L-PI-12-099, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested Bv NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54 (F) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near- Term Task

Emergency Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested Bv NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54 (F) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near- Term Task for

ML12306A198
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	10/31/2012
From:	Jeffery Lynch Xcel Energy, Northern States Power Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
L-PI-12-099
Download: ML12306A198 (28)

Text

Xcel Energy@

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 171 7 Wakonade Drive East Welch. MN 55089 L-PI-12-099 10 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-282 and 50-306 Renewed License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 Emeraencv Preparedness (EP) Communications Assessment Requested bv NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations 50.54ff) Reaardina Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsiahts from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 1 2, 201 2

References:

1. NRC letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A046.

2. NSPM letter, M.A. Schimmel to NRC Document Control Desk, "60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(19 Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated May 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12142Al97.

3. NSPM letter, J.E. Molden to NRC Document Control Desk, "Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations

2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated March 12, 2012," dated June 11,2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12163A571.

This letter provides the EP Communications Assessment for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP), as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory

Document Control Desk Page 2 Commission (NRC) in Recommendation 9.3 of Reference I.

Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation (NSPM), doing business as Xcel Energy, committed to provide this assessment and a schedule for implementation of the results of the communications assessment by October 31, 2012 (Reference 2). This letter and its enclosure provide the requested information and are submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f).

The PlNGP EP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization." As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.

Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the NRC under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 3). Internal communications within the plant (i.e., Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.

The following is a summary of actions under development to enhance EP communications:

1 2

3 Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 4.1.1 Communications from the Control Room, TSC and EOF with Offsite Response Facilities 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Control Room 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Technical Support Center Action Communications will be maintained post event through the use of satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.

Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.

Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.

Document Control Desk Page 3 EP communications enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies supporting the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 4.2 four months prior to the beginning of PlNGP 2R29 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

4 5

6 7

Until the enhancements to EP communications at PlNGP can be completed, interim corrective actions are being taken as described in Reference 3.

If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Ms.

Jennie Eckholt, Licensing Engineer, at 612-330-5788.

Function Roll-up Table - NEI 12-01 Communications Capabilities 4.1.2 NRC Communications via the HPN Network 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications (Site ERFs) 4.1.3 ERF Communications with Offsite Response Organizations 4.1.4 Field Team Communications Summarv of Commitments Action Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site EOF.

Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event through the use of the Sound Powered Phone System and enhanced reliability of the site PBX system. Satellite phones may also be used.

The Key Site functions with offsite officials (Management links, Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of satellite phone capabilities in the site ERFs.

Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.

Submittal of the enclosed information completes a commitment in Enclosure I of Reference 2. This letter makes the following new commitment:

NSPM will implement recommendations from the Emergency Preparedness Communications Assessment in coordination with development of FLEX mitigating strategies four months prior to the beginning of the PlNGP 2R29 refueling outage or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.

Document Control Desk Page 4 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on QCT 3 1 2012 w

Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosure cc:

Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), USNRC NRR Project Manager, PINGP, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, PINGP, USNRC

Communications Assessment Prairie and Nuc ear Generating Plant Revision 0:

September 28,201 2 Revision I:

October 17,2012 Page 1 of 24 Revision 1

Communications Assessment Prairie and Nuc ear Generating P Index Purpose References

Background

Planned Actions Schedule Communication Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Communication Equipment - Power Sources Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Page 2 of 24 Revision 1

Purpose In response to the NRC Near-Term task force recommendations a Request for lnformation pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations was issued.

Included in that request was information pertaining to communications capabilities following a beyond design basis event. Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (NSPM) responded to this request for information in a letter dated May 11, 2012 with a plan to respond to the various components of the request. This assessment provides the response to the following commitments. By October 31, 2012:

0 Provide an assessment of the current communications systems and equipment used during an emergency event to identify any enhancements that may be needed to ensure communications are maintained during a large scale natural event meeting the conditions described for Recommendation 9.3.

0 Provide an implementation schedule of the time needed to implement the results of the communications assessment.

This report documents the communications assessment required to be performed as a result of the March 2012 USNRC Request for Additional lnformation pertaining to lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Event. Attachments 1 and 2 provide the details on the current communications capabilities. Attachment 3 and the body of this assessment discuss enhancements and proposed schedules.

References

1. NRC Letter, "Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident dated March 12, 201 2, ADAMs Accession No. ML12056A046

2. Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) letter dated May 11, 2012 (L-PI 037), 60-Day Response to NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012

3. Nuclear Energy Institute, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities (NEI 12-01)

4. PINGP letter dated June 11, 2012 (L-PI-12-049), Emergency Preparedness lnformation Requested by NRC Letter, Request for lnformation Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2. 1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of lnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 Page 3 of 24 Revision 1

=

Background===

Pursuant to the US NRC Request for Additional Information (Reference 1) NSPM committed in Reference 2 to perform an assessment of communications capabilities using the methodology outlined in NEI 12-01 (Reference 3).

The assessment involved reviewing pertinent documents, such as the Emergency Plan, associated Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and responses to INPO IER 11-4.

The NRC information request indicates that the communications assessment must assume a total loss of all AC power with severe impact on the infrastructure within 25 miles of the site. The current communications systems were designed and installed to assure reliability of communications, both on-site and off-site, during normal and emergency conditions. The potential on-site issues are related to the required assumption that all AC power is lost. Offsite impact assumptions outlined in NEI 12-01 assumed failure of key infrastructure (e.g., phone lines, radio towers) out to 25 miles.

The assumed off-site impacts stem from the assumptions that public infrastructure, including public telephone networks, microwave towers, and cellular phone towers/networks, are unavailable. Observations and recommendations for technology solutions to various challenges were discussed as the project progressed.

Assessment of Existing Communication Equipment Attachments 1 and 2 provide the details of the existing communications equipment and power supplies Public Address Svstem On-site power for the Public Address (PA) System is provided from battery backed essential power busses. The Gaitronics hub is powered from the inverter. Battery backup is available for the repeaters, comparators and satellite receivers of the in-plant radio system; however under the assessment guidelines these batteries are susceptible to flooding and are assumed to be unavailable.

Telephone System The telephone system supplies normal off-site communications capability. Off-site communications with the telephone system are dependent on the functionality of the equipment powered offsite and within the 25 mile radius of the plant. On-site telecommunications are provided with power from batteries and the plant's non-safeguards diesel generators; however under the assessment guidelines theses sources are susceptible to flooding and are assumed to be unavailable. In addition, the equipment is not located in safety related buildings.

Radio Svstem The site 800 MHz radio equipment is distributed in the site Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) and powered from the non safety related service building. The in-plant radio system is used extensively for emergency response purposes, including equipment operation, fire brigade, and in-plant monitoring. Under normal conditions, the in-plant radio system uses repeaters to ensure radio Page 4 of 24 Revision 1

coverage throughout the plant. The PA and the in-plant sound powered phone system provide alternates to the radios.

Sound Powered Phones Sound powered phones are located throughout the site and provide alternates to the radios.

Offsite Communications Communications with the off-site response organizations (OROs) depend on the on-site telephone system and the PBX system. Some of these telephones are direct lines and do not pass through the PBX; however, they do pass through the local phone company central office. Per the assessment assumptions all such lines are assumed to be non-functional. Similarly, based on the assumptions of NEI 12-01, cell phones are assumed to be non-functional due to the impact on cell towers in the impacted 25-mile area. Ten-mile EPZ Offsite Response Organizations are required to receive timely (within1 5-minute) notifications of Classifications and/or Protective Action Recommendations.

Field Teams dispatched from the site use the 800 MHz radio system to communicate with the EOF with cell phone back-up. For Prairie Island, the primary EOF for this event is expected to be the approved back-up EOF located in downtown Minneapolis, outside the 25-mile impact zone. The radios in the vehicles are powered by the vehicle's electrical system. With the postulated loss of AC power to the on-site repeater, these radios will be limited to line of sight effectiveness. Satellite phones will be provided as a tertiary means of communication. Dose Assessment and communication of key radiological data and any required Protective Action Recommendations will be performed from the fully functional back-up EOF.

Planned actions:

The PlNGP Communications Assessment identified essential communications capabilities to be maintained following a beyond design basis natural disaster impacting the plant and causing an extended loss of offsite power, considering the assumptions of NEI 10-05. As an aspect of its overall and ongoing Fukushima response initiatives, NSPM will determine the means to ensure required communications functions will be maintained. Options to enhance the communications capabilities and to meet the functional communications requirements post-event are being identified.

Following a station blackout and loss of all power in the surrounding 25 miles, the PBX system has battery backup capability for one to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> depending on load capacity.

Load shedding could extend the battery life up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> but would not provide needed capacity to support the needs defined in this assessment.

Existing satellite capabilities will be enhanced. An improvement being evaluated to the plant telephone system could allow the site telephone system to call offsite during a station blackout by integrating a satellite phone into the telephone system.

Page 5 of 24 Revision 1

Currently, the primary option being considered and evaluated is the use of stand-alone and plant infrastructure-integrated satellite phones. It is assumed that satellite phone communication will be an integral aspect of maintaining critical communications functions with the Offsite Response Organizations for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the assumptions of NEI 10-05. Backup power supplies for the satellite phones are described in NSPM letter dated June 11, 2012 (Reference 4). Internal communications within the plant (i.e.,

Emergency Response Facility to Emergency Response Facility) are planned to be assured through the implementation of actions (both communications and power supply) that will maintain a reliable internal phone network. Key offsite response organizations in the impacted area have been or will be provided satellite phone capability.

A summary of actions under development include:

I Function I

Action I

1 2

Control Room 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the Technical Support Center 4.1.2 NRC Communications via the HPN Network I sate~litd~hone-capabilities in the site ERFs.

4.1.4 Field Team Communications I Environmental Field Monitoring Teams will be provided with satellite Roll-up Table 4.1.1 4.1.1 Communications from the Control Room, TSC and EOF with Offsite Response Facilities 4.1.2 NRC Communications with the satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Control Room.

Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a satellite communications phone (in addition to the phone used for EPZ OROs) within the Technical Support Center.

Communications between the site and the NRC will be supported by satellite communications capabilities in both the TSC and near site 4.1.3 Emergency Response Facility Communications (Site ERFs) 4.1.3 ERF Communications with Offsite Response Organizations phone capabilities to backup the normal radio links. Team direction from the EOF will similarly be supported by satellite capabilities.

Communications will be maintained post event through the use of satellite phone technologies until normal systems are restored.

Communications with the NRC via the ENS line will be supported by a Communications between site ERFs will be maintained post event through the use of the Sound Powered Phone System and enhanced reliability of the site PBX system. Satellite phones may also be used.

The Key Site functions with offsite officials (Management links, Radiological support, etc) will be maintained through the use of Schedule These enhancements will be coordinated with the development of the FLEX strategies supporting the Near Term Task Force Recommendation 4.2 four months prior to the beginning of PlNGP 2R29 refueling outage or December 31, 201 6, whichever comes first.

Page 6 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment I Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Primary System SystemlEquipment Component includes Site Evacuation, Fire and Security Alarms.

Plant Public Address System (PA)

2. Plant Public Address System (PA) amplifiers located in various locations.

Paging System (PP) located in Relay Room and Seismic Flooding Wind 1

as defined in this 1

as defined in this 1

as defined in this 1

Equipment protected from the below hazards 1

document 1

document 1

document I

Protected from located in seismically rugged structures.

Protected from

1. PP Reasonably protected due to most locations

2. PA Reasonably protected due to most locations located in seismically rugged structures.

2. PA power is subject to flooding loss.

Protected from

1. PP power is subject to flooding loss.

located within robust structures.

Comments

2. PA reasonably protected due to most locations located within robust structures.

1. PP reasonably protected due to most locations

2. PA relies on power from Service Building UPS batteries and audio interface from Plant PBX system.

1. PP relies on power from Service Building UPS batteries.

Security Stentofon lntercome System -

Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) locally based communication system.

Dual exchange servers located in SAS and Guardhouse.

Access intercom stations are located in various locations throughout the site.

1. Both exchange servers are reasonably protected being located in seismically rugged structures.

2. lntercom stations may or may not be located in rugged locations.

1. Guardhouse exchange server is powered from the Security UPS located in the Guardhouse and SAS exchange server is powered from Service Building UPS.

Both power sources would be subject to flooding loss.

2. lntercom stations are connected via Page 7 of 24

1. Exchange servers are reasonably protected due to both locations located within robust structures.

2. lntercom stations reasonably protected due to most locations located within robust structures.

Revision 1 Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Seismic Flooding Wind Primary System

/

as defined in this 1

as defined in this 1

as defined in this 1

Equipment protected from the below hazards Component 1

document I

document I

document I

Protected from SystemlEquipment Location Protected from Emergency Response Paging System

1. Long Range and Short Range Radio ERO Paging System (LRP & SRP) interface with Plant PBX located in OAB 3rd floor Communications Room.

Protected from

1. LRP & SRP transmit from local Microwave Tower which is not seismically designed.

Comments

2. Training Center PBX (TCPBX) located in PITC Communications closet.

Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX)

Telephone System rugged structures.

2. TCPBX Reasonably protected due to location in seismically rugged structure.

1. Plant PBX (PPBX) located in OAB 3rd floor Communications Room.

Local Commercial

1. Direct Sysop

1. Direct access Tele~hone Svstem

/

phone link 1

phone interfaces

1. PPBX Reasonably protected due to location in seismically Power over Ethernet (PoE) cable and would also be lost when UPS or server power is lost.

1. LRP & SRP transmitters located in Microwave shack is elevated above flood; however normal power and emergency generator are subject to flood loss.

1. PPBX power comes from Service Building UPS and is subject to flooding loss.

2. TCPBX power and all related interface equipment are subject to flooding loss.

1. LRP & SRP antennas located on Microwave Tower are designed and guy-wired for elevated winds.

1. LRP & SRP data interface requires Plant PBX to be functional. Long range pagers can be activated via a satellite phone as servers are outside of 25 miles.

1. PPBX and TCPBX are reasonably protected from wind damage due to being located within robust structures.

I 1. Non-Plant PBX I I. Reasonably

1. PPBX relies on power from Service Building UPS batteries.

interface

2. TCPBX only relies on unprotected AC power from PITC normal or backup AC power sources (no battery backup) and is assumed as completely lost.

protected due to all

3. PPBX and TCPBX both rely on SONET interface to transmit off site.

1. Non-PBX lines support multiple voice and data links Page 8 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment I Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration SystemlEquipment Interface (Non-PBX interface direct access voiceldata lines)

Primary System Component Location located in Control Room.

2. Direct NRC phone links located in EOF and PlTC Room

3. Direct EOF FAX inlout going machines located in EOF.

4. Tech Support direct line located in EOF.

5. Assistant EOF Coordinator direct line located in EOF.

6. Emergency Director city line.

7. Eau Clair Emergency direct lines located in TSC.

8. SONET Fiber Network voice and data interfaces are located in OAB srd floor communications Seismic as defined in this document are located in Plant Communications Room and reasonably protected from seismic effects.

SONET Fiber interface components are located in Plant Communications Room and reasonably Flooding as defined in this document Equipment protected from the below hazards Wind as defined in this document Protected from components and SONET main power is from Service Building UPS however SONET System, including system interface devices, are backed up with an independent local UPS for 8 locations located within robust structures.

Protected from throughout site.

Comments Page 9 of 24 Revision 1

Attachment I Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Equipment protected from the below hazards Location room.

Protected from SystemlEquipment NRC ETS Communications Emergency

Response

Notification Phone (ENS Red Phone). Direct access phones located in:

Control Room, TSC, EOF and Resident Inspector.

Reactor Safety Counterpart Link.

Direct access phones located in TSC and EOF.

Protected from Primary System Component

3. Protective Measures Counterpart Link Direct access phone located in TSC and EOF.

4. Health Physics Counterpart Link Direct access phones located in EOF and PITC Room 9.

Protected from Seismic as defined in this document

5. Emergency Management Counter art Link P

Comments

1. Direct access for all ETS phone interfaces are located in Plant Communications Room and reasonably protected from seismic effects.

Flooding as defined in this document

1. All ETS phone interface components and SONET main power are from Service Building UPS however SONET System, including system interface devices, is backed up with an independent local UPS for 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> mission time.

Wind as defined in this document

2. SONET link external to site has sections that may be prone to flood interruption; however the link is designed as a bidirectional ring such that the loss Reasonably protected due to all locations located within robust structures.

of one node will not disable the system.

I I

Page 10 of 24

1. Offsite communication using this system depends on installed telephone lines.

Revision 1

SystemlEquipment Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)

VPN System.

Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Primary System Component Location Direct access phones located in TSC and EOF.

6. NRC Operations LAN Data Link Terminals located in TSC and PlTC Room 8

7. SONET voice and data interface located in OAB 3rd floor communication room.

1. Access terminals are located in Control Room, TSC, EOF, and Plant Computer Room.

2. Internet access is located in Plant Computer Room,

3. VPN appliance is located off site at Edina Data Center.

Seismic as defined in this document Equipment protected from the below hazards Protected from

1. Terminals and computer systems in various locations are reasonably protected from seismic effects.

Flooding as defined in this document

2. SONET Fiber interface components are located in Plant Communications Room and reasonably protected from seismic effects.

Protected from Wind as defined in this document

3. VPN appliance located at Edina

1. Power for computer system in Service Building comes from Service Building UPS and is subject to flooding loss.

Protected from SONET main power is from Service Building UPS however SONET System is also backed up with local UPS for 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> mission time.

Comments Page 11 of 24

1. Reasonably protected; all onsite and offsite components are located within Revision 1 SystemlEquipment Plant 800 MHZ Trunked Radio System Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Primary System Component Equipment protected from the below hazards Seismic as defined in this document Protected from

1. Radio consoles are located in Control Room, Central Alarm Station (CAS),

Secondary Alarm Station (SAS),

TSC and EOF.

2. Audio interface components from radio consoles to radio transceivers are located in OAB 3'"loor Communications Room.

Protected from

3. Main transceivers are located in 755' Level of Auxiliary Building.

4.

Radio system antennas are either locally distributed within buildings or mounted Protected from Data Center is greater than 25 miles away and is assumed to be protected from seismic effects.

Comments Radio consoles and interface components located in various locations are reasonably protected from seismic effects.

2. Transceivers are located in seismically designed building; however are not seismically installed.

3. Antennas for some channels are located on or within the Aux.

Building and are seismically rugged; antennas for other channels are located on the Mirrowave Tower Flooding as defined in this document than 25 miles from PI and assumed to be protected from flooding.

1. Communications Room power comes from Service Building UPS and is subject to flooding loss.

Wind as defined in this document

1. A11 800 MHz components are located within robust structures.

2. 800 MHz antennas located on Microwave Tower are designed and guy-wired for elevated winds.

1. All major radio components (transceivers, controllers and antenna couplers) are powered from AC sources without battery backup.

Upon loss of main transceivers, all handheld portable radios will still operate on a single channel point-to-point with line-of-sight limited range and subject to available battery life.

2. 24 Spare batteries for handheld radios are available Page 12 of 24 Revision 1

Sound Powered Phone System Emergency Cellular Phones (Sprint service provider)

Communications Equipment - Location and Current Configuration Equipment prote

1. Sound Powered Phone boxes are located at multiple locations throughout the plant.

Protected from Primary System Component Location remotely on Microwave Tower.

2. Powered audio amplifier for system monitoring is located in the Relay Room.

Protected from

1. Dedicated cell phones located in Control Room, TSC and EOF Seismic as defined in this document and are not seismically rugged.

1. Sound powered phone cabling and jack boxes are located in seismically rugged locations.

Flooding as defined in this document

2. Amplifier and monitors are located in seismically rugged locations.

1. Cell phone towers that interface are less than 25 miles from site and are assumed to be lost due to local seismic event.

1. Multiple jack boxes are located in flood prone locations which would render entire system nonfunctional.

2. Amplifier and monitor receive power from Service Building UPS and are subject to flooding loss.

1. Cell phone towers that interface are less than 25 miles from site, are located on high ground above the local flood plain, and are assumed to be available.

ted from the below hazards Wind as defined in this document

1. All sound powered components are located in robust structures.

Page 13 of 24

1. Cellular towers are typically designed and supported to withstand high Revision 1

1. Priority Emergency service is ordered.

Communication Equipment - Power Sources Supply (List the power source)

Equipment Power Source(s)

Plant Public Normal off site power Address System supplied by non-vital 480 volt Bus 31 0 via 33 lnverter to Panel Primary Power I

Alternate Power I

Backup power Supply (List the power source)

Comments Alternate emergency sources via Diesel Generator 03.

availability (e.g.,

batteries, portable generators, etc.)

YeslNo Yes - Installed battery backup is from 33 Battery.

Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) locally based communication system)

Security Stentofon lntercome System -

Emergency Response Paging System power is supplied by non-vital 480 volt Bus 260 via Security lnverter to Panel 237.

2. SAS Exchange -

Normal off site power supplied by non-vital480 volt Bus 420 via 44 lnverter to

1. Guardhouse Exchange -

Normal off site Panel 4145 Normal off site power supplied by non-vital 480 volt Bus 310 via 33 lnverter to Panel

1. Guardhouse Exchange alternate emergency power source via Guard house Diesel Generator.

2. SAS Exchange alternate emergency source is via Diesel Generator D4.

1. Yes - Installed battery backup for Guardhouse Alternate emergency sources via Diesel Generator 03.

Exchange is from the Security Battery.

2. Yes - Installed battery backup for SAS Exchange is from 44 Battery.

Yes - lnstalled battery backup is from 33 Battery.

Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?

Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time estimate.

1. Current Guardhouse battery life is indeterminate due to present state of battery; replacement battery to be installed October 2012 is estimated to have at least a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> minimum capacity which could be extended with selective load shedding.

2. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time estimate.

Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time estimate.

Page 14 of 24 Revision 1 Communication Equipment - Power Sources 1 SystemlEquipment Plant Private Branch Exchange (PBX) Telephone System Local Commercial Telephone System Interface (Non-PBX interface direct access voiceldata

, lines)

NRC ETS Communications Primary Power Supply (List the power source)

1. Plant PBX -

Normal off site power supplied by non-vital480 volt Bus 31 0 via 33 lnverter and Bus 320 to 34 Inverter via automatic transfer switch to Panel 3146.

2. Training Center PBX - Normal power is provided from off site source to communications closet in PITC.

Normal off site power supplied by non-vital 480 volt Bus 31 0 via 33 lnverter and Bus 320 to 34 lnverter via automatic transfer switch to Panel Supply (List the power source)

1. Alternate emergency sources via Diesel Generator D3 and D4.

2. Normal building power source has alternate feed via automatic transfer switch.

Alternate emergency sources via Diesel Generator D3 and D4.

480 volt Bus 31 0 via Equipment Power S Backup power availability (e.g.,

batteries, portable generators, etc.)

YeslNo

1. Yes - Installed battery backup is from 33 Battery and 34 Battery.

2. No.

urce(s)

Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?

1. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time estimate.

2. No additional actions available for PITC power.

capacity.

Yes - Installed battery backup is from 33 Battery and 34 Battery.

Additional backup UPS for SONET system has additional 6 - 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time estimate.

Yes - Installed battery backup is from 33 Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time Page 15 of 24 Revision 1

Page 16 of 24 Revision 1 Communication Equipment - Power Sources SystemlEquipment Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)

VPN System.

Plant 800 MHz Trunked Radio System Primary Power Supply (List the power source) 33 lnverter and Bus 320 to 34 lnverter via automatic transfer switch to Panel 3146.

1 Normal off site power to computer room is supplied by non-vital480 volt Buses 31 0, 320, 41 0 and 420 via 33,34,43 and 44 Inverters.

2. Normal power for off site Edina Data Center is unknown.

3. VPN appliance is located off site at Edina Data Center.

1. Normal off site power for main radio transceivers and controllers is from vital Bus 11 1 to Panel 217.

2. Portable Radios Alternate Power Supply (List the power source)

Generator D3 and D4.

1. Alternate emergency sources via Diesel Generator D3 and D4.

2. Alternate power source for Edina Data Center is unknown.

1. Alternate emergency power is from Diesel Generator D l or via maintenance feed from Panel 217 and D5.

2. None Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g.,

batteries, portable generators, etc.)

YeslNo Battery and 34 Battery.

Additional backup UPS for SONET system has additional 6 - 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> capacity.

1. Yes - Installed battery backup is from 33, 34, 43 and 44 Batteries.

2. Yes - Data Center systems are powered from battery backed UPS.

None.

Source(s)

Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?

estimate.

1. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time estimate.

2. None known.

None

Page 17 of 24 Communication Equipment - Power Sources Revision 1 SystemlEquipment Sound Powered Phone System Emergency Cellular Phones (Sprint service provider)

Primary Power Supply (List the power source) are powered from contained batteries.

1. No power required for SP phones.

2. Sound power phone monitor amplifier receives normal off site power supplied by non-vital 480 volt Bus 31 0 via 33 Inverter to Panel 116.

Phone battery.

Alternate Power Supply (List the power source)

1. No power required for SP phones.

2. Alternate emergency sources via Diesel Generator D3.

None.

Equipment Power Backup power availability (e.g.,

batteries, portable generators, etc.)

YeslNo

1. No power required for SP phones.

2. Yes - Installed battery backup is from 33 Battery.

None.

Source(s)

Comments Will interim actions be taken to enhance the power supplies?

1. None required.

2. Service Building Batteries have an estimated 1-8 hour capacity depending on loading. Selective load shedding can be made to extend battery life beyond this time estimate.

None.

Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Page 18 of 24 Revision 1 Emergency Response Facility Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Minimum Communications Links 4.1.1 Notifications to, Control Room Technical Support Center (TSC)

Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Backup Method(s)

Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Backup Method(s)

Described in site E-Plan Note 1, pg 24 Note 1 and communications 1 per Control Room for Shift Communicator 1 for Key TSC Communicator

1. No

2. Yes (6-8 hours)

3. No

1. No

2. Yes (6-8 hours)

3. No Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

with, OROs [per 10 Direct Phone1 Fax Line Direct Phone Line/ Fax Line Refer to Following Section for Additional Information CFR 50 Appendix No N o E.1V.D and E.9.a]

I. 800 MHz radios

2. Plant PBX Telephone System

3. Local Commercial Telephone System

1. 800 MHz radios

2. Plant PBX Telephone System

3. Local Commercial Telephone System

Emergency Response Facility Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Minimum Communications Links 1 for Key EOF Communicator Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Direct Phone Line1 Fax Line Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 No for Primary EOF Yes for Back-up EOF (Outside 25 miles)

Backup Method@)

Described in site E-Plan

1. 800 MHz radios

2. Plant PBX Telephone System

3. Local Commercial Telephone System Backup Method(s)

Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2

1. No

2. Yes (6-8 hours)

3. No Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System for Primary EOF Back-up EOF Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 Page 19 of 24 Revision 1 4.1.2 Notifications to, and communications with, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Headquarters Incident Response Center and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.1V.D and E.9.d]

Control Room Technical Support Center (TSC) 1 per Control Room for ENS Communicator 1 for ENS Communicator ENSIFTS Phone ENSIFTS Phone Yes 6-8 hours Yes 6-8 hours Local Commercial Telephone System Local Commercial Telephone System No N o Perform ENS on Satellite Phone Perform ENS on Satellite Phone Note 1 Note 1

Emergency Response Facility Location(s) where HPN communications are performed Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Minimum Communications Links 1 for HPN Communicator HPN phone in Backup EOF Primary Method Described in site E-Plan HPN phone in TSC HPN phone in EOF 6-8 hours Commercial Telephone System Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Yes all Satellite Phone from TSC Backup Method(s)

Described in site E-Plan Local Backup Method(s)

Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 No Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

Perform HPN on Note 1 Page 20 of 24 Revision 1 4.1.3 Communications between licensee emergency response facilities [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c. Additional links that support performance of critical response functions are also specified.] The minimum communications links to support this function are listed below by facility. For example, if the normally used telephone system cannot be restored to service, these links could rely upon some combination of radio, sound-powered and satellite-based communications systems.

Note 1 Prairie ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system.

ERO responders requiring communication with offsite responders will be provided an integrated capability.

N o Control Room Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Direct Phone Line 1 per unit No Portable Cell Plant Page system Plant Radio System Sound Powered CR to TSC Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Emergency Response Facility Technical Support Center (TSC)

Operational Support Center (OSC)

Minimum Communications Links 1 each for:

• SeniorILead TSC Manager Operations Coordination Maintenance Coordination Engineering Coordination Radiological Support Additional response coordination links for multi-unit sites:

• 1 for each position providing Unit

Response

Coordination.

1 each for:

SeniorILead OSC Manager Radiological Support Additional response coordination links for multi-unit sites:

1 for each position providing Unit In-Plant Team Coordination.

Primary Method Described in site E-Plan I

I Direct Phone Line Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI Plant Page system Backup Method(s)

Described in site E-Plan 12-01 2.2 N o Plant Radio System Portable Cell Backup Method(s)

Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 No No Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

Sound Powered CR to TSC Plant Page system l ntegrate multiple Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 Prairie Island ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system.

ERO responders requiring communication with offsite responders will be provided an integrated capability.

Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Note 1 Prairie Island ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system.

ERO responders requiring communication with offsite responders will Page 21 of 24 Revision 1

Emergency Response Facility Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Communications Method Links Described in site E-Plan Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 1 each for:

SeniorILead Manager Key Protective Measures Operations or Technical Support (as needed to support I

I performance of dose Backup Method@)

Described in site E-Plan Back-Up Emergency Operations Facility projections, formulation of PARS and plant status updates to OR0 authorities).

Backup Method(s)

Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 There are no enhanced functional requirements for the Back-up Facility (Greater than 25 Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

I miles from the site)

Joint lnformation Center (JIC) 1 for Senior Manager Line I Direct Phone I

I I Normal Means

( Yes I No are Available The Joint lnformation Center is located outside the 25 miles Plant Radio System Portable Cell Plant Page system Integrate multiple Satellite Phones into Protected Plant No PBX System Install additional available means Satellite capability in Back-up EOF l ntegrate other direct dial Satellite Phones lines into Protected Plant PBX Svstem (this Refer to Following Section for Additional lnformation be provided an integrated capability.

Note 1 Prairie Island ERFs will be supported by the enhanced PBX system.

ERO responders requiring communication with offsite responders will be provided an integrated capability.

Note 1 Page 22 of 24 Revision 1

Emergency Response Facility Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Communications Method Links Described in site E-Plan zone and is protected by back-up power.

Direct Phone Line Method Available following Assumed NEI Backup Method(s)

Described in site E-Plan Backup Method(s)

Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

commitment provides a line from onsite ERFs to support information flow to the JIC 4.1.4 Communications with fieldloffsite monitoring teams [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.c]

Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Primary location from which field1 offsite monitoring teams are deployed Primary location where fieldloffsite monitoring team coordination is performed Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System No 1 for each fieldloffsite monitoring team Note 1 Note 1 Personal Pagers Fieldloffsite monitoring team 4.1.5 Communications with other Federal agencies as described in the site emergency plan (e.g., the US Coast Guard) [per 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.9.b]

Plant Radio System Personal Pagers Plant Radio System Note 1 N o Page 23 of 24 Revision 1 Integrate Satellite Phones into Protected Plant PBX System. The proposed system would provide sufficient NIA Primary location where communication with Federal agencies is performed NIA There are no commitments in the Prairie Island Emergency Plan for direct contact with other agencies.

Coordination with Federal agencies NIA

1 1

Emergency Response Facility Communication Equipment - Summary and Improvements Minimum Communications Links Primary Method Described in site E-Plan Planned or Potential Improvement Identified?

number of available lines to support any event specific Backup Method(s)

Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2 Primary Method Available following Assumed NEI 12-01 2.2

/ needs.

Backup Method&)

Described in site E-Plan Refer to Following Section for Additional Information Note 1 :

The satellite phone system will be integrated with the enhanced plant PBX system. Those responders required to communicate with offsite agencies will be provided an integrated satellite system capable of functioning from the facility ERF and that will not require the responder to leave the facility. The system is also provided a transportable handset should the PBX system fail.

Page 24 of 24 Revision 1