05000285/LER-2013-003-01, For Fort Calhoun Station Regarding Calculations Indicate the HPSI Pumps Will Operate in Run-out During a DBA: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[05000285/LER-2013-003, Regarding Calculations Indicate the HPSI Pumps Will Operate in Run-out During a DBA]]
| number = ML13333A673
| issue date = 11/27/2013
| title = For Fort Calhoun Station Regarding Calculations Indicate the HPSI Pumps Will Operate in Run-out During a DBA
| author name = Cortopassi L
| author affiliation = Omaha Public Power District
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation = NRC/Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR
| docket = 05000285
| license number =
| contact person =
| case reference number = LlC-13-0171
| document report number = LER 13-003-01
| document type = Letter, Licensee Event Report (LER)
| page count = 5
}}
{{LER
| Title = For Fort Calhoun Station Regarding Calculations Indicate the HPSI Pumps Will Operate in Run-out During a DBA
| Plant =
| Reporting criterion = 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
| Power level =
| Mode =
| Docket = 05000285
| LER year = 2013
| LER number = 3
| LER revision = 1
| Event date =
| Report date =
| ENS =
| abstract =
}}
 
=text=
{{#Wiki_filter:-~-
011110 Omaha Pub/It: Power O/slrlcl 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247 LlC-13-0171 November 27,2013 u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
 
==Reference:==
: 1. Docket No. 50-285
: 2. Letter from the OPPD (Louis P. Cortopassi) to NRC (Document Control Desk), Licensee Event Report 2013-003, Revision 0, dated April 1,
2013 (LlC-13-0039)
 
==Subject:==
Licensee Event Report 2013-003, Revision 1, for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2013-003, Revision 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(8) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). There are no new commitments being made in this letter.
If you should have any questions, please contact Terrence W. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance, at (402) 533-6263.
Louis P. Cortopassi, Site Vice President and CNO LC/rjr Attachment c:
M. L. Dapas, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV J. M. Sebrosky, NRC Senior Project Manager L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Employment with Equal Opportunity
 
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: No. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (1 0-201 O}
, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
: 13. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1 OF 4
: 4. TITLE Calculations Indicate the HPSI Pumps will Operate in Run-out During a DBA
: 5. EVENT DATE
: 6. LER NUMBER
: 7. REPORT DATE
: 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 1
30 2013 2013 003 -
1 11 27 2013 05000
: 9. OPERATING MODE
: 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201 (b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 D
20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4) 181 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)*
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
: 10. POWER LEVEL D
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4) 0 D
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D OTHER D
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 181 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in The HPSI pumps have been susceptible to runout conditions since initial plant start-up in 1973.
During the October 1972 Safety Injection Preoperational Testing, HPSI pump runout operation was noted by the Operator and Field Engineer. The test procedure noted that HPSIIoop injection valves were throttled to resolve the runout condition.
At approximately 1721 CST on February 7,2013, a late 8-hour notification was made to the Headquarters Operations Office under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety (Event Number 48730). The late notification was entered into the station's corrective action program (CR 2013-05070). This written report is being submitted in accordance with 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(B), any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CONCLUSION A causal analysis identified that the HPSI pump cross-tie valves HCV-304 and HCV-305 required position, impeller design, and runout characteristics identified during pre-operational testing were not translated into FCS design and licensing basis documents. This resulted in several HPSI system configuration and procedural changes that reduced margin to reliable pump operation.
 
==CORRECTIVE ACTIONS==
Completed Corrective Actions to Correct/Prevent the Runout Condition:
New analysis (FC08254, HPSI Pump Maximum and Minimum Flow - SI-2A, SI-28 and SI-2C, completed after the causal analysis) shows that a new design flow rate of 450 gpm is acceptable for up to 1000 hours.
Orifices have been installed and tested that limits maximum flow to prevent the HPSI pumps from operating beyond 450 gpm during a design basis accident.
HPSIIoop injection valve position has been set to balance HPSI safety injection flow into the four ReS loops.
Remaining Corrective Actions to Correct/Prevent the Runout Condition:
Ensure site testing procedures and preventive maintenance work orders periodically verify that HPSI and LPSI safety injection pump flow into the four reactor coolant loops is balanced, meets pump flow operability criteria, and satisfies accident analysis assumptions. (Due 6/15/2014)
Corrective Actions to Verify Design and Licensing Bases:
Identify and define the licenSing bases for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump functions and assure licensing bases documentation is current, accurate, complete, and retrievable.
This action applies to HPSI, low pressure safety injection, and containment spray systems (CS).
This action is replicated from RCA 2013-05570 (FCS Design and Licensing Basis Configuration Control) CAPR-1 and modified to prioritize and accelerate the Licensing Bases reviews and revisions for ECCS pumps to the initial phases of the RCA 2013-05570 CAPR-1 project. (Due 10/5/2014)
Identify and define the design bases for the ECCS pump functions and assure design bases documentation remains current, accurate, complete, and retrievable. This action applies to HPSI, LPSI, and CS systems. This action is replicated from RCA 2013-05570 (FCS Design and Licensing Basis Configuration Control) CAPR-2 and modified to prioritize and accelerate the Design Bases reviews and revisions for ECCS pumps to the initial phases of the RCA 2013-05570 CAPR-2 project. (Due 10/5/2014)
 
==SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE==
HPSI pumps are credited in USAR Section 6.2 to respond to design basis accidents, including a large break LOCA. The HPSI pumps must be able to operate reliably to supply sufficient water for core cooling. However, HPSI pump operation is unreliable when operated in the extended flow region of the manufacturer's pump curve during the injection phase. The available net positive suction head is insufficient to support pump operation in the extended flow region. As a result, one or more of the HPSI pumps may be damaged and fail to provide core cooling during a design basis LOCA resulting in core damage. However, for a design basis large break LOCA, both the HPSI and LPSI pumps are designed to operate for accident mitigation.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.
PREVIOUS EVENTS Fourteen licensee event reports (LER) with event dates since January 1, 2010, were identified with the same reporting criteria. Several of these LERs have causal analyses which are still in progress.
Since the condition described in this LER was a result of actions taken by the station in 1990 and 2008 and an incorrect vendor document in 1991, it is a legacy condition that would not have been prevented by any corrective actions taken by the station since January 2010. 4
}}
 
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