the reason for the limits on AFD and DNB parameters.
LO-LP-39209-O1 LO-LP-39209-01      For any given item in section 3.5 of Tech Specs, be able to:
aLlState
: a.                LCD.
OState the LeO.
b.LlState
: b.          any one hour or less required actions.
OState anyone LO-LP-39209-02    Given a set of the Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. LI Whether any Tech Spec LeOs a.OWhether                        LCOs of section 3.5 are exceeded.
bLIThe required actions for all section 3.5 LeOs.
b.OThe                                          LCOs.
LO-LP-39209-03      Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.5.
LD-LP-39209-04 LO-LP-39209-04      For any given item in section 13.5 of the TRM, be able to:
oLI
: a. o              TIR for operation State the TR LlState b.LlState
: b.            any one hour or less actions.
o State anyone LO-LP-39209-05    Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
o LI
: a. o LI Whether any TR of section 13.5 has been exceeded.
oLI blIThe
: b. o The required actions for all section 13.5 TRs.
LO-LP-39210-O1 LO-LP-3921 0-01    For any given item in section 3.6 of Tech Specs, be able to:
aLlState
: a.                LCD.
OState the LeO.
any one hour or less required actions.
b.LlState anyone b.QState LQ-LP-39210-02 LO-LP-3921 0-02    Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a sepcific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
: a. LI Whether any Tech Spec LeOs a.DWhether                        LCOs of section 3.6 are exceeded.
b.OThe                                          LCO5.
bLIThe required actions for all section 3.6 LeOs.
LO-LP-3921 0-03    Describe the bases for any given Tech Spec in section 3.6.
LD-LP-39211-01 LO-LP-39211-01      For any given item in section 3.7 of Tech Specs, be able to:
LlState the LeO.
: a. OState        LCD.
b.LlState
: b.            any one hour or less required actions.
OState anyone c Friday, June 01, 2007 Page 43 of 165
                                                                              /&deg;o/
 
Containment Containment 3.6.1 c 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1 Containment LCO 3.6.1 LCO                    Containment shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:        MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
4 ACTIONS CONDITION                      REQUIRED ACTION                COMPLETION TIME A. Containment inoperable. A.1        Restore containment to    11 hour OPERABLE status.                        iffV' c('-
r,.
k B. Required Action and        B.1        Be in MODE 3.            6 hours associated Completion Time not met.              AND B.2        Be in MODE 5.            36 hours (4
1&deg;k&deg;I Vogtle Vogtle Units 11 and and 22                        3.6.1-1 3.6.1-1                                (Unit 1)
No. 96 (Unit Amendment No.          1)
No. 74 Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
 
Containment Containment 3.6.1 3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE        REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SURVEILLANCE                                      FREQUENCY FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1          Perform required Perform    required visual examinations and          In In accordance with leakage rate testing except for containment containment air    the Containment lock testing, in in accordance accordance with the Containment Containment    Leakage Rate Leakage    Rate Testing Leakage Rate Leakage    Rate Testing Program.                    Program SR 3.6.1.2          Verify containment structural integrity              In accordance with in accordance with the Containment Tendon            the Containment Surveillance Program.                                Tendon Surveillance Program f
Vogtle Units I1 and Vogtle Units    and 22                          3.6.1-2 3.6.1-2                Amendment Amendment No.
No. 96 96 (Unit (Unit 1) 1)
Amendment No.
Amendment    No. 74 74 (Unit (Unit 2) 2)
 
Containment Containment AirAir Locks Locks 3.6.2 3.6.2 3.6  CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6 CONTAINMENT          SYSTEMS 3.6.2 Containment 3.6.2  Containment Air Locks Locks 3.6.2 LCO 3.6.2                  containment air locks Two containment        locks shall shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:          MODES 1, MODES  1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS NOTES
  ------------------------NOTES----------------------------------
: 1. Entry and exit are permissible to perform repairs on the affected air lock components.
: 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock.
3.
: 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment,"
Containment, when air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate.
CONDITION                        REQUIRED ACTION                    COMPLETION TIME A. One or more                  ---------------NOTES--------------------
NOTES containment air locks        1. Required Actions A.1, A.2, and with one containment air            A.3 are not applicable if both lock door inoperable.              doors in the same air lock are inoperable and Condition C is entered.
                                                                                -10[~ 'Jt(~) ~
2.
: 2. Entry Entry and exit are permissible for 77 days days under under administrative controls ifif both both air air locks locks are are P1 inoperable.
inoperable.
7-i3-i2 ff--[  BtD (continued)
(continued)
Re                                          I O?7r4-~fO l (o5O c Vogtle Vogtle Units Units I1 and and 22                          3.6.2-1 3.6.2-1                  Amendment No.
Amendment Amendment No.
Amendment No. 96 96 (Unit No. 74 (Unit 1) 74 (Unit 1)
(Unit 2) 2)
 
Containment Containment Air Air Locks Locks 3.6.2 3.6.2
(
ACTIONS CONDITION CONDITION        REQUIRED ACTION REQUIRED      ACTION            COMPLETION COMPLETION TIMETIME (continued)
A. (continued)        A.1 A.1          the OPERABLE Verify the  OPERABLE        11 hour hour door is          in the is closed in affected air lock.
affected      lock.
AND A.2              OPERABLE Lock the OPERABLE            24 hours closed in the door closed                                      O/L affected air lock.
lock.
AND 1p1 A.3              NOTE
                              ---------NOTE------------
Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by administrative means.
Verify the OPERABLE          Once per 31 days door is locked closed in the affected air lock.
(continued) erce                  I          kO)
Vogtle Vogtle Units Units 11 and and 22        3.6.2-2 3.6.2-2                Amendment No.
Amendment    No. 96 96 (Unit (Unit 1) 1)
Amendment No.
Amendment    No. 74 74 (Unit (Unit 2) 2)
 
Containment Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION                    REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME B. One or more              ---------NOTES--------
NOTES containment air locks    1. Required Actions B.1, B.2, and with containment air lock    B.3 B.3 are not applicable if both interlock mechanism          doors inin the same air lock are inoperable.                  inoperable and Condition C is entered.
: 2. Entry and exit of containment are permissible under the control of a dedicated individual.
B.1      Verify an OPERABLE door is closed in the 1 hour Ihour          p{C1 "7/\ b(t affected air lock.
(((]ll AND O;t....-
B.2      Lock an OPERABLE door        24 hours closed in the affected air lock.
((
(f  0 ID  l (
AND B.3      --------NOTE---------
NOTE Air lock doors in high radiation areas may be verified locked closed by administrative means.
Verify an an OPERABLE          Once per 31 31 days door isis locked closed in in the affected air lock.
(continued)
(03 Vogtle Units Units I1 and and 22                    3.6.2-3 3.6.2-3                  Amendment No.
No. 96 (Unit 1)1)
No. 74 Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
 
Containment Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 c ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION                REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME C. One or more              C.1  Initiate action to evaluate  Immediately locks containment air locks        overall containment reasons inoperable for reasons other than Condition A leakage rate per LCO leakage 3.6.1..
3.6.1 LCO 5p~+J or B.
AND                                                    3/~ 1 C.2  Verify a door is closed in    11 hour the affected air lock.                    .MVike)
AND C.3  Restore air lock to OPERABLE status.
24 hours    I?JJ-IVvA Jf v Id"&#xa3;*)1\
y1J  -
o D. Required Action and      D.1  Be in MODE 3.                  6 hours associated Completion Time not met.            AND D.2  Be in MODE 5.                  36 hours d
1 7O3k Vogtle Units 11 and 22                3.6.2-4                              No. 96 (Unit Amendment No.        (Unit 1) 1)
No. 74 Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2) 2)
 
Containment Containment Air Locks Locks 3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE                                            FREQUENCY FREQUENCY 3.6.2.1 SR 3.6.2.1                                      -NOTES-
                        ----------------------------N()TES----------------------------
: 1.      An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
: 2.      Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.
Perform required air lock leakage rate testing in              In accordance with accordance with the Containment Leakage Rage                  the Containment Testing Program.                                              Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.2.2          Verify only one door in the air lock can be opened              18 months at a time.
c eeefc (Q
( Vogtle Units Units 11 and and 22                              3.6.2-5                                No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.            1)
No. 74 Amendment No. 74 (Unit (Unit 2)
: 17. G2.1.5 001001 Which ONE of the following would be    be CORRECT regarding the stated condition and requirements?
action regarding shift crew minimum staffing requirements?
c          A. An SO has called in just prior to shift turnover and will be about an hour late due to a flat tire. This would put staffing 11 below the minimum.
It will not be necessary to hold anyone over since he will arrive at the plant within the next hour.
B. An SO has unexpectedly failed an FFD B.                                          FED test and is not allowed back on site. This puts staffing 11 below the minimum.
Shift crew minimum could be reduced by 11 person for a time period not to exceed 11 shift.
C~
C,  2 licensed control room operators have become extremely sick due to something they ate and have to leave work. This puts staffing 11 below the minimum.
Shift crew minimum could be reduced by 1      1 person for a time period not to exceed 2 hours.
D. An RO has called in sick just prior to shift turnover. Another RO has been called in and can arrive within 2 hours. This puts staffing 11 below minimum until he arrives.
It would not be necessary to hold over the day shift RO.
c.
Page: 32 32 of 49 49                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
KIA G2.1 .5 Ability to locate and use procedures and directives related to shift staffing G2.1.S
(                    and activities.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Questions gives several plausible scenarios the candidate may encounter as an SRO regarding minimum shift staffing and the candidate has to determine the correct action.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria item ##2 Question meets 10CFR55.43(b)                      2 - Facility operating limits in Tech Specs and their bases. There is no bases for the Shift Mannin Admin requirements.
Question also is SRO due to KA importance factor for this topic is only 2.3 for the RO level and 3.4 for the SRO level. Therefore, it is an SRO only topic.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. You can only go below minimum staffing for an exepected absence of duty. In this instance, there would be time to hold shift personnel over to maintain the minimum staffing. Plausible the candidate could think it would be OK to allow the personnel to leave as long as the off duty person arrives within 2 hours or not think of minimun requirements pertaining to non-licensed personnel.
B. Incorrect. Miminum for unexpected on duty person is limited to 2 hours. Would need a replacement within 2 hours. Plausible the candidate could think there is one shift to replace the persons since a lot of other admin requirements are within one shift.
C. Correct. Could go below minimum due to unexpected absense but would be required to replace the personnel within 2 hours.
D. Incorrect. There is a 2 hour time limit for unexpected absence of on duty personnel.
Would have to hold someone over. Plausible the candidate would think it is OK to allow the person to leave since a replacement should arrive within 2 hours.
REFERENCES 10003-C, Manning 10003-C,    "Manning the Shift, Shift", REQUIREMENT #3.8 # 3.8 G2.1 G2.1.5 .5 from Vogtle October 2005 SRO Audit Exam VEGP learning objectives:
Not applicable.
l Page:
Page: 33 33 of of 49 49                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
ApprovedBy Approved C. H.
C.
By Williams, Jr.
H. Williams,  Jr.            Vogtle Electric Vogtle    Electric Generating Generating Plant  Plant  A                Procedw-e ProcedureNumber 10003-C 10003-C Number  Rev Rev 24 24 DateApproved Date  Approved                                                                                      Page  Number PageNumber 1/11/2004 111112004                                    MANNING THE MANNING            THE SHIFT SHIFT                                  40f6 4 of 6
(  3 8 3.8 .              The    shift crew The shift    crew minimum minimum requirements requirements may      may bebe reduced reduced by by one one persOjl persop      RJE 7  5 tJII\
M
      ~              for      period of f or aa period    of time time not not toto exceed exceed 22 hours.hours. This This isis to to            ~          i Olll r-~~5~e~ccommodate
      )eccommodate the                  the unexpected unexpected absence absence of      of on-duty on-duty shift shift personnel.
persoel.                      J~
ff    ~t    Immediate action Immediate      action shall shall bebe taken taken to        restore manning to restore    manning to to the the minimum minimum      n (
c:Q        requirements. This requirements.
to be to    be unmanned This provision unmanned upon provision does upon shift shift change change due does not due to permit any not permit tardiness or to tardiness shift Position~'\
any shift      position or absence absence of    of ~
u (e3
                                                                                                                                ~
                                                                                                                                  ~
on-coming    personnel.
on-coming personnel.            ~ 1) (
1                    1- IC (      '"                                  1. I r  e3 t
NA 1"'''''          ~\
f,:, 004-      0 \. I Q
3.9 3.9                During any During    any absence absence of  of the the USS USS from  from the the Control Control Room Room while while either either        ~t~ ~
unit is unit    is in in Mode Mode 1,1, 2,2, 33 or or 4, 4, an    an individual individual with with aa valid valid SRO SRO license      shall be license shall      be designated designated to  to assume assume the the Unit's Units Control Control RoomRoom operating responsibilities.
operating      responsibilities. During    During any  any absence absence of of the the USS USS from from the    Control Room the Control    Room while while either either unit  unit is is in in Mode Mode 55 oror 6, 6, an an individual with individual      with aa valid valid SRO SRO or or RO  RO license license shall shall be be designated designated to    to assume the assume    the Unit's Units Control Control Room Room operating operating responsibilities.
responsibilities.
3.10 3.10              The    balance of The balance    of Plant Plant (BOP)
(BOP) operator operator will    will normally normally remain remain in  in the the Control Room Control      Room when when not not needed needed elsewhere elsewhere in  in the the plant.
plant.
3.11 3.11                The SS The    SS shall shall designate designate aa qualified qualified person  person toto perform perform thethe Shift Shift Technical      Advisor Technical Advisor (STA)    (STA) function function at      at the the beginning beginning of  of each each shift.
shift.
Shift Technical The Shift The            Technical Advisor Advisor (STA)(STA) provides provides engineering engineering expertise expertise during    operational emergencies during operational          emergencies to      to assess assess plant plant status status and and assist assist implementing EOPs.
in implementing in                    EOPs.
The STA The    STA may may be be aa dual dual role role position position if      if the the Shift Shift Superintendent Superintendent (SS),
(SS), USS,    or SSS USS, or  SSS holds holds aa bachelors bachelors degree  degree in in engineering engineering or    or aa related science.
related      science. ThisThis dual-roled dual-roled position position will will notnot normally normally be    be Emergency Plan the Emergency the                Plan Communicator Communicator or      or the the Fire Fire Brigade Brigade Captain.
Captain.
If an If    an STA STA is is assigned assigned on  on shift, shift, he    he or or she she will will report report toto thethe SS.SS.
3.12 3.12              The SS The        should use SS should    use the the guidance guidance provided provided in  in Procedure Procedure 00012-C, 00012-C, Shift Manning "Shift    Manning Requirements",
Requirements, to        to ensure ensure that that the the shift shift isis adequately staffed adequately      staffed to  to meet meet applicable applicable regulatory regulatory requirements.
requirements.
4.0
: 4. 0              REFERENCES REFERENCES 4.1 4.1                          Technical Specifications Vogtle Technical Vogtle                  Specifications Section  Section 5.2.2 5.2.2 and and TRM TRM 15.1 15.1 4.2 4.2                PROCEDURES PROCEDURBS 4.2.1 4.2.1              10000-C, 10000-C,              "Conduct Conduct Of Of Operations" Operations 4.2.2 4.2.2              00715-C, 00715-C,                Licensed Operator "Licensed      Operator Requalification Requalification Program" Program END OF END  OF PROCEDURE PROCEDURE TEXT    TEXT
(
1,/3 Printed June Printed    June 6,  2007 at 6, 2007      3:49 at 3:49
 
18.
: 18. G2.1.34 001 Given the following conditions:
r          - Unit 1I has just tripped from 100% power and is at no-load temperature and pressure.
          - Chemistry has sampled the primary and secondary plants.
Which ONE of the following CORRECTLY states the Tech Spec limits for RCS Dose Equivalent 1-131 and Secondary Specific Activity?
RCS Dose Res                            Secondary Equivalent 1-131              Specific Activity A. 0.15 micro curies per gram              1.5 micro curies per gram B. 1.5 micro curies per gram                0.15 micro curies per gram C. 0.10 micro curies per gram              1.0 micro curies per gram D~
D  1.0 micro curies per gram                0.10 micro curies per gram Page: 34 of 49 34 of 49                                                                            6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
KIA G2.1.34 Ability to maintain primary and secondary plant chemistry within allowable c                    limits.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS scenario..
Question gives a plausible scenario OCFR55.43(b) criteria item ##2 Question is SRO and meets 1IOCFR55.43(b)                          Facility operating limits in 2 - Facility Tech Specs and their bases.
Question is also SRO due to the KA Catalog importance factor for this KA # is only a 2.3 for RO and is 3.4 for SRO. Therefore, it is an SRO level question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may confuse the limit with the values for Chlorides or Fluorides from the TRM and invert the numbers.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may confuse the limit with the values for Chlorides or Fluorides from the TRM.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may invert the correct values for primary and secondary 1-131.
D. Correct.
REFERENCES TRM 13.4.1 Reactor Coolant System - Chemistry.
HL-AW-39000-OO-016 Vogtle SRO Audit question from HL-13.
HL-AW-39000-00-016 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-64101-03, State the LCO applicability and any action statement required within one hour for the following Technical Specifications:
: a. T.R.M. 13.4.1 13.4.1 Chemistry
: b. T.S. 3.4.16 Specific Activity l
Page:
Page: 35 35 of 49 49                                                                                  6/6/200 6/6/20077
 
c, Number Number LO-LP-63930-05 Text Text State the State    the posting posting requirements requirements forfor each each ofof the following areas:
the following  areas:
LO-LP-63930-05 a.a. DRestricted    Area Restricted Area
: b. [Radiation
: b. DRadiation Control Control Area Area (RCA)
(RCA) c.c. iRadiation DRadiation Area Area
: d. [High
: d. DHigh Radiation Radiation Area Area e.e. [Locked DLocked HighHigh Radiation Radiation Area Area f.f. [Hot DHot Spot Spot g.g. [Contaminated DContaminated Area Area h.h. [Airborne DAirbome Radioactivity Radioactivity Area Area i.i. DRadioactive      Materials Area iRadioactive Materials      Area j.j. [Hot DHot Particle Particle Control Control Area Area
: k. [Hot
: k. DHot Particle Particle Buffer Buffer Area Area I. [Very DVery High High Radiation Radiation Area Area LO-LP-63930-06 LO-LP-63930-06      State the State    the entry  requirements applicable entry requirements                to each applicable to  each of  the following:
of the  following:
: a. [Restricted
: a. 0 Restricted Area Area
: b. [Radiation
: b. DRadiation Control Control Area Area (RCA)
(RCA)
DRadiation Area
: c. [Radiation      Area
: d. DHigh
: d.    [High Radiation Area
: e. DLocked
[Locked HighHigh Radiation Area DHot Spot
: f. [Hot      Spot
: g. DContaminated
[Contaminated Area
: h. DAirbome
[Airborne Radioactivity Area
: i. DRadioactivity
[Radioactivity Materials Area
: j. DHot
[Hot Particle Control Area
: k. DHot
[Hot Particle Buffer Area I. DVery High Radiation Area l.EVery LO-LP-63930-0B LO-LP-63930-08      Given a requirement for entry into an area containing radiation or                            state the RWP or contamination, Btate    RWP requirement for that area.
LO-LP-63930-09      Describe the routing required for RWP issuance.
LO-LP-63930-10 LO-LP-63930-1 0    State the conditions under which a general and/or specific RWP may be terminated.
LO-LP-63930-11 LO-LP-63930-1 1    State the frisking requirements necessary when leaving the RCA.
LO-LP-641 01-01 LO-LP-64101-01      Describe major sample flowpaths from RCS and pressurizer through the NSSL.
LO-LP-641 01-02 LO-LP-64101-02      With regards to the Primary Sampling System, state the Primary Sampling sample points.
LO-LP-64101-03      State the LCO  LCD applicability andand any action statement required within one hour for the following Technical Specifications:
: a. T.R.M 13.4.1 13.4.1 chemistry b.
: b. T.S.
T.S. 3.4.16 3.4.16 specific activity LO-LP-641 02-01 LO-LP-64102-D1      List List eight eight sample sample points points into into the the TPSS TPSS for    which continuous for which  continuous monitoring monitoring is  is provided.
provided.
LO-LP-661 LO-LP-661 00-01 00-01    State State methods methods usedused to to deliver deliver clear clear and and concise concise messages.
messages.
LO-LP-661 LO-LP-661 00-02 00-02    State State the    fundamentals of the fundamentals      of group  communication and group communication        and how how these these fundamentals  are applied fundamentals are          in the applied in  the control control room room setting.
setting.
Friday, June Friday, June 01, 01, 2007 2007                                                                                                          Page  102 of Page 102    165 of165 eece Sr/,3
 
(
HL-AW-39000-00 016
: 15. lll..-A W-39000-00 016 Giv ivenen the the follow followi  ng condit conditi  ons:
ing          ions:
Unit 11 has
* Unit        has just just trippe tripped  from 100%
100% powepower d from                          and isis at r and        at no-loa no-load  d tempe tem rature perature and and presspressu  ure.
re.
Chemis
* Chem        try has istry  has samp sampled      the prima primary led the          ry and and secon second    ary plants dary    plan .ts.
Which ONE Which      ONE of  of the the follow followiing ng correc correcttly ly states states the the Tech Tech Spec Spec limits limits for for RCS RCS Dose Equ    ival ent  1-13 Equivalent 1-1311 and    and Secon Second                                                                    Dose ary  Spe dary Speci cifi ficc Activi Activitty?y?
RCS Dose RCS      Dose                                      Second Secon      ary dary Equ  ival Equiv alent ent 1-131 1-131                            Specifi Speci  ficc Activi Activittyy A.
A.
B. 1.5 B.
              .15 micro
            .15  micro curies 1.5 micro curies per micro curies per gram curies per gram per gram gram 1.5 micro 1.5    micro curies curies per gram gram  J_ P{        q ... '7 (
                                                                                                                          'hlLIL TilL        \'
Q.kA5 ~
Q&--v1i  5
                                                            ..15    mic 15 micro ' ro cunes curies. per gramgram                      w\,r.lA    ~ -,
                                                                                                                              ' V\.            ~5
_ 'H 11 C. .10 C. iO micro micro cur    ies per curies  per gra gram m            1.0 micro 1.0    micro cur    ies per gra curies          gram m :h D
D~ 1.0 1.0 mic  ro cur micro        ies per curies  per gra gram m          JO
                                                          .10 mic  microro cur curies ies per gragram m            1r)laLt.~I,1J7 le.L 7            '"
                                                                                                                                                'd."'f 1 (v ...... "r p                      c;ecc
                                                                                                                                      / 3e ccJ.~
L .(
ScttYY)                        //\
sec C-c
 
RCS RCS Chemistry TR 13.4.1 13.4.1 c 13.4 13.4  Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
TR 13.4.1      Chemistry TR 13.4.1                                maintained within the limits specified in Table 13.4.1-1.
RCS chemistry shall be maintained                                          13.4.1-1.
APPLICABILITY:        At all times, except for dissolved oxygen when T  Tavg avg ~ 250 of.
                                                                                      &deg;F.
ACTIONS CONDITION                          REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME A. One or more chemistry          A.1    Restore parameter to within      24 hours parameters > steady-parameters>                            steady-state limit.
state limit and ~ transient limit in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.
B. One or more chemistry          B.1    Be in Mode 3.                    6 hours parameters > transient parameters>
limit in MODES 1, 2, 3, or    AND 4.
B.2    Be in Mode 5.                    36 hours OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.
((continued) continued)
Ree c Vogtle Units I1 and and 22                    13.4 13.4 - 11
                                                  -                                              Rev.O Rev.0 Technical Requirement                                                                      12/26/96 12/26/96
 
RCS RCS Chemistry Chemistry TR 13.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION                                  REQUIRED ACTION              COMPLETION TIME C.
C.                  NOTE
        --------------NOTE------------        C.1 C.1                        reduce the Initiate action to reduce    Immediately All Required Actions must                    pressurizer pressure to :s; be completed whenever                        500 psig.
this Condition is entered.
        ----------------------------------    AND Chloride or fluoride                  C.2    Perform an engineering        Prior to increasing concentration >    > steady-                  evaluation to determine the  pressurizer pressure state limit for> 24 hours                    effects of the out-of-limit  >
                                                                                    > 500 psig.
in any condition other than                  condition on the structural MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.                          integrity of the RCS.        OR OR                                                                          Prior to entering MODE 4.
Chloride or fluoride concentration > transient concentration>                        AND limit in any condition other than MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.              C.3    Determine that the RCS        Prior to increasing remains acceptable for        pressurizer pressure continued operation.          >
                                                                                    > 500 psig.
OR Prior to entering MODE 4.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT SURVEILLANCES SURVEILLANCE                                        FREQUENCY TRS 13.4.1.1 13.4.1.1                                    NOTE
                    ---------------------------NOTE------------------------------
Not required to be performed for dissolved Not                                      dissolved oxygen Tavg:S; 250 when Tavg      250 &deg;F.of.
Verify RCS chemistry within limits specified on Table          72 hours 72 3.4.1-1.
(
Vogtle Units 11 and 22                            13.4 13.4 - 22
                                                        -                                          Rev.0 Rev.O Technical Requirement                                                                          12/26/96
 
RCS Chemistry RCS TR 13.4.1 c                                          Table 13.4.1-1 RCS Chemistry Limits PARAMETER                  STEADY-STATE LIMIT        TRANSIENT LIMIT (a)
Dissolved Oxygen    (a)                  ~  0.10 ppm            ~ 1.00 ppm
                                                                                  /"
Chloride                                  ~  0.15 ppm            ~ 1.50 ppm Fluoride                                  ~
0.l5ppm 0.15 ppm              1.50 ppm (a)
Limits not applicable when T T a ~ 250 &deg;F.
(a)
N of.
                                                              /
                                                          )/ (5rk2 c
: c. Vogtle Units 11 and 22                  13.4 13.4 - 33
                                                -                                Rev.O Rev.0 Technical Requirement                                                      12/26/96 12/26/96
 
RCS RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16
(
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity LCO 3.4.16              The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits.
APPLICABILITY:          MODES 11 and 2, MODE 3 with RCS average temperature (Tavg)        ~ 500&deg;F.
ACTIONS NOTE---,          ------------
LCO 3.0.4c is applicable.
CONDITION                        REQUIRED ACTION                  COMPLETION TIME A. DOSE EQUIVALENT                A.1        Verify DOSE                  Once perper44 hours iCifgm.
1-131 > 1.0 IlCi/gm.                      EQUIVALENT 1-131 within the acceptable region of Figure 3.4.16-1.
AND 41\15vv( IL/
(( D r Th l(
j
(.(
A.2        Restore DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 to within limit.
48 hours B. Gross specific activity of    B.1        Perform SR 3.4.16.2.          4 hours the reactor coolant not within limit.                  AND B.2        Be inin MODE 33 with          66 hours hours T avg << 500&deg;F.
Tavg    500&deg;F.
(continued)
                                -iiZ3L Vogtle Units Units 1I and 22                            3.4.16-1              Amendment No. No. 137 137 (Unit (Unit 1) 1)
Amendment No. 116 AmendmentNo.        116 (Unit2)
(Unit 2)
 
RCS RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 c ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION                          REQUIRED ACTION        COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and            C.1          Be in MODE 3 with    6 hours associated Completion                      Tavg T    < 500&deg;F.
avg <
Time of Condition A not met.
OR DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 in the unacceptable region of 3.4.16-1..
Figure 3.4.16-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE                              FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1        Verify reactor coolant gross specific            7 days OOIE ~Ci/gm.
activity S 1bolE  pCi/gm.
SR 3.4.16.2                                  NOTE Only required to be performed in MODE 1. 1.
Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131      14 14 days specific activity S 1.0 1 .0 JlCi/gm jiCi/gm..
AND Between 2 and 6 hours after aa THERMAL POWER change of ~ 15%15% RTP within aa 1      period 1 hour period (continued)
Vogtle Units I and 22 Units 1                                    3.4.16-2 3.4.16-2          Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment                  1)
Amendment No.
Amendment    No. 74 (Unit 2) 2)
                                                  /
 
RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 c* SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE                                    FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.3 SR                  ----------NO          NOTETE----------
until 31 days after a Not required to be performed until minimum of 2 effective full power minimum                      power days andand 20 MODE 11 operation have elapsed since days of MODE the reactor was last subcritical for ~ 48 hours.
Determine E E from a sample taken in MODE 11          184 days after a minimum of 2 effective full power days and 20 days of MODE 1I operation have elapsed since the reactor was last subcritical for ~ 48 hours.
Vogtle Units 1 and Units 1 and 22                        3.4.16-3                              No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.          1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
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Secondary Specific Activity 3.7.16 c 3.7  PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.16 Secondary Specific Activity LCO 3.7.16            The specific activity of the secondary coolant shall be ~ 0.10 IlCi/gm jiCilgm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
APPLICABILITY:        MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION                        REQUIRED ACTION                COMPLETION TIME A. Specific activity not        A.1        Be in MODE 3.                6 hours within limit.
AND A.2        Be in MODE 5.                36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE                                    FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1        Verify the specific activity of the secondary          31 days coolant is ~ 0.10 pCi/gm IlCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.
                                      '{J I (qlA '7/ ~ le. tv (',.,;
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l Vogtle Units I and 22 Units 1                                  3.7.16-1 3.7.16-1                Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
No. 96 Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2) 1)
Ae-feC'-u        ec    c e.. 6--2--, / '2;~
: 19. G2.2.7001 G2.2.7 001 A new system engineer has requested that CCP 1A    IA be started with the discharge valve throttled to determine current and flow rate data under these conditions.
(          Which ONE of the following describes the process for evaluating this test and who can perform this evaluation?
10CFR5O.59 process is required to determine if......... .
The 10CFR50.59 A. an NRC review of the results is required after conducting the test and the 50.59 evaluation can be performed by any currently licensed SRO.
B~
B  NRC approval is required prior to conducting the test and the 50.59 evaluation can only be performed by a qualified reviewer.
C. PRB approval is required prior to conducting the test and the 50.59 evaluation can be performed by any currently licensed SRO.
D. a PRB review of the results is required after conducting the test and the 50.59 evaluation can only be performed by a Qualified Reviewer.
Page: 36 of 49                                                                              6/6/2007
 
KIA G2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting tests or experiments not described in the safety analysis report.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario where engineering wants to perform a test on a safety related MOV. The candidate must determine what is required to allow performance of the test.
10CFR55.43(b) criteria for item ##3 Questions meets 10CFR55.43(b)                        3 - Facility license procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility.
Question also is SRO only due to the KA catalog # for RO only rates a 2.0 importance factor while the rating is 3.2 for SRO. Therefore, question is an SRO only question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible candidate may think an NRC review of the test results is required and any qualified SRO may perform.
B. Correct. Determines if NRC approval is required and a Qualified Reviewer to review.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think the PRB is highest level of approval but 10CFR5O.59 is to determine if NRC approval required. Also, plausible the candidate 10CFR50.59 may think the SRO level is all that is required.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think a PRB review of the test results is required and must be performed by a qualified reviewer.
REFERENCES NMP-AD-01 0, "10CFR50.59 NMP-AD-010,                                    Evaluations 1 OCFR5O.59 Screening and Evaluations" Oconee June 2004 NRC SRO Exam question # 21 VEGP learning objectives:
Explain the purpose of plant design control (SRO only)
LO-LP-63400-01 Explain
(
Page:
Page: 37 37 of 49 49                                                                                6/6/2007
 
Number                Text LO-LP-63350-04 LO-LP-63350-04        Describe the requirements for emergency maintenance and when emergency maintenance can be performed.
LO-LP-63350-05      State who, by title, must authorize work to begin for normal plant maintenance of plant systems, such as an idle condensate pump.
LO-LP-63350-06      Describe the action taken by the SS if the need for an emergency Work Order (WO) arises.
LO-LP-63350-07 LO-LP-63350-07      Define the following terms:
: a. Tool pouch maintenance
: b. Marker
: c. Emergency maintenance
: d. Functional test
: e. Operations controlled equipment
: f. Trouble shooting LO-LP-63350-08 LO-LP-63350-08      Discuss the types of information that the SS should consider prior to authorizing work, including documentation of work orders in LCO status sheets.
the documentation LO-LP-63350-09      Describe how to determine an assigned functional test is adequate on work orders following maintenance where a functional test is not pre-assigned, and who is responsible for this determination.
LO-LP-63354-O1 LO-LP-63354-01                              10CFR5O.65, Maintenance State the purpose of 10CFR50.65,      Maintenance Rule.
LO-LP-63354-02      Define the following terms relating to the Maintenance Rule:
: a. OCategory ElCategory (a)(1) bzlCategory
: b. OCategory (a)(2) c.EJCritical
: c. OCritical Safety Function d.LMaintenance
: d. OMaintenance Rule Functions e.
eEl  Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual OMaintenance f.f.EOut OOut of Service Time ZSystem Unavailable
: g. OSystem hzlSystem
: h. OSystem Reliability LO-LP-63354-03                            Superintendents responsibility concerning maintenance activities Describe the Shift Superintendent's LO-LP-63354-04      Describe what actions can be taken to minimize the impact of maintenance on plant safety.
LO-LP-63354-05 LO-LP-63354-05      Describe the rules concerning emergent work and pre-release activities.
LO-LP-63400-O1 LO-LP-63400-01      Explain the purpose of the plant design control (SRO ONLY).
LO-LP-63400-03      Briefly describe the essential elements of plant design control.
LO-LP-63400-04                                                                                  design control:
Give a brief description of the following plant documents that support plant design
: a. DELETED a.DELETED
: b. DELETED b.DELETED
: c. Design change package
: d. Design change request
: e. Field change request
: f. Minor design change
: g. Component design change
: h. As-built notice
: i. Equivalency determination
                      ].j. DELETED
: k. Request for engineering review I. Request for engineering assistance
: m. DELETED
: n. DELETED l Friday, June Juite 01, 2007 Page 96 of 165
                                                  /eec Sf(7
 
OCONEE OCONEE NRC  NRC SRO SRO EXAM EXAM 06-25-2004 06*25*2004 11 POINT c Question 21 Question Engineering wants to safety analysis.
safety to conduct aa temporary test ITT)(IT) procedure procedure not described described inin the Which ONE Which  ONE ofof the the following describes describes the    process for evaluating the process        evaluating this this test and and who who can can perform this evaluation?
perform The 10CFR5O.59 The                process is 10CFR50.59 process      Is required  to determine if...
required to              if .. .
NRC approval A. NRC                required prior to conducting this test and can be approval is required                                                  performed by be performed    by any any licensed SRO.
currently licensed B. NRC approval is required prior to conducting this test and can only be B. NRC                                                                          be performed by Qualified Reviewer.
a Qualified C. PORC approval Is C.                    is required prior to conducting this test and can be performed performed byby any currently licensed SRO.
D. PORC approval Is  is required prior to conducting this test and can only be performed performed by a Qualified Reviewer.
7
 
OCONEE OCONEE NRC  NRC SROSRO EXAM EXAM 06-25-2004 06-25-2004 Question 21 Question  21 T3      CFR: 43.3145.13 T3 - CFR:    43.3/45.13 c
Knowledge of G2.2.7, Knowledge G2.2.7,                of the the process process forfor conducting    tests or conducting tests      or experiments experiments not not described in described    In the the safety saf      analysis.  (2.013.2) analysis. (2.0/3.2)
Answer: B Answer:    B A. incorrect, A. Incorrect, first first part part is  correct. Second is correct.            part is Second part      Incorrect. in is incorrect. Operations only In Operations    only Qualified Qualified Reviewers can Reviewers    can perform    10CFR50.59 screenings perfonn IOCFR5O.59        screenings andand evaluations.
evaluations.
B. Correct, B. Correct, the                    process Is 10CFR50.59 process the 10CFR5O.59                  Is required required toto determine determine if  If NRC    approval is NRC approval      Is to conducting aa test prior to required prior                          teet and  in Operations and in  Operations can      only be can only  be performed performed by    Qualified Reviewer.
by aa Qualified    Reviewer.
C.
C. Incorrect, first first part  is incorrect.
part is              The 110CFR50.59 incorrect. The    OCFR5O.59 process is      is NOT  used to NOT used    to determine determine PORe approval is required. The ifIf PORC                                10CFR50.59 process is The 10CFR5O.59                                  determine ifif to determine is required to NRC approval NRC    approval is  requIred prior to conducting a test. Second part is is required                                                    Incorrect. in Is incorrect. In Operations onlyonly Qualified Reviewers                                    screenings and 10CFR50.59 screenings Reviewers can perform 10CFR5O.59                          and evaluations.
D. Incorrect, first part is
: 0.                                              OCFR5O.59 process Is incorrect. The 11OCFRSO.59      process is    NOT used to determine is NOT            detennine if PORC approval is                      10CFR5O.59 process is required to determine Ifif is required. The 10CFR50.59 NRC approval is required prior to conducting a test. Second  Second part is correct.
Technical Reference(s): NSD-209 (1        OCFR5O.59 Process)
(10CFR50.59      Process)
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: None Question Source: NEW Question History: Last NRC Exam _ _ _ __
Question Cognitive Level:                Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis Rewrote question to better better match KA.
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Southern Nuclear Operating Southern              Operating Company Company I  SOUTHERN SOUTHERN COMPANY A
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Nuclear Management Procedure I
I 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations 10                                  Evaluations I      NMP-AD-010 Version 1.0 Page 11 of 19 I Procedure Owner:                                  W. F. Kitchens 1/ Fleet Improvement lmrrovement Mgr.
(Print: Name I/ Title I Site)
Approved By:                          Original Signed by WW.. F. Kitchens                  1/    01/04/2007 0 1/04/2007 Owners Approval Signature)
(Procedure Owner's                                          (Approval Date)
Effective Dates:              01/18/07                  01/18/07                    03/30107 03/30/07            02/16/07 Corporate                      FNP                      HNP                VEGP The individuals listed below are members of the Performance Improvement Peer Team and are responsible for the creation and maintenance of this procedure.
SNC Corporate Office                  - W. F. Kitchens (Champion)
Farley Nuclear Plant                  - W. R. Bayne Hatch Nuclear Plant                    - K. A. Underwood Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - W. G. Copeland SNC Corporate Office                  - T. M. Milton (Procedure Writer)
PROCEDURE USAGE REQUIREMENTS                                                SECTIONS Procedure must be open and readily available at the Continuous Use:              work location. Follow procedure step by                unless by step unless otherwise_directed_by_the_procedure.
otherwise directed by the procedure.
Procedure or applicable section(s) section(s) available at the work Reference Use:    Use:            .
location for ready reference by person performing steps.
location Information Information Use:  Use:      Available on site for reference as needed.
needed.                            ALL S
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Nuclear Operating Company Southern Nuclear
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I SOUIHERNA SOUTHERN ESYW,W COMPANY COMPANY urrt:/_Sn-Y.. rVllnU" Nuclear Management Management Procedure I
i 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations 10 I      NMP-AO-010 NMP-AD-O10 Version 1.0 1.0 Page 2 of 19    1 Procedure Version Description Version Number                                                      Description Version Descri  tion 1.0            Version 1.0 represents a common approach to be used at all  all SNC locations for 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and preparing 10                        and Evaluations. ItIt supercedes the following site procedures which were previously used to perform this task:
* Corporate: TS-003, Version 3.0
* Farley: FNP-0-AP-88, Version 8.0
* Hatch: 11OAC-MGR-010-0, OAC-MGR-01 0-0, Version 6.0
* VoVoqtle:
tie: 00056-C, Version 21.2 Printed: 6/6/2007 6/6/20074:144:14 AM AM
 
Southern Nuclear Nuclear Operating Company      Company Nuclear                                                                                                NMP-AD-010 NMP-AD-010 SOUTHERNSa SOUTHERN..\.          Management                  10 CFR CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations                                        Version 1.0  1.0 COMPANY COMPANY EnnygaSenYpur11/4,W
  ~1'V~Snw  Y",r w.rIir  Procedure                                                                                                Page 3 of 19 r                                                              Table of Contents Page 1.0        Purpose ...................................................................................................................................... 4 2.0        Applicability ................................................................................................................................ 4 3.0        References ................................................................................................................................. 5 References 4.0        Definitions .................................................................................................................................. 5 5.0        Responsibilities .......................................................................................................................... 5 6.0        Procedure .................................................................................................................................. 7 7.0        Records .................................................................................................................................... 18 8.0        Commitments ........................................................................................................................... 18
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Southern Nuclear Southern  Nuclear Operating Company
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SOUTHERN SOUTHERN.\.
COMPANY U"D'.Sn- y..,.1&#xa5;WU' 1.0 1.0        Purpose Nuclear Management Procedure I
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10 CFR 10  CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations I      NMP-AD-010 NMP-AD-010 Version 1.0 1.0 Page 4 of 19      1 This procedure describes the process for compliance with the requirements of 10          10 CFR 50.59 using the guidelines contained in NEI 96-07, Revision 1. This document defines the responsibilities and responsibilities      and establishes the controls and and methods for the 10 CFR 50.59 process including development and review. Methods described herein      herein are sufficiently detailed to enable enable individuals to organize and prepare prepare 10 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations needed to support various activities to be performed within Southern Nuclear  Nuclear Operating Company (SNC).
2.0        Applicability This procedure applies to all personnel within the SNC organization who prepare and review 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations. Activities for which 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations must be prepared are identified by completion of an Applicability Determination Checklist. Refer to NMP-AD-008 (Reference 3.5) for information on preparation of an Applicability Determination.
If an Applicability Determination concludes that 10 CFR 50.59 is applicable to an activity, then a 10 CFR 50.59 screen is performed which further determines if a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation is required. Accordingly, a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation establishes the basis for determining if NRC approval must be obtained prior to implementation of the activity. NRC approval is obtained by licensee application for a license amendment. An explanation of the process for performing a 10 CFR 50.59 screen and a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation is provided in this procedure.
Additional guidance regarding digital design activities is provided in Reference 3.4. For digital-to-digital changes that appear to be like-for-like replacements, an equivalency evaluation should be performed to determine if the replacement is a plant design change (subject to 10 CFR 50.59) versus a maintenance activity (subject to 10 CFR 50.65). Digital-to-digital changes may not necessarily be like-for-like because the system behaviors, response time, failure modes, etc.
for the new system may be different from the old system. If the vendor, hardware, firmware, application software, and configuration data are identical, then the upgrade may be a like-for-like maintenance activity to be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65, and 10 CFR 50.59 would not apply.
Note:          If it has been predetermined and documented in a procedure that an activity or group of activities do not require a 10  10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, neither an Applicability Determination nor a 10    10 CFR 50.59 screen need to be performed or documented. The procedure serves as the documented Applicability DeterminationllO Determination/10 CFR 50.59 screen.
Otherwise, Otherwise, an      Applicability  Determination  Checklist should should be completed for proposed activities.
In general, this procedure applies to the implementation of certain activities that affect the In following:
* Changes to structures, systems, and components outlined, summarized, or completely described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) including items    items incorporated by reference. (Refer to NEI 98-03, Revision 1,    1, Guidelines "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports Reports" for additional guidance guidance on this topic.)
* Permanent and  and temporary design changes.
* Changes to  to plant procedures outlined, outlined, summarized or completely described described in the Updated FSAR.
Printed:
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Southern Nuclear Operating ComRan~
Company
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SOUTHERN SOUTHERN COMPANY COMPANY A
    &"'DIOSw"" Ho.,WfwV Nuclear Management Procedure I
I I
10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations Test or experiments not described in the Updated FSAR.
I      NMP-AD-010 Version 1.0 Page 5 of 19    1
* Revisions to NRC approved analysis methodology or assumptions as described in the Updated FSAR.
* Proposed compensatory actions to address degraded or non-conforming conditions.
3.0          References 3.1          10 CFR 50.59: Changes, Tests, and Experiments.
10 3.2          NEI 96-07, Revision 1: Guidelines for 1010 CFR 50.59 Implementation (NEI96-07, (NEI 96-07, Rev. 1).
3.3          Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-20, Revision To Guidance Formerly Contained In NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Information To Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections On Resolution Of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability, dated September 26,2005.
26, 2005.
3.4          RIS 2002-22, Use of EPRI/NEI Joint Task Force Report, Guideline on Licensing Digital Upgrades: EPRI TR-102348, Revision 1, NEI 01-01: A Revision of EPRI TR-102348 to reflect changes to the 10 CFR 50.59 Rule.
3.5          NMP-AD-008, Applicability Determinations.
3.6          NMP-AD-009, Licensing Document Change Requests.
3.7          Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments.
3.8          Plateau Qualification, S-CFR-EVAL (10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Training).
3.9          Plant Review Board, NMP-GM-009.
3.10          NMP-AD-010-F01, NMP-AD-01    0-F01, 10 CFR 50.59 Screening/Evaluation Form.
4.0          Definitions Refer to NEI 96-07, Revision 1, Section 3 for the definition of terms used in conjunction with this procedure. Refer to Reference 3.4 for additional definition of terms applicable to digital design activities.
5.0          Responsibilities 5.1          Manager 5.1.1        Assures that 10 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations prepared within the group receive adequate reviews.
5.1.2        Assures appropriate personnel within the group are qualified (Reference 3.8) to perform or review 10 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations to support activities under their responsibility.
6/6/2007 4:14 AM Printed: 6/6/20074:14
 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear Nuclear                                                              NMP-AD-010 NMP-AO-010 SOUTHERN SOUTHERN COMPANY A        Management          10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations                Version 1.0 1.0 ESY,iA EM'VNSnwY..,.VWU"          Procedure                                                              Page6of Page  6 of 19
(            5.1.3          Recommends approval to the PRB for 10 CFR 50.59 screens that have a Yes answer in Section B of NMP-AO-01 NMP-AD-010-F01 0-F01 (Reference 3.10) for activities under their responsibility.
5.2          10 CFR 50.59 Preparer The preparer is a knowledgeable person trained in the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 preparers (Reference 3.8), with additional technical qualifications determined by the preparer's management sufficient to prepare or revise a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation to support an preparers area of responsibility.
activity within the preparer's 5.2.1          Performs necessary research (includes obtaining data from various engineering disciplines or organizations, if necessary) to develop a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation that is technically correct.
5.2.2          Using the guidance contained in References 3.2 and 3.4, as applicable, prepares complete, consistent, clear, and accurate 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations.
5.3          10 CFR 50.59 Reviewer 10 The reviewer is a knowledgeable person trained in the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 (Reference 3.8), with additional technical qualifications determined by the reviewer's reviewers management sufficient to prepare the 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations being reviewed.
The reviewer should not have participated in the preparation of the 10    10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation. The reviewer concurs that the 10      10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is complete, consistent, clear, and accurate, and endorses the conclusion of the 10 CFR 50.59 reviewers comments.
screen/evaluation upon satisfactory disposition of the reviewer's 5.4        10 CFR 50.59 Nuclear Regulatory Reviewer 10 The Nuclear Regulatory reviewer is a knowledgeable person trained in the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 (Reference 3.8). The Nuclear Regulatory reviewer is also knowledgeable 10 regarding other regulatory requirements that may be applicable to the activity. The Nuclear Regulatory reviewer concurs that the 10    10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is complete, consistent, clear, and accurate, and endorses the conclusions of the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation upon satisfactory disposition of the reviewers reviewer's comments. A Nuclear Regulatory review signature is not required for aa 10  10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation prepared at the plant site.
5.5 5.5        10 CFR 50.59 Nuclear Hazards Reviewer 10 The Nuclear Nuclear Hazards Hazards reviewer is aa knowledgeable person trained in the requirements of 10    10 CFR 50.59 (Reference 3.8). The Nuclear Hazards reviewer is          is also knowledgeable regarding hazard requirements related to issues such as      as tornados, missiles, heavy loads, loads, pipe break, floods, pressure/tern    perature analysis, pressure/temperature  analysis, hydrogen generation, radiation protection and and shielding, and toxic chemicals. The Nuclear Hazards reviewer concurs that the 10          10 CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation has  has appropriately considered considered hazard hazard issues.
issues. A Nuclear Nuclear Hazards Hazards review signature signature is is not not required required for aa 10 10 CFR CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation prepared at  at the plant
(                  site.
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Nuclear Operating Company Southern Nuclear
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SOUTHERN COMPANY W"D"'Snw,...,"ArU" 5.6 Nuclear Nuclear Management Procedure Personnel Requirements I
I I
10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations 10 I      NMP-AO-010 NMP-AD-010 Version 1.0 Page 1.0 Page 7 of 19    1 Personnel who prepare and review 110      0 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations will be trained in accordance with Reference 3.8. Additionally, 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations will be prepared and reviewed by persons working within a quality assurance program that conforms to 10  10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
5.7        Plant Review Board/Qualified Reviewer Reviews selected 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations to make a determination as to whether a license amendment is involved.
5.8        Safety Review Board Selected 10 CFR 50.59 screens/evaluations are reviewed for: 1) changes to procedures, structures, systems, or components and 2) tests or experiments completed under the provision of 10 CFR 50.59 to verify such actions do not involve a license amendment.
6.0        Procedure This section establishes the basis for a common understanding and application of 10 CFR 50.59, and establishes minimum requirements to ensure consistency in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.
6.1        10 CFR 50.59 Consideration 6.1.1          Quotation from 10 10 CFR 50.59 (c)(1) A licensee may make changes in the facility as described in the final safety
                              "(c)(1) analysis report (as updated), make changes in the procedures as described in the final safety analysis report (as updated), and conduct tests or experiments not described in the final safety analysis report (as updated) without obtaining a license amendment pursuant to &sect; 50.90 only if:
Note:          For the purposes of this procedure, Updated FSAR refers to the current FSAR as updated per 10    10 CFR 50.71(e), approved changes to the Updated FSAR which have not yet been submitted to the NRC by amendment, and documents incorporated into the Updated FSAR by reference.
(i)    A change to the technical specifications incorporated in                      not in the license is not required, and (ii)    The change, test, or experiment does not    meet any not meet    any of the criteria in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(cX2)
(c)(2) A licensee shall obtain aa license amendment pursuant to &sect;&sect; 50.90  50.90 prior prior to implementing implementing aa proposed change, test,test, or experiment ifif the change, test, test, or experiment would:
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Nuclear Operating Company Southern Nuclear
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Nuclear Nuclear Management Management Procedure (i)
I 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations 10                                Evaluations I      NMP-AD-010 NMP-AO-010 Version 1.0 1.0 Page 8 of 19 Result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an I
accident previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report (as updated);
(ii)      Result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of aa structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in in the final safety analysis analysis report report (as (as updated);
(iii)                more than a minimal increase in Result in more                              in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report (as updated);
(iv)      Result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report (as updated);
(v)        Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report (as updated);
(vi)      Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report (as updated);
(vii)      Result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the FSAR (as updated) being exceeded or altered; or (viii)    Result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the FSAR (as updated) used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.
(c)(3) In implementing this paragraph, the FSAR (as updated) is considered to include FSAR changes resulting from evaluations performed pursuant to this section and analyses performed pursuant to &sect;        &sect; 50.90 since submittal of the last update of the final safety analysis report pursuant to &sect;&sect; 50.71 of this part.
(c)(4) The provisions in this section do not apply to changes to the facility or procedures when the applicable regulations establish more specific criteria for accomplishing such changes.
(d)(1)
(d)(  1) The licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility, of changes in procedures, procedures, and of tests and experiments made pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section. These records must include aa written evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change, test or experiment does not          not require aa license amendment pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of this section. section."
(d)(2) The licensee shall                as specified in &sect;&sect; 50.4, aa report containing aa brief shall submit, as description description of any changes, tests, and experiments, including                summary of the including aa summary evaluation of each. A report must be submitted at intervals not to exceed 24 months.
(d)(3) The records of changes in the facility must be maintained until      until the termination of aa license issued issued pursuant pursuant to this part or the termination of aa license license issued pursuant pursuant to c~                                  10 CFR Part 54, 10 tests and 54, whichever is later. Records of changes in procedures and and experiments must be maintained maintained for aa period of of 55 years.
and records of Printed:
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear                                                                NMP-AO-010 SOUTHERN COMPANY A        Management            10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations              Version 1.0 ur'V,.SnwY..r . v        Procedure                                                                Page 9 of 19
(            6.1.2        Explanation of 10 CFR 50.59 6.1.2.1      General 6.1.2.1.1        10 CFR 50.59 is a legal requirement established to prevent plant changes from degrading the safety design basis of the plant.
* licensee can show (through a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation If the licensee and a review of the Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan) a proposed activity does not require a license amendment, the NRC, by authority of 10 CFR 50.59, grants the utility pre-approval to conduct the activity. In such cases, the utility has the leeway to do what it determines is best for operation of the facility, provided the activity does not conflict with another license requirement.
* However, if a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation and/or review of the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan concludes that an activity proposed by the utility is contrary to the basis for design and operation of the plant as described in the Updated FSAR, and/or requires a change to the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan, prior NRC approval and an amendment to the operating license is required prior to conducting the activity. (Refer to subsection 6.4.2 for guidance on exceptions.) The 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation provides confidence that safety is maintained.
6.1.2.1.2      A change involving a license amendment is not necessarily unsafe. In fact, a change would be proposed for implementation only if it were found to be safe. The fact that a change involves a license amendment only means prior NRC review and approval are necessary for implementation of the change.
6.1.2.1.3      The range of changes covered in 10      10 CFR 50.59 is very broad. It includes changes to non safety-related, non safety-related that could impact safety, as well as safety-related safety-related systems and documents.
6.1.2.1.4 6.1.2.1.4      If, If, during the process process of preparing aa 10 10 CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation fora for a proposed activity, it is determined the activity requires a license amendment, one of four actions will normally occur; (1) aa more detailed evaluation incorporating all involved parties will be performed to determine whether the activity can be reclassified so it does does not require aa license amendment, (2) revision(s) to the activity will be attempted attempted such that it no  longer requires aa license amendment, (3) the change will be no longer withdrawn, or (4) aa request for aa license license amendment will be prepared.
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear                                                                    NMP-AD-010 SOUTHERN COMPANY A        Management          10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations                    Version 1.0
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(                  6.1.2.2      Simplified Statement of the Intent of 10 CFR 50.59 6.1.2.2.1                                  operating license The maintenance of an operating        license implies:
                                        **                                          maintain previously Plant design basis is adequate to maintain        previously NRC approved margins of safety.
* The structures, systems, and components described in the Updated analyzed to assure their proper function whenever FSAR have been "analyzed" required.
6.1.2.2.2      The intent of 10 CFR 50.59 is to prohibit changes which might:
* analyzed capabilities of Defeat needed functions or exceed "analyzed" structures, systems, or components.
* Adversely affect the frequency or likelihood that the plant can and will be operated without undue risk to public health and safety.
6.2        10 CFR 50.59 Screening Criteria 6.2.1        Structure for Performing 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings 6.2.1.1        For the purposes of performing 10 CFR 50.59 screenings, the 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1) criteria identified in subsection 6.1.1 must be addressed. Using the guidance contained in NEI 96-07, Revision 1      1 (also refer to Reference 3.4 for additional guidance regarding digital design activities), these criteria have been rephrased into the following five questions:
: 1. Does the activity involve a modification, addition to, or removal of a structure, system, or component (SSC) such that a design function as described in the Updated FSAR is adversely affected?
: 2. Does the activity involve a change to procedures that adversely affects the performance or method of control of a design function as described in the Updated FSAR?
Updated
: 3. Does the activity involve an adverse change to a method of evaluation or use of an alternate method of evaluation from that described described in the Updated FSAR that is used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses?
: 4. Does the activity involve a test or experiment not described in the Updated FSAR which is outside the reference bounds of the design bases as described in the Updated FSAR or is inconsistent with the analyses or descriptions described in  in the Updated FSAR?
: 5. Does Does the activity activity involve aa change to    the Technical Specifications and/or to the Environmental Environmental Protection Protection Plan Plan (See Sections 6.46.4 and and 6.6.2.1.4.)?
6.6.2.1.4.)?
6.2.1.2      The The screening portion portion of the 1010 CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation form shown in NMP-AD-010-F01 (Reference 3.10) is      is structured to list each of of the screening Printed: 6/6/2007 Printed:            4:14 AM 6/6/20074:14    AM
 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear                                                                    NMP-AD-010 SOUTHERN COMPANY A.      Management          10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations                    Version 1.0
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(                                    questions with a YES and NO block before each question. A NOT APPLICABLE (N/A) block is also included before the 10    10 CFR 50.59 evaluation questions which are discussed in Section 6.3. An explanation of either a YES or NO response is required. The form also provides ample space to provide -the      the justification for each answer. For an activity not to require a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, the answer to all of the 10 CFR 50.59 screening questions must be NO. If 10 CFR 50.59 screening questions 1, 2, or 4 are answered YES, then 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation questions 1-7 must be answered; 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation question 8 is answered N/A. If only 10 CFR 50.59 screening question 3 is answered YES, then only 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation question 8 must be answered; evaluation questions 1-7 are answered N/A. If question 5 is answered YES, which indicates a license amendment request is required, and all aspects of the activity will be addressed in the license amendment request, then preparation of a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation is not required. Refer to NEI 96-07, Revision 1, Section 4 for additional guidance on how to answer these questions (also refer to Reference 3.4 for additional guidance regarding digital design activities).
6.3            10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Criteria 6.3.1        Structure for Performing 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations 6.3.1.1      For the purposes of performing 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, the 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) 50.59(  c)(2) criteria identified in subsection 6.1.1 must be addressed. Using the guidance contained in NEI 96-07, Revision 11 (also refer to Reference 3.4 for additional guidance regarding digital design activities), these criteria have been rephrased into the following eight questions. Note that a pre-screening question (7a) has been developed for criterion (vii):
: 1. Does the proposed activity result in more than aa minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR?
: 2. Does the proposed activity result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR?
: 3. Does the proposed activity result in more than aa minimalminimal increase in the consequences (i.e.,(Le., radiological) of an an accident previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR?
Updated
: 4. Does the proposed activity result in more  more than aa minimal minimal increase in  in the consequences (i.e.,(Le., radiological) of aa malfunction of an an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the Updated Updated FSAR?
: 5. Does
: 5. Does the proposed activity create the possibility for an accident of      of aa different different type than any any previously evaluated evaluated in      Updated FSAR?
in the Updated
: 6. Does the proposed activity activity create the possibility for aa malfunction malfunction of        sse of an SSC important      safety with aa different important to safety            different result than any any previously evaluated in the Updated Updated FSAR?
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Southern Nuclear Operating Com~an~
Company Nuclear                                                              NMP-AD-010 SOUTHERNg SOUTHERN..\.                  Management                                        Evaluations 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and E,(aluations            Version 1.0 COMPANY EsYw,,iA Lf,'V,.s"..",y....rllWU*      Procedure                                                            Page 12 of 19  19
(                                    7. a. Does the proposed activity have any impact on the integrity of the fuel YES, cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment? If "YES",
answer Question 7.b.
: b. Does the proposed activity result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the Updated FSAR being exceeded or altered?
Note:                To answer this question, refer to the list of fission product barriers identified in Updated Farley FSAR Table 15.1-6, Hatch FSAR Table 15.1-3, and Vogtle FSAR Table 15.0.8-2, as applicable.
: 8. Does the proposed activity result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the Updated FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses?
6.3.1.2    The evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation form shown in NMP-AD-010-F01 (Reference 3.10) is structured to list each of the evaluation questions with a YES, NO, and Not Applicable (N/A) block before each question.
An explanation of the YES, NO, or N/A response is required. For an activity not to involve a license amendment, the answer to all of the foregoing questions must be either NO or N/A (with the exception of question 7.a). If the answer to one or more of the questions is YES (with the exception question 7.a), a license amendment must be obtained from the NRC. Refer to NEI 96-07, Revision 1, Section 4 for additional guidance on how to answer these questions (also refer to Reference 3.4 for additional guidance regarding digital design activities).
6.3.2          Level of Detail 6.3.2.1    In describing the activity, the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation preparer should include:
* What systems and components are affected by the change, including their safety classification?
* What was the design function of the structure, system, or component?
* What parameters of the accident/transient analysis are affected by the change?
* What design basis accidents or operational transients were reviewed for impact?
* What failure modes of the change were reviewed?
* What systems and analyses are indirectly impacted (e.g., diesel generator Il/I, etc.)?
loading, electromagnetic/radiofrequency interference, seismic II/I, l                                    Documenting the effects considered and the references consulted will allow the independent reviewer to be able to note/address any effects that were not considered. These effects must be addressed in responding to the eight 6/6/2007 4:14 AM Printed: 6/6/20074:14
 
Southern Nuclear Southern    Nuclear Operating Company Company Nuclear                                                                  NMP-AD-010 5OUTHERN.g.
SOUTHERN COMPANY A          Management Management            10 CFR 10  CFR 50.59 Screenings andand Evaluations Evaluations            Version 1.0 1.0 htl"D" StTw r..,.1JWU'          Procedure                                                                Page Page 13 of 19 questions of the 10 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. The 10 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation shall document how the evaluator reached the conclusion for each question by considering, as a minimum, the effects enumerated below.
considering,                                            below.
6.3.2.2        In performing a 1010 CFR 50.59 evaluation for a proposed activity, the preparer must answer the eight questions (refer to subsection 6.3.1.1) must                                                    6.3.1 .1) to determine license amendment is required. Although the answers are either YES, whether a license NO, or N/A, there must be an accompanying explanation providing justification for the answer. These explanations must be complete in the sense that an independent reviewer could draw the same conclusion and arrive at the same answer. However, in the routine of conducting a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, evaluators may be inclined to short cut this aspect and provide explanations that are either too brief or deficient. For example, in support of a NO answer, the temptation is to reverse the word order of the question such that it becomes a simple statement of conclusion rather than provide words of explanation; e.g.,
This activity does not increase the frequency of an accident previously evaluated "This FSAR. Also, some evaluators provide an explanation in answer in the Updated FSAR."
to one question and defer all explanations of other answers to that explanation.
This approach will be used only when a single explanation clearly justifies all answers. Likewise, a single explanation will not be used in multiple cases unless matched.
it clearly justifies the answers to which it is being "matched."
Sufficient documentation must be available to demonstrate to an independent reviewer that correct engineering judgment was applied or that the specifications based on safety requirements have been met. The importance of documentation is emphasized by the fact that often experience and engineering judgment are relied upon in making the license amendment determination. Since an important goal of the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is completeness, the items considered by the evaluator must be clearly specified.
6.4            Technical Specifications/Environmental Protection Plan Considerations 6.4.1          The provisions of 10  10 CFR 50.59 allow a licensee to engage in activities that do not require prior NRC approval provided such an activity satisfies the eight 50.59(c)(2) evaluation criteria discussed in subsection 6.3.1, and does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan. Note that 10 CFR 50.59 basically equates not meeting any      one of the eight 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) anyone evaluation criteria with a Technical Specification or Environmental Protection Plan change, in that for each, prior NRC approval in accordance with a license amendment is required.
6.4.2          Any activity that causes a change, however slight, to an existing Technical Specification or the Environmental Protection Plan requires prior NRC approval in accordance with a license amendment. The situation becomes less clear for an activity that does not cause a change to an existing Technical Specification or the Environmental Protection Protection Plan but does have the potential to become an addition addition to the Technical Specifications SpeCifications or the the Environmental Environmental Protection Plan. In  In such situations, c
the 10 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation evaluation should should be completed, and the decision decision as to whether NRC NRC approval is necessary shouldshould be based based on on whether or not not aa license license amendment is required.
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company                                              I Nuclear Nuclear        I                                                  I      NMP-AD-010            I I SOUTHERN SOUTHERN COMPANY COMPANY A      Management        I                                    Evaluations 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations                Version 1.01.0      I I E.'t:/,.SnwY_rWWU"        Procedure      I                                                        Page 14 of 19          I
(                6.4.3      A change to the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan is typically associated with a physical or administrative required change to the plant.
However, a change to the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan can also occur outside those activities when simply revising a safety analysis.
Therefore, when an activity only involves a change to an analytical basis, the associated Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan should be reviewed for potential impact.
6.4.4      A review of the activity will be performed/documented on the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation form shown in NMP-AD-010-F01 (Reference 3.10) to determine whether an existing Technical Specification or the Environmental Protection Plan will be impacted or whether an addition to the Technical Specifications or the Environmental Protection Plan is required.
6.5      Resolution of Degraded and Non-conforming Conditions 6.5.1      NRC guidance regarding the corrective action associated with a degraded and non-          non conforming condition that may involve a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is contained in RIS 2005-20 (Reference 3.3). This direction is consistent with the guidance for degraded and non-conforming conditions that is also contained in NEI 96-07, Revision
: 1. As discussed in NEI 96-07, Revision 1, there are three potential scenarios for addressing the applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 to a degraded and non-conforming condition (also refer to Reference 3.4 for additional guidance regarding digital design activities). They are as follows:
* If the licensee intends to restore the structure, system, or component back to its previous condition (as described in the Updated FSAR), then this corrective action should be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B        B (Le.,
(i.e., in a timely manner commensurate with safety). This activity is not subject to 10      10 CFR 50.59.
* If an interim compensatory action is taken to address the condition and involves aa temporary procedure or facility change, 10 CFR 50.59 should be applied to the temporary change. The intent is to determine whether the temporary change/compensatory action itself (not the degraded condition) impacts other aspects of the facility described in the Updated FSAR. In considering whether a temporary change impacts other aspects of the facility, particular attention should be given to ancillary aspects aspects of the temporary change that result from actions taken to directly compensate for the degraded condition.
* If the licensee corrective action is either to accept accept the condition as-is "as-is" resulting inin something different than described in  in the Updated FSAR or to change the facility or procedures to something different than described described in the Updated FSAR, FSAR, then 10  10 CFR 50.59 50.59 should  be applied to  the  corrective  action action unless unless another regulation applies (e.g., 10 10 CFR 50.55a). In In these cases the final resolution becomes the proposed change that would be subjected to 10    10 CFR 50.59.
(
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear Nuclear                                                                  NMP-AD-010 NMP-AD-010 SOUTHERN SOUTHERN COMPANY A.        Management Management          10 CFR 10  CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations Evaluations          Version 1.0 1.0 Lt".",.SITw y..,wwu*        Procedure Procedure                                                                Page 15 of 19 19
(        6.6          10 CFR 50.59 Screen/Evaluation Process  Process 6.6.1                  Guidelines for Performing 10 General Guidelines                      10 CFR 50.59 Screens/Evaluations Screens/Evaluations 6.6.1.1      Be as specific as possible.
6.6.1.2      Use a computer generated form provided in NMP-AD-010-F01 (Reference 3.10).
6.6.1.3      Identify and perform a thorough review of applicable sections of the Updated FSAR, the Technical Specifications, the Environmental Protection Plan, and other applicable licensing documents (e.g., the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Process Control Program, Core Operating Limits Report, PressureiTemperature Pressure/Temperature Limits Report, Technical Requirements Manual, Technical Specification Bases, etc.).
Utilize computer word search capability, if available, as an aid in accomplishing Utilize this task. Remember that a word search is only as good as the words that are chosen for the search. For example, to search the FSAR or TS for reactor reactor coolant pump,"
coolant pump, you might have to enter "reactor                pump, "RCP,"
RCP, "pump,"
pump, etc.
If possible, state where the applicable system, component, etc., is addressed and why the specific activity is not covered. If the activity is not covered in these documents, so indicate and include a reference to the sections of these documents reviewed.
6.6.1.4      From the nature of the change, determine whether it may affect any safety functions. For each potentially affected function, review the list of evaluated accidents in the Updated FSAR (e.g., Chapters 6 and 15) and determine whether the system in question (Le.,(i.e., the one covered/affected by the 10 CFR 50.59 review being performed) plays a part in initiating the accident or mitigating the severity of the accident. For each accident identified, review the following information in the Updated FSAR:
* Any analysis available for the accident in question and determine whether any of the variables are affected by the changes for which the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is being prepared.
* The methods of accident mitigation to determine whether they are affected by the changes for which the 10    10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is is being prepared.
* The methods of evaluation which means the calculational framework as described in the Updated FSAR accident analyses used for evaluating behavior or response of the facility or an SSC.
6.6.1.5      Ensure any conditional requirements contained within a 10      10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation are  are also also contained within the applicable applicable document.
document. For example, ifif the the 10 10 CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation screen/evaluation depends upon    the fact the upon the        the unit unit is is in in cold cold shutdown, an appropriate administrative administrative control control must must be be in in effect effect to ensure the unit unit is is in cold shutdown during performance of the activity.
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Southern Nuclear Operating_
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Ensure the 110 10  CFR 10 CFR    50.59  Screenings  and  Evaluations Evaluations I      NMP-AD-010 Version 1.0 1.0 Page 16 of 19 0 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation addresses any system interactions I
that could occur; be particularly careful of non-safety system actions that can impact safety-related systems.
6.6.1.7      Ensure the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is performed for the "scope"    scope of the document or activity to which itit applies by adhering to the following guidelines:
                              *. The 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation is to address the effect of a change.
                              *. If a change involves a temporary plant alteration that supports maintenance or a temporary alteration that supports the installation and post-modification testing of an approved plant change, then those aspects of the change are considered maintenance activities to be assessed and managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) provided the temporary plant alteration will be restored to its as-designed condition prior to startup if shutdown or will be restored to its as-designed condition within 90 days during power operations (Modes 11 and 2). 2). 10 CFR 50.59 would not apply to those aspects of the change. If the temporary plant alteration is not restored prior to startup, or within 90 days during power operation, a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation will be performed.
6.6.1.8      Significant changes to a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation will not normally be made once it has received plant approval; such changes will normally require a revision to the associated document. If it is necessary to make such changes to an approved 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation, each change should receive the same level of review as before.
before.
Note: Pen and ink changes to 10 CFR 50.59 screenings/evaluations may be made for misspellings, typographical and grammatical errors, and obvious incorrect numerical transpositions such as step numbers. Pen and ink changes shall have concurrence of CFR 50.59 Preparer and the 10 CFR 50.59 Reviewer. The person making the pen the 10 CFR50.59 and ink change shall be 10 CFR 50.59 qualified, and shall initial and date the change with any needed explanations. Pen and ink changes shall not be used to correct technical deficiencies. Pen and ink changes shall not be made after site approval.
6.6.2        10 CFR 50.59 Screen/Evaluation Performance 10 Note: The 10 Note:            10 CFR CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation form shown in NMP-AD-010-F01 (Reference 3.10) will be completed in    in accordance with the instructions in this subsection. The Section Letter designation, designation, where applicable in aa step in this procedure, is            is aa cross-reference to the Section Letter on the form.
6.6.2.1 6.6.2.1      The 10 10 CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation preparer will:
6.6.2.1.1 6.6.2.1.1          Indicate Indicate the following in the header of the form:
form :
* Check Check the box for the applicable applicable plant and and the box for the applicable unit(s) unit(s) (e.g., 1,2, 1,2,  or shared,  but but  not both  1      2) to which the 10 1 and 2)to            10 CFR CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation screen/evaluation applies.
Printed:
Printed: 6/6/2007 4:14 AM 6/6/20074:14
 
Nuclear Operating Company Southern Nuclear I  SOUTHERNA SOUTHERN ESYW COMPANY A
EaI"",.Sln.Y..,r~*
Nuclear Management Management Procedure I
I I
10 CFR 10  CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations Evaluations The type of activity/document to which the 110 I      NMP-AD-010 Version 1.0 Page 17 of 19 0 CFR 50.59 5059 1
screen/evaluation applies (e.g., Design Change Request, Request for Engineering Review, Licensing Document Change Request, Condition Report, etc.), that initiated the change.
                                      **    The activity/document number to which the 10  10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation applies such that the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation and the document describing the activity may be uniquely associated.
* The 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation version number. This is a major version only beginning with 1.0. Each subsequent revision of a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation advances the version number to the next sequential major version, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, etc.
* The title of the activity/document to which the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation applies or other means of identifying the document.
* The proposed version number of the activity/document to which the 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation applies.
6.6.2.1.2                      Activity Summary,"
In Section A, "Activity    Summary, provide a description of the proposed change. This description should provide a general discussion of the proposed change and why it is necessary. It should include any references necessary to support the responses to the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation questions. Any limitations on how or when the activity or change is to be performed should be included.
6.6.2.1.3    Answer the 10 CFR 50.59 screening questions contained in Section B, Screening, and give the basis for the answers using the 10 CFR 50.59 Screening,"
                                      "10 guidelines contained in NEI 96-07, Revision 1, Section 4 (also refer to Reference 3.4 for additional guidance regarding digital design activities).
6.6.2.1.4      If the answer to any question in subsection 6.6.2.1.3 is YES, continue with subsection 6.6.2.1.5.
NOTE:            If If any of the screening questions are answered YES,    "YES", PRB review of the 10  10 CFR 50.59 screeninglevaluation screening/evaluation is required PRIOR to implementation of the proposed activity.
If all of the answers answers to the 10 10 CFR 50.59 screening questions contained in Section B  B are NO, do not complete Sections C and D. Sections C      C and and D should also be deleted from the 10 D                                        10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation form.
form .
Continue with subsection 6.6.2.1.8.
If the entire change is to be submitted If                                submitted for pre-implementation pre-implementation approval to the NRC, NRC, then aa license amendment determination is not  not required.
Continue with subsection subsection 6.6.2.1.8.
6.6.2.1.8.
6.6.2.1.5    Answer the 10  10 CFR 50.59 evaluation questions questions contained in Section Section C, C,
10    CFR "10 CFR 50.5950.59 Evaluation, Evaluation," and give the basis      each answer basis for each  answer using using the Printed:
Printed: 6/6/2007  4:14 AM 6/6/20074:14  AM
 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear                                                                  NMP-AD-010 SOUTIIERNA SOUTHERN COMPANY Management Management            10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations Evaluations            Version 1.0 L",v,.SnwY..,IIlJrIJ'*        Procedure                                                                  Page 18 of 19
(                                              guidelines contained in NEI 96-07, Revision 1, Section 4 (also refer to Reference 3.4 for additional guidance regarding digital design activities).
6.6.2.1.6        If the answer to any question answered in Section C is YES (with the exception of question 7.a), a license amendment must be obtained from the NRC before the change/activity may be implemented.
6.6.2.1.7        Provide a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation summary in Section D.      D. It should include a brief description of the change and a concise summary of the responses to the evaluation questions provided in Section C. Also check the YES question in Section 0, D, indicating a copy of the completed 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation will be forwarded to Nuclear licenSing.
Licensing.
6.6.2.1.8        Sign and date the form in Section A.
6.6.2.2      The 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation reviewer will review the completed form and indicate concurrence/endorsement by signing and dating the form in Section A.
Note:            For packages prepared by vendors and contractors that do not use NMP-AD-010-F01      NMP-AD-O10-F01 to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 review, additional reviewer and approver slots can be pen and inked as needed on their form.
6.6.2.3      The 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation Nuclear Hazards reviewer will review the completed form and indicate concurrence/endorsement by signing and dating the form in Section A. A Nuclear Hazards review signature is not required for a 10        10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation prepared at the plant site.
6.6.2.4      The 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation Nuclear Regulatory reviewer will review the completed form and indicate concurrence/endorsement by signing and dating the form in Section A. A  A Nuclear Regulatory review signature is not required for a 10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation prepared at the plant site.
6.6.2.5      The preparer shall forward a copy of the completed 10                      screen/
10 CFR 50.59 screen!
evaluation to Nuclear Licensing if Section 0    D of the checklist is completed.
6.6.2.6      IfIf required byby NMP-GM-009 (Reference 3.9), the PRB will review the completed form and indicate concurrence by signing and dating  dating the form, or providing the PRB meeting number which approved the document.
6.6.2.7      From this point on, the 10  10 CFR 50.59 screen/evaluation should remain with the document to which it applies and be maintained in      in plant records in accordance accordance with 10 10 CFR CFR 50.59(d)(3).
7.0 7.0        Records Documents generated  generated by this procedure are  are considered QA records and shallshall be be maintained maintained for
(            the life  life of of plants Farley, Farley, Hatch Hatch and Vogtle.
8.0 8.0        Commitments Commitments Printed:
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Operating Company Southern Nuclear Operating  Company
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SOUTHERN SOUTHERN COMPANY A
wro"Snw YH' WWU-8.1 Nuclear Nuclear Management Procedure Farley - None I
I 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and Evaluations 10 I NMP-AD-010 NMP-AD-010 Version 1.0 Version Page 1.0 19 of 19 Page 19    19 1 8.2        Hatch - None 8.3      Vogtle Vogtle  - C00010315, Section 1.0 1.0 C00010356, Section 1.0 C00019844, Section 1.0
(
Printed:
Printed: 6/6/2007 4:14 AM 6/6/20074:14  AM
 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear      I 10 CFR 50.59 SOUTHERN.A SOuTHERNaS                  Management I                                                              Page 11 of_
of ScreeninglEvaluation Screen        i ng/Evaluation COMPANY EIN'D"s".., YtI.rw.ru"        Procedure      I Plant: Farley 0Li Hatch 0Li Vogtle 0Li                              I Unit No. 10  1 [1 20 2 0 Shared 0 U
Activity/Document ActivitylDocument No.:                                              110 10 CFR 50.59 Version No.:
(ActiDoc. Initiating the Change)
(Act./Doc.
Activity/Document Version No.:
ActivitylDocument
 
==Title:==
A. Activity Summary Preparer:                                                      !/                                Date: _ _ _ __
Print                              Signature Reviewer:                                                      !/                                Date:
Print                              Signature Nuclear Hazards Reviewer:                                                      !/                                  Date:
(If required)                          Print
                                                                      ----~-~-----
Signature Nuclear Regulatory Reviewer:                                                      !/                                  Date:
(If required)                          Print
                                                                      ----~-~-----
Signature Reviewer!
Reviewer/Approver:  Approver:                                  !I                                  Date:
                                                                      ----~-~-----                        --~--
(As Needed)                            Print                              Signature PRB Approval or Meeting No.:                                                                                        Date:
                                  ------~~~-~-~~~~~------
Print!I Signature or PRB Meeting No.
Print PRB Meeting No. (if applicable and not identified above            above):. ):, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
 
==
Description:==
 
==References:==
: 1.  (Plant) FSAR, (Version, date), Section(s)
: 2.  (Plant) Technical Specifications, (Amendment, date), Section(s)
: 3.  (Plant) Environmental Protection Plan, (Amendment, date)
: 4. Others as appropriate B. 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Does the activity to which this screening applies represent:
: 1. DYes D                No LINo      A modification, addition to, or removal of a structure, system, or component (SSC) such that a design function as described in the Updated FSAR is (SSe) adversely affected?
Basis for Answer:
: 2. DYes LlYes DNo      LIN0      A change to procedures that adversely affects the performance or method of control of a design function as described in the Updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
NMP-AD-01 NMP-AD-O1O-FO1,        0-F01, Version 1.0                                                                  NMP-AD-010 NMP-AD-01 0
 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Nuclear                            ftD SOUTHERN SOUTHERN COMPANY A        Management 10 CFR  50.59 ScreeninglEvaluation Screening/Evaluation
                                                                                .                    Page 2 of_
of E-ro" Snw ~.,.fiftJ"        i-roceuure Procedure Plant: Farley 0U Hatch 0U Vogtle 0U                                No. 10 Unit No. 1 0 202 0    Shared 00
(  ActivitylDocument No.:
Activity/Document                                              10 CFR 50.59 Version No.:
10 (Act.IDoc. Initiating the Change)
(Act./Doc.                  Change)
Activity/Document Version No.:
 
==Title:==
LI Yes DNo
: 3. DVes            LI No        An adverse change to a method of evaluation or use of an alternate method of evaluation from that described in the Updated FSAR that is used in establishing design bases or in the safety analysis?
Basis for Answer:
LI Yes
: 4. DVes            LI No DNo          A test or experiment not described in the Updated FSAR which is outside the reference bounds of the design basis as described in the Updated FSAR or is inconsistent with the analyses or descriptions described in the updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
LI Yes DNo
: 5. DVes            LI No        A change to the Technical Specifications and/or Environmental Protection Plan incorporated in the operating license?
Basis for Answer:
IF the answer to all of the questions in section B            NO, do not complete sections C and D. Sections B is "NO",
C and D should also be deleted from the form. IF the answer to any of questions 1, 2, or 4 in section B            B YES, then only complete the answers to questions 1-7 is "VES",                                                          1-7 in section C and complete the summary in Section D. IF only the answer to question 3 in section B is "VES",    YES, then only complete the answer to question 8 in section C and complete the summary in section D. IF question 5 is answered "VES",          YES, a license amendment is involved which requires NRC approval. Do not complete sections C and D if all aspects of the activity will be addressed in the license amendment request.
C.          10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation 10 LI Yes
: 1. DVes            LI No DNo        Does the proposed activity result in more than a minimal increase in the LI DN/A  N/A              frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
: 2. LI  DVes  Yes DNoLI No      Does the proposed activity result in more than aa minimal increase in the LI DN/A  N/A              likelihood likelihood of occurrence of aa malfunction of aa structure, system, orcomponent (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the Updated Updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
: 3. LI DVes  Yes LI ONo No    Does the proposed activity result inin more than aa minimal increase in the LI DN/A  N/A              consequences of an accident previously previously evaluated inin the Updated Updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
NMP-AD-01 NMP-AD-010-F01,      0-FOl, Version 1.01.0                                                              NMP-AD-010 NMP-AD-01  0
 
Southern Nuclear Nuclear Operating Company 4        Nuclear Nuclear SOUTHEflN2.i SOUTHERN COMPANY A        Management Management 10 CFR 50.59 50 59 Screening/Evaluation ScreeninglEvaluation
                                                                                    .                    Page30f_
Page 3 of buru"Sww y.,.,,\IWlJ-        Procedure Plant: Farley 0D Hatch 0D Vogtle 0U                              Unit No. 101 U 20 2 U    Shared 0U
~
ActivitylDocument No.:
Activity/Document                                                10 10 CFR 50.59 Version No.:
(Act./Doc. Initiating the Change)
(Act.lDoc.
Activity/Document Version No.:
 
==Title:==
: 4. DVesLI Yes DNo    LI No    Does the proposed activity result in  in more than a minimal increase in  in the LI N/A DN/A                    consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important important to safety previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
: 5. DVesLI Yes DNo    LI No    Does the proposed activity create the possibility for an accident of a different LI DN/A    N/A            type than any previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
: 6. DVesLI Yes DNo    LI No    Does the proposed activity create the possibility for a malfunction of an SSC LI DN/A    N/A            important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR?
Basis for Answer:
7.a LI Yes 7.aDves              LI No D        Does the proposed activity have any impact on the integrity of the fuel LI N/A DN/A                    cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment? (Note:
Answer Question 7b only if the answer to Question 7a is "VES.")YES.)
Basis for Answer:
7.b LI Yes DNo 7.bDves              LI No    Does the proposed activity result in a design basis limit for a  a fission product LI DN/A    N/A              barrier as described in the Updated FSAR being exceeded or altered?
Basis for Answer:
LI Yes
: 8. DVes              LI No DNo      Does the proposed activity result in a departure from a method of evaluation LI N/A DN/A                    described in the Updated FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses?
Basis for Answer:
Provide aa summary of the 10          10 CFR 50.59 evaluation in Section D. IF the answer to y      any of the questions in section C      C (excluding Question 7a) is "VES",
YES, aa license amendment must be obtained from the NRC before the activity may be implemented. Do not complete section D                0 if all aspects of the activity will be addressed in the license amendment request.
0.
D.          10 CFR 50.59  50.59 Evaluation Summary The 10 10 CFRCFR 50.59  50.59 evaluation summary should include a brief description of the change and aa concise summary of the responses to the evaluation questions provided in Section C.
Summary:
LI D Yes Ves          Check this box box indicating indicating aa copy of the completed 10 10 CFR 50.59 50.59 screen/evaluation will be be forwarded to Nuclear Nuclear Licensing.
Licensing.
NMP-AD-01 0-FOl,      0-F01, Version 1.0 1.0                                                                  NMP-AD-010 NMP-AD-01    0
: 20. G2.2.14 001 Which ONE of the following situations would require a piece of equipment to be added to the CAUTION Tag log?
A. A normally locked open valve is tagged out in accordance with a clearance, the clearance is expected to be released on the following shift.
B. Opening a normally closed valve in accordance with a troubleshooting work document that addresses promptly returning the valve to normal alignment.
C. Placing a safety related pump handswitch in PTL in accordance to a surveillance procedure and will be placed back to normal by the end of shift.
D~
D  A pump breaker is opened per SS direction due to a low oil level, the pump will be restored to normal on the next shift.
Page: 38 of 49                                                                            6/6/2007
 
KIA G2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for making configuration changes.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario where the candidate has to determine which component will require an entry to be made into the CAUTION Tag Log.
Question meets SRO only criteria by 10CFR55.43(b) 10CFR55.43(b) item ##33 - Facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility.
Positions off normal condition require entry into logs such as OOPL and CAUTION Tag Log and this requires SRO authorization. Also, G2.2.14 in KA Catalog only has an importance factor of 2.1 for the RO level and an importance factor of 3.0 for the SRO level. Therefore, this is an SRO only level question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible, however configuration would be controlled by the clearance and would not require a CAUTION Tag Log entry.
B. Incorrect. Plausible, not required since procedurally driven by the MWO with specific controls in place to return the equipment to normal configuration.
C. Incorrect. Plausible, not required since the surveillance procedure drives this and the component will be placed back in normal by the end of shift.
D. Correct. A component is added to the CAUTION TAG Log if it will not be restored prior to the end of shift.
REFERENCES 10000-C, "Conduct 10000-C,                Operations section 4.6 "Tracking Conduct of Operations"            Tracking Out of Position Components".
Components.
Vogtle May 2006 SRO Retake Exam question # 18      18 Watts Bar July 2004 NRC SRO Exam question # 21.
VEGP learning learning objectives:
LO-LP-63500-03, Describe General General work practices associated with Conduct of Operations.
: i. Equipment return to service.
(
Page: 39 39 of 49 49                                                                              6/6/2007
 
Number Number              Text Text LO-LP-63404-01 LO-LP-63404-O1      State the State    the purpose purpose of  of the the surveillance surveillance test test program.
program.
LO-LP-63404-02 LO-LP-63404-02      Describe the Describe      the following following as as applicable applicable toto the the surveillance surveillance test test program:
program:
: a. purpose
: a. purpose of  of surveillance work work orders orders
: b. where
: b. where the procedure procedure numbernumber to  to be be used used for for performance of    of surveillance    tests are surveillance tests    are identified identified
: c. who
: c. who must must authorize authorize the the performance performance of  of tests tests that that manipulate manipulate or  or affect  plant equipment affect plant  equipment
: d. who
: d. who reviews reviews the the test test results results toto confirm confirm that that they they satisfy satisfy the    acceptance criteria the acceptance        criteria
: e. purpose
: e. purpose of  of surveillance surveillance testtest f.f. failure fallure ofof surveillance surveillance teststests g.duties and g.duties      and responsibilities responsibilities of  of surveillance surveillance test      performer ifif aa test test performer              falls or test fails    cannot be or cannot    be completed completed within within the specified time LO-LP-63404-03 LO-LP-63404-03    Describe the Describe      the SMSM responsiblies as      as applicable applicable to to the the surveillance test      program. (SRO test program.      (SRO only) only)
LO-LP-63404-04 LO-LP-63404-04    With regards to With                to implementation implementation of    of the the surveillance test program,        describe the Shift program, describe            Shift Supervisors Supervisor's responsibility for the following: (SRO      (SRO only)
: a. prior authorization
: a.          authorization of    of performance tests
: b. actions for surveillance test failures
: c. operational mode change surveillance requirement LO-LP-63500-01 LO-LP-63500-O1    Briefly Briefly describe the reactor operators operator's overall responsibility.
Include a statement of the duties and responsibility concerning the following:              following:
: a. direction of balance of plant operator (BOP) b.DELETED
: b. DELETED
: c. plant operations with regards to Tech Specs and procedures c.
: d. reportable notifications/unusual conditions
: e. load dispatcher requests
: f. emergencies on site
: g. responsibility to shutdown the reactor LO-LP-63500-02    Briefly describe the BOP's    BOPs overall responsibility. Include a statement of the duties and responsibility conceming concerning the following:
: a. direction of plant equipment operators b.DELETED
: b. DELETED
: c. plant operations with regards    regards to Tech Specs and proceduresprocedures
: d. reportable notifications/unusual notifications/unusual conditions
: e. load load dispatcher requests
: f. emergencies on        on site
: g. reactor reactor operator relief LO-LP-63500-03 LO-LP-63500-03    Describe general work practices for the following associated          associated withwith the conduct of operations:
a.
: a. Abnormal indications indications b.
: b. Instrument Instrument setpoints setpoints c.
: c. Control Control room room access
: d. Generator load    load changes e.
: e. Control Control roomroom housekeeping housekeeping f.f. Manual Manual operation operation of  of Motor Motor Operated Operated Valves Valves g.
: g. Shift Shift relief relief and and evolution evolution briefings briefings h.
: h. Reactor Reactor TripTrip Review Review I.i. Equipment Equipment returnreturn toto service service j.j. DELETED DELETED k.
: k. Procedure Procedure compliance compliance I.I. Procedure Procedure implementation implementation m.m. System System lineups lineups andand system system status status file file n.n. Inaccessible Inaccessible component component control control o.
: o. Surveillance Surveillance testing testing p.p. Operation Operation of  of Dragon Dragon Needle Needle Valves Valves Friday,]uneOL2007 Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                                          Page 97 of Page 97 of165 165
                                        /Feec
 
Approved ByBy Waidrup C. S. Waldrup                          Vogtle Electric Generating Plant A              Procedure Number Procedure 10000-C 10000-c Number Rev 70 Rev Date Approved Date                                                                                                      Page Number Page  Number 2-1 5-2007 2-15-2007                                        CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS                                          55 of 70 4.6                TRACKING OUT OF POSITION COMPONENTS 4.6.1              When a plant component is manipulated to a position other than its normal alignment and its alignment is not controlled by existing administrative controls (e.g., procedure or clearance), then the component configuration will be tracked R
n V\ ("(5 (A&#xe7;5 i      as follows:
as    follows:        ...&i L      a.        If the component is intended to be restored to its normal position by the O0 01\  '( .            end of the shift, it should be added to the Out of Position sublog (OOPL) of AutoLog by the SS/SSS. SSISSS. The text entry should contain the following information:
(1))
(1        component tag number Component (2)        Component required position (3)      Reason component removed from required position and resolution document, if applicable (e.g., MWO, CR, RER, etc.)
(4)        Name of person authorized to remove component from its required position LL 4..
        *IT WSW b.
b e/'LJ If the component is not intended to be restored to its normal position by the end of the shift, it should be Caution Tagged and entered into the (f  D0  \1        Caution Tag Log (figure 5), marked as an "Out        Out of Position Component."
Component.
: c.        If the component was added to the OOPL sublog per 4.6.1        4.6.laa but will not be restored by the end of the shift, then it should be transferred to the Caution Tag Log per 4.6.1 b, and removed from the OOPL sublog with a notation stating that control was transferred to the Caution Tag Log.
: d.        If the component was added to the OOPL per 4.6.1 a and is now ready to be returned to its normal position, then it will be removed from the OOPL      OOPL sublog, sublog, with subsequent text entry specifying its return to normal position,  position, by whom it was positioned, and IV performed if required. It is required that the OOPL sublog be cleared before the shift turns over.
4.6.2              Systems which are placed in an off normal configuration by a procedure and will remain in this configuration for greater than a shift should be Caution Tagged and entered into the Caution Tag Log, (figure 5) marked      marked as an Out "Out of Position Component..
Component.". This also includes systems which are intended to be continuously in service, such as      as battery room fans, even if they are shutdown shutdown per the applicable SOP. This        This will ensure ensure that their status is tracked and and they are returned to to service in  in aa timely manner.
manner.
Reec PrInted Pnnted June  6. 2007 June 6,      at 3:57 2007 at  3:57
 
Approved By Approved  By Waidrup C. S. Waldrup I
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant            A A            Procedure Number Procedure ioooo-c 10000-C Number Rev 70 70 Rev Date Approved Date                      I                                                                      Number Page Number Page 2-15-2007                I            CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS                                      56 of 70 J 4.6.3          ~ MWOs or surveillances that do not have specific procedure controls in place to maintain
              "'/  maintain the configuration of a component should not be considered an 17t          acceptable method for tracking the position of a component; they should be
                  ~ _kracked Itracked per this section.
p1~v.0(t7 l .e P
4.6.4              Tracking of Out of Position Components components should not be used as a substitute for appropriate procedure changes or temporary modifications. The SS/SSSSSISSS is responsible for ensuring that the listing of Out of Position Components components is accurate and in their aggregate do not impact the operation of other systems, components, or equipment.
4.6.5              If the computer based programs are not available to track the Out of Position components, then figure 5 should be used to document Out of Position Components, components until such time as availability is restored. At that time the Out of Components components should be transferred to the applicable tracking method.
position Components 4.6.6                      SSISSS should ensure a Semi-Annual review of the Out of Position The SS/SSS caution Tag Log is performed. The review should ensure that component in the Caution the components are still required to be out of position and the status of the resolution document.
(4 Printed Pnnted June  6, 2007 June 6,        at 3:57 2007 at  3:57
: 1. G2.2.14 001 G2.2.14 require a piece of equipment to be Which ONE of the following situations would require                            be added AutoLog??
to the Out of Position (OOPL) sublog of AutoLog
(        A. Opening a normally closed valve in accordance with a troubleshooting work document that addresses returning the valve to normal alignment.
B. Placing a safety related pump handswitch in PTL in accordance with a system operating procedure and will be placed back to normal by the end of shift.
C~
C  A pump breaker is opened in accordance with Shift Supervisor direction due to an inadvertent oil discharge and will be restored to normal position by the end of shift.
D. A normally locked open valve will be repositioned in accordance with a clearance, release of the clearance is expected sometime on the following shift.
KIA G2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for making configuration changes.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives plausible scenarios for making an entry into the Out Of Position Sublog of AutoLog (OOPL). Candidate must determine which of the scenarios would require an entry to be made in the OOPL.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible, not required to be placed in OOPL since troubleshooting plan addresses returing component to normal status.
B. Incorrect. Plausible, not required since procedurally driven and component will be placed back in normal by end of shift.
C. Correct. Would require an OOPL entry since not procedurally driven.
D. Incorrect. Plausible, however configuration would be controlled by the clearance and would not require an OOPL entry.
REFERENCES 10000-C, 10000-C, Conduct "Conduct of Operations Operations" section 4.6 Tracking "Tracking Out of Position Components Components" Watts Bar NRC SRO exam from July 2004 question          # 21 question #21 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-63500-03 Describe Describe general general work practices practices associated associated with Conduct of of Ops.
Ops.
Page: 1                                              /
                                                            )                                6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
G 2.2.14002 02.2.14  002 Which ONE of the following situations requires tracking via a Configuration Status Sheet?
A A pump breaker is opened in accordance with Shift Manager direction A'!
due to inadvertent oil discharge.
B. Repositioning a normally locked open valve in accordance with a system clearance.
C. Opening a 125V DC control power breaker for a safety related pump in accordance with a system operating instruction.
D. Opening a normally closed valve in accordance with a troubleshooting work document.
The correct answer is A.
A. Correct- unanticipated problems that require configuration changes must be tracked. The configuration Status Sheet would be included with the work order used for repairs.
B. Incorrect - repositioning a valve in accordance with the system clearance procedure is allowable and the clearance process would provide for tracking component configuration.
C. Incorrect - opening a
                -          a breaker in accordance with the system operating procedure is allowable and the procedure would provide for tracking component configuration.
Incorrect- component configuration changes are allowable during trouble D. Incorrect-shooting activities using a work document document that contains general configuration control instruction.
 
==REFERENCES:==
 
3-OT-SPPI 001 3-0T-SPP1001 IOCFR55.43.3/45.13 10CFR55.43.3/45.13 Knowledge of the process for making configuration changes RQ-NA        SRO-96
 
==Reference:==
 
Reference,    3-0T-SPPIOOI 3-OT-SPPIOOI                    KlANumber:
K/A Number (12.214 0 2.2 14 K/A value:
KfA            3.0                            Last Used:
Level:
Level          2                              Source:      NF.W NEW Tier/Grp:
Tier/Grp:                                      SROOnly.
SRO Only:    YES Wq t+J f;crrG                                          O 2, OcJ 4 sV(~
SM ~2--l
: 21. G2.3.6 001 Given the following:
          - The Shift Supervisor has declared A-RE-0014 Inoperable.
          - The radiation monitor will not come off the low end of scale.
Which ONE of the following statements is CORRECT regarding approving a permit for the release of Waste Gas Decay Tank # 3?
A. Approve. As long as the Shift Manager and the Chemistry Manager concurrently give permission to perform the release.
B. Disapprove. The release CANNOT proceed because the discharge flow path cannot be aligned with A-RE-0014 failed offscale low.
C. Disapprove. The release CANNOT proceed until A-RE-0014 has been returned to Operable status in accordance with ODCM requirements.
D D~  Approve. As long as independent samples of tank contents are analyzed and the discharge valve alignment and release rate calculations are independently verified.
(
Page:
Page: 40 40 of of 49 49                                                                            6/6/2007 6/6/2007
 
KIA ments  ts for reviewing and approv            releasse ing relea approving            e permit permits.s.
G2.3.66 Knowl G2.3        Knowledge                requiremen edge of the require
(      KIA MATCH ANAL K/A                ANAL YSIS plausible    scenario le scenar    io where A-RE-A-RE-0014                able and a relea Inoperrable 0014 in Inope                    releassee Question Questi  on gives a plausib approved.ed. The cand        date must determine which requir candiidate                                require  ment emen    t must needs permit need permit          s to be approv be met to approapprovve          releasse e the relea          permit..
e permit meets 1              55.43(b)
OCFR55.43(
10CFR                          criteria item b) SRO criteria                  Radiation
                                                                                # 4 - Radiat item #4                  hazarrds ion haza      ds that may Question Questi    on meets                                                          -
normall and abnormabnormal  al situatio  ns, including main situations,                      tenan maintenance  ce  actitivies and arise during norma contam various conta      minat  ion conditions.
ination 1 OCFR s 10CF    R55.4  3(b) 55.43(              criteria item # 2 - Facility opera b) SRO criteria                                      ng limits in Tech operatiting Question Questi        meets on meet                                                          -
Specs Spec    s and their basesbases..
on is also SRO only from KA Catalog since RO impor                        ance factor is only 2.1 and importtance Questiion Quest SRO impor        ance factor is 3.1 for this topic. There importtance                                          Thereffore,  questio ore, quest    n is SRO only.
ion ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANAL              ANALYSIS  YSIS Plausib            candid le the candi ible                  ate may think a highe date                  higherr level of autho    ity from the two authorrity Incorre A. Incorr    ct. Plaus ect.
departme depar  tment              normally ntss who norma            approv lly appro        releases e releas ve                require es is requir  d.
ed.
candid    ate may think that the RE failure preve date                                        preven  nts  openin ts openi  ng g B. Incorr Incorre        Plausib ct. Plaus ect.            le the candi ible RV-0014, this would be true on high failure, but not low.
candid le the candi ible                ate may think RE-0014 inope date                                    able would preve inoperrable            preven  ntt the C. Incorr Incorre ect. Plausib ct. Plaus release, releas  e, ODCM action actionss allow.
Correcct.
D. Corre      t. ODCM action # 45 requir      require        ts.
ments.
emen REFE REFER    RENC ENCE  ESS Radioa  ctive Gaseous Efflue active                Effluen    Monito ntt Monit  oring  Instrum ring Instru      entatio menta      n for tion ODCM Table 3-1 for Radio ARE-0014, action # 45.
ARE-0 Retake  e but for a different system and ODCM action        action..
Similar to Vogtle 2005 SRO Retak VEGP learning objec              tives:
objective    s:
Descriibebe the major steps involv        ed in releas involved              ng a gas decay releasiing            decay tanks LO-PP-4610-46101    -10, Descr 1-10, conte conten                environmen ts to the enviro nts                    nment. t.
any one bility,, and anyon applicaability                  e hour or LO-PP-4610 LO-PP      -46101    -15, State the LCO, ODCM LCO, or TR, applic 1-15, actionss for the GWP less action                  GWPS  S..
6/6/2007 6/6/200 7 41 of Page: 41    49 of 49
 
NO OBI            TX OBI TX_OBJ
( NO_OBJ LO-PP-46101-0    List the the parameters parameters that that will            oxygen /I hydrogen terminate oxygen will terminate              hydrogen flow      to the flow to  the recombiner.
recombiner.
LO-PP-461 01-0 List LO-PP-46101-0 Predict LO-PP-46101-0    Predict the the consequences consequences of      RE-014 failing of RE-014    failing high high or  low on or low  on the    Gaseous Radwaste the Gaseous                  System during Radwaste System        during aa gas release.
gas    release.
LO-PP-46101-0 LO-PP-461        Describe how 01-0 Describe      how the the hydrogen hydrogen recombiner      prevents hydrogen recombiner prevents      hydrogen and  and oxygen          reaching aa flammable from reaching oxygen from                  flammable or or explosive condition.
explosive    condition.                                                                      .
LO-PP-46101-0 Describe LD-PP-46101-0    Describe howhow VCT VCT purge purge isis established established andand maintained.
maintained.
LO-PP-46101-1 Describe the LO-PP-46101-1                the major major steps steps involved involved inin releasing releasing a gas      decay tanks contents gas decay              contents to  the environment.
to the LO-PP-46101-1 LO-PP-461        State the events 01-1 State                      require immediate termination of events that require                                of a gaseous release.
LO-PP-46101-1 Describe LO-PP-46101-1    Describe whywhy helium                must be corrections must helium corrections              performed on be performed      on the  waste gas the waste    gas analyzers.
analyzers.
LO-PP-461 01-1 Describe how LO-PP-461                    how the waste gas system is used  used during a unit shutdown to degas    degas the RCS.
PV-01 15 to LO-PP-461 01-1 List the conditions that will cause PV-0115 LO-PP-46101-1                                                        to automatically close.
LO-PP-461 01-1 State LO-PP-461        State the LCO, LCD, ODCM DDCM LCO, LCD, or TR, applicability, and and any anyone                    actions for the GWPS one hour or less actions LO-PP-47101-0 LD-PP-47101-0 Describe how the FDT, WHUT, COT,        CDT, LHST, and RHUT are normally processed.
LO-PP-47101-0                              altemate discharge point for the Containment and State the normal and alternate LO-PP-471 01-0 State                                                                                and Reactor Cavity sumps.
LO-PP-47101-0 LD-PP-47101-0 Briefly describe how a containment isolation signal affects the Containment Building Rad Drain System.
LO-PP-47101-0 LD-PP-471 01-0 Describe the intended use of the CCW Drain Tank (CCWDT) and how the tank contents are handled.
LO-PP-47101-0 LO-PP-471 01-0 Describe the preferred flow path and criteria to consider for draining of various plant systems to include:
: a. NSCW
: b. ACCW
: c. CCW
: d. Rad Systems
: e. Condensate
: f. Fire Water LO-PP-47101-0 LD-PP-47101-0 Describe the  the flow path from the Aux                through the Aux Building through            RPFfor the RPF        processing of for proceSSing                          stream.
of aa Liquid waste stream.
LO-PP-47101-0 LD-PP-471 01-0 State State the Operability Dperability requirement requirement for the HVACHVAC and                    Radiation monitor and associated Radiation                        processing via monitor for processing the RPF.
RPF.
LO-PP-47101-0 LD-PP-471 01-0 Describe Describe the the major major steps steps required  for Operations required for  Dperations to to release      WMT.
release aa WMT.
LO-PP-47101-0 LD-PP-47101-0 State State the conditions conditions that require require immediate immediate termination of      of aa Liquid          release.
Liquid waste release.
LO-PP-47101-1 LD-PP-471 01-1 State State the the ODCM, ODCM, TR,TR, applicabilities,  and anyone applicabilities, and              hour or any one hour    or less less actions  required for actions required        the Liquid for the        Waste Liquid Waste Processing Processing System.
System.
(                                                                                                                                          Page 60 of68 60 of 68 Friday, June Friday, June 01, 01, 2007 2007                                                                                                                Page
 
VEGP ODCM VEGPODCM Table 3-1.      Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation
(
OPERABILITY Requirements Minimum Instrument                      Channels OPERABLE            Applicability    ACTION
: 1. GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM (Common)
Noble Gas Activity Monitor, with (M ~a.
La. Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release (ARE-0014)                              11                releasesaa During releases        45
(\
: b. Effluent System Flowrate Measuring Device (AFT-0014)                              11                releasesaa During releases        46
: 2. Turbine Building Vent (Each Unit)
: a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor (RE-12839C)                                    11        During  releasesaa releases      47
: b. Iodine and Particulate Samplers (RE-12839A & B)                                11        During  releasesaa releases      51
: c. Flowrate Monitor (FT-12839 or FIS12862)b FIS-12862)b                                    11        During  releasesaa releases      46
: d. Sampler Flowrate Monitor (Fl-13211))
(FI-13211                                      1I                releasesaa During releases        46
: 3. Plant Vent (Each Unit)
: a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor (RE-I 2442C or RE-12444C)
(RE-12442C        RE-i 2444C)                  11            At all times      47,48 (RE-i 2442B
: b. Iodine Sampler/Monitor (RE-12442B or RE-12444B)                                  11            At all times        51
: c. Particulate Sampler/Monitor (RE-12442A        RE-i 2444A)
(RE-i2442A or RE-12444A)                        11            At all times        51 (FT-i2442 or
: d. Flowrate Monitor (FT-12442 12835)                                          11            Atalltimes At all times        46 (Fl-i2442
: e. Sampler Flowrate Monitor (FI-12442 FI-i2444) or FI-12444)                                    11            At all times        46
: 4. Radwaste Processing Facility Vent (Common)
: a. Particulate Monitor (ARE-i6980)
(ARE-16980)                                    11                releasesaa During releases        51
: a. During releases" "During                    During radioactive releases via this pathway."
releases means "During                                  pathway.
: b. During emergency filtration.
i 3-3                                      VER 23 VER23
 
VEGP ODCM VEGPODCM Table 3-1 (contd).            Notation for Table 3 ACTION Statements
(
ACTION 45 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the contents of the tank(s) may be released to the environment for up to 14 days provided that prior to initiating the release:
: a.                                                  tank s contents are analyzed, and At least two independent samples of the tank's
: b.        At least two technically qualified members of the Facility Staff independently verify the discharge line valving, and verify the release rate calculations.
t ( ( \
Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.
ACTION 46 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided the flowrate is estimated at least once per 4 hours.
ACTION 47 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours and these samples are analyzed for radioactivity within 24 hours.
ACTION 48 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend containment purging of radioactive effluents via this pathway.
ACTION 4949- (Not Used)
ACTION 5050(Not
              - (Not Used)
ACTION 51 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via the affected pathway may continue provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment.
3-4                                        VER23
: 22. G2.3.8 001 A release of Waste Gas Decay Tank # 11 is in progress when the following occurs during the tank release.
        - RE-0013, Waste Gas Process Monitor fails and is declared Inoperable.
        - Auxiliary Building Continuous Exhaust Unit # 1
        -                                              1 has just tripped on low flow.
        - The inlet Oxygen analyzer on the recombiner panel is declared Inoperable.
        - Waste Gas Decay Tank # 2 pressure is noted to be lowering by the ABO.
Which ONE of the conditions listed above would REQUIRE release termination?
A. RE-0013 monitor Inoperable.
B. Auxiliary Building Continuous Exhaust trip.
C~ Waste Gas Decay Tank # 2 pressure lowering.
C D. Inlet Oxygen analyzer for recombiner inoperable.
Page: 42 of 49                                                                          6/6/2007
 
KIA G2.3.8 Knowledge of the process for performing a planned gaseous radioactive release.
(
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario where a Waste Gas Decay Tank release is in progress with several malfunctions occurring. The candidate must determine which of the malfunctions would require termination of the release.
Question meets 1    IOCFR55.43(b)
OCFR55.43(b) criteria item ##44 - Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.
Question is also SRO only since RO importance factor is 2.3 for this KA #, the SRO importance factor for this KA # is 3.2. Therefore, this is an SRO only question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. RE-0013 not required per ODCM for Waste Gas Decay Tank release.
Plausible the candidate may consider this since it is a gaseous radiation monitor but would only indicate radiation during processing, not releases. Not required to terminate the release.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may consider an Aux. Building Exhaust unit trip as requiring to terminate the release as it could affect Aux. Building Pressure.
C. Correct. Procedure specifically states to stop release if more than 1  1 tank lowering.
D. Incorrect. Plausible but no procedure requirement to terminate due to this.
Candidate may consider possible 02 or H2 concentrations a reason to stop the release.
REFERENCES SOP-i 3202-1/2, "Gaseous SOP-13202-1/2,                Releasesstep 4.2.13 and preceeding CAUTION.
Gaseous Releases"step Vogtle 2002 NRC SRo Exam question # 85 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-PP-46101-11, LO-PP-461    01-11, State the events that require immediate termination of a gaseous release.
Page: 43 of 49                                                                                6/6/2007
 
NO OBI NO_OBJ            TX OBI TX_OBJ LO-PP-46101-0 LO-PP-461          Listthe 01-0 List    theparameters parametersthatthatwill  terminateoxygen willterminate                hydrogenflow oxygenI /hydrogen        flowtotothe therecombiner.
recombiner.
LO-PP-46101-0 LO-PP-461          Predictthe 01-0 Predict      theconsequence consequences    s ofofRE-Ol RE-014            highor fallinghigh 4 failing            lowon orlow    onthetheGaseous        RadwasteSystem GaseousRadwaste                          duringaa Systemduring gas release.
gas    release.
LO-PP-46101-0 LO-PP-4610        Describehow 1-0 Describe        howthethehydrogen hydrogen recombiner                      hydrogenand prevents hydrogen recombinerprevents                        andoxygen oxygenfrom                          flammableor reaching aaflammable from reaching                          or explosive      condition.
explosive condition.                                                                                  -
LO-PP-46101-0 LO-PP-4610        Describe how 1-0 Describe        howVCTVCT purge purge isis established established and  and maintained.
maintained.
LO-PP-46101-1 01-1 Describe Describe the  the major major steps steps involved involved inin releasing      gas decay releasing aa gas                      contents to tanks contents decay tanks                  to thethe environment environment.    .
LO-PP-461 LO-PP-461 01-1 LO-PP-4610        State the 1-1 State      the events events that that require require immediate        termination of immediate termination              gaseous release.
of aa gaseous      release.
LO-PP-461 01-1 LO-PP-4610        Describe why 1-1 Describe        why helium helium corrections corrections mustmust be    performed on be performed      on the    waste gas the waste    gas analyzers.
analyzers.
LO-PP-46101-1 LO-PP-4610        Describe how 1-1 Describe        how the the waste waste gasgas system system is    used during is used                    shutdown to unit shutdown during aa unit                    degas the to degas      the RCS.
RCS.
LO-PP-461 01-1 LO-PP-4610        List the 1-1 List    the conditions conditions that that will will cause cause PV-01 PV-0115        automatically close.
to automatically 15 to LO-PP-461 01-1 LO-Pp-461  01-1 State State thethe LCO, LCO, ODCM LCO, or        or TR, applicability    and any applicability,, and  anyone one hour or less actions for            the GWPS for the  GWPS LO-PP-47101-0 LO-PP-47101-0 Describe Describe how the FDT, WHUT, COT,            CDT, LHST, and RHUT are normally processed.
LO-PP-47101-0                  normal and alternate discharge point for the Containment and Reactor Cavity sumps.                        sumps.
LO-PP-47101-0 State State thethe normal LO-PP-47101-0                                                    isolation signal affects the Containment Building Rad                Rad Drain    System.
Drain System.
LO-PP-47101-0 Briefly Briefly describe describe how how a containment Isolation LO-PP-47101-0                                  use of of the the CCW CCW Drain              (CCWDT) and Drain Tank (CCWDT)                                    contents are how the tank contents and how                                are handled.
handled.
LO-Pp-471 01-0 Describe Describe the  the intended intended use LO-PP-47101-0                                                                    consider for      draining of for draining      various plant of various      plant systems systems to      include:
to Include:
LO-PP-471 01-0 Describe Describe the the preferred preferred flow flow path path and and criteria criteria to to consider a.
: a. NSCW NSCW b.b. ACCW ACCW c.
: c. CCW CCW d.d. Rad Rad Systems Systems e.
: e. Condensate Condensate f.f. Fire Fire Water Water LO-PP-47101-0                                                                            the RPF through the      RPFfor    processing of for processing                          waste stream.
Liquid waste of aa liquid            stream.
LO-PP-471 01-0 Describe Describe the the flow flow path path from from thethe Aux Aux Building Building through LO-PP-47101-0                                                              HVAC and and associated                    monitorfor Radiation monitor associated Radiation                            processing via for processing      via LO-PP-47101-0 State State thethe Operability Operability requirement requirementfor  forthe the HVAC the the RPF.
RPF.
LO-PP-47101-0 LO-PP-471 01-0 Describe Describethe  themajor majorsteps steps required requiredfor    Operationsto forOperations          releaseaaWMT.
to reiease        WMT.
LO-PP-47101-0 LO-PP-471 01-0 State Statethetheconditions conditionsthat thatrequire requireimmediate          terminationofofaaLiquid immediatetermination                        wasterelease.
Liquidwaste      release.
LO-PP-471                                                                            hourororless any onehour                            requiredfor actionsrequired lessactions                        theLiquid forthe            Waste LiquidWaste LO-PP-47101-1 01-1 State StatethetheODCM, ODCM,TR,  TR,applicabilities, applicabilities,and  andanyone Processing ProcessingSystem.
System.
Friday,                                                                                                                                                  Page6060of  68 of68 Friday,June June01, 01,2007 2007                                                                                                                              Page R&e~etV'eG                                    G-          z., 3 (8
: 1. G2.3.8 002 Waste Gas Decay A release of Waste        Decay Tank #1 is is in progress.
progress. Which one of  of the following would require that the release be terminated?
A. RE-0013, Waste Gas process monitor fails low and is declared inoperable by the USS B:' Waste Gas Decay Tank #2 pressure is lowering in conjunction with Gas Decay Tank #1 recombiner panel is declared C. The inlet Oxygen analyzer on the recombiner                declared inoperable D. Auxiliary Building Continuous Exhaust UnitUnit #1 trips on low low flow Ref: VG Procedure 13201-1 Waste Gas Processing System CONTACT the USS and VERIFY that all LCOs for the Oxygen and Hydrogen Analyzers for "CONTACT the Recombiner to be placed in service have been exited. If not, DO NOT proceed until LCOs have been exited unless the USS approves operation under the action statement."
statement.
                                                                              %?K0                          ((
                                                                        &3 Page: 11                                                                                              6/6/2007
 
Approved By J. O.
D. Williams                    Vogtle Electric Generating Plant          A            Procedure Number Procedure 13202-1 Number Rev 17 17 Rev Date Approved Date                                                                                      Page Number Page Number 2-13-2007                                  GASEOUS RELEASES                                        9 of 31 90f31 CAUTION GDT,s and SOT,s All Unit 11 and Unit 2 GOT,s      SDT,s should be monitored to verify that only GDT or SOT the GOT        SDT being released released is decreasing in pressure.
pressure.
4.2.13            IF a GOT      SDT NOT being released decreases in pressure, GDT or SOT immediately stop the release and notify the 55.
SS.                      D  / f/V 4.2.14              Continuously monitor all Gas Decay Tanks and Shutdown Decay Tanks pressures during the first hour of the release, and THEN check all pressures hourly until the release is complete.
C, Document on Data Sheet 1.                                              D LI CAUTION Do not exceed the maximum allowable release rate or A-RE-0014 setpoint stated on the release permit. If at any time during the release, the allowable release rate or A-RE-0014 setpoint is exceeded, stop the release and notify the SS.
55.
4.2.15              IFAFT-0014 IF                                  A-Rl-0014 and release flow AFT-0014 is operable, monitor A-RI-0014 rate while adjusting A-HIC-0014 to obtain the desired release rate.                                                                  D LI lf                  g Printed Pnnted June June 6, 6, 2007  at 4:29 2007 at  4:29
: 23. G2.4.46 001 Given the following conditions:
Given cc          - Unit 1I at 100% power.
            - A reactor trip and SI occur due to a large LOCA, on the reactor trip, an LOSP occurs to both RAT 1A and RAT 1B. lB.
            - Both DGs re-energize 4160 1E busses 1AA02
            -                                          IAAO2 and 1BA03.
IBAO3.
The following alarms are noted by the RO  RD during the Initial Operator Actions of E-O.
E-0.
            --ACCW ACCW LO  LOHDRPRESSURE HDR PRESSURE
            - ACCW RPC 11 (2,
            -                (2,3,4) 3, 4) CLR LO FLOW
            - ACCW RCP 11 (2, 3, 4) CLR OUTLET HI TEMP
            - ACCW RX COOLANT DRN TK HX LO FLOW
            - ACCW EXCESS L
            -                    LTDN TON HX LO FLOW
            - ACCW RTN HDR FROM RCP LO FLOW Which ONE of the following is CORRECT regarding the alarms and the actions the SS should direct the crew to perform?
(C A EXPECTED alarms, direct the RO A'!I                                  RD to start an ACCW pump per direction of E-O  E-0 Initial Operator Actions.
B. UNEXPECTED alarms, direct the RO      RD to trip the RCPs, direct an operator to Loss of ACCW perform actions of 18022-C, "Loss      ACCW" in parallel with E-O.
E-0.
C. EXPECTED alarms, direct the RO to trip the RCPs, direct an operator to perform actions of 18022-C in parallel with E-O, E-0, if ACCW is restored, re-start the RCPs.
D. UNEXPECTED alarms, take no action at this time, the EOP network will address the loss of ACCW pumps in later steps of E-O E-0 or upon transition to another EOP.
(
Page: 44 of 49                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
KIA G2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausible scenario during a simultaneous LOSP I SI where the ACCW arent running due to being locked out by the SI sequence. The candidate must pumps aren't determine the correct course of action I procedure to use to address the condition.
0CFR55.43(b) criteria item # 5 - Assessment of facility conditions and Question meets 11 OCFR55.43(b)                          -
selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. ACCW pumps would not be running on a simultaneous LOSP I SI as SI sequence prevails and locks out the pumps. Initial Operator Actions of E-O      E-0 would have the RO notify the SS of the condition and request permission to start the ACCW pumps, if they can'tcant be started, trip the RCPs.
B. Incorrect. Plausible if the candidate does not realize E-O  E-0 initial actions address restoring ACCW or recognize why the pumps are stopped. An ACCW pump should be started and the RCPs not tripped.
C. Incorrect. Plausible that candidate may realize why the ACCW pumps are stopped E-0 Initial Operator Actions addresses. Stopping RCPs to protect but not realize E-O them is a logical choice on loss of ACCW and AOP could be run in parallel by another operator. Restart of RCPs when available is also directed in many EOPs.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may not recognize why the pumps are stopped or E-0 Immediate Operator Actions will address the condition. It is plausible that that E-O E-0 would address the situation later, other EOPs such as the LOCA procedure E-O which is the most likely transition in this situation would address the loss of ACCW pumps.
REFERENCES 19000-C, "E-O 19000-C,    E-O Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Injection", RO Initial Operator Actions step # 11.11.
18022-C, Loss 18022-C,    "Loss of ACCW, ACCW", in particular symptoms and entry conditions for low flow annunciators which would occur on a loss of ACCW.
LO-PP-041 01, ACCW Power Point slides 14 LO-PP-04101,                                    14-- 19, 19, 14 & 15 14 & 15 included here.
here.
VEGP learning objectives:
obiectives:
LO-PP-04101-04, From memory describe the expected system response and operator corrective actions for each of the following:
l
: c. SI followed by LOSP Page: 45 of 49                                                                                    6/6/2 007 6/6/2007
 
c, NO OBI NO_OBJ LO-PP-021 01-1 LO-PP-021 TX_OBJ 01-1 Using Using AOP AOP 18028-C 18028-C describe describe the    plant response the plant response to      loss of to aa loss  of instrument instrument air:
air:
a.a. with with the the unit unit at at full full power power
: b. Unit
: b. Unit in in mode mode 33
: c. Unit
: c. Unit in in mode mode 4,  4, 5, 5, or or 6.
6.
LO-PP-021 01-1 Discuss LO-PP-02101-1        Discuss thethe operation operation of  of loading  and unloading loading and              the rotary unloading the          and reciprocating rotary and                    air compressors.
reCiprocating air  compressors.
01-1 Discuss LO-PP-021 01-1 LO-PP-021            Discuss thethe swing swing airair compressor compressor discharge      flow path discharge flow          and required path and    required support    systems (cooling support systems    (cooling water, water, power supplies).
power    supplies).
LO-PP-03101-0 LO-PP-031  01-0 From memory state                the following for the state the                  the River Water Make Make Up Up System:
a.
: a. System loads System    loads b.
: b. Normal configuration Normal    configuration with  with both both units units at 100% power at 100%  power c.
: c. System Interfaces System    Interfaces LO-PP-03101-0 LO-PP-031  01-0 Describe how      how plant cooling tower basin level is      is controlled.
LO-PP-031 01-0 Describe the starting sequence of a River Water pump.
LO-PP-03101-O                                                                      pump.
LO-PP-03101-0 Describe the starting sequence of the traveling screen system for all LO-PP-03101-0                                                                                          all modes of operation.
LO-PP-03101-0 Describe the restrictions to water usage from the Savannah River.
LO-PP-03101 LO-PP-031 01-0-0 Describe the purpose of the emergency air compressor at the river intake structure.            structure.
LO-PP-04101-0 From memory state the following for the ACCW system:
a.
: a. Heat loads b.
: b. Heat loads cooled by either unit's      units ACCW cooling system
: c. Where heat  heat is rejected to
: d. The impact on ACCW due to a loss of one train of NSCW LO-PP-04101-0 LO-PP-041 01-0 Describe Describe how to shut down the ACCW system.
LO-PP-04101-O LO-PP-041 01-0 Describe Describe how ACCW surge tank level and RE-1950          RE-i 950 are used to determine source of in-leakage and when the in-leakage in-leakage is Isolated.
isolated.
LO-PP-04101-0 LO-PP-04101-0 From  From memory memory describe the expected    expected system    response and operator corrective actions system response                                  actions for each of the the following:
a.
: a. SISI b.
: b. LOSP LOSP c.
: c. SISI followed followed by  by LOSP LOSP d.
: d. LOSP LOSP followed followed by  by SISI e.
: e. LOW-LOW LOW-LOW surge    surge tank tank level level 1.f. Pump Pump shaft shaft shear/locked shear/locked rotor rotor g.g. Thermal Thermal barrier barrier heat heat exchanger exchanger leak leak h.h. Two Two pumps pumps running running i.i. CVCS CVCS letdown letdown heat heat exchanger exchanger leakleak j.j. Stuck Stuck open open relief relief valve valve k.k. TIC-130 TIC-i 30 failure failure I.I. Loss Loss ofof air air to  TV-i 30 to TV-130 Friday, June FriJIay, June 01, 01, 2007 2007                                                                                                                    Page 22 of Page      68 of68 ifcL                                            &f
 
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.
NO.                        REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                        PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP              19000-C 19000-C                                  32 32                              20 20 of of 34 34 Sheet Sheet 33 of of 44 RO RO INITIAL INITIAL ACTIONS ACTIONS 9.
: 9.      Check Check ECCS ECCS flows:
flows:
oD a.a. BIT BIT flow flow                                  oD a.a. Align Align Valves Valves using using ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT B. B.
Ob.
Qb.      RCS  pressure - LESS RCS pressure      -  LESS THANTHAN      oQb.
: b. Go Go to        Step 10.
to Step    10.
1625 1625 PSIG PSIG oQ c.c. SI SI Pump Pump flow flow                            o0 c.c. Align Align Valves Valves using using ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT C. C.
oOd. d. RCS  pressure - LESS RCS pressure      -  LESS THANTHAN      oOd.
: d. Go Go to  to Step Step 10.
10.
300 PSIG 300  PSIG o0 e.e. RHR RHR Pump Pump flow flow                            o0 e.e. Align Align Valves Valves using using ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT D. D.
o0 10.
: 10.      Check Check ECCS ECCS Valve Valve alignment alignment          0 10.
010. Align Align valves valves using using
                - PROPER
                -  PROPER INJECTION INJECTION LINEUP LINEUP                ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENTS B,      B, C C and and DD asas INDICATED INDICATED ONON MLBs MLB5                            necessary.
necessary.
0 11.
OIl.          Check Check ACCW ACCW Pumps Pumps                        0 11.
011. Try Try toto start start oneone ACCW ACCW Pump.
Pump. (( (:  l(
                - AT AT LEAST LEAST ONE ONE RUNNING RUNNING                                                                    I-D o0 IF an an ACCW ACCW PumpPump can can NOT NOT bebe started within started      within 10  10 minutes minutes of of ~        rL
                                    /7
                                  ;fl\lswev                        loss of loss THEN THEN stop of ACCW, ACCW, stop all  all RCPs.
RCP5.      ~
I ~ U} : ~(
1\ v{~S A
I I ,,-
ti J (fA [(
(      ((
IF an loss an ACCW started loss of THEN ACCW Pump started within of ACCW, THEN close ACCW, close ACCW Pump can within 30 can NOT NOT be 30 minutes be minutes of ACCW Containment Containment of
                                  ;;;~rec-+-eJ isolation isolation valves:  valves:
d-'    ,f-                                    e 0-0
* ACCW ACCW SPLY SPLY HDR HDR ORC ORC ISO ISO VLVVLV HV-1979 er C( () ((
i                                                    HV-1979 f~f\.-
I            sr:            0-0
* 0-0
* ACCW ACCW SPLY HV-1978 HV-1978 ACCW ACCW RTN HV-1974 HV-1974 SPLY HDR RTN HDR HDR IRC IRC ISO HDR IRC ISO VLV IRC ISO ISO VLV VLV VLV aJJr-ef)e) c,c?cY-e55e)                          (
                                  ) 1( vve&' h(
0-0
* ACCW ACCW RTN RTN HDRHDR ORC ORC ISO ISO VLV
                                -f= -  I 00 //9(          L            HV-1975 HV- 1975
          /N ld5P d5
 
Approval Approval                                                                      Procedure Procedure No.
No.
Vogtie  Electric Generating Vogtle Electric            Plant Generating Plant            A                    18022-C 18022-C
(
Date Date NUCLEAR NUCLEAR OPERATIONS Unit  COON OPERATIONS Unit COMMON A.          Revision Revision No.
Page Page No.
No.
No.
11 of 14 14 of 10 10 Abnormal Abnormal Operating Operating Procedures Procedures LOSS LOSS OF OF AUXILIARY AUXILIARY COMPONENT COMPONENT COOLING COOLING WATER WATER PURPOSE PURPOSE                                                  PRB PRB REVIEW REVIEW REOUIRED REQUIRED This This procedure procedure provides provides operator operator actions actions forfor stabilizing stabilizing the the plant plant following following aa loss loss ofof Auxiliary Auxiliary Component Component Cooling Cooling Water.
Water.
SYMPTOMS SYMPTOMS
          **  Observed  gross system Observed gross    system leakage.
leakage.
          **  Low ACCW Low        surge tank ACCW surge    tank level level that that can can NOT iQ bebe restored.
restored.
          **  Both ACCW Both  ACCW heat heat exchangers exchangers unavailable.
unavailable.
          **  High High temperature temperature on  on any  heat exchanger any heat  exchanger serviced serviced byby ACCW.
ACCW.
          **  ALB04-A02 ALBO4-A02 ACCW ACCW LOLO HDR HDR PRESS PRESS
          **  ALBO4-A03(B03, C03, ALB04-A03(B03,    C03, D03)    ACCW RCP D03) ACCW  RCP 1(2, 1(2, 3, 3, 4)
: 4) CLR CLR LOW LOW FLOW FLOW
          **  ALBO4-A04(B04, C04, ALB04-A04(B04,    C04, D04)
D04) ACCW  RCP 1(2, ACCW RCP    1(2, 3, 3, 4)
: 4) CLR CLR OUTLET OUTLET HI    HI TEMP TEMP
          **  ALB04-B02  ACCW RX ALBO4-B02 ACCW    RX COOLANT COOLANT DRN DRN TK TK HX HX LO LO FLOW FLOW PlC{ Vt 7ihlee ALB04-C02  ACCW EXCESS ALBO4-C02 ACCW    EXCESS LTDN LTDN HXHX LO LO FLOW FLOW
          **              ACCW RTN ALBO4-D02 ACCW ALB04-D02          RTN HDR HDR FROM FROM RCP RCP LO LO FLOW FLOW                         
          **  ALBO4-A01 ACCW ALB04-A01  ACCW SURGE SURGE TKTK HI/LO HI/LO LVL LVL                              rIL.-
MAJOR MAJOR ACTIONS ACTIONS
          **  Diagnose and Diagnose  and attempt attempt to to correct correct cause cause ofof loss loss ofof ACCW.
ACCW. f
          **  Monitor RCP Monitor        parameters.
RCP parameters.
          **  Shutdown or Shutdown      isolate components or isolate    components cooled cooled by    ACCW.
by ACCW.
(
 
1\
jPUMP PUMP AUTO STARTS ]
: 2. Loss of Offsite Power on the train related bus
: a. This start is blocked anytime a Safety Injection signal is present                  ;:0
                                                  ~
11
                                                    \1
                                              ~~
                                              )--l t
                                            ~~
                                            ~0
                                          ~
 
n I)
\                    n                              f)
AUTO START LOGIC SEQ BLOCK AUTO START OPENS ON                          SEQ START SI OR LOSP                        MOMENTARY I LOSP          ~
CLOSES ON Low ICLOSES Pressure  -      II ION LOP I I'ECLOSES CLOSES ON LOP
                                                        ~
It:)
AUTO START
                                                        ~
                                                          ~
                            "" ....      OPENS ON SI    o
                                    "                  (\J
_PUMP PUMP START CfJ
                                                          ~
                                                        ~
r
                                                        ~
                                                      ~
: 24. WE03EA2.1 WEO3EA2.1 001 Given the following conditions:
c        -
Coolant Coolant" which  states check "check  if RCS 19010-C,
          - The crew is performing the steps of 1901 cooldown Loss of Reactor or Secondary O-C, "Loss and depressurization is required".
required.
          - RCS pressure is 450 psig and relatively stable.
          - RHR flow is reading 0 gpm on both trains.
Which ONE of the following procedures would be the CORRECT procedure to perform with the given conditions?
Termination.
SI Termination".
A. Transition to 19011-C, "51 B. Continue with subsequent steps of 190119010-C.
O-C.
Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation".
C. Transition to 19111-C, "Loss                            Recirculation.
D~
D  Transistion to 19012-C, "Post Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization".
Depressurization.
Page: 46 46 of of 49 49                                                                              6/6/2007
 
KIA WEO3 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal WE03 C~                    and emergency operations.
EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
MATCH ANALYSIS KIA MATCH performingl9olO-C.
Question gives a plausible scenario where the crew is performing1901  O-C. A transition point has been reached and the candidate must determine the proper procedure transition to make.
Question meets 11 OCFR55.43(b) criteria item # 5 - Assessment of facility conditons and selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think 19011-C would be appropriate since RCS pressure is stable.
B. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think continuing with 19010-C is appropriate.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may think a transition to 19111-C, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation is appropriate due to no RHR flow.
D. Correct. Transition to 19012-C, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization is 19010-C required per the 1901 O-C step.
REFERENCES SI Termination.
19011-C, "SI Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization".
19012-C, "Post                        Depressurization.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-371    11-08, Using EOP 19010 LO-LP-37111-08,                19010 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.
accom plished.
Page:
Page: 47 47 of 49                                                                              6/6/2007
 
c, Number Number LO-LP-37071-0S Text Text Statethethe intent intent of of EOP EOP 19241, 19241, Response Response to    to Imminent                                Shock Condition.
Thermal Shock Pressurized Thermal Imminent Pressurized                        Condition.
LO-LP-3707  1-05  State LO-LP-37071-06 LO-LP-3707  1-06    Using EOP Using    EOP 19241 19241 as as aa guide, guide, briefly    describe how briefly describe                  step isis accomplished each step how each              accomplished.  .
LO-LP-37071-07 LO-LP-3707  1 -07  Given aa NOTE Given      NOTE or  or CAUTION        statementfrom CAUTION statement            from the            state the EOP, state the EOP,                bases for the bases        that NOTE for that        orCAUTION NOTE or CAUTION statement.
statement.
LO-LP-37101-0B LO-LP-3710  1-08    Given aa NOTE Given      NOTE or  or CAUTION CAUTION from  from 19101-C,              the bases state the 191 01-C, state          bases LO-LP-37111-01 LO-LP-371  11-01    State the State    the physical physical bases bases for    establishing equilibrium for establishing      equilibrium temperature and temperature      and pressure pressure in  in the the RCS.
RCS.
LO-LP-37111-02 LO-LP-371  11-02    State the State    the effect effect of of various various size    breaks on size breaks      on the    Primary System the Primary    System with respect with  respect toto temperatures temperatures and    and pressures.
pressures.
LO-LP-37111-03 LO-LP-371  11-03  State the State  the four characteristic stages stages of of aa large    break LOCA.
large break    LOCA.
LO-LP-37111-04 LO-LP-371  11-04  State why a small break LOCA is            is a concem for propagation of        of cracks in the reactor vessel.
cracks                      vessel.
LO-LP-37111-0S LO-LP-371  11-05  State how a LOCA is        is initially detected. State how the proper procedure is entered.
LO-LP-37111-06 LO-LP-371 11-06    State the RCP trip criteria. Tell why it is especially
  )                    important in the case of a small break LOCA.
LO-LP-37111-07 LO-LP-371 11-07    State the bases for 'Loss    Loss of Reactor Reactor or Secondary Coolant' Coolants procedure.
procedure.
LO-LP-37111-0B LO-LP-371 11-08    Using Using EOPEOP 19010 19010 as as aa guide, briefly briefly describe how              step is how each step    is accomplished.
accomplished.
LO-LP-37111-09 LO-LP-371 11-09    Given Given aa NOTE NOTE or  or CAUTION CAUTION statement statement from from the    EOP, state the EOP,                bases the bases state the for for that  NOTE or that NOTE    or CAUTION CAUTION statement.
statement.
LO-LP-37111-10 LO-LP-371 11-10  Given Given aa scenario scenario requiring requiring thethe use use of of the    foldout page, the foldout                  the state the page, state actions actions that that the the operator operator would would be be required required to      take.
to take.
LO-LP-37112-01 LO-LP-37112-01    Using Using EOPEOP 19012 19012 as  as aa guide, guide, briefly briefly describe describe how            step isis each step how each accomplished.
accomplished.
LO-LP-37112-02 LO-LP-37112-02    State State when when post-LOCA post-LOCA cooldown cooldown and        depressurization would and depressurization        would be    used.
be used.
l Fnaa~JuneO~2007 Friday, June 01, 2007                                                                                                                    Page34 Page 34of 165 of165 k                                                                      E/        ,
 
PROCEDURE NO.
PROCEDURE  NO.                      REVISION REVISION NO.
NO.                      PAGE PAGE NO.
NO.
VEGP VEGP            19010-C 19010-C                                  30 30                          14 14 of of 21 21 c              ACTION/EXPECTED ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSERESPONSE                    RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT  NOT OBTAINED OBTAINED 21.
: 21.      Evaluate plant Evaluate      plant equipment:
equipment:
oQ a.a. Secure Secure unnecessary unnecessary plant  plant equipment.
equipment.
b.
: b. Within Within 88 hours hours of of SI SI actuation, actuation, isolate isolate NSCW  NSCW Corrosion Corrosion Monitor Monitor Racks:Racks:
o0 -*  Close 1202-U4-179 Close  1202-U4-179 oQ -*          1202-U4-l80 Close 1202-U4-180 Close (located (located in in NSCTs NSCTs on    on NSCW NSCW return return header) header) o0 c.c. Repair Repair or or make make available available inoperable inoperable equipment equipment which which may may be be required.
required.
d.
: d. Consult Consult TSC TSC for for additional additional equipment equipment to      to be be started started oror actions actions to    to be be taken taken toto assist assist in      in recovery recovery including:
including:
(
P{?f~'j(11{e {~lI D-0
* H2 112 Monitors Monitors O-0-
CRDM Fans Within Within 55 days, initiate days initiate Containment Containment
( H({
inspection/cleanup inspection/cleanup if Containment Containment SpraySpray if            '5/vce tVb I~(-{"                f(ow actuated actuated and and was was terminated terminated prior prior to    to                                            (r (4    (I recirculation.
recirculation.                                          OOf
( {Ci<A. ,,)hle- C          to
[
22.
: 22.      Check Check if  if RCS RCS cooldown depressurization depressurization is cooldown and  and is required:
required:
{        k1vt t- W~1II7 Lj
          ), 0 a.          RCS RCS pressure pressure - GREATER
                                            -  GREATER            o0 a.
: a. IF IF RHR RHR Pump Pump flow flow is is ?
THAN 300 PSIG THAN  300  PSIG                                  greater greater than  than 500 500 gpm gpm.
THEN THEN go  go toto Step Step 23.
23.
Ob.      Go Go to to 19012-C, 19012-C, ES-1.2 ES-1.2 POST-LOCA POST-LOCA COOLDOWN COOLDOWN AND    AND      IL
[2 t55 DEPRESSURI ZATION.
DEPRESSURIZATION.            \ . f llV5Vefl..,      1(0 q c                                                                                                    Z      1
: 25. WE08G2.1.14 WEO8G2.1.14 001 Given the following plant conditions:
Given
          - A LOCA has just occurred at 0742 hours.
          - RHR flow is approximately 4500 gpm per train.
          - RCS lowest Cold leg temperature is 282 degrees F and stable.
Manager (SM) makes an emergency classification at 0750 hours.
The Shift Manager Which ONE of the following is CORRECT regarding the emergency classification and required notifications?
A. The SM was required to declare an NOUE and was expected to notify plant personnel by 0747 hours.
B~
B  The SM was required to declare an ALERT and was expected to notify plant personnel by 0755 hours.
C. The SM was required to declare an NOUE and was expected to notify plant personnel by 0757 hours.
D. The SM was required to declare an ALERT and was expected to notify plant personnel by 0805 hours.
KIA WEO8 WE  OS RCS Overcooling - PTS.
G2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification of plant personnel.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS Question gives a plausble scenarion where an RCS LOCA has occurred resulting in two differeent reasons the RCS Barrier is challenged (Potential Loss) and requires an emergency declaration. The candidate must determine if an NOUE is required or an ALERT emergency and the time frame for notifying plant personnel.
Questions meets SRO only threshold by requirement of a classification in addition to the notification requirement. Per the KA Catalog Knowledge of Emergency action level thresholds and classification is an SRO importance factor of 4.1 with the RO importance factor level being only aa 2.3. Therefore, this is an SRO only level question.
Vogtle also has specific objectives for classification which are SRO only objectives.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS
(
A. Incorrect. Plausible Plausible the candidate may may not recognize the threshold for RCS Integrity Integrity Page: 48 of 49 49                                                                              6/6/2007
 
barrier challenged                          Temperature > 265 challenged yet due to Cold Leg Temperature>        265 degrees degrees F. However, However, with break is greater than the capacity of RHR flow the break                                  of one charging pump inin the normal mode of operation. Also, plausible the candidate may think the time for plant c            personnel notification is 5 minutes from the time of the event.
B. Correct. Alert emergency required and time is 5 minutes from declaration.
C. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may not recognize the threshold for RCS Integrity Temperature > 265 degrees F. However, with barrier challenged yet due to Cold Leg Temperature>
RHR flow the break is greater than the capacity of one charging pump in the normal RHR mode of operation. Also, plausible the candidate may think the time for plant personnel notification is 15 minutes from the time of the event by confusing the time limit with that of notification of state and local authorities.
D. Incorrect. Plausible the candidate may the threshold for RCS Integrity barrier challenged with RHR flow the break is greater than the capacity of one charging pump in the normal mode of operation. Also, plausible the candidate may think the time for plant personnel notification is 15 minutes from the time of the event by confusing the time limit with that of notification of state and local authorities.
REFERENCES 91001-C, 91  001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementation Instructions.
Vogtle May 2005 NRC SRO Exam question # 94 used as base for modification.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-40101-02, LO-LP-401    01-02, State the four emergency classifications in order of severity from least to worst.
Page: 49 of of 49 49                                                                                  6/6/2007
 
Number              Text
(
LO-LP-40101-01      Name the key individual responsible for the implementation of the EPIPs.
LO-LP-40101-02      State the four emergency classifications in order of severity from least to worst.
LO-LP-40101-04      Describe the basic function of the TSC, OSC, EOF, Recovery Organization, and HP and Chemistry groups during a declared emergency.
LO-LP-40101-05      List the various radiological emergency teams (RETs), describe their function, and state who deploys them (91202-C). (SRO only)
LO-LP-40101-06      State who fills the initial ED position when the primary is not on-site.
LO-LP-40101-07      State who the primaries and altemates alternates are for the ED position. (SRO only)
LO-LP-40101-08      State from memory ED duties that cannot be delegated (SRO only).
LO-LP-40101-09      State who has authority to approve modifications to EPIPs during an emergency situation (91002- (91 002-C).
LO-LP-40101-10 LO-LP-401 01-1 0                                                                              classifying an emergency.
List the three fission product barriers that are part of the criteria for clasSifying LO-LP-40101-11      Describe how the status of fission product barrier integrity is obtained.
LO-LP-40101-13      Given an emergency scenario, and the procedure, classify the emergency (SRO only).
LO-LP-40101-15      State the individual responsible for making emergency notifications.
LO-LP-40101-16      List the state and federal authorities that are notified in an emergency.
LO-LP-401 01-17 LO-LP-40101-17      State the allotted time to contact the
: a. NRC
: b. State and local authorities LO-LP-40101-18      Describe when follow-up messages are required for state and local officials.
LO-LP-40101-19      Describe when follow-up messages are required for the NRC.
LO-LP-40101-20      Describe the communication system including power supplies, for notifing state and local officials.
LO-LP-40101-21      Describe the communication system for notifying federal (NRC) officials.
LO-LP-401 01-22 LO-LP-40101-22      List the backup communications for notifying state and local authorities.
LO-LP-401 01-23 LO-LP-40101-23      List the backup communications for notifying federal officials.
LO-LP-40101-24      State the circumstances requiring site dismissal with or without monitoring (SRO only).
LO-LP-40101-25      State the individual responsible for conducting the site dismissal (91403-C). (SRO ONLY)
LO-LP-40101-26      State the off-site reception center for VEGP personnel.
LO-LP-40101-27      State the circumstances requiring assembly of VEGP non-essential personnel. (SRO ONLY)
LO-LP-40101-28      State the group responsible for personnel accountability (91401-C). (SRO only)
( Friday, June Julie 01, 2007                                                                                                  Page 47 of 165
                                      /eilCQ
 
n ~
I"\.-v- C(l-~ Alee., \(f) d1        v-o 4    --~G--~r{ll1f Vtif:::.          Vogtle kcietiant Nuclear Plant 2005-3011 SRO 2005-30          SRO InitalInital Exam Exam
: 94. (32.1.14
: 94.            OO1l3/(~19:rIFIC~TI9NS G2. 1. 1400113/INOT  IFICATIONS ALARMS/C Al_!!-R:.VISICIA    3.31N1Y.9.Q5301/~1R~B.
IA 3.3/N1V0053    0 1/S/MAB/RSB __                    __    ... _
1          While performing While Room performing an are Room are unexpectedly classification at classification Which ONE Which      ONE of notifications?
notifications?
an emergency unexpectedly at 0910 emergency downpower, 0910 hours.
of the hours.
the following lost lost following describes at at downpower, all 0900 0900 describes the hours hours    and and annunciators inin the all annunciators the the the emergency SS 55    makes makes      an an classification and emergency classification Unit 11 Control the Unit emergency emergency Control and required required A. The A.      The SS5S was was required required to    to declare declare aa NOUE NOUE and  and was      expected to was expected                notify plant to notify    plant personnel by personnel  by 0905.
0905.
B. The B. The SSS5 was was required required to    to declare declare aa NOUE NOUE and  and was      expected to was expected            to notify notify plant plant personnel byby 0915.
0915.
C. The 55 C.          SS was required to declare    declare an Alert and                  expected to notify and was expected                            plant personnel :
notify plant
                        ~~~.
by 0905.                                                                                                                    i Dt The SS DI'          55 was required to declare an Alert and was expected to notify plant personnel I by 0915 0915..
KIA K/A
(                G2.1.14 Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification of plant personnel.
KIA K/A MATCH MATCH ANALANALYSISVSIS ED is expected to notify plant personnel within 5 minutes of declaring an Alert or higher. The system status portion of the KIA                      K/A is met by giving them a total loss of annunciators.
annunciators.
ANSWER // DISTRACTOR DISTRACTOR ANAL          ANALYSIS  VSIS A. Incorrect.
Incorrect. Unplanned Unplanned loss      loss of of annunciators annunciators placesplaces plant plant in      automatic Alert.
in automatic          Alert.
B.      Incorrect. Unplanned B. Incorrect.      Unplanned loss      loss of annunciators places    places plant      in automatic Alert.
plant in C.
C. Incorrect.
Incorrect. Expectation Expectation          is is within within    55  minutes minutes    of of declaring declaring    Alert Alert    or  higher.
or higher.
D. Correct. Alert  declared D. Correct. Alert declared at 0910 and    at  0910    and    expectation expectation    is is within within  55  minutes minutes      of  declaring of declaring Alert.
Alert.
AU All distractors distractors are are plausible plausible based  based on    on memory        nature of memory nature              items.
of items.              V 5 Vc0) It Re      y-1
                                                                                                                                                ,vlct
                                                                                                                                                ;Ill.
REFERENCES REFERENCES
: 1. LO-LP-40101-39-C,        EPIP
: 1. LO-LP-401 01-39-C, EPIP Overview, Rev. 39, Overview,        Rev. 39,  05/03/2004.
05/03/2004.
                                                                                                                              <J
                                                                                                                                -y L-
                                                                                                                                    /"I';!MfZCCij"5!ZO V/O....J  J A
(Vk&
l 5/c 2.
: 2. 91001-C, 91001-C, Emergency Emergency Classification Classification and      and Implementing Implementing Instructions, Instructions, Rev.          20.1, Rev. 20.1, 09/1212000.
09/12/2000.
c .-
                                                /*feL                                                                                              /
 
I:
Approved By Approved  By J D Williams J.D.                                      Vogtle Electric Generating Plant              A                Procedure Number 91002-C          48 Rev Rev DateApproved Date Approved                                                                                            Page Number PageNumber EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS
( !
01/23/2007 01123/2007                                                                                                          77of22 of 22 Sheet 1 of2 Reference Use CHECKLIST 1I PLANT PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT CHECKLIST (RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY)
(1985304608))
(1985304608 NOTES
* If the declared emergency involves an actual or credible imminent threat of attack on the plant by a hostile force, then go to Sheet 2 of 2 of Checklist 1.
* The completion of an initial plant page announcement that activated the ERO is expected to be completed within 5 minutes of the declaration of an Alert or higher. All subsequent upgrade announcements should be completed as soon as possible
: 1.              Make an announcement with the plant page public address system:                                0E
[select one]
: a.          ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL - THIS IS A (DRILL / ACTUAL EMERGENCY)
                          "ATTENTION                              -
[select one]
(A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT)                          (A SITE AREA EMERGENCY)
(AN ALERT EMERGENCY)                                      (A GENERAL EMERGENCY)
[select one]
HAS BEEN DECLARED FOR (Unit 11            Il Unit 21 2! THE SITE) [event description] _ __
(                                                                      NOTES
                          **      For Alert declarations or higher, complete b. and c. as applicable.
* Parts b. and c. below are not required if assembly and accountability are complete.
: b.          PERSONNEL WORKING (ONIIN)
                          "PERSONNEL                      (ON/IN)                                        CALL CONTROL ROOM AT EXTENSION                    & CONTINUE WORK."
WORK.
: c.          EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR EMERGENCY RESPONSE "EMERGENCY FACILITY. NON EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL, CONTRACTORS AND VISITORS EXIT THE PROTECTED AREA AND REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING.
BUILDING."
[select one]
THIS IS A (DRILL I ACTUAL EMERGENCY)
THIS                                EMERGENCY)"
: 2.        Sound the appropriate tone for 15        15 seconds:    NOUE - None
                                                                                  - None      SITE AREA - Warble
                                                                                                            -              0 ALERT-Warble        GENERAL- Warble
: 3.        REPEAT above announcement(s).                                                                            o
: 4.        For an Alert or higher, repeat items 1        I && 2, one (1) more time in about 10  10 minutes.        o (except for part 1.b. 1.b. which should be repeated only for those affected personnel or locations who have not      not yet called the Control Room).
: 5.        Indicate the time the announcements are made.
: a.            Initial Initial Page Page Announcement Time:_______________
Time: _ _ _ _ __                                            o b.
: b.            Repeat PagePage Announcement Time:______________
Time: _ _ _ _ __                                          o 8C                                      1 Printed Pnnted June  6, 2007 June 6, 2007 at4:58 at 4:58
 
i            ~                                                                n                                                  ~
Approved By Approved T.E.
By Tvnan T.E. Tynan                  I Vogtle Vogtle Electric Generating Generating Plant Plant  A:
A -- - _.              II Procedure Number Procedure Number 91001-C          2S 25 Rev Rev i Date Approved
          ~;~;;:6 I      EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS                                    Page Number 06/30/2006                                                                                                                              88ofll of 11
: 1. RCS Leak in progress AND RCS Subcooling is Less Than 24&deg;F OR
[38&deg;F ADVERSE]
: 2. Indication that a SG is ruptured AND it has a NON-Isolable Secondary Line Break Outside Containment
: 3. Indication of a SGTR AND a Prolonged Release of Secondary Coolant is occurring from the AFFECTED SG          SC to the Environment OR OR OR I
I
                                                                                                                      .. LOSS of RCS Barrier I    -
~ --------------------------------------------
: 4. Containment Radiation Monitors RE-005 I/ 006 >            2.OE+4 mr/hr
                                                                              > 2.0E+4 OR r ?,              HEAT SINK                      IV                                                          OR OR
  ~
  ~                CSFST
  ~
RED F                                                                        Potential
~                RCS INTEGRITY                  IV OR OR  I
* Loss of CSFST                                                                                                    RCS          1-RED                            ~                                                                        Barrier cp>
  ~
r---            1.        NON-lsolable RCS leak (including SG tube leakage) GREATER NON-Isolable                                                                      OR OR THAN the Capacity of One Charging Pump in the normal charging mode--      mode
-k . --------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT: Opinion        Opinion of      the ED that the RCS Barrier of the                              is Lost or Potentially Lost OR Barrier is the inability the              to determine inability to  determine the the status status of  the RCS Barrier of the        Barrier                                          '
FIGURE 2-FIGURE    2 - REACTOR COOLANT COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) INTEGRITY Printed Printed June 6,2007  at 4:59 6, 2007 at 4:59
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ------T"""!""'"-~~~~-~~"=""-.,.I-::-Proc:-:-:'edure (J-------.,
Procedure Number                                Rev '
Approved By I                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Number                      Rev T.E. T~nanTynan                                                                                                                                                            Vogtle Electric Generating                                            Generatmg Plant ..:..                                                                                                                                                                                                  91001-C 91001-C                                  25 25 Date Approved EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    IPageNum~ of 11 Page Number 06/30/2006                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  10 of 11 ELECTRICAL POWER        POWER                                RADIOACTIVITY RADIOACT1VITY                                              PLANT SYSTEMSSYSTEMS                    I    NATURAL PHENOMENON  PHENOMENON:                                          HAZARDS HAZAROS                                                    SECURITY                                              BARRIERS BARRIERS                              SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS        SYSTEMS                                OTHER OTHER G(3 Mod.. 1~:
ModI;,  1-4 LOM Loss of oIAC AI<<) 8A03 MIll EITHER-MO2MIDOAT3thQEITHER AN>>.
OOI to AC,.,.,    In BOTH BOTH        Valki      oesdinoor Hale r..tIng                RE12444 ht on RE-12,,"
SOEoOpulorloroISrror,.Ofi 855 3CIE+O,.cIIccfor>>16I'1'M.QlIIhiI Oral I,,.
is&deg;                                                                                                                        -
A HOSTilE HOSTILE FORCE ofptMt..........,
EORCE t.. has _ken-*Ol Oaken cAncel
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .........'plant ofpl.rf.q,eprnlsooHensfolsroo LOM      of THREE e.m.n LoseoITHREE          Earners                                                                        at.
Oloso con4tor.
corrtahorre .
judgrtlsntoft.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ..  ....,.In ..
sHslehth EMERGENCY lud,rrrrI0ISteEMEROCNCT rIo.
oslu..eorerntsdlobssoceaded value      I.~ to be-=-ded                                                                                                                                                                                                                  per1JOfftII    ........... operMIi porsoncela.or,rebtsloopsrst.                                                                                                                                  DIRECTOR      ~ pc4enlalw EE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  D....,....,.. ..            LonofNfYTWOberrientlm LoseoIfllTTWOBsr,isr.5p                                                                              TlBECoOBirdioatspoter8sltor N
ReUnlonof.t R.sBret,un of at .....
bw loss.
bu, HOT IUIy Isest _~
oHs ornorgencr
                                      "'INn *...
BusNOTI,kelye,Hir4hreoflrneof    ot.". 01 10r0 for,. 15 V.ad Held
* t*
nrc, (Not.')
15 .....
* bound8ry 0_
(50&deg;c 1)
Eouttdet
_~ ... :. 1000 rrnm TEDE
_ .-....nt dose    eesoesrnonlof    ofl eqYp"*"~
ouiprnonI rsro,rnsd H,roBon.
1&deg; rrtrletr Safely  ty    Po YocIn
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ..nIaILonoft.
PotsrHal Modes 1-2; Loss of the ,"IRD THIRD Mmer SuEcrinrnelity CSFST 1-2: SubcrlIcaIIty Bsrrlsr CBFBT .. ts
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ~~,.....Ihat urrorBoll.d redioruolde rsfeesss that can,..-..t.ty 1000 nnm 1000  tooern TEDE be....-,d D o:Md cerreesorablyBeoopsrnwdloeec.ed TEDE Of  01 1000""",
5000 rfrsrn COE TEE E                          ceo OR                                oel.esslrdlo.Asor000rrnernTEDE RED    &Q.ErrHER Core Cooing OR HEDth0,EITHERCHr5C00IIrOOH                                                                            lh)lfOlddoMlevMouIIIdeh'"
thyoolddusolsoetsoutidsthe.ds m."l5OOOrsnmCOE IhyroidQl:hIcI                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ....  , SInk CSfST .. REO HeetS,rkCSFSTtsREE                                                                                    -  . . " . gfAA.-l.""nI R R    Lns.orPolerialLossofFUELCLAD L_Of~loMoiFUELQ.AO                                  ....,., r-'ta1nclcD ,. 1000 nnmltv Eound.rnoRAntu.lortrnrnenent delerninsd *-'
BABBlER dMInrinecI          Born Fila.,.
Fiseror                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ........... ccn~ton.tlh BARRER                                                            sopsotsd to ooronuo for of Er H-al is ..,.c:tecIID~for,.'tw A      P,oduct Baffler EAL*.<F Ptoducta.m.                  .... wat.
EALs (Figurs  ftoala            OR field suroeo .
gfIh1c1......,.            sarnplos    irdicate
                                                                                                        . . . . nIb.
po  ...... torIoMGf~
potoroaf  for Ins. ofoontainrnert shestt(
LL                                                          Hryrnlddoseot5000rrnCDElort lhyRjd ItrHslaEoo
                                                                                      . . . all5OOO_CDEb 1 hrall              Htof Modes ,~:
                    ...... 1-4: lftilofAC,.,.,on LossofcC poweror                    VHeld ... ,.,....onRE*1:
readtngon HE-t2444        ..........
thetis            ....
Mode ,.2:1-2: ~,...,
Autoroattor.solorthp
                                                                                                                                          ... ,.. .......... MJIJ. ....
                                                                                                                                                                              ..                                                                          CoMroI CunHol AMlmftKUdDn roorneosouabon ...          ....
Hssbeeo                                                                        '--of LossofTWO  TWO ........
Befflets UodM W : lou ofreedDr _ _
Modes 5-H: Lossnfroeoloroessel                    ot.fGOndllons        . . . ",*"In ono.rveteieonseoisr,airnl              ..
more SS      B0EAA4020MBB00510Io BOTH    IW&#xa5;l AltO BIIOS 1Df ,. 'I      mn.
flair.              ooEoosomlocfor .'6"*'.28
:o-3E+OpQteIor                otsnec.QB on        00          s.tEolntr.eeeoceedodAlyoan inIIIIItsdMI/J.ooNraIof iriuetoddsDnortrnloftHeplant    ... .....              s.c..tty    ....... it . . . . WAlMEA BecuritosoontineplerOolToLoHEA                                                                              ............. NlIt.MMIIty Ion of wat.rleo.leetrdtcetedbylnseol                      ~of'"              EMERGENCY I    Modes 4 l/npWIned ModH1-4:                          aI.,...
or tarred .lossofoolta RE-1213t          Hrsl is>,. &E+211 2810 .....
                                                                            >15 for 55 ..........
                                                                            .,61rin..Q8 SEo2 THIGH tHoseesloos,re dIoc bfor euHInsuc reacHr
                                                                                                                                        ~,....,                . . dldNOT ftEd,d occurthQa succassHd rnertusl OOGUI'MJD.a~""""
NOT                                                                              CRISNOT be CNOK>T Ih*'-n be ..........
established hm,.,.,.
panelsortHir tl sEutdcer pensts....,
Horn retrolo lbrrir lon Loss ofDHE LON Lossots of ONE benW of. SECX>>m EaHOrABOMR. PotsnIaI SECOND banIer barTer poteroc            BRB cooIng.. detsrr.rsd HH 001&deg; RHRCIOOIno 180to-C MJIJ..,."OHE of . .
15010ffl400e040NEo0th5
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    "'JDP          ,dgrnentotewEMERoENCT DltECTOR
_Jor indicate ~OI'~
DIRECTOR ......
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ...... of .... ln:IoM actual ot Ikelr rrajortailurssofplaotSuncBoos aepected 10 be aooeedsd for >>'6_
                                                                            ~.,be..:..dedb                              015 rOn          ~dId H1P dd NOT occur_-        ..
Horn    . cot*oI the corBel                                                                                                                                  PsAa.ct (l . ,., )                                                                                          ~ v....I ...... c1131<<~
T E
E or All on  ALL YhII 5142 DC BC tN..
Buses (ADt.
CDr.errd 000Ilor&deg;torten.
mt,MdDD1)b,.161rin.
(001. BOt.
Bot.
_'I                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,)AfICIIIcdlJnhlfth r(Anorn ore ...
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~""IwtMarmsd P<*nCWlOMofBOTH PoBrSslLcssofBOTHEoelOad      F,,*CIed              Z&deg;tti&deg;&deg; R\IlI8).OA~ ..... rad IfIOfI6Dn,REoOO2JD03v.1de.gh-..rrt rnorilorsRE-Ro2t002osltdfegHalsrrrr r..ted needsd ... prooscfor of .
for protsc:Ion        Bs. pdIc.
pubIc.
AJIlJ.RCSburieq vaw HM,d ....                                                      .....
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    '"'*"exPoeM.1SaICt,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~
eds boundary Boundary do..-.-nt dose aseesernert              Modee t-4: f-H SIgr6anI:
Higntlc.rl ........
Baneenl 1sIs In In                                                                                                                              attack, soploelee aoack, aatInw  Aliner                                                                    (16 (tI ndv)            . . . . hMdNlnDVed,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            . . . .uoessl rrodrr(oelth            Bead reoroned.
olrslsass,nd,csrssvtoBrnessrn ot  ........ IndIca... "'OOrrnm                              resssrrdEHFsnnurtc,slors 5
prc
                                                                                                                                        ~andESF~                                                                                                                                                                      ko&#xe7;aor.0I0HrerHOSTILEACHO Of ohf HOSTD..E ACT10N                                                                          OR  CoreaH ........... " 711*F OHCoreseitlsrrrereturoso            lOVE A                                                            TEOE TEDE      m.,. Boo nnm o 500    eeern meTHE ."...
Hooroid          ,teedsd B ,rror-ilor ...
                                                                                                                                        ,.......DI'I'ICItIlDf    the hn.-nt_noI lensleert are not                                                                                                                            l.occurrlngorh is ocrnorrrg or has    .. OCICU'T.cI.1hIn occursd oolH,r              Modes 1-4:
Modes      14, n.r..ctorl.~
TEe rseclor Is rnpced                  yeas2 essIko
):::)      R                                                              op Wd....,,.....incSa QB      r suovoy rosuos indicate            .. "'OO
                                                                                                                            >100        avaIabIa MID  585 ESF ESE conRI onrrpensalotn nornslsrnwtg conBol board boerd AND holD                                                                                                                            .As. PROTECTED PBOTECTED AREA ,            -
MJ/1.Subc:riIcaIty 585 Sucococofty CSfST  CHEST I. is RED BEE
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .Modss  1-4 ~b
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  . . . ,-4:  CorAlets loss  .. offunclon of Sorceon E
morSEl hllaupedld
                                                                          ."",twQff              hIcI...v..,..,...
that is sopected to foe> I 5155 Bald sarong sarnples H oontnu.
corrirue          ~,..,...rynon-alarrnng 1ndIca    . . . _NOT.vaIlabIe Ir,dloaBore    sIc NOT susrlalle
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ~  &deg;B
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          . .sd0s05      or rnslrfair Hot
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              . . . . Of-ualn (fITliER Core ShroduosrlElTHER        Core CooIng Rot OR ConlIrreOB
~
A                                                            "'l&#xa5;okIdoM trdioafsBrroddceoofloorosrn      011500 rrnm                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ....t SIr*. CSF8T I. REO) MJIl no BssISIrECHEHTisRED)ANOno TOE lot lEt of irknelsoor COEb1hrofinhaidon                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    oe-ofosr ....
deaft . . . .aoa0sos Siric  vaIabM.
Modes 04 louof Mon.1-4:        LossofooltagscrtElTHEl
                                              ...... onEnHEF                HeudoeedirgonBE-r20000totie VaIId...slng "2E-1 o2E-r on RE-12 ...... htll pdlc:cfor.,.m clunloror5rar.Qftor        ..QI!on Modssl:  ,-3: Aa.ItomIlIcl'Mdor.,.
AooonrstlcosscforHp
                                                                                                                                            . . . . _ . exOMMd lJJDan autDnIdc,.....,.did
                                                                                                                                                                                                              ~ pIInt . . . .,..gs TornadosBlurgrlsrfoltalsoesQS Tom.do dornralcresthcorfrrosdrneysclplsof AInnt
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ~L~!:
cr.lhcor6msd
____________    ~ .ftectpCant
_      s.cunty 0000 NOV.
e--.t Security Eoenttra      In. PWIt    PROTECTED PIerOPBOTETTEH Lo.  ** Potanllalloss of F,,* a.d LossorpotsrBalLossofFuelClad                        Mod.s5-R: ~""oIRHR WodMi6oe:      Erplare.dbssofeuB                  ot.c0n4      ........ wNc:fIln ...
Oorercorosonesorstoothicsmrere
~
kB000BB000foro            rsrrircdNothe                                                                            .seHorrfesssoroededAhoQsr                                su.fatnsdfooricarslorneedndsnf
                                                                                                                                                                                                  .....wn.dhurrlc:.lrMforoellllnd.oI                                                                                                                                        Barler                                              ooaIIno  .6m.EITHEA RCS coolirgdWD,EITHEBRES ANJ2ORBA03          ... " 'Im.MJ!J.      ...                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    judgmsnC  of . . EMERGENCY I."                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        iso mo-j>ndtr.ttcloo.EMEROENCT rernaics
                    ~~1.e.bu."'noI poMf"'"
ever oed f-E Bos doss rot                    BE-t2800 .moat.
RE-12I3O
                                                                            ,.0 16  "*'.
tO rio. gs      on RE.o18 lEoO fflilcc tor
                                                                                                ., 0 e:E+O,.c&#xa5;cc RE-Of 0 . thaI  is
                                                                                                                    ., I.
for        autorostic toactor lip did NOT oc:cu 5850 socrnosstcd rnarual top occurred tlllJallUOCMafu1l'11MUa1.,.OCICU'T.cI ocour            100 rwH or 0 100ft1lhOffll"N  rsasr b y _ ..............
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .... on  ..... ~
onsileasosrtsed By rnsteornlogical irscumeoteboc Rsport Of.~
Of cWsctIon oftoxic,lIiImIMbte, RsB000rdaBobor orespftsoierf ga of Born, Oetrortsbls, gasessorroor          r.c.tr
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  . . . wHt*t.a feolboy
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  .....,..tw.
ArnnsraHcs I.,.
200 F
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ... lalnctuling 0 tn:OnhIed F OR OR RCSBCS            ORECTOR DIRECTOR .......            nerO ufIty indicete plan!:    seleon Baese    Bockcp pOorer supply .wdabAe.
aeeilaBls                            5501                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            LON Lose Of or PoWIIaILon Potsnrsi Loss ofRCS nIRCH                  OernpsnaBce    isirocreesen    rarcosrrn4.sd h..... Mdwp                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .,...ms,be........,
RE-I lrnilcc for> tO air. C'*-'}
                                                                            "'1E-1,.c11ccb""I5,,*,*                  (Sole IT            hm froon ... concH rooM ths eot*oI  roorrc                              IfS osrute sosradet.
(16mnM.--.).                                              -..:u.1n      corrnsrcsfrnrs t.t sBurccne rn concenhIon.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ....:udon 01. room Of . . . neecMd Oral .......
reqor.
NoeIcdon          of ., AIrbatM Abc*
Hsfflsr                                              ~mo-F loooerd 200 E..                                    ~
daradod    ......,tncne_
syeerre rory He scAeoenBeey and that incrsassd N001cooororarporHornsooaoi                                                                                                                                        ~ofpfMbdonI'-
sAodsaS.o.erOsEoelsd :
WodMI,O,or~                    LosanfoC LoesofAC              Toolrrnsdsanplserelysisforgssenu ConfttrMd          ....... .,."... tor gMeOUI                  ~.'-4            Hrptsrrsdlossofnrostoo Modosf: Unp6anMcIlouolrNlel.Of                                                                                    ~~~_~'!t~
t_,
2 jIsoporaeorofEe,rje                    ___ _                                                                                                                                                                              rnooelornrgoOplernyorrntaonsis
                    ....... 0rBOTcIk000AOBBADSI0r0 rosost on power      BO," ANJ.2 AND BA03 b >                    pp l  u,otelesse,nocatas 5
                                                                            .QI!~""'1ncIcaM                                              sllsrorcrcistursorlrdloatutslntHe
                                                                                                                                        .. amunc:IatDn .. 6ndIcatDn In h
                                                                                                                                                                                                .B.isrnscronrforirrasostarncorflmrs
                                                                                                                                                                                                    . . . . rndDring 'f'ISm oonItmI seisrrscsoenloBl2g
                                                                                                                                                                                                  ......-::  ....... ", 0.12 g.
T~(l Ttoosf (to.,)
1)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                * ..* )
A wIdatecI      noIIcdon..,..,
t(AoelidsfsdnobficaborhcrnNBTol            NRC of osetrartod rhrsn                                                  corosrssbrrsorrstesssrstes
                                                                            ~Of"""'"
coroolrnornforplsrns.fenysysfsrns
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          .Me      . . Of~In . . . . . . .
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              . . .rflternextosioninaaltat.tss conerofroomb,.......,..,....                                                                                                                                            .,ebIhw        ................. 30 aralttirsratleckthrsstlessBaroe 1')                                                                                    ClC)CM ..... b " 'I "*'-
020B000TMllnstsIororBnir "2ODX                                                          IIIR                              hnUstIl_
EJTHEA
* eIpIIcaR( EersieRis fl4pElTHEyssigrHcsrt                                                                                              1JIJIJ..a.dad AND If rod .......
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ~~
ty .,...~
stern araootsr sHoosdsoredsdnemlorrnerceottherais                    niruossawsy.
                                                                                                                                        ,,~                ~
Radisuco ..... leosls hlclhwhn-'In higHor Her ror,mel I 0                                                                                                                                Cs,        atoraQo o Esm
\)          A                                                            RfICIdon TusI HardIng<<
Fwi                          ConIiIInnwIlBldv Rsrdla orConlamrrnsrt                BAA
                                                                                                                                        ~ 1ndIcdons_
roo-elsrn-lrg aoeilsBls.
mrdicati one ato NOT NOT
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ,...... . . . . . . Of..tscy I'IIMsd  I L                                                          MID ........
555 0 104
                                                                            <1 cnty,
                                                                                    ,rsdieledh,stisuocooored,OR conty. ...,.
spsffltud MII'-~, OR feet orator taool      in refueling r.v.IlnleluellncJ
                                                                                                ... pooI.
pool, .or.fuel Bander Rsport:
5P0 011B55 of . . . . 1IlrucUW LB
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ~
equlpntenloeotlcthe.psctledsree.
e ctan.gs strtege HoIkaIonofHOSTI.E N000caHcOOIHOSTILEATTIONesA1r Ba. OWNER OWNER CONTROLLED (l.o..,I (I .....)
COHTROU.ED AREA ACTK)H .....
Nt&#xa3;A E                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              (CMtMCI by ........ ot~
c ctNI ca        .
Ba ., .....
suds lnunr:lO'feltng nc000rg                                                                                                                                                                                              1)A noIblonhmh ... sec:uIty                  I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ~)whIch pEa      nta (wHhfor            A
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ........... the abIIty bltp
                                                                            ,ned,sM ImIctiatIlCIbl(1Wb2)  .1 ole C                                                                                                                                                                                                        .... 1hat .... .m.d.ttM:k,~
wet nak R                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ofhllruc:U.~perfannU...wy of Be sEuctrne to perlorrn its ssly
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    . . ~OI'ot.HOSTLE 0.."..
0 rrsg to        ~ n.dIa  d ......
Osdbtelca ~.      09
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .......,Udon tel odbonc            DNfY oMIT oftHrefntlooerrg
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  .  . . ., .all afack        . .mner  -
ACTtoN I.CICCI..W'Ytng or hu ACTON ctot odoet HOSTILE H oc:curred  02 TI                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              .,..,..AuceuNs:
Hart rcucluree.
oald vdd high folloerorg:
hIgE slave foIooMng: BE-ORB al8rmon  on one RE-008 (2.1 one OfOr rncnof mArl, (2.5 mrlhr),
HO tHe    ..
Contoimw>I or inn no odthmn t AREA AREA.
the. OWNER        CONTROllED OWNER CONTROLLED
~)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          """""' ........
RB-25220503              hoE RE-2S32J2533 AlB (1SE-4 ccilccE(5E4    flCl/oc). OR OR                                                                                                                            CorHol Baldi during durlngModeO  Model ...          .....,.,
Eosl BanTer RE-OO2I500(lsrothr(
Fu.I Fuel HandlIng Handling BulkIng Balding RE~(115                    ....1hr)
D_.I      o.n.nklf BuildIng OieselOensralororiloirlA Hsltdradleoelseoloethr,rths000Bof Condenu      .. 8kng11 Tri TnnderselsHlorogsTsrk Vddr.dtav.l.",l5l11'lhrlnh                        Cor*aI
~
rnrrn      55    0100 trnthr a, emsas requlrro room.Ql!>l00Iln'''''In_.~
                                                                        ,nBsrdr.ertsccasetornsiofatr pIsH NSCW CoolIngTOWIW CoolirBTooeo lnhquentllCC>>"~""""~                                                                                                                                                                BWHT RWSr satslytuncloos c;;;.
(()                                                                      (fe.e**. local dwgtng.-.on)
                                                                            * *CI-. bcaI      charCrg elafnr(
CerBol R;;.-.;;:';;'
iriearsd Boorn soecualor-~;-b;;- has Bean LossotOff-HilepoererfcBOTHARo2 Lou ofQJ...ehs powIII' to BOTH AN12                Valid tMdIncI 0fI RE*12444112442 ...
HatidreadinenroE-f24441t24420oat                                Modssd-S:                    INC_'"
4-6: Aul000asrnrsacrotBp Idomdc                                                                                          Aftnft CIMh '*-" daINoe D....,
MrcresctesErausesdsnogeloeefety                          Cot6m.d        8ecwtty EWMI.tIk:h CorerrnsdtecialtyEoerforoucft Loa      Of ~ Lo. ofConWrwnent LoesnrPuteotfalLnseotCorroslnnart Gilt""
fUdot.., .,.oacurq,d ..-.-
Modes                                                    Repouotrnro.dosseomeeftton Re,oftoflomecto""'*"'              ....
~
oct..        --          -
AND    ROOD for> tO ron. (neitHet Bus Is AHD8A03_",I""'C_busle oonneded * . , _ _ _ 0fI..Ms cornecteOfoansnerpIoedOffi-SiOs
                  ~) ABS soutcs(          BOTH ArBO2 M/Il80lli      ANn. 4200    0000 ANOIIAIXS I.e le" 2E-2  2&#xa3;4 tdIcc-",
BE-r2800erarisosE-2cdtrotor>
RE-t2I3D ..... "IE-l tdlccb >
eo 00 min. em, 55on DBonRE'Ot eo . .
rrnocc for> 00 ren. Si!8on RE-RIO......
HR or
                                                                                                                      >1IE03 drot ie >00-0 seHOrt wes soc0000d .4l!I2M MJlDmdc eutorrsbcreerlrettirthdNOTnrcor IJIR.a scrccseabm ABO        - - U ___
AND en cId NOT occur oranual top occo,ansd rnfected ares                                          related .....
N6etsd            structures Of dart 1IlNdurn syeoernewlthlrthsprolsclsdeees.
sysIIImswllhlnhprotlc:tilcl ....
or ~f.-..cI safely rorstod
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ~."""~lnh irdicofesa        potenlel degrada000 In floe lsoeloteafsonufthsplsnO
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  -..01.....,.of ......... O 1.0    credibls ...
: 1. AcndIb6e        sole ..-ctIc    ""*""....J (r.e...l speoloc eecurldr Barrier RCSa....y.....,...inIII::etN RCS OrenisHy snelyee Ontacelss oondIIIDM so,sloOtlcE In Other cond,Scrs
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      "~d"EMERGEHC't' tEoyrdgnenfoftheEMERGENCH OItECTOR DtBECTOR .      , . . . .pcferroel
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ,ndIcale    .,.,..
Bumcans Huntc8ne . force
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  . .esnOs              "1Ih-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      . . . 0of 74 rrffib    &deg;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~of                            of..wy
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      &sect;
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        ~ on                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          .......
_ p    - . d Byby DIesel    o.-.tDn DIMeI OeoetaOors                nltcc      for> ORmrlc (Sole I)
JIdoII:IC_"IO"'~f)                                              Horn    the cennol born                                                                                          RspoR        delecoon olboelo, OaoeoeBle, otdMsdlonoflDldc."""""',                    threat rrorflcaeon                                          "".......,.1-131 Dcse sqcioelsnt I-for >1,.c&#xa5;gmtor or pcdgrn or                                                              degradsSor      olore  leoel olsafefy ems  pooeted                                                                                                          from"'t.ClnhltoOAI.                                                  recast by'"          e
                                                                                                                                                                                                . . . . . fcncnt        H      NdoMt                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                of .........
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ~DMM*"'oo.M"""
oraepHrdsHpesaesthal001iderfsr                          22.AnldUsdnolllcdofthmNRC Aoaodswdf000tica000h000NoC>4OlBe.cflneocoe.oITecESreo. " ......... orln_ofTechs,.c.                                                                            otBaplsob
--+=
Cod Cot6m.d ..        saA ,... ele        bgaseocs
                                                                                                          , . " . for    ...-          Mod    cc 14    ~Ionof,,-*or 1-4: Urpterosd      lose ofoweor            Wea          .,...(NWS-CoILwDIII W. . . . . Ssorce      INW10 Colu                      BA    . . . . InMlOWllla"~
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        . .AtsarsansowARs>                  l4soEraelsrr MocIM                                                                                                                                                                      ~,,*,",-lonofMMad 0000mg        HEon otar sooref                            .... 0.4.tthf fARe    :u.1~lgrRC855 ROS .....
spendo N
N      Modes
                    ..,..W:  5-H, Unplsnrosd
                                  ~tDMaI"""      lose oIonMee        55 mllquld  Bqrod release        irrdrnales
                                                                                        ....... 1tIdIcatM                            all  sreruncielors or
                                                                                                                                      ............            irrdicalers in 0I'1nctIc:Mon    In BA S8.C. otkIe)~beath""''''1n C. olIcel    00 be af the pOnt site 1                orHsrnrnebls      ~ Befcoiid
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ........... oorecsnEsbene        ...t'*'d
* thresh                                                                  "'001'E d'IIIly oroOligrn acodtr              JdfIm""o glnea
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ..                                                                  felodas  '-4: Pessrt
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ...... 14:    PlantNOT~
NOT Eroalrf 00 0        *
                                                                                                                ,..."ZX Irs nut fo feu HO on on ALL All Sf42 WIll DCDC buses    loOt,. 000.
b.-.(ADt      B01 ,        coercanha500e
                                                                      . . . . . . .IIonsOf,... or ralaaoa .. rates> 20              ~roornbpt.rll..wy.,.....b ronrnol    roorn for plant safety eysanrafor            !he              hcua.                                ~_~~.2!.'!-~
effecf  ncrntcsl opsrabon of Be plarl          __                                                                                                                                                                        r..,nd openalrrg reqcored  operdng rroodemode .....      Tem orfsr Tsch 0o      CD , ...
001    ndDDIIfc DDt). >>15        "*'.
Ide                    ODCMIrr5 t ODa.Ilnfttfor",eo,,*,.        Sore                            ""6mn.MJQ~
lOre do topo sa no
                                                                                                                                      ~~~!'!~~
t                                                u.n.:rnonIIorInv""""'~          A      od                  Reportof B    pH Of. .AnsI. . . ,....~1n I      solIng
: 3. oosoaoe
: 0.    ~~"'*''''
PRDTECTED EOOTECTEDOBEA(NoI
: 4. ~~onPWIIlltsht dC        lBluBnoe ertosoonerOur MEA (NeIIa.t)
Pt H)
SitsOna red,ooclery RCSlJridenllecl    0021. .fage
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          . . "10gpm
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    &p.c lCO B
5            gf TAM T.........
LCODBTBMT R..........-,..,nod B        rnoqed III:IOn H cal ea  . . . ,..,.hIlonOfctam.glt~
cangptretfl                      regaIn                                                                          BCSUrId                              Dgprn U
U                                                          Rd                  vee.
loelhgheth          ..... norrel                                                                                    ee 55 lip
                                                                                                    ~
AMidon ..                                    nDmailn                                                                        no MlN'ltD8p1ant~
                                                                                                                                                                                                ......                                  In
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ...                                                                      ....... Dtwm,.,-lOf                                        {l8 RCS P. . . . . boundary IN-.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ~!'-~~-~~-----
EuelHtrdlrgorC                                                L          AU ofOAt offALL            IcoengO      -Ste            r.port  . . . scAR
                                                                                                                                                                                                                ...... I . we
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              . . . *f
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .....,..                  Ens      BereBsal FuM~orContlllnrnwttBkig tim                                                            LoN                . . faDcMtng    On-SI  ..              p                                    o unooMoOed _ _ ...,.. decrN.                                                                                                                                                                                                    ~"'NIde"PROTECTED alt    lprrrs I IdAsPROTECTED                                ", 10  gpm gs RCSIcf8nlhd . .to lOgprnQRRTSdfdI                    ...
E E                                                                                                                  se    ~1IkIns..,.....: (n.p.nt WephoM.        GaI _ _ .. Sound ~
tslephone.Delttormtcs.Boundpoeerad Flraln ........ oonIguousOf ~              dpI          AREA.                                                      ,.26gpmgprn Mode. 1-4:
Mcd
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    .~lonofoneOf_
Unoonnhd 4 Hcoo            lad 1n"""lnoca&#xa5;lty,If*II r,ofuslnoceofy,sperlhlslponl.oI      . .lpooI, Of                                                                                                                              D.'III..........'lsno'~
HadtalateathstisrrotsoSr,guiehed                                                                                                                                                                                          dsprseeuroaeonofoneorrrore fuM hnsfeJ feel      Eenslsr canal, carrel, OUT
                                                                                      -ean,.......
fueleesarthlesrernomrcooeredert fueI **
BUT el d mediated n.dIatsd co-.d will phone, sod Pteot radio rotrrrsinicaoons
                                                                                                                                      ~~!~~~!<<"                                                                                                          .1Nn elBmn 16  11 min.
Or, ofof corbol control room room nob-nod-                                                                                                                                                                            .1Mm~1ors.
e100rngsreretore.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ~~~'!--~~~-~ N;tibiOn 0    El        I            reorrette 00 eeter.(Nooao)                                                LoeeoIALLoIAaIollceingOB-Site LoN of ALL ofh foIbMng 0tJ.SI..
                                                                        ~!-!!"'!!!!-~------------                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  b;L~c.;;.t;:;;tU;.
oormuallons"'-"":                  ENN and ferns: ENNand                                                                            Unenlclpstld upIosIon . . . .
Treroompatederplo.rcrelBmn                            NoefceoorbpLocel,Courly.0rSAA Hslid srssrad nroo,tor reed,nos Valid .... r.d monitor rNdIngt                                T. . . . . capability Telsphone                    1000-Rita noleotk CllpablllyD~netwofIt                                                                                prolisdlsd etes ptctectod            ,..-ana
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .... tee> long in  In eistSo vi....            oISdat.
officials ofofpotental..,        . . . . .1on poteraal fcr eeecue              of Sen of 1ncrM. . lOOOX_ nonneI r.v.I ..
rncrs,eel0000005rrornmallensls.
(SoleD)
(2)
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an.oe equipoteoc D perrnsnent strucUN Of dartegetcleroanartstncctureeor III.. psrsornelbssednnarOp-Hite Ate    persomsI besed on en 0fJ..Us NOTE NOTE I:  f : Tlsssdcecon a.MIkaIonstlodd should be  be_
be bessd 0000CM onOOCM or          OP-site Dose Celcutefor orOlJ..-DoM                          corrouret prograrn results: Ecwaeot.
c.acu.Ion~PfOCIfM"NMJtts:                        ' - -. itIf'" the tmnritcr  reading(e( is eustaioed monI_I'MdIng(.)I.        ~ for              kInget then
_ Inreer          h period
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ..... the    period                                -..om.I.vee.. _ ..
NOTE I: Ncmntsl leeols&deg; ems the hi NOTEd:                                      hlehMt E
0          reeding in est reading      In the  &HI 24 bouts
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              . . lsstOA  hcMn pTcm      10" prior 00      -vsncJ', eecludimrg the arnstaency. ecb$1ng'"      cuNftI peak the current  ....k caine.
mndiceted  end release sssesernerl has NOT
                                          ~ted..-d""".,,-":'"                                NOT or  Of CANNOT CAMrIOT He    be cotripteted
                                                                                                                            ~1IId"""'"  orythmn his petiod.
period, than
                                                                                                                                                                ..... declateecn dedMllon AUST          be.,..
MUST Be oredo Bessd  beNd or  on the h..ld ealid reading.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    '*Ing.                                              NOTE3:
NOTE    3: SeeS.MCIIon2.oof"'~
eerfor 2.0 of this procedure .
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Latest revision as of 05:44, 14 January 2025

301 Draft SRO Written Exam (Section 3)
ML101520091
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  
Issue date: 03/28/2010
From:
NRC/RGN-II
To:
References
Download: ML101520091 (205)


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