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| {{#Wiki_filter:Pacific Gas and Electric Company Barry S. Allen Diablo Canyon Power Plant Site Vice President Mail Code 104/6 P. 0. Box 56 Avila Beach, CA 93424 805.545.4888 Internal: 691.4888 November 25, 2013 Fax: 805.545.6445 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 50.90 ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 License Amendment Request 13-02 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505. Revision 1. "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times-RITSTF Initiative 48" | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
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| ==Dear Commissioners and Staff:==
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| In accordance with the provisions of Section 50.90 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR 50.90), Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) is submitting a request for an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2.
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| The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements to permit the use of Risk Informed Completion Times in accordance with Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)-505, Revision 1, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times -
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| RITSTF Initiative 4b." The availability of this TS improvement was announced in the Federal Register on March 15, 2012 (77 FR 15399).
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| The Enclosure provides a description and assessment of the proposed change, the requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific verifications. Attachment 1 to the Enclosure provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes. Attachment 2 to the Enclosure provides revised (clean) TS pages. to the Enclosure provides existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes.
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| This communication contains new regulatory commitments (as defined by NEI 99-04) to be implemented, which are identified in Attachment 4 to the Enclosure.
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| Attachments 5 - 16 to the Enclosure provide information identified to support implementation of TSTF-505.
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| A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway
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| * Comanche Peak
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| * Diablo Canyon
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| * Palo Verde
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| * San Onofre
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| * South Texas Project
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| * Wolf Creek
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| Document Control Desk PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 m November 25, 2013
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| ~&~ . Page 2 PG&E requests approval of the proposed license amendment by November 30, 2014, with the amendment being implemented within 120 days.
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| In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (b)(1 ), "Notice for Public Comment; State Consultation," a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the California Department of Public Health.
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| If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Tom Baldwin at 805-545-4720.
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| I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
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| Executed on November 25, 2013 .
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| Sincerely,
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| ~5.4&_
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| Barry S. Allen Site Vice President kjse/4328 Enclosure cc: Diablo Distribution cc/enc: Thomas R. Hipschman, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Gonzalo L. Perez, Branch Chief, California Department of Public Health Jennivine K. Rankin, NRR Project Manager Steven A. Reynolds, NRC Region IV A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway
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| * Comanche Peak
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| * Diablo Canyon
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| * Palo Verde
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| * San Onofre
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| * South Texas Project
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| * Wolf Creek
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Evaluation of the Proposed Change License Amendment Request 13-02 Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 1, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 48"
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| ==1.0 DESCRIPTION==
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| 2.0 ASSESSMENT 3.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSES
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| ==4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION==
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| ATTACHMENTS:
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| : 1. Proposed Technical Specification Change(s)
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| : 2. Revised Technical Specification Page(s)
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| : 3. Technical Specification Bases Change(s)
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| : 4. List of Regulatory Commitments
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| : 5. List of Revised Required Actions to Corresponding Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Functions
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| : 6. Information Supporting Consistency with Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2
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| : 7. Information Supporting Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Models Without PRA Standards Endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2 (Not Applicable)
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| : 8. Information Supporting Justification of Excluding Sources of Risk Not Addressed by the Diablo Canyon Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Models
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| : 9. Baseline Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF)
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| : 10. Justification of Application of At-Power Probabilistic Risk Assessment Models to Shutdown Modes (Not Applicable)
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| : 11. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model Update Process
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| : 12. Attributes of the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) Model
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| : 13. Key Assumptions and Sources of Uncertainty
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| : 14. Program Implementation
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| : 15. Monitoring Program
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| : 16. Risk Management Action Examples 1
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106
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| ==1.0 DESCRIPTION==
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| The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specification (TS) requirements related to Completion Times (CTs) for Required Actions (RAs) to provide the option to calculate a longer, risk-informed CT (RICT). A new program, the Risk-Informed Completion Time Program, is added to TS Section 5 Administrative Controls.
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| The methodology for using the RICT Program is described in NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS)
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| Guidelines," Revision 0, which was approved by the NRC on May 17, 2007. Adherence to NEI 06-09 is required by the RICT Program, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) is not proposing any deviations from the NEI guidance.
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| The proposed amendment is consistent with Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) traveler TSTF-505, Revision 1, "Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b." However, only those RAs *described in Attachment 5 to this Enclosure are proposed to be changed. Attachment 5 does not include all of the modified RAs in TSTF-505 and includes some plant-specific RAs not included in TSTF-505.
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| 2.0 ASSESSMENT 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation PG&E has reviewed the model safety evaluation dated March 6, 2012, as part of the Federal Register Notice for Comment. This review included a review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support TSTF-505 and the safety evaluation for NEI 06-09. PG&E has concluded that the technical basis presented in the TSTF-505 proposal and the associated model safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 and support incorporation of this amendment in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) TS.
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| 2.2 Verifications and Regulatory Commitments In accordance with Section 4.0, Limitations and Conditions, of the safety evaluation for NEI 06-09, the following is provided:
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| : 1. Attachment 5 to this Enclosure identifies each of the TS RAs to which the RICT Program will apply, with a comparison of the TS functions to the functions modeled in the PRA of the structures, systems and components (SSCs) subject to those actions.
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| 2
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13~106
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| : 2. Attachment 6 to this Enclosure provides a discussion of the results of peer reviews and self-assessments conducted for the plant-specific PRA models which support the RICT Program, as required by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200 Section 4.2.
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| : 3. Attachment 7 to this Enclosure is not applicable since each PRA model used for the RICT Program is addressed using a standard endorsed by the NRC.
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| : 4. Attachment 8 to this Enclosure provides appropriate justification for excluding sources of risk not addressed by the PRA models.
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| : 5. Attachment 9 to this Enclosure provides the plant-specific baseline CDF and LERF to confirm that the potential risk increases allowed under the RICT Program are acceptable.
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| : 6. Attachment 10 to this Enclosure is not applicable since the RICT Program is not being applied to shutdown modes.
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| : 7. Attachment 11 to this Enclosure provides a discussion of the programs and procedures that assure the PRA models that support the RICT Program are maintained consistent with the as-built, as-operated plant.
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| : 8. Attachment 12 to this Enclosure provides a description of how the baseline PRA model, which calculates average annual risk, is evaluated and modified for use in the CRMP to assess real-time configuration risk, and describes the scope of, and quality controls applied to, the CRMP.
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| : 9. Attachment 13 to this Enclosure provides a discussion of how the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty in the PRA models were identified for this application, and how their impact on the RICT Program was assessed and dispositioned.
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| 1O.Attachment 14 to this Enclosure provides a description of the implementing programs and procedures regarding the plant staff responsibilities for the RICT Program, including risk management action (RMA) implementation.
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| : 11. Attachment 15 to this Enclosure provides a description of the implementation and monitoring program as described in NEI 06-09, Section 2.3.2, Step 7.
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| 12.Attachment 16 to this Enclosure provides a description of the process to identify RMAs, including specific example RMAs.
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| 2.3 Optional Changes and Variations Table 1 identifies each limiting condition of operation (LCO) and RA of TSTF-505 and the corresponding Diablo Canyon plant-specific LCO and RA. Any differences between the plant-specific TS and TSTF-505 are identified and a justification provided.
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| 3
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 In general, the DCPP TS are the same as the Standard TS for Westinghouse designed nuclear steam supply system plants on which TSTF-505 was based, but some TS have different numbering or titles. TSTF-505 also has different options available based on the plant-specific design considerations. TSTF-505 also includes TS with MODE 3 and 4 applicability, which Diablo Canyon is not adopting at this time. These editorial differences are not considered optional changes or variations, and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-505 to the DCPP TS.
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| DCPP TS do not have all of the LCOs and conditions in the scope of TSTF-505. Such cases are identified as variations in Table 1.
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| There are some plant-specific changes necessary to accommodate implementation of TSTF-505 for the existing DCPP TS structure, as well as some plant-specific TS requirements for which the RICT Program is proposed to apply, and some TSTF-505 conditions where Diablo Canyon is not proposing to apply the RICT Program. These are identified as variations in Table 1.
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| PG&E has identified four generic issues with TSTF-505 (one affects only the TS Bases},
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| which must be corrected for Diablo Canyon to implement the RICT Program correctly.
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| These are not considered variations since they are not plant-specific issues but rather issues with the TSTF-505 structure, and are identified as editorial changes in Table 1.
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| (Note that TSTF-505 also has spelling and grammar errors which have been corrected in the plant-specific TS markups; these are not identified as changes in Table 1.)
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| * TS 3.3.1 Functions 6, 7, BA, 88, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, and 21 in Table 3.3-1 of TSTF-505 only identify the Condition associated with one channel inoperable, but do not identify the new Conditions applicable for the RICT Program which address more than one channel inoperable. PG&E is proposing to include these additional Conditions to correct this apparent oversight in TSTF-505.
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| * TS 3.7.2 for main steam*isolation valves (MSIV) in TSTF-505 provides for unlimited operation in MODE 2 with one or more inoperable MSIVs provided the inoperable MSIVs are closed. The Condition applicable in MODE 1 for two or more inoperable MISVs (Condition C) requires a shutdown to MODE 4 if the MSIVs are not restored to operable. This structure is not correct, since once MODE 1 is exited, operation in MODE 2 is permitted allowing continued operation in MODE 2 with MSIVs inoperable but closed. In order to establish the correct structure for the DCPP TS, PG&E is proposing that the existing MODE 2 shutdown condition, applicable when one MSIV is inoperable in MODE 1, be made the subsequent action when two or more MSIVs are inoperable in MODE 1. The order of Conditions B and C in TSTF-505 is swapped to make the TS structure logically correct.
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| 4
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
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| * TS 3.8.9 Condition Dis a new Condition in TSTF-505 which specifically addresses loss of safety function due to multiple inoperable distribution subsystems - Conditions involving a loss of a safety function are prohibited from applying the RICT Program per the NEI guidance. Further, the other Conditions (A, B, and C) are modified by TSTF-505 to address more than one inoperable distribution subsystem, so adopting TSTF-505 Condition D is considered unnecessary. Therefore, PG&E is not proposing to adopt this Condition.
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| * The TSTF-505 bases have typographical errors and differences in wording for similar actions. The plant-specific bases, provided for information in Attachment 3, correct these errors, and use common phrasing for similar actions to avoid potential confusion in implementation.
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| There are four plant-specific conditions for which PG&E is proposing to apply the RICT Program. These conditions are variations as identified in Table 1 with additional detailed justification provided below:
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| * TS 3.3.1, Function 148, Condition X (renumbered to JJ) and TS 3.3.2 Function 6D2 Condition M (renumbered to V) address steam generator (SG)
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| Water Level - Low Low Trip Time Delay. These are separate plant-specific conditions not found in the Standard TS or TSTF-505. RA X.2 (renumbered to JJ.2) and M.2 (renumbered V.2) place the affected channel in trip, which is the same action as Functions 14A and 6D1, which address channel inoperability for other causes. Since the TSTF-505 equivalent of Functions 14A and 6D1 are in scope, PG&E is proposing to apply the RICT Program to TS 3.3.1 Function 148 and TS 3.3.2 Function 6D2.
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| * TS 3.3.2, Function 7, Condition K (renumbered to S) addresses the Residual Heat Removal Pump Trip on Refueling Water Storage Tank Level- Low. This is a plant-specific function and condition not found in the Standard TS or TSTF-505.
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| RA K.1.2 (renumbered S.2) is to restore the channel to operable status. Since similar required actions for other functions are in the TSTF-505 scope, PG&E is proposing to apply the RICT Program to TS 3.3.2 Function 7, and to also include a condition to address two or more inoperable channels, consistent with other similar functions in TSTF-505.
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| * TS 3.6.6 addresses containment cooling systems (containment sprays and containment fan cooling units (CFCUs)). The Diablo Canyon plant-specific design has five CFCUs instead of the two trains assumed in Standard TS and TSTF-505, and thus has additional plant-specific Conditions involving unique combinations of CFCUs and/or spray trains inoperable. PG&E is proposing to apply the RICT Program to the plant-specific RAs involving restoring the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status.
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| 5
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
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| * TS 3.8.1 addresses the electric power systems including the diesel generators (DGs). Diablo Canyon plant-specific design has a shared fuel oil system, and the TS include Conditions F and G which address inoperability of the shared fuel oil system. PG&E is proposing to apply the RICT Program to the plant-specific RAs involving restoring the inoperable shared fuel oil equipment to OPERABLE status.
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| Finally, two TS have plant-specific RAs which differ from TSTF-505, which are proposed to be changed to be consistent with TSTF-505 to better accommodate implementation.
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| * TS 3.5.2 addresses Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and includes separate RAs (A.1 and A.2.1, 2, and 3) for planned and unplanned Condition Entry. These changes were approved by the NRC in License Amendments 203 (Unit 1) and 202 (Unit 2) in December, 2008. The plant-specific RAs in A.2 provide a 14-day CT for unplanned maintenance when only one subsystem of the ECCS is inoperable, and no common cause failure exists in the redundant susbsystem, compared to a 72-hour CT in TSTF-505. A note specifies the applicability of RAs A.1 and A.2.1, 2, and 3, and the Condition also has a restriction that 100 percent of the flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train must be available. PG&E proposes to adopt the TSTF-505 structure by eliminating the extended 14-day CT of RAs A.2.1, 2, and 3, and the associated note and condition restriction.
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| * TS 3.6.6 addresses Containment Spray and Cooling Systems and includes separate RAs (A.1 and A.2) for planned and unplanned Condition Entry.
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| These changes were approved by NRC in TS License Amendments 203 (Unit 1) and 202 (Unit 2) in December, 2008. The plant-specific RA A.2 provides a 14-day CT for unplanned maintenance when one Containment Spray train is inoperable, compared to a 72-hour CT in TSTF-505. A note specifies the applicability of RAs A.1 and A.2. PG&E proposes to adopt the TSTF-505 structure by eliminating the extended 14-day CT of RA A.2 and the associated note.
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| 6
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.3.1 Function 1 Condition 8, C 3.3.1 Function 1 Condition D, E N/A OPTIONAL CHANGE: This RA has MODE 3 - 5 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODES 3 - 5. Renumbering of condition is the only change.
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| 3.3.1 Function 2A Condition F, G 3.3.1 Function 2A Condition E, F EDITORIAL: DCPP TS for Function 2A do not include the Standard TS optional RAs (F.1.1 and F.1.2) to reduce reactor power below 750fc, with one power range high flux channel inoperable, which changes the numbering of RAs to which the RICT Program applies.
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| 3.3.1 Function 28 Condition H, I 3.3.1 Function 28 Condition G, H 3.3.1 Function 3A Condition H, I 3.3.1 Function 3 Condition G, H EDITORIAL: DCPP TS Function 3A is numbered as 3.
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| 3.3.1 Function 38 Condition H, I N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 38.
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| 3.3.1 Function 4 Condition J, K 3.3.1 Function 4 Condition I, J EDITORIAL: Renumbering of conditions is the only change.
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| 3.3.1 Function 5 Condition L, M, N 3.3.1 Function 5 Condition K, L, EDITORIAL: Renumbering of conditions is the only change.
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| 0 3.3.1 Condition 0 3.3.1 Condition N EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 5 Condition 0 EDITORIAL: Renumbering of plant-specific condition is the only change.
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| 7
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO IRA (if different) NOTES 3.3.1 Function 6 Condition H 3.3.1 Function 6 Condition G, H EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Function 7 Condition H 3.3.1 Function 6 Condition G, H EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Function 8A Condition P 3.3.1 Function 8A Condition P, Q EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 88 Condition H 3.3.1 Function 88 Condition G, H EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Function 9 Condition P 3.3.1 Function 9 Condition P, Q EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Function 10 Condition P 3.3.1 Function 10 Condition P, Q EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Condition R 3.3.1 Function 11A Condition S, T N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 11A.
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| 3.3.1 Condition U N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 11A.
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| 3.3.1 Function 11 8 Condition V, W 3.3.1 Function 11 Condition S, T EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Condition X 3.3.1 Condition U EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 8
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.3.1 Function 12 Condition P 3.3.1 Function 12 Condition P, Q EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Function 13 Condition P 3.3.1 Function 13 Condition P, Q EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Function 14 Condition H 3.3.1 Function 14A Condition G, EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one H inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| 3.3.1 Function 148 Condition JJ VARIATION: DCPP TS has a separate function for channel trip time delay (148) and other inoperabilities (14A); RA for placing channel in trip is the same for both conditions, and so the RICT is applied to both actions.
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| 3.3.1 Function 15 Condition H N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 15.
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| 3.3.1 Function 16A Condition Y, Z 3.3.1 Function 16A Condition V, EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in w numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 168 Condition Y, Z 3.3.1 Function 168 Condition X EDITORIAL: DCPP TS have separate conditions for low pressure auto stop oil trip, and single condition for one or more turbine stop valve inputs, resulting in differing numbering.
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| 3.3.1 Condition AA 3~3.1 Condition Y EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 17 Condition 88 3.3.1 Function 17 Condition Z, EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one AA inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 9
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA {if different) NOTES 3.3.1 Function 18A and E Condition 3.3.1 Function 18A and E EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in FF Condition DO numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 188, C, D, and F 3.3.1 Function 188, C, D, and F EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in Condition GG Condition EE numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Condition HH 3.3.1 Condition FF EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 19 Condition DO, EE 3.3.1 Function 19 Condition 88, EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in cc numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 19 Condition D N/A OPTIONAL CHANGE: This RA has MODE 3 - 5 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODES 3 - 5. Renumbering of condition is the only change.
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| 3.3.1 Function 20 Condition II 3.3.1 Function 20 Condition EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one GG,HH inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 3.3.1 Function 20 Condition D N/A OPTIONAL CHANGE: This RA has MODE 3 - 5 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODES 3 - 5. Renumbering of condition is the only change. !
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| 3.3.1 Function 21 Condition 88 3.3.1 Function 21 Condition Z, EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 condition addressing more than one AA inoperable channel should apply to this function.
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| EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 10
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.3.1 Function 21 Condition D N/A OPTIONAL CHANGE: This RA has MODE 3 - 5 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODES 3 - 5. Renumbering of condition is the only change.
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| 3.3.1 Function 22 Condition II EDITORIAL: Renumbering of plant-specific condition is the only change.
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| 3.3.1 Condition KK 3.3.2 Function 1A Condition B, C 3.3.2 Function 1B Condition D, E I
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| 3.3.2 Function 1C Condition F, G 3.3.2 Function 1C Condition X, Y EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS condition and RA differs from TSTF-505 only due to the details of the note applicable for channel testing.
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| 3.3.2 Function 1D Condition F, G 3.3.2 Function 1E1 Condition F, G 3.3.2 Function 1E2 Condition F, G N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 1E2.
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| 3.3.2 Function 1F Condition F, G N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 1F.
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| 3.3.2 Function 1G Condition F, G N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 1G.
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| 3.3.2 Function 2A Condition B, C 3.3.2 Function 28 Condition D, E 11
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| Enclosure.
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| PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.3.2 Function 2C Condition H, I 3.3.2 Function 2C1 Condition Z, EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in AA numbering only.
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| EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS condition and RA differs from TSTF-505 only due to the details of the note applicable for channel testing.
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| 3.3.2 Function 2D Condition H, I N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 2D.
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| 3.3.2 Function 3A 1 Condition 8, C 3.3.2 Function 3A2 Condition D, E 3.3.2 Function 381 Condition 8, C 3.3.2 Function 382 Condition D, E 3.3.2 Function 383 Condition H, I 3.3.2 Function 383 Condition Z, EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in AA numbering only.
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| EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS condition and RA differs from TSTF-505 only due to the details of the note applicable for channel testing.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4A Condition J, K N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS Function 4A has a plant-specific RA to declare the affected MSIV inoperable after 48 hours.
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| Since the MSIV TS has the RICT Program applicable, PG&E does not propose to apply the RICT Program toTS 3.3.2 Function 4A. Renumbering of plant-specific condition is the only change.
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| 3.3.2 Function 48 Condition L, M 3.3.2 Function 48 Condition K, L EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 12
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| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.3.2 Function 4C Condition F, G 3.3.2 Function 4C Condition H, I EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4D1 Condition F, G 3.3.2 Function 4D2 Condition F, G N/A OPTIONAL CHANGE: This function has MODE 3 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODE 3. Renumbering of plant-specific condition is only change.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4E Condition F, G N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 4E.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4F Condition F, G N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 4F.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4G Condition F, G N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 4G.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4H Condition F, G N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 4H.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function SA Condition N, 0, 3.3.2 Function SA Condition M, N OPTIONAL CHANGE: DCPP TS has a plant-specific end L, M state of MODE 3, so Conditions N, 0 are applicable and not L, M. TSTF-505 accommodates the plant-specific end state as an option. Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 58 Condition P, Q, 3.3.2 Function 58 Condition R, S OPTIONAL CHANGE: DCPP TS has a plant-specific end F, G state of MODE 3, so Conditions P, Q (plant-specific numbering R, S) are applicable and not F, G. TSTF-505 accommodates the plant-specific end state as an option.
| |
| Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 6A Condition W EDITORIAL: Renumber of plant-specific condition is the only change.
| |
| 13
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.3.2 Function 6A Condition L, M 3.3.2 Function 68 Condition K, L EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 68 Condition L, M N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 68.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 6C Condition F, G 3.3.2 Function 6D1 Condition F, EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in G numbering only.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 6D2 Condition V VARIATION: DCPP TS has a separate function for channel trip time delay (6D2) and other inoperabilities (6D1 ); RA for placing channel in trip is the same for both conditions, and so the RICT is applied to both actions.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 6E Condition J, K N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 6E.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 6F Condition P, Q 3.3.2 Function 6G Condition 0, P EDITORIAL: Plant-specific TS differs from TSTF-505 in numbering only.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 6G Condition R, S N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 6G.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 6H Condition J, K N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 6H.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 7A Condition D, E N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 7A.
| |
| i I
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 78 Condition T, U N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 78.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 7C Condition T, U N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 7C.
| |
| I 14
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.3.2 Function 7 Condition S, T VARIATION: DCPP plant-specific refueling water storage tank (RWST) low-low level function 7 for trip of residual heat removal (RHR) pumps is analogous to Functions 7A- 7C of TSTF-505. This is not a plant-specific design to trip RHR pumps rather than initiate switchover to the sump.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 8A Condition J, K VARIATION: Diablo Canyon is not proposing to apply the RICT Program to this condition. Renumber of plant-specific condition is the only change.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 88 Condition V VARIATION: Diablo Canyon is not proposing to apply the RICT Program to this condition. Renumber of plant-specific condition is the only change.
| |
| 3.3.2 Function 8C Condition N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Function 8C.
| |
| 3.4.5 A.1 OPTIONAL CHANGE: This LCO has MODE 3 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODE 3.
| |
| 3.4.5 C.1 OPTIONAL CHANGE: This LCO has MODE 3 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODE 3.
| |
| 3.4.9 8.1 3.4.9 C.1 3.4.9 D.1 3.4.9 D.2
| |
| -~
| |
| 15
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.4.10 A.1 3.4.11 B.3 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS separately address Non-Class 1 and Class 1 power operated relief valves (PORVs) in the RAs; PG&E does not propose to apply the RICT Program to required actions associated with the Non-Class 1 PORV since these actions do not require restoration of the PORV to operable status.
| |
| 3.4.11 C.2 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS separately address Non-Class 1 and Class 1 PORVs in the RAs; PG&E does not propose to apply the RICT Program to RAs associated with Non-Class 1 PORV since these actions do not require restoration of the PORV to operable status.
| |
| 3.4.11 E.3 3.4.11 E.4 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS differ from Standard TS in that they have a requirement to immediately initiate action to restore PORVs to OPERABLE status as plant-specific RA E.1, which changes the numbering of applicable action for RICT Program.
| |
| 3.4.11 F.1 3.4.11 F.2 AND F.3 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS differ from Standard TS in that they have a requirement to place associated PORV in manual control as plant-specific RA F.1, which changes numbering of applicable actions for RICT Program.
| |
| EDITORIAL: In addition, DCPP TS have three RAs based on differing requirements for block valves associated with Class 1 and Non-Class 1 PORVs. PG&E does not propose to apply the RICT Program to the action associated with the Non-Class 1 PORV block valve since the RA does not involve restoration to OPERABLE status.
| |
| 16
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.4.11 G.1 AND G.2 3.4.11 G.2 AND G.3 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS differ from Standard TS in that they have a requirement to immediately initiate action to restore PORV block valves to OPERABLE status as plant-specific RA G.1, which changes numbering of applicable action for RICT Program.
| |
| 3.4.14 C.1 N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Condition C.
| |
| 3.5.1 A.1 3.5.1 8.1 3.5.1 C.1 3.5.1 D.1 AND D.2 EDITORIAL: TSTF-505 identifies each of the separate conditions to which these final shutdown actions apply; this is unnecessary since Condition D is applicable to all conditions when the RA(s) are not completed.
| |
| 17
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.5.2 A.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS differ from TSTF-505 in three ways:
| |
| (1) The requirement that 100%, of ECCS flow equivalent is available is included in condition A; this is no longer required when adopting TSTF-505 since this is addressed in the new condition 3.5.2 B.
| |
| (2) Separate plant-specific RAs exist for planned and unplanned maintenance or inspections, and the unplanned actions are restricted to a single subsystem. The existing TS are inconsistent in that RA A.1 only applies to planned maintenance, and it would be a violation of the RICT program to plan maintenance on more than one train although RA A.1 is to restore train(s) to operable status.
| |
| (3) RA A.2.2 addresses common cause failure mechanisms; this is no longer required when adopting TSTF-505 since common cause failure mechanisms is addressed within the RICT Program for unplanned corrective maintenance. The plant-specific actions were incorporated into the DCPP TS by License Amendments 203 (Unit 1) and 202 (Unit 2) 1 .
| |
| In order to adopt TSTF-505, PG&E proposes to restructure its plant-specific TS 3.5.2 consistent with TSTF-505. The existing plant-specific RA A.2.1 no longer applies since an extended CT on unplanned single subsystem repairs is addressed by A.1. Existing RA A.2.2 to determine common cause impacts on unplanned inoperabilities is already a requirement for using the RICT Program to extend the CT beyond 72 hours for unplanned corrective maintenance.
| |
| The 14-day CT is eliminated, since the RICT Program will be applied to unplanned single subsystem inoperabilities to establish the correct CT by RA A.1. New condition 3.5.2 B of TSTF-505 is also adopted.
| |
| 18
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF -505 LCO I RA DCPP LCO IRA (if different) NOTES 3.5.2 8.1 3.5.2 C.1 AND C.2 3.5.3 8.1 OPTIONAL CHANGE: This LCO has MODE 4 applicability only; PG&E is not proposing to apply the RICT Program in MODE4.
| |
| 3.5.4 A.1 3.5.4 8.1 3.5.6.A.1 N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.5.6.
| |
| 3.6.2 C.3 3.6.3 A.1 3.6.3 8.1 3.6.3 C.1 i
| |
| 3.6.3 D.1 N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have condition D of TSTF-505 .
| |
| 19
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.6.3 E.1 3.6.3 0.1 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS numbering is different since it does not have Condition D of TSTF-505.
| |
| VARIATION: DCPP TS conservatively include exhaust and vacuum I pressure relief valves in this condition; the 24-hour CT for restoration in Condition D is more restrictive than the 72-hour CT in the Standard TS Condition C. TSTF-505 applies the RICT Program to both conditions.
| |
| 3.6.6AA.1 3.6.6 A.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS differ from TSTF-505 in that they have plant-specific separate RAs with different CTs for planned and unplanned activities. The plant-specific actions were incorporated into the DCPP TS by License Amendments 203 (Unit 1) and 202 (Unit 2) 1
| |
| * PG&E proposes to eliminate the extended 14-day CT for unplanned activities so that the plant-specific TS would be identical with 72-hour CT of TSTF-505.
| |
| 3.6.6A C.1 3.6.6 C.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS include in the additional condition that a minimum of two CFCUs remain OPERABLE.
| |
| 3.6.6 0.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS have a plant-specific condition associated with one containment spray train inoperable coincident with one CFCU system inoperable and two CFCUs OPERABLE. This condition accommodates the plant-specific design which has five CFCUs instead of two trains. PG&E proposes to apply the RICT Program for this condition which involves restoration of equipment to OPERABLE status.
| |
| 20
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table 1 TSTF -505 LCO I RA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.6.6A D.1 3.6.6 E.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS for inoperability of all CFCUs (equivalent of TSTF-505 3.6.6A D) does not provide a 72-hour CT. This condition is therefore included in Condition E with a 1-hour CT.
| |
| 3.6.6A E.1 3.6.6 E.1 VARIATION: The equipment inoperability combinations currently delineated in plant-specific TS Condition F have been incorporated into Condition E with its 1-hour CT as these are analogous to the combinations of equipment inoperabilities addressed in TSTF-505 Condition E.
| |
| 3.6.9 N/A EDITORIAL: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.6.9.
| |
| 3.6.10 N/A EDITORIAL: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.6.1 0.
| |
| i 3.6.14 N/A EDITORIAL: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.6.14.
| |
| 3.6.15 N/A EDITORIAL: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.6.15.
| |
| 3.6.16 N/A EDITORIAL: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.6.16.
| |
| I 3.6.17 N/A EDITORIAL: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.6.17.
| |
| 3.6.18 N/A EDITORIAL: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.6.18.
| |
| 3.7.2 A.1 21
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table 1 TSTF -505 LCO I RA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.7.2 C.1 3.7.2 8.1 EDITORIAL: The RA if one or more MSIVs are inoperable in MODE 1 and not restored at the end of the RICT should be to exit MODE 1. The existing MODE 2 shutdown Condition 8 is proposed to be applied when either one MSIV (TSTF-505 Condition A) or two or more MSIVs (TSTF-505 Condition C) are inoperable in MODE 1. The order of Conditions 8 and C in TSTF-505 is swapped to make the DCPP TS structure logically correct.
| |
| 3.7.2.8 3.7.2.C EDITORIAL: Reordering of conditions to accommodate MODE 2 shutdown for TSTF-505 Condition C.
| |
| 3.7.2 D EDITORIAL: Renumbering of condition is the only change.
| |
| 3.7.2 E EDITORIAL: This condition is not applicable to RA C as described above.
| |
| 3.7.4 A.1 3.7.4 8.1 3.7.4 8.1 AND C.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS have separate conditions for two ADV inoperable and three or more atmospheric dump valves (ADV) inoperable. TSTF-505 has a single condition and applies the RICT Program with two or more ADV inoperable.
| |
| 3.7.5 A.1 3.7.5 8.1 22
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different} NOTES 3.7.5 C.1 AND C.2 VARIATION: DCPP TS have a separate Condition C for two auxiliary feedwater (AFW) trains inoperable when the turbine driven train is inoperable due to an inoperable steam supply. TSTF-505 has a single condition for two inoperable AFW trains for any reason and applies the RICT Program.
| |
| 3.7.5 C.1 3.7.5 D.1 3.7.5 D.1 3.7.5 E.1 3.7.5 E AND F EDITORIAL: Renumbering of condition is the only change.
| |
| 3.7.6 A.2 3.7.7 A.1 3.7.7 8.1 3.7.7 c 3.7.8 A.1 3.7.8 8.1 3.7.8 c
| |
| | |
| ====3.7.9 VARIATION====
| |
| PG&E does not propose to apply the RICT Program to LCO 3.7.9 since the ultimate heat sink is the Pacific Ocean, which can only be inoperable based on temperature.
| |
| 3.7.11 N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have LCO 3.7.11.
| |
| 23
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table 1 TSTF -505 LCO I RA DCPP LCO IRA (if different) NOTES 3.8.1 A.3 3.8.1 A.2 VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have Condition A.2 which affects numbering.
| |
| 3.8.1 8.4 3.8.1 C.2 3.8.1. D.1 3.8.1 E.1 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS condition is for two or more DGs.
| |
| This is not considered a variation since the TSTF-505 condition applies when there is no OPERABLE DG for a two-DG plant, and the DCPP plant-specific design simply includes more than two DGs.
| |
| 3.8.1F.1 N/A VARIATION: DCPP TS do not have a separate condition for sequencers.
| |
| 3.8.1 F AND G VARIATION: DCPP TS have two plant-specific conditions for diesel fuel oil supply trains. PG&E proposes to apply the RICT Program to these conditions based on a plant-specific design to share fuel oil rather than be diesel-specific.
| |
| 3.8.1 G.1 3.8.1 1.1 AND J.1 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS have existing Conditions I and J, which are equivalent to TSTF-505 3.8.1 Condition G. It is proposed to retain separate conditions rather than to combine the conditions. This is not considered a variation but an editorial difference only.
| |
| 3.8.1 H 3.8.1 J EDITORIAL: Renumbering of condition is the only change.
| |
| 24
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 I
| |
| Table 1 I
| |
| i TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES I
| |
| 1 3.8.3 H VARIATION: DCPP TS require declaring all DGs inoperable and shutting down to MODE 5. It is proposed to delete the shutdown requirement; since this is addressed by declaring the DGs inoperable under TS 3.8.1, which includes a RA for a MODE 5 shutdown.
| |
| 3.8.4A.1 3.8.4 A.3 3.8.4 8.1 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS have plant-specific one-time actions which have expired and no longer apply; these are editorially eliminated.
| |
| 3.8.4 C.1 3.8.4 D.1 3.8.4 E.1 EDITORIAL: DCPP TS have plant-specific Condition D which changes the numbering of applicable action for RICT Program.
| |
| 3.8.4 E 3.8.4 F EDITORIAL: DCPP TS have plant-specific Condition D which changes the numbering of applicable action for RICT Program.
| |
| 3.8.7 A.1 3.8.7 8.1 3.8.7 c EDITORIAL: Renumbering of condition is the only change.
| |
| 25
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table 1 TSTF-505 LCO IRA DCPP LCO I RA (if different) NOTES 3.8.9 A.1 3.8.9 A.1 AND E.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS have a separate ConditionE for more than one subsystem inoperable; consistent with TSTF-505, this is incorporated into Condition A.
| |
| 3.8.9 8.1 3.8.9 8.1 AND E.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS have a separate ConditionE for more than one subsystem inoperable; consistent with TSTF-505, this is incorporated into Condition B.
| |
| 3.8.9 C.1 3.8.9 C.1 AND E.1 VARIATION: DCPP TS have a separate ConditionE for more than one subsystem inoperable; consistent with TSTF-505, this is incorporated into Condition C.
| |
| 3.8.9 D.1 EDITORIAL: This new condition in TSTF-505 specifies ,a loss of a safety function, for which it is not permitted to apply a RICT. Therefore, PG&E does not propose to adopt this change.
| |
| 3.8.9 E.1 3.8.9.D.1 EDITORIAL: Renumbering of condition is the only change; not required for DCPP TS since PG&E is not proposing to adopt new Condition 3.8.9.D.
| |
| U.S. NRC, Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 -Issuance ofAmendments re: Increase in the Completion Times for Required Actions Related to Technical Specifications 3.5.2, Regarding the Emergency Core Cooling System, and 3.6.6, regarding the Containment Spray and Cooling Systems (TAG Nos. MD7512 and MD7513), December 31, 2008.
| |
| 26
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 3.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS PG&E has evaluated the proposed change to the Technical Specification (TS) using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
| |
| Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 request adoption of an approved change to the Standard TS and plant specific TS, to modify the TS requirements related to Completion Times (CTs) for RAs to provide the option to calculate a longer, risk informed CT. The allowance is described in a new program in Chapter 5, "Administrative Controls,"
| |
| entitled the "Risk Informed Completion Time Program."
| |
| As required by 10 CFR 50.91 (a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:
| |
| : 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
| |
| Response: No.
| |
| The proposed change permits the extension of CTs provided the associated risk is assessed and managed in accordance with the NRC approved Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated because the change involves no change to the plant or its modes of operation. The proposed change does not increase the consequences of an accident because the design-basis mitigation function of the affected systems is not changed and the consequences of an accident during the extended CT are no different from those during the existing CT.
| |
| Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
| |
| : 2. Does the proposed change create the possibility or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
| |
| Response: No.
| |
| The proposed change does not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different kind of equipment will be installed).
| |
| Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
| |
| 27
| |
| | |
| Enclosure PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
| |
| : 3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
| |
| Response: No.
| |
| The proposed change permit the extension of CTs provided risk is assessed and managed in accordance with the NRC approved RICT Program. The proposed change implements a risk-informed configuration management program to assure that adequate margins of safety are maintained. Application of these new specifications and the configuration management program considers cumulative effects of multiple systems or components being out of service and does so more effectively than the current TS.
| |
| Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
| |
| Based on the above, PG&E concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.
| |
| | |
| ==4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION==
| |
| | |
| PG&E has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation (77 FR 51), published on March 15, 2012, as part of the Notice of Availability.
| |
| PG&E has concluded that the NRC staff findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2.
| |
| The proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.
| |
| 28
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 1 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Proposed Technical Specification Change(s)
| |
| | |
| Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-7 (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One A.1 Verify affected 1 hour subsystem subsystem AND inoperable. isolated.
| |
| Once per 8 hours thereafter AND A.2 Restore 72 hours subsystem to OPERABLE status.
| |
| B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Action and AND associated Completion B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Time not met.
| |
| Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours thereafter" interval begins upon performance of Required Action A.1.
| |
| If after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either the initial1 hour or any subsequent 8 hour interval from the previous* performance (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2),
| |
| Condition B is entered. The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not expired.
| |
| IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the Required COMPLETION Action should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
| |
| TIME DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 1.3-10 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ---------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately one or more required referenced in channels or trains Table 3.3.1-1 for the inoperable. channel(s) or trains.
| |
| B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| !INSERT 2 I
| |
| channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| 'INSERT 3 I GR L B.2 Be iR MG9e J. 94 A91::1FS
| |
| ----------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| While this LCO is not met for function 19, 20 or 21, in MODE 5, making the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal is not permitted.
| |
| G{Q]. One channel or train G{Q].1 Restore channel or train 48 hours inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR C.2.1 IRitiate actieR te f~::~lly 48 A91::1FS iRsert all Feds.
| |
| (ceRtiRI::Ied~
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~ 442Q Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~ 442{J
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) AND G.2.2 Plaee tl=le Red GeRtFel 49 hours System iR a eeRditieR iReapable ef Fed tNitl=ldFawal.
| |
| G!§. One Power Range Neutron ------------------NOTE------------------ \
| |
| Flux-High channel The inoperable channel may be inoperable. bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing and setpoint
| |
| ~
| |
| adjustment of other channels.
| |
| Gl§.1.1 -----------NOTE---------------
| |
| Only required when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable.
| |
| Perform SR 3.2.4.2. 12 hours from discovery of THERMAL POWER
| |
| > 75o/o RTP AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND I INSERT2 Gl§.1.2 Place channel in trip 72 hours GR 4 0.2 Be iR MGDe 3. 78 Rel::JFS (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-2 Unit 1 - Amendmen_ t No. 4-aa, 4-79Q Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-aa, ~
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| ~.One channel inoperable. ------------------N 0 TE------------------
| |
| For functions 6, 7, and 8.b, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours, or both the inoperable and the additional channel may be surveillance testedjn bypass for up to 12 hours. For functions* 2.b and 3, only the inoperable channel may be bypassed for surveillance testing of other channels. For function 14.a, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours.
| |
| This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis
| |
| -------------------------------------------- I INSERT 2
| |
| ~.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours GR
| |
| 'INSERT 5 I
| |
| e.2 Be iA MQge a.
| |
| I~~. 78 R9l:JFS One Intermediate Range ~.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours Neutron Flux channel POWER to < P-6.
| |
| inoperable. OR
| |
| ~.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours POWER to> P-10.
| |
| (continued).
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-3 Un~t 1 -Amendment No. ~ 442,- 4-§8, 47-3, 479, ~
| |
| Umt 2- Amendment No.~ 442,- 4-W, 7&, 48-1-, ~
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME GQ]. Two Intermediate Range ~.1 -----------N 0 TE -------------
| |
| Neutron Flux channels Limited boron inoperable. concentration changes associated with RCS inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed.
| |
| Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
| |
| AND GQ].2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours POWER to < P-6.
| |
| 1=1. Net blsea t]. One Source Range Neutron fSj.1 -----------N 0 T E-------------
| |
| Flux channel inoperable. Limited boron concentration changes associated with RCS inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed.
| |
| Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
| |
| JIQ. Two Source Range Neutron J[Q.1 Open reactor trip Immediately Flux channels inoperable. breakers (RTBs).
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-3a 1
| |
| Un~t ~Amendment No.:::~::~:::*
| |
| Umt 2 Amendment No. , ,
| |
| -mQ
| |
| , 7-aQ
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 I INSERT 2 I ACTIONS (continued) /
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION~
| |
| KIM]. One Source Range Neutron KIM].1 Restore channel to 48hou~
| |
| Flux channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR K.2.1 Initiate action to fully 48 hours insert all rods.
| |
| ANG K.2.2 Place the Gontrol Rod 49 hours 6 Systern in a condition incapable of rod
| |
| }Nithdra}Nal.
| |
| hjQJ. Required Source Range t&].1 -----------N 0 TE ------------- I Neutron Flux channel Plant temperature inoperable. changes are allowed provided the temperature change is accounted for in the calculated SDM.
| |
| Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
| |
| AND t&].2 Perform SR 3.1.1.1. 1 hour AND I
| |
| Once per 12 hours thereafter (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-4 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~. 7aQ Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~. 4-7aQ
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Mf]. One channel inoperable. -----------------NOTE------------------
| |
| I For function 8.a, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours, or both the inoperable and the additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours. For functions 9 and 10, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours.
| |
| For functions 12 and 13, only the inoperable channel may be bypassed for surveillance testing of other channels. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis. I INSERT 2
| |
| ~.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours GR RT7 78 hOl:JFS M.2 Reel:Jee +FI~RM,6,b PQlalV~R to .c:: P 7.
| |
| N!§l. One channel inoperable Ni§].1 GR Place channel in trip 6hou/
| |
| RT8 N.2 Reel:Jee +FI~RMAb 12 hOl:JFS PGVV~R to .c:: P 7 (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-4a Un~t 1 - Amendment No. ~. 68, 4-7d, 4-79Q Untt 2- Amendment No.~. 4-§9, 4-?a, 484Q
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| ~- One Low Auto-Stop Oil ------------------N 0 TE------------------
| |
| Pressure Turbine Trip An inoperable channel may be channel inoperable bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.
| |
| ~.1 Place channel in trip.
| |
| INSERT9 ---------------~-GR--------------------+-----~--~----
| |
| ~- One or more Turbine Stop 0.2
| |
| ~.1 Reduce THERMAL POVVER TO < P 9 Place channel(s) in trip.
| |
| Valve Closure, Turbine Trip GR channel(s) inoperable.
| |
| I INSC::10 R_e_d_uc_e_T_H_E_R_~_A_A_L
| |
| '------------------+-P-.2_____POVVER to< P 9. ____ +-7-6_h_o_ur-s~-r------
| |
| ~- One train inoperable. ------------------NOTE------------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| ~.1 Restore train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| ~ GR
| |
| ~-----------------+-a_.2 ___s_e_i_n_M_o_o_E_a_.______ -+----~----------
| |
| ~- One RTB train ------------------NOTE----------------
| |
| inoperable. One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| ~.1 Restore train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| I INSE~ '------------------~R-.2---B_e_i_n_~_4o_o_E__ ------~-a_o_h_ou_r_s__________
| |
| 12 a_.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~. 4-79IJ Unit 2- Amendment No.~. 484Q
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| @. One or more channels or @.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour I__fQ-,
| |
| trains inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.
| |
| GR S.~ Be iR MG!;>~ a. 7 R9l:JFS
| |
| +jg§.One or more channels or +jg§.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour trains inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.
| |
| IINSET1'3 I GR I INSERT 2 I MG!;>~ ~. 7 R9l:JFS 48h7
| |
| +.~ Be iR /
| |
| ~.One trip mechanism ~.1 Restore inepemble trip inoperable for one RTB. mechanism to OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR I INSERT 14 I bJ.~ Be iR MG!;>~ a. §4 R9l:JFS
| |
| \1 v-. Net l:Jsea
| |
| 'WUJ. One channel inoperable ------------------NOTE------------------
| |
| The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 72 hours for surveillance or maintenance.
| |
| 1Aij.1 Place channel in trip 6 hours OR 1Aij.2 Be in MODE 3 12 hours (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-6 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-3§, 479IJ Unit 2- Amendment No. 4-3§, 43tjJ
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| ~* One or more SG Water ------------------N 0 TE ------------------
| |
| Level Low- Low Trip For function 14.b, the inoperable Time Delay channel(s) TTD channel (processor) and/or inoperable. one additional TTD channel (processor) may be surveillance tested with the affected steam generator low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip for up to 12 hours. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.
| |
| ~.1 Set the Trip Time Delay to zero seconds.
| |
| 72 hours I~
| |
| OR I INSERT 2 ____.
| |
| ~.2 Place the affected SG 72ho~
| |
| Water Level Low - Low channel(s) in trip.
| |
| I INSiR~==15==='==================GR====================~==============
| |
| X.a Be in MODE a. 78 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-7 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-35, ~, 4+9jJ Unit 2- Amendment No. 4-35, 4-75, 48-1-jJ
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<a>
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 1. Manual 1,2 2 B[9 SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA Reactor Trip 3(b)' 4(b)' 5(b) 2 GIQj SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA
| |
| : 2. Power Range Neutron Flux
| |
| : a. High 1,2 4 ~ SR 3.3.1.1 :::; 110.2% 109% RTP SR 3.3.1.2 RTP SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : b. Low 1(c),2 4 ~ SR 3.3.1.1 :526.2% 25% RTP SR 3.3.1.8 RTP SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 3. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate High Positive Rate 1,2 4 ~ SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| :55.6% RTP with time 5% RTP with time
| |
| _q_J SR 3.3.1.16 constant constant~
| |
| ~ 2 sec ~ 2 sec 1(c), 2(d)
| |
| : 4. Intermediate 2 ~ SR 3.3.1.1 :530.6% 25%
| |
| Range SR 3.3.1.8 RTP RTP Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.11 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
| |
| (c) Below the P-1 0 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (d) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-12 Un~t 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa,~,4&7,~
| |
| Umt 2 -Amendment No. 4-aa,~,4SS,~
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<a>
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS . REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 5. Source Range 2<e> 2 ~ SR3.3.1.1 ::; 1.4 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cps Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 _)2!,
| |
| 2 SR 3.3.1.1 ::; 1.4 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cps I SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 _ch SR 3.3.1.1 N/A N/A I SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| : 6. Overtemperature 1,2 4 SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to I LH SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 Note 1 SR 3.3.1.6 (Page 3.3-17) (Page3.3-~
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 7. Overpower 1,2 4 SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to LlT SR 3.3.1.7 Note 2 Note 2 SR 3.3.1.10 (Page 3.3-18) (Page 3.3-18~
| |
| SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 8. Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| : a. Low 4 SR 3.3.1.1 ;::: 1947.5 psig 1950 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : b. High 1,2 4 SR 3.3.1.1 ::; 2387.5 psig 2385 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 9. Pressurizer 3 SR 3.3.1.1 ::;90.2% 90%
| |
| Water SR 3.3.1.7 Level-High SR 3.3.1.10 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint.
| |
| A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
| |
| (e) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (f) With the RTBs open or all rods fully inserted and incapable of witlidrawal. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide indication.
| |
| (g) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-13 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<al SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 10. Reactor Coolant 1(g) 3perloop MM SR 3.3.1.1 ~ 89.8% of 90%of Flow-Low SR 3.3.1.7 measured measured SR 3.3.1.10 loop flow loop flow SR 3.3.1.16 1(g)
| |
| : 11. Reactor Coolant 1 per RCP ~ SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA Pump (RCP)
| |
| Breaker Position 1(9) v
| |
| : 12. Undervoltage RCPs 2 per bus MM SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| ~ 7877 each bus 8050V each bus SR 3.3.1.16 1(g)
| |
| : 13. Underfrequency RCPs 3 per bus MM SR 3.3.1.9 SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| ~ 53.9 Hz each bus 54.0 Hz each bus SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 14. a. Steam 1,2 3 perSG ~ SR 3.3.1.1 ~ 14.8% 15.0%
| |
| Generator SR 3.3.1.7 (SG) Water SR 3.3.1.10 Level-Low SR 3.3.1.16 Low
| |
| : b. SG Water 1,2 4 SR 3.3.1.7 TTD:s;1.01 TTD :s;TD Level- Low SR3.3.1.10 TD (Note 3) (Note 3) for Low Trip Time for RCS loop RCS loop l1T Delay (TID} l1T variable variable input input::;; 50.7% 50% RTP RTP TTD=O and TTD=O for RCS loop for RCS loop 1:1T variable 1:1T variable input 50%
| |
| input> 50.7 RTP
| |
| %RTP
| |
| : 15. Not used (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (g) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-14 Un~t 1 -Amendment No.~, 42, 46-1-, 478, 479jJ Umt 2- Amendment No.~, 42, 4S2:, 400, 484jJ
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<a>
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS TRIP FUNCTION CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 16. Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Low 3 SR 3.3.1.10 <::: 46.5 psig 50 psig Auto-Stop SR 3.3.1.15 Oil Pressure
| |
| : b. Turbine Stop 4 SR 3.3.1.15 <::: 1% open 2%open~
| |
| Valve Closure
| |
| : 17. Safety Injection 1,2 2 trains SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA (SI) Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| : 18. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
| |
| : a. Intermediate 2 SR 3.3.1.11 <::: 8E-11 amp 1E-10 amp Range SR 3.3.1.13 Neutron Flux, P-6 b Low Power 1 per train SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips Block, P-7
| |
| : c. Power 4 SR 3.3.1.11 :::; 36.2% RTP 35% RTP Range SR 3.3.1.13 Neutron Flux, P-8 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (e) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| : 0) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-15 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 435-, ..:+42-, ~
| |
| Unit 2 - Amendment No. 435-, ..:+42-, 4+eQ
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 18. Reactor Trip System Interlocks (cent)
| |
| : d. Power Range Neutron 4 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.13
| |
| ::; 51.2% RTP 50% RTP Flux, P-9
| |
| : e. Power Range 1,2 4 @ SR 3.3.1.11 ;::: 8.8% RTP 10% RTP Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 and::; 11.2%
| |
| Flux, P-10 RTP
| |
| : f. Turbine 2 SR 3.3.1.10 ::; 10.2% 10%turbin~
| |
| Impulse SR 3.3.1.13 turbine power power Chamber Pressure, P-13
| |
| : 19. Reactor Trip 1,2 2 trains gjss, eel SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Breakers(k)
| |
| (RTBs) 3(b>, 4(b>, s(b) 2 trains G©] SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA
| |
| : 20. Reactor Trip 1,2 1 each per Y)GG, HHI SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Breaker RTB Undervoltage 3(b>, 4(b>, s(b) 1 each per and Shunt Tri~ G©] SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Mechanisms > RTB
| |
| : 21. Automatic 1,2 2 trains ~ SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Trip Logic 3(b>, 4(b>, s(b) 2 trains G©] SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA
| |
| : 22. Seismic Trip 1,2 3 directions ~ SR 3.3.1.5 ::; 0.43g 0.35g (x,y,z) in 3 SR 3.3.1.12 locations SR 3.3.1.14 (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
| |
| (k) Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-16 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~ 442, ~
| |
| Unit 2- Amendment No.~ 442, 4+aQ
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| (
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------N0 T E-------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately one or more required referenced in Table channels or trains 3.3.2-1 for the inoperable. channel(s) or train(s).
| |
| B. One channel or train B.1 Restore channel or train inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR B.~.~ Be iR MGQe a. 54 hours IINSr~16 1 B.~.~
| |
| ANf}
| |
| Be iR MGQe 5. 84 hours G!QJ. One train inoperable. ----------------N 0 TE -----------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| G!Qj.1 Restore train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR C.~.~ Be iR MGQe a. ao hours ANf}
| |
| IINSTT:7 I C.~.~ Be iR MGQe a. eO hours (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-19 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~, 4+9jJ Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, ~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G!E]. One channel inoperable. ------------------N 0 TE-----------------
| |
| For function 1.d, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass
| |
| ~
| |
| and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours, or both the inoperable and the additional channel may
| |
| ~
| |
| be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours. For functions 1.e(1 ), 4.d(1 ), 4.d(2), and 6.d(1 ),
| |
| the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours. _}(2-,
| |
| This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of I INSERT 2 coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| G!E].1 Place channel in trip. 72 hour A
| |
| GR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours __q.,
| |
| '----------------~--------------------~------------- Yb ANf)
| |
| IINSiRT:S D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-20 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~' 4-+a, 4-796]
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, +a, ~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME et8]. One Containment Pressure ------------------NOTE----------------
| |
| channel inoperable. The inoperable channel and one additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours only if any function 1.c channel associated with the inoperable channel is in trip. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| et8].1 Place channel in bypass. 72 hours GR E.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours INSERT19 ---------------~-----ANQ----------------~----------------
| |
| E.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-20a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-3§, 473, .:t-79jJ Unit 2- Amendment No. 4-3§, 75, 4-84jJ
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| -FQI. One channel or train -FQI.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| -FQI.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours AND
| |
| -FQI.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 60 hours G!!SI. One train inoperable. -------------------N0 TE -----------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| GIBJ.1 Restore train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR G.2.1 Be in MODE 3.
| |
| I INSL:T20 I________________,_____
| |
| G.2.2 AN9----------------+-----r---------
| |
| Be in MODE 4.
| |
| Y+
| |
| ~.One train inoperable. .------------------NOTE---------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for I up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| ~.1 Restore train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR H.2 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours __Q_J, (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-21 Unit 1 -Amendment No. a5, 479jJ Unit 2- Amendment No. a5, ~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| : g. One channel inoperable. ------------------N 0 TE-----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.
| |
| g.1 Place channel in trip. __d GR
| |
| ~----------------~--------------------+-------~~----
| |
| 1.2. Be in MODE 2. 78 hours --'b
| |
| , INSrR:22 Jjg]. One channel inoperable ------------------N 0 TE -----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up. to 12 hours.
| |
| This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| Ji9].1 Place channel in trip. __d GR IINSiR:23 1----------------~--------------------+---~~--------
| |
| -KI§]. One channel inoperable J.2. Be in MODE 3.
| |
| K!§l.~1 Place the channel in cut-
| |
| ~
| |
| \
| |
| out.
| |
| AND
| |
| -KI§].~2 Return the inoperable channel to an OPERABLE status GR K.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours ANI}
| |
| I INSiR:24 ~----------------~--------------------~--------------
| |
| K.2.2 Be in MODE 5 84 hours (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-22 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~- 4-73-, 4+9b]
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~- 7-a, ~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME h!Q]. One or more channels or kfQ].1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour trains inoperable. required state for existing unit condition.
| |
| GR L.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours AN.Q.
| |
| b.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours
| |
| ~- One or more SG Water ------------------N0 TE-----------------
| |
| Level - Low Low Trip Time The inoperable TTD channel Delay channel( s) (processor) and/or one additional inoperable. TTD channel (processor) may be surveillance tested with the affected steam generator low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip for up to 12 hours. This note is not intended to allow I INSERT 2 simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.
| |
| \
| |
| ~.1 Set the Trip Time Delay to 72 hours zero seconds.
| |
| OR
| |
| ~.2 Place the affected SG 72 hour Water Level - Low Low channel(s) in trip.
| |
| GR M.3.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours AN.Q.
| |
| M.3.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-23 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~, 73, 479bJ Unit 2- Amendment No. ~, 47e, 484IJ
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| ~. One channel inoperable. ~.1 Restore channel to 48 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| ~.2 Declare the associated Immediately AFW pump or MSIV inoperable.
| |
| ~*One channel inoperable ------------------N 0 TE -----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel may be I
| |
| ~
| |
| surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours, or with the inoperable channel in trip, one additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis. I INSERT 2
| |
| ~.1 Place channel in trip. 72hou~
| |
| GR 0.2.1 Be in MODE 3 78 hours ANQ 25 0.2.2 Be in MODE a. 1Q8 hours (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-24 Un~t 1 -Amendment No. ~ ~. ~. 4-79Q Umt 2 -Amendment No. ~ ~. 4-7-§, 484Q
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| ~- One channel inoperable. ------------------N0 T E-----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel and one additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours only if any function 1.c channel associated with the inoperable channel is in trip. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| pgj.1 Place channel in bypass. 72 hours GR P.2.1 Be in MODE 3 78 hours I INSiRT=~=26===1================~=P=.2=.2===Be==in=~=AO==D=E=5=.=========1=0=8=h=o=ur=s=========
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-24a Un~t 1 - Amendment No. Ja, ~, ~, 479IJ Umt 2- Amendment No. Ja, ~, 79, 484-Q
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a*>
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 1. Safety Injection
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B@ SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation
| |
| : b. Automatic Actuation 1,2,3,4 2 trains GM SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 NA NA Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays
| |
| : c. Containment 1,2,3,4 3 ~ SR 3.3.2.1 :::; 3.12 psig 3.0 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(b) 4 ~ SR 3.3.2.1 ;::: 1847.5 psig 1850 psig Pressure-Low SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : e. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1,2,3(b) 3 per steam ~ SR 3.3.2.1 ;::: 597.6(c) 600(c) psig line SR 3.3.2.5 psig SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Not used
| |
| : f. Notused
| |
| : g. Not used (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and below the P-11 interlock unless the Function is blocked.
| |
| (c) Time constants used in the lead/lag compensator are t 1 =50 seconds and t 2 = 5 seconds.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-27 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 3§jJ Unit 2- Amendment No. 3§jJ
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR NOMINAL(a)
| |
| OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 2. Containment Spray
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train B@ SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation
| |
| : b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains Gj[] SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays
| |
| : c. Containment Pressure (1) High- 1,2,3,4 4 ~ SR 3.3.2.1 ~ 22.12 psig 22 psig High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Not used
| |
| : 3. Containment Isolation
| |
| : a. Phase A Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B@ SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains Gj[] SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| Injection (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-28 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<a>
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 3. Containment Isolation (continued)
| |
| : b. Phase B Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train B[g SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation (2) Automatic Actuation 1,2,3,4 2 trains GM SR 3.3.2.2 SR 3.3.2.4 NA NA Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (3) Contain- 1,2,3,4 4 ~ SR 3.3.2.1 ::; 22.12 psig 22 psig I ment SR 3.3.2.5 Pressure High-High SR 3.3.2.9 ~
| |
| : 4. Steam Line Isolation
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2(i),3(i) 1/valve ~ SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation 1,2(i),3(i)
| |
| : b. Automatic 2 trains GKQ SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays 1,2(i),3(i)
| |
| : c. Containment Pressure-4 eEJl SR SR 3.3.2.1 3.3.2.5
| |
| ::; 22.12 psig 2.3 psig High -High SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (i) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-29 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL <a>
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 4. Steam Line Isolation (continued)
| |
| : d. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1,2(i>, 3(b)(i) 1 1 3 per steam SR 3.3.2.1 2! 597.6 psig 600 psig line SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Negative 3(g)(i) 3 per steam SR 3.3.2.1 :::; 102.4 (h) 100 (h)
| |
| Rate-High line SR 3.3.2.5 psi/sec psi/sec SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : e. Not used.
| |
| : f. Not used
| |
| : g. Not used
| |
| : h. Not used
| |
| : 5. Feedwater Isolation
| |
| : a. Automatic 2 trains SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and below the P-11 interlock unless the Function is blocked.
| |
| I Time constants used in the lead/lag compensator are t 1 = 50 seconds and t2 =5 seconds (g) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure). However, may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.
| |
| (h) Time constant utilized in the rate/lag compensator are ts =50 sec and 4 =50 sec.
| |
| (i) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
| |
| U) Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-30 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~, 47aiJ Unit 2- Amendment No.~, 4-7aQ
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL (al SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 5. Feedwater Isolation (continued)
| |
| : b. SG Water Level-High High (P-14) 1,2°) 3 per SG ~ SR SR SR 3.3.2.1 3.3.2.5(d)(e) 3.3.2.9(d)(e)
| |
| :::; 90.2% 90.0%
| |
| ~ \
| |
| SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : c. Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| Injection
| |
| : 6. Auxiliary Feedwater
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2,3 1 sw/pp ~ SR 3.3.2.13 NA NA
| |
| : b. Automatic 1,2,3 2 trains GKQ SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (Solid State Protection System)
| |
| : c. Not used d.1 SG Water 1,2,3 3 per SG Gl[§] SR 3.3.2.1 ;;:: 14.8% 15.0%
| |
| Level-Low Low SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| G) Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.
| |
| (d) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. Footnote (a) does not apply to this function.
| |
| (e) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Equipment Control Guidelines. Footnote (a) does not apply to this function.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-31 Un~t 1 - Amendment No. ~, 41-3, .:++&, 4WIJ Umt 2 - Amendment No. ~, 479, 4-00, 4-QQjJ
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<al SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Auxiliary Feedwater (continued) d.2) SG Water 1,2,3 4 SR 3.3.2.5 TTD:s; TTD :5 TD(I,kl Level- Low SR 3.3.2.9 1.01 TD(I,kl for RCS Low Trip Time for RCS Loop Loop LlT Delay (TTD) LlT variable variable input ::; 50.7% input 50%
| |
| RTP and RTP and TTD=O TTD=O for RCS Loop for RCS LlT variable Loop LlT input> 50.7% variable RTP input 50%
| |
| RTP
| |
| : e. Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements:
| |
| Injection
| |
| : f. Not used
| |
| : g. Under- 2 per bus SR 3.3.2.8 <::: 7877 volts 8050 volts voltage SR 3.3.2.9 Reactor SR 3.3.2.10 Coolant Pump (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (k) For Mode 3, the Trip Time Delay associated with the Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low channel must be less than or equal to 464.1 seconds.
| |
| (I) Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low Time Delay The Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low time delay function power allowable value shall not exceed the following trip setpoint power by more than 0.7% RTP.
| |
| 3 2 TD = B1(P) + B2(P) + B3(P) + B4.
| |
| Where: P = RCS Loop LlT Equivalent to Power (%RTP), P ::; 50% RTP TD = Time delay for Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (in seconds) 3 B1 = -0.007128 sec/(RTP) 2 B2 = +0.8099 sec/(RTP)
| |
| B3 = -31.40 sec/(RTP)
| |
| B4 = +464.1 sec DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-32 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 7 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
| |
| : h. Not used
| |
| : i. Not used
| |
| : 7. Residual 1,2,3,4 3 ~ SR 3.3.2.1 :5 33.68% 32.56%
| |
| Heat Removal SR 3.3.2.5 2:31.44%
| |
| Pump Trip on SR 3.3.2.9 Refueling Water SR 3.3.2.12 Storage Tank Level-low
| |
| : 8. ESFAS Interlocks
| |
| : a. Reactor 1,2,3 1 per train, 2 ~ SR 3.3.2.11 NA NA Trip, P-4 trains
| |
| : b. Pressurizer 1,2,3 3 ~ SR 3.3.2.5 :5 1917.5 psig 1915 psig Pressure, P- SR 3.3.2.9 11
| |
| : c. Not used (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-33 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer 3.4.9 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
| |
| : a. Pressurizer water level =::; 90%; and
| |
| : b. Two groups of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of each group ~ 150 kW and capable of being powered from an emergency power supply.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer water level not A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours within limit.
| |
| AND A.2 Fully insert all rods. 6 hours AND A.3 Place Rod Control 6 hours System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| AND A.4 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours I INSERT 2 I B. One required group of B.1 Restore required group 72hou~
| |
| 7 pressurizer heaters of pressurizer heaters to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| G!QI. Required Action and G!QI.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Condition B [Qr::9 not met.
| |
| G!QI.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 0 Pressurizer Safety Valves LCO 3.4.1 0 Three pressurizer safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings 2: 2460 psig and::;; 2510 psig.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures> Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) arming temperature specified in the PTLR.
| |
| ----------------------------------------------N0 T E-----------------------------------------
| |
| The lift settings are not required to be within the LCO limits during MODES 3 and 4 for the purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) conditions. This exception is allowed for 54 hours following entry into MODE 3 provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup.
| |
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INSERT 2 I
| |
| ACTIONS /
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION~
| |
| A. One pressurizer safety A.1 Restore valve to 1sminutr valve inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| I B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| OR Two or more pressurizer B.2 Be in MODE 4 with any 12 hours safety valves inoperable. RCS cold leg temperatures ::;; LTOP arming temperature specified in the PTLR.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.10.1 Verify each pressurizer safety valve is OPERABLE in In accordance with accordance with the lnservice Testing Program. the Inservice Following testing, lift settings shall be within +/- 1%. Testing Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-18 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
| |
| LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ---------------------------------------------------------N 0 T E-----------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more PORVs A.1 Close and maintain 1 hour inoperable solely due to power to associated excessive seat leakage. block valve.
| |
| B. One PORV inoperable for B.1 Close associated block 1 hour reasons other than valve.
| |
| excessive seat leakage.
| |
| AND B.2 Remove power from 1 hour associated block valve.
| |
| AND I INSERT2 B.3 Restore the Class I 72 hours PORV to OPERABLE status.
| |
| C. One block valve inoperable. ----------------N 0 TE ------------------- 1 hour Required Actions do not apply when block valve is inoperable solely as result of complying with Required Actions B.2 or E.3.
| |
| C.1 Place associated PORV in manual control.
| |
| AND (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-19 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-3§,469,~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-3§,470,~
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 If the block valve is 72 hours associated with a Class I PORV:
| |
| Restore block valve to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR C.3 If the block valve is 72 hours associated with the non-Class I PORV:
| |
| Close the block valve and remove its power.
| |
| D. Required Action and D.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion Class I PORV and/or Time of Condition A, B, or C associated block valves( s) not met. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| AND D.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours AND D.3 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours E. Two Class I PORVs E.1 Initiate action to restore inoperable for reasons other Class I PORVs to than excessive seat OPERABLE status.
| |
| leakage. AND E.2 Close associated block 1 hour valves.
| |
| AND E.3 Remove power from associated block valves.
| |
| AND E.4 Restore Class I PORVs to OPERABLE status. Be--iR-MODE a.
| |
| AN&
| |
| E.a Be iR MODE 4. ~2 R9l::IFS (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-20 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~, 4-7-tjJ Unit 2- Amendment No.~, 472Q
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. More than one block valve ------------------N 0 TE ------------------
| |
| inoperable. Required Actions do not apply when block valve is inoperable solely as result of complying with Required Actions B.2 or E.3.
| |
| F.1 Place associated 1 hour PORVs in manual control.
| |
| AND F.2 Restore one block valve 2 hours I INSERT 2 for a Class I PORV to OPERABLE status.
| |
| AND F.3 Restore remaining block 72 hour valve for a Class I PORV to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR F.4 If the remaining block 72 hours valve is associated with the non-Class I PORV, close the block valve and remove its power.
| |
| G. Required Action and G.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion block valve( s) to IE Time of Condition orl F OPERABLE status.
| |
| not met. AND G.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours AND G.3 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-21 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Accumulators 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.1 Accumulators LCO 3.5.1 Four ECCS accumulators shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY* MODES 1 and 2 MODE 3 with RCS pressure> 1000 psig I INSERT 2 I ACTIONS A CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION )JMJI A. One accumulator inoperable due to boron A.1 Restore boron concentration to within 72hou~
| |
| concentration not within limits.
| |
| limits.
| |
| B. One accumulator B.1 Restore accumulator to 24ho7 inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.
| |
| : 1. INSERT 28 I other than Condition A.
| |
| L. G!Ql. Required Action and G!Ql.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A-ef-B AND not met.
| |
| G!Ql.2 Reduce RCS pressure to 12 hours
| |
| .:::1000 psig.
| |
| D. Tv1o or more accumulators 0.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoJ3eraele.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY r
| |
| SR 3.5.1.1
| |
| * Verify each accumulator isolation valve is fully open. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program r
| |
| SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borated water volume in each accumulator is In accordance with
| |
| ~ 814 fe and.::: 886 te. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program r
| |
| SR 3.5.1.3 Verify nitrogen cover pressure in each accumulator is In accordance with
| |
| ~ 579 psig and.::: 664 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5-1 Un~t 1 - Amendment No. 43a, 447, .:t-60, 200Q Umt 2 - Amendment No. 43a, 447, 4-6-1-, ~
| |
| | |
| ECCS - Operating 3.5.2 3~5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| --------------------------------------------------------N0 T E-------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| In MODE 3, both safety injection (SI) pump flow paths may be isolated by closing the isolation valve(s) for up to 2 hours to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INSERT 2 ACTIONS /
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETIO~
| |
| A. One or more trains A.1 Restore train(s) to 72hourV inoperable. OPERABLE status NG+~
| |
| ANG +l=le ReEJl:liFee AetieR
| |
| ,A,.~ GeFRf3letieR +iFRe
| |
| ,AJ least ~ QQ% ef tl=le ~GGS is te ee l:ISee feF flev; eEJl:lilataleRt tea siR§Ie 13laRRee FRaiRteRaRee GP~R/\BL~ ~GGS tmiR 9F iRSf3eeti9RS. +l=le availaele. GeFRf3letieR +iFRes ef GR ReEJl:liFee AetieRs _j2_,
| |
| A.2.~, A.2.2, aRe A.2.a aFe feF l:IRf3laRRee eeFFeetive FRaiRteRaRee eF iRSf3eetieRS.
| |
| A.2.~ VeFiPl eRiy eRe 72 R9l:IFS Sl:ll3systeFR iR eRe ~GGS troiR is iRef3emele.
| |
| ANG A.2.2 QeteFFRiRe tl=leFe is Re 72 R9l:IFS eeFRFReR eal:lse faill:IFe iR
| |
| _j2p tl=le saFRe sl:lesysteFR iR tl=le GP~RABL~ ~GGS tFaffi.:.
| |
| 4 ANG A.2.3 ResteFe tFaiR te ~ 4 eays RT29 GP~RABL~ statl:ls.
| |
| B§. Required Action and B§.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion I
| |
| Time not met. AND B§.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours I
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5-3 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~. 4-aB, ~
| |
| Unit 2- Amendment No.~. -Me, 00, 2WQ
| |
| | |
| RWST 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
| |
| LCO 3.5.4 The RWST shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 I INSERT 2 I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION T ; ; : ; t A. RWST boron concentration not within limits.
| |
| A.1 Restore RWST to OPERABLE status.
| |
| 8ho//; I OR RWST borated water temperature not within limits.
| |
| B. RWST inoperable for reasons other than B.1 Restore RWST to OPERABLE status.
| |
| 1hoi I Condition A.
| |
| C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.4.1 -----------------------------N0 T E----------------------------
| |
| Only required to be performed when ambient air temperature is < 35°F.
| |
| Verify RWST borated water temperature is In accordance with
| |
| ~ 35°F. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program In accordance with SR 3.5.4.2 Verify RWST borated water volume is ~ 455,300 the Surveillance gallons.
| |
| Frequency Control Program In accordance with SR 3.5.4.3 Verify RWST boron concentration is ~ 2300 ppm and the Surveillance
| |
| ~ 2500 ppm.
| |
| Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5-7 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 435, 499, ~
| |
| Unit 2- Amendment No. 435, 2-00, ~
| |
| | |
| Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 I INSERT 2 I ACTIONS {continued}
| |
| C.
| |
| CONDITION One or more containment C.1 REQUIRED ACTION Initiate action to evaluate COMPLETION TIME Immediately I
| |
| air locks inoperable for overall containment reasons other than leakage rate per Condition A or B. LCO 3.6.1.
| |
| AND C.2 Verify a door is closed iri 1 hour the affected air lock.
| |
| AND C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hour OPERABLE status. I D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -----------------------------N 0 TE S--------------------------
| |
| : 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
| |
| : 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1 Perform required air lock leakage rate testing in In accordance with accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate the Containment Testing Program. Leakage Rate Testing Program t
| |
| SR 3.6.2.2 Verify only one door in the air lock can be opened In accordance with the at a time. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~' 200IJ Unit 2- Amendment No.~, 2-G4Q
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ---------------------------------------------------N0 T ES----------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| : 1. Penetration flow path(s) except no more than two of three flow paths for containment purge supply and exhaust and containment vacuum/pressure relief paths at one time may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
| |
| : 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
| |
| : 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves.
| |
| : 4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 INSERT 2 I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION~
| |
| A. --------------NOTE-------------- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours /
| |
| Only applicable to penetration flow path by /
| |
| penetration flow paths with use of at least one two containment isolation closed and de-activated valves. automatic valve, closed
| |
| ------------------------------------ manual valve, blind One or more penetration flange, or check valve flow paths with one with flow through the containment isolation valve valve secured.
| |
| inoperable except for a containment purge supply and exhaust valve or pressure/vacuum relief valve leakage not within limit. (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-5 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 -----------N 0 TE S-----------
| |
| : 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
| |
| : 2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.
| |
| Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is ~ollowing isolation!
| |
| isolated. for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment
| |
| ~I B. --------------N0 TE -------------- B.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour INSERT Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one two containment isolation closed and de-activated valves. automatic valve, closed
| |
| ------------------------------------ manual valve, or blind One or more penetration flange.
| |
| flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable except for a containment purge supply and exhaust valve or pressure/vacuum relief valve leakage not within limit.
| |
| (contmued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-6 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. --------------N0 TE-------------- C.1 Isolate the affected 72 hours Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one only one containment closed and de-activated isolation valve and a closed automatic valve, closed system. manual valve, or blind
| |
| ------------------------------------ flange.
| |
| One or more penetration AND flow paths with one containment isolation valve C.2 ------------N 0 TE S----------
| |
| inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
| |
| : 2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.
| |
| Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.
| |
| D. One or more penetration D.1 Isolate the affected flow paths with one or more penetration flow path by containment purge supply use of at least one and exhaust and closed and de-activated vacuum/pressure relief automatic valve, closed valves not within purge manual valve, or blind valve leakage limits. flange.
| |
| AND (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-7 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 ------------N 0 TE S----------
| |
| : 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
| |
| : 2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.
| |
| Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is ~ollowing isolation!
| |
| isolated. for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment AND D.3 Perform SR 3.6.3.7 for Once per 92 days the resilient seal purge ~ollowing isolation!
| |
| or vacuum/pressure relief valves closed to comply with Required Action D.1.
| |
| E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| E.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-8 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6.6 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems LCO 3.6.6 The containment fan cooling unit (CFCU) system and two containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One containment spray A.1 Restore containment train inoperable. spray train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR A.2 Restore containment 14 days spray train to OPERABLE status B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Condition A not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5.
| |
| C. One required [hel CFCU C.1 Restore required ~hel system inoperable such CFCU system to that a minimum of two OPERABLE status.
| |
| CFCUs remain OPERABLE.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-13 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~.202, 215~
| |
| Unit 2- Amendment No. ~.-1-1-3,203, 217~
| |
| | |
| Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6.6 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One required containment D.1 Restore one required 72 hours
| |
| 'INS ERT2 spray train in~rable and containment spray one required he CFCU ~to system inoperable such OPERABLE status, that a minimum of two OR CFCUs remain OPERABLE.
| |
| D.2 Restore~ CFCU 72 hour system to OPERABLE status such that four CFCUs or three CFCUs, each supplied by a 30 different vital bus, are
| |
| . OPERABLE.
| |
| eJEI. Required Action and eJEI.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition~ AND lo, El or not met.
| |
| eJEI.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours F. +t~tto eontainment s13ray F.1 Enter LCO a.o.a. Immediately trains ino13erable.
| |
| GR One eontainment s13ray train ino13erable and t\*.1o CFCbl systems ino13erable sueh that one or less CFCbls remain OPERABLE.
| |
| GR One or less CFCl:Js OPERABLE.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-14 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2- Amendment No.~, 7-dQ
| |
| | |
| MSIVs 3.7.2
| |
| : 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
| |
| LCO 3.7.2 Four MSIVs shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
| |
| ACTIONS I INSERT 2 I
| |
| 'INSERT 31 I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION~
| |
| A. One MSIV inoperable in A.1 Restore MSIV to 8ho~
| |
| MODE 1. OPERABLE status. I
| |
| ~gfg. Required Action and gf9.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours I associated Completion Time of Condition A IQ!)) I not met.
| |
| G!QI. ------------N0 TE----------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is G!QI.1 Close MSIV. 8 hours I allowed for each MSIV. AND One or more MSIVs inoperable in MODE 2 or 3.
| |
| G!QI.2 Verify MSIV is closed. Once per 7 days I G[§. Required Action and G[§.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours I associated Completion Time AND of Condition G!QI not met. I G[§.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours I
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| ADVs 3.7.4
| |
| : 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 10% Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)
| |
| LCO 3. 7.4 Four ADV lines shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A.
| |
| B.
| |
| One required ADV line inoperable.
| |
| Two required ADV lines A.1 B.1 Restore required ADV line to OPERABLE status Restore at least one ADV
| |
| -nf I inoperable. line to OPERABLE status.
| |
| I C. Three or more required C.1 Restore at least two ADV ADV lines inoperable; lines to OPERABLE status.
| |
| D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| D.2 Be in MODE 4 without 18 hours reliance upon steam generator for heat removal.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-8 Unit 1 - Amendment No . .:t-3a,4-e9[J Unit 2 -Amendment No . .:t-3a,4+QjJ
| |
| | |
| AFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS
| |
| : 3. 7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| -----------------------------------------------N0 T E--------------------------------------------------
| |
| Only one AFW train, which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| --------------------------------------------N0 T E------------------------------------------------------
| |
| LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. Turbine driven AFW train A.1 Restore affected 7 days inoperable due to one equipment to inoperable steam supply. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| ------------N 0 TE ----------------
| |
| Only applicable if MODE 2 has not been entered following refueling.
| |
| Turbine driven AFW pump inoperable in MODE 3 following refueling.
| |
| B. One AFW train inoperable B.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hours in MODE 1, 2 or 3 for reasons other than Condition A.
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| -or (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-10 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~,4-69, ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~,47Q, 2-1-7Q
| |
| | |
| AFWSystem 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| I INSERT 2 I T~
| |
| C.
| |
| CONDITION
| |
| --------------N 0 T E-------------- C.1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore the steam 48hoy COMPLETION
| |
| ~J Only applicable when the supply to the turbine remaining OPERABLE driven train to _[)_
| |
| motor driven AFW train OPERABLE status.
| |
| provides feedwter to the OR steam generator with the inoperable steam supply. C.2 Restore the motor driven 48 hours
| |
| ------------------------------------ AFWtrain to Turbine driven AFW train inoperable due to one OPERABLE status.
| |
| I inoperable steam supply.
| |
| AND I INSERT 32 I One motor driven AFW train inoperable.
| |
| Gl§. Required Action and Gi§.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time for Condition
| |
| ~not met.
| |
| GR lA, C,l 8,
| |
| AND Gl§.2 Be in MODE 4.
| |
| 18 hours -or
| |
| +v1e A'FV4 traiRs iReJ3eFaele iR MODE 1, 2 9F feF a
| |
| ~
| |
| FeaseRs ett:leF tt:laR GeRaitieR G.
| |
| IEJ. Three AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or IEJ.1 -----------N 0 TE ---------------
| |
| LCO 3.0.3 and all other
| |
| _or I
| |
| : 3. LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Initiate action to restore Immediately one AFW train to OPERABLE status
| |
| ~* Required AFW train inoperable in MODE 4.
| |
| ~.1 Initiate action to restore AFW train to OPERABLE Immediately __0f'l status.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-11 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~, 69, 2-1-§jJ Unit 2- Amendment No.~, f.Q, 2-1-+jJ
| |
| | |
| CST 3.7.6
| |
| : 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
| |
| LCO 3.7.6 The CST shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| 'INSERT 2 I A.
| |
| CONDITION CST inoperable. A.1 REQUIRED ACTION Verify by administrative COMPLETION TIME 4 hours
| |
| 'I means OPERABILITY of backup water supply. AND Once per 12 h rs thereafter AND B. Required Action and A.2 B.1 Restore CST to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Be in MODE 3.
| |
| 7 days 6 hours
| |
| -ot associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4, without 18 hours reliance on steam generator for heat removal.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify the CST water volume is~ 200,000 gallons In accordance with the for Unit 1 and~ 166,000 gallons for Unit 2. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-13 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~,200,2-Q4.jJ Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~,2-94,~
| |
| | |
| CCWSystem 3.7.7
| |
| : 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW) System LCO 3.7.7 Two vital CCW loops shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One vital CCW loop A.1 ------------N 0 TE --------------
| |
| inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops- MODE 4,"
| |
| for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CCW. IINSER 33 Restore vital CCW loop to 72 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| 8§. Required Action and 8§.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Condition A not met. 36 hours 8§.2 Be in MODE 5.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 -----------------------------N0 TE----------------------------
| |
| Isolation of CCW flow to individual components does not render the CCW System inoperable Verify each CCW manual, power operated, and In accordance with the automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety Surveillance related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or Frequency Control otherwise secured in position, is in the correct Program position.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-14 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~. 200IJ Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~. ~
| |
| | |
| ASW 3.7.8
| |
| : 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) System LCO 3. 7.8 Two ASW trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One ASW train inoperable. A.1 ------------N0 TE --------------
| |
| Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops- MODE 4,"
| |
| for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by ASW. I INSER Restore ASW train to 72 hours I INSERT 34 I OPERABLE status L; B§. Required Action and Bj9.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Condition A not met. 36 hours Bjg.2 Be in MODE 5.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 Verify each ASW manual and power operated, In accordance with the valve in the flow path servicing safety related Surveillance equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise Frequency Control secured in position, is in the correct position. Program SR 3.7.8.2 Verify each ASW power operated valve in the flow In accordance with the path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise Inservice Test secured in position, can be moved to the correct Program.
| |
| position.
| |
| t SR 3.7.8.3 Verify each ASW pump starts automatically on an
| |
| * In accordance with the actual or simulated actuation signal. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 435, 200Q Unit 2 -Amendment No. 435, ~
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
| |
| : a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and
| |
| : b. Three diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s); and
| |
| : c. Two supply trains of the diesel fuel oil (DFO) transfer system.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| -------------------------------------N0 T E---------------------------------------------------
| |
| LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable to DGs.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour inoperable. required OPERABLE AND offsite circuit.
| |
| Once per 8 hours thereafter.
| |
| AND A.2 Restore required offsite 72 hours circuit to OPERABLE status. ~I (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-1 Un~t 1 -Amendment No. ~,4$,4@, ~
| |
| Umt 2- Amendment No. ~,4S7,47G, 24-+jJ
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS {continued}
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour the required offsite AND circuit(s).
| |
| Once per 8 hours thereafter.
| |
| AND
| |
| ------------N 0 TE -------------
| |
| In MODE 1, 2, and 3, TDAFW pump is considered a required redundant feature.
| |
| B.2 Declare required 4 hours from discovery feature(s) supported by of Condition B the inoperable DG concurrent with inoperable when its inoperability of required redundant redundant required feature(s) is inoperable. feature( s).
| |
| AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours DG( s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure.
| |
| OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours OPERABLE DG(s).
| |
| AND B.4 Restore DG to 14 days OPERABLE status.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| ~I DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~.-tee, ~
| |
| Unit 2- Amendment No. ~.4&7, 2-1-+k]
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two required offsite circuits C.1 Declare required 12 hours from inoperable. feature(s) inoperable discovery of Condition when its redundant C concurrent with required feature(s) is inoperability of inoperable. redundant required features.
| |
| AND C.2 Restore one required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.
| |
| D. One required offsite circuit D.1 Restore required offsite inoperable. circuit to OPERABLE status.
| |
| AND OR One DG inoperable. D.2 Restore DG to OPERABLE status.
| |
| E. Two or more DGs E.1 Ensure at least two DGs inoperable. are OPERABLE.
| |
| F. One supply train of the F.1 Restore the DFO transfer DFO transfer system system to OPERABLE inoperable. status.
| |
| G. Two supply trains of the G.1 Restore one train of the j DFO transfer system DFO transfer system to INSERT 35 inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| 4 -I=IQ]. Required Action and -I=IQ].1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Condition A, B, C, Q, ~, ~ oF G not met. -I=IQ].2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours I. Two oF mom QGs 1.1 ~nteF LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inopeFable.
| |
| ANI}
| |
| Gne oF more FeEll:liFed offsite eiFel:lits inopeFable.
| |
| J. Gne OF moFe QGs J.1 ~nteF LCG 3.0.3. Immediately inopeFable.
| |
| ANI}
| |
| +'NO Fe<:ll:liFed Offsite GiFGl:lits inopeFable.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, Starting Air, and Turbocharger Air Assist 3.8.3 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One or more DGs with F.1 Restore turbocharger air 48 hours turbocharger air assist air assist air receiver receiver pressure pressure to~ 180 psig.
| |
| < 180 psig and ~ 150 psig.
| |
| G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated DG Immediately associated Completion inoperable.
| |
| Time or Conditions E or F not met.
| |
| OR One or more DG's turbocharger air assist, or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than ConditionE or F.
| |
| H. Required Action and H.1 Declare all DGs on Immediately associated Completion associated unit(s)
| |
| Time of Condition A, B, C, inoperable.
| |
| or D not met.
| |
| ANQI if asseeiateEil:IRit is iR OR MQQ~S ~~ 2 1 d 1 eF 41 Fuel oil storage tanks or I=L2 Be iR MQQ~ a. 6 hel:IFS lube oil not within limits for AN.Q reasons other than Conditions A, B, C, or D. I=La Be iR MQQ~ e. a6 hel:IFS DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-16 Unit 1 -Amendment No.~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.4 Three Class 1E DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One battery charger inoperable.
| |
| A.1 Restore battery terminal voltage to greater than 2 hours I INSERT 2 I
| |
| ~
| |
| or equal to the minimum established float voltage. I AND A.2 Verify battery float 12 hours current s 2 amps.
| |
| AND A.3 Restore battery charger 14 da~
| |
| to OPERABLE status.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-18 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~.-1-72-,49GQ Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~.414Q
| |
| | |
| DC Sources- Operating 3.8.4 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One battery inoperable. B.1 Restore battery to 2 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| GR 8.2A.~ NG+E ReEfuir=ea P,etieRs 8.2.~ .~, B.2.~ .2, aRa 8.2.2 aFe a(3(31ieal31e, eR a eRe time 13asis, feF ldRit ~ eyele ~ 4.
| |
| QeteFFfliRe GPERA8bE 2 hel:IFS 13atteFies aFe Ret iRe(3eFal31e aue te eemmeR eause failuFe.*
| |
| GR 8.2.~.2 PeFfeFFfl SR a.8.4 A aRa 2 hel:IFS SR a.S.e.~ feF GPERA8bE 13atleFies.
| |
| AN.Q 8.2.2 ResteFe 13atleP,( te GPERA8bE status.
| |
| C. One DC electrical power C.1 Restore DC electrical subsystem inoperable for power subsystem to reasons other than OPERABLE status.
| |
| Condition A or B.
| |
| D. More than one full capacity D.1 Restore the DC electrical 14 days charger receiving power power subsystem to a simultaneously from a configuration wherein single 480 V vital bus. each charger is powered from its associated 480 volt vital bus.
| |
| F. Required Action and ef].1
| |
| * Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Associated Completion Time not met. AND ef].2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-18a Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~'~'~
| |
| Unit 2- Amendment No. ~,-1-746]
| |
| | |
| Inverters- Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
| |
| : 3. 8. 7 Inverters-0 perating LCO 3.8.7 Four Class 1E Vital120 V UPS inverters shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required*inverter A.1 -----------N 0 TE ---------------
| |
| inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems -
| |
| Operating" with any vital 120 V AC bus de-energized.
| |
| ---------------------------------- I INSERT 2 INSERT 37 Restore inverter to OPERABLE status.
| |
| 24ho~
| |
| I c;
| |
| B§. Required Action and B[9.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B[9.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct inverter voltage and alignment to In accordance with the required AC vital buses. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-26 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~. 200IJ Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~. ~
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating LCO 3.8.9 The required Class 1E AC, DC, and 120 VAC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One lor morel AC electrical A.1 Restore AC electrical
| |
| ~
| |
| power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.
| |
| B. One lor morel120 VAC vital bus subsystem inoperable.
| |
| B.1 Restore 120 VAC vital bus subsystem to OPERABLE status.
| |
| A C. One lor morel DC electrical C.1 Restore DC electrical power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OPERABLE status.
| |
| D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours E. :PNe FeEll::liFeEf Glass 1E AG, E.1 Enter LGO 3.0.3. lmmeaiately QG, eF 120 VAG vitalla1::1ses
| |
| ~NitA ineJ3eFalale EfistFila~::~tien s1::1lasystems tt:lat Fes~::~lt in a less ef safety f1::1netien.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-29 Unit 1 - Amendment No . .:t-ae, 24-eiJ Unit 2 -Amendment No . .:t-ae, 241\J
| |
| | |
| Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.5.19 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program A Control Room Envelope (CRE) Habitability Program shall be established and implemented to ensure that CRE habitability is maintained such that, with an OPERABLE Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS), CRE occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body for the duration of the accident. The program shall include the following elements:
| |
| : a. The definition of the CRE and the CRE boundary.
| |
| : b. Requirements for maintaining the CRE boundary in its design condition, including configuration control and preventive maintenance.
| |
| : c. Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air in leakage past the CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, "Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,"
| |
| Revision 0, May 2003, and (ii) assessing CRE habitability at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0.
| |
| : d. Measurement, at designated locations, of the CRE pressure relative to all external areas adjacent to the CRE boundary during the pressurization mode of operation by one train of the CRVS, operating at the flow rate required by the VFTP, at a Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The results shall be trended and used as part of the 24 month assessment of the CRE boundary.
| |
| : e. The quantitative limits on unfiltered air in leakage into the CRE. These limits shall be stated in a manner to allow direct comparison to the unfiltered air in leakage measured by the testing described in paragraph c. The unfiltered air inleakage limit for radiological challenges is the inleakage flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. Unfiltered air inleakage limits for hazardous chemicals must ensure that exposure of CRE occupants to these hazards will be within the assumptions in the licensing basis.
| |
| : f. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the Frequencies required by paragraphs c and d for determining CRE unfiltered in leakage and assessing CRE habitability, and measuring CRE pressure and assessing the CRE boundary.
| |
| INSERT 38 (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 5.0-17a Unit 1 -Amendment No.~
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~
| |
| | |
| INSERT 1 EXAMPLE 1.3-8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One A.1 Restore 7 days subsystem subsystem to OR inoperable. OPERABLE status. In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. ---- NOTE------ B.1 Restore 1 hour Not applicable subsystems to OR when second OPERABLE Subsystem status. In accordance with the intentionally Risk Informed made Completion Time inoperable. Program Two subsystems inoperable.
| |
| C. Required C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Action and AND associated Completion C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Time not met.
| |
| When a subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. The 7 day Completion Time may be applied as discussed in Example 1.3-2.
| |
| However, the licensee may elect to apply the Risk Informed Completion Time Program which permits calculation of a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) that may be used to complete the Required Action beyond the 7 day Completion Time. The RICT cannot exceed 30 days. After the 7 day Completion Time has expired, the subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within the RICT or Condition C must also be entered.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 1 (continued)
| |
| If a second subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition B may also be entered. The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable if the second subsystem is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Actions of Condition B are not intended for voluntary removal of redundant subsystems from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one subsystem is inoperable for any reason and the second subsystem is found to be inoperable, or if both subsystems are found to be inoperable at the same time. If Condition B is applicable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or Condition C must also be entered. The licensee may be able to apply a RICT to extend the Completion Time beyond 1 hour if the requirements of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program are met. If two subsystems are inoperable and Condition B is not applicable (i.e., the second subsystem was intentionally made inoperable), LCO 3.0.3 is entered as there is no applicable Condition.
| |
| The Risk Informed Completion Time Program requires recalculation of the RICT to reflect changing plant conditions. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.
| |
| If the 7 day Completion Time clock of Condition A or the 1 hour Completion Time clock of Condition B have expired and subsequent changes in plant condition result in exiting the applicability of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program without restoring the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status, Condition C is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions C.1 and C.2 start.
| |
| If the RICT expires or is recalculated to be less than the elapsed time since the Condition was entered and the inoperable subsystem has not been restored to OPERABLE status, Condition C is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions C.1 and C.2 start. If the inoperable subsystems are restored to OPERABLE status after Condition Cis entered, Conditions A, B, and Care exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition C may be terminated.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 2 In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program INSERT 3 C. ------------ NOTE----------- C.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR Manual Reactor Trip In accordance with the channel intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program Two Manual Reactor Trip channels inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| INSERT 4 F. ------------ NOTE ----------- F.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more Power Range Neutron In accordance with the Flux- High channels Risk Informed intentionally made Completion Time inoperable.
| |
| Program Two or more Power Range Neutron Flux - High channels inoperable.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 5 H. ------------NOTE-----------. H.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more channels intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 6 N. Required Action and N.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately associated Completion insert all rods.
| |
| Time of Condition D or M AND not met.
| |
| N.2 Place the Rod Control 1 hour System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| INSERT 7 Q. ------------ NOTE----------- Q.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more channels intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| R. Required Action and R.1 Reduce THERMAL 6 hours associated Completion Time POWER to< P-7.
| |
| of Condition P or Q not met.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 8 T. ------------ NOTE ----------- T.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR channel intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| U. Required Action and U.1 Reduce THERMAL 6 hours associated Completion Time POWER to< P-7.
| |
| of ConditionS or T not met.
| |
| INSERT9 W. ------------ NOTE----------- W.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more Low Auto-Stop Oil In accordance with the Pressure Turbine Trip Risk Informed channels intentionally made Completion Time inoperable.
| |
| Program Two or more Low Auto-Stop Oil Pressure Turbine Trip channels inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 10 Y. Required Action and Y.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion POWER to< P-9.
| |
| Time of Condition V, W, or X not met.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 11 AA.------------ NOTE----------- AA.1 Restore trains to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR train intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two trains inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 12 CC.------------ NOTE----------- CC.1 Restore trains to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR RTB train intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two RTB trains inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 13 FF. Required Action and FF.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition EE not met.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 14 HH. ------------- NOTE--------- HH.1 Restore trip mechanisms 1 hour to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when one OR trip mechanism for two or In accordance with the more RTBs intentionally Risk Informed made inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program One trip mechanism inoperable for two or more RTBs.
| |
| INSERT 15 KK. Required Action and KK.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, E, F,G,H,Z,AA,BB,CC, DO, GG, HH, II, or JJ not met.
| |
| INSERT 16 C. ------------ NOTE----------- C.1 Restore at least one 1 hour channel or train to Not applicable when second OR OPERABLE status.
| |
| channel or train intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two channels or trains inoperable.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 17 E. ------------ NOTE ----------- E.1 Restore at least one 1 hour train to OPERABLE Not applicable when second OR status.
| |
| train intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two trains inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 18 G. ------------ NOTE ----------- E.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more required channels or In accordance with the one channel in more than Risk Informed one loop, steam line, or Completion Time steam generator intentionally Program made inoperable.
| |
| Two or more required channels inoperable or one channel inoperable in more than one loop, steam line, or steam generator.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 19 I. ------------ NOTE ----------- 1.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR Containment Pressure In accordance with the channel intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program Two or more Containment Pressure channels inoperable.
| |
| INSERT20 L. ------------ NOTE ----------- L.1 Restore at least one train 1 hour to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR train intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time P~ogram Two trains inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 21 N. ------------ NOTE----------- N.1 Restore at least one train 1 hour to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR train intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two trains inoperable.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 22 P. ------------ NOTE ----------- P .1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more channels intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 23 R. ------------ NOTE----------- R.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more channels intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 24 T. ------------ NOTE ----------- T.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more channels intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 25 Y. ------------ NOTE ----------- Y.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more channels intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 26 J\1\. ------------ NOTE ----------- J\1\.1 Restore channels to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more channels intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Program Two or more channels inoperable.
| |
| BB. Required Action and BB.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Conditions B, C, 0, E, S, T, X, Y, Z, or J\1\ not BB.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours met.
| |
| CC. Required Action and CC.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Conditions F, G, H, I, J, K, L, U, or V not met. CC.2 Be in MODE4. 12 hours DO. Required Action and 00.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Conditions M, N, Q, or R not met.
| |
| EE. Required Action and EE.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Conditions 0 or P not met.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 27 C. ------------ NOTE----------- C.1 Restore pressurizer 1 hour heaters to OPERABLE Not applicable when second OR status.
| |
| group of pressurizer heaters In accordance with the intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program.
| |
| Two groups of pressurizer heaters inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 28 C. ------------ NOTE----------- C.1 Restore accumulators to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more accumulators In accordance with the intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program Two or more accumulators inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 29 B. ------------ NOTE----------- B.1 Restore ECCS flow 1 hour equivalent to 100% of a Not applicable when second OR single OPERABLE ECCS ECCS train intentionally train. In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Less than 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 30 E. ------------ NOTE ----------- E.1 Restore containment spray 1 hour trains and the CFCU system Not applicable when second OR to OPERABLE status.
| |
| containment spray train or In accordance with the fourth CFCU intentionally Risk Informed made inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program Two containment spray trains inoperable.
| |
| OR One containment spray train inoperable and the CFCU system inoperable such that one or less CFCUs remain OPERABLE.
| |
| OR The CFCU system inoperable such that one or less CFCUs remain OPERABLE.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 31 B. ------------ NOTE----------- B.1 Restore MSIVs to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more MSIVs intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two or more MSIVs inoperable in MODE 1.
| |
| INSERT 32 D. ------------ NOTE----------- D.1 Restore AFW trains to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR AFW train intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk.lnformed Completion Time Program Two AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition C.
| |
| INSERT 33 B. ------------ NOTE----------- B.1 Restore vital CCW loops 1 hour to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR vital CCW loop intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two vital CCW loops inoperable.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 34 B. ------------ NOTE----------- B.1 Restore ASW trains to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when second OR ASW train intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable.
| |
| Risk Informed Completion Time Program Two ASW trains inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 35 H. ------------ NOTE----------- H.1 Restore required AC 1 hour sources to OPERABLE Not applicable when offsite OR status.
| |
| circuit or second DG In accordance with the intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program Two or more DGs inoperable.
| |
| AND One or more required offsite circuits inoperable.
| |
| I. ------------ NOTE ----------- 1.1 Restore required AC 1 hour sources to OPERABLE Not applicable when DG or OR status.
| |
| second offsite circuit In accordance with the intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program One or more DGs inoperable.
| |
| AND Two required offsite circuits inoperable.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 36 E. ------------ NOTE ----------- H .1 Restore at least one DC 1 hour electrical power subsystem OR Not applicable when second to OPERABLE status.
| |
| DC electrical power In accordance with the subsystem intentionally Risk Informed made inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program Two DC electrical power subsystems inoperable.
| |
| INSERT 37 B. ------------ NOTE----------- B.1 Restore inverters to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| Not applicable when two or OR more required inverters In accordance with the intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable.
| |
| Completion Time Program Two or more required inverters inoperable.
| |
| | |
| INSERT 38 5.5.20 Risk Informed Completion Time Program This program provides controls to calculate a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) and must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines." The program shall include the following:
| |
| : a. The RICT may not exceed 30 days;
| |
| : b. A RICT may only be utilized in MODE 1 and 2;
| |
| : c. When a RICT is being used, any plant configuration change within the scope of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program must be considered for the effect .
| |
| on the RICT.
| |
| : 1. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration.
| |
| : 2. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must oe determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.
| |
| : 3. Revising the RICT is not required If the plant configuration change would lower plant risk and would result in a longer RICT.
| |
| : d. Use of a RICT is not permitted for voluntary entry into a configuration which represents a loss of a specified safety function or inoperability of all required trains of a system required to be OPERABLE.
| |
| : e. Use of a RICT is permitted for emergent conditions which represent a loss of a specified safety function or inoperability of all required trains of a system required to be OPERABLE if one or more of the trains are considered "PRA functional" as defined in Section 2.3.1 of NEI 06-09.
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 2 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Revised Technical Specification Page(s)
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 2 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Revised Technical Specification Page(s)
| |
| Remove Page Insert Page 1.3-10 1.3-10 1.3-11 1.3-12 3.3-1 3.3-1 3.3-1a 3.3-2 3.3-2 3.3-3 3.3-3 3.3-3a 3.3-3a 3.3-4 3.3-4 3.3-4a 3.3-4a 3.3-4b 3.3-5 3.3-5 3.3-5a 3.3-6 3.3-6 3.3-7 3.3-7 3.3-12 3.3-12 3.3-13 3.3-13 3.3-14 3.3-14 3.3-15 3.3-15 3.3-16 3.3-16 3.3-19 3.3-19 3.3-19a 3.3-20 3.3-20 3.3-20a 3.3-20a 3.3-21 3.3-21 3.3-22 3.3-22 3.3-22a 3.3-23 3.3-23 3.3-24 3.3-24 3.3-24a 3.3-24a 3.3-27 3.3-27 3.3-28 3.3-28 3.3-29 3.3-29 3.3-30 3.3-30 3.3-31 3.3-31 3.3-32 3.3-32 3.3-33 3.3-33 3.4-16 3.4-16 3.4-16a
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 2 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Revised Technical Specification Page(s) (continued)
| |
| Remove Page Insert Page 3.4-18 3.4-18 3.4-18a 3.4-19 3.4-19 3.4-20 3.4-20 3.4-21 3.4-21 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-1a 3.5-3 3.5-3 3.5-7 3.5-7 3.5-7a 3.6-4 3.6-4 3.6-5 3.6-5 3.6-6 3.6-6 3.6-7 3.6-7 3.6-8 3.6-8 3.6-13 3.6-13 3.6-14 3.6-14 3.7-4 3.7-4 3.7-8 3.7-8 3.7-10 3.7-10 3.7-11 3.7-11 3.7-13 3.7-13 3.7-14 3.7-14 3.7-15 3.7-15 3.7-16 3.7-16 3.7-16a 3.8-1 3.8-1 3.8-2 3.8-2 3.8-3 3.8-3 3.8-3a 3.8-16 3.8-16 3.8-18 3.8-18 3.8-18a 3.8-18a 3.8-26 3.8-26 3.8-26a 3.8-29 3.8-29 5.0-17a 5.0-17a 5.0-17b
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| | |
| Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-7 (continued)
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| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One A.1 Verify affected 1 hour subsystem subsystem AND inoperable. isolated.
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| Once per 8 hours thereafter AND A.2 Restore 72 hours subsystem to OPERABLE status.
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| B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Action and AND associated Completion B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours Time not met.
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| Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours thereafter" interval begins upon performance of Required Action A.1.
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| If after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either the initial 1 hour or any subsequent 8 hour interval from the previous performance (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2),
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| Condition B is entered. The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not expired.
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| (continued) 1.3-10 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~,
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~,
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| | |
| Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-8 (continued)
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| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One A.1 Restore 7 days subsystem subsystem to OR inoperable. OPERABLE status. In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. ---- NOTE------ B.1 Restore 1 hour Not applicable subsystems to OR when second OPERABLE Subsystem status. In accordance with the intentionally Risk Informed made Completion Time inoperable. Program Two subsystems inoperable.
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| C. Required C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Action and associated AND Completion Time not met. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours When a subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. The 7 day Completion Time may be applied as discussed in Example 1.3-2.
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| However, the licensee may elect to apply the Risk Informed Completion Time Program which permits calculation of a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) that may be used to complete the Required Action beyond the 7 day Completion Time. The RICT cannot exceed 30 days. After the 7 day Completion Time has expired, the subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within the RICT or Condition C must also be entered.
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| (continued) 1.3-11 Unit 1 - Amendment No.
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No.
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| | |
| Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-8 (continued)
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| (continued)
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| If a second subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition B may also be entered. The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable if the second subsystem is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Actions of Condition B are not intended for voluntary removal of redundant subsystems from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one subsystem is inoperable for any reason and the second subsystem is found to be inoperable, or if both subsystems are found to be inoperable at the same time. If Condition B is applicable, at least one subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or Condition C must also be entered. The licensee may be able to apply a RICT to extend the Completion Time beyond 1 hour if the requirements of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program are met. If two subsystems are inoperable and Condition B is not applicable (i.e., the second subsystem was intentionally made inoperable}, LCO 3.0.3 is entered as there is no applicable Condition.
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| The Risk Informed Completion Time Program requires recalculation of the RICT to reflect changing plant conditions. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.
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| If the 7 day Completion Time clock of Condition A or the 1 hour Completion Time clock of Condition B have expired and subsequent changes in plant condition result in exiting the applicability of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program without restoring the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status, Condition C is also entered and the
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| . Completion Time clocks for Required Actions C.1 and C.2 start.
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| If the RICT expires or is recalculated to be less than the elapsed time since the Condition was entered and the inoperable subsystem has not been restored to OPERABLE status, Condition C is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions C.1 and C.2 start. If the inoperable subsystems are restored to OPERABLE status after Condition C is entered, Conditions A, B, and C are exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition C may be terminated.
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| IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the Required Action COMPLETION should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.
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| TIME 1.3-12 Unit 1 -Amendment No.
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No.
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
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| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
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| ACTIONS
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| ---------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------
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| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately one or more required referenced in channels or trains Table 3.3.1-1 for the inoperable. channel(s) or trains.
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| B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
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| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No . .:1-d§, ~,
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| Unit 2 -Amendment No . .:1-d§, ~,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. ------------ NOTE ----------- C. 1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status.
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| OR Manual Reactor Trip channel intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable. Risk Informed
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| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two Manual Reactor Trip Program channels inoperable.
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| ----------------NOTE:---~-------------
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| While this LCO is not met for function 19, 20 or 21, in MODE 5, making the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal is not permitted.
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| D. One channel or train inoperable.
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| D.1 Restore channel or train to OPERABLE status.
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| 48 hours I (continued)
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| -11 DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-1a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-3-a, 442:,
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| Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-3-a, 442:,
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| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One Power Range Neutron ------------------NOTE------------------
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| Flux-High channel The inoperable channel may be inoperable. bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment of other channels.
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| E.1.1 -----------NOTE---------------
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| Only required when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable.
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| Perform SR 3.2.4.2. 12 hours from discovery of THERMAL POWER
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| > 75% RTP AND Once per 12 hours thereafter AND E.1.2 Place channel in trip 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program
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| ~
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| F. ------------ NOTE ----------- F.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
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| OR more Power Range Neutron Flux- High channels In accordance with the intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable. Completion Time
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| -------------------------------- Program Two or more Power Range Neutron Flux- High channels inoperable.
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| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-3§, 479, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-3§, 484-,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G. One channel inoperable. ------------------NOTE------------------
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| For functions 6, 7, and 8.b, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours, or both the inoperable and the additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours. For functions 2. b and 3, only the inoperable channel may be bypassed for surveillance testing of other channels. For function 14.a, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours.
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| This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis G.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program H. ------------ NOTE ----------- H.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
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| OR more channels intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
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| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more channels Completion Time inoperable. Program (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-3 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, 442, 4-aS, .m, 4-79, 2:G5, Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, 442, .:t-§9, 4-7-a, ~, 2-00,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. One Intermediate Range 1.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours Neutron Flux channel POWER to < P-6.
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| inoperable. OR 1.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours POWER to> P-10.
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| J. Two Intermediate Range J.1 -----------NOTE-------------
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| Neutron Flux channels Limited boron inoperable. concentration changes associated with RCS inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed.
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| Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
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| AND J.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours I POWER to < P-6.
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| K. One Source Range K.1 -----------NOTE-------------
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| -1 Neutron Flux channel Limited boron I inoperable. concentration changes associated with RCS inventory control or limited plant temperature changes are allowed.
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| Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
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| L. Two Source Range Neutron L.1 Open reactor trip Immediately Flux channels inoperable. breakers (RTBs).
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| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-3a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-aa, ~' 458, ~,
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| Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-aa, ~' 4-W, 4-7§,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One Source Range M.1 Restore channel to 48 hours Neutron Flux channel OPERABLE status.
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| inoperable. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program N. Required Action and N.1 Initiate action to fully Immediately associated Completion Time insert all rods.
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| of Condition D or M not met.
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| AND 1 hour N.2 Place the Rod Control System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.
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| : 0. Required Source Range 0.1 -----------N()TE-------------
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| Neutron Flux channel Plant temperature inoperable. changes are allowed provided the temperature change is accounted for in the calculated SDM.
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| Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
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| AND
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| ().2 Perform SR 3.1.1.1. 1 hour AND
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| ()nee per 12 hours thereafter (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-4 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, 4§8, 473, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~' 4-59, 47§,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME P. One channel inoperable. ------------------NOTE------------------
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| For function 8.a, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours, or both the inoperable and the additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours. For functions 9 and 10, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours.
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| For functions 12 and 13, only the inoperable channel may be bypassed for surveillance testing of other channels. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
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| P.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program Q. ------------ NOTE ----------- Q.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE statusc.
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| OR more channels intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
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| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Completion Time Two or more channels Program inoperable.
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| R. Required Action and R. 1 Reduce THERMAL 6 hours associated Completion Time POWER to < P-7.
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| of Condition P or Q not met.
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| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-4a Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~ 4§8, ~, 4+9, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~ 4-59, ~, 4-84,
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| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME S. One channel inoperable 8.1 Place channel in trip 6 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program T. ------------ NOTE ----------- T.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status.
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| OR channel intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
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| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more channels Completion Time inoperable. Program U. Required Action and U.1 Reduce THERMAL 6 hours associated Completion Time POWER to< P-7.
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| of Condition S or T not met.
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| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-4b Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa, 4-79, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-aa, 48-l,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
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| : v. One Low Auto-Stop Oil ------------------NOTE------------------
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| Pressure Turbine Trip An inoperable channel may be channel inoperable bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.
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| V.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program
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| \AI. ------------ NOTE ----------- \A/.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
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| OR more Low Auto-Stop Oil Pressure Turbine Trip In accordance with the channels intentionally made Risk Informed inoperable. Completion Time
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| -------------------------------- Program Two or more Low Auto-Stop Oil Pressure Turbine Trip channels inoperable.
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| X. One or more Turbine Stop X.1 Place channel(s) in trip. 72 hours Valve Closure, Turbine Trip channel(s) inoperable.
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| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program Y. Required Action and Y.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours associated Completion Time PO\A/ER to < P-9.
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| of Condition V, \A/, or X not met.
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| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-5 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~' .:t-79, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~, 484-,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
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| : z. One train inoperable. ------------------NOTE------------------
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| One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
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| Z.1 Restore train to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
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| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program
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| ~------------- NOTE----------- ~.1 Restore trains to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status.
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| OR train intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
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| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two trains inoperable. Completion Time Program BB. One RTB train ------------------NOTE----------------
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| inoperable. One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
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| BB.1 Restore train to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
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| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program CC.------------ NOTE ----------- CC.1 Restore trains to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status.
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| OR RTB train intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
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| -------------------------------- Risk Informed
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| * Two RTB trains inoperable. Completion Time Program (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-Sa Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-35, 4+9, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-35, 484,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME DD. One or more channels or trains inoperable.
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| DD.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing 1 hour I unit conditions. -1 EE. One or more channels or EE.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour I trains inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions. -1 FF. Required Action and FF.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition EE not met.
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| GG. One trip mechanism GG.1 Restore trip mechanism 48 hours inoperable for one RTB. to OPERABLE status.
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| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program HH. ------------- NOTE --------- HH.1 Restore trip mechanisms 1 hour Not applicable when one to OPERABLE status.
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| OR trip mechanism for two or more RTBs intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable. Risk Informed
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| --------------------------------- Completion Time One trip mechanism Program inoperable for two or more RTBs.
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| II. One channel inoperable ------------------NOTE------------------
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| The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 72 hours for surveillance or maintenance.
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| 11.1 Place channel in trip 6 hours OR 11.2 Be in MODE 3 12 hours (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~, 4-79, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~' 4-8-t,
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| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
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| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME JJ. One or more SG Water ------------------NOTE------------------
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| Level Low - Low Trip For function 14.b, the inoperable Time Delay channel(s) TTD channel (processor) and/or inoperable. one additional TTD channel (processor) may be surveillance tested with the affected steam generator low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip for up to 12 hours. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.
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| JJ.1 Set the Trip Time Delay to 72 hours zero seconds.
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| OR JJ.2 Place the affected SG 72 hours Water Level Low - Low OR channel(s) in trip.
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| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program KK. Required Action and KK.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, E, F, G, H, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD, GG, HH, II, or JJ not met.
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| DIABLO CANYON -UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-7 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4a§, 4-7a, 479, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4a§, 475, 484,
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| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 7)
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| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a)
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| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
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| : 1. Manual 1,2 2 B,C SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA Reactor Trip 3(b)' 4(b)' 5(b) 2 D SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA
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| : 2. Power Range Neutron Flux
| |
| : a. High 1,2 4 E,F SR 3.3.1.1 :::; 110.2% 109% RTP SR 3.3.1.2 RTP SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16
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| : b. Low 1(c),2 4 G,H SR 3.3.1.1 :526.2% 25% RTP SR 3.3.1.8 RTP SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 3. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate High Positive 1,2 4 G,H SR 3.3.1.7 :::; 5.6% RTP 5%RTP Rate SR 3.3.1.11 with time with time SR 3.3.1.16 constant constant
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| ;:: 2 sec ;:: 2 sec
| |
| : 4. Intermediate 1(c), 2(d) 2 I, J SR 3.3.1.1 :530.6% 25%
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| Range SR 3.3.1.8 RTP RTP Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.11 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
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| (b) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
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| (c) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
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| (d) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-12 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~,~,4-&7,~.
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| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~,~,468,200,
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| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 5. Source 2(e) 2 K, L SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.4 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cps Range SR 3.3.1.8 Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.11 SR 3.3.1.16 2 L, M SR 3.3.1.1 s 1.4 E5 cps 1.0 E5 cps SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1-.11 SR 3.3.1.16 0 SR 3.3.1.1 N/A N/A SR 3.3.1.11 ~
| |
| : 6. Overtemperature 11T 1,2 4 G,H SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.3 Note 1 Note 1 SR 3.3.1.6 (Page 3.3-17) (Page 3.3-17)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 7. Overpower 11T 1,2 4 G,H SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Refer to SR 3.3.1.7 Note 2 Note 2 SR 3.3.1.10 (Page 3.3-18) (Page 3.3-18)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 8. Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| : a. Low 1(9 > 4 P,Q SR 3.3.1-.1 ~ 1947.5 psig 1950 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : b. High 1,2 4 G,H SR 3.3.1.1 s 2387.5 psig 2385 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 9. Pressurizer Water 1(g) 3 P,Q SR 3.3.1.1 s 90.2% 90%
| |
| Level-High SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint.
| |
| A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
| |
| (e) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (f) With the RTBs open or all rods fully inserted and incapable of withdrawal. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide indication.
| |
| (g) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-13 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-35, ~.
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-35, ~.
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR NOMINAL(a)
| |
| OTHER SPECIFIED TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS SETPOINT FUNCTION CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
| |
| : 10. Reactor Coolant 1(g) 3 per loop P, Q SR 3.3.1.1 ~ 89.8% of 90%of Flow-Low SR 3.3.1.7 measured measured SR 3.3.1.10 loop flow loop flow SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 11. Reactor Coolant 1(9) 1 per RCP S,T SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA Pump (RCP)
| |
| Breaker Position
| |
| : 12. Undervoltage 1(9) 2 per bus P,Q SR 3.3.1.9 ~ 7877 v 8050V RCPs SR 3.3.1.10 each bus each bus SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 13. Underfrequency 1(g) 3 per bus P,Q SR 3.3.1.9 ~ 53.9 Hz 54.0 Hz RCPs SR 3.3.1.10 each bus each bus SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| : 14. a. Steam 1,2 3 per SG G,H SR 3.3.1.1 ~ 14.8% 15.0%
| |
| Generator SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| *(SG) Water SR 3.3.1.10 Level-Low SR 3.3.1.16 Low
| |
| : b. SG Water 1,2 4 JJ SR 3.3.1.7 TTD::; 1.01 TTD sTD Level- Low SR 3.3.1.10 TD (Note 3) (Note 3) for Low Trip Time for RCS loop RCS loop fj,T Delay (TTD) fj,T variable variable input input::; 50.7% 50% RTP RTP TTD=O and TTD=O for RCS loop for RCS loop fj,T variable fj,T variable input 50%
| |
| input> 50.7 RTP
| |
| %RTP
| |
| : 15. Not used (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (g) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-14 Unit 1 - Amendment No. aa, ~, ~, 78, 4+9, Unit 2 -Amendment No. aa, ~, 4-e2, 489, 484-,
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 4 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS TRIP FUNCTION CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 16. Turbine Trip
| |
| : a. Low 1(j) 3 V,W SR 3.3.1.10 ~ 46.5 psig 50 psig Auto-Stop SR 3.3.1.15 Oil Pressure
| |
| : b. Turbine Stop 1(j) 4 X SR 3.3.1.15 ~ 1% open 2% open Valve Closure
| |
| : 17. Safety Injection 1,2 2 trains Z,AA SR 3.3.1.14 NA NA (SI) Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| : 18. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
| |
| : a. Intermediate 2(e) 2 DO SR 3.3.1.11 ~ 8E-11 amp 1E-10 amp Range SR 3.3.1.13 Neutron Flux, P-6 b Low Power 1 per train EE SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips Block, P-7
| |
| : c. Power 4 EE SR 3.3.1.11 s 36.2% RTP 35% RTP Range SR 3.3.1.13 Neutron Flux, P-8 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (e) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| : 0) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-15 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 435, ~, -rn, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 435, ~, 4-7$,
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 7)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<a>
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS TRIP FUNCTION CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 18. Reactor Trip System Interlocks (cont)
| |
| : d. Power Range 4 EE SR 3.3.1.11 s 51.2% RTP 50% RTP Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 Flux, P-9
| |
| : e. Power Range 1,2 4 DD SR 3.3.1.11 ;::: 8.8% RTP 10% RTP Neutron SR 3.3.1.13 and s 11.2%
| |
| Flux, P-10 RTP
| |
| : f. Turbine 2 EE SR 3.3.1.10 s 10.2% 10% turbine Impulse SR 3.3.1.13 turbine power power Chamber Pressure, P-13
| |
| : 19. Reactor Trip 1,2 2 trains BB,CC SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Breakers<kl (RTBs) 3(b)l 4(b)l 5(b) 2 trains D SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA
| |
| : 20. Reactor Trip 1,2 1 each per GG, HH SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA Breaker RTB Undervoltage 3(b)l 4(b)l 5(b) 1 each per D SR 3.3.1.4 NA NA and Shunt Tri~
| |
| Mechanisms > RTB
| |
| : 21. Automatic 1,2 2 trains Z,AA SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Trip Logic 3(b)l 4(b)l 5(b) 2 trains D SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA
| |
| : 22. Seismic Trip 1,2 3 directions II SR 3.3.1.5 s 0.43g 0.35g (x,y,z) in 3 SR 3.3.1.12 locations SR 3.3.1.14 (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) With Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted.
| |
| (k) Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing an RTB.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 35, ~~ 4-73, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 35, ~~ .:t-7§,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately one or more required referenced in Table channels or trains 3.3.2-1 for the inoperable. channel(s) or train(s).
| |
| B. One channel or train B.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. ------------ NOTE ----------- C.1 Restore at least one 1 hour Not applicable when second channel or train to OR channel or train intentionally OPERABLE status.
| |
| made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two channels or trains Completion Time inoperable. Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-19 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-aa, 4+9, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-aa, 484-,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One train inoperable. ----------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| D.1 Restore train to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E. ------------ NOTE ----------- E.1 Restore at least one 1 hour Not applicable when second train to OPERABLE OR train intentionally made status.
| |
| inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two trains inoperable. Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-19a Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, 4-79, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~, 4-8-1-,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One channel inoperable. ------------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| For function 1.d, the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours, or both the inoperable and the additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours. For functions 1.e(1 ), 4.d(1 ), 4.d(2), and 6.d(1 ),
| |
| the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours.
| |
| This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| F.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program G. ------------ NOTE ----------- G.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more required channels or one channel in more than In accordance with the one loop, steam line, or Risk Informed steam generator Completion Time intentionally made Program inoperable.
| |
| Two or more required channels inoperable or one channel inoperable in more than one loop, steam line, or steam generator.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-20 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa, ~' 4-79, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-aa, 4+-a, 48-1-,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION .COMPLETION TIME H. One Containment Pressure ------------------NOTE----------------
| |
| channel inoperable.
| |
| The inoperable channel and one additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours only if any function 1.c channel associated with the inoperable channel is in trip. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| H.1 Place channel in bypass. 72 hours I
| |
| -1 I. ------------ NOTE ----------- 1.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR Containment Pressure channel intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable. Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two or more Containment Program Pressure channels inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-20a Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-da, -i7a, 479, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-da, 4-+a, 484,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME J. One channel or train J.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR J.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours AND J.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 60 hours K. One train inoperable. -------------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| K.1 Restore train to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program L. ------------ NOTE ----------- L.1 Restore at least one train 1 hour Not applicable when second to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR train intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two trains inoperable. Completion Time Program M. One train inoperable. ------------------NOTE---------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
| |
| M.1 Restore train to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-21 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4aa, 479, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4aa, 484,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME N. ------------ NOTE ----------- N.1 Restore at least one train 1 hour Not applicable when second to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR train intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two trains inoperable. Completion Time Program
| |
| : 0. One channel inoperable. ------------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels.
| |
| 0.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program P. ------------ NOTE ----------- P.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more channels intentionally niade inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more channels Completion Time inoperable. Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-22 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, 4+-J, 4-79, Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, +a, .:t-8-1-,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Q. One channel inoperable ------------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel and/or one additional channel may be surveillance tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours.
| |
| This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| 0.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program R. ------------ NOTE ----------- R.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more channels intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more channels Completion Time inoperable. Program S. One channel inoperable S.1 Place the channel in cut- 6 hours out.
| |
| AND S.2 Return the inoperable 48 hours channel to an OPERABLE status OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-22a Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~. ~, .:t-79, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~. 4+-5, 48-1-,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME T. ------------ NOTE ----------- T.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more channels intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more channels Completion Time inoperable. Program U. One or more channels or trains inoperable.
| |
| U.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing 1 hour I unit condition.
| |
| -i V. One or more SG Water Level - Low Low Trip Time
| |
| ------------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| The inoperable TTD channel I
| |
| Delay channel( s) (processor) and/or one additional inoperable. TTD channel (processor) may be surveillance tested with the affected steam generator low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip for up to 12 hours. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.
| |
| V.1 Set the Trip Time Delay to 72 hours zero seconds.
| |
| OR V.2 Place the affected SG 72 hours Water Level - Low Low channel(s) in trip.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-23 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~~ 4-7a, .:t-79, Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~~ 47§, 4-84,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| : w. One channel inoperable. W.1 Restore channel to 48 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR W.2 Declare the associated Immediately AFW pump or MSIV inoperable.
| |
| X. One channel inoperable ------------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours, or with the inoperable channel in trip, one additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| X.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program Y. ------------ NOTE ----------- Y.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more channels intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more channels Completion Time inoperable. Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-24 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~ 442, 4-7-a, 479, Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~ 442, 4-+a, 484,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| : z. One channel inoperable. ------------------NOTE-----------------
| |
| The inoperable channel and one additional channel may be surveillance tested in bypass for up to 12 hours only if any function 1.c channel associated with the inoperable channel is in trip. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| Z.1 Place channel in bypass. 72 hours I
| |
| -i AA. ------------ NOTE ----------- AA.1 Restore channels to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more channels intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more channels Completion Time inoperable. Program BB. Required Action and BB.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Conditions B, C, D, AND E, S, T, X, Y, Z, or AA not met. BB.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours CC. Required Action and CC.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Conditions F, G, H, AND I, J, K, L, U, or V not met.
| |
| CC.2 Be in MODE4. 12 hours DO. Required Action and 00.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Conditions M, N, Q, or R not met.
| |
| EE. Required Action and EE.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Conditions 0 or P I not met.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-24a Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~' 442:, 4-+J, 479, Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, 442:, 47-§, 48-1-,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<a*)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE . TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 1. Safety Injection
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B,C SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation
| |
| : b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains D,E SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays
| |
| : c. Containment 1,2,3,4 3 X,Y SR 3.3.2.1 s 3.12 psig 3.0 psig Pressure-High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(b) 4 F, G SR 3.3.2.1 2!: 1847.5 1850 psig Pressure-Low SR 3.3.2.5 psig SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : e. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1,2,3(b) 3 per steam F, G SR 3.3.2.1 2!: 597.6(c) 600(c) psig line SR 3.3.2.5 psig SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Not used
| |
| : f. Not used
| |
| : g. Not used (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and below the P-11 interlock unless the Function is blocked.
| |
| (c) Time constants used in the lead/lag compensator are t1 =50 seconds and h = 5 seconds.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-27 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~,
| |
| Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature ACtuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR NOMINAL(a)
| |
| OTHER SPECIFIED TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS SETPOINT FUNCTION CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
| |
| : 2. Containment Spray
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train B,C SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation
| |
| : b. Automatic 1 ,2,3,4 2 trains D,E SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays
| |
| : c. Containment Pressure (1) High- 1,2,3,4 4 Z,AA SR 3.3.2.1 :::;; 22.12 psig 22 psig High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Not used
| |
| : 3. Containment Isolation
| |
| : a. Phase A Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B,C SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains D,E SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| Injection (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-28 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~~
| |
| Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~~
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2.
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 3. Containment Isolation (continued)
| |
| : b. Phase B Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train B,C SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains D,E SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (3) Contain- 1,2,3,4 4 Z,AA SR 3.3.2.1 s 22.12 psig 22 psig ment SR 3.3.2.5 Pressure SR 3.3.2.9 High-High
| |
| : 4. Steam Line Isolation
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2(i),3(i) 1/valve w SR 3.3.2.8 NA NA Initiation
| |
| : b. Automatic 1,2(i),3(i) 2 trains K, L SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays
| |
| : c. Containment 1,2(i),3(i) 4 H, I SR 3.3.2.1 s 22.12 psig 2.3 psig Pressure- SR 3.3.2.5 High -High SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (i) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-29 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~. 442, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~. 442,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL (a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 4. Steam Line Isolation (continued)
| |
| : d. Steam Line Pressure 1 1 (1) Low 1,2<i>, 3(b)(i) 3 per steam F,G SR 3.3.2.1 ;::: 597.6 psig 600 psig line SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Negative 3(g)(i) 3 per steam F SR 3.3.2.1 ::;; 102.4 (h) 100 (h)
| |
| Rate-High line SR 3.3.2.5 psi/sec psi/sec SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : e. Not used.
| |
| : f. Not used
| |
| : g. Not used
| |
| : h. Not used
| |
| : 5. Feedwater Isolation
| |
| : a. Automatic 2 trains M,N SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (b) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and below the P-11 interlock unless the Function is blocked.
| |
| I Time constants used in the lead/lag compensator are t1 =50 seconds and t2 =5 seconds (g) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure). However, may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure-Low is not blocked.
| |
| (h) Time constant utilized in the rate/lag compensator are b = 50 sec and i4 = 50 sec.
| |
| (i) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
| |
| : 0) Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-30 Unit 1 -Amendment No . .:taa, ~,
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No . .:taa, 4-7-9,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL (a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 5. Feedwater Isolation (continued)
| |
| : b. SG Water 1,2m 3 per SG Q,R SR 3.3.2.1 s 90.2% 90.0%
| |
| Level-High SR 3.3.2.5(d)(e)
| |
| High (P-14) SR 3.3.2.9(d)(e)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.10
| |
| : c. Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| Injection
| |
| : 6. Auxiliary Feedwater
| |
| : a. Manual 1,2,3 1 sw/pp w SR 3.3.2.13 NA NA
| |
| : b. Automatic 1,2,3 2 trains K, L SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (Solid State Protection System)
| |
| : c. Not used d.1 SG Water 1,2,3 3 per SG F,G SR 3.3.2.1 ~ 14.8% 15.0%
| |
| Level-Low Low SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| G) Except when all MFIVs, MFRVs, and associated bypass valves are closed and de-activated or isolated by a closed manual valve. ,
| |
| (d) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. Footnote (a) does not apply to this function.
| |
| (e) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in the Equipment Control Guidelines. Footnote (a) does not apply to this function.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-31 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, ~, 4-78, 4-98, Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, 47§, .:t-SG, 4-99,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL<al SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT Auxiliary Feedwater (continued) d.2) SG Water 1,2,3 4 v SR 3.3.2.5 TTDS TTD S TD(I,k)
| |
| Level- Low SR 3.3.2.9 1.01 TD(I,k) for RCS Low Trip Time for RCS Loop Loop f1T Delay (TTD) 1:1T variable variable input s 50.7% input 50%
| |
| RTP and RTP and TTD=O TTD=O for RCS Loop for RCS 1:1T variable Loop f1T input> 50.7% variable RTP input 50%
| |
| RTP
| |
| : e. Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| Injection
| |
| : f. Not used
| |
| : g. Under- 2 per bus 0, p SR 3.3.2.8 2! 7877 volts 8050 volts voltage SR 3.3.2.9 Reactor SR 3.3.2.10 Coolant Pump (continued)
| |
| (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| (k) For Mode 3, the Trip Time Delay associated with the Steam Generator Water Level-Low-Low channel must be less than or equal to 464.1 seconds.
| |
| (I) Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low Time Delay The Steam Generator Water Level-Low Low time delay function power allowable value shall not exceed the following trip setpoint power by more than 0.7% RTP.
| |
| 3 2 TD = B1 (P) + B2(P) + B3(P) + B4.
| |
| Where: P = RCS Loop f1T Equivalent to Power (%RTP), P s 50% RTP TD>= Time delay for Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low (in seconds) 3 B1 = -0.007128 sec/(RTP) 2 B2 = +0.8099 sec/(RTP)
| |
| B3 = -31.40 sec/(RTP)
| |
| B4 = +464.1 sec DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-32 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-aa,
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 7 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL(a)
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| : 6. Auxiliary Feedwater (continued)
| |
| : h. Not used
| |
| : i. Not used
| |
| : 7. Residual 1,2,3,4 3 S,T SR 3.3.2.1 s 33.68% 32.56%
| |
| Heat Removal SR 3.3.2.5 ;:: 31.44%
| |
| Pump Trip on , SR 3.3.2.9 Refueling Water SR 3.3.2.12 Storage Tank Level-low
| |
| : 8. ESFAS Interlocks
| |
| : a. Reactor 1,2,3 1 per train, 2 J SR 3.3.2.11 NA NA Trip, P-4 trains
| |
| : b. Pressurizer 1,2,3 3 u SR 3.3.2.5 s 1917.5 psig 1915 psig Pressure, SR 3.3.2.9 P-11
| |
| : c. Not used (a) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is re-adjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-33 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~~
| |
| Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~~
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer 3.4.9 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
| |
| : a. Pressurizer water level s 90%; and
| |
| : b. Two groups of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of each group :2: 150 kW and capable of being powered from an emergency power supply.*
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer water level not A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours within limit.
| |
| AND A.2 Fully insert all rods. 6 hours AND A.3 Place Rod Control 6 hours System in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| AND A.4 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours B. One required group of B.1 Restore required group 72 hours pressurizer heaters of pressurizer heaters to inoperable. OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. ------------ NOTE ----------- C.1 Restore pressurizer 1 hour Not applicable when second heaters to OPERABLE OR group of pressurizer heaters status.
| |
| intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable. Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two groups of pressurizer Program heaters inoperable.
| |
| (continued) 3.4-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~,
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~,
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer 3.4.9 ACTIONS {continued}
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Condition B or C not met.
| |
| D.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours 3.4-16a Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~,
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~'
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves LCO 3.4.1 0 Three pressurizer safety valves shall be OPERABLE with lift settings
| |
| ~ 2460 psig and s 2510 psig.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 with all RCS cold leg temperatures > Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) arming temperature specified in the PTLR.
| |
| ----------------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------------
| |
| The lift settings are not required to be within the LCO limits during MODES 3 and 4 for the purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) conditions. This exception is allowed for 54 hours following entry into MODE 3 provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One pressurizer safety A.1 Restore valve to 15 minutes valve inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| OR Two or more pressurizer B.2 Be in MODE 4 with any 12 hours safety valves inoperable. RCS cold leg temperatures s LTOP arming temperature specified in the PTLR.
| |
| 3.4-18 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~,
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~,
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.10.1 Verify each pressurizer safety valve is OPERABLE in In accordance with accordance with the lnservice Testing Program. the Inservice Following testing, lift settings shall be within +/- 1%. Testing Program 3.4-18a Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4da, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4da,
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
| |
| LCO 3.4.11
| |
| * Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ---------------------------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more PORVs A.1 Close and maintain 1 hour inoperable solely due to power to associated excessive seat leakage. block valve.
| |
| B. One PORV inoperable for B.1 Close associated block 1 hour reasons other than valve.
| |
| excessive seat leakage.
| |
| AND B.2 Remove power from 1 hour associated block valve.
| |
| AND B.3 Restore the Class I 72 hours PORV to OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. One block valve inoperable. ----------------NOTE------------------- 1 hour Required Actions do not apply when block valve is inoperable solely as result of complying with Required Actions B.2 or E.3.
| |
| C.1 Place associated PORV in manual control.
| |
| AND (continued) 3.4-19 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~,469,4-74, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~,4+G,~,
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued) C.2 If the block valve is 72 hours associated with a Class I PORV: OR Restore block valve to In accordance with the OPERABLE status. Risk Informed Completion Time OR Program C.3 If the block valve is 72 hours associated with the non-Class I PORV:
| |
| Close the block valve and remove its power.
| |
| D. Required Action and D.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion Class I PORV and/or Time of Condition A, B, or C associated block valves( s) not met. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| AND D.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours AND D.3 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours E. Two Class I PORVs E.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately inoperable for reasons other Class I PORVs to than excessive seat OPERABLE status.
| |
| leakage. AND E.2 Close associated block 1 hour valves.
| |
| AND E.3 Remove power from 1 hour associated block valves.
| |
| AND E.4 Restore Class I PORVs to 1 hour OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued) 3.4-20 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa, 4-74, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-aa, ~,
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. More than one block valve ------------------NOTE------------------
| |
| inoperable. Required Actions do not apply when block valve is inoperable solely as result of complying with Required Actions B.2 or E.3.
| |
| F.1 Place associated 1 hour PORVs in manual control.
| |
| AND F.2 Restore one block valve 2 hours for a Class I PORV to OPERABLE status. OR AND In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program F.3 Restore remaining block 72 hours valve for a Class I PORV to OPERABLE status. OR OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program F.4 If the remaining block 72 hours valve is associated with the non-Class I PORV, close the block valve and remove its power.
| |
| G. Required Action and G.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately associated Completion block valve(s) to Time of Condition E or F OPERABLE status.
| |
| not met.
| |
| AND G.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours AND G.3 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours 3.4-21 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~,
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~,
| |
| | |
| Accumulators 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.1 Accumulators LCO 3.5.1 Four ECCS accumulators shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with RCS pressure > 1000 psig.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One accumulator A. 1 Restore boron 72 hours inoperable due to boron concentration to within concentration not within limits. OR limits.
| |
| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. One accumulator B.1 Restore accumulator to 24 hour inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.
| |
| other than Condition A. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. ------------ NOTE ----------- C.1 Restore accumulators to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more accumulators intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable. Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two or more accumulators Program inoperable.
| |
| D. Required Action and associated Completion D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours I Time not met. AND I D.2 Reduce RCS pressure 12 hours I to~ 1000 psig.
| |
| ~
| |
| 3.5-1 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, 447, .:tW, 200, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~, 447, 464-, 2-94-,
| |
| | |
| Accumulators 3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify each accumulator isolation valve is fully open. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borated water volume in each accumulator is In accordance with
| |
| ~ 814 fe and~ 886 fe. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.3 Verify nitrogen cover pressure in each accumulator is In accordance with
| |
| ~ 579 psig and ~ 664 psig. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued) 3.5-1 a Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, -147, 400, ~,
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, -147, .:t-94, 2:Q..l,
| |
| | |
| ECCS- Operating 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| --------------------------------------------------------N()TE-------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| In M()DE 3, both safety injection (SI) pump flow paths may be isolated by closing the isolation valve(s) for up to 2 hours to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1.
| |
| ACTI()NS C()NDITI()N REQUIRED ACTI()N C()MPLETI()N TIME A. ()ne or more trains A.1 Restore train( s) to 72 hours inoperable. ()PERABLE status
| |
| ()R In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. ------------ N()TE ----------- B.1 Restore ECCS flow 1 hour Not applicable when second equivalent to 100% of a ()R ECCS train intentionally single ()PERABLE ECCS made inoperable. train. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Less than 100% of the Completion Time ECCS flow equivalent to a Program single ()PERABLE ECCS train available.
| |
| C. Required Action and C.1 Be in M()DE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in M()DE 4. 12 hours 3.5-3 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa, 4§9, 200:,
| |
| DIABL() CANY()N - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-aa, 446, 45Q, ~,
| |
| | |
| RWST 3.5.4 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
| |
| LCO 3.5.4 The RWST shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RWST boron concentration A.1 Restore RWST to 8 hours not within limits. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR OR In accordance with the RWST borated water Risk Informed temperature not within Completion Time limits.
| |
| Program B. RWST inoperable for B.1 Restore RWST to 1 hour reasons other than OPERABLE status.
| |
| Condition A. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours 3.5-7 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa, 499, ~'
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-aa, ~, ~,
| |
| | |
| RWST 3.5.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.4.1 -----------------------------N()TE----------------------------
| |
| ()nly required to be performed when ambient air temperature is < 35°F.
| |
| Verify RWST borated water temperature is In accordance with
| |
| ~ 35°F. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program In accordance with SR 3.5.4.2 Verify RWST borated water volume is~ 455,300 the Surveillance gallons.
| |
| Frequency Control Program In accordance with SR 3.5.4.3 Verify RWST boron concentration is ~ 2300 ppm and the Surveillance
| |
| ~2500 ppm.
| |
| Frequency Control Program 3.5-7a Unit 1 -Amendment No. 43a, 499, 200, DIABL() CANY()N - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. 436, ~, 2M,
| |
| | |
| Containment Air Locks 3.6.2 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more containment C. 1 Initiate action to evaluate Immediately air locks inoperable for overall containment reasons other than leakage rate per Condition A or B. LCO 3.6.1.
| |
| AND C.2 Verify a door is closed in 1 hour the affected air lock.
| |
| AND C.3 Restore air lock to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
| |
| ~ SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.1 -----------------------------NOTES--------------------------
| |
| : 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.
| |
| : 2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1 ,
| |
| Perform required air lock leakage rate testing in In accordance with accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate the Containment Testing Program. Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.2.2 Verify only one door in the air lock can be opened In accordance with the at a time. Surveillance Frequency Control Program 3.6-4 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4aa, ~,
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4aa, ~,
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ---------------------------------------------------NOTES----------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| : 1. Penetration flow path(s) except no more than two of three flow paths for containment purge supply and exhaust and containment vacuum/pressure relief paths at one time may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.
| |
| : 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
| |
| : 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves.
| |
| : 4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. --------------NOTE-------------- A. 1 Isolate the affected 4 hours Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one two containment isolation closed and de-activated OR valves. automatic valve, closed In accordance with the manual valve, blind Risk Informed One or more penetration flange, or check valve Completion. Time flow paths with one with flow through the Program containment isolation valve valve secured.
| |
| inoperable except for a containment purge supply and exhaust valve or pressure/vacuum relief valve leakage not within limit.
| |
| (continued) 3.6-5 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-a-5, DIABLO CANYON -UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-a-5,
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 -----------NOTES-----------
| |
| : 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
| |
| : 2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.
| |
| Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is following isolation I-isolated. for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment B. --------------NOTE-------------- B.1 Isolate the affected 1 hour Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one OR two containment isolation closed and de-activated In accordance with the valves. automatic valve, closed Risk Informed
| |
| ------------------------*----------- manual valve, or blind Completion Time One or more penetration flange. Program flow paths with two containment isolation valves inoperable except for a containment purge supply and exhaust valve or pressure/vacuum relief valve leakage not within limit.
| |
| (continued) 3.6-6 Unit 1 - Amendment No . ..:1-da, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No . ..:1-da,
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. ----~---------NOTE-------------- C.1 Isolate the affected 72 hours Only applicable to penetration flow path by penetration flow paths with use of at least one OR only one containment closed and de-activated In accordance with the isolation valve and a closed automatic valve, closed Risk Informed system. manual valve, or blind Completion Time
| |
| ------------------------------------ flange. Program One or more penetration AND flow paths with one containment isolation valve C.2 ------------NOTES----------
| |
| inoperable. 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.
| |
| : 2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.
| |
| Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is following isolation isolated.
| |
| D. One or more penetration D.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours flow paths with one or more penetration flow path by containment purge supply use of at least one OR and exhaust and closed and de-activated vacuum/pressure relief automatic valve, closed valves not within purge manual valve, or blind In accordance with the valve leakage limits. flange. Risk Informed AND Completion Time Program (continued) 3.6-7 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~,
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~,
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued) D.2 ------------NOTES----------
| |
| : 1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of admini~trative means.
| |
| : 2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.
| |
| Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path is following isolation isolated. for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment AND D.3 Perform SR 3.6.3. 7 for Once per 92 days the resilient seal purge following isolation or vacuum/pressure relief valves closed to comply with Required Action D.1.
| |
| E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| E.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours 3.6-8 Unit 1 _-Amendment No. 4-aa, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-aa,
| |
| | |
| Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6.6 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems LCO 3.6.6 The containment fan cooling unit (CFCU) system and two containment spray trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One containment spray A.1 Restore containment 72 hours train inoperable. spray train to OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time of Condition A not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours C. The CFCU system C.1 Restore the CFCU 7 days inoperable such that a system to OPERABLE minimum of two CFCUs status. OR remain OPERABLE. In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued) 3.6-13 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-da,~, 245, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-da,~,2W, 247,
| |
| | |
| Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6.6 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One containment spray D.1 Restore containment 72 hours train inoperable and the spray train to OPERABLE CFCU system inoperable status, OR such that a minimum of two In accordance with OR CFCUs remain the Risk Informed OPERABLE. Completion Time Program D.2 Restore the CFCU 72 hours system to OPERABLE status such that four OR CFCUs or three CFCUs, each supplied by a In accordance with different vital bus, are the Risk Informed OPERABLE. Completion Time Program E. ------------ NOTE ----------- E.1 Restore containment spray 1 hour Not applicable when second trains and the CFCU system OR containment spray train or to OPERABLE status.
| |
| fourth CFCU intentionally In accordance with made inoperable. the Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two containment spray Program trains inoperable.
| |
| OR One containment spray train inoperable and the CFCU system inoperable such that one or less CFCUs remain OPERABLE.
| |
| OR The CFCU system inoperable such that one or less CFCUs remain OPERABLE.
| |
| F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition C, D, or AND E not met.
| |
| F.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours 3.6-14 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~'
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~,~,
| |
| | |
| MSIVs 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS
| |
| : 3. 7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
| |
| LCO 3. 7.2 Four MSIVs shall be. OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MSIV inoperable in A.1 Restore MSIV to 8 hours MODE 1. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. ------------ NOTE ----------- B.1 Restore MSIVs to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more MSIVs intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two or more MSIVs Completion Time inoperable in MODE 1. Program C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.
| |
| D. ------------NOTE---------------- D.1 Close MSIV. 8 hours Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV. AND One or more MSIVs D.2 Verify MSIV is closed. Once per 7 days inoperable in MODE 2 or 3.
| |
| E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition D not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE4. 12 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4a5, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4a5,
| |
| | |
| ADVs 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 10°/o Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)
| |
| LCO 3. 7.4 Four ADV lines shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required ADV line A.1 Restore required ADV line 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Two required ADV lines B.1 Restore at least one ADV 72 hours inoperable. line to OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. Three or more required C.1 Restore at least two ADV 24 hours ADV lines inoperable. lines to OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| D.2 Be in MODE 4 without 18 hours reliance upon steam generator for heat removal.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-8 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa,4e9, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-aa,4-7G,
| |
| | |
| AFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| -----------------------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------------------
| |
| Only one AFW train, which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| --------------------------------------------NOlrE------------------------------------------------------
| |
| LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLElriON TIME A. Turbine driven AFW train A.1 Restore affected 7 days inoperable due to one equipment to inoperable steam supply. OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the OR Risk Informed
| |
| ------------NOTE----------------
| |
| Completion Time Only applicable if MODE 2 Program has not been entered following refueling.
| |
| Turbine .driven AFW pump inoperable in MODE 3 following refueling.
| |
| B. One AFW train inoperable B.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hours in MODE 1, 2 or 3 for OPERABLE status.
| |
| reasons other than OR Condition A. In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-10 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 43§,4-eQ, ~,
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4aa,4+G, 2-1-7,
| |
| | |
| AFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. --------------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore the steam 48 hours Only applicable when the supply to the turbine remaining OPERABLE driven train to OR motor driven AFW train OPERABLE status.
| |
| In accordance with the provides feedwter to the Risk Informed steam generator with the Completion Time inoperable steam supply. OR Program Turbine driven AFW train C.2 Restore the motor driven 48 hours inoperable due to one AFW train to inoperable steam supply. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR AND In accordance with the Risk Informed One motor driven AFW Completion Time train inoperable. Program D. ------------ NOTE ----------- D.1 Restore AFW trains to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status ..
| |
| OR AFW train intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two AFW trains inoperable Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for Program reasons other than Condition C.
| |
| E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time for Condition A, B, C, or D not met. 18 hours E.2 Be in MODE 4.
| |
| F. Three AFW trains F.1 -----------NOTE---------------
| |
| inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or LCO 3.0.3 and all other
| |
| : 3. LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Initiate action to restore Immediately one AFW train to OPERABLE status G. Required AFW train G. 1 Initiate action to restore Immediately inoperable in MODE 4. AFW train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-11 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~, 469, 24-e, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~, 4-+Q, 247,
| |
| | |
| CST 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
| |
| LCO 3.7.6 The CST shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CST inoperable. A.1 Verify by administrative 4 hours means OPERABILITY of backup water supply. AND
| |
| *Once per 12 hours thereafter AND A.2 Restore CST to 7 days OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4, without 18 hours reliance on steam generator for heat removal.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify the CST water volume is 2! 200,000 gallons In accordance with the for Unit 1 and 2! 166,000 gallons for Unit 2. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-13 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 43a,~,2G4, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 43a,2M,~,
| |
| | |
| CCW System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Vital Component Cooling Water (CCW) System LCO 3. 7. 7 Two vital CCW loops shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One vital CCW loop A.1 ------------NOTE--------------
| |
| inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4,"
| |
| for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CCW.
| |
| Restore vital CCW loop to 72 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. ------------ NOTE ----------- B.1 Restore vital CCW loops to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR vital CCW loop intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two vital CCW loops Completion Time inoperable. Program C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON -UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-14 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~, 200, Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~, 2:Q.l,
| |
| | |
| CCW System 3.7.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 -----------------------------N()TE----------------------------
| |
| Isolation of CCW flow to individual components does not render the CCW System inoperable Verify each CCW manual, power operated, and In accordance with the automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety Surveillance related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or Frequency Control otherwise secured in position, is in the correct Program position.
| |
| SR 3.7.7.2 Verify each CCW automatic valve in the flow path In accordance with the that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in Surveillance position, actuates to the correct position on an Frequency Control actual or simulated actuation signal. Program SR 3.7.7.3 Verify each CCW pump starts automatically on an In accordance with the actual or simulated actuation signal. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABL() CANY()N - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-15 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~, 2:GQ, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~, ~,
| |
| | |
| ASW 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) System LCO 3.7.8 Two ASW trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One ASW train inoperable. A.1 ------------NOTE--------------
| |
| Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4,"
| |
| for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by ASW.
| |
| Restore ASW train to 72 hours OPERABLE status OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. ------------ NOTE ----------- B.1 Restore ASW trains to 1 hour Not applicable when second OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR ASW train intentionally made inoperable. In accordance with the
| |
| -------------------------------- Risk Informed Two ASW trains inoperable. Completion Time Program C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-aa, 200, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-aa, 2G-1-,
| |
| | |
| ASW 3.7.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 Verify each ASW manual and power operated, In accordance with the valve in the flow path servicing safety related Surveillance equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise Frequency Control secured in position, is in the correct position. Program SR 3.7.8.2 Verify each ASW power operated valve in the flow In accordance with the path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise lnservice Test secured in position, can be moved to the correct Program.
| |
| position.
| |
| SR 3.7.8.3 Verify each ASW pump starts automatically on an In accordance with the actual or simulated actuation signal. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-16a Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-ae, 200, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-ae, 2M,
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
| |
| : a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and
| |
| : b. Three diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s); and
| |
| : c. Two supply trains of the diesel fuel oil (DFO) transfer system.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| -------------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------------------
| |
| LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable to DGs.
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite circuit A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour inoperable. required OPERABLE AND offsite circuit.
| |
| Once per 8 hours thereafter.
| |
| A.2 Restore required offsite 72 hours circuit to OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-1 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-a§,4W,4-S9, ~,
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-a§,4e+,4+G, 24-7,
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour the required offsite AND circuit(s).
| |
| Once per 8 hours thereafter.
| |
| AND
| |
| ------------NOTE-------------
| |
| In MODE 1, 2, and 3, TDAFW pump is considered a required redundant feature.
| |
| B.2 Declare required 4 hours from feature( s) supported by discovery of Condition the inoperable DG B concurrent with inoperable when its inoperability of required redundant redundant required feature(s) is inoperable. feature(s).
| |
| B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE 24 hours DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure.
| |
| OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours OPERABLE DG(s).
| |
| AND B.4 Restore DG to 14 days OPERABLE status.
| |
| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-2 Unit 1 -Amendment No . .:t-aa,4W, ~'
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No . .:t-aa,4e7, 24+,
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating
| |
| * 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two required offsite circuits C.1 Declare required 12 hours from inoperable. feature(s) inoperable discovery of Condition when its redundant C concurrent with required feature(s) is inoperability of inoperable. redundant required features.
| |
| AND C.2 Restore one required 24 hours offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D. One required offsite circuit D.1 Restore required offsite 12 hours inoperable. circuit to OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program AND OR One DG inoperable. D.2 Restore DG to 12 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E. Two or more DGs E.1 Ensure at least two DGs 2 hours inoperable. are OPERABLE.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4aa, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4aa,
| |
| | |
| AC Sources- Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One supply train of the F.1 Restore the DFO 72 hours DFO transfer system transfer system to inoperable. OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program G. Two supply trains of the G.1 Restore one train of the 1 hour DFO transfer system DFO transfer system to inoperable. OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program H. ------------ NOTE ----------- H.1 Restore required AC 1 hour Not applicable when offsite sources to OPERABLE OR circuit or second DG status.
| |
| intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable. Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two or more DGs Program inoperable.
| |
| AND One or more required offsite circuits inoperable.
| |
| I. ------------ NOTE ----------- 1.1 Restore required AC 1 hour Not applicable when DG or sources to OPERABLE OR second offsite circuit status.
| |
| intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable. Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time One or more DGs Program inoperable.
| |
| AND Two required offsite circuits inoperable.
| |
| J. Required Action and J.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion AND Time not met.
| |
| J.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-3a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-36, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-36,
| |
| | |
| Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, Starting Air, and Turbocharger Air Assist 3.8.3 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. One or more DGs with F.1 Restore turbocharger air 48 hours turbocharger air assist air assist air receiver receiver pressure pressure to ;;:;: 180 psig.
| |
| < 180 psig and;;:;: 150 psig.
| |
| G. Required Action and G.1 Declare associated DG Immediately associated Completion inoperable.
| |
| Time or Conditions E or F not met.
| |
| OR One or more DG's turbocharger air assist, or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than Condition E or F.
| |
| H. Required Action and H.1 Declare all DGs on Immediately associated Completion associated unit(s)
| |
| Time of Condition A, 8, C, inoperable.
| |
| or D not met.
| |
| OR Fuel oil storage tanks or lube oil not within limits for reasons other than Conditions A, 8, C, or D.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-16 Unit 1 - Amendment No. ~,
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. ~,
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.4 Three Class 1E DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One battery charger A. 1 Restore battery terminal 2 hours inoperable. voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage.
| |
| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program A.2 Verify battery float 12 hours current s 2 amps.
| |
| AND A.3 Restore battery charger 14 days to OPERABLE status.
| |
| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-18 Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~,~,4-00, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~,474,
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One battery inoperable. B.1 Restore battery to 2 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. One DC electrical power C.1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours subsystem inoperable for power subsystem to reasons other than OPERABLE status. OR Condition A or B.
| |
| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D. More than one full capacity D.1 Restore the DC 14 days charger receiving power electrical power simultaneously from a subsystem to a single 480 V vital bus. configuration wherein each charger is powered from its associated 480 volt vital bus.
| |
| E. ------------ NOTE ----------- E.1 Restore at least one DC 1 hour Not applicable when second electrical power subsystem OR DC electrical power to OPERASLE status.
| |
| subsystem intentionally In accordance with the made inoperable. Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two DC electrical power Program subsystems inoperable.
| |
| F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours Associated Completion Time not met. AND F.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-18a Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-aa,~,.:t-W, Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-3§,4-74,
| |
| | |
| Inverters - Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8. 7 Inverters-Operating LCO 3.8. 7 Four Class 1E Vital 120 V UPS inverters shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required inverter A.1 -----------NOTE---------------
| |
| inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems -
| |
| Operating" with any vital 120 V AC bus de-energized.
| |
| Restore inverter to 24 hours OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. ------------ NOTE ----------- B.1 Restore inverters to 1 hour Not applicable when two or OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR more required inverters intentionally made In accordance with the inoperable. Risk Informed
| |
| -------------------------------- Completion Time Two or more required Program inverters inoperable.
| |
| C. Required Action and C. 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-26 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 4-aa, ~,
| |
| Unit 2 -Amendment No. 4-aa, ~,
| |
| | |
| Inverters - Operating 3.8.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.7.1 Verify correct inverter voltage and alignment to In accordance with the required AC vital buses. Surveillance Frequency Control Program DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-26a Unit 1 -Amendment No. ~' 200, Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~' ~,
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating LCO 3.8.9 The required Class 1E AC, DC, and 120 VAC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more AC electrical A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hours power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OR OPERABLE status.
| |
| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program
| |
| : e. One or more 120 VAC vital B.1 Restore 120 VAC vital 2 hours bus subsystem inoperable. bus subsystem to OPERABLE status. OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C. One or more DC electrical C. 1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours power distribution power distribution subsystem inoperable. subsystem to OR OPERABLE status.
| |
| In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D. Required Action and D. 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time not met. AND D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8-29 Unit 1 -Amendment No. 4-3§, 2-1-9, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4-3§, 247,
| |
| | |
| Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.5.19 Control Room Envelope Habitability Program A Control Room Envelope (CRE) Habitability Program shall be established and implemented to ensure that CRE habitability is maintained such that, with an OPERABLE Control Room Ventilation System (CRVS), CRE occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body for the duration of the accident. The program shall include the following elements:
| |
| : a. The definition of the CRE and the CRE boundary.
| |
| : b. Requirements for maintaining the CRE boundary in its design condition, including configuration control and preventive maintenance.
| |
| : c. Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, "Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,"
| |
| Revision 0, May 2003, and (ii) assessing CRE habitability at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0.
| |
| : d. Measurement, at designated locations, of the CRE pressure relative to all external areas adjacent to the CRE boundary during the pressurization mode of operation by one train of the CRVS, operating at the flow rate required by the VFTP, at a Frequency of 24 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The results shall be trended and used as part of the 24 month assessment of the CRE boundary.
| |
| : e. The quantitative limits on unfiltered air inleakage into the CRE. These limits shall be stated in a manner to allow direct comparison to the unfiltered air inleakage measured by the testing described in paragraph c. The unfiltered air inleakage limit for radiological challenges is the inleakage flow rate assumed in the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. Unfiltered air inleakage limits for hazardous chemicals must ensure that exposure of CRE occupants to
| |
| , these hazards will be within the assumptions in the licensing basis.
| |
| : f. The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the Frequencies required by paragraphs c and d for determining CRE unfiltered inleakage and assessing CRE habitability, and measuring CRE pressure and assessing the CRE boundary.
| |
| (continued) 5.0-17a Unit 1 - Amendment No. 2M, DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. ~,
| |
| | |
| Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals (continued) 5.5.20 Risk Informed Completion Time Program This program provides controls to calculate a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) and must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines." The program shall include the following:
| |
| : a. The RICT may not exceed 30 days;
| |
| : b. A RICT may only be utilized in MODE 1 and 2;
| |
| : c. When a RICT is being used, any plant configuration change within the scope of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program must be considered for the effect on the RICT.
| |
| : 1. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration.
| |
| : 2. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.
| |
| : 3. Revising the RICT is not required If the plant configuration change would lower plant risk and would result in a longer RICT.
| |
| : d. Use of a RICT is not permitted for voluntary entry into a configuration which represents a loss of a specified safety function or inoperability of all required trains of a system required to be OPERABLE.
| |
| : e. Use of a RICT is permitted for emergent conditions which represent a loss of a specified safety function or inoperability of all required trains of a system required to be OPERABLE if one or more of the trains are considered "PRA functional" as defined in Section 2.3.1 of NEI 06-09.
| |
| 5.0-17b Unit 1 - Amendment No.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2 Unit 2 -Amendment No.
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 3 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Technical Specification Bases Change(s)
| |
| (For information only)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 INSERT 8-1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 1
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Condition B applies to the Manual Reac r Trip in MODE 1 or 2. This action addresses the train orientation o the SSPS for this Function.
| |
| With one channel inoperable, the inop rable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the safety function.
| |
| The Completion Time of 48 hours is reasonable considering that there are two automatic actuation trains and another manual initiation channel OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
| |
| INSERT 8-3
| |
| * If the Manual Roaster Trip Function eannot be restored to OPERABLE status 'Nithin the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in whieh the requirement does not apply. To aehieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 v1ithin 6 additional hours (54 hours total time). The 6 additional hours to reash MODE 3 is reasonable, based on operating experiense, to exit the applisability from full power operation in an orderly manner and without shallenging unit systems. VVith the unit in MODE 3, Condition C is entered if the Manual Roaster Trip Funstion has not been restored and the Rod Control System is eapable of rod withdrawal or one more rods are not fully inserted.
| |
| C.1 C.2.1 and C.2.2 1 1 M
| |
| Condition GiQ] applies to the following reactor trip Functions in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted:
| |
| * Manual Reactor Trip;
| |
| * RTBs;
| |
| * RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms; and
| |
| * Automatic Trip Logic.
| |
| This action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS for these Functions. With one channel or train inoperable, the inoperable channel or train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. If the affected Funetion(s) eannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowed 48 hour Completion Time, the unit must be plaeed in a MODE in whieh the requirement does not apply. To aehieve this status aetion must be initiated 'Nithin the same 48 hours to fully insert all rods, and the Rod Control System must be rendered (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1. C.2.1. and C.2.2 (continued) incapable of rod withdrawal 'Nithin the next hour (e.g., by de energizing all CRDMs, by opening the RTBs, or by de energizing the motor generator (MG) sets). The additional hour for the latter provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner. VVith the rods fully inserted and the Rod Control System rendered incapable of rod Yt'ithdrawal, these F"unctions are no longer required.
| |
| The Completion Time is reasonable considering that in this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE train is adequate to perform the safety function, and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
| |
| INSERT B-2 CeRtition GIQ] is modified by a Note stating that while this LCO is not met for Functions 19, 20, or 21 in MODE 5 making the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal is not permitted. This note is in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.0.4 which preclude the transition from either MODE 3 or MODE 4 to MODE 3 or MODE 4 with the Rod control System capable of rod withdrawal or all rods not fully inserted for Functions 19, 20, or 21 with one channel or train inoperable.
| |
| Gl§j.1.1JiQd]GI§.1.2. and 0.2 Condition gl§ applies to the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Function.
| |
| With one of the NIS power range detectors inoperable, 1/4 of the radial power distribution monitoring capability is lost. Therefore, SR 3.2.4.2 must be performed (Required Action QJ§.1.1) within 12 hours after THERMAL POWER exceeds 75% RTP and every 12 hours thereafter.
| |
| If reactor power decreases to~ 75% RTP, the measurement of both intervals stops, and SR 3.2.4.2 is no longer required. New intervals start upon reactor power exceeding 75% RTP. Calculating QPTR every 12 hours compensates for the lost monitoring capability due to the inoperable NIS power range channel and allows continued unit operation at power levels > 75% RTP. When THERMAL POWER is ~
| |
| 75%, core radial power distributions are prevented from exceeding design limits where DNB conditions may exist. The 12-hour Completion Time is consistent with the Surveillance Requirement Frequency in LCO 3.2.4, "QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)."
| |
| The NIS power range detectors provide input to the Rod Control System and, therefore, have a two-out-of-four trip logic. A known inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition. This results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-three logic for actuation. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in Re INSERT B-2 (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS Q§.1.1Jaildl Qj§.1.2. and D.2 (continued)
| |
| As an alternative to the above Actions, the plant must be placed in a MODE 'Nhere this Function is no longer required OPERABLE.
| |
| Seventy eight hours are allowed to place the plant in MODE 3. The 78 hour completion tiiJle includes 72 hoi:Jrs for channel corrective maintenanoe, and an additional 6 hours for the MODE reduotion as required by Aotion D.2. This is a reasonable time, based on operating experienoe, to reaoh MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without ohallenging plant systems. If Required Aotions oannot be completed .'Nithin their allowed Completion Times, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing of other channels. The Note also allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition to allow setpoint adjustments of other channels when required to reduce the setpoint in accordance with other Technical Specifications. In accordance with WCAP 10271-P-A (Reference 7),
| |
| very specific circumstances are related to the use of this bypass condition. Since the NIS channels are not designed with Bypass-capable logic that meets the requirements of IEEE 279, the provisions for bypass only apply to a specific type of channel failure. To apply, the channel must fail in such a way that it does not trip the bistables.
| |
| With this type of failure, the channel may be returned to service and considered "bypassed" under this Note. Specifically, the bypass condition is the state when a failed channel is taken out of the forced "tripped" state and placed in operation. Due to the failed nature of the channel, the channel cannot be assumed to be OPERABLE, and is therefore considered to be in a state of bypass when the channel failure is such that its bistables are not tripped. The provisions of WCAP 10271 specifically prohibit the use of jumpers or lifted leads to bypass these channels. In this configuration, a second channel can be tested or setpoints adjusted with the channel in the tripped mode without completing reactor trip logic. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 28.
| |
| Required Action gj§.1.1 has been modified by a Note which only requires SR 3.2.4.2 to be performed if the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR becomes inoperable. The performance of SR 3.2.4.2 per ACTION -0!§.1.1 is subject to the SR 3.2.4.2 note. Failure of a component in the Power Range Neutron Flux Channel which renders the High Flux Trip Function inoperable may not affect the capability to monitor QPTR. As such, determining QPTR using core power distribution measurement information once per 12 hours may not be necessary.
| |
| INSERT B-4 .. (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS el§l.1 and E.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition g§i applies to the following reactor trip Functions:
| |
| * Power Range Neutron Flux-Low;
| |
| * Overtemperature ~T; INSERT 8-1
| |
| * Overpower ~T; Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate; Pressurizer Pressure-High; and
| |
| * ater Level-Low Low.
| |
| A known ina rable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours. Placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one-out-of-two logic for actuation of the two-out-of-three trips and one-out-of-three logic for actuation of the two-out-of-four trips. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 28.
| |
| If the operable ehannel eannot be plaeed in the trip eondition within the speeified Completion Time, the unit must be plaeed in a MODE 'Nhere these Funetions are not required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours is allovled to place the unit in MODE a. Six hours is a reasonable time, a
| |
| based on oper-ating experience, to place the unit in MODE from full power in an orderly manner and 'Nithout challenging unit systems.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note for Functions 6, 7 and 8.b, that allows an inoperable channel and/or one additional channel to be tested with one channel in bypass and the other channel in trip for up to 12 hours for performing surveillance testing.
| |
| Additionally, for Function 6, 7 and 8b, both the inoperable and the additional channel maybe placed in bypass for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. The Note allows only the inoperable channel for Functions 2.b and 3, to be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis. In accordance with WCAP 10271, very specific circumstances are related to the use of this bypass condition for RTS Functions 2.b and 3. Since these channels are not designed with Bypass-capable logic that meets the requirements of IEEE 279, the provisions for bypass only apply to a specific type of channel failure. To apply, the channel must fail in such a way that it does not trip the bistables. With this type of failure, the channel may be returned to service and considered "bypassed" under this Note. Specifically, the bypass condition is the state when a failed channel is taken out of the forced "tripped" state and placed in operation.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS e[§l.1 and E.2 (continued)
| |
| Due to the failed nature of the channel, the channel cannot be assumed to be OPERABLE, and is therefore considered to be in a state of bypass when the channel failure is such that its bistables are not tripped. The provisions of WCAP 10271 specifically prohibit the use of jumpers or lifted leads to bypass these channels. In this configuration, a second channel can be tested with the channel in the tripped mode without completing reactor trip logic. The Note for Function 14.a, allows the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel to be tested with one channel in bypass and the other in trip for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. Functions 6,7, and 8.b are two-out-of-four trip logic, and 14.a is two-out-of-three trip logic and the allowed testing configurations provide flexibility for testing, while assuring that during testing no configuration will cause an inadvertent trip of the reactor or keep a valid signal from tripping the reactor as it was designed. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 28.
| |
| INSERT B-5 t----+111 Efi].1 and Efi].2 Condition Efi] applies to the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-1 0 setpoint and one channel is inoperable. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint, the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions. If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-6 setpoint but less than the P-1 0 setpoint, 24 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint or increase to THERMAL POWER above the P-10 setpoint. The NIS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability of the source range, P-6, and below the capability of the power range, P-10. If THERMAL POWER is greater than the P-1 0 setpoint, the NIS power range detectors perform the monitoring and protection functions and the intermediate range is not required. The Completion Times allow for a slow and controlled power adjustment above P-1 0 or below P-6 and take into account the redundant capability afforded by the redundant OPERABLE channel, the overlap of the power range detectors, and the low probability of its failure during this period. This action does not require the inoperable channel to be tripped because the Function uses one-out-of-two logic.
| |
| Tripping one channel would trip the reactor. Thus, the Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failure does not result in reactor trip.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS GQ].1 and GQ].2 (continued)
| |
| Condition GQ] applies to two inoperable Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip channels in MODE 2 when THERMAL POWER is above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-10 setpoint. Required Actions specified in this Condition are only applicable when channel failures do not result in reactor trip. Above the P-6 setpoint and below the P-1 0 setpoint, the NIS intermediate range detector performs the monitoring Functions.
| |
| With no intermediate range channels OPERABLE, the Required Actions are to suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions immediately. This will preclude any power level increase since there are no OPERABLE Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channels. The operator must also reduce THERMAL POWER below the P-6 setpoint within two hours. Below P-6, the Source Range Neutron Flux channels will be able to monitor the core power level. The Completion Time of 2 hours will allow a slow and controlled power reduction to less than the P-6 setpoint and takes into account the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the NIS Intermediate Range Neutron Flux trip.
| |
| Required Action GQ].1 is modified by a Note to indicate that normal plant control operations that individually add limited positive reactivity (i.e., temperature or boron concentration fluctuations associated with RCS inventory management or temperature control) are not precluded by this Action, provided the SDM limits specified in the COLR are met and the requirements of LCOs 3.1.5, 3.1.6, and 3.4.2 are met.
| |
| !i.1 ~Jot used (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| Hi Condition !lB]1 applies to one inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channel when in MODE 2, below the P-6 setpoint, and performing a reactor startup. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With one of the two channels inoperable, operations involving positive reactivity additions shall be suspended immediately.
| |
| This will preclude any power escalation. With only one source range channel OPERABLE, core protection is severely reduced and any actions that add positive reactivity to the core must be suspended immediately.
| |
| Required Action !lB].1 is modified by a Note to indicate that normal plant control operations that individually add limited positive reactivity (i.e.,
| |
| temperature or boron concentration fluctuations associated with RCS inventory management or temperature control) are not precluded by this Action, provided the SDM limits specified in the COLR are met and the requirements of LCOs 3.1.5, 3.1.6, and 3.4.2 are met.
| |
| w Condition ~ applies to two inoperable Source Range Neutron Flux trip channels when in MODE 2, below the P-6 setpoint, and performing a reactor startup, or in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the monitoring and protection functions. With both source range channels inoperable, the RTBs must be opened immediately. With the RTBs open, the core is in a more stable condition and the unit enters Condition h{QI.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS 4M].1 K.2.1 and K.2.2 1 1 (continued)
| |
| Condition 4M] applies to one inoperable source range channel in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods not fully inserted. With the unit in this Condition, below P-6, the NIS source range performs the protection functions. With one of the source range channels inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to restore it to an OPERABLE status. If the ehannel eannot be returned to an OPERABLE status, action must be initiated within the same 48 houFS to fully insert all rods. 1 additional hour is allowed to plaee the Rod Control System in a condition incapable of rod withdrav:al (e.g., by de energizing all CRDMs, by opening the RTBs, or by de energizing the motor generator (MG) sets). Onee these ACTIONS are eompleted the sore is in a more stable eondition. The allowance of 48 hours to restore the channel to OPERABLE status, and the additional hour to plaee the Rod Control System in a eondition ineapable of rod withdrawal, are ~justified in Reference 7 .
| |
| INSERT B-6 WQ].1 and WQ].2 Condition tlQ] applies when the required number of OPERABLE Source Range Neutron Flux channels is not met in MODE 3, 4, or 5 with the RTBs open or with the Rod Control System incapable of rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted. With the unit in this Condition, the NIS source range performs a monitoring function. With less than the required number of source range channels OPERABLE, operations involving positive reactivity additions shall be suspended immediately.
| |
| This will preclude any power escalation.
| |
| Also, the SDM must be verified within 1 hour and once every 12 hours thereafter as per SR 3.1.1.1, SDM verification. With no source range channels OPERABLE, core protection is severely reduced. Verifying the SDM within 1 hour allows sufficient time to perform the calculations and determine that the SDM requirements are met. The SDM must also be verified once per 12 hours thereafter to ensure that the core reactivity has not changed. Required Action !:IQI.1 precludes any positive reactivity additions; therefore, core reactivity should not be increasing, and a 12 hour Frequency is adequate. The Completion Times of within 1 hour and once per 12 hours are based on operating experience in performing the Required Actions and the knowledge that unit conditions will change slowly.
| |
| Required Action k!Q].1 is modified by a Note which permits plant temperature changes provided the temperature change is accounted for in the calculated SDM. Introduction of temperature changes, including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC, must be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS Me.1 and M.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition ~ applies to the following reactor trip Functions:
| |
| * Pressurizer Pressure - Low;
| |
| * Pressurizer Water Level~ High;
| |
| * Reactor Coolant Flow - Low; INSERT B-1
| |
| * RCP Breaker Position ;
| |
| * Undervoltage RCPs; and
| |
| * Underfrequency RCPs .
| |
| With one channel inoperable, the ino erable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours. For the Pressurizer Pressure -
| |
| Low, Pressurizer Water Level- High, Undervoltage RCPs, and Underfrequency RCPs trip Functions, placing the channel in the tripped condition when above the P-7 setpoint results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip. For the Reactor Coolant Flow- Low trip Function, placing the channel in the tripped condition results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip above the P-7 and P-8 setpoints. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint because there are no loss of flow trips below the P-7 setpoint. The 72 hours allowed to place the channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 28. An additional6 hours is allo*.ved to reduce THERMAL POVVER to below P 7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip 'Nithin the specified Completion Time. The Reactor Coolant Flow - Low reactor trip function goes from 1 of 4 logic to 2 of 4 logic below the P-8 setpoint; however, the Required Action must take the plant below the P-7 setpoint, *if an inoperable channel is not tripped within 72 hours, due to the shared components between this function and the Reactor Coolant Flow - Low trip function.
| |
| Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the Functions associated with Condition ~-
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS MleJ.1 and MleJ.2 (continued)
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note for Function 8.a, that allows the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel to be tested with one channel in bypass and the other in trip, or with both the inoperable channel and the additional channel in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing surveillance testing of those channels. The Note for Function 9 and 10 allows the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel to be tested with one channel in bypass and the other channel in trip for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. The Note allows only the inoperable channel for Functions 12 and 13 to be bypassed for surveillance testing of other channels. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis. In accordance with WCAP 10271, very specific circumstances are related to the use of this bypass condition for RTS Functions 12 and 13. Since these channels are not designed with Bypass-capable logic that meets the requirements of IEEE 279, the provisions for bypass only apply to a specific type of channel failure.
| |
| To apply, the channel must fail in such a way that it does not trip the bistables. With this type of failure, the channel may be returned to service and considered "bypassed" under this Note. Specifically, the bypass condition is the state when a failed channel is taken out of the forced "tripped" state and placed in operation. Due to the failed nature of the channel, the channel cannot be assumed to be OPERABLE, and is therefore considered to be in a state of bypass when the channel failure is such that its bistables are not tripped. The provisions of WCAP 10271 specifically prohibit the use of jumpers or lifted leads to bypass these channels. In this configuration, a second channel can be tested with the channel in the tripped mode without completing reactor trip logic. Function 11 may not be bypassed since its logic is not 2 of 4 or 2 of 3, therefore, single failure would not be maintained. Function 8.a is a two-out-of-four trip logic and Functions 9 and 10 are two-out-of-three logic trip logics. The allowed testing configurations provide flexibility for testing, while assuring that during testing no configuration will cause an inadvertent trip of the reactor or keep a valid signal from tripping the reactor as it was designed. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 28.
| |
| INSERT B-7 . (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 INSERT 8-1 BASES ACTIONS Nl§l.1 and ~J.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition ~applies to the RCP Bre er Position reactor trip function.
| |
| With one channel inoperable, the in perable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hour-s. The 6 hours allowed to place the channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference 7. AA additional 6 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POVVER to belo'N P 7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.
| |
| Allowanee of this time interval takes into consideration the IO't"l probability of oco'urrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the Functions associated with Condition N.
| |
| Function 11 may not be bypassed since its logic is not 2 of 4 or 2 of 3, therefore, single failure would not be maintained.
| |
| INSERT B-8 .. (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 INSERT 8-1 BASES ACTIONS ~.1 and 0.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition GV applies to Turbine Tr" on Low Auto-Stop Oil Pressure.
| |
| With one channel inoperable, the
| |
| * operable channel must be placed in the trip condition within 12 hours. If placed in the tripped condition, this results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip. If the shannel san not be restored to OPERABLE status or plased in the trip sondition, then power must be redused belo'N the P 9 setpoint within the next 4 hours. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition and the 4 hours allowed for redusing power are is justified in Reference 28.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing an inoperable channel in the bypassed condition for up to 12 hours while performing routine surveillance testing of the other channels. In accordance with WCAP 10271, very specific circumstances are related to the use of this bypass condition for RTS Function 16. Since this channel is not designed with Bypass-capable logic that meets the requirements of IEEE 279, the provisions for bypass only apply to a specific type of channel failure. To apply, the channel must fail in such a way that it does not trip the bistables. With this type of failure, the channel may be returned to service and considered "bypassed" under this Note. Specifically, the bypass condition is the state when a failed channel is taken out of the forced "tripped" state and placed in operation. Due to the failed nature of the channel, the channel cannot be assumed to be OPERABLE, and is therefore considered to be in a state of bypass when the channel failure is such that its bistables are not tripped. The provisions of WCAP 10271 specifically prohibit the use of jumpers or lifted leads to bypass this channel. In this configuration, a second channel can be tested with the channel in the tripped mode without completing reactor trip logic. The 12 hour time limit is justified in Reference 28.
| |
| INSERT 8-9 1----+* INSERT 8-1
| |
| ~.1 and P.2 Condition ~ applies to Turbine Trip on Tu ine Stop Valve Closure.
| |
| With one or more channels inoperable, th inoperable channel must be placed in the trip condition within 72 hours. For the Turbine Trip on Turbine Stop Valve Closure function, where four-of-four channels are required to initiate a reactor trip; hence more than one channel may be placed in trip. If the channel(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or placed in the trip condition, then power must be reduced below the P 9 setpoint within the next 4 hours. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel(s) in the tripped condition and the 4 hours allowed for reducing pov1er are ~justified in Reference 28.
| |
| INSERT 8-10 ._
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS ~.1 and Q.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition~ applies to the Sllnput from ESFAS reactor trip and the RTS Automatic Trip Logic in MODES 1 and 2. These actions address INSERT B-2 he train orientation of the RTS for these Functions. With one train e, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE WH+Hfli-H-t'~-8*1t-e-Hel::ffS".:. The 24 hours allowed to restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 29. 1\n additional6 hours is allo*Ned to place the unit in MODE a. Six hours (Required Action Q.2) is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach a
| |
| MODE from full power in an orderly manner and 'Nithout challenging unit systems.
| |
| Consistent with the requirement in Reference 28 to include Tier 2 insights into the decision-making process before taking equipment out of service, restrictions on concurrent removal of certain equipment when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance are included. These restrictions do not apply when a logic train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass Note of Condition ~* When a logic train is inoperable for maintenance, the following should not be scheduled:
| |
| * Activities that degrade the availability of the auxiliary feedwater system, RCS pressure relief system (pressurizer PORVs and safety valves), AMSAC, or turbine trip (to preserve ATWS mitigation capability).
| |
| * Activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable (to preserve reactor trip and safeguards actuation capability).
| |
| * Activities that prevent maintaining one complete emergency core cooling system train that can be actuated automatically (to preserve LOCA mitigation capability).
| |
| * Activities on electrical systems (e.g., AC and DC power) and cooling systems (ASW and CCW) that support the systems or functions listed above.
| |
| Since Condition ~ is typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the above restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition ~entry. If this situation were to occur during the 24-hour Completion Time of Required Action ~.1, the configuration risk management program will assess the emergent condition and direct activities to restore the inoperable logic train and exit Condition ~ or fully implement the restrictions.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows bypassing one train up to 4 hours for surveillance testing, provided the t---_o_t~.er train is OPERABLE.
| |
| INSERT B-11 (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS B!BBI.1 and R.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition BJBB! applies to the RTBs in MODES 1 and 2. These actions INSERT B-2 address the train orientation of the RTS for the RTBs. With one train ino 24 hours is allowed for train corrective maintenance to restore the tram RABLE status or the unit must be plased in iYI-'::::Ii::li:=-d-wttftff-t-trtt:H~~--f*:lft:tRfl!". The 24-hou r Completion Time is justified in Reference 29. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experienee, to reaeh MODE 3 from full pov:er in an orderly manner and without ehallenging unit systems.
| |
| Plaeing the unit in MODE 3 results in Condition C entry if one RTB train is inoperable.
| |
| Consistent with the requirement in Reference 29 to include Tier 2 insights into the decision-making process before taking equipment out of service, restrictions on concurrent removal of certain equipment when a RTB train is inoperable for maintenance are included. These restrictions do not apply when a RTB train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass Note of Condition BJBBL When a RTB train is inoperable for maintenance, the following should not be scheduled:
| |
| * Activities that degrade the availability of the auxiliary feedwater system, RCS pressure relief system (pressurizer PORVs and safety valves), AMSAC, or turbine trip (to preserve ATWS mitigation capability).
| |
| * Activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable (to preserve reactor trip and safeguards actuation capability).
| |
| * Activities on electrical systems (e.g., AC and DC power) and cooling systems (ASW) that support the systems or functions listed above.
| |
| Since Condition BJBB! is typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the above restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition R entry. If this situation were to occur during the 24-hour Completion Time of Required Action BJBBL1, the configuration risk management program will assess the emergent condition and direct activities to restore the inoperable logic train and exit Condition R or fully implement the above restrictions.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note. The Note allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE. The 4-hour time limit is justified in Reference 29.
| |
| INSERT 8-12 (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS @.1 and S .2 (continued)
| |
| Condition sloe! applies to the P-6 and P-1 0 interlocks. With one or more channels inoperable, the associated interlock must be verified by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window to be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour or the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours. Verifying the interlock status manually accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. +Ae Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full po*.ver in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. The 1 hour and 6 hour Completion Times are equal to the time allo'A'ed by LCO 3.0.3 for shutdo*.vn actions in the event of a complete loss of RTS Function.
| |
| t i . 1 and T.2 Condition 6 applies to the P-7, P-8, P-9, and P-13 interlocks. With one or more channelfst inoperable, the associated interlock must be verified by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window to be in its required state for the existing unit condition within 1 hour or the unit must be placed in MODE 2 'Nithin the next 6 hours.
| |
| These actions are conservative for the case where power level is being raised. Verifying the interlock status manually accomplishes the interlock's Function. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on operating experience and the minimum amount of time allowed for manual operator actions. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| INSERT B-13 ..
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS Y!GGJ.1 and U.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition Y!GG! applies to the RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip INSERT 8-1 ~.u.~.u-:l.hanisms, O( diverse trip features, in MODES 1 and 2. With one of L.......------' the diverse
| |
| * inoperable, it must be restored to an OPERABLE status within 48 o or the unit must be placed in a MODE where the requirement does not apply. This is accomplished by placing the unit in MODE 3 within the ne>G 6 hours (54 hours total time). The Completion Time of 6 hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full po*Ner in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| VVith the unit in MODE 3, Condition Cis entered if the inoperable trip mechanism has not been restored and the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted.
| |
| The affected RTB shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse features is inoperable except for the time required to perform maintenance to restore the inoperable trip mechanism to OPERABLE status, consistent with Ref. 13.
| |
| The Completion Time of 48 hours for Required Action Y!GGL1 is reasonable considering that in this Condition there is one remaining diverse feature for the affected RTB, and one OPERABLE RTB capable of performing the safety function and given the low probability of an event occurring during this interval.
| |
| INSERT 8-14
| |
| ~
| |
| ~Jot used vvU].1 and vvU].2 Condition ¥VB] applies to the Seismic Trip, in MODES 1 and 2. With one of the channels inoperable, START UP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in trip within the next 6 hours. If a direction is inoperable, then the channel must be considered inoperable. Placing the channel in the tripped condition creates a partial trip condition requiring only one out of two logic from the remaining locations for reactor trip actuation.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows placing the inoperable channel in the bypassed condition for up to 72 hours while performing surveillance testing or maintenance. The allowed 72 hour bypass time is reasonable based on the low probability of an event occurring while the channel is bypassed and on the time required to perform the required surveillance testing.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 BASES ACTIONS t@j.1 ;-X4 and vvm!.~
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Condition t@J applies to the Trip Time Delay (TTD) channels (processors) for the SG Water Level-Low Low trip function in MODES 1 and 2. With one or more TTD channels (processors) inoperable or the RCS delta-T equivalent power input inoperable, 72 hours are allowed to adjust the threshold power level for no time delay to 0%
| |
| RTP. This sets the TTD processor timer to zero seconds and INSERT B-1 tively removes its time delay input from the affected SG water level eire * . f the TTD processor timer cannot be set to zero seconds then the affected r level low-low output channels must be placed in trip ithin 72 hour . Only one SG water level low-low output channel per generator can be placed in the trip position without tripping the plant. The Completion Time of 72 hours is justified in Reference 28.
| |
| If the TTD threshold povt'er for no time delay cannot be adjusted to 0%
| |
| RTP (zero seconds time delay) or the single SG water level output channel cannot be placed in the trip condition *.vithin the specified Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE *.vhere these Functions are not required OPERABLE. An additional 6 hours is allowed to place the unit in MODE a. Six hours is a reasonable time, a
| |
| based on operating experience, to place the unit in MODE from full po*.ver in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a note that allows the inoperable TTD channel (processor) and/or one additional TID channel (processor) to be surveillance tested with the affected SG low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip for up to 12 hours. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.
| |
| If Required Action t@j.1 is completed for an inoperable TTD processor, the affected SG low-low water level channels would still be operable in that a valid SG low-low water level trip function would not be delayed. With the inoperable TTD processor meeting this required action, the above note will still apply for the inoperable TTD processor
| |
| ~ a~d/or one additional TID processor.
| |
| ~
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)
| |
| Condition B applies to manual initiation of:
| |
| * Sl;
| |
| * Containment Spray; INSERT B-2
| |
| * Phase A Isolation; and
| |
| * Phase B Isolation.
| |
| This action addresses the train orientation of th SS S for the functions listed above. If a channel or train is* ope able, 48 hours is allowed to return it to an OPERABLE status. ote at for containment spray and Phase B isolation, failure of one or both hannels in one train renders the train inoperable. Condition B, th efore, encompasses both situations. The specified Com letion Time is reasonable considering that there are two autom ic actuation trains and another manual initiation train OPERABLE fo each Function, and the low probability of an event occurring during t is interval. If the train systems.
| |
| INSERT 8-16 1------..~
| |
| qij.1, C.2.1 and C.2.2 Condition G§ applies to the automatic actu tion logic and actuation relays for the following functions:
| |
| * Sl;
| |
| * Containment Spray;
| |
| * Phase A Isolation; and
| |
| * Phase B Isolation This action addresses the train orientati n of the SSPS and the master and slave relays. If one train is inoper le, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. he 24 hours allowed for restoring the inoperable train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 17. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train oannot be restored to OPERABLE status, the unit must be plaoed in a MODE in whioh the LCO does not apply. This is done by plaoing the (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS GQ.1 G.2.1 and G.2.2 (continued) unit in at least MODE 3 *.vithin an additional 6 hours (30 hours total time) and in MODE 5 'Nithin an additional 30 hours (60 hours total time). The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| Consistent with the requirement in Reference 17 to include Tier 2 insights into the decision-making process before taking equipment out of service, restrictions on concurrent removal of certain equipment when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance are included. These restrictions do not apply when a ~ic train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass Note of Condition gQJ. When a logic train is inoperable for maintenance, the following should not be scheduled:
| |
| * Activities that degrade the availability of the auxiliary feedwater system, RCS pressure relief system (pressurizer PORVs and safety valves), AMSAC, or turbine trip (to preserve ATWS mitigation capability).
| |
| * Activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable (to preserve reactor trip and safeguards actuation capability).
| |
| * Activities that prevent maintaining one complete emergency core cooling system train that can be actuated automatically (to preserve LOCA mitigation capability).
| |
| * Activities on electrical systems (e.g., AC and DC power) and cooling systems (ASW and CCW) that support the systems or functions listed above.
| |
| Since Condition gQj is typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the above restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition gQj entry. If this situation were to occur during the 24-hour Completion Time of Required Action gQI.1, the configuration risk management program will assess the emergent condition and direct activities to restore the inoperable logic train and exit Condition C or fully implement the restrictions.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis assumption ofWCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 8) that 4 hours is the average time required to perform train surveillance.
| |
| INSERT B-17 1------.. .
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS ti].1. 0.2.1. and 0.2.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition til applies to: INSERT B-2
| |
| * Sl - Pressurizer Pressure - Low;
| |
| * Sl- Steam Line Pressure- Low;
| |
| * Steam Line Isolation - Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate -
| |
| High;
| |
| * Steam Line Isolation- Steam Line Pressure- Low; and
| |
| * Auxiliary Feedwater- SG Water level - Low Low; If one channel is inoperable, 72 hours are allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition.
| |
| Generally this Condition applies to functions that operate on two-out-of-three logic (excluding pressurizer pressure- low which is two-out-of-four due to its control input function). Therefore, failure of one channel places the Function in a two-out-of-two configuration. The inoperable channel must be tripped to place the Function in a one-out-of-two configuration that satisfies redundancy requirements.
| |
| Since pressurizer pressure is used for control and SSPS input, its coincidence is two-out-of-four to provide to required reliability and redundancy. Failure of one channel places the function in a two-out-of-three configuration. The inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition to place the Function in a one-out-of-three configuration that satisfies the reliability and redundancy requirements.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS gf].1 D.2.1 and D.2.2 (continued)
| |
| I I Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within 72 hours requires the unit be placed in MODE 3 within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 within the next 6 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full povw'er conditions in an orderly manner and 'Nithout challenging unit systems.
| |
| In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note for Function 1.d that allows the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel to be tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip, or with both the inoperable and the additional channel in bypass for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. For Functions 1.e, 4.d(1 ), 4.d(2) and 6.d(1 ), the Note allows the inoperable channel and/or one additional channel to be tested with one channel in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. Function 1.d is a two-out-of-four trip logic and Functions 1.e, 4.d(1 ), 4.d(2) and 6.d(1) are two-out-of-three logic actuation logics. The allowed testing configurations provide flexibility for testing, while assuring that during testing no configuration will cause an inadvertent actuation of the function or keep a valid signal from actuating the function as it was designed. The 72 hours allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, and the 12 hours allowed for testing, are justified in Reference 17. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| INSERT B-18
| |
| * el8].1 E.2.1 and E.2.2 I I Condition el8J applies to:
| |
| * Steam Line Isolation- Containment Pressure- High-high This signal does not input to a control function. Thus, two-out-of-three logic is necessary to meet acceptable protective requirements.
| |
| However, a two-out-of-three design would require tripping a failed channel. This is undesirable because a single failure of the Containment Pressure input would then cause spurious containment spray initiation. Spurious spray actuation is undesirable because of the cleanup problems presented. Therefore, these channels are designed with two-out-of-four logic so that a failed channel may be bypassed rather than tripped. Note that one channel may be bypassed and still satisfy the single failure criterion. Furthermore, with one channel bypassed, a single instrumentation channel failure will not spuriously initiate containment spray.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS w.1 E.2.1 and E.2.2 (continued)
| |
| I I To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray and Phase B containment isolation, the inoperable channel should not be placed in the tripped condition. Instead it is bypassed. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 72 hours, is sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The 72 hours allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the bypass condition is justified in Reference 17.
| |
| F'ailure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status, or place it in the bypassed condition within 72 hours, requires the unit be a
| |
| placed in MODE within the following 6 hours and MODE 4 v1ithin the next 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and *.vithout challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, these F'unctions are no longer required OPERABLE.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoperable channel to be tested in bypass for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. In addition, the Note allows the inoperable channel and one additional channel to be tested in bypass for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing only if the Function 1.c channel associated with the inoperable channel is in trip during the testing. The 12 hour time limit is justified in reference 17.
| |
| This function is a two-out-of-four actuation logic and three of its channels are contained on common control channels with three other functions and the fourth channel is on a common control channel with two other functions. As a result, if a common control channel is inoperable then one channel from each of its contained functions is inoperable. Three of the common control channels each contain a channel from the Safety Injection Containment Pressure- High (Function. 1.c). Function 1.c, is a two-out-of-three logic, which requires an inoperable channel to be placed in trip to continue operability and only one channel at a time is allowed to be bypassed for testing.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS ei8J.1 E.2.1 and E.2.2 (continued)
| |
| I I As a result, for the three common control channels that include a Function 1.c channel the testing of a second common control channel in bypass requires verification that the Function 1.c channel on the inoperable common control channel is in trip. Otherwise no second common control channel can be tested in bypass. However, if the fourth common control channel is the inoperable channel, then with that common control channel in bypass, any one of the other three common control channels may be tested in bypass without placing the associated Function 1.c, channel in trip. Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours for testing purposes is acceptable based on Reference 17. The allowed testing configurations provide flexibility for testing, while assuring that during testing no configuration will cause an inadvertent actuation of the function or keep a valid signal from actuating the function or an associated function as designed. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| INSERT 8-19 ..
| |
| R1].1 R1].2.1 and R1].2.2 I I Condition FQj applies to the P-4 Interlock.
| |
| For the P-4 Interlock Function, this action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS. If a train is inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to return it to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the nature of this Function, the available redundancy, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the following 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection function noted above.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS GltSj.1. G.2.1 and G.2.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition G{BI applies to the automatic actuation logic and actuatio relays for the Steam Line Isolation and AFW actuation Functions.
| |
| The action addresses the train orientation of the SSPS and the aster and slave relays for these functions. If one train is inoperable, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE status. The 24 hours allowed for restoring the inoperable train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 17. The Completion Time for restoring a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the follot.ving 6 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating e:xperience, to reach the required unit conditions from full pov1er conditions in an orderly manner and tNithout challenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of the protection channels and actuation functions. In this MODE, the unit does not have analyzed transients or conditions that require the e:xplicit use of the protection functions noted above.
| |
| Consistent with the requirement in Reference 17 to include Tier 2 insights into the decision-making process before taking equipment out of service, restrictions on concurrent removal of certain equipment when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance are included. These restrictions do not apply when a l~ic train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass Note of Condition ~* When a logic train is inoperable for maintenance, the following should not be scheduled:
| |
| * Activities that degrade the availability of the auxiliary feedwater system, RCS pressure relief system (pressurizer PORVs and safety valves), AMSAC, or turbine trip (to preserve ATWS mitigation capability).
| |
| * Activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable (to preserve reactor trip and safeguards actuation capability).
| |
| * Activities that prevent maintaining one complete emergency core cooling system train that can be actuated automatically (to preserve LOCA mitigation capability).
| |
| * Activities on electrical systems (e.g., AC and DC power) and cooling systems (ASW and CCW) that support the systems or functions listed above.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS ~.1, G.2.1 and G.2.2 (continued)
| |
| Since Condition GI!SI is typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the above restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition G entry. If this situation were to occur during the 24-hour Completion Time of Required Action GI!SI.1, the configuration risk management program will assess the emergent condition and direct activities to restore the inoperable logic train and exit Condition GI!SI or fully implement the restrictions.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 8) assumption that 4 hours is the average time required to perform channel surveillance.
| |
| INSERT B-20 t----** INSERT 8-2
| |
| !={M.1 and 1=4.2 Condition ~ applies to the Automatic Actuation Logic Relays for the Feedwater Isolation Function.
| |
| This action addresses the train orientation of the SSP and the master and slave relays for this Function. If one train is ino erable, 24 hours are allowed to restore the train to OPERABLE stat or the unit must a
| |
| be placed in MODE within the follovling 6 hours. The 24 hours allowed for restoring the inoperable train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 17. The Completion Time for restoring a train to OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another train OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experienee, to reaeh MODE 3 from full power eonditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. These Functions are no longer required in MODE a. Placing the unit in a
| |
| MODE removes all requirements for OPERABI LIT¥ of the protection channels and actuation functions. In this MODE, the unit does not have analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the protection functions noted above.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS ~.1 and H.2 (continued)
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 8) assumption that 4 hours is the average time required to perform train surveillance.
| |
| INSERT B-21 ..
| |
| !IQ].1 and 1.2 Condition tiQ] applies to Auxiliary Feedwater - Undervoltage Reactor Coolant Pump If one channel is inoperable, 72 hours are allowed to restore one channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition.
| |
| placed in the tripped condition, the function is then in a partial trip condition where one additional tripped channel will result in actuation.
| |
| The 72 hour Completion Time is justified in Ref. 17. Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within 72 hours, requires the Unit to be placed in MODE 2
| |
| 'Nith in the following 6 hours. Si* hours is reasonable, based on operating e*perience, to reach MODE 2 from full po*11er conditions in an orderly manner l.vithout challenging unit systems. In MODE 2, this Function is no longer required OPERABLE.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoperable channel to be bypassed for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing of other channels. In accordance with WCAP 10271, very specific circumstances are related to the use of this bypass condition for ESFAS Functions 6.g. Since this channel is not designed with Bypass-capable logic that meets the requirements of IEEE 279, the provisions for bypass only apply to a specific type of channel failure.
| |
| To apply, the channel must fail in such a way that it does not trip the bistables. With this type of failure, the channel may be returned to service and considered "bypassed" under this Note. Specifically, the bypass condition is the state when a failed channel is taken out of the forced "tripped" state and placed in operation. Due to the failed nature of the channel, the channel cannot be assumed to be OPERABLE, and is therefore considered to be in a state of bypass when the channel failure is such that its bistables are not tripped. The provisions of WCAP 10271 specifically prohibit the use of jumpers or lifted leads to bypass this channel. In this configuration, a second channel can be tested with the channel in the tripped mode without completing ESFAS logic. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, and the 12 hours allowed for a second channel to be in the bypassed condition for testing, are justified in Reference 17.
| |
| INSERT B-22
| |
| .. (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS J[QI.1 and J.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition .J§ applies to the Feedwater Isolation Actuation signal resulting from Steam Generator Level- High-High (P-14).
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoper le channel and/or one additional channel to be tested with one channe in bypass and one channel in trip for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. This Function is a two-out-of-three actuation logic and the allowed testing configurations provide flexibility for testing, while assuring that during testing no configuration will cause an inadvert actuation of the function or keep a valid signal from actuating the function as it was designed. The 72 hours allowed to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, and the 12 hours allo for a second channel to be in the bypassed condition for testing, justified in Reference 17. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| INSERT B-23 ...
| |
| +<1§1.1.1. K.1.2. K.2.1 and+<l§].2-:-2:
| |
| Condition Kl§l applies to the Residual Heat Removal Pump Trip on RWST Level- Low. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE stat s or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass (cut-out) conditio within 6 hours is sufficient to ensure that the Function remains OPE ABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial t p condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed low). lacing the out-of-service channel in cut-out removes that channel from the trip logic, similar to a bypass function. This provides a two-out-of-two trip logic from the remaining channels. The 6 hour Completion Time is justified in Reference 8. If the channel cannot be placed in the cut out condition within 6 hours, and returned to an OPERABLE status within 48 hours, the unit must be brought to MODE 3 within 54 hours and MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Times for shutdown are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and
| |
| 'Nithout challenging unit systems. In MODE 5, the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require the explicit use of the pump trip function noted above.
| |
| INSERT B-24 (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS t!QJ.1, L.2.1 and L.2.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition hjQ] applies to the P-11 interlock.
| |
| With one or more channels inoperable, the operator must verify that the interlock is in the required state for the existing unit condition. This action manually accomplishes the function of the interlock.
| |
| Determination must be made within 1 hour. The verification determination can be made by observation of the associated annunciator window(s). The 1 hour Completion Time is equal to the time allowed by LCO 3.0.3 to initiate shutdown actions in the event of a complete loss of ESFAS function. If the interlock is not in the required state (or placed in the required state) for the existing unit condition, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within the next 6 hours and MODE 4 within the follmving 6 hours. The allo*Ned Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes all requirements for OPERABILITY of these interlocks.
| |
| INSERT B-2
| |
| ~.1, and ~.2, M.3.1 and M.3.2 Condition ~ applies to the Trip Time Delay (TTD) channels (processors) for the SG Water Level-Low Low actuation of the turbine-driven AFW pump and is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2 and 3. With one or more TTD channels (processors) inoperable or the RSC flT equivalent power input inoperable, 72 hours are allowed to adjust the threshold power level for no time delay to 0% RTP. This sets the TTD processor timer to zero seconds and effectively removes its input for the SG water level circuit. If the TTD timer processor cannot be set to zero seconds for a single SG water level control, th the affected SG water level low-low channel must be placed in trip.
| |
| Only one SG water level low-low channel per generator can be placed in trip position without tripping the plant. The Completion Time of 72 hours is justified in Reference 17.
| |
| If the TTD threshold po'Ner for no time delay cannot be adjusted to 0%
| |
| RTP (zero seconds time delay) or the single SG water level output channel cannot be placed in the trip condition within the specified Completion Time, the unit must be placed in MODE 4 where these Functions are not required OPERABLE. A completion time of 78 hours is allowed to place the unit in MODE 3 and 84 hours for MODE 4.
| |
| These completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to place the unit in MODE 4 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4 there are no analyzed transients requiring the use of the turbine driven AF'I'/ pump.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS MI2J.1 1 and MI2J.2, M.3.1 and M.3.2 (continued)
| |
| The Required Actions have been modified by a note that allows the inoperable TTD channel (processor) and/or one additional TTD channel (processor) to be surveillance tested with the affected SG low-low water level channels for one TTD channel (processor) in bypass and the affected SG low-low water level channels for the other TTD channel (processor) in trip for up to 12 hours. The 12 hour time limit is justified in reference 17. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of multiple TTD channels (processors) on a routine basis.
| |
| If Required Action ~.1 is completed for an inoperable TTD processor, the affected SG low-low water level channels would still be operable in that a valid SG low-low water level trip function would not be delayed.
| |
| With the inoperable TTD processor meeting this required action, the above note will still apply for the inoperable TTD processor and/or one additional TTD processor.
| |
| ~.1 or~.2 Condition ~ applies to:
| |
| * Manual Initiation of Steam Line Isolation; and
| |
| * Manual Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater.
| |
| If a channel is inoperable, 48 hours is allowed to return the channel to an OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering the nature of these functions, the available redundancy, and the low probability of an event occurring during this interval. If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the associated pump or valve shall be declared inoperable immediately and the REQUIRED ACTION of 3.7.5 or 3.7.2 as applicable complied with immediately.
| |
| INSERT B-2 Gf&j.1 or 0.2.1 and 0.2.2 Condition ~applies to Safety Injection resulting from Containment Pressure- High.
| |
| If one channel is inoperable, 72 hours are allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition.
| |
| Failure of one channel places the function in a two-out-of-two configuration since the trip coincidence is two-out-of-three. The inoperable channel must be tripped to place the Function in a one-out-of-two configuration that satisfies redundancy requirements.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS G[&l.1 or 0.2.1 and 0.2.2 (continued)
| |
| Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the tripped condition within 72 hours requires the unit be placed in a
| |
| MODE within 78 hours and MODE 5 in 108 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and lh'ithout challenging unit systems.
| |
| In MODE 5, these functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoperable channel to be tested in bypass or with the inoperable channel in trip, one additional channel maybe tested in bypass for up to 12 hours while performing surveillance testing. This function is a two-out-of-three trip logic and the allowed testing configurations provide flexibility for testing, while assuring that during testing no configuration will cause an inadvertent actuation of the function or keep a valid signal from actuating the function as it was designed. The 72 hours allowed to restore the channel to operable status or to place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition, and the 12 hours allowed for testing, are justified in Reference 17. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| INSERT B-25 1-----+-..
| |
| pgj.1 or P.2.1 and P.2.2 Condition ~ applies to:
| |
| Containment Spray- Containment Pressure- High-High.
| |
| Containment Isolation - Phase B Isolation - Containment Pressure -
| |
| High-High Neither of these signals has input to a control function. Thus, two-out-of-three logic is necessary to meet acceptable protective requirements. However, a two-out-of-three design would require tripping a failed channel. This is undesirable because a single failure would then cause spurious containment spray initiation. Spurious spray actuation is undesirable because of the cleanup problems presented. Therefore, these channels are designed with two-out-of-four logic so that a failed channel may be bypassed rather than tripped. Note that one channel may be bypassed and still satisfy the single failure criterion. Furthermore, with one channel bypassed, a single instrumentation channel failure will not spuriously initiate containment spray. The containment spray signal is also interlocked with Sl and will not initiate without simultaneous Sl and containment spray signals.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS pgj.1 or P.2.1 and P.2.2 (continued)
| |
| To avoid the inadvertent actuation of containment spray and Phase B containment isolation, the inoperable channel is bypassed. Restoring the channel to OPERABLE status, or placing the inoperable channel in the bypass condition within 72 hours, is sufficient to assure that the Function remains OPERABLE and minimizes the time that the Function may be in a partial trip condition (assuming the inoperable channel has failed high). The 72 hours allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the bypassed condition is justified in Reference 17.
| |
| Failure to restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status or place it in the bypassed eondition '*'lithin 72 hours requires the unit be plaeed in MODE 3 within 78 hours, and MODE 5 in 108 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating m<perience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and 'Nithout challenging unit systems.
| |
| In MODE 5, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows the inoperable channel to be tested in bypass for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing. In addition, the Note allows the inoperable channel and one additional channel to be tested in bypass for up to 12 hours for surveillance testing only if the Function 1.c channel associated with the inoperable channel is in trip during the testing.
| |
| This function is a two-out-of-four actuation logic and three of its channels are contained on common control channels with three other functions and the fourth channel is on a common control channel with two other functions. As a result, if a common control channel is inoperable then one channel from each of its contained functions is inoperable. Three of the common control channels each contain a channel from the Safety Injection Containment Pressure- High (Function. 1.c). Function 1.c, is a two-out-of-three logic, which requires an inoperable channel to be placed in trip to continue operability and only one channel at a time is allowed to be bypassed for testing. As a result, for the three common control channels that include a Function 1.c channel the testing of a second common control channel in bypass requires verification that the Function 1.c channel on the inoperable common control channel is in trip. Otherwise no second common control channel can be tested in bypass. However, if the fourth common control channel is the inoperable channel, then with that common control channel in bypass, any one of the other three common control channels may be tested in bypass without placing the associated Function 1.c, channel in trip.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS pgj.1 or P.2.1 and P.2.2 (continued)
| |
| Placing a second channel in the bypass condition for up to 12 hours for testing purposes is justified in Reference 17. The allowed testing configurations provide flexibility for testing, while assuring that during testing no configuration will cause an inadvertent actuation of the function or keep a valid signal from actuating the function or an associated function as designed. This note is not intended to allow simultaneous testing of coincident channels on a routine basis.
| |
| INSERT B-26 SURVEILLANCE The SRs for each ESFAS Function are identified by the SRs column of REQUIREMENTS Table 3.3.2-1.
| |
| A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.2-1 determines which SRs apply to which ESFAS Functions.
| |
| Note that each channel of process protection supplies both trains of the ESFAS. When testing channel I, train A and train B must be examined. Similarly, train A and train B must be examined when testing channel II, channel Ill, and channel IV (if applicable).
| |
| The CHANNEL CALIBRATION and COTs are performed in a manner that is consistent with the assumptions used in analytically calculating the required channel accuracies.
| |
| SR 3.3.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the.assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALl BRATION.
| |
| Agreement criteria are established in STP I-1A, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and reliability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY The need for pressure control is most pertinent when core heat can cause the greatest effect on RCS temperature, resulting in the greatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control. Thus, applicability has been designated for MODES 1 and 2. The applicability is also provided for MODE 3. The purpose is to prevent solid water RCS operation during heatup and cooldown to avoid rapid pressure rises caused by normal operational perturbation, such as reactor coolant pump startup.
| |
| In MODES 1, 2, and 3, there is need to maintain the availability of pressurizer heaters capable of being powered from either the offsite power source or the emergency power supply, and if necessary, using bus cross-tie to an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initial conditions of these MODES give the greatest demand for maintaining the RCS in a hot pressurized condition with loop subcooling for an extended period. For MODE 4, 5, or 6, it is not necessary to control pressure (by heaters) to ensure loop subcooling for heat transfer when the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
| |
| System is in service, and therefore, the LCO is not applicable.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1, A.2. A.3, and A.4 Pressurizer water level control malfunctions or other plant evolutions may result in a pressurizer water level above the nominal upper limit, even with the plant at steady state conditions. The upper limit of this LCO is below the Pressurizer Water Level - High Trip at 90% of span.
| |
| If the pressurizer water level is not within the limit, action must be taken to bring the unit to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, within 6 hours the unit must be brought to MODE 3, with rods fully inserted and the Rod Control System not capable of rod withdrawal (e.g., de-energize all CRDMs by opening the RTBs or de-energizing the motor- generator sets). Additionally, the unit must be brought to MODE 4 within 12 hours. This takes the unit out of the applicable MODES.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| INSERT 8-1 If one require of pressurizer heaters is inoperable, restoration is required within 72 hour . The Completion Time is reasonable considering the anticipation that a demand caused by loss of offsite power would be unlikely in this period. Pressure control may be maintained during this time using normal station powered heaters.
| |
| INSERT 8-27 ..
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES ACTIONS G[QI.1 and G[QI.2 (continued)
| |
| If one lor twol required group~ of pressurizer heaters is larel inoperable and cannot be restored in the allowed Completion Time of Required Action B.1, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires that during steady state operation, pressurizer level is maintained below the nominal upper limit to provide a minimum space for a steam bubble. The Surveillance is performed by observing the indicated level. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.4.9.2 The SR is satisfied when the power supplies are demonstrated to be capable of producing the minimum power and the associated pressurizer heaters are verified to be at their design rating. This may be done by testing the power supply output and by performing an electrical check on heater element continuity and resistance. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.4.9.3 This SR demonstrates that the heaters can be manually transferred from the normal to the emergency power supply and energized. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 15.
| |
| : 2. NUREG-0737, November 1980.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer Safety Valves B3.4.10 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and portions of MODE 4 above the LTOP arming temperature, OPERABILITY of three valves is required because the combined capacity is required to keep reactor coolant pressure below*11 0% of its design value during certain accidents.
| |
| MODE 3 and portions of MODE 4 are conservatively included, although the listed accidents may not require the safety valves for protection.
| |
| The LCO is not applicable in MODE 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is s LTOP arming temperature specified in the PTLR, or in MODE 5 because LTOP is provided. Overpressure protection is not required in MODE 6 with reactor vessel head closure bolts fully de-tensioned.
| |
| The Note allows entry into MODES 3 and 4 with the lift settings outside the LCO limits. This permits testing and examination of the safety valves at high pressure and temperature near their normal operating range, but only after the valves have had a preliminary cold setting.
| |
| The cold setting gives assurance that the valves are OPERABLE near their design condition. Only one valve at a time will be removed from service for testing. The 54 hour exception is based on 18 hour outage time for each of the three valves. The 18 hour period is derived from operating experience that hot testing can be performed in this time frame.
| |
| INSERT B-1 ACTIONS A.1 With one pressurizer sa ty valve inoperable, restoration must take place within 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS Overpressure Protection System. An inoperable safety valve coincident with an RCS overpressure event could challenge the integrity of the pressure boundary.
| |
| B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action of A.1 cannot be met.within the required Completion Time or if two or more pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 with any RCS cold leg temperatures s LTOP arming temperature specified in the PTLR within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. With any RCS cold leg temperature at or (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the problem condition. Normally, the PORVs should be available for automatic mitigation of overpressure events and should be returned to OPERABLE and automatic actuation status prior to entering startup (MODE 2).
| |
| Quick access to the PORV for pressure control can be made when power remains on the closed block valve. The Completion Time of 1 hour is based on plant operating experience that has shown that minor problems can be corrected or closure accomplished in this time period.
| |
| B.1 B.21 and B.3 I
| |
| If one PORV is inoperable and not capable of automatic pressure relief or not capable of being manually cycled, it must be either restored or isolated by closing the associated block valve and removing the power to the associated block valve. The Completion Time of 1 hour for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is reasonable, based on challenges to the PORVs during this time period, and provides the operator adequate INSERT B-2 time to correct the situation.
| |
| If the inoperable PORV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, it m t be isolated within the specified time lof 1 houij. Because at least one s I PORV remains OPERABLE, an additional 72 hours is provided estore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status if it is Class I. If the lve is the non-Class I PORV, there is no required Completion Time. If the Class I PORV cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply as required by Condition D.
| |
| C.1 C.21 and C.3 I
| |
| If one PORV block valve is inoperable, then it is necessary to either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status within the Completion Time of 1 hour or place tne associated PORV in manual control. The
| |
| *PORV control switch has three positions; open, close, and auto.
| |
| Placing the PORV in manual control, if required in ACTION C, is accomplished by positioning the switch out of the auto control mode.
| |
| The prime importance for the capability to close the block valve is to isolate a stuck open PORV. Therefore, if the block valve cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour, the Required Action is to place the associated PORV in manual control.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS C.1. C.2. and C.3 (continued)
| |
| (continued)
| |
| This action is taken to avoid the potential for a stuck open PORV if the INSERT B-2 valve were to open under automatic control at a time that the block e is inoperable. The Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable, based o small potential for challenges to the system during this time period, an 'des the operator time to correct the situation. If the inoperable block valve
| |
| * sociated with a Class 1 PORV, the operator is permitted a Completion
| |
| * of 72 hours to restore the inoperable block valve to OPERABLE statu . The time allowed to restore the Class I PORV block valve is based upon the Completion Time for restoring an inoperable Class I PORV in Condition B, since the PORVs are not capable of mitigating a SGTR or spurious operation of the safety injection system at power event when inoperable. If the block valve is restored within the Completion Time of 72 hours, the PORV will be transferred to the automatic mode of operation. If the block valve cannot be restored within this additional time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply as required by Condition D.
| |
| If the inoperable block valve is associated with the non-Class I PORV, the block valve may be closed and the power removed. The 72 hour Completion Time for closing the block valve is the same applied in Required Action C.2. This recognizes that some restoration work may be required since the block valve is inoperable.
| |
| Restoration of the non-class I PORV block valve to OPERABLE status is not required because the non-Class I PORV is not required is not required to be available, although having the valve closed impairs the load rejection design capability. Therefore, once the block valve has been closed per Required Action C.3, Completion Time requirements of Condition D do not apply.
| |
| If the block valve can not be placed in the closed position, per Required Action C.3, Condition D applies and the unit must be taken to MODE 4 until the block valve is restored or closed.
| |
| The Required Actions are modified by a Note stating that the Required Actions do not apply if the sole reason for the block valve being declared inoperable is as a result of power being removed to comply with other Required Actions. In this event, the Required Actions for inoperable PORV(s) (which require the block valve power to be removed once it is closed) are adequate to address the condition.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS D.1. D.2. and D.3 (continued)
| |
| If the Required Action of Condition A, B, or Cis not met, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4, INSERT B-1 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head closure bolts not fully do-te
| |
| * ed, maintaining Class I PORV OPERABILITY is required by LC03 ..
| |
| * inoperable for reasons other than excessive seat leakage, it is necess to either restore at least one valve, within the Completion Time of 1 ho , or isolate the flow path by closing and removing the power to the associated block valves. The Completion Time of 1 hour is reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provides the operator time to correct the situation. If one Class I PORV is restored and one Class I PORV remains inoperable, then the plant will be in Condition B with the time clock started at the original declaration of having two Class I PORVs inoperable. If no Class I PORVs are restored within the Completion Time, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 Vlithin 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full po'Ner conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| In MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head closure bolts not fully de tensioned, maintaining Class I PORV OPERABILITY is required by LCO 3.4.12.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS F.1. F.2. F.3. and F.4 (continued)
| |
| If more than one PORV block valve is inoperable, it is necessary to INSERT B-2 either restore the block valves within the Completion Time of 1 hour, or lace the associated PORVs in manual control and restore at least one blo alve within 2 hours and restore the remaining block valve within 72 hour . The PORV control switch has three positions; open, close and auto. Placing the PORV in manual control, if required in ACTION F, is accomplished by positioning the switch out of the auto control mode. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on the small potential for challenges to the system during this time and provide the operator time to correct the situation.
| |
| If the inoperable block valve is associated with the non-Class I PORV, the block valve may be closed and the power removed. The 72 hour
| |
| * Completion Time for closing the block valve is the same time used in Required Action F.3. This recognizes that some restoration work may be required since the block valve is inoperable. Restoration of the non-class I PORV block valve to OPERABLE status is not required because the non-Class I PORV is not required to be available, although having the valve closed impairs the load rejection design capability. Therefore, once the block valve has been closed per Required Action F.4, Completion Time requirements of Condition G do not apply.
| |
| If the block valve can not be placed in the closed position per Required Action F.4, Condition G applies until the block valve is restored or closed.
| |
| The required Actions are modified by a Note stating that the Required Actions do not apply if the sole reason for the block valve being declared inoperable is as a result of power being removed to comply with other Required Actions. In this event, the Required Actions for inoperable PORV(s) (which require the block valve power to be removed once it is closed) are adequate to address the condition.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES ACTIONS G.1. G.2 and G.3 (continued)
| |
| IE If the Required Actions of Condition orl F are not met, then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. In MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head closure bolts not fully de-tensioned, maintaining Class I PORV OPERABILITY is required by LCO 3.4.12.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.11.1 REQUIREMENTS Block valve cycling verifies that the valve(s) can be closed if needed.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The Note modifies this SR by stating that it is not required to be performed with the block valve closed in accordance with the Required Action of this LCO. Opening the block valve in this condition increases the risk of an unisolable leak from the RCS since the PORV is already inoperable.
| |
| SR 3.4.11.2 SR 3.4.11.2 requires a complete cycle of each PORV. Operating a PORV through one complete cycle ensures that the PORV can be manually actuated for mitigation of an SGTR. Operating experience has shown that these valves usually pass the surveillance when performed at the required lnservice Testing Program frequency. The frequency is acceptable form a reliability standpoint.
| |
| The Note modifies this SR to allow entry into an operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows the surveillance to be performed in MODE 3 or 4.
| |
| The Note that modified this SR to allow entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows the test to be performed in MODE 3 under operating temperature and pressure conditions, prior to entering MODE 1 or 2. In accordance with Reference 4, administrative controls require this test be performed in MODE 3 or 4 to adequately simulate operating temperature and pressure effects on PORV operation.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS pressure> 1000 psig, the accumulator OPERAS ILITY requirements are based on full power operation. Although cooling requirements decrease as power decreases, the accumulators are still required to provide core cooling as long as elevated RCS pressures and temperatures exist.
| |
| This LCO is only applicable at RCS pressures> 1000 psig. At pressures~ 1000 psig, the rate of RCS blowdown is such that the ECCS pumps can provide adequate injection to ensure that peak clad temperature remains below the 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) limit of 2200°F.
| |
| In MODE 3, with RCS pressure~ 1000 psig, and in MODES 4, 5, and 6, the accumulator motor operated isolation valves are normally closed to isolate the accumulators from the RCS. This allows RCS cooldown and depressurization without discharging the accumulators into the r--------,
| |
| RCS or requiring depressurization of the accumulators.
| |
| INSERT B-1 cumulator may be unisolated when accumulator pressure is less than aximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg emperature ed by the PIT limit curves provided in the PTLR. This ondition is in agree t with the TS 3.4.12 LCO requirement.
| |
| ACTIONS If t e boron concentration of one accumulate
| |
| * not within limits, it mu t be returned to within the limits within 72 hours. In this Condition, the bility to maintain subcriticality or minimum boron precipitation time may e reduced. The boron in the accumulators contributes to the assu ption that the combined ECCS water in the partially recovered core ring the early reflooding phase of a large break LOCA is suffici nt to keep that portion of the core subcritical. One accumulator below t e minimum boron concentration limit, however, will have no effect o available ECCS water and an insignificant effect on core subcritic lity during reflood. Boiling of ECCS water in the core during reflood c ncentrates boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core. In dition, current analyses demonstrate that the accumulators will discha ge following a large main steam line break. The impact of their disch rge is minor and not a design limiting event. Thus, 72 hours is llowed to return the boron concentration to within limits.
| |
| B.1 If one accum ator is inoperable for a reason other than boron concentration, he accumulator must be returned to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. In this Condition, the required contents of three accumulators cannot be assumed to reach the core during a LOCA.
| |
| Due to the severity of the consequences should a LOCA occur in these conditions, the 24 hour Completion Time to open the valve, remove (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) power to the valve, or restore the proper water volume or nitrogen cover pressure ensures that prompt action will be taken to return the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status. The Completion Time minimizes the potential for exposure of the plant to a LOCA under these conditions. The 24 hours allowed to restore an inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status is justified in WCAP-15049-A, Rev 1. (Ref. 7)
| |
| ,_IN_S_E_R_T_B_-_2_8_ __.~.1 and C.2 ID.1 and 0.21 If the accumulate~ cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and RCS pressure reduced to
| |
| ~ 1000 psig within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| 0.1 If more than one accumulator is inoperable, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analyses; therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Each accumulator motor operated isolation valve (8808A, B, C, and D) should be verified to be fully open. This verification ensures that the accumulators are available for injection and ensures timely discovery if a valve should be less than fully open. If an isolation valve is not fully open, the rate of injection to the RCS would be reduced. Although a motor operated valve position should not change with power removed, a closed valve could result in not meeting accident analyses assumptions. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 Borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure are verified for each accumulator. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ECCS- Operating B 3.5.2 BASES (continued)
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| ACTIONS A.1 INSERT 8-1 With one or more trains inoperable and at least 100% of the ECCS flow equiva e
| |
| * e OPERABLE ECCS train available (capable of injection into the RCS, if ac , *no erable components must be returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hou . The 72 hour Completion Time is based on an NRC reliability evaluation (Ref. 5) and is a reasonable time for repair of many ECCS components.
| |
| An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering design flow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable if they are not capable of performing their safety function or supporting systems are not available.
| |
| The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The intent of this Condition is to maintain a combination of equipment such that 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train remains available. (i.e. minimum of one OPERABLE CCP, Sl, and RHR pump and applicable flow paths capable of drawing from the RWST and injecting into the RCS cold legs). This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.
| |
| The intent of this Condition, to maintain a combination of equipment such that 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train remains available, applies to both the injection mode and the recirculation mode.
| |
| An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 5) has shown that the impact of having one full ECCS train inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for 72 hours.
| |
| Reference 6 describes situations in which one component, such as an RHR cross-tie valve can disable both ECCS trains. With one or more component(s) inoperable such that 100% of the flow equivalent to a (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) single OPERABLE ECCS train is not available, the facility is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 Bl
| |
| !condition must be immediately entered.
| |
| Opening the containment recirculation sump strainer system access ports, or lower plenum drain valve (SI-1-294 for Unit 1 or Sl-2-295 for Unit 2) without pipe cap or inlet strainer (STR-440) installed in MODES 1 through 3 is considered to be a condition which is outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO a.o.al Condition must beBl immediately entered.
| |
| A.2.1. A.2.2. and A.2.3 These Required Actions allo\f\1 restoring one inoperable EGGS train \!\lith no more than one inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status with a CT of 14 days if it is determined that only one subsystem in one EGGS train is inoperable and that the OPERABLE subsystem is not inoperable due to common cause failure .. The common cause failure investigation shall be associated with the subsystem failure that prompts the EGGS subsystem to be declared inoperable originally.
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| The common cause failure evaluation can be performed by analyses, inspection, and/or testing. The addition of these Required Actions into this TS *.vas per LA 202 for Unit 1 and LA 203 for Unit 2. The 14 day CT is intended to be used for unplanned corrective maintenance or inspections.
| |
| The justification to e*end the CT to 14 days i.s based on risk informed insight *.vhere the evaluation would meet the NRC risk informed criteria assuming only one subsystem in one EGGS train is inoperable and with the elimination of conditional failure probability of the redundant EGGS subsystem due to common cause failure. PRA analysis assumes no more than one subsystem in one EGGS train is inoperable. The PRJ\
| |
| risk insignificance thresholds are not met for the14 day Completion Time when a RHR subsystem component is found to be inoperable as a result of a higher conditional failure probability of the redundant component due to common cause failure. To comply 'iVith the assumption in the PRJ\ analysis that only one subsystem in one EGGS train is inoperable and to eliminate the common cause failure concerns, the 14 day Completion Time assumes that actions are to be taken within 72 hours to determine that there is only one subsystem in one EGGS train inoperable and there is no common cause failure in the same subsystem in the OPERABLE EGGS train.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1. A.2.2. and A.2.3 (eontinued)
| |
| The 72 hour Completion Time in Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are reasonable and is chosen so that the risk is no 'Norse than the risk associated with the 72 hour Completion Time for Required Action A.1.
| |
| The Completion Time is modified by a ~Jete stating that the Required Action A.1 Completion Time is to be used for planned maintenance or inspections. The Completion Times of Required Actions A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.2.3 are for unplanned corrective maintenance or inspections.
| |
| or the ECCS flow equivalent cannot be returned to 100% of the B.1 and 8.2 ECCS flow equivalent to a single INSERT B-29 lc.1 and C.21 OPERABLE ECCS train If the inoperable trains cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification of proper valve position ensures that the flow path from the ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained. Valve position is the concern and not indicated position in the control room. Misalignment of these valves could render both ECCS trains inoperable. Securing these valves in position by removal of power ensures that they cannot change position as a result of an active failure or be inadvertently misaligned. The surveillance can be satisfied using indicated position in the control room but may also be satisfied using local observation.
| |
| These valves are of the type, described in References 6 and 7, that can disable the function of both ECCS trains and invalidate the accident analyses. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. As noted in LCO Note 1, both Sl pump flow paths may each be isolated for two hours in MODE 3 by closure of one or more of these valves to perform pressure isolation valve testing.
| |
| In addition to the valves listed in SR 3.5.2.1, there are other ECCS related valves that must be appropriately positioned. Improper valve position can affect the ECCS performance required to meet the analysis assumptions. These valves are identified in plant documents and are listed in the following table.
| |
| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RWST B 3.5.4 BASES APPLICABLE Temperature SAFETY Minimum RWST water temperature is not a factor in SGTR. The heat ANALYSES capacity of RWST water injected into the RCS is small relative to the (continued)
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| RCS inventory and heat sources.
| |
| LCO The RWST ensures that an adequate supply of borated water is available to cool and depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), to cool and cover the core in the event of a LOCA, to maintain the reactor subcritical following a DBA, and to ensure adequate level in the containment recirculation sump to support ECCS pump operation in the recirculation mode.
| |
| To be considered OPERABLE, the RWST must meet the water volume, boron concentration, and temperature limits established in the SRs.
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, RWST OPERABILITY requirements are dictated by ECCS and CS System OPERABILITY requirements. Since both the ECCS and the CS System must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the RWST must also be OPERABLE to support their operation. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level."
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 With RWST boron concentration or borated water temperature* not within limits, they must be returned to within limits within 8 hours.
| |
| Under these conditions neither the ECCS nor the CS System can perform its design function. Therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE condition. The 8 hour limit to restore the RWST temperature or boron concentration to within limits was .
| |
| developed considering the time required to change either the boron concentration or temperature and the fact that the contents of the tank are still available for injection.
| |
| DCPP does not have an upper limit for RWST borated water temperature. An upper limit would typically be about 100°F. The coastal weather at the DCPP site is moderated by the Pacific Ocean and historically does not exceed 100°F. A requirement for a high temperature limit would therefore not be of value.
| |
| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| RWST B 3.5.4 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
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| * The requirement for RWST temperature is to be greater than or equal to the minimum required temperature. The expression "within the required limits", applied to RWST temperature is satisfied when the temperature is greater than or equal to the minimum.
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| B.1 INSERT 8-1 With the RWST inoperable for reasons other than Condition A
| |
| ., water volume), it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 ho .
| |
| In this Condition, neither the ECCS nor the CS System can perform its design function. Therefore, prompt action must be taken to restore the tank to OPERABLE status or to place the plant in a MODE in which the RWST is not required. The short time limit of 1 hour to restore the RWST to OPERABLE status is based on this condition simultaneously affecting redundant trains and that borated water volume can be restored more rapidly than boron concentration or temperature.
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| C.1 and C.2 If the RWST cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The RWST borated water temperature should be verified to be above the minimum assumed in the accident analyses. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| The SR is modified by a Note that eliminates the requirement to perform this Surveillance when ambient air temperature is above the minimum temperature for the RWST. With ambient air temperature above the minimum temperature, the RWST temperature should not exceed the limit.
| |
| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Air Locks B 3.6.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 B.21 and B.3 (continued)
| |
| I Required Action B.3 is modified by a Note that applies to air lock doors located in high radiation areas and allows these doors to be verified locked closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of the door, once it has been verified to be in the proper position, is small.
| |
| C.1 C.21 and C.3 I
| |
| With one or more air locks inoperable for reasons other than those described in Condition A orB, Required Action C:1 requires action to be initiated immediately to evaluate previous combined leakage rates using current air lock test results. An evaluation is acceptable, since it is overly conservative to immediately declare the containment inoperable if both doors in an air lock have failed a seal test or if the overall air lock leakage is not within limits. In many instances (e.g.,
| |
| only one seal per door has failed), containment remains OPERABLE, yet only 1 hour (per LCO 3.6.1) would be provided to restore the air lock door to OPERABLE status prior to requiring a plant shutdown. In addition, even with both doors failing the seal test, the overall containment leakage rate can still be within limits.
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| INSERT B-1 Required Action C.2 requires that one door in the affected containment
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| * lock must be verified to be closed within the 1 hour Completion Time.
| |
| * specified time period is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1, w
| |
| * equires that containment be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour.
| |
| Additionally, the affected air locks st be restored to OPERABLE status within the 24 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is considered reasonable for restoring an inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status, assuming that at least one door is maintained closed 'in each affected air lock.
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| D.1 and D.2 If the inoperable containment air lock cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCQ does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated auto atic isolation valve, a closed manual valve (this includes power oper ed valves with power removed), a blind flange, and a check valve ith flow through the valve secured. For a penetration flow path isol din accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to i olate the penetration should be the closest available one to conta* ment.
| |
| Required Action A.1 must be completed within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| For affected penetration flow paths that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour Completion Time and that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow paths must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification through a system walkdown, which may include the use of local or remote indicators, that those isolation devices outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct osition. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days ollowin isolation for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
| |
| Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system, Condition C provides the appropriate actions.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)
| |
| Required Action A.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. ...--IN_S_E_R_T_B_-_1____,
| |
| B.1 With two containment isolation valves in one or more pe tration flow paths requiring isolation following a DBA inoperable, affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve (this includes power operated valves with power removed), and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action B.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action A.2, which remains in effect. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that penetrations requiring isolation following an accident are isolated.
| |
| The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the fact that the valves are operated under administrative control and the probability of their misalignment is low.
| |
| Condition 8 is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. Condition A of this LCO addresses the condition of one containment isolation valve inoperable in this type of penetration flow path.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
| |
| With one or more penetration flow paths requiring isolation following a DBA with one containment isolation valve inoperable, the inoperable valve flow path must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adverse!....--'--------,
| |
| affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a close manual valve (this includes power operated valves with po removed), and a blind flange. A check valve may not b sed to isolate the affected penetration flow path. Required Actio .1 must be completed within the 72 hour Completion Time he specified time period is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of maintaining containment integrity during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 (See FSAR Table 6.2-39, GDC-57 valves). In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This periodfc verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that containment penetrations requiring isolation followin an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days ollowin isolation for verifying that each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
| |
| Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 3. This Note is necessary since this Condition is written to specifically address those penetration flow paths in a closed system.
| |
| Required Action C.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1. D.2. and D.3 (continued)
| |
| In the event one or more Containment Purge supply and exhaust, or Containment PressureNacuum Relief isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths are not within leakage limits, leakage must be reduced to within limits, or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. For this Action, the leakage limit is as specified under the Leakage Rate Testing Program and exceeding this limit would require evaluation per Note 4 under LCO 3.6.3. The method of isolation must be by the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve (this includes power operated valves with power removed), or blind flange. A Containment Purge supply and exhaust, or Containment PressureNacuum Relief isolation valve with resilient seals utilized to satisfy Required Action D.1 must have been demonstrated to meet the leakage requirements of SR 3.6.3.7. The specified Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one valve remains closed so that a ross breach of containment does not exist.
| |
| INSERT B-2 In accordance with Required Action D.2, this penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. The periodic verification is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, which may include the use of local or remote indicators, that those isolation devices outside containment capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as "prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other administrative controls that will ensure that isolation device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
| |
| For the Containment Purge supply and exhaust, or Containment PressureNacuum Relief isolation valve with resilient seal that is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, SR 3.6.3.7 must be performed at least once every 92 days Wollowing isolation!. This assures that degradation of the resilient seal is detected and confirms that the leakage rate of the containment purge valve does not increase beyond the limits during the time the penetration is isolated. The normal Frequency for SR 3.6.3.7, is 24 months per the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Since more reliance is placed on a single valve while in this (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) condition, it is prudent to perform the SR more often. Therefore, a Frequency of once per 92 days Wallowing isolation! was chosen and has been shown to be acceptable based on operating experience.
| |
| Required Action D.2 is modified by two Notes. Note 1 applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Note 2 applies to isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position and allows these devices to be verifi.ed closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since the function of locking, sealing, or securing components is to ensure that these devices are not inadvertently repositioned. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.
| |
| E.1 and E.2 If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.
| |
| To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Not Used SR 3.6.3.2 This SR ensures that the 48 inch Containment Purge supply and exhaust and the 12 inch Containment PressureNacuum Relief valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge or pressure relief valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is not required to be met when the Containment Purge supply and exhaust or Containment Pressure Relief valves are open for the reasons stated. The valves may be opened for pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be open.
| |
| The Containment Purge supply and exhaust or Containment PressureNacuum Relief valves are capable of closing in the (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 With one containment spray train inoperable, "the inoperable containment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hour . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray and cooli trains are adequate to perform the iodine removal and co inment cooling functions. The 72 hour Completion Time takes i o account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by the Containment Spray System, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
| |
| INSERT B-1 The Completion Time is modified by a Note stating that for planned maintenanee or inspeetions, the Completion time is 72 hours. The Completion Times of Required 1\etion 1\.2 are for unplanned eorreetive maintenanee or inspeetions.
| |
| A.2 VVith one eontainment spray train inoperable, the inoperable eontainment spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days. This Required Aetion applies to unplanned eorreetive maintenanee or inspeetions. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray and eooling trains are adequate to perform the iodine removal and eontainment eooling funetions. The 14 day Completion Time is based on PRJ\ analysis and has taken into aeeount the redundant heat removal eapability afforded by the Containment Spray System, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA oeeurring during this period.
| |
| These Required Aetion and Completion Time were added to the TS by LA 202 for Unit 1 and LA 203 for Unit 2. The 14 day Completion Time is intended to be used for unplanned eorreetive maintenanee or inspeetions.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)
| |
| With~ CFCU system inoperable such that a minimum of two CFCUs remain operable, restore the required CFCUs ~ystem ~o OPERABLE status within 7 d The components in this degraded condition are capab roviding at least 100% of the heat removal needs. T ay Completion Time was developed taking into account eaundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the INSERT B-1 Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling~ System he low probability of DBA occurring during this period.
| |
| D.1 and D.2 With one train of containme ray inoperable and the CFCUs
| |
| ~stem inoperable such that a *
| |
| * um of two CFCUs remain OPERABLE, restore one required train ontainment spray or CFCU system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The components remaining in OPERABLE status in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing at least 100%
| |
| of the heat removal needs after an accident. The 72 hour Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling~ System, the iodine removal function of the Containment Spray System, and the low probability of DBA
| |
| ~ <2ccurring during this period .
| |
| .1 and E(J.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C~
| |
| Gf D IQ!]I of this LCO are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| ~
| |
| 'A'ith PNO containment spray trains or one containment spray train inoperable and two CFCU systems inoperable such that one or less CFCUs remain OPERABLE or one or less CFCUs are OPERABLE, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES APPLICABLE c. A break downstream of the MSIVs will be isolated by the closure of SAFETY the MSIVs.
| |
| ANALYSES
| |
| : d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the MSIVs (continued) isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generators to minimize radiological releases.
| |
| : e. The MSIVs are also utilized during other events such as a feedwater line break. This event is less limiting so far as MSIV OPERABILITY is concerned.
| |
| The MSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
| |
| LCO This LCO requires that four MSIVs in the steam lines be OPERABLE.
| |
| The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal.
| |
| This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) limits or the NRC staff approved licensing basis.
| |
| APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 except when closed and de-activated (vented or prevented from opening), when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safety function.
| |
| In MODE 4, the steam generator energy is low, thus OPERABILITY in MODE 4 is not required.
| |
| In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy INSERT B-1 because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, SIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy system pipe breaks in these MODES.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 With one MSIV inoperable 1 ODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hour . Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVs.
| |
| The 8 hour Completion Time is greater than that normally allowed for containment isolation valves because the MSIVs are valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. These valves differ from other containment isolation valves in that the closed system provides an additional means for containment isolation.
| |
| INSERT B-31 (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES ACTIONS ~
| |
| (continued) re uired Com letion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours and Condition GjQ] would be entered.
| |
| The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| Glij.1 and Glij.2 Condition GjQ] is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.
| |
| Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed. When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. MSIV closure is indicated by the control room valve indicating lights or monitor light box lights.
| |
| The 8 hour Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition A.
| |
| For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position.
| |
| 9§.1 and 9§.2 If the MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that MSIV closure time is::=:;; 5.0 seconds. The remote manual hand switch may be used as the actuation signal for this SR.
| |
| The MSIV closure time is assumed in the accident and containment (continued)
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| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| ADVs B 3.7.4 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, all four ADVs are required to be OPERABLE. In MODE 4, only the ADVs associated with the steam generators being relied upon for heat removal, are required to be OPERABLE.
| |
| In MODE 5 or 6, an SGTR is not a credible event.
| |
| ACTIONS B.1 With two ADV lines inoperable, action must be taken o restore at least one ADV line to OPERABLE status IWithin 72 hours!. This will result in at least three operable ADVs. Since the block valve can be closed to isolate an ADV, some repairs may be possible with the unit at power.
| |
| The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable to repair inoperable ADV lines, based on the availability of the Steam Dump System (40% steam dump valves to the condenser) and MSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurring during this period that would require the ADV lines.
| |
| C.1 With three or more ADV lines inoperable, action must be taken to restore at least two ADV lines to OPERABLE status. This will result in at least two operable ADVs. Since the block valve can be closed to isolate an ADV, some repairs may be possible with the unit at power.
| |
| The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable to repair inoperable ADV lines, based on the availability of the Steam Dump System (40o/o steam dump valves to the condenser) and MSSVs, and the low probability of an event occurrin durin this eriod that would require the ADV lines.
| |
| INSERT B-2 D.1 and D.2 If the ADV lines cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4, without reliance upon steam generator for heat removal, within 18 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES LCO each powered by a separated vital bus, be OPERABLE in two diverse (continued) paths, each supplying AFW to separate steam generators. The turbine driven AFW pump is required to be OPERABLE with redundant steam supplies from each of two main steam lines upstream of the MSIVs, and shall be capable of supplying AFW to any of the steam generators.
| |
| The piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls in the required flow paths also are required to be OPERABLE.
| |
| The LCO is modified by a Note indicating that one AFW train, which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4. This is because of the reduced heat removal requirements and short period of time in MODE 4 during which the AFW is required and the insufficient steam available in MODE 4 to power the turbine
| |
| * driven AFW pump.
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE in the event that it is called upon to function when the MFW is lost. In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace the steam generator secondary inventory, lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.
| |
| In MODE 4 the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generators.
| |
| In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators are not normally used for heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.
| |
| ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable AFW train. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or INSERT B-1 other specified condition in the Applicability with an AFW train erable and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MO r other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after p ormance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and co onents, should not be applied in this circumstance.
| |
| A.1 refuelin , action must be taken to restore the inoperabl e uipment to an OPERABLE status within 7 da s. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on the following reasons:
| |
| : a. The redundant OPERABLE steam supply to the turbine driven AFWpump; (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
| |
| : b. The availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps; and
| |
| : c. The low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump .
| |
| INSERT B-1 With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow pat inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition A, ction must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This Condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.
| |
| INSERT B-32 .. (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AFW System B 3.7.5 BASES ACTIONS Gl§.1 and Gl§.2 (continued)
| |
| When Required Action A.1Q-et: B.1, C.1, C.2 or 0.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, or if two l\F'N trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 18 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| In MODE 4 with two /\FVV trains inoperable, operation is allo'.ved to eontinue beeause only one motor driven pump /\FVV train is required in aeeordanee 'Nith the Note that modifies the LCO. Although not required, the unit may eontinue to eool dovtn and initiate RHR.
| |
| ~
| |
| If all three AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with no safety related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for conducting a cooldown with non-safety related equipment. In such a condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be started immediately to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.
| |
| Required Action GIEI.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable because it could force the unit into a less safe condition.
| |
| In MODE 4, either the reactor coolant pumps or the RHR loops can be used to provide forced circulation. This is addressed in LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4." With one required AFW train inoperable, action must be taken to immediately restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time is consistent with LCO 3.4.6.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| CST B 3.7.6 BASES (continued)
| |
| LCO The CST volume required is for a usable volume of;:::: 200,000 gallons (51% indicated level without instrument uncertainty) for Unit 1 and
| |
| ;:::: 166,000 gallons (43% indicated level without instrument uncertainty) for Unit 2. The volume for Unit 1 is based on holding the unit in MODE 3 for 1 hour, followed by a natural circulation cooldown to RHR entry conditions at 25°F/hour. The volume for Unit 2 is based on holding the unit in MODE 3 for 2 hours, followed by a natural circulation cooldown to RHR entry conditions at 50°F/hour. These bases are established in Reference 4 and exceed the volume required by the accident analyses.
| |
| The OPERABILITY of the CST for each unit is determined by maintaining the tank volume (equivalent indicated level) at or above the minimum required volume.
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in MODE 4, when steam generator is being relied upon for heat removal, the CST is required to be OPERABLE.
| |
| In MODE 5 or 6, the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CST is not OPERABLE, the OPERABILITY of the backup supply INSERT 8-2 should be verified by administrative means within 4 hours and once every 12 hours thereafter. OPERABILITY of the backup feedwater supply must include verification that that the flow paths from the backup ater supply to the AFW pumps are OPERABLE, and that the backup su ly has the required volume of water available. The CST must be resto d to OPERABLE status within 7 days, because the backup supply ay be performing this function in addition to its normal functions. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify the OPERABILITY of the backup water supply. Additionally, verifying the backup water supply every 12 hours is adequate to ensure the backup water supply continues to be available. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE backup water supply being available, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period requiring the CST. The seismically-qualified fire water storage tank and alternate non-seismically qualified water sources are examples of back-up water supplies available to supply water to supplement the CST volume.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| CCW System B 3.7.7 BASES LCO A vital CCW loop is considered OPERABLE when:
| |
| (continued)
| |
| : a. Two CCW pumps, one CCW heat exchanger, one vital CCW header and the surge tank are OPERABLE; and
| |
| : b. The associated piping, valves, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.
| |
| The isolation of CCW from other components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CCW System, except for isolation of CCW to the CFCUs. Isolation of CCW to the CFCUs could potentially affect the flow balance and requires evaluation to ensure continued operability.
| |
| Split loop alignment of the CCW system during normal operation requires Condition A to be entered because the CCW system cannot tolerate a single failure in this configuration.
| |
| APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CCW System is a normally operating system, which must be prepared to perform its principal safety related function of removal of accident generated containment heat via the CFCUs and removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System.
| |
| In MODE 5 or 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the CCW System are determined by the systems it supports.
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE ,
| |
| be entered if an inoperable vital CCW loop results in an inoperabl RHR loop. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the oper actions are taken for these components.
| |
| If one vital CCW loop is inoperable, action must be tak vital CCW loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE vital CCW loop is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the overall heat transfer capability of ultimate heat sink system, operator action, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
| |
| Split loop alignment of the CCW system during normal operation requires Condition A to be entered because the CCW system cannot tolerate a single failure in this configuration.
| |
| INSERT 8-33 *
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| CCW System B 3.7.7 BASES ACTIONS .g§.1 and .g§.2 (continued)
| |
| If the vital CCW loops cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the CCW flow to individual components may render those components inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CCW System.
| |
| A possible exception to this note, is isolation of CCW to the CFCUs.
| |
| Isolation of CCW to the CFCUs could potentially affect the flow balance and requires evaluation to ensure continued operability.
| |
| Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the CCW flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for CCW operation. The CCW flow path consists of the direct flow path servicing the safety related equipment (e.g., ECCS pump coolers, CFCUs, RHR heat exchanger) and portions of any branch line flow path off the direct flow path that a valve misposition could result in degradation of the system safety function.
| |
| This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also does not apply to valves which are closed and secured by a cap or blind flange (e.g., manual test, vent, and drain valves), to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned (e.g., check valves), or to valves in instrument or sample lines. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| SR 3.7.7.2 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CCW valves on an actual or simulated Phase A or Phase B containment isolation actuation signal. The CCW System is a normally operating system that cannot be fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation.
| |
| This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2 .
| |
| | |
| ASW B 3.7.8 BASES (continued)
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 If one ASW train is inoperable, actio must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE ASW train is adequate to perform the heat removal function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single ,
| |
| failure in the OPERABLE ASW train could result in loss of ASW system function. The Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," should be entered if an inoperable ASW train results in an inoperable decay heat removal train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components. The 72 hour Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE train, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.
| |
| INSERT B-34 +----**Bg.1 and gj£].2 If the ASW train~ cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Times, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and in MODE 5 within 36 hours.
| |
| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the ASW system flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for ASW system operation. The ASW system flow path consists of the direct flow path servicing the safety related equipment (e.g., CCW heat exchanger) and portions of any branch line flow path off the direct flow path that a valve misposition could result in degradation of the system safety function. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since they are verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed, or secured. This SR also does not apply to valves which are closed and secured by a cap or blind flange (e.g., manual test, vent, and drain valves), to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned (e.g., check valves), or to valves in instrument or sample lines. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.
| |
| The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating .
| |
| B 3.8.1 BASES (continued)
| |
| APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:
| |
| : a. Acceptable fuel design, limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
| |
| : b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
| |
| The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources- Shutdown."
| |
| ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable DG.
| |
| There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DG and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.
| |
| A.1 To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met.
| |
| However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.
| |
| A.2 According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation m Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. ith one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS B.3.1 and B.3.2 (continued)
| |
| Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DGs, SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DGs, the other DGs would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E of LCO 3.8.1 would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists, and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DGs, performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those DGs. If a DG has already started and loaded on a bus, it is not necessary to shutdown the DG and perform SR 3.8.1.2. The DG is verified OPERABLE since it is performing its intended function.
| |
| In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the plant corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition B.
| |
| According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DGs are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.
| |
| B.4 Operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 14 days. This Completion Time was revised from 72 hours to 7 days by License Amendment (LA) 44 for Unit 1 and LA 43 for Unit 2 and from 7 days to 14 days by LA 166 for Unit 1 and LA 167 for Unit 2.
| |
| In accordance with Reference 17, the 14-day Completion Time is intended to be used for planned maintenance or inspections at a frequency of no more than once per DG per operating cycle for each DG. For all other DG maintenance or inspections, the Completion....---------.
| |
| Time is expected to remain at 7 days. This is consistent with the Completion Times assumed in References 17 and 18.
| |
| In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1 E Distribution System. The 14 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
| |
| According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation rna conti ue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours. his le el of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does ot have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the ffects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to at tal loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.
| |
| Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, t is level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or ore DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the se erity of this level of degradation:
| |
| : a. The configuration of the Class 1E AC electrical powers stem that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus r switching failure; and
| |
| : b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable ffsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.
| |
| With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient nsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown ondition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous lo s of offsite AC sources, a DBA, and a worst case single failure w re postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysi . Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to eft ct restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with t e importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system ca able of meeting its design criteria.
| |
| According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sou es, two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 4 hours. If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestrict d operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 4 hours, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A D.1 and D.2 According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation m y continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 12 hours.
| |
| In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in the offsite electrical power system and may be lost in the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
| |
| Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
| |
| E.1 With two or more DGs inoperable, the remaining onsite AC sources are inadequate. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system may be the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.
| |
| According to Reference 6, with two or more DGS inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours.
| |
| INSERT 8-2 E.1 Condition F corresponds to a level of degradation in which one train of the DFO transfer system is inoperable. The onsite AC electrical power systems are redundant and available to support ESF loads. However, one subsystem required for the on site AC electrical system operability has lost its redundancy (DFO supply to the DGs).
| |
| The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, nd the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
| |
| G.1 With both trains of DFO inoperable, the onsite AC sources are inadequate (loss of DFO supply to all DGs). With an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source for AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS G.1 (continued) be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid INSERT 8-2
| |
| * * *
| |
| * mediate controlled shutdown and to
| |
| ~nimize the risk associated with this leve o e INSERT B-35
| |
| .._____ _ _ ____. HQ].1 and HQ].2 If the inoperable AC electric power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| +:4 Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in whish all redundancy in the /\C electrical po'Ner supplies has been lost. /\t this severely degraded level, further loss of the remaining offsite circuit will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.
| |
| J.:4 Condition J corresponds to a level of degradation in whish all redundancy in the /\C electrical pov1er supplies has been lost. /\t this severely degraded level, further loss of a remaining DG v1ill cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all REQUIREMENTS important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8).
| |
| Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions).
| |
| The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGS are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 Rev. 3 (Ref. 15) for the types of surveillance tests and surveillance frequencies, Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10), as addressed in the FSAR.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES (continued)
| |
| LCO The DC electrical power subsystems, each subsystem consisting of one battery, battery charger for each battery and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. Loss of any one DC electrical power subsystem does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).
| |
| An OPERABLE DC electrical power subsystem requires the battery and its normal or backup charger to be operating and connected to the associated DC bus.
| |
| APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:
| |
| : a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
| |
| : b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
| |
| The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources- Shutdown."
| |
| ACTIONS A.1. A.2. and A.3 Condition A represents one DC electrical power subsystem with one dedicated battery charger inoperable (e.g., the voltage limit of SR 3.8.4.1 is not maintained). The ACTION~ provide a tiered response INSERT B-1 that focuses on returning the battery to the fully charged state and oring a fully qualified charger to OPERABLE status in a reasonable time p * . Required Action A.1 requires that the terminal voltage be restored to gr r than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hour . This time provides for returning the dedicated charger to OPERABLE status or providing an alternate means of restoring the associated battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage. Restoring the battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage provides good assurance that, within 12 hours, the battery will be restored to its fully charged condition (Required Action A.2) from any discharge that might have occurred due to the charger inoperability.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS A discharged battery having terminal voltage of at least the minimum (continued) established float voltage indicates that the battery is on the exponential charging current portion (the second part) of its recharge cycle. The time to return a battery to its fully charged state under this condition is simply a function of the amount of the previous discharge and the recharge characteristic of the battery. Thus there is good assurance of fully recharging the battery within 12 hours, avoiding a premature shutdown with its own attendant risk.
| |
| If established battery terminal float voltage cannot be restored to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage within 2 hours, and the charger is not operating in the current-limiting mode, a faulty charger is indicated. A faulty charger that is incapable of maintaining established battery terminal float voltage does not provide assurance that it can revert to and operate properly in the current limit mode that is necessary during the recovery period following a battery discharge event that the DC system is designed for.
| |
| If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery is partially discharged and its capacity margins will be reduced. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within 12 hours (Required Action A.2).
| |
| Required Action A.2 requires that the battery float current be verified as less than or equal to 2 amps. This indicates that, if the battery had been discharged as the result of the inoperable battery charger, it has now been fully recharged. If at the expiration of the 12 hour period the INSERT B-2 attery float current is not less than or equal to 2 amps this indicates the ay be additional battery problems and the battery must be declared 1 rable in accordance with LCO 3.8.6 Required Action B.2.
| |
| Required Action A.3 limits the oration time for the inoperable dedicated battery charger to 14 day . This action is applicable if an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage has been used (e.g.,
| |
| backup charger or non-Class 1E battery charger). The 14 day completion time reflects a reasonable time to effect restoration of the dedicated battery charger to operable status.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating 8 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| Condition B represents one DC electrical power subsystem with one battery inoperable. With one battery inoperable, the DC bus is being supplied by the associated OPERABLE battery charger. Any event that results in a loss of the associated 480 VAC vital bus supporting the normal battery charger will also result in loss of or degraded DC to the associated DC electrical power subsystem. Recovery of the 480 VAC vital bus, especially if it is due to a loss of offsite power, will be hampered by the fact that many of the components necessary for the recovery (e.g., diesel generator control and field flash, AC load shed and diesel generator output circuit breakers, etc.) likely rely upon the battery. In addition, the energization transients of any DC loads that are beyond the capability of the battery charger and normally require the assistance of the battery will not be able to be brought online. The 2 hour limit allows sufficient time to effect restoration of an inoperable battery given that the majority of the conditions that lead to battery inoperability (e.g., loss of battery charger, battery cell voltage less than 2.07 V, etc.) are identified in Specifications 3.8.4, 3.8.5, and 3.8.6 together with additional specific completion times.
| |
| INSERT B-2 ~
| |
| B.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2. B.2.2 The completion time for restoring the inoperable battery to OPERABLE status can be extended to 4 hours, on a one time basis for Unit 1 Vital Battery 1 1 for Unit 1 cycle 14, if additional Required Actions are taken.
| |
| The 4 hour completion time is based upon Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRJ\) calculation of risk given one battery is inoperable.
| |
| This PRA assessment makes the assumptions that actions are taken to either determine that the OPER/\BLE batteries are not inoperable due to common cause failure or SR a.8.4.1 and SR a.8.6.1 are performed for the OPERABLE batteries. Taking steps to determine whether the battery condition is a result of a common cause failure will provide assurance that a similar failure 'Nill not occur to other OPERABLE batteries. Performing SR a.8.4 .1 and SR a.8.6.1 will serve the same purpose of ensuring the OPERABLE batteries remain in OPERABLE condition. The 2 hour completion times for Required Actions 8.2.1.1, and 8.2.1.2 are consistent with completion time to restore a battery to OPERABLE status in Required Action B.1. VVhen Required Actions B.2.1.1 or 8.2.1.2 are met, then the inoperable battery can be restored to OPERABLE status in 4 hours.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)
| |
| Condition C represents one Class 1 E DC electrical power subsystem and associated ESF equipment with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected subsystem. The 2 hour limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC distribution subsystem.
| |
| INSERT B-2 1-----+*
| |
| If one of the required DC electrical power subsystems is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A orB (e.g., inoperable battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of the minimum necessary DC electrical power subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| DC Sources - Operating B 3.8.4 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)
| |
| The design of the 125 VDC electrical power distribution system is such that a battery can have associated with it a dedicated full capacity charger powered from its associated 480 VAG vital bus or a backup full capacity charger powered from another 480 VAG vital bus. Use of the backup full capacity charger results in more than one full capacity charger receiving power simultaneously from a single 480 V vital bus and causes the requirements of independence and redundancy between subsystems to no longer be maintained. Thus, operation with two chargers powered by the same vital bus is limited to 14 days.
| |
| INSERT B-36 ..
| |
| ef].1 andef].2 If the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem~ cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 5 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.4.1 REQUIREMENTS The minimum established float voltage provided by the battery manufacturer is 2.17 Vpc or 130.2 Vat the battery terminals for a 60-cell battery. This voltage maintains the battery plates in a condition that supports maintaining the grid life (expected to be approximately 20 years). Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the battery chargers, which support the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state, while supplying the continuous steady state loads of the associated DC electrical power subsystem. On float charge, battery cells will receive adequate current to optimally charge the battery. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Inverters- Operating B 3.8.7 BASES LCO Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the (continued) redundancy incorporated into the design of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls is maintained. The four inverters ensure an uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the 120 VAC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized.
| |
| Operable inverters require the associated 120 VAC vital bus to be powered by the inverter with output voltage within tolerances, and power input to the inverter from a 125 VDC station battery. Alternatively, power supply may be from an internal AC source via rectifier as long as the station battery is available as the uninterruptible power supply.
| |
| APPLICABILITY The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that: ,
| |
| : a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
| |
| : b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
| |
| Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters- Shutdown."
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 With a required inverter inoperable, its associated 120 VAC vital bus becomes inoperable until it is re-energized from its Class 1E constant voltage source transformer.
| |
| For this reason a Note has* been included in Condition A requiring the INSERT B-2 entry into the Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9,
| |
| "
| |
| * ibution Systems- Operating." This ensures that the 120 VAC bus ized within 2 hours.
| |
| Required Act1 .1 allows 24 hours to fix the inoperable inverter and return it to service. The 24 hour limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the unit is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such a shutdown might entail. When the 120 VAC vital bus is powered from its constant voltage source, it is relying upon interruptible (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Inverters- Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)
| |
| AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The uninterruptible inverter source to the 120 VAC vital buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.
| |
| INSERT B-37 ..
| |
| s§.1 and s§.2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and 120 VAC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation of the RPS and ESFAS connected to the AC vital buses. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 7.
| |
| : 2. FSAR, Chapter 6.
| |
| : 3. FSAR, Chapter 15.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES LCO In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related Class 1 E (continued) AC, DC, and 120 VAC vital bus power distribution subsystems, if they exist, must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, that could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). If any tie breakers are closed, the affected redundant electrical power distribution subsystems are considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class 1E 4.16 kV buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit.
| |
| APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:
| |
| : a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
| |
| : b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
| |
| Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown."
| |
| ACTIONS A.1 With one lOr mor~ required Class 1E AC electrical power subsystem inoperable, the remaining portions of the AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is INSERT 8-1 ced, however, because a single failure in the remaining portions of the po *stribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions n *ng supported. Therefore, the required Class 1E AC buses, load centers, otor control centers must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours.
| |
| Condition A worst scenario is one AC electrical power distribution subsystem without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the 4160 V ESF bus and the associated DG inoperable). In this Condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operator's attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining AC electrical power (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) distribution subsystems by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected subsystem. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:
| |
| : a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit operator's attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected subsystem, to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit; and
| |
| : b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the other AC electrical power distribution subsystems with AC power.
| |
| B.1 With one lOr mor~ 120 VAC vital bus subsystem inoperable, the remaining OPERABLE 120 VAC vital buses are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Overall reliability is reduced, however, since an additional single failure could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC vital bus subsystem must be powered from an alternate source within 2 hours by powering the bus from the associated inverter via inverted DC, inverter using internal AC source, or Class 1E (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 INSERT 8..;2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) constant voltage transformer. The required AC vital bus subsystems must then be re-powered by restoring it~s associated inverter to OPERABLE status within 24 hours under LCO 3.8.7. ACTION A.1.
| |
| Condition B represents one lOr mor~ 120 VAC vital bu~ without power; potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all non interruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected 120 VAC vital bus subsystem.
| |
| This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate 120 VAC power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital120 VAC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:
| |
| : a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue;
| |
| : b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous Applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital 120 VAC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected subsystem; and
| |
| : c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.
| |
| The 2 hour Completion Time takes into account the importance to safety of restoring the 120 VAC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE 120 VAC vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON- UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1 With one lOr mor~ DC electrical power distribution subsystem~
| |
| inoperable, the remaining portions of the DC electrical power distribution subsystem are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining portion of the DC electrical power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.
| |
| INSERT B-2 Condition C represents one lOr morel DC electrical power distribution subsystem~ without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning for the affected bus. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems and restoring power to the affected subsystem.
| |
| This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without power.
| |
| Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours, is acceptable because of:
| |
| : a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue; (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)
| |
| : b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected subsystem; and
| |
| : c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.
| |
| The 2 hour Completion Time for DC buses is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1:93 (Ref. 3).
| |
| D.1 and D.2 If the inoperable distribution subsysteml{i}l cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued)
| |
| Condition E corresponds to two required Class 1EAC, DC, or 120 VAG vital buses with inoperable distribution subsystems that result in a loss of safety function, adequate core cooling, containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions for DBA mitigation would be compromised, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance Vt'ith LCO 3.0.3 is required.
| |
| SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.9.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the required Class 1E AC, DC, and 120 VAC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
| |
| Table B 3.8.9-1 The table on the next page defines the general features of the AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution System.
| |
| REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6.
| |
| : 2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
| |
| : 3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
| |
| DIABLO CANYON - UNITS 1 & 2
| |
| | |
| INSERT B-1 or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
| |
| INSERT B-2 Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
| |
| INSERT B-3 C.1 With two Reactor Manual Trip channels inoperab,le, the Required Action is to restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of inoperable channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
| |
| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second Manual Reactor Trip channel is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one Reactor Manual Trip channel is inoperable for any reason and the second Reactor Manual Trip channel is found to be inoperable, or if both Reactor Manual Trip channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
| |
| INSERT B-4 EJ.
| |
| With two or more Power Range Neutron Flux- High channels inoperable, the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of inoperable channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
| |
| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more Power Range Neutron Flux - High channels are intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one Power Range Neutron Flux- High channel is inoperable for any reason and additional Power Range Neutron Flux - High channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more Power Range Neutron Flux - High channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
| |
| | |
| INSERT B-5 With two or more channJels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of inoperable channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more channels are intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-6 N.1 and N.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D or M is not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, action must be initiated immediately to ensure that all rods are fully inserted, and the Rod Control System must be placed in a condition incapable of rod withdrawal (e.g., by de-energizing all CRDMs, by opening the RTBs, or by de energizing the motor generator (MG) sets) within 1 hour. A Completion Time of 1 hour provides sufficient time to accomplish the action in an orderly manner and is justified in Reference 7. With rods fully inserted and the Rod Control System incapable of rod withdrawal, these Functions are no longer required.
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| INSERT 8-7 With two or more channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of inoperable channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more channels are intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| R.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition P or Q is not met, 6 hours is allowed to reduce THERMAL POWER to below P-7.
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| INSERT B-8 T.1 With two RCP Breaker Position channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position channel is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position channel is inoperable for any reason and the second Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position channel is found to be inoperable; or if two Reactor Coolant Pump Breaker Position channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition S or T is not met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-8 setpoint within 4 hours. This places the unit in a MODE where the LCO is no longer applicable. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-8 setpoint because other RTS Functions provide core protection below the P-8 setpoint. The 4 hours to reduce THERMAL POWER to below the P-8 setpoint is justified in Reference 7.
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| INSERT B-9 W.1 With two or more Turbine Trip on Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure channels inoperable, the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more Turbine Trip on Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure channels are intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service.
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| The Required Action is only applicable if one Turbine Trip on Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure channel is inoperable for any reason and additional Turbine Trip on Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more Turbine Trip on Low Auto Stop Oil Pressure channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-10 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition V, W, or X is not met, THERMAL POWER must be reduced below the P-9 setpoint within 4 hours. This places the unit in a MODE where the LCO is no longer applicable. The 4 hours allowed for reducing power is justified in Reference 28.
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| INSERT B-11 With two trains inoperable the Required Action is to restore at least one train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable trains. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second train is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if a train is inoperable for any reason and the second train is found to be inoperable, or if two trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-12 CC.1 With two RTB trains inoperable the Required Action is to restore at least one train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable trains. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second RTB train is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if an RTB train is inoperable for any reason and the second RTB train is found to be inoperable, or if two RTB trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-13 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition EE is not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.
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| INSERT 8-14 With one trip mechanism inoperable for two or more RTBs, the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable trip mechanisms to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable RTBs to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the trip mechanisms. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when one trip mechanism for two or more RTBs is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if the trip mechanisms for two or more RTBs are inoperable for any reason and additional trip mechanisms for two or more RTBs are found to be inoperable, or if two or more trip mechanisms for two or more RTBs are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT 8-15 KK.1 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, E, F, G, H, Z, AA, 88, CC, DD, GG, HH, II, or JJ is not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours is a reasonable time, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. With the unit in MODE 3, ACTION D would apply to any inoperable RTB, RTB trip mechanism, or to any inoperable Manual Reactor Trip Function if the Rod Control System is capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods are not fully inserted.
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| INSERT B-16 With two channels or trains inoperable the Required Action is to restore at least one of the inoperable channels or trains to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable channels or trains. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable if the second channel or train is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel or train is inoperable for any reason and the second channel or train is found to be inoperable, or if two channels or trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-17 E.1 With two trains inoperable the Required Action is to restore at least one of the inoperable trains to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable trains. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable if the second train is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one train is inoperable for any reason and the second train is found to be inoperable, or if two trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-18 With two or more channels inoperable, or more than one channel inoperable in more than one loop, steam line, or steam generator, the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one per loop, steam line, or steam generator within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more required channels or one channel in more than one loop, steam line, or steam generator are intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-19 11 With two or more Containment Pressure channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable Containment Pressure channels to OPERABLE status to reduce the total inoperable Containment Pressure channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second Containment Pressure channel is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one Containment Pressure channel is inoperable for any reason and additional Containment Pressure channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more Containment Pressure channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-20 u
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| With two trains inoperable the Required Action is to restore at least one inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable trains. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second train is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one train is inoperable for any reason and the second trains is found to be inoperable, or if two trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-21 With two trains inoperable the Required Action is to restore at least one inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of the inoperable trains. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second train is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one train is inoperable for any reason and the second trains is found to be inoperable, or if two trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-22 With two or more channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more channels are intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and the additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-23 With two or more channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more channels are intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and the additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-24 L1 With two or more channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more channels are intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and the additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-25 With two or more channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more channels are intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and the additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-26 With two or more channels inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable channels to OPERABLE status to reduce total inoperable channels to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient channels. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more channels are intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one channel is inoperable for any reason and the additional channels are found to be inoperable, or if two or more channels are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| BB.1 and BB.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, D, E, S, T, X, Y, Z, or AA is not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours.
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| The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 5, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
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| CC.1 and CC.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F, G, H, I, J, K, L, U, or Vis not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours and MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
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| If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition M, N, Q, or R is not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 6 hours. The allowed Co.mpletion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 3, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
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| If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition 0 or P is not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 2, these Functions are no longer required OPERABLE.
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| INSERT B-27 C.1 With two required groups of pressurizer heaters inoperable, the Required Action is to restore at least one inoperable required group of pressurizer heaters to OPERABLE status within 1 hour prior to initiating actions to place the plant in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second required group of pressurizer heaters is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one required group of pressurizer heaters is inoperable for any reason and the second required group of pressurizer heaters is found to be inoperable, or if two required groups of pressurizer heaters are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-28 With two or more accumulators inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient inoperable accumulators to OPERABLE status to reduce the total inoperable accumulators to one within 1 hour. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient accumulators. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more accumulators are intentionally made inoperable. The Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one accumulator is inoperable for any reason and additional accumulators are found to be inoperable, or if two or more accumulators are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-29 Condition A is applicable with one or more trains inoperable. The allowed Completion Time is based on the assumption that at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is available. With less than 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the facility is in a condition outside of the accident analyses and flow must be restored to 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train within the 1 hour Completion Time, or a Completion Time determined under the Risk Informed Completion Time Program. The Completion Time is based on the need to restore the ECCS flow to within the safety analysis assumptions.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second ECCS train is intentionally made inoperable. The Required Actions are not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Actions are only applicable if one ECCS train is inoperable for any reason and the second ECCS train is found to be inoperable, or if two ECCS trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-30 With two containment spray trains inoperable, or one containment spray train inoperable and the CFCU System inoperable such that one or less CFCUs remain OPERABLE, er one or less CFCUs are OPERABLE, sufficient containment spray trains and/or CFCUs must be restored to OPERABLE status so that no more than one containment spray train is inoperable and two CFCUs are OPERABLE within one hour or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program. The allowed Completion Time provides a short time to restore the trains to OPERABLE, before proceeding with a plant shutdown required by Condition F.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two containment spray trains or four CFCUs are intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one containment spray train or a combination of one containment spray train and CFCUs are inoperable for any reason and a second containment spray train or additional CFCUs are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT 8-31 8.1 With two or more MSIVs inoperable the Required Action is to restore sufficient required inoperable MSIVs to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain a method of main steam line isolation. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient MSIVs. Alternately, a Completion time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more MSIVs are intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one MSIV is inoperable for any reason and additional MSIVs are found to be inoperable, or if two or more MSIVs are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-32 C.1 and C.2 With one motor driven AFW train inoperable coincident with one turbine driven AFW pump steam supply where the remaining OPERABLE motor driven AFW train provides feedwater to the steam generator with the inoperable steam supply, action must be taken to restore either the inoperable motor driven AFW train or the inoperable steam supply with 48 hours, or in accordance with the Risk Informed Completin Time Program. The 48 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System with on OPERABLE motor driven AFW train, and the turbine driven pump with one OPERABLE steam supply with the capability to provide feedwater to the steam generator with the OPERABLE steam supply by the turbine driven pump.
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| D.1 With two AFW trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition C, the Required Action is to restore the inoperable AFW trains to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain a method of decay heat removal. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of at least one train. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second AFW train is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one AFW train is inoperable for any reason and a second AFW train is found to be inoperable, or if two AFW trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| In MODE 4 with two AFW trains inoperable, operation is allowed to continue because only one motor driven pump AFW train is required in accordance with the Note that modifies the LCO.
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| Although not required, the unit may continue to cool down and initiate RHR.
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| INSERT B-33 B.1 With two vital CCW loops inoperable the Required Action is to restore the inoperable vital CCW loops to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain a heat sink for safety related components.
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| The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of at least one vital CCW loop. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second vital CCW loop is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one vital CCW loop is inoperable for any reason and a second vital CCW loop is found to be inoperable, or if two vital CCW loops are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-34 B.1 With two ASW trains inoperable, the Required Action is to restore the inoperable ASW trains to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain a heat sink for safety related components. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of at least one train. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second ASW train is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one ASW train is inoperable for any reason and a second ASW train is found to be inoperable, or if two ASW trains are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-35 H.1 With two or more DGs and one or more required offsite circuits inoperable, the Required Action is to restore enough of the required inoperable AC sources to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain some level of redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient AC electrical power supplies. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when an offsite circuit or second DG is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one required offsite circuit and DG are inoperable for any reason and additional DGs are found to be inoperable, or if two DGs are inoperable and one or more required offsite circuits are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| 1.. 1 With two or more required offsite circuits and one or more DGs inoperable, the Required Action is to restore enough of the required inoperable AC sources to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain some level of redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of sufficient AC electrical power supplies. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when a DG or second offsite circuit is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one required offsite circuit and DG are inoperable for any reason and additional offsite circuits are found to be inoperable, or if two required offsite circuits are inoperable and one or more DGs are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-36 E.1 With two DC electrical power subsystems inoperable, the Required Action is to restore at least one of the required inoperable DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain control power for the AC emergency power system. The 1 hour.Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of at least one DC electrical power subsystem. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when the second DC electrical power subsystem is intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one DC electrical power subsystem is inoperable for any reason and a second DC electrical power subsystem is found to be inoperable, or if two DC electrical power subsystem are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| INSERT B-37 B.1 With two or more required inverters inoperable the Required Action is to restore at least one of the required inverters to OPERABLE status within 1 hour to regain AC electrical power to the vital buses. The 1 hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of at least one [required] inverter. Alternately, a Completion Time can be determined in accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.
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| The Condition is modified by a Note stating it is not applicable when two or more required inverters are intentionally made inoperable. This Required Action is not intended for voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service. The Required Action is only applicable if one required inverter is inoperable for any reason and additional required inverters are found to be inoperable, or if two or more required inverters are found to be inoperable at the same time.
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| Enclosure Attachment 4 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 4 List of Regulatory Commitments 1
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| Enclosure Attachment 4 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 List of Regulatory Commitments
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| : 1. Plant procedures will be developed to incorporate the following with regards to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model update process:
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| * Plant changes affecting systems, structures, and components within the scope of the configuration risk management program (CRMP) will be reviewed prior to implementation to identify if an interim update of the CRMP model or other interim administrative control for the Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT)
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| Program is required; and,
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| * Discovered conditions affecting the CRMP model will be addressed in the corrective action program.
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| : 2. The CRMP model used for the RICT Program will include logic for the pressurizer heaters to require at least one group of functional heaters in order to credit secondary heat removal prior to any application of the RICT Program for a RICT for Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.9.
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| : 3. Shared systems and equipment between the two units will be identified in plant procedures used for establishing risk management actions when required by the RICT Program.
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| : 4. The error in the PRA model related to not modeling shorter containment sump recirculation time window for small loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) when the containment fan cooling system fails will be corrected in the CRMP model before the RICT Program is implemented.
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| : 5. The emergency core cooling system charging pump recovery factor will not be credited in the RICT Program whenever an emergency core cooling system charging pump is made unavailable.
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| : 6. The 24-hour mission time will be applied to the emergency diesel generators and fuel oil transfer pumps in the RICT program whenever the offsite power 230 kV system is made unavailable.
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| : 7. The Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program will assume inoperability of the auxiliary saltwater (ASW) train if one or more vacuum breakers are nonfunctional.
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| : 8. At any time when a RICT is in effect, a continuous fire watch will be established in the Cable Spreading and Solid State Protection System (SSPS) rooms until incipient detection and hot shutdown panel modifications are implemented.
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| 2
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| Enclosure Attachment 4 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106
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| : 9. At any time when a RICT is in effect, welding and cutting activities will be prohibited in the following fire areas until fire wrap and circuit rerouting modifications in these areas are implemented:
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| * Unit 1, Fire Area 3-88, Elevation 115
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| * Unit 2, Fire Area 5-8-4
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| : 10. The following peer review findings and observations, identified and discussed in Table A6-1, will be resolved prior to implementation of the RICT Program:
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| * AS-83-01
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| * SC-A5-01
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| * SC-A5-02
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| * SC-83-01
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| * SC-83-02
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| * SY-A16-01
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| * SY-810-01
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| * SY-815-01
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| * HR-A1-01
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| * HR-C3-01
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| * HR-03-01
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| * HR-G?-01
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| * DA-C1-01
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| * QU-C2-01 3
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 5 List of Revised Required Actions to Corresponding Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Functions 1
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 List of Revised Required Actions to Corresponding Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Functions Section 4.0, Item 2 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
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| (Reference 2) identifies the following license amendment request (LAR) content needed on applicable Technical Specifications (TS), comparison ofthe TS functions to the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) functions, and comparison of design basis assumptions to the scope of the PRA:
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| * The LAR will provide identification of the TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and action requirements to which the RMTS will apply.
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| * The LARwill provide a comparison of the TS functions to the PRA modeled functions of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) subject to those LCO actions.
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| * The comparison should justify that the scope of the PRA model, including applicable success criteria such as number of SSCs required, flowrate, etc., are consistent
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| [with] licensing basis assumptions (i.e., 50.46 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) flowrates) for each of the TS requirements, or an appropriate disposition or programmatic restriction will be provided.
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| This attachment provides confirmation that the Diablo Canyon PRA models include the necessary scope of SSCs and their functions to address each proposed application of the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program to the proposed scope TS LCO Conditions, and provides the information requested for Item 2 of the NRC safety evaluation. The scope of the comparison includes each of the TS LCO conditions and associated required actions within the scope of the RICT Program, as identified in Table 1 of the LAR.
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| Table A5-1 below lists each TS LCO Condition to which the RICT Program is proposed to be applied, and documents the following information regarding the TS with the associated safety analyses, the analogous PRA functions, and the results of the comparison:
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| * Column "TS LCO/Condition": Lists all of the LCOs and condition statements within the scope of the 48 implementation.
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| * Column "SSCs Covered by TS LCO/Condition": The SSCs addressed by each action requirement.
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| * Column "SSCs Modeled in PRA": Indicates whether the SSCs addressed by the TS LCO/Condition are included in the PRA.
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| 2
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
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| * Column "Function Covered by TS LCO/Condition": A summary of the required functions from the design basis analyses.
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| * Column "Design Success Criteria": A summary of the success criteria from the design basis analyses.
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| * Column "PRA Success Criteria": The function success criteria modeled in the PRA.
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| * Column "Disposition": Justification or resolution to address any inconsistencies between the TS and PRA functions, regarding the scope of SSCs and the success criteria. Where the PRA scope of SSCs is not consistent with the TS, additional information is provided to describe how the LCO condition can be evaluated using appropriate surrogate events. Differences in the success criteria forTS functions are addressed to demonstrate the PRA criteria provide a realistic estimate of the risk of the TS condition as required by NEI 06-09.
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| The corresponding SSCs for each TS LCO and the associated TS functions are identified and compared to the PRA. This description also includes the design success criteria and the applicable PRA success criteria. Any differences between the scope or success criteria are described in the table. Scope differences are justified by identifying appropriate surrogate events which permit a risk evaluation to be completed using the CRMP tool for the RICT program. Differences in success criteria typically arise due to the requirement in the PRA standard (for example, SC-81) to make PRAs realistic rather than bounding, whereas design basis criteria are necessarily conservative and bounding. The use of realistic success criteria is necessary to conform to Capability Category II of the PRA standard as required by NEI 06-09.
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| The calculated RICT is provided in Table A5-2 for each individual condition to which the RICT applies (assuming no other SSCs modeled in the PRA are unavailable). Unless stated otherwise, RICTs presented are based on a Unit 1 model calculation and should be considered applicable to Unit 2 for the purpose of providing an estimate due to the close similarity between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 models. (Actual RICT values will be calculated based on the actual plant configuration using a current revision of the PRA model which represents the as-built/as-operated condition of the plant, as required by NEI 06-09 and the NRC safety evaluation, and may differ from the RICTs presented.)
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| 3
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.1 Reactor Trip (1) Unit shutdown to Note 1 System (RTS) protect core fuel Instrumentation design limits and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary 3.3.1 Function 1 - 2 channels No The operator action for failure to Manual Reactor Trip actuate a manual reactor trip will be used as a surrogate to conservatively bound the risk increase associated with this function as permitted by NEI 06-09.
| |
| | |
| ====3.3.1 Functions====
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| 2, 3, Note 2 6, 7,8a,8b,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14a, 16a, 16b, and 17 (instrumentation inputs to automatic RTS function) 3.3.1 Function 19 - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of 2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for the RTBs are modeled Reactor Trip Breakers consistent with the TS scope and (RTB) so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 4
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in by TS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.1 Function 20 - 1 per RTB Yes (1) 1 of 2 mechanisms (1) SAME SSCs for the mechanisms are RTB Undervoltage per RTB modeled consistent with the TS and Shunt Trip scope and so can be directly Mechanisms evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.1 Function 21 - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of 2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for the automatic RTS logic Automatic Trip Logic are modeled consistent with the TS scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Engineered (1) Initiate safety
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| . Safety Features systems to protect Actuation System against violating (ESFAS) core design limits Instrumentation and RCS pressure boundary, and to mitigate accidents 3.3.2 Function 1a - 2 channels No The operator action for failure to safety injection (SI) - actuate a manual Sl will be used Manual Initiation as a surrogate to conservatively bound the risk increase associated with this function as permitted by NEI 06-09.
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| 5
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.2 Function 1b - Sl 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of 2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for automatic Sl actuation
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| - Automatic Actuation are modeled consistent with the Logic and Actuation TS scope and so can be directly Relays evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 1c- Sl 3 channels Yes (1) 2 of 3 channels (1) SAME SSCs for Sl actuation on
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| - Containment containment pressure - high are Pressure - High modeled consistent with the TS scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 1d- Sl 4 channels Yes (1) 2 of 4 channels (1) SAME SSCs for Sl actuation on
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| - Pressurizer pressurizer pressure - low are Pressure - Low modeled consistent with the TS scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 6
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.2 Function 1e- Sl 3 channels per Yes (1) 2 of 3 channels on 1 (1) SAME SSCs for Sl actuation on steam
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| -Steam Line steam line of 4 steam lines line pressure - low are modeled Pressure - Low consistent with the TS scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 2a- 2 channels No SSCs for manual CS actuation Containment Spray can be evaluated by a bounding (CS) - Manual assessment assuming Initiation unavailability of the CS system as permitted by NEI 06-09.
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| 3.3.2 Function 2b - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of 2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for automatic CS actuation CS -Automatic are modeled consistent with the Actuation Logic and TS scope and so can be directly Actuation Relays evaluated using the CRMP. (See Note 3 for impact on fire PRA.)
| |
| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 2c- 4 channels Yes (1) 2 of 4 channels (1) SAME SSCs for CS actuation on CS - Containment containment pressure - high-high Pressure - High-High are modeled consistent with the TS scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
| |
| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 7
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.2 Function 3a1 - 2 channels No The operator action for failure to Phase A Isolation - actuate a manual Phase A will be Manual Initiation used as a surrogate to conservatively bound the risk increase associated with this function as permitted by NEI 06-09.
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| 3.3.2 Function 3a2 - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for automatic containment Phase A Isolation - isolation Phase A actuation are Automatic Actuation modeled consistent with the TS Logic and Actuation scope and so can be directly Relays evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 3b1 - 2 channels No The operator action for failure to Phase B Isolation - actuate a manual Phase B will be Manual Initiation used as a surrogate to conservatively bound the risk increase associated with this function as permitted by NEI 06-09.
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| 3.3.2 Function 3b2 - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for automatic containment Phase B Isolation - isolation Phase B actuation are Automatic Actuation modeled consistent with the TS Logic and Actuation scope and so can be directly Relays evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 8
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5
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| :,~
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| PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.2 Function 3b3 - 4 channels Yes (1) 2 of 4 channels (1) SAME SSCs for containment isolation Phase B Isolation - Phase B on containment pressure Containment - high-high are modeled Pressure - High-High consistent with the TS scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4a- 2 channels No The operator action for failure to Steam Line Isolation actuate manual steam line
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| - Manual Initiation isolation will be used as a surrogate to conservatively bound the risk increase associated with this function as permitted by NEI 06-09.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4b - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for automatic steam line Steam Line Isolation isolation actuation are modeled
| |
| - Automatic Actuation consistent with the TS scope and Logic and Actuation so can be directly evaluated using Relays the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 9
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.2 Function 4c- 4 channels Yes (1) 2 of 4 channels (1) SAME SSCs for steam line isolation on Steam Line Isolation containment pressure - high are
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| - Containment modeled consistent with the TS Pressure - High-High scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 4d1 - 2 channels per Yes (1) 2 of 3 channels on 1 (1) SAME SSCs for steam line isolation on Steam Line Isolation steam line of 4 steam lines steam line pressure - low are
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| -Steam Line modeled consistent with the TS Pressure - Low scope and so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function Sa - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of 2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for automatic feedwater Feedwater Isolation - isolation actuation are modeled Automatic Actuation consistent with the TS scope and Logic and Actuation so can be directly evaluated using Relays the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 10
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.2 Function 5b - 3 channels per No SSCs for feedwater isolation Feedwater Isolation - SG actuation on SG water level -
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| Steam Generator high-high can be evaluated by a (SG) Water Level - bounding assessment assuming High-High (P-14) unavailability of the associated SG low level actuation of AFW (TS 3.3.2 Function 6d1) as permitted by NEI 06-09.
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| 3.3.2 Function 6b - 2 trains Yes (1) 1 of2 trains (1) SAME SSCs for automatic AFW Auxiliary Feedwater actuation are modeled consistent (AFW)- Automatic with the TS scope and so can be Actuation Logic and directly evaluated using the Actuation Relays CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 6d1 3 channels per Yes (1) 2 of 3 channels on 1 (1) SAME SSCs for AFW actuation on SG and 6d2 - AFW- SG SG of4 SGs water level - low-low are modeled Water Level - Low- consistent with the TS scope and Low so can be directly evaluated using the CRMP.
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| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.3.2 Function 6g - 2 channels per No SSCs for AFW actuation on RCP reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage can be evaluated by (RCP) undervoltage a bounding assessment assuming AFW start unavailability of the turbine-driven AFW pump as permitted by NEI 06-09.
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| 11
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.3.2 Function 7 - 3 channels No Note 4 refueling water storage tank (RWST) low level residual heat removal (RHR) pump trip 3.4.9 Pressurizer 2 groups of No (1) Maintain RCS Note 5 Heaters heaters subcooling margin 3.4.1 0 Pressurizer 3SRVs Yes (1) Prevent RCS (1) 3 of 3 SRVs (1) SAME for limiting SSCs are modeled consistent with safety relief valves pressure from anticipated transient the TS scope and so can be (SRVs) exceeding safety without trip (ATWT); 1 directly evaluated using the limit of 3 SRVs for non- CRMP.
| |
| ATWT scenarios.
| |
| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria for the limiting ATWT scenarios; other non-ATWT scenarios use realistic success criteria for RCS pressure control consistent with the PRA standards for Capability Category II..
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| 12
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.4.11 Pressurizer 3 PORVs (2 Yes (1) Depressurize (1) 1 of 2 Class I PORVs (1) SAME or more SSCs are modeled consistent with power operated relief Class I, 1 non- RCS open restrictive the TS scope and so can be valves (PORVs) Class I) directly evaluated using the 3 PORV block (2) Mitigate spurious (2) 1 of 2 Class I PORVs (2) SAME CRMP.
| |
| valves operation of safety open injection system at (3) SAME The success criteria in the PRA power (3) Associated block are consistent with the design valve manually closed basis criteria, and in some cases (3) No excessive are more restrictive when the seat leakage PORVs are used to mitigate some beyond design basis scenarios.
| |
| The PRA also credits the Non-Class I PORV if it is not failed; this is consistent with the TS bases which identifies that the Non-Class I PORV can be used if it is available.
| |
| 3.5.1 Accumulators 4 accumulators Yes (1) Emergency core (1) 3 of 4 accumulators (1) SAME for large SSCs are modeled consistent with cooling system LOCA scenarios the TS scope and so can be (ECCS) injection directly evaluated using the during loss-of- CRMP. The success criteria in coolant accident the PRA are consistent with the (LOCA) design basis criteria for large LOCA scenarios. For medium LOCA scenarios, the PRA success criteria do not require accumulator injection based on realistic analyses consistent with the PRA standards for Capability Category II.
| |
| 13
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.5.2 ECCS- 2 Centrifugal Yes (1) Injection from (1) (1) SSCs are modeled consistent with Operating charging (CH) RWST into cold legs (a) 1 of 2 CH pumps for (a) small LOCA: 1 of 4 the TS scope and so can be pumps (high small/medium LOCA until CH pumps or Sl pumps directly evaluated using the pressure) (2) Cold leg RCS depressurized to into 3 cold legs; medium CRMP.
| |
| recirculation from allow 1 of 2 Sl pumps LOCA: 2 of 4 CH 2 Sl pumps containment sumps (b) 1 of 2 RHR pumps, Sl pumps or Sl pumps The PRA success criteria differ (intermediate pumps, and CH pumps (b) 1 of 2 RHR pumps from the design basis in: (1) pressure) (3) Hot leg for large LOCA (c) 1 CH pump or Sl crediting CCPs or Sl pumps recirculation from (c) 1 of 2 CH pumps for pump for SGTR, where the design basis requires containment sumps steam generator tube nonefor MSLB. one of each to function; (2) not 2 RHR pumps rupture (SGTR) or main requiring injection into all RCS (low pressure) steam line break (MSLB) loops; (3) not crediting mitigation (2) SAME except for MSLB events; (4) not requiring Associated injection into 2 cold legs hot leg recirculation. Success piping, valves (2) 1 of 2 RHR pumps to criteria in PRA are based on plant-and heat supply other required (3) Not required specific realistic analyses exchangers ECCS pumps suction and consistent with the PRA standards RCS cold legs for Capability Category II.
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| (3) 1 of 2 RHR pumps to supply other required ECCS pumps suction and RCS hot legs 14
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.5.4 RWST RWST Yes (1) Supply borated (1) RWST boron (1) SAME The PRA does not explicitly model water to ECCS and concentration, the impact of out of limit boron or CS system during temperature, and level temperature, but conservatively LOCA injection within limits these can be addressed for the phase for: RICT Program by assuming the (a) containment RWST is unavailable. Therefore, cooling and this LCO condition can be depressurization, evaluated using the CRMP.
| |
| (b) core cooling and replacement The success criteria in the PRA inventory, and are consistent with the design (c) negative basis criteria.
| |
| reactivity for reactor shutdown 3.6.2 Containment 2 air locks No (1) post-accident SSCs for the containment air Air Locks (personnel and containment locks can be evaluated by a emergency) leakage within limits bounding assessment as permitted by NEI 06-09. The PRA model includes an event which involves a large, pre-existing containment leak; this would be bounding on risk on an inoperable air lock and can be used as a bounding surrogate .
| |
| 15
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.6.3 Containment 2 active or Yes (1) Each (1) 1 of 2 isolation (1) SAME for: SSCs for containment isolation Isolation Valves passive containment devices per penetration containment pressure valves not in the PRA model can isolation penetration isolated isolate within required and vacuum relief and be evaluated by a bounding devices on within the time limits stroke time. containment purge assessment as permitted by each fluid assumed in the lines; SG blowdown and NEI 06-09. The PRA model penetration safety analyses sample lines; reactor includes an event which involves line cavity common drain a large, pre-existing containment line; RCP seal water leak; this would be bounding on return and letdown line; risk on an inoperable isolation reactor coolant drain valve and can be used as a tank (RCDT) discharge, bounding surrogate.
| |
| vent header, and nitrogen supply lines; The PRA does not explicitly model and pressurizer relief the impact of excessive stroke tank (PRT) nitrogen time. This condition can be supply lines. addressed for the RICT Program by conservatively assuming the All other penetrations inoperable containment isolation evaluated as not valve is unclosable if it is open.
| |
| significant sources of Otherwise, the success criteria in fission product leakage the PRA are consistent with the and are screened out. design basis criteria.
| |
| 3.6.6 CS and Cooling 2 CS trains Yes (1) Containment (1) 1 of 2 CS trains and 2 (1) SAME The SSCs in the TS scope are Systems 5 containment atmosphere cooling CFCUs modeled in the PRA. The iodine fan cooling to limit post- (2) 1 of 2 CS trains (2) Not modeled removal function of the CS trains units (CFCU) accident pressure is not required for mitigation of and temperature severe accidents and is not (2) Iodine removal modeled. (Note 3) to reduce the release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment 16
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.7.2 Main Steam 4 MSIVs Yes (1) Isolate steam (1) MSIV on affected (1) SAME or more SSCs are modeled consistent with Isolation Valves flow from the steamline closes, or restrictive the TS scope and so can be (MSIVs) secondary side of remaining 3 MSIVs on directly evaluated using the the SGs following a unaffected steamlines CRMP.
| |
| high energy line close.
| |
| break (HELB)
| |
| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria for a HELB. The PRA also credits MSIV closure for isolation of a ruptured SG, and on 3 of 4 steam lines to prevent RCS overcooling in the event of a failure of the turbine trip function.
| |
| 3.7.4 Atmospheric 4ADVIines Yes (1) Cool unit to RHR (1) 4 of 4 ADVs to cool (1) 1 of 4 ADVs SSCs are modeled consistent with Dump Valves (ADVs) (one per steam entry conditions, if down unit at design rate the TS scope and so can be generator, preferred heat sink of 1OOoF per hour; 1 of 4 directly evaluated using the (2) 1 of 4 ADVs on each with ADV via steam dump to ADVs permit 25°F per CRMP.
| |
| intact steam generator and block condenser not hour cooldown for a lines valve) available natural circulation The success criteria in the PRA cooldown event.
| |
| do not require a maximum rate (2) Cool down RCS cooldown capability to mitigate following SGTR to (2) 3 ADVs on intact severe accidents, and therefore permit termination steam generator lines. more realistic criteria are of primary to applicable consistent with the secondary break PRA standards for Capability flow. Category II.
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| 17
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
| |
| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.7.5 AFW System 2 motor-driven Yes (1) Supply (1) 2 motor-driven pumps (1) 1 of 3 pumps SSCs are modeled consistent with pumps and 1 feedwater to SGs to or 1 turbine-driven pump the TS scope and so can be turbine-driven remove RCS decay for the most limiting event directly evaluated using the pump heat (loss of main feedwater) CRMP.
| |
| The success criteria in the PRA are based on a "better estimate" evaluation which demonstrates any one AFW pump can provide 100% of the feedwater flow required for removal of decay heat I from the reactor. This is discussed in the plant-specific TS Bases. The use of more realistic success criteria is consistent with the PRA standards for Capability Category II.
| |
| 3.7.6 Condensate 1 CST Yes (1) Safety grade (1) 1 CST aligned with (a) SAME SSCs are modeled consistent with Storage Tank (CST) source of water to minimum water volume the TS scope and so can be SGs for removing directly evaluated using the heat from RCS CRMP.
| |
| The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
| |
| 18
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AS-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in byTS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.7.7 Component 2 vital loops Yes (1) Heat sink for (1) 1 of 2 vital loops with (1) SAME unless SSCs are modeled consistent with Cooling Water (CCW) removal of process 2 of 3 CCW pumps and 1 successful isolation of the TS scope and so can be System and operating heat of 2 heat exchangers unnecessary CCW heat directly evaluated using the from safety-related loads CRMP.
| |
| components The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria, but also include credit for operator action to isolate unnecessary CCW heat loads; in this case, only 1 of 3 CCW pumps is required.
| |
| : 3. 7.8 Auxiliary 2 trains Yes (1) Heat sink for (1) 1 of2 trains (1) SAME; however, SSCs are modeled consistent with Saltwater (ASW) removal of process cross-tie to unaffected the TS scope and so can be System and operating heat unit is also credited. directly evaluated using the from the CCW CRMP.
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| system The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.8.1 Alternating 2 offsite Yes (in part) (1) Source of power (1) Automatically power (1) SAME SSCs are modeled consistent with Current (AC) Sources circuits to engineered safety associated ESF busses the TS scope and so can be
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| -Operating 3 diesel features (ESF) (2) SAME directly evaluated using the generators systems (2) 1 of 2 trains CRMP. (Note 6)
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| (DG) 2 supply trains (2) Source of fuel oil The success criteria in the PRA of diesel fuel to DGs are consistent with the design oil (DFO) basis criteria.
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| transfer system 19
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-1: In Scope TS/LCO Conditions to Corresponding PRA Functions TS LCO/Condition SSCs SSCs Function Covered Design Success Criteria PRA Success Criteria Disposition Covered by Modeled in by TS LCO/
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| TS LCO/ PRA Condition Condition 3.8.4 Direct Current 3 Class 1E DC Yes (1) Provide control (1) Aligned to provide (1) SAME SSCs are modeled consistent with (DC) Sources - subsytems power to AC power to associated the TS scope and so can be Operating emergency power equipment from battery directly evaluated using the system, motive and and associated charger CRMP.
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| control power to selected safety The success criteria in the PRA related equipment are consistent with the design and backup 120 basis criteria.
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| VAG vital bus power 3.8.7 Inverters- 4 Class 1E Yes (1) Provide (1) Align to associated (1) SAME SSCs are modeled consistent with Operating inverters uninterruptible 120 VAG vital bus, with the TS scope and so can be power to reactor input power from vital AC directly evaluated using the protection system and associated battery CRMP.
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| (RPS) and ESFAS The success criteria in the PRA are consistent with the design basis criteria.
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| 3.8.9 Distribution Class 1E AC, Yes (1) Provide (1) Align to provide power (1) SAME SSCs are modeled consistent with Systems - Operating DC, and 120 necessary power to to busses the TS scope and so can be volts, ESF systems directly evaluated using the alternating CRMP.
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| current (VAG) vital bus The success criteria in the PRA electrical are consistent with the design power basis criteria.
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| distribution L__
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| subsystems Note 1: The reactor trip function is assumed successful for all fires in the fire PRA which is consistent with NUREG/CR-6850 and satisfies the PRA standard at Capability Category II. This is acceptable since implementation of a RICT requires that at least one train remain functional such that the reactor trip capability will be available, consistent with the assumption in the fire PRA; 20
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Note 2: Individual RTS instrumentation channels for input to the automatic RTS function will be evaluated using a bounding evaluation as permitted by NEI 06-09. The design basis provides for initiation of an automatic reactor trip from two or more signals for any initiating event, and so the failure probability of the automatic RTS function is typically dominated by failure of the common non instrumentation components in the RTS system. Generic logic will address failure of the automatic trip function when two of two generic RTS signals fail. Any inoperability of one or more channels of a RTS signal will be assumed to result in unavailability of that signal as an input to the automatic RTS function. For the RICT Program, the risk for one or more inoperable instrument channels for one trip signal will be evaluated assuming that one of the two generic RTS signals is unavailable, and crediting only one remaining signal for automatic reactor trip for all initiating events. If two or more RTS signals have inoperable instrument channels, then no credit will be taken for the automatic RTS function by assuming unavailability of both generic RTS signal inputs. This is a bounding conservative risk assessment as permitted by NEI 06-09. It is conservative because: (1) inoperability of any single instrument channel for any RTS function is evaluated as causing the loss of that RTS function even if the remaining channels could actuate a reactor trip; (2) inoperability of any RTS signal is assumed to impact mitigation of all transient and accident conditions, even though only a subset of all initiating events would be impacted; and (3) no credit is taken for automatic RTS actuation for more than two RTS signals for any initiator.
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| Note 3: The fire PRA does not credit containment sprays or CFCUs.
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| Note 4: ESFAS Function 7 for RHR pump trip on low RWST level: Any inoperability of this function will be evaluated for the RICT Program by a bounding assessment as permitted by NEI 06-09 assuming the affected RHR pump cannot be aligned for recirculation. This function to protect the RHR pumps if they have not been manually aligned for recirculation when the RWST is empty is not credited in the PRA. This function only provides a plant risk reduction if the operator fails to align recirculation such that by automatically tripping the RHR pumps the operator can then recover the error. Very limited credit for such a recovery action can be justified, such that this function would have an insignificant impact if it were credited.
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| Note 5: The pressurizer heaters will be evaluated for the RICT Program by a bounding assessment as permitted by NEI 06-09. The function of the heaters is to maintain subcooled conditions in the RCS for decay heat removal using forced or natural circulation. In the PRA, this is addressed by secondary cooling via the 21
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 SGs. lnoperability of the pressurizer heaters will be conservatively bounded by assuming secondary cooling is unavailable if there are no pressurizer heaters are available.
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| Note 6: The 500 kV offsite circuits are only credited for mitigation of internal events.
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| 22
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-2: Unit 1/Unit 2 In Scope TS/LCO Conditions RICT Estimate TS LCO/Condition RICT Estimate 1 3.3.1 RTS Instrumentation > 1 year Condition B, One of two manual reactor trip channels inoperable 3.3.1 RTS Instrumentation 225.2 day (Various Conditions) One of two credited automatic RTS functions inoperable 3.3.1 RTS Instrumentation > 1 year Condition CC, One of two reactor trip breakers inoperable 3.3.1 RTS Instrumentation 79.3 day3 Condition AA, One of two automatic trip logic trains inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 22.7 day2
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| * 4 Condition B, One of two manual Sl channels inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 79.3 day Condition D, One of two automatic Sl actuation and logic trains inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation > 1 year Conditions H, Y, AA, One containment pressure channel inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation > 1 year Condition F, One pressurizer pressure channel inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 92.8 day Condition F, One steam line pressure channel inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 79.3 day Condition D, One of two containment spray automatic actuation logic trains inoperable (Note 2) 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 79.3 day3 Condition D, One of two containment isolation* Phase A automatic actuation logic trains inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 79.3 day3 Condition D, One of two containment isolation Phase B automatic actuation logic trains inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 79.3 day3 Condition L, One of two steam line isolation automatic actuation logic trains inoperable 23
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-2: Unit 1/Unit 2 In Scope TS/LCO Conditions RICT Estimate TS LCO/Condition RICT Estimate1 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 79.3 day3 Condition N, One of two feedwater isolation automatic actuation logic trains inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation > 1 year Conditions F, R, W, One steam generator water level channel inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 79.3 day3 Condition L, One of two AFW automatic actuation logic trains inoperable 3.3.2 ESFAS Instrumentation 259.7 day Condition T, One RHR pump train trip on RWST low level inoperable 3.4.9 Pressurizer Heaters (Note 5)
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| B. One pressurizer heater group inoperable 3.4.1 0 Pressurizer Safety Valves > 1 year A. One pressurizer safety valve inoperable 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) 100.3 day B. One PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) 100.3 day C. One block valve inoperable 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) 47.3 day E. Two Class I PORVs inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) 47.3 day F. More than one block valve inoperable 3.5.1 Accumulators > 1 year A, B. One accumulator inoperable 3.5.2 ECCS- Operating 45.8 day A. One or more trains inoperable AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST): 0.8 day A, B, D. RWST inoperble 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks: 7.2 day2 C. One containment air lock inoperable 24
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A5-2: Unit 1/Unit 2 In Scope TS/LCO Conditions RICT Estimate TS LCO/Condition RICT Estimate 1 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves: 107.4 day2 A, B, C. One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems: > 1 year A. One containment spray train inoperable 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems: > 1 year C. One CFCU inoperable 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems: > 1 year D. One containment spray train and one CFCU inoperable 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs): 301.6 day A. One or more steam lines with one MSIV system inoperable in MODE 1 3.7.4 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs): > 1 year A. One required ADV lines inoperable 3.7.4 ADVs: > 1 year B. Two required ADV line inoperable
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| : 3. 7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System: > 1 year A. One steam supply to turbine-driven AFW pump inoperable 3.7.5 AFW System: 19.4 day B. One AFW train inoperable for reasons other than Condition A 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System: 1.4 day C. One motor-driven AFW pump and one turbine-driven pump steam supply inoperable 3.7.6 (Unit 1) Condensate Storage Tank (CST): 0.3 day A. CST volume not within limit
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| : 3. 7. 7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System: > 1 year A. One CCW train inoperable
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| : 3. 7.8 Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) System: > 1 year A. One ASW train inoperable 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating: 17.3 day A. One required offsite circuit inoperable 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating: 157.9 day B. One DG inoperable 25
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AS-2: Unit 1/Unit 2 In Scope TS/LCO Conditions RICT Estimate TS LCO/Condition RICT Estimate1 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating: 17.3 day C. Two required offsite circuits inoperable 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating: 4.4 day D. One required offsite circuit inoperable and one DG inoperable 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating: 21.8 day E. Two DGs inoperable 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating: 55.4 day F. One DFO supply train inoperable 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating: 27.1 day A. One battery charger inoperable 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating: 5.7 day B. One battery inoperable 3.8. 7 Inverters - Operating: > 1 year A. One required inverter inoperable 3.8. 7 Inverters - Operating: > 1 year B. Two or more [required] inverters inoperable 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating: 9.9 day A. One or more AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating: 76.3 day B. One or more AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating: 5.9 day C. One or more DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable Actual results are provided, but RICT is limited to a maximum of 30 days.
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| 2 Large early release frequency (LERF) is the limiting risk metric.
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| 3 Model fails all automatic actuations of ESFAS functions.
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| 4 Model fails all manual actuations of ESFAS functions.
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| 5 Pressurizer heaters are not currently modeled and will be added to CRMP model to support the RICT Program.
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| 26
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| Enclosure Attachment 5 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 References
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| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
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| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Industry Guidance Document, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0, November 2006.
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| 27
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 6 Information Supporting Consistency with Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2 1
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Information Supporting Consistency with Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2 Introduction NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines," (Reference 1) Section 2.3.4 identifies that the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) shall be reviewed using the guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, Revision 0 (Reference 2) for a PRA which meets Capability Category II for the supporting requirements (SRs) of the internal events at power PRA standard, and that deviations shall be justified and documented.
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| Section 4.0, Item 3 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 3) for NEI 06-09 requires the license amendment request (LAR) to include a discussion of the results of peer reviews and self-assessments conducted for the plant-specific PRA models which support the RMTS Program, including the resolution or disposition of any identified deficiencies (i.e., findings and observations from peer reviews). The scope of this information includes the internal events PRA model, and other models for which additional standards have been endorsed by a revision to RG 1.200.
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| This attachment provides information on the technical adequacy of the Diablo Canyon PRA internal event, internal flood, fire, and seismic models which support the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program, in support of the LAR to revise Technical Specifications (TS) to implement NEI 06-09. This information is consistent with the requirements of item 3 of Reference 3, and addresses each PRA model for which a RG 1.200 endorsed standard exists. The information is provided as follows:
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| Table A6-1 Internal Event PRA Model Peer Review Table A6-2 Internal Flood PRA Model Peer Review Table A6-3 Seismic PRA Model Peer Review Table A6-4 Internal Fire PRA Model Peer Review Note that other external hazards are not addressed by PRA models, and are further discussed in Attachment 8. Shutdown modes of operation are not in the scope of the RICT Program, and so low power and shutdown PRA models are not addressed. No other PRA standards are endorsed by RG 1.200, Revision 2 (Reference 12).
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| No changes have been made to the internal event, internal flood, or fire PRA models since the peer reviews that would constitute an upgrade as defined by ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, and therefore no additional focused-scope peer reviews are required to support implementation of the RICT Program. Future changes to the DCPP PRA models will be performed consistent with station procedures for design changes, procedure changes, and equipment performance monitoring. This will also include updates to implemented risk informed applications as applicable and appropriate.
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| 2
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Internal Event and Internal Flood PRA PG&E conducted an internal event and internal flood PRA peer review in December 2012 (Reference 4). The full-scope peer review of these models was performed consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 2, using the current endorsed standard ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Levei1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Addendum A to RA-S-2008" (Reference 5).
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| The peer review identified facts and observations (F&Os) for SRs of the internal event and internal flood PRA models. These included: findings (F) for elements which did not meet at least Capability Category II of a SR of the standard, suggestions (S) from the peer review team for elements which met the SR but could be improved, and best practices (BP). All F&Os categorized by the peer review team as findings have been either resolved by PRA model revision, including documentation updates, or evaluated in terms of their impact on the RICT Program and dispositioned, as presented in Table 1, Internal Event PRA Peer Review- Findings Resolution, and Table 2, Internal Flood PRA Peer Review- Findings Resolution.
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| Seismic PRA Seismic risk is not expected to be a significant contributor to configuration risk calculations of the RICT Program for Diablo Canyon. This is due to the robust seismic design of the plant, such that a very significant seismic event is required to cause any substantial equipment failures. Less significant seismic events which do not result in failure of safety-related equipment or structures are bounded in impact by a plant trip coincident with a loss of offsite power. The design of the safety-related equipment is such that the seismic impact is the same for each safety train, such that it is very likely that seismic failures will be correlated; that is, if the seismic event is of sufficient magnitude to fail one train, it will similarly fail the redundant train, and therefore the impact of out of service equipment to seismic risk is minimal. Further, most large, beyond design basis seismic events result in equipment impacts such that mitigation by the affected equipment is not able to be credited, and so there is no impact on seismic risk calculations for the RICT Program.
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| A review of the sample RICTs provided in Attachment 5 identified only two cases where the RICT was less than the 30-day backstop and had a seismic contribution above 10 percent of the total risk change in core damage frequency (CDF) and/or large early release frequency (LERF) from all sources (internal, seismic, and fire).
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| : 1) The RICT associated with one containment airlock door inoperable has a 7 .1-day RICT based on LERF; seismic change in risk contributes about 19 percent of the total risk change. This contribution is due to the bounding assessment made for this case, where it is assumed that the airlock inoperability directly fails containment and results in all core damage sequences becoming large early 3
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 releases. The redundant airlock door is functional and provides for containment integrity, so that a realistic calculation would result in a much longer RICT, and the seismic risk contribution would not be significant.
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| : 2) The RICT associated with two inoperable diesel generators (DG) has a 21.8 day RICT based on CDF; seismic change in risk contributes about 29 percent of the total risk change. This contribution is due to the assumptions that the seismic event directly fails offsite power circuits such that these cannot be recovered.
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| These assumptions are somewhat conservative, in that repairs to offsite circuits would be attempted, and that other cooling strategies which do not rely on AC power (e.g., turbine-driven AFW pump operation with loss of DC power) are not credited in the seismic PRA. Since simultaneous maintenance on more than one DG is not typical, this TS Condition would most likely only be rarely entered for emergent conditions.
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| The seismic PRA model uses the internal events model as its basis; this model was separately peer-reviewed in December 2012, as discussed above.
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| PG&E conducted a seismic PRA peer review in January 2013 (Reference 6). The full-scope peer review, that also included a review of seismic hazard and fragility analyses, was performed consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 2, using the current endorsed standard ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009. The peer review identified F&Os as described above for the internal event and internal flood PRA peer review. All F&Os categorized as findings have been either resolved by PRA model revision, including documentation updates, or evaluated in terms of their impact on the RICT Program and dispositioned, as presented in Table 3, Seismic PRA Peer Review- Findings Resolution. The seismic hazards and fragilities analyses are currently being updated to incorporate more recent available data and methodologies, as well as specifically addressing the seismic PRA standard requirements. Fragilities were updated for the Turbine Building prior to the peer review, based on initial estimates which suggest that this building is the most risk significant structure from a seismic standpoint. The update of seismic hazards and fragilities for the remaining buildings and equipment is currently expected to be completed in early 2015. The updated methodologies used in the hazards and fragilities analyses were reviewed during the seismic PRA peer review.
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| For the RICT Program, PG&E proposes to use the existing seismic hazards and fragilities analyses until the update is completed and all peer review F&Os are fully resolved. The existing analyses are robust, and the Diablo Canyon study is specifically identified in the endorsed seismic PRA standard as representing a Capability Category Ill seismic hazard study (Reference 5, Section 5-2.1 page 218). As noted in the standard, the methodology for seismic PRA has been well established for more than 20 years. The Diablo Canyon analysis is identified in the standard as a basis used to establish the requirements of the seismic PRA standard: Reference 5-26 is cited in several instances in the standard as an acceptable method.
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| 4
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 These seismic PRA analyses were previously provided to NRC and reviewed and approved as part of the initial licensing basis for the plant. The Unit 1 full-power Operating License included a condition, in Section 2.C.(7), to require, in part, that PG&E perform a seismic PRA. PG&E submitted a program plan for the seismic design-basis reevaluation, titled the Long-Term Seismic Program (LTSP), which included a description of a PRA model to assess seismic risk. The staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed and approved a modified version of the LTSP, and PG&E submitted its final report on the Diablo Canyon LTSP, which included a description of the seismic PRA in Chapter 6 or the report. The NRC staff safety evaluation, Supplement 34 to NUREG-0675 (SSER 34) (Reference 10), closing out the DCPP LTSP, stated in part:
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| '~s a result of its review, conducted with the assistance of a number of expert consultants, the NRC staff has concluded that, subject to satisfactory analytical substantiation of the confirmatory item discussed below, PG&E has met all aspects of License Condition 2. C. (7) of Facility Operating License DPR-80."
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| To resolve the confirmatory item contained in Supplement 34 to NUREG-0675, PG&E performed additional analysis to show that the plant can withstand staff estimates of seismic ground motion that were higher in certain frequency ranges than originally assumed by PG&E in the initial LTSP report studies. The NRC staff safety evaluation closing out the DCPP LTSP confirmatory item was provided to PG&E in a NRC letter dated April 17, 1992 (Reference 11), and stated:
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| "The staff has reviewed these submittals and concurs with PG&E's conclusions.
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| On this basis the staff finds that the confirmatory item from SSER 34 has been satisfactorily resolved."
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| Based on the limited impact on RICT calculations from seismic risk contributions, the robustness of the existing seismic PRA methodology, and prior NRC reviews of the acceptability of the seismic PRA, PG&E judges that the existing seismic PRA is acceptable for use in the RICT Program.
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| Fire PRA The fire PRA was reviewed in January 2008 as part of the pilot application of the peer review process of NEI 07-12 (Reference 7). The 2008 peer review was conducted against the requirements of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) Standard "FPRA Methodology" ANSI/ANS-58.23-2007 (Reference 8). At the time of this first peer review, certain technical elements of the fire PRA had not been completed. The second phase of the peer review was completed in December 2010 (Reference 9).
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| The 2010 Peer Review was conducted against the requirements of Section 4 of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, the Combined Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard (Reference 5.) The scope of the 2010 review included rereview of elements from the 2008 review which did not meet at least Capability Category II of the standard.
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| 5
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 The peer review identified F&Os as described above for the internal event and internal flood PRA peer review.
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| All F&Os categorized as findings have been either resolved by PRA model revision, including documentation updates, or evaluated in terms of their impact on the RICT Program and dispositioned, as presented in Table 4, Fire PRA Peer Review- Findings Resolution.
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| All fire PRA related F&Os, except SF-A5-01 against SR SF-A5, have been addressed and dis positioned as closed. SF-A5-01 tracks the implementation (revision of the fire brigade training procedure) of a recommendation related to a fire brigade training requirement dealing with seismically induced fires. This is a documentation item that will not otherwise impact the fire PRA.
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| Per the 2010 peer review, the fire PRA meets Capability Category II or better in all SRs but two (CF-A 1 and FSS-07). This includes SRs not meeting Capability Category II from the 2008 review, which were within the scope of the 2010 review. The F&Os identifying the deficiencies associated with these two SRs have been addressed, and these two SRs are now considered to be met at Capability Category II or better.
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| 6
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level IE-A5 IE-A5-01 (Systematic review of F Closed There is no evidence in the documentation This F&O has been resolved by additional each system) of a systematic evaluation of every system reviews; no new or changed initiating events to assess the possibility of an initiating were identified. Each system was screened IE-A5 not met event occurring due to failure of the system. for potential initiating events. If a system did not screen, it was then reviewed to confirm that a bounding or representative initiating event is already modeled in the PRA. An interview with an Operations representative was conducted to confirm the system screening and to discuss low power or non-power operations for each system.
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| This SR is judged to now be met at Capability Category II, based on the use of a structured approach for evaluation of each system for initiating event potential.
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| IE-A? IE-A?-01 (Events which occurred F Closed The identification of initiating events does This F&O has been resolved by additional other than at-power) not include consideration of events reviews; no new or changed initiating events occurring during low-power or shutdown were identified. A rereview of plant IE-A? not met conditions, and events which result in a information in the Twice-Daily Shift Manager Associated SRs: controlled shutdown leading to a scram Turnover Reports, On-line/Off-line Daily Log, prior to reaching low-power conditions as and Outage History was conducted to identify IE-A8 met at Capability Category I specified in the standard. A review of potential initiating events. Low power and IE-A9 met at Capability Category I historical events, plant operating history, non-power operation events were discussed and interviews with plant personnel are also as part of the system screening performed to required by the standard. resolve F&O IE-A5, discussed above.
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| This SR is judged to now be met, based on consideration of shutdown and low power events and unplanned shutdowns.
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| Associated SRs IE-A8 and IE-A9 are also judged to be met at Capability Category II 7
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level based on inteNiews having been conducted, and on review of operating history for precursor events.
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| IE-C5 IE-CS-01 (Initiating event F Open Initiating event frequencies are converted to This F&O has no impact the RICT Program.
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| frequency based on a reactor year events per calendar year by multiplying by In accordance with Note 1 of Table 2.2.1-4(c) basis) the site critical hours per calendar year of the PRA standard (Reference 5), weighting factor calculated from site operating of initiating event frequencies by the fraction IE-C5 not met experience, instead of a unit-specific factor of the year the plant was actually operating is as required by the standard. This not applicable to configuration risk distinguishes differences in the plant units' management applications. The CRMP used operating experience. for RICT Program calculations will not use any weighting factors since the RICT calculations assume the plant is operating. Therefore, resolution of this F&O would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IE-C10 IE-C10-01 (Combination of F Open Use of plant specific information, including This F&O will be resolved by additional review component failure with the common cause failure (CCF) treatment, and model update if required. A summary unavailability of other components) plant-specific data, repair times, and the review of the initiating event fault trees applicability of mitigating function success indicates that plant-specific information, IE-C10 met criteria in the initiating event fault tree was including CCF treatment, plant-specific data, not evident. repair times, and the applicability of the mitigating function success criteria are currently used in the PRA model. A detailed review will be performed and documented to confirm that all the required plant-specific information is included in the initiating event fault trees.
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| IE-C14 IE-C14-01 (Interfacing systems F Open There is no documented systematic review This F&O has no impact on the RICT loss-of-coolant accident (ISLOCA) of allc;ontainment penetrations for potential Program. A systematic review of containment 8
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AS-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level frequency) ISLOCAs, including identification of penetrations for potential ISLOCA initiators screened penetrations and the basis for was performed as part of the fire PRA IE-C14 not met screening, and relevant surveillance test development, and no new ISLOCA initiators procedures and their impact on the potential were identified. The criteria for fire-induced for an ISLOCA. ISLOCA are more conservative than for internal events, so the evaluation is bounding.
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| Updating the documentation to disposition each containment penetration would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IE-C15 IE-C15-01 (Uncertainty associated F Open No discussion of uncertainty parameters for This F&O has no impact on the RICT with initiating events) initiating event fault trees was identified. Program. Updating documentation to include a characterization of uncertainty parameters IE-C15 not met for initiating event fault trees would not impact Associated SR: IE-C1 met the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IE-01 IE-01-01 (Documentation) F Open The documentation is not written in manner This F&O has no impact on the RICT that facilitates PRA applications, upgrades, Program. Updating documentation to address ID-01 not met and peer review. The peer review team the clarity of information and refere11ces made Associated SRs: identified that the existing documentation to the original PRA basis document would not heavily references the original DCPP PRA impact the calculations of risk changes for the IE-02 not met documents, especially PLG-0637. This RICT Program.
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| IE-03 not met makes it difficult to understand details of the model, difficult to confirm that the model AS-C1 not met addresses PRA requirements, and difficult SY-C 1 not met to update and use it for PRA applications.
| |
| This finding applies to other elements of the DA-E1 not met standard besides I E.
| |
| QU-F1 not met 9
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level LE-G 1 not met IFPP-81 not met IFSO-B 1 not met IFSN-A5 met IFSN-81 not met IFQU-81 met IE-02 IE-02-0 1 (Documentation) F Open The peer review team identified specific This F&O has no impact on the RICT examples of deficiencies in the Program. Updating the documentation for IE-02 not met documentation of initiating events which specific information which is unclear or needs Associated SRs: need to be addressed, including specific correction to address specific requirements of references missing, addressing dual unit the standard would not impact the calculations IE-A3 met loss of instrument air as an initiating event, of risk changes for the RICT Program.
| |
| IE-A10 met identification of "freeze dates," identification of credited operator recovery actions, IE-83 met at Capability Category II details of uncertainty parameters and IE-C2 met Bayesian updating of data, details of initiating event fault trees (see IE-C1 0-01 ),
| |
| IE-C3 met and comparison to generic data sources.
| |
| IE-C4 met IE-C8 met IE-C9 met IE-C10 met IE-C12 met IE-01 not met 10
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level AS-A11 AS-A 11-01 (Transfer between s Open This F&O is a suggestion that the event tree This F&O has no impact on the RICT event trees and preserving transfers would be more easily followed if Program. Updating documentation as per this dependencies) they were explicitly given in the event trees. suggestion F&O to improve the clarity of documentation related to transfers between AS-A11 met event trees in the PRA logic would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
| |
| AS-83 AS-83-01 (Phenomenological F Open There does not appear to be a review of This F&O will be resolved by additional conditions created by accident phenomenological conditions created by evaluation and model updates. A review of progressions) each accident sequence; thus, there may the nonsafety-related components credited in be nonsafety-related components that are the PRA will be conducted to ensure AS-83 not met affected by an accident sequence that were unqualified components are not being Associated SRs: not reviewed for the accident impact on the improperly credited for mitigation of initiating functionality of the component. events which may involve harsh AS-83 not met environments.
| |
| SY-A18 met Upon resolution of this F&O, SR AS-83 will be SY-A21met met.
| |
| SY-A23 met SY-814 (met)
| |
| AS-87 AS-87-01 (Time-phased F Open Time-phased dependencies were found to This F&O has no impact on the RICT dependencies) be modeled in the accident sequences Program. It has been confirmed that the (e.g., AC power recovery and DC battery modeling is consistent and correct for time-AS-87 met depletion). However, the documentation phased dependencies. Updating has inconsistencies that need to be documentation to ensure consistency of the resolved. details related to time-phased dependencies would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| 11
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level AS-C2 AS-C2-01 (Documenting F Open The processes used to develop accident This F&O has no impact on the RICT processes used to develop sequences are not sufficiently documented, Program. Updating documentation to improve accident sequences) as noted in F&Os AS-A 11-01 and the clarity of the accident sequence AS-87-01, which identify issues related to documentation would not impact the AS-C2 not met the documentation of the accident calculations of risk changes for the RICT sequence analyses. Program.
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| SC-A1 SC-A 1-01 (Definition of core F Closed Two definitions of core damage are used in This F&O has been resolved by further damage) the documentation. The first definition, evaluation; no PRA model changes were peak node temperature >1800°F, is a valid required. In some cases, the core uncovery SC-A1 not met success criterion, and meets the definition definition of core damage was used as the Associated SR: SC-A2 not met in Section 1-2 of the standard. However, end point in the timing analysis for the Human the second criterion of "the time until the Reliability Analysis (HRA). The use of core water level is collapsed below the top of uncovery instead of peak clad temperature active fuel" is not a valid definition since the results in a slightly conservative estimate of definition of core damage as written in the time available to accomplish an action, Section 1-2 requires the consideration of which potentially results in slight conservatism uncovery and heat-up, and this definition in the calculated human error probabilities.
| |
| does not consider heat-up. This conservatism is acceptable for the RICT Program calculations.
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| SC-A4 SC-A4-01 (Shared systems F Closed The identification of shared systems This F&O has been resolved by further between units) between the units and how they are evaluation; no PRA model changes were credited is not documented. For example, required. A review of the mitigating systems SC-A4 not met no discussion on the Diesel Fuel Oil (DFO) credited in the PRA model for dual-unit Transfer System is provided, although it is a initiators identified only the DFO Transfer known shared system. This is significant to System as a shard mitigation system not ensure that a shared system is not specifically evaluated. Other shared systems inadvertently credited for both units were identified correctly. The model correctly simultaneously if the system does not have credits the DFO system with consideration that capacity. made that both units are impacted.
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| 12
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level With this F&O resolved, SR SC-A4 is met.
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| SC-A5 SC-A5-01 (Mission times) F Open No discussion could be found that verified This F&O will be resolved by a model change.
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| that each accident sequence actually The condensate supply has a 20-hour SC-A5 not met reached a safe stable state at the minimum capacity, and therefore a supplemental water specified mission time of 24 hours. supply for auxiliary feedwater (AFW), or other decay heat removal method (such as residual heat removal (RHR) or sump recirculation (for loss-of-coolant accident (LOCAs)) would be required.
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| With this F&O resolved, along with additional F&O SC-A5-02 (see below), SR SC-A5 is met at Capability Category 11/11 I.
| |
| SC-A5 SC-A5-02 (Mission times) F Open Several accident sequences were identified See response to F&O SC-A5-01 (above).
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| where RHR entry conditions were met prior SC-A5 not met to 24 hours, but RHR was not required for success in the accident sequence. If RHR is not questioned, then the end state may not be stable since heat removal via the steam generators (SGs) will be diminished as decay heat lowers, and RHR will be required to maintain temperatures long term.
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| SC-83 SC-83-01 (LOCA nreak sizes) F Open The current success criterion for LOCAs is This F&O will be resolved by an update to based on plant capabilities and system initiating event frequencies. Additional SC-83 not met responses. The specific break sizes analyses have been performed and break Associated SRs: associated with the transitions between the sizes have been identified. The medium LOCA definitions have not been adequately LOCA transition size will be updated, and the SC-81 met at Capability Category justified by specific thermal-hydraulic frequencies of LOCAs adjusted.
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| II evaluations.
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| Upon resolution of this F&O, and additional 13
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level IE-84 met F&O SC-83-02 (below), the SR SC-83 will be met.
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| IE-C1 met IE-C13 met at Capability Category 1111 SC-83 SC-83-02 (ISLOCA sizes) F Open The thermal-hydraulic analysis for ISLOCA This F&O will be resolved by conducting referenced for the success criteria validation additional analyses to validate or revise the SC-83 not met is based on an 8-inch break size, and not current ISLOCA break sizes and Associated SR: SC-81 met at on a 2-inch break size. The use of an corresponding success criteria and plant Capability Category II 8-inch break size is inappropriate because impacts. Documentation will be updated to the required equipment and timing properly identify and validate assumptions on associated with responding to a 2-inch impacts to the RHR pumps.
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| break would be significantly different than Upon resolution of this F&O, and additional the required equipment and timing F&O SC-83-01 (above), the SR SC-83 will be associated with an 8-inch break. In met.
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| addition, the RHR pumps are assumed to be unavailable based on conservative assumptions related to the effects of the ISLOCA; more realistic assumptions should be applied.
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| SC-84 SC-84-01 (Define large break F Closed The analysis code used to establish This F&O has been resolved by additional LOCAs) success criteria has known limitations with reviews; no model updates were required.
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| respect to its modeling of large LOCAs. The success criteria from the design basis SC-84 met The limitations of the code are not analysis are consistent with the PRA success summarized anywhere in the analyses, so it criteria for large LOCAs.
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| is not clear that the limitations of the code were considered when developing the success criteria.
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| SC-84 SC-84-02 (Anticipated Transient F Open The discussions associated with the A TWT This F&O will be resolved by additional scenarios and the success criteria for evaluation and model updates as required to 14
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level Without Trip (ATWT) definition) ATWT are not consistent in the the ATWT model to ensure the correct documentation with regards to parameters parameters are used to establish the plant SC-84 met relevant to A TWT events. The actual response to these events.
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| criteria for plant-specific ATWT conditions needs to be defined, justified, and evaluated for system response required to mitigate the ATWT.
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| SC-85 SC-85-01 (Crediting power- F Open In the documentation of the comparison of This F&O has no adverse impact on the RICT operated relief valves (PORVs) for success criteria to similar plants, one outlier Program. The issue is conservatism in the depressurization when AFW not was noted in the success criteria for a small success criteria applied to small LOCAs in not available) LOCA without Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) crediting feed-and-bleed cooling when AFW is available. This is assumed to result in core not available. This will result in shorter RICTs SC-85 met damage, but the use of PORVs to for AFW, which is acceptable.
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| depressurize and cooldown is credited at similar plants. The basis for not crediting the use or PORVs is not documented, and discussions with plant PRA personnel did not identify any reason that the PORVs could not be credited at Diablo Canyon.
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| SC-C2 SC-C2-01 (Unclear process of F Open The process followed for developing the This F&O has no impact on the RICT developing success criteria) success criteria for each accident scenario Program. Updating the documentation to is not clearly documented. For example, clarify the basis for success criteria would not SC-C2 not met there are two definitions of core damage impact the calculations of risk changes for the used, the basis for the timing of human RICT Program.
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| actions is not clear (two criteria used- but nothing showing why both are acceptable),
| |
| the limitations of the software used for the success criteria is not documented, etc.
| |
| SC-C3 SC-C3-01 (Documenting sources F Closed A review of many of the PRA elements This F&O has been resolved by a identified that there was no summarization documentation update. Each PRA element 15
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level of uncertainty) of the sources of uncertainty or calculation has been reviewed and the assumptions associated with the individual assumptions and sources of uncertainty have SC-C3 not met PRA element. been documented.
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| Associated SRs: With this F&O resolved, SC-C3 is met.
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| IE-03 not met SY-C3 not met SY-A4 SY-A4-0 1 (Walkdowns and F Open Neither plant walkdowns nor interviews with This F&O has no adverse impact on the RICT interviews) knowledgeable plant personnel were Program. The Diablo Canyon system models performed to confirm that the systems were prepared by industry and in-house SY-A4 not met analysis correctly reflects the experts in 1988. Since the original as-built/as-operated plant. development, the system models have been updated and upgraded to reflect the as-built/as-operated plant based on routine review of procedure changes, design changes, equipment reliability data, and other inputs. The models and their technical elements have been continuously refined through their use in various risk-informed applications. Numerous walkdowns for fire and seismic PRA development have been performed over the past five years, and no evidence that the system analyses differ from the as-built/as-operated plant have been identified.
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| Based on the maturity of the system models and their ongoing application at the plant, it is judged unlikely that additional walkdowns or interviews would identify significant deficiencies requiring model updates, and that the current system models reasonably reflect 16
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DC L-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level the as-built/as-operated plant condition and configuration. Therefore, resolution of this F&O would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SY-A11 SY-A11-01 (Failures to run in first s Closed Failures to run in first hour (rather than over This F&O has no impact on the RICT hour) the entire 24-hour mission time) were not Program. This suggestion F&O is concerned addressed by creating a new basic event. with ease of model update. A review This could lead to model update issues. confirmed that the failure to run probability is properly handled in the PRA model (for example, there are separate basic events for the DGs for failure to run for the first two hours and failure to run over the 24-hour mission time). Therefore, this suggestion would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SY-A16 SY-A 16-01 (Modeling of pre- F Open No pre-initiator human failure events (HFEs) See F&O HR-A1-01 (below.)
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| initiators) are modeled in the AFW system model.
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| Upon resolution of this F&O, and additional Since AFW is a standby system, at least SY-A 16 not met) F&O HR-A1-01 (below), the SR SY-A16 will one pre-initiator HFE (e.g., failure to restore be met at Capability Category 1111.
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| Associated SR: HR-A1not met pump after maintenance or testing) is expected to be in the model.
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| SY-A20 SY-A20-01 (Simultaneous F Closed Simultaneous unavailability of redundant This F&O has been resolved by examination unavailability of redundant safety-related equipment due to a planned of the maintenance schedules and update of structures, systems, and activity is excluded from consideration, documentation. However, it has no impact on components (SSCs)) consistent with TS 3.0.3 restrictions. This the RICT Program because it only impacts the assumption is probably not appropriate for average annual CDF and LERF results. The SY-A20 not met nonsafety-related equipment, whose RICT calculations are based on the actual unavailability is not restricted by TS. An configuration of the plant at the time the TS example of this is multiple instrument air action is applicable, and reflects all 17
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level compressors concurrently out of service. unavailable equipment including outages of redundant trains when applicable.
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| SY-A23 SY-A23-01 (Consistent system F Open Consistent system/component failure mode This F&O has no impact on the RICT model nomenclature) nomenclature is used in all system Program. Changing nomenclature to achieve notebooks, except the AFW notebook. consistency would not impact the calculations SY-A23 met of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SY-83 SY-83-01 (CCF groups) F Open No documentation was found for the CCF This F&O has no impact on the RICT group definition for the Safety Injection (SI) Program. CCFs of the Sl system components SY-83 not met top event. For other systems, CCF groups were confirmed to be modeled and common-appear to generally be defined inside of cause groups are defined within the model.
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| RISKMAN files but not in the Therefore, it is judged that SR SY-83 is met.
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| documentation.
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| The common cause groups are not documented in the system notebook.
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| Updating the documentation of the CCF group definition for the Sl system would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SY-88 SY-88-01 (Spatial and F Closed No discussion of spatial and environmental This F&O has been closed with no action environmental hazards impacting dependencies, or room heatup and taken. Documentation of the effects of room multiple SSCs) dependence on heating, ventilation and air heatup is available and references plant conditioning (HVAC) could be found in the specific room heatup calculations. These SY-88 not met sampled system notebooks. The peer results are not reiterated within the individual Associated SR: SY-814 met review team subsequently identified system notebooks but system modeling is additional documentation that was available consistent with the room heatup calculations.
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| to potentially address these gaps.
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| SY-810 SY-810-01 (Modeling of F Open The treatment of permissives and interlocks This F&O will be resolved by a review of each 18
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level permissive and interlocks) could not be located in the system system for permissives and interlocks notebooks. affecting system operation, and updates to the SY-810 not met system model if required.
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| Upon resolution of this F&O, the SR SY-81 0 will be met at Capability Category 11/111.
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| SY-815 SY-815-01 (Inter-system operator F Open Human actions that had the potential to This F&O will be resolved by a model update.
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| dependencies) impact multiple trains of a given system A review of system models for potential cross-(miscalibration). and actions from one train and cross-system pre-initiators and SY-815 not met system that could impact the function of adverse impact from credited operator actions another system are not addressed. on other systems has been performed to identify additional pre-initiator events, which will be incorporated into the model.
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| Upon resolution of this F&O, the SR SY-815 will be met.
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| SY-C2 SY-C2-01 (Documentation) F Open The peer review team identified specific This F&O has no impact on the RICT examples of deficiencies in the Program. Updating the documentation to SY-C2 not met documentation of system models which address specific examples of missing Associated SRs: need to be addressed, including information would not impact the calculations documenting assumptions, references, of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SY-A22 met at Capability HVAC dependencies, success criteria and Category II timing, and discussion of available SY-81 met inventories of air, power, and cooling to support the mission time.
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| SY-83 not met SY-86 met SY-87 met at Capability Category II SY-89 met 19
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level SY-811 met HR-A1 HR-A1-01 (Pre-initiator events) F Open The identification of pre-initiator HFEs This F&O will be resolved by a model update.
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| based on whether the procedure or practice A review of the pre-initiator event screening, H R-A 1 not met involves realignment or calibration should including a review of applicable plant Associated SRs: be performed before screening processes procedures, procedure quality, and system are applied. configurations, has been completed to identify HR-A2 not met realignment and calibration activities which SY-A16 not met could result in system unavailability due to human error. Additional pre-initiator events have been identified and quantified consistent with requirements of the PRA standard.
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| These new pre-initiator events will be added to the PRA model.
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| Upon resolution of this F&O, and addjtional F&Os HR-A3-01, HR-C3-01, and HR-03-01 (below), the SR HR-A1 will be met.
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| HR-A3 HR-A3-01 (Pre-initiator events) F Open Pre-initiator HRA screening criteria could See resolution of HR-A1-01.
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| remove restoration errors prematurely. If a HR-A3 met system or train is automatically actuated following an event, then a restoration error of manual valves in the flow path could be missed. Examples include mispositioning of a valve in the standby Component Cooling Water (CCW) pump train if it receives an automatic start signal on low header pressure and misposition of a valve in Sl pump train if the valve does not automatically open on an engineered safety 20
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level features actuation system (ESFAS) signal.
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| HR-C3 HR-C3-01 (Consideration of F Open The pre-initiator HRA documentation See resolution of HR-A1-01.
| |
| miscalibration) discusses the reasons for not including Upon resolution of this F&O, and additional common miscalibration, but the standard HR-C3 not met F&Os HR-A1-01 (above), HR-A3-01 (above),
| |
| requires inclusion of such miscalibration and HR-03-01 (below), the SR HR-C3 will be events.
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| met.
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| HR-03 HR-03-01 (Pre-initiator HFEs) F Open The detailed discussion of pre-initiator HFEs See resolution of HR-A1-01.
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| does not discuss the quality of procedures, HR-03 met at Capability Category Upon resolution of this F&O, and additional administrative controls, or man-machine I F&Os HR-A1-01, HR-A3-01, and HR-C3-01 interface (MMI) requirements in performing (above), the SR HR-03 will be met at the assessments.
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| Capability Category IIIII I.
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| HR-E1 HR-E1-01 (Crediting manual F Open Operator actions associated with starting This F&O does not adversely impact the RICT verification steps when automatic pumps or aligning valves are not credited Program. Additional credit of human action to actuation failed) even when the Emergency Operating operate equipment when automatic actuation Procedures (EOP) specifically states fails would typically decrease risk and HR-E1 met "Verify" pump started or "Verify" valve increase calculated RICTs, so the current Associated SR: SY-A17 met open/closed. In the event the automatic PRA model is conservative for the RICT signal fails to start the pump or align the Program.
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| valve, credit should be taken for the operator backing up the automatic signal.
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| HR-E3 HR-E3-01 (Consistent F Open There is no discussion in the HRA This F&O does not adversely impact the RICT interpretation of procedures) documentation on how the specific Program. Based on the maturity of the scenarios discussed in operator talk- models and their ongoing application at the HR-E3 met at Capability Category throughs were selected, the questions plant, it is judged unlikely that additional talk-I posed to the operators, the entire sequence throughs of procedures would identify a mis-of procedures followed in the response to interpretation of a procedure which would the accident sequence, etc. Actual operator require an update affecting the human error 21
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level interview sheets are not included; only a probabilities, and that the current system summary of the discussion is provided. models reasonably reflect the as-built/as-Without having the basis for why the operated plant condition and configuration.
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| scenarios discussed were selected, it is not Therefore, resolution of this F&O would not possible to ensure that the most risk- impact the calculations of risk changes for the significant or important operator actions RICT Program.
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| were discussed. Additionally, without the This SR HR-E3 is judged met at Capability operator interview sheets it is not possible Category II based on actual talk-throughs to verify what the operators/trainers said, conducted as documented by the peer review and that the responses were taken in team comments.
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| context.
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| HR-E4 HR-E4-01 (Confirming response F Open Talk-throughs performed with Operations This F&O does not adversely impactthe RICT models via simulator observations and Training personnel do not address Program. The most recent talk-through with or talk-throughs) confirming that the response models (i.e., operators does not include discussion of the thermal-hydraulic analysis codes) used to reasonableness of response models; HR-E4 met at Capability Category support the PRA are realistic. Additionally, however, previous talk-throughs did confirm I no documentation of the use of simulator the results of such analyses. Many different observations to confirm the response talk-throughs of accident scenarios have been models can be found. performed since the original development of the PRA in 1988 that confirm the accuracy of the accident response models. Based on the maturity of the PRA models and supporting analyses for the HRA timing, it is judged unlikely that additional talk-throughs or simulator observations would identify any significant deficiencies in these analyses, which would require an update affecting the human error probabilities.
| |
| This SR HR-E4 is judged met at Capability Category II based on actual talk-throughs conducted as documented by the peer review 22
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level team comments.
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| HR-G5 HR-G5-01 (Verification of the time F Open For some HFEs, no basis for the required This F&O has no impact on the RICT estimates in HRA via observation time to perform the action is provided. Program. A review confirmed that time-critical of simulator or walk-throughs) operator actions and risk significant HFEs are based on actual time-motion runs and/or talk-HR-G5 met at Capability Category throughs, which is not identified in the II documentation, but is consistent with the Associated SRs: standard at Capability Category II. Therefore, resolution of this F&O would not impact the HR-E3 met at Capability Category calculations of risk changes for the RICT I Program.
| |
| HR-E4 met at Capability Category I
| |
| HR-G6 HR-G6-01 (Combining identical F Open Two HFEs appear to be essentially identical This F&O has no impact on the RICT HFEs) with the s~me human error probability Program. A review confirmed that the two (HEP). These two should be combined into identical HFEs are within the same top event HR-G6 met one HFE, since the use of both could and are used exclusively of each other; adversely affect the HRA dependence therefore, the dependency analysis and analysis and the impact of the state of model results are not impacted. Therefore, knowledge correlation in the quantified resolution of this F&O would not impact the results. calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
| |
| HR-G7 HR-G?-01 (HFE dependencies) F Open The HFE dependency documentation does This F&O will be resolved by developing an HR-G7 not met not list a set of operator actions that were updated HFE dependency analysis consistent evaluated or how the dependence between with SR HR-G7. Upon resolution of this F&O, actions is determined. The process to the SR HR-G7 will be met.
| |
| identify and evaluate HFE dependencies does not seem to provide a thorough means 23
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level for identifying and accounting for dependent human actions.
| |
| HR-H2 HR-H2-01 (Staffing level assumed F Closed The staffing levels credited in the HRA This F&O has been resolved by a in HRA) include personnel not on-site 24-hours, documentation update; no model changes 7-days a week, but are available via call-in - were required. All HFEs were reviewed and HR-H2 met so they should not be credited for shorter updated to reflect actual on-site staffing levels.
| |
| term responses. Additionally, minimum There were no impacts to the probabilities of Operations staffing levels should be used existing HFEs.
| |
| when evaluating the post-initiator recovery actions.
| |
| HR-12 HR-12-01 (Documentation) s Open The peer review team identified specific This F&O will be resolved by a documentation examples of deficiencies in the update.
| |
| documentation of HRA which need to be addressed, including assumption of normal instead of minimum staffing levels, use of multiple procedures, editorial corrections, and significant digits in the HEPs.
| |
| HR-12 HR-12-02 (Estimation of HEPs) s Closed A screening value is used for Post-Initiator This F&O has been resolved by additional Event ZHEAS6 (Failure to close Header review; no model changes were required. A Cross Tie Valves, FCV-495 and FCV-496.) review confirmed that Event ZHEAS6 is not a This HFE is used in many accident significant HFE from a risk importance sequences, including ISLOCA accident standpoint and use of a screening value is scenarios. The number of these scenarios therefore consistent with the standard.
| |
| and their use in ISLOCAs indicate that they are relatively significant events which should not use a screening value.
| |
| DA-C1 DA-C1-01 (Use of the latest F Open It is not evident that recognized sources are This F&O will be resolved by additional review industry documentation for sse utilized for CCF and off-site power recovery and data update if necessary. The generic failure rate, CCF, and offsite source of CCF data will be updated to use the 24
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level power recovery) data. NRC "CCF Parameter Estimation, 2010 Update." Offsite power recovery data will be DA-C 1 not met reviewed and updated as necessary. Upon resolution of this F&O, SR DA-C1 will be met.
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| DA-C4 DA-C4-01 (Basis for identification F Open A clear basis for the identification of events This F&O has no significant impact on the of an event as a failure) as failures has not been developed. Also, RICT Program. This finding is related to the no evidence was found that degraded documented definition of a plant-specific DA-C4 not met states were distinguished as being component failure when compiling plant Associated SR: DC-C3 not met applicable (or not) as failures. reliability data. The documentation will be updated to define the basis for failures, and a rereview of the plant data and failure events will be conducted to confirm no improperly counted failure events. Based on the maturity of the models and their ongoing application at the plant, it is judged unlikely that significant deficiencies requiring model updates will be identified due to any change in the definition of a failure, and that the current system models reasonably reflect the as-built/as-operated plant condition and configuration.
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| Therefore, resolution of this F&O is not expected to impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| DA-C5 DA-C5-01 (Documenting F Open Documentation is inadequate to confirm This F&O has no significant impact on the evaluation of failure events) whether component failures occurring close RICT Program. This finding is related to the in time are separately counted. documented evaluation of failures occurring DA-C5 not met close in time when compiling plant reliability data. The documentation will be updated to include reference to the Maintenance Rule methodology. Only a single example of such failures has been identified, so it is judged to 25
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level not be a significant issue with plant data.
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| Therefore, resolution of this F&O is not expected to impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| DA-C6 DA-C6-01 (Removing post- F Open Some post-maintenance tests have been This F&O will be resolved by a model update.
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| maintenance events from demand included in the accounting of demands and Data analysis was reviewed and post-counts) operating hours for plant-specific data, maintenance testing demands were removed which conflicts with the standard. from the counts. Updates to the impacted DA-C6 met failure probabilities in the model will be made.
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| DA-C10 DA-C1 0-01 (Planned coincident F Closed There was no discussion regarding counting This F&O has no impact on the RICT unavailability) of successful demands when components Program. The documentation for plant-are decomposed into sub elements. specific data will be updated to identify any DA-C 10 not met component sub elements which may have unique demand counts. Updating documentation for data collection would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| DA-C14 DA-C14-01 (Planned coincident F Closed No assessment of routine planned Refer to F&0 SY-A20-0 1.
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| unavailability) maintenance activities for multiple component unavailabilities, or DA-C14 not met documentation that Maintenance Rule Associated SR: SY-A20 not met practices do not allow for routine instances of multiple trains or equipment being unavailable, were identified in the documentation.
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| DA-C16 DA-C16-01 (Disposition of plant- F Open Plant specific LOOP events are not This F&O has no impact on the RICT specific loss-of-offsite power identified in the documentation. Program. The finding is related to gaps in documentation of the disposition of plant-26
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level (LOOP) events) specific LOOP events used in determining the initiating event frequency. A review of the DA-C16 met LOOP initiator frequency determined that plant-specific LOOP events are properly considered in the determination of initiating event frequency. Therefore resolution of this F&O would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| DA-D4 DA-D4-01 (Tests and check of F Open The peer review team identified specific This F&O has no impact on the RICT data updates) examples of deficiencies in the Program. The finding is related to documentation of data which need to be documentation of various reasonableness DA-D4 met at Capability Category addressed, related to Bayesian update data checks of data which is subject to Bayesian IIIII I checks. updating. A review of the data determined Associated SR: DA-E1 not met that the checks would be satisfactory such that the data is valid. Documentation of these checks would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| DA-D6 DA-D6-01 (Documenting method F Closed NUREG/CR-5485 was used for CCF This F&O has been resolved by a and references in data calculation) methodology; however this is not listed as a documentation update to include the reference or in discussions in the applicable reference to NUREG/CR-5485 for DA-D6 met at Capability Category calculation. the generic data source for CCF.
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| Ill DA-D8 DA-D8-01 (Documenting F Closed No documentation of analysis done on This F&O has been resolved with no action evaluation of design changes on impact on data of design changes (such as taken. The evaluation of the potential impact impact on data) recirculation sump screen design change to PRA data due to DCNs are made as part of notices (DCNs), or new charging pump the design change process and documented DA-D8 not met DCNs) could be found in the data during the design change process. On a calculation. routine basis as part of model maintenance, all design changes since the last model update are rereviewed for impacts on the 27
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level model.
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| Based on the documented evaluation of DCNs, SR DA-D8 is judged to be met at Capability Category II since plant data is used for significant basic events.
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| DA-E2 DA-E2-01 (Documentation) F Open Documentation does not facilitate review. This F&O does not impact the RICT Program.
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| Additional uncontrolled backup materials The information provided in the backup DA-E2 not met such as spreadsheets are required for a documents was accurate and review of these Associated SR: DA-D5 met at traceable basis for plant data. documents did not result in a finding that Capability Category Ill would impact the PRA model. An update to the formal data documentation to properly incorporate the information will resolve the finding, and would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| QU-81 QU-81-01 (RISKMAN code s Open The peer review team recommended that This suggestion F&O does not impact the limitations) the quantification document include a RICT Program and will be resolved by a specific section that discusses RISKMAN documentation update to include the code limitations. RISKMAN code limitations. The limitations of the RISKMAN code do not adversely impact its use in the RICT Program.
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| QU-C2 QU-C2-01 (HFE dependency) F Open Human action dependencies are not Refer to F&O HR-G7-01. There is no evaluated with a minimum default value of requirement in the standard to use any QU-C2 not met the H EP to prevent underestimating risk. minimum HEP for dependent actions, only to account for such dependencies.
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| Upon resolution of F&O HR-G7-01, QU-C2 is met.
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| QU-D4 QU-D4-01 (Comparison to other F Open The documentation includes a comparison This F&O has no impact on the RICT of results to other similar plc:mts, but causes Program. The issue relates to the comparison 28
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level similar plants) of significant differences are not identified. of the results of the internal event PRA with other similar plants and identifying causes for QU-D4 met at Capability Category significant differences. Based on the maturity I
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| of the DCPP internal events PRA model, it is not anticipated that any significant deficiency would be identified by additional comparisons and evaluations. Therefore, resolution of this F&O would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| QU-E1 QU-E1-01 (Uncertainty) s Closed A review of generic sources of uncertainty This suggestion F&O has been resolved by a was performed; however, this analysis documentation update. The assumptions and would be improved by a review of plant- uncertainties associated with each technical specific sources of uncertainty. element of different hazard groups are identified in the documentation. As suggested in this F&O, these documents have been updated by systematically reviewing PRA development documents (e.g., system notebooks, success criteria notebook, event-tree notebooks, etc.)
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| QU-F2 QU-F2-01 (Documentation) F Open The peer review team identified specific This F&O has no impact on the RICT examples of deficiencies in the Program. The issue is details required to be QU-F2 not met documentation of quantification which need included in the quantification notebook which Associated SR: QU-F1 not met to be addressed as specified in the are missing and is identified as not meeting a standard. documentation SR (i.e., not a technical SR.)
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| Update of documentation would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| QU-F6 QU-F6-01 (Documenting definition F Open There was no definition for significant basic This F&O has no impact on the RICT of significant) event located in the documentation. Program. The issue is relevant to identification of significant elements of the 29
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level QU-F6 not met baseline PRA and is identified as not meeting a documentation SR (i.e., not a technical SR.)
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| The definition of significance does not affect PRA model results, and would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| LE-C1 LE-C1-01 (Plant-specific level2 s Closed Containment challenges in high level This suggestion F&O was closed with no model) requirement LE-8 must be compared to the action taken. The containment structural containment structural capability analysis capability has been assessed and LE-C1 met at Capability Category I described in high level requirement LE-D. documented adequately.
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| LE-C2 LE-C2-01 (Modeling of operator F Open The LERF analysis states that there are no This F&O does not adversely impact the RICT actions following the onset of core post-core damage operator actions Program and will be resolved by including damage) available or credited. However, a review of additional HFEs in the PRA model. The plant procedures identified that there are current model conservatively does not credit LE-C2 not met several Severe Accident Mitigation any post-core damage recovery actions by Guidelines (SAMG) procedures available operators, which results in a conservative that do include post-core damage actions estimate of LERF. This conservative that need to be reviewed and credited as treatment is acceptable for the RICT Program.
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| applicable.
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| LE-C3 LE-C3-01 (Crediting repair of s Open No repair of equipment, other than the This suggestion F&O does not adversely SSCs in significant LERF potential restoration of alternating current impact the RICT Program and will be resolved sequences) (AC) power following a loss of station power by additional analysis and model changes to (LOSP) event, is credited in the LERF include any appropriate equipment repairs for LE-C3 met at Capability Category I analysis. The recovery of offsite power is post-core damage large early release only credited pre-core damage, but could be mitigation. Excluding mitigating actions from considered for post-core damage scenarios. the PRA results in a conservative calculation of LERF. This conservative treatment is acceptable for the RICT Program.
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| 30
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level LE-C4 LE-C4-01 (Feasibility of scrubbing) s Open The LERF model does not credit mitigating This suggestion F&O does not adversely actions (e.g., isolate the ruptured SG after impact the RICT Program and will be resolved LE-C4 met at Capability Category I core damage, depressurize the RCS and by additional analysis and model changes to terminate the leak, recover containment include consideration of the potential for integrity). Additional fission product fission product scrubbing for large early scrubbing provided by the containment release mitigation when appropriate.
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| sprays is not credited. Because it is Excluding mitigating actions from the PRA assumed that all early releases are large, it results in a conservative calculation of LERF.
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| is implied that all steam generator tube This conservative treatment is acceptable for rupture (SGTR) and ISLOCA core damage systems in the scope of the RICT Program, sequences remain unscrubbed. except for the Containment Spray (CS)
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| System. For CS, not crediting scrubbing mitigation could underestimate the change in LERF. However, the frequency of core damage sequences which would still have the CS system available is not significant in typical pressurized water reactor (PWR)
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| PRAs, and the operation of CS therefore has limited impact on LERF. A conservative treatment of the CS system function is proposed (see Enclosure 1) to bound the scrubbing mitigation impact.
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| LE-C9 LE-C9-01 (Equipment survivability s Open No credit is taken for any equipment This suggestion F&O does not adversely or human action under adverse survivability or human actions under impact the RICT Program and will be resolved environments) adverse conditions or after containment by additional analysis and model changes failure. where appropriate to include consideration of LE-C9 met at Capability Category I equipment survivability and operator actions under adverse conditions or after containment failure for large early release mitigation.
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| Excluding mitigating actions or equipment from the PRA results in a conservative 31
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level calculation of LERF. This conservative treatment is acceptable for the RICT Program.
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| LE-C13 LE-C13-01 (Realistic containment s Open All core damage events involving either a This suggestion F&O does not adversely bypass analysis) spontaneous SGTR, pressure induced impact the RICT Program. Credit for SGTR (PI-SGTR), or a thermally induced scrubbing of fission products is addressed by LE-C13 met at Capability SGTR (TI-SGTR) event, as well as F&O LE-C4-01 (above.) Conservative Category I ISLOCA, were conservatively assumed to treatment of ISLOCA and induced SGTR lead to a large early release. In addition, impacts results in a conservative estimate of fission product scrubbing provided by the LERF. However, the ISLOCA contribution is containment sprays is not credited. an order of magnitude lower than SGTR, and is a smaller contributor than most Level 2 contributors (such as high pressure melt injection). This conservative treatment is acceptable for the RICT Program.
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| LE-07 LE-07-01 (Realistic containment F Open There is no traceable basis for the list of This F&O will be resolved by additional review isolation analysis) containment isolation (CI) valves that are and model updates if required. The F&O is present in the model and the systematic related to the disposition of all containment LE-07 met at Capability Category disposition of all of the containment penetrations for the potential for large II penetrations that are not in the model. releases. A systematic review of all to identify any additional containment penetrations contributing to large releases, and the model will be updated if required.
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| LE-E2 LE-E2-02 (Definition of LERF with F Closed No actual calculation verifying the 3-inch This F&O has been resolved by an evaluation 3-inch opening) containment break size which constitutes a which confirms the adequacy of the existing large release exists. model; no model changes were required.
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| LE-E2 met There are existing calculations for 2-inch and 4-inch containment bypass sizes. Using the same methodology as this existing calculation, a 3-inch size was evaluated and determined to be an acceptable size for LERF 32
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-1 Diablo Canyon Internal Events PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level purposes.
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| LE-F2 LE-F2-01 (Review of LERF F Open The LERF results documentation does not This F&O has no impact on the RICT sequences for reasonableness) reflect the latest LERF cutsets. Additionally, Program. The F&O is related to the results include an out-of-date documentation of the baseline LERF results, LE-F2 met assumption on reactor coolant pump (RCP) and identified outdated results and seal LOCA sizes which needs to be deleted assumptions. The seal LOCA split fractions and actual detailed results presented. were confirmed to not have changed since the Level2 analysis was performed, so there are no model updates required to address this issue. Reviewing and documenting the most current results and assumptions for LERF would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| LE-G3 LE-G3-01 (Documenting LERF F Open The relative contribution of contributors is This F&O has no impact on the RICT calculations) not documented in the LERF calculation, Program. The F&O is related to and the information in the quantification documentation of all contributors to LERF.
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| LE-G3 not met calculation does not reflect the latest Documenting LERF contributors would not results, and does not include all the types of impact the calculations of risk changes for the contributions discussed in this SR. RICT Program.
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| LE-GS LE-GS-01 (Limitations in the LERF F Open The limitations in the various portions of the This F&O has no impact on the RICT analysis) LERF analyses that would impact Program. The F&O is related to applications are not identified or discussed. documentation of limitations in the LERF LE-GS not met analysis. Documenting the limitations of the LERF analysis would not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| 33
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-2 Diablo Canyon Internal Flood PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level IFSO-A1 IFSO-A1-01 (Applicable external s Open Not all external flooding sources are identified This suggestion F&O has no impact on the sources) in the documentation, and walkdown RICT Program. Updating the information does not identify tank inventories. documentation to comprehensively identify all external sources and inventories will not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IFSO-A6 IFSO-A6-01 (Spray protection) F Open The walkdown reports identify equipment This F&O has no impact on the RICT which is protected from the effects of spray; Program. Updating the documentation to IFSO-A6 met however, the documentation does not discuss include specific details of spray protection what is specifically credited as spray in order to ensure configuration control of protection and the limitations of that the model would not impact the protection. This could result in future plant calculations of risk changes for the RICT modifications which alter the plant Program.
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| configuration in a manner which impacts the spray protection without being recognized as an impact to the PRA.
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| IFS0-83 IFS0-83-01 (Uncertainty) s Open Sources of epistemic uncertainty related to This suggestion F&O has no impact on the flood sources are not explicitly discussed. RICT Program. Updating the documentation to discuss uncertainty will not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IFSN-A3 IFSN-A3-01 (Automatic and/or F Open Relevant automatic or operator responses to This F&O has no adverse impact on the operator responses) flood events which could terminate or contain RICT Program. The issue is identification flood propagation are not identified in the of all automatic and manual isolation IFSN-A3 not met documentation. capability which could be credited to terminate flooding from each source. Not crediting such capability increases the internal flood risk contribution which is conservative. Additional credit of 34
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AS-2 Diablo Canyon Internal Flood PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level automatic or manual actions to isolate a flooding source would decrease risk and increase calculated RICTs, so the current PRA model is conservative for the RICT Program.
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| IFSN-A4 IFSN-A4-01 (Capacity of drains, s Open Details on the capacity of floor drains and This suggestion F&O has no adverse berm, dikes, etc.) sumps, and the impact of berms, dikes, and impact on the RICT Program. The current curbs are not discussed in the documentation. model does not credit drains, berms, and IFSN-A4 not met These features in general are not credited, other similar design features, which is and a more realistic evaluation could be conservative. Additional credit of these performed. features would decrease risk and increase calculated RICTs, so the current PRA model is conservative for the RICT Program.
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| IFSN-A6 IFSN-A6-01 (Spray targets) s Open No detailed evaluation of potential spray This suggestion F&O has no impact on the targets based on the distance from the source RICT Program. The peer review found the with consideration of the maximum potential SR IFSN-A6 is met at Capability Category spray elevation and specific propagation 1111, and the suggestion would further paths has been made. enhance the identification of sse failure modes due to spray impacts, but the existing PRA model satisfies the standard as required to support the RICT Program.
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| IFSN-A7 IFSN-A7-01(Fiooding impacts on s Open For flooding effects to SSCs other than This suggestion F&O has no impact on the SSCs) submersion, the documentation does not RICT Program. Enhancing the describe the effects in a manner which is documentation of flooding impacts on easily verifiable. SSCs so that the failure mechanism is easily identified will not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT 35
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-2 Diablo Canyon Internal Flood PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition level Program.
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| IFSN-A8 IFSN-A8-01 (Drain line and back F Open The potential for inter-area propagation This F&O is judged to have no significant flow paths) through various flowpaths identified in the impact on the RICT Program. The peer standard are not identified in the review found the SR IFSN-A6 is met at IFSN-A8-01 met at Capability documentation. Capability Category II. Based on the Category II physical configuration of drains and sumps, additional analysis is not expected to identify a significant impact for inter-area propagation. Therefore, resolution of this F&O would enhance the documentation of inter-area propagation, and enhance the model by more rigorous analysis of flooding impacts and mitigation actions, but is not expected to have a significant impact on the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IFSN-A9 IFSN-A9-01 (Flood depth and F Open No calculations determine the flooding rates This F&O has no adverse impact on the propagation) and the time to equipment damage. RICT Program. The current model is conservative since out-leakage is not IFSN-A9 not met credited for providing additional time to take mitigating actions to terminate the flood. Additional analysis of the timing of equipment damage and crediting mitigation actions would decrease risk and increase calculated RICTs, so the current PRA model is conservative for the RICT Program .
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| IFSN- IFSN-A 10-01 (Size of flood F Open .Evaluations of the flooding scenarios do not This F&O is judged to have no significant A10 sources) include the impact of emptying a source on impact on the RICT Program. The peer the flood depth in the areas, or the review found the SR IFSN-A10 is met.
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| 36
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-2 Diablo Canyon Internal Flood PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level IFSN-A10 met propagation of infinite water sources without Based on the physical configuration of the operator action to isolate the flood. plant, significant time is available for mitigating actions. Therefore, resolution of this F&O would enhance the documentation of capacities of flood sources and enhance the model by more rigorous analysis of flooding impacts and mitigation actions, but is not expected to have a significant impact on the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IFSN- IFSN-A11-01 (Multi-unit effects) F Open The impact of large flooding sources in areas This F&O has no significant impact on the A11 that could impact both units has not been RICT Program. Large internal floods IFSN-A11 not met considered. The potential for a large which impact both units are low frequency circulating water or ASW flood event on the events, and there are other more likely common turbine building and intake structure scenarios which cause similar impacts.
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| resulting in a dual-unit shutdown was For the turbine building, the impacts of identified. large floods are bounded by a dual-unit LOOP, which has the same failure impacts. For the intake structure, the loss of ASW initiating event has the same impact as the most limiting flood scenario.
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| Thus, the potential dual-unit flood scenarios are bounded by existing initiating events, and therefore there is no significant impact on the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| IFSN- IFSN-A12-01 (Screening of flood F Open Flooding scenarios are screened or assumed This F&O is judged to have no significant A12 scenarios) not to propagate based on drains, curbs and impact on the RICT Program. The peer barriers between rooms, and the screening review found the SR IFSN-A12 is met. A IFSN-A 12 met implicitly assumes that the leak is smaller than review of internal flood scenario screening 37
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-2 Diablo Canyon Internal Flood PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level the drain capacity and/or that the operators is judged unlikely to identify new significant take action to reduce or stop the flow before flood scenarios. Resolution of this F&O water backs up into the room and fails will enhance the documentation to properly additional equipment or propagates beyond identify assumptions, but is not expected to the room. The propagation screening does have a significant impact on the not look at accumulation on the area where calculations of risk changes for the RICT the water is going and whether equipment in Program.
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| that area would be impacted due to flood or whether the flood could propagate beyond the second flood area to another area and damage equipment.
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| IFPP-A5 IFPP-A5-01 (Walkdown F Open The walkdown documentation has missing This F&O has no impact on the RICT documents) information associated with the flooding Program. Updating the walkdown sources. documentation to include information on IFPP-A5 met flooding sources not currently included will not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| 38
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level The seismic peer review was performed against a draft version of the Diablo Canyon seismic PRA model, which used updated hazard and fragilities analyses. As noted, the current seismic PRA model, which uses the existing hazard analysis and fragilities, is proposed to be used for the RICT Program; therefore, the F&Os for the seismic hazard model (SHA) and seismic fragility model (SFR) elements do not apply to the model proposed to be used.
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| SPR-81 SPR-81-01 (Basis for delay F Open The seismic influence for human actions uses This F&O is judged to have no significant time in seismic HRA) generic delay times which are not clearly impact on the RICT Program. The seismic defined, and the task analysis for additional HRA is relatively unimportant, and any SPR-81 met workload in response to a seismic event is not increase in HEP values would not have a documented. significant impact on seismic risk.
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| SPR-81 SPR-81-02 (DG mission time) F Open The assessment for restoration of a DG after This F&O has no impact on the RICT SPR-81 met a seismic event is based on the internal Program. The DG recovery is only events analysis which assumes only a 6-hour credited for nonseismic failures for lower mission time instead of a 24-hour mission acceleration earthquakes. No diesel time. recoveries are credited for scenarios in which the components suffer a seismic failure; therefore, the impacts of the seismic event on the recovery action will be minimized. The failure probability and basis was reviewed and confirmed to be correct for seismic events.
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| SPR-81 SPR-81-03 (Offsite power F Open The fragility for the offsite power does not This F&O will be resolved by additional fragility) address external impacts of transmission review and model update if required.
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| SPR-81 met lines to the site or potential for other failures that would occur beyond the plant boundary.
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| A review indicated that the analysis appears to be under predicting the likelihood of a LOOP.
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| SPR-82 SPR-82-01 (Operator F Open The current analyses of seismic HFEs This F&O has no significant impact on the 39
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level interviews in HFE basis) appears to not include any insights from RICT Program. The seismic HRA is SPR-82 not met operator interviews related to how the seismic relatively unimportant, and any increase in event would impact timing or other stress HEP values would not have a significant factors necessary to adjust the internal events impact on seismic risk.
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| HFE. The basis for selecting generic time delays does not appear to consider timing and the complexity of the scenario.
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| SPR-82 SPR-82-02 (Seismic HRA F Open No HFE dependency assessment has been This F&O has no significant impact on the dependency) developed for the seismic PRA at this point. RICT Program. The seismic HRA is SPR-82 not met relatively unimportant, and any increase in dependent HEP values would not have a significant impact on seismic risk.
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| SPR-82 SPR-82-03 (Lack of operator s Open The HRA documentation and the HRA This F&O has no impact on the RICT insights in HRA) Calculator files have no documentation of any Program. Enhancing documentation of SPR-82 not met insights which will hinder utility update and HRA insights will not impact the maintenance. This may also influence calculations of risk changes for the RICT acceptance of adjustment factors. Program.
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| SPR-82 SPR-82-04 (Treatment of s Open The influence of the seismic event on stress This F&O has no adverse impact on the stress level in seismic HRA) level is masked due to the existence of high RICT Program. The issue involves a SPR-82 not met stress for the internal events assessment. possibly conservative treatment of stress in (The peer review noted that this may be a the internal events HRA such that there is limitation in the HRA calculator with regard to insignificant difference in the calculated addressing seismic and other external events HEPs for internal and seismic event and may require feedback to EPRI.) mitigation. The relevant seismic HFEs have high stress assumed, so that the HEP values are conservative. Therefore, resolution of this F&O will not adversely impact the calculations of risk changes for 40
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level the RICT Program.
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| SPR-83 SPR-83-01 (No acceleration F Open There is no description of use of a systematic This F&O has no impact on the RICT screening criteria) process for screening SSCs or documentation Program. Because the original seismic SPR-83 not met of screened SSCs. PRA model was developed concurrent with the internal events PRA model, no screening was used. Updating the documentation to better describe this process will not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-84 SPR-84-01 (Correlation s Open The basis and treatment of correlation This suggestion F&O is judged to have no between identical SSCs between identical SSCs across systems could significant impact on the RICT Program.
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| across systems) be improved. Correlation of SSC failures across SPR-84 met at Capability systems would typically involve significant Category 1/11 seismic events which have limited mitigation from plant systems. Therefore, resolution of this F&O would not be expected to have significant impacts on the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-84 SPR-84-02 (Documentation s Open Dependencies and correlations to the seismic This suggestion F&O has no impact on the of dependencies and PRA in a manner that facilitates the review of RICT Program. Enhancing the correlations) their impact on screened out SSCs should be documentation of dependencies and SPR-84 met at Capability documented. correlations will not impact the calculations Category 1111 of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-85 SPR-85-01 (HRA s Open The documentation should address only This suggestion F&O has no impact on the documentation) those actions that are actually utilized in the RICT Program. Enhancing the SPR-85 met model and then clarify those that are documentation of the HRA will not impact assumed to be not credited. This will better the calculations of risk changes for the 41
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level support reviews and updates. RICT Program.
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| SPR-89 SPR-89-01 (Time-motion F Open No time or task analysis seems to be This F&O has no significant impact on the study) developed or documented to provide the RICT Program. The seismic HRA is SPR-89 met at Capability basis on an individual action to demonstrate relatively unimportant, and any increase in Category I the ability to perform the action and to HEP values would not have a significant estimate not only initial delay but delays in impact on seismic risk. The time delay diagnosis and implementation. The current used in the seismic HRA was based on assessment only captures in a very general scenario specific interviews with basis the initial delay and does not provide Operations personnel; therefore, it is any delay impact for resources being diverted expected that these values are valid, and or delayed to do other activities or problems therefore additional documentation may in implementing the actions. The current be needed to resolve this F&O.
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| assessment is also independent of the location of the action which could also mask action specific considerations.
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| SPR- SPR-811-01 (Seismically F Open There are seismic failure modes involving This F&O has is judged to have no 811 induced floods) loss of inventory with the potential for flood significant impact on the RICT Program.
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| SPR-811 met impacts that go beyond the local seismic The unconditional seismic failure failure where the flood effects are not probability for SSCs that could result considered. flooding was reviewed to estimate the impact of this issue. In all cases, the total unconditional failure probability for these types of SSCs (piping, tanks, etc.) was less than 1E-06. Therefore, the potential impact of additional seismically induced flooding is not significant. Therefore, resolution of this F&O is judged not to significantly impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| 42
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level SPR-C1 SPR-C1-01 (Chattering of F Open There are conservative assumptions related This F&O has no adverse impact on the solid state relays) to the solid state protective relays on the 4 kV RICT Program. Conservatisms in the SPR-C1 met breakers and the updated charging pump. seismic response of components will not adversely impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-E1 SPR-E1-01 (Expand number F Open The discrete bins for offsite power fragility do This F&O has no adverse impact on the of bins to allow for a better not provide a good representation of the RICT Program. The issue is how the fragility representation) offsite power fragility curve. While RISKMAN initiator binning is used to credit operator SPR-E1 met properly handles this in the fragility calculation recovery actions. Because the upper bin with the use of 100-bin representation of the boundary was used in developing fragility curve in each initiator bin, the use of operator actions and not bin midpoint the mid-point may not accurately reflect the values, the operator actions are range of plant conditions for HRA and conservative for a given range of recovery. Due to the range of the first bin acceleration. If additional binning is compared to the change in fragility for offsite added, it is possible that more credit could power, it is possible that the first bin is be taken for a recovery action at lower non conservative for the upper portion of that accelerations. Therefore, resolution of bin. this F&O would not to adversely impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-E1 SPR-E1-02 (Expand bins F Open The definition of the hazard bins results in This F&O has no impact on the RICT covering hazard above 4.0g) loss of information regarding the relative Program. Redefining the hazard bin to SPR-E1 met importance of LERF contributors because the ensure LERF importance can be conditional probability is not close to 1.0 in the assessed has no impact on the last bin. calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-E1 SPR-E1-03 (Fragility curve s Open Fragility curve truncation values are not This suggestion F&O has no adverse truncation) consistently applied within RISKMAN, impact on the RICT Program. Because SPR-E1 met apparently due to an issue where the point the Monte Carlo quantification does not 43
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level estimate quantification appropriately applies truncate the fragility at the specified the truncation values but the Monte Carlo values, very low probabilities of failure are quantification does not. used where it is appropriate to use a failure probability of zero. This results in an insignificantly (conservative) higher seismic CDF.
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| SPR-E1 SPR-E1-04, MET, fragility s Open The peer review identified some This suggestion F&O has no impact on truncation inconsistencies in the fragility truncation the RICT Program. Simplification of the values which add unnecessary complication modeling will not impact the results of the to the model. The peer review noted that seismic PRA, and will not impact the these issues did not impact the model. calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-E1 SPR-E1-05 (Error in event F Open The event tree ELECPWR appears to have This F&O will have no significant impact tree ELECPWR) an error in the rules for one top event. This on the RICT Program. A review of the SPR-E1 met error will likely not be important to the results error concluded that it will not impact the because it represents the lower acceleration results of the seismic PRA, and therefore bins. In addition, this was the only error will not impact the calculations of risk identified in the seismic-related rules that changes for the RICT Program.
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| were rereviewed.
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| SPR-E5 SPR-ES-01 (No uncertainty F Open Point estimates for CDF and LERF are This F&O has no impact on the RICT distribution provided) documented, but uncertainty distributions are Program. Seismic parametric uncertainty SPR-E5 not met not provided as required. analysis does not impact the quantitative results and will not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-E6 SPR-E6-01 (Sensitivity s Open Additional sensitivities that explore the This suggestion F&O has no impact on analysis for operation actions) uncertainties and assumptions, especially the the RICT Program. Sensitivity analyses SPR-E6 met importance of operator actions, should be do not impact the quantitative results and considered. will not impact the calculations of risk 44
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-F1 SPR-F1-01 (Modeling of F Open The seismic PRA documentation identifies This F&O has no impact on the RICT cross ties between units) that no credit is taken for cross ties between Program. The issue was reviewed and it SPR-F1 not met units following a seismic event. However, the was determined that the model RISKMAN event tree model does not appropriately addresses availability for guarantee failure of all cross-tie options for opposite unit equipment. Therefore, seismic events. As a result, it is not clear that resolution of this F&O will not impact the the model is consistent with the calculations of risk changes for the RICT documentation. Program.
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| SPR-F1 . SPR-F1-02 (Roadmap F Open The current documentation includes This F&O has no impact on the RICT between current documents references to PLG-0637, but it is not clear Program. Clarification of documentation and PLG-0637) how much of that 1988 document is still valid will not impact the calculations of risk SPR-F1 not met and relied on. changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-F1 SPR-F1-03 (Document top s Open The assumption that failures of top events This suggestion F&O has no impact on event SEL and SSG leading SEL (excessive LOCA) and SSG (impact on the RICT Program. Improving the to LERF) SGs) are assumed to lead directly to LERF documentation of an assumption will not SPR-F1 not met should be better documented because of their impact the calculations of risk changes for significance. the RICT Program.
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| SPR-F1 SPR-F1-04 (Order of split s Open The logic rules for event tree SGENTRN are This suggestion F&O has no impact on fraction rules not matching included in a different order list of top events the RICT Program. Improving the with the event tree) in the tree structure. While RISKMAN has no documentation of logic rules will not SPR-F1 not met difficulty with rule order, it does add another impact the calculations of risk changes for level of complexity in trying to review the the RICT Program.
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| rules. In addition, RISKMAN event tree logic provides a comment line for each rule, but generally these are blank. This is an opportunity to provide documentation for the reviewer directly in the model.
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| * 45
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-3 Diablo Canyon Seismic PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level SPR-F1 SPF-F1-05 (Document split s Open RISKMAN event tree logic provides a This F&O has no impact on the RICT fraction rule comments) comment line for each split fraction rule, but Program. The documentation issue SPR-F1 not met generally, these are blank. identified by this F&O does not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-F1 SPR-F1-06 (Document future F Open The documentation is not clear on whether This F&O has no impact on the RICT plant modifications) RCP shutdown seals are credited. Program. The current seismic PRA model SPR-F1 not met does not include credit for these seals.
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| The documentation issue identified by this F&O does not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-F1 SPR-F1-07 (Conservative s Open A dominant sequence is failure of both trains This suggestion F&O does not adversely modeling of Solid State of SSPS, with guaranteed failure of the impact the RICT Program. The Protection System (SSPS)) operator action to manually trip the reactor. assumption of no manual reactor trip SPR-F1 not met This appears to be an overly conservative would conservatively estimate the risk assumption with regard to operator failure for impact of SSCs which mitigate ATWT a dominant sequence. events, which is acceptable for the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| SPR-F3 SPR-F3-01 (Complete F Open There is no complete documentation of This F&O has no impact on the RICT sources of model uncertainty sources of model uncertainty and Program. Improving the documentation of and assumptions) assumptions identified for the plant response model uncertainty and assumptions will SPR-F3 not met model. not impact the calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
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| 46
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level PP-81 PP-81-01 (2008- Partitioning of s Closed There are compartments comprised of two This suggestion F&O has been closed battery room and battery charger rooms separated by a rated fire barrier that without action. Further partitioning of the room) could be treated as separate compartments. areas in question could slightly impact the The current treatment is not unacceptable, fire frequencies (i.e., plant-wide areas as but further partitioning could lead to more well as the areas of concern), but the realistic treatment of the scenarios. (This current treatment is acceptable (as noted F&O was generated during the January 2008 by the 2008 peer review, and confirmed review.) by the 2010 peer review.)
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| PP-C2 PP-C2-01 (2008 - Exclusion of F Closed There is no documented justification for the This F&O has been resolved by a areas) exclusion of locations within the licensee- documentation update. The controlled area. The peer review identified documentation has been revised to PP-C2 not met this as a documentation issue and not a include all of the permanent buildings on technical issue. (This F&O was generated the site and the potential fire effects have during the January 2008 review.) been identified in order to justify inclusion or exclusion of locations from the global plant analysis boundary.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR PP-C2 is met.
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| ES-A1 ES-A1-01 (2008- Basis for s Closed The basis for not considering A TWT is not This suggestion F&O has been closed removing A TWT) well established. As stated in supporting with no action taken. The documentation guidance (NUREG/CR-6850) it is expected a identifies the plant-specific design
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| * fire-induced A TWT event is probably not features of the Reactor Protection System likely. A plant specific review and which support the justification for removal justification should be provided. (This F&O of A TWT from consideration.
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| was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| 47
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level ES-81 ES-81-01 (2008- Basis for not s Closed Some low importance SSCs (i.e., Instrument This suggestion F&O has been resolved including low importance SSCs) Air, Main Feed Water) from the internal by a documentation update. The event PRA are documented as being documentation has been revised to excluded from the fire PRA model based on identify exclusion of specific equipment cable routing information being unknown based on low risk significance to the rather than the SSCs not being risk internal events PRA model, and sensitivity significant. (This F&O was generated during analyses are also provided to support the January 2008 review.) exclusion from the fire PRA.
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| ES-81 ES-8 1-02 (2008 - Verify the basis F Closed The equipment selection analysis does not This F&O has been resolved by additional of excluding low importance sse demonstrate that excluded components are analysis. The risk significance of remains valid) re-evaluated for their fire risk importance. An excluded systems and equipment has iterative approach to validate the been documented in the uncertainty and ES-8 1 met at Capability Category I assumptions made in the initial review of sensitivity analysis to justify the final set of components is required based on Note 2 of SSCs credited in the fire PRA.
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| the standard. (This F&O was generated With this F&O resolved, along with during the January 2008 review.)
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| additional F&Os ES-81-03 (2008) and ES-81-01 (2010), SR ES-81 is judged to be met at Capability Category II based on the verification of low risk importance of excluded SSCs. The 2010 peer review identified a similar finding (see ES-81-01 (201 0) below), but concluded that SR ES-81 is met at Capability Category II.
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| ES-81 ES-8 1-03 (2008 - Recovery action F Closed Recovery actions for potentially significant This F&O has been resolved by additional for potentially significant scenario, multiple spurious operations (MSOs) are not analysis and model updates. A sensitivity drain-down of the refueling water applied, and an example of RWST drain analysis was performed and documented storage tank (RWST)) down was identified. (This F&O was to evaluate the risk significance of EOP and post-fire recovery actions. Important 48
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level ES-8 1 met at Capability Category I generated during the January 2008 review.) actions have been added to the fire PRA model.
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| With this F&O resolved, along with additional F&Os ES-81-02 (2008) and ES-81-01 (201 0), SR ES-81 is judged to be met at Capability Category II. The 2010 peer review concluded that SR ES-81 is met at Capability Category II.
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| ES-81 ES-81-01 (2010- Basis of F Closed Refer to ES-8 1-02 from 2008 peer review See F&O ES-81-02 from 2008 peer excluding low importance SSCs) (above.) (This F&O was generated during review (above.)
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| the December 2010 review.)
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| ES-8 1 met at Capability Category II ES-82 ES-82-01 (2008- MSO effect on F Closed The MSO review does not appear to This F&O has been resolved by additional success criteria) evaluate and disposition the effects of reviews and model updates. The multiple spurious operations on calculations qualitative screening criteria used to ES-82 met at Capability Category I to support the success criteria in the fire evaluate the impact of MSOs on the probabilistic risk assessment (FPRA). (This function success criteria was F&O was generated during the January 2008 supplemented by additional reviews to review.) confirm there were no situations in which the effects of coincident MSOs would impact system success criteria. As a result, MSO of pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) was considered as requiring mitigation as a medium-break instead of a small-break LOCA.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR ES-82 is met at Capability 49
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level Category Ill. (A new suggestion-level F&O ES-82-01 was identified- see below.)
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| ES-82 ES-82-01 (201 0 - Inconsistencies s Closed F&O: Several documentation This suggestion F&O has been resolved and errors in MSO documentation) inconsistencies and errors in the by a documentation update. The MSO documentation of MSO evaluations and report was completely rereviewed and resolutions were noted during the peer revised to correct all identified review. inconsistencies and errors.
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| (This F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
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| CS-A1 CS-A1-01 (2008- Remove s Closed The circuit analysis documentation includes This suggestion F&O has been resolved Appendix R assumption from the an assumption referencing the Appendix R by a documentation update. The circuit circuit analysis calculation) analysis which should be removed. (This analysis documentation was revised to F&O was generated during the January 2008 remove the assumption.
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| review.)
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| CS-A2 CS-A2-01 (2008- Lack of s Closed The cable selection task documentation This suggestion F&O has been closed documentation specifying the does not specify the number of hot shorts with no action taken. The documentation number of hot shorts considered) considered in the analysis. The actual does not identify any limit on the number analysis indicates in most cases the number of hot shorts to be considered.
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| of hot shorts for individual components is not limited. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| CS-A2 CS-A2-03 (2008- (Circuit analysis F Closed A review of has not been completed to Refer to F&O CS-A2-01 from the 2010 for the bypass of motor-operated identify potential circuit failures that could peer review (below).
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| valve (MOV) torque and limit bypass MOV torque and limit switches.
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| 50
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level switches) Where damage to the MOV is possible, manual action to operate the MOV should CS-A2 met at Capability Category not be credited. (This F&O was generated Ill during the January 2008 review.)
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| CS-A2 CS-A2-01 (201 0 - Evaluation of F Closed The scope of MOVs reviewed to identify This F&O has been resolved by additional MOVs required to support the circuit failures that could bypass MOV torque analyses. Action request (AR) A0414724 manual actions in the FPRA) and limit switches and damage the MOV documented the review of MOVs credited such that manual operation is not possible in the Appendix R analysis to address CS-A2 met at Capability Category II does not include all MOVs in the fire PRA. NRC Information Notice 92-18. Additional (This F&O was generated during the review of the fire PRA identified additional December 2010 review.) MOVs not in the scope of AR A0414 724.
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| These MOVs have been evaluated for this failure mode to ensure that manual operation of the MOV is not improperly credited, and the documentation has been revised to reflect the additional evaluations.
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| With this F&O resolved, SR CS-A2 is judged to be met at Capability Category II.
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| (The 2010 peer review concluded that SR CS-A2 is met at Capability Category II.)
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| CS-A6 CS-A6-01 (2008- Associated circuit s Closed The potential for a secondary fire due to a This suggestion F&O has been resolved common enclosures) common enclosure concern related to a load by additional analysis. Additional reviews center transformer fault has not been considering a secondary fire and addressed. (This F&O was generated during additional targets concluded that none of the January 2008 review.) the potential common enclosure associated circuits resulted in risk-significant scenarios. Therefore these 51
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level scenarios were not modeled in the fire PRA.
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| CS-A7 CS-A7-01 (2008 -Three-phase hot F Closed The ISLOCA analysis does not three-phase This F&O has been resolved by a model shorts) hot short consideration for isolation valves, update. Cables associated with isolation and specific valves were identified as not valves where spurious actuation due to CS-A7 not met included. (This F&O was generated during three-phase hot shorts could result in an the January 2008 review.) ISLOCA have been verified in the model, and additional cables for valves identified have been added.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR CS-A7 is met.
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| CS-A8 CS-A8-01 (2008 -Incomplete s Closed The methodology documented for Thermo- This suggestion F&O has been resolved treatment of thermoset and set and Thermo-plastic inter-cable failures is by a model update and completion of thermoplastic cable failures) not complete. (This F&O was generated documentation. The fire modeling of all during the January 2008 review.) areas containing thermoplastic cables have been updated, using a procedure which incorporates the NUREG/CR-6850 guidelines for various material properties for thermoset and thermoplastic cables.
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| CS-A10 CS-A 10-01 (2008 - Potential impact F. Closed The assumptions regarding equipment See F&O ES-81-02 from the 2008 peer of the assumptions of guaranteed guaranteed to fail due to not identifying cable review (above.)
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| failure of non-traced SSCs) routing may be causing a significant The 2010 peer review concluded that SR conservative impact on the results. (This CS-A 10 not met CS-A 10 is met at Capability Category Ill.
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| F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| 52
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level CS-A10 CS-A 10-02 (2008 - Description of s Closed The documentation of guaranteed failed This suggestion F&O has been closed the impact of the guaranteed failure SSCs does not adequately describe the with no action taken. The documentation assumption) impact of this assumption. Some SSCs was reviewed and judged to adequately guaranteed failed are credited in most areas, describe the impact of the guaranteed or the model is modified to address the failure assumption, and for each fire area known information. (This F&O was undergoing detailed fire analysis, a generated during the January 2008 review.) detailed fire risk workbook is provided which identifies the cable impacts.
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| CS-A11 CS-A11-01 (2008- Basis for F Closed Several components use Appendix R as the This F&O has been resolved by a assumed cable routing) basis for cable routing without specific documentation update. The cables cable/circuit review and routing, including associated with the 480 V switchgear CS-A 11 not met some cables associated with risk significant HVAC and damper were analyzed and Associated SRs: scenarios. (This F&O was generated during traced. The remaining assumed cable the January 2008 review.) routing were reviewed and the CS-C3 documentation updated to document the FSS-E4 basis for the routing assumptions The 2010 peer review concluded that SRs CS-A 11 and CS-C3 are not applicable.
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| CS-81 CS-81-01 (2008- Documentation of s Closed Only two (the two more significant items) of This suggestion F&O has been resolved resolution of findings from the 30 findings from a documented review of the by a documentation update. The report associated circuit review report) associated circuit analysis have been has been revised to provide a resolution formally addressed and documented. (This for all 30 observations.
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| Associated SRs: CS-C4 F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| CS-81 CS-81-02 (2008- Potential new s Closed The peer review recommended making the This suggestion F&O has been resolved scenario from associated circuits associated circuits review for new PRA by a documentation update. The 53
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level review) components part of the PRA documentation. associated circuits review and resolution (This F&O was generated during the January of issues has been completed and Associated SRs: CS-C4 2008 review.) included in the documentation. Refer to the resolution of F&O CS-81-01 for additional discussion.
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| CS-C1 CS-C1-01 (2008- Cable Selection s Closed Documentation for cable selection and This suggestion F&O has been resolved calculation in draft form) locations was in draft and needs to be by completion of the documentation finalized. (This F&O was generated during associated with cable selection and Associated SRs: CS-C2 the January 2008 review.) location.
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| PRM-A1 PRM-A1-01 (2008- Binning of level s Closed The total CCDP and CLERP may exceed 1.0 This suggestion F&O has been resolved 1 conditional core damage apparently because the containment event by a change to the quantification method.
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| probability (CCDP) and level 2 tree (CET) success logic for both level1 The core melt and damage states bins are conditional large early release CCDP and level 2 CLERP were binned separate, and, CCDP and CLERP can probability (CLERP) resulting their together. (This F&O was generated during use different quantification cutoffs.
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| total greater than 1.0) the January 2008 review.)
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| Associated SRs:
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| PRM-A2 FQ-A1 PRM-A4 PRM-A4-01 (2008 - Uncertainty and F Closed The uncertainty and sensitivity analyses This F&O has been resolved by sensitivity analyses incomplete) have not been performed. This item could development and documentation of not be verified. (This F&O was generated uncertainty and sensitivity analyses.
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| PRM-A4 not met during the January 2008 review.)
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| SR PRM-A4 in the 2007 PRA Standard has been deleted from 2009 PRA Standard.
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| 54
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level PRM-82 PRM-82-01 (201 0 - Remaining S Closed The peer review identified open items from This suggestion F&O has been resolved open internal event PRA self- the internal event PRA review with negligible by model updates and documentation assessment items) or conservative impact on the fire PRA updates. The internal event and internal results, and no discussion in the fire PRA flood PRAs were peer-reviewed in documentation regarding their impact. (This December 2012. Each F&O identified has F&O was generated during the December been reviewed for impact on the fire PRA 2010 review.) and either resolved by a model update or dispositioned for impact to the fire PRA.
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| PRM-814 PRM-813-01 (2008- Quantification F Closed The fire PRA has not completed analysis of This F&O has been resolved a model of LERF model) fire-induced containment failure (LERF) update. The LERF model for fires has accident progression. (This F&O was been completed and documented.
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| PRM-814 not met generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| The 2010 peer review team concluded Associated SRs: PRM-815 that SR PRM-814 is met.
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| (Note that PRM-813 and PRM-814 are now PRM-8 14 and PRM-8 15 in the current standard.)
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| PRM-815 PRM-815-01 (2010- Documenting F Closed The documentation of containment isolation This F&O has been resolved with a low probability of multiple open does not include multiple small openings, documentation update. The pathways leading to greater than which combined would exceed the 3-inch documentation has been revised to 3-inch opening in containment) criteria for large releases. The peer review disposition all potential large release concluded that these could be screened on pathways including consideration of PRM-815 met low probability. (This F&O was generated multiple containment penetrations.
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| Associated SRs: PRM-C1 during the December 2010 review.)
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| PRM-C1 PRM-C1-01 (2010- Documenting s Closed The documentation of plant modifications This suggestion F&O has been resolved future plant modifications credited) credited in the fire PRA is not clear. (This by a documentation update. The F&O was generated during the December documentation was revised to include 55
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level 2010 review.) identification of credited modifications.
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| PRM-C1 PRM-C1-02 (2010- Modeling of F Closed The current model assumes RCP seal This F&O has been resolved by a model new low leakage RCP seals) LOCAs cannot occur due to the type of seals update. The RCP seal model was used; however, random seal failures can modified based on the vendor guidance PRM-C1 met occur as well as failure due to continued documents to include both human error operation of the RCP after a loss of seal and random failure modes.
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| cooling. (This F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
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| PRM-C1 PRM-D1-01 (2008 - PRM report in F Closed Documentation for the plant response model This F&O has been resolved by draft form) has portions in draft and other portions not completion of the plant response model complete. This is due to the current status of documentation.
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| PRM-D1 not met the project with the plant response model The 2010 peer review concluded SR (Note that PRM-D1 is now PRM-C1 undergoing updates. (This F&O was PRM-C1 is met. (See F&O PRM-C1-02 in the current standard.) generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| above.)
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| FSS-A1 FSS-A1-01 (2010), justification for s Closed Electrical distribution panels are screened This suggestion F&O has been resolved screening low voltage distribution from fire modeling because fires in these by a documentation update. Screening of panels. panels are not expected to propagate electrical cabinets was performed beyond the ignition source. The referenced consistent with NUREG/CR-6850, and the basis for this screening in the detailed fire procedure has been revised to provide an modeling procedure applies to small control appropriate justification which does not panels rather than distribution panels. (This refer to control panels.
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| F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
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| FSS-A5 FSS-A5-01 (2008 - Incomplete F Closed For many compartments, ignition sources This F&O has been resolved by a model development of detailed fire and target sets associated with high risk update. Since the initial peer review in 56
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level scenarios) compartments has not been completed. A 2008, the fire PRA scenarios have been review of one example fire compartment completed and documented. The 2010 FSS-A5 not met identified that the scenario selection method peer review identified an industry best was not consistent with the intent of the practice for this element.
| |
| standard, and therefore high risk The 2010 peer review concluded SR FSS-compartments are not evaluated in a level of A5 is met at Capability Category Ill.
| |
| depth sufficient to understand the results.
| |
| (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| FSS-A6 FSS-A6-01 (2008 - Incomplete the F Closed The MCR analysis is not complete; this item This F&O has been resolved by fire modeling of the Main Control could not be verified. (This F&O was completion of the MCR analysis. The fire Room (MCR)) generated during the January 2008 review.) modeling of the MCR has been performed and documented.
| |
| FSS-A6 not met The 2010 peer review concluded SR FSS-A6 is met at Capability Category 1/11.
| |
| FSS-81 FSS-81-01 (2008- MCR F Closed Scenarios that require MCR abandonment or This F&O has been resolved by a abandonment analysis) reliance on ex-control room operator actions documentation update. The control room have not been developed, and the criteria abandonment criteria are consistent with FSS-8 1 not met used for abandonment are identified but not NUREG/CR-6850, and this is Associated SRs: FSS-82 justified in the documentation. (This F&O documented.
| |
| was generated during the January 2008 With this F&O resolved, FSS-81 is judged review.)
| |
| to be met.
| |
| FSS-C1 FSS-C1-01 (2008- Use of s Closed The HRR value for cabinets was based upon This suggestion F&O has been closed nonqualified cable heat release rate nonqualified cable. It is likely that most with no changes made. Electrical (HRR) value, in general, for cabinets contain qualified cable so that this is cabinets are assumed to have non-electrical cabinets) a conservative assumption. (This F&O was qualified cables, unless the cables are 57
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level generated during the January 2008 review.) known to be qualified, such as the electrical cabinets in the Cable Spreading Room and the 4 kV Bus Switchgear Rooms. This potential conservatism affecting HRR values is acceptable for calculations of risk changes for the RICT Program.
| |
| FSS-C2 FSS-C2-01 (2008- Lack of time- F Closed A constant HRR was used for scenarios This F&O has been resolved with a model dependent HRR) which are significant contributors; the update. Time dependent HRRs have standard for Capability Category II/III been developed and implemented using FSS-C2 not met requires a time-dependent HRR. (This F&O "the f fire growth, peak, and decay per was generated during the January 2008 NUREG/CR-6850.
| |
| review.)
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded SR FSS-A6 is met at Capability Category IIIII I.
| |
| FSS-C4 FSS-C4-01 (2008 - Conservative s Closed The assumed location of a fire in the fire This suggestion F&O has been resolved treatment of the location of fires in modeling is conservatively chosen as the top by a model change. The approach has the fire modeling) of the component/cabinet. This results in a been modified to follow FAQ-08-0043, conservative treatment of damage, and is such that the point-of-origin is at the top of recommended to be reconsidered for risk- combustibles if visible, otherwise at the significant scenarios. {This F&O was door/vent level.
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| generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| FSS-C5 FSS-C5-01 (2008- Justification for F Closed A technical basis is needed to justify the use The F&O has been resolved with a model the use of damage criteria of of damage temperatures for qualified cable update. The fire modeling of all fire areas qualified cable for nonqualified when a limited amount of nonqualified cable containing thermoplastic cables (or cables cable) is installed in the plant. Use of damage of unknown material which are assumed 58
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level FSS-C5 met at Capability Category temperatures for qualified cables may be to be thermoplastic) were updated, and 1111 nonconservative for targets that include now considers appropriate damage nonqualified cables. (This F&O was criteria for unqualified cables.
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| generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| FSS-C5 FSS-C5-01 (201 0 -Treatment of F. Closed A very limited set of nonqualified cables exist The F&O has been resolved with a model thermoplastic cables) in the plant which should be evaluated using update. See F&O FSS-C5-01 (2008) lower damage/ignition temperatures. If above.
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| FSS-C5 met at Capability Category these cables are present in a fire scenario for 1111 which fire modeling was performed, use of damage criteria for qualified cable may be nonconservative. (This F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
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| FSS-C8 FSS-C8-01 (2008- Treatment of F Closed The treatment of fire wrap is not adequately This F&O has been resolved with a model fire wrap) identified or it effectiveness justified in the update and documentation update.
| |
| documentation. (This F&O was generated Credited fire wrap in each fire area and FSS-C8 not met during the January 2008 review.) fire scenario is documented in its risk modeling workbook.
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded SR FSS-C8 is met.
| |
| FSS-03 FSS-03-01 (2008 - Fire modeling F Closed The fire modeling task is not complete. (This This F&O has been resolved by not completed for all screened F&O was generated during the January 2008 completion of fire modeling and areas) review.) documentation.
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| FSS-03 met at Capability Category The 2010 peer review concluded SR FSS-I 03 is met at Capability Category Ill.
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| 59
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level FSS-05 FSS-05-01 (2008 - Fire s Closed The tray propagation model in This suggestion F&O has been resolved propagation between cable trays NUREG/CR-6850 was not intended to be by a model update. The detailed fire beyond two stacks) used for propagation to horizontal trays modeling has been adjusted to align with beyond one or two stacks. This is not Supplement 1 of NUREG/CR-6850, which considered a finding since this interpretation includes "Cable Tray Propagation" (FAQ of the NUREG/CR-6850 method is a 08-0049.)
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| standard interpretation, and alternate guidance is not yet provided. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| FSS-07 FSS-07-01 (2010- Use of plant F Closed A review of the plant suppression and This F&O has been resolved by additional specific data for suppression and detection systems to confirm it has not review with no model change required. A detection systems) experienced outlier behavior relative to review of plant-specific maintenance and system unavailability has not been testing data for fire suppression and FSS-07 met at Capability Category performed for the heat detectors or the fire detection systems was performed and I
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| suppression systems. (This F&O was results documented. It was concluded generated during the December 201 0 that these systems have not experienced review.) outlier behavior compared to the generic data applied in the fire PRA.
| |
| With this F&O resolved, SR FSS-07 is judged to be met at Capability Category II.
| |
| FSS-08 FSS-08-01 (2008 - Suitability of F Closed The effectiveness of the fire detection and This F&O has been resolved by a detection and suppression systems) suppression systems is included in the fire documentation update. The effectiveness modeling spreadsheets; however evidence of the automatic detection and FSS-08 met of an evaluation of the suitability of detection suppression systems has been evaluated and suppression systems and specific during walkdowns and inspections, and features that may impact these systems was has been included in revised 60
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level not identified in documentation. This documentation.
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| information is contained to some degree in the fire hazard analysis (FHA) but specific discussion in the fire modeling calculations should be included. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| FSS-09 FSS-09-01 (2008 -Incomplete F Closed The smoke damage analysis needs to be This F&O has been resolved by smoke damage analysis) completed for all affected compartments. completion of the smoke damage (This F&O was generated during the January analysis; no model change was required.
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| FSS-09 met at Capability Category 2008 review.) The smoke damage analysis was I completed with no new risk-significant scenarios identified. Smoke damage was evaluated based on the guidance in Appendix T of NUREG/CR-6850.
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-09 is met at Capability Category IIIII I.
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| FSS-010 FSS-01 0-01 (2008- Confirmatory F Closed Confirmatory walkdowns have not been This F&O has been resolved by a walkdowns of detection and performed to verify that as-built plant documentation update. Confirmatory suppression system not done) conditions of detection, suppression, etc. walkdowns have been performed for fire have been characterized appropriately for scenarios per the fire modeling procedure FSS-01 0 not met each analyzed fire scenario. (This F&O was and documented in the fire modeling generated during the January 2008 review.) workbooks.
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-010 is met at Capability Category 111111.
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| 61
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level FSS-D11 FSS-D11-01 (2008 - Confirmatory F Closed Confirmatory walkdowns have not been This F&O has been resolved by a walkdowns of fire sources and performed to confirm that the combinations documentation update. Confirmatory targets not done) of fire sources and target sets appropriately walkdowns have been performed for fire represent the as-built plant conditions. {This scenarios per the fire modeling procedure FSS-D11 not met
| |
| * F&O was generated during the January 2008 as documented in the fire modeling review.) workbooks.
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-D11 is met with a new finding-refer to F&O FSS-D11-01 (below).
| |
| FSS-D11 FSS-D11-01 (2010- Crediting the F Closed Fire modeling for some of the electrical This F&O is not applicable to the RICT incipient detection system for cabinets includes credit for incipient Program. For the use of the fire PRA in electrical cabinets in the Cable detection which is not yet installed. {This the RICT Program, the status of Spreading Room) F&O was generated during the December committed plant changes will be properly 2010 review.) reflected in the CRMP, or other FSS-D11 met compensatory measures will be in place as applicable.
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| FSS-E1 FSS-E1-01 (2008- Use of damage s Closed Damage temperatures for qualified cable are The suggestion F&O has been resolved criteria of qualified cables for used exclusively although sampling indicates with a model update. See F&O unqualified cables) that limited amounts of nonqualified cable FSS-C5-01 (2008) above.
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| are installed in the plant. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| FSS-E1 FSS-E1-01 (2010- Validating type F Closed The documentation of the C0 2 suppression This F&O has been resolved with no of detection system (smoke or system in the Cable Spreading Room does action taken. The fire modeling heat) credited in the Cable not address how the system is actuated to assumption of a single heat detector to Spreading Room) ensure the fire modeling assumptions are actuate the suppression system was valid. The fire modeling is based on confirmed by review of plant drawings and 62
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level FSS-E1 met activation by a single heat detector which is procedures.
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| likely accurate for this system; however, the system function should be validated and accurate modeling of system response should be documented. (This F&O was generated during the December 201 0 review.)
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| FSS-E2 FSS-E2-01 (2010- Use of generic F Closed The basis for the fire suppression system See F&O FSS-D7-01 (2010) above.
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| unavailability for the suppression unavailability factor of 0.01 is not clear.
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| system) Documentation of the fire modeling reports indicates that this value was adopted based FSS-E2 met on a lack of plant-specific information and that this value equates to 80 hours of exposure per year. The report indicates that the value is based on an estimate of maintenance activities; however, no additional detail is provided. (Note: This F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
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| FSS-E3 FSS-E3-01 (2008 - Fire modeling F Closed The fire modeling and accident sequence This F&O has been resolved by a uncertainty) analysis does not include a characterization documentation update. The uncertainty of uncertainty, either qualitative or associated with fire modeling has been FSS-E3 not met quantitative. (This F&O was generated identified and characterized in the during the January 2008 review.) documentation.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-E3 is met at Capability Category Ill.
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| 63
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level FSS-F1 FSS-F1-01 (2008- Exposed F Closed An analysis of exposed structural steel has This F&O has been resolved by a structure steel analysis not dorie) not been performed. (This F&O was documentation update. The exposed generated during the January 2008 review.) structural steel analysis has been FSS-F1 not met completed and documented.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-F1 is met at Capability Category 1/11.
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| FSS-G1 FSS-G1-01 (2008- Multi- F Closed Multi-Compartment Analysis has not be This F&O has been resolved by a compartment analysis not done) performed. (This F&O was generated documentation update. The multi-during the January 2008 review.) compartment analysis has been FSS-G1 not met completed and documented.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-G 1 is met.
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| FSS-G5 FSS-GS-01 (201 0 - use of plant- S Closed When developing the fire barrier failure This suggestion F&O has been resolved specific fire door failure probability) probabilities for the multi-compartment by a model update. The multi-analysis plant-specific data was used to compartment analysis has been updated determine the unavailability for fire dampers to account for plant-specific fire door and penetration seals; however, the generic unavailability, and the scenario unavailability factor for doors provided in frequencies have been updated NUREG/CR-6850 was used. (This F&O was accordingly.
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| generated during the December 2010 review.)
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| FSS-H1 FSS-H1-01 (2008- Documentation F Closed Documentation is not completed; fire This F&O has been resolved by of the detailed fire modeling not modeling is currently in-process; the detailed completing the analysis and complete) fire modeling analyses have not been fully documentation. Fire modeling has been documented. Documentation of uncertainty completed and documented in detailed FSS-H 1 not met analysis, multi-compartment analysis and fire 64
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level Associated F&Os: SR FSS-H2 scenario confirmatory walkdowns is required. fire modeling workbooks.
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| through H1 0. (This F&O was generated during the January See F&O FSS-E3-01 (2008) (above) for 2008 review.)
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| completion of the uncertainty analysis.
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| See F&O FSS-G1-01 (2008) (above) for completion of the multi-compartment analysis.
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-H 1 is met.
| |
| FSS-H4 FSS-H4-01 (2008 -Incomplete F Closed The detailed fire modeling task has not been This F&O has been resolved by detailed fire modeling and completed to permit completion of the completing the analysis and documentation of fire modeling documentation. (This F&O was generated documentation. Fire modeling has been inputs) during the January 2008 review.) completed and documented in detailed fire modeling workbooks.
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| FSS-H4 met FSS-H5 FSS-H5-01 (2008 -Incomplete F Closed No evidence of uncertainty evaluations was This F&O has been resolved by detailed fire modeling and identified in the draft fire modeling results completing the analysis and parametric uncertainty) documentation. (This F&O was generated documentation. Fire modeling has been during the January 2008 review.) completed and documented in detailed FSS-H5 met at Capability Category fire modeling workbooks. The results of I the parameter uncertainty was performed and documented.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FSS-H5 is met at Capability Category II, with a new finding; see FSS-H5-01 (201 0) below.
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| 65
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level FSS-H5 FSS-H5-01 (201 0 - Lack of F Closed The documentation does not clearly identify This F&O has been resolved by a documenting the cause of the target the cause of the target damage (i.e., heat doGumentation update. The risk modeling damage) effects, smoke.) Smoke damage is a workbooks have been revised to identify consideration and can be the cause of target the cause of target damage.
| |
| FSS-H5 met at Capability Category damage. However, the analysis results II documentation do not differentiate between Associated SRs: FSS-09 smoke and heat damage. (This F&O was generated during the December 201 0 review.)
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| IGN-A4 IGN-A4-01 (2008- Possible F Closed There have been two DG fires at DCPP This F&O has been resolved by a Bayesian update for DG fire documented in the plant-specific fire documentation update. The two DG fires frequency or provide justification) experience. A Bayesian update for the DG have been further reviewed and additional fire frequency should be performed, or a justification for not using the plant-specific IGN-A4 met at Capability Category more detailed justification of the basis for not experience has been documented. The II performing the Bayesian update should be use of generic fire frequency data without Associated SRs: IGN-B4 documented, and this issue identified as an a Bayesian update has been specifically epistemic sources of uncertainty. (This F&O addressed as a source of uncertainty.
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| was generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| IGN-A9 IGN-A9-01 (2008 - Ranking or s Closed The transient fire ranking for several areas This suggestion F&O has been resolved weighing of transient fire for some should be reviewed and possibly modified to by additional review and model updates.
| |
| fire areas) account for the as-operated condition. The The influence factors have been peer review identified example areas where rereviewed and adjusted as necessary, occupancy and maintenance or testing and the results and basis documented.
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| activities could occur. (This F&O was The specific areas identified by the peer generated during the January 2008 review.) review team were updated.
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| 66
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level IGN-85 IGN-85-01 (2008 - "Zero" cable s Closed For several physical analysis units there is a This suggestion F&O has been resolved loading) comment "no data, assumed to be zero" by a documentation update, validating pertaining to evaluating the weight of cable. and documenting the "zero" cable loading While this appears to be a reasonable assumption.
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| assumption, it is not captured as an assumption in the documentation. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| QNS-A1 QNS-A 1-01 (2008 - Need to iterate s Closed Quantitative screening criteria include two This suggestion F&O has been resolved the screening process again the criteria for a single scenario, a fire area by update of screening of scenarios to criteria once the model is finalized) screening criteria (1 E-07/year CDF, ensure that both screening criteria are 1E-08/year LERF), and a cumulative satisfied.
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| screening criteria (1 0% of the risk). Process should include a possible iteration of the Fire Area screening criteria in order to ensure the cumulative criteria are met. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| QNS-81 QNS-81-01 (2008- Lack of F Closed Compartments with risk below the screening This F&O has been resolved by a documenting the screened fire criteria and the risk results are not documentation update. The areas) documented. It is not possible to verify that documentation was confirmed to list the all fire areas and compartments identified in fire compartments with risk below the QNS-81 not met the plant partitioning have been analyzed. screening criteria, including both CDF and Associated SRs: QNS-01 (This F&O was generated during the January LERF.
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| 2008 review.)
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR QNS-81 is met.
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| QNS-81 QNS-81-02 (2008- Lack of LERF F Closed LERF results are part of the screening See F&O QNS-81-01 (2008) above.
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| 67
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level screening results) criteria but are not documented. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 QNS-81 not met review.)
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| Associated SRs: QNS-01 CF-A1 CF-A1-01 (2008- Clarify the use of s Closed The calculation of spurious operation This suggestion F&O was closed with no the loss of power (LOP) for the fault probability includes LOP as a failure mode action taken. After review, PG&E judged condition) for numerous components. LOP as a fault that additional clarification to LOP condition is confusing, unless LOP causes a consequence in the circuit analysis is spurious operation. (This F&O was unnecessary.
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| generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| CF-A1 CF-A 1-02 (2008 - Circuit failure F Closed Circuit failure probabilities are incorrectly This F&O has been resolved by a model probability estimate involving combined when there are multiple cables in update. The circuit failure mode dependent/independent circuits a fire area. As a result, the spurious probability calculations have been revised (e.g., off-scheme or interlock operation probabilities used are conservative to properly combine multiple cable failure circuits)) by a factor of two. (This F&O was generated probabilities.
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| during the January 2008 review.)
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| CF-A 1 not met The 2010 peer review concluded that this SR was met at Capability Category I with a new finding F&O CF-A1-01 (2010).
| |
| CF-A1 CF-A 1-03 (2008 - Three-phase hot s Closed Three-phase hot shorts are not addressed in See F&O CS-A?-01 (above).
| |
| shorts) the circuit failure probability analysis, and the peer review team identified one example.
| |
| (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
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| 68
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| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level CF-A1 CF-A 1-04 (2008 - Component type s Closed* The component type is not included in the This suggestion F&O has been resolved not identified in documentation) documentation of spurious operation with no action taken. The description of probability. (This F&O was generated during each component is judged adequate to the January 2008 review.) identify the component type.
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| CF-A1 CF-A 1-05 (2008 - Mismatch s Closed The hot short probability analysis does not This suggestion F&O was closed with no between documents) match the component selection and impact action taken. The examples of apparent matrix results. The peer review team documentation mismatches were provided specific examples. (This F&O was reviewed and dis positioned as correct as generated during the January 2008 review.) is. No document updates or other model changes were required.
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| CF-A1 CF-A1-06 (2008- Fault clearing of s Closed Air-operated valves (AOVs), PORVs, This suggestion F&O was closed with no fail-safe valves) solenoid-operated valves (SOVs), etc., that action taken. The current industry will return to their fail-safe position on loss of guidance has not yet fully resolved this power should be considered for application issue. The existing assumption that hot of a recovery factor considering spurious shorts do not clear is conservative and actuation duration, using industry guidance. acceptable.
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| (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| CF-A1 CF-A 1-01 (201 0 - Detailed circuit F Closed A substantial number of risk significant This F&O has been resolved with a model failure calculations for risk components need to have circuit failure update. The circuit failure probabilities significant components using probabilities updated to make use of the were updated for basic events with risk appropriate method (e.g., FAQ 08- methodology provided in FAQ 08-0047, reduction worth (RRW) values greater 047)) since the current calculations are than 1. 05 for fire CDF and LERF conservative. (This F&O was generated employing the FAQ 08-0047 69
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level CF-A 1 met at Capability Category I during the December 2010 review.) methodology.
| |
| With this F&O resolved, PG&E judges that SR CF-A 1 is now met at Capability Category 11/111, based on consideration of the specific circuit configuration for risk-significant components.
| |
| CF-A2 CF-A2-01 (2008- Uncertainty F Closed Uncertainty values and distribution types for This F&O has been resolved with a values and distribution types for the the circuit failure probabilities was not documentation update. The circuit failure probabilities not provided in the analysis files, CF tables or in documentation was revised to add a provided) RISKMAN. (This F&O was generated discussion on distribution types and during the January 2008 review.) uncertainty values for the circuit failure CF-A2 not met probabilities.
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| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR CF-A2 is met.
| |
| CF-81 CF-81-01 (2010 -Inconsistencies in s Closed A spot check of circuit failure calculations This suggestion F&O has been resolved documentation of circuit failure identified several inconsistencies in the by a documentation update. The calculations) values presented in different parts of the documentation has been revised to report. This was characterized as a correct inconsistencies.
| |
| documentation issue by the peer review team. (This F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
| |
| HRA-A3 HRA-A3-01 (201 0 - Basis for F Closed The basis for screening undesired actions in This F&O has been resolved by additional screening undesired actions in response to spurious annunciators [and review and update of the documentation.
| |
| response to spurious annunciators) indications] is either inadequate or not The screening basis for all annunciators provided in the documentation. The peer and indications was reviewed and HR-A3 met at Capability Category II review team provided specific examples. confirmed to be acceptable. The specific 70
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level (This F&O was generated during the examples identified were corrected in the December 2010 review.) documentation.
| |
| HRA-81 HRA-81-01 (2008- Additional F Closed The instrumentation required for This F&O has been resolved by additional instrumentation beyond that implementation of feed-and-bleed cooling evaluations and model updates. A review explicitly addressed in the internal includes RCS pressure and temperature was conducted of operator actions to events PRA (e.g., RCS pressure indications for ensuring adequate, but not identify additional equipment or cables to and temperature indications in excessive, heat removal. The fire PRA does be evaluated; this included the feed-and-support of bleed-and-feed not assess potential fire-induced failure of bleed action.
| |
| operation) these instruments. (This F&O was generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| HRA-81 met HRA-83 HRA-83-01 (2008- Basis for s Closed There are cases where a single spurious This suggestion F&O has been closed screening undesired operator operation could lead to an indication calling with no action taken. Actions taken in actions in response to spurious for operator action without first verifying the response to spurious annunciators are annunciator indications) validity of the indication. These are not in component protection actions to trip the the fire PRA model, and are only required to piece of equipment. As such, the be considered to meet Capability Category component is actually available for Ill of the SR HRA-83. Since the review has subsequent use. Since these scenarios already identified these actions, it would be are inconsequential, they have not been prudent to incorporate these into the model. incorporated into the fire PRA.
| |
| HRA-C1 HRA-C1-01 (2008- Open F&Os F Closed The F&Os from a focused-scope peer review The internal events HRA was updated in from the focused peer review of of HRA for the internal event PRA model, 2012 and included review and resolution HRA in 2007) conducted in 2007, have not yet been of the previous F&Os. Results of the resolved, and could impact the fire PRA. updated internal event HRA were HRA-C1 not met (This F&O was generated during the January incorporated into the fire HRA.
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| 2008 review.)
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR HRA-C1 is met at Capability 71
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level Category II with a new finding F&O HRA-C1-01 (201 0).
| |
| HRA-C1 HRA-C1-02 (2008- No detailed F Closed HFEs for actions identified from the fire This F&O has been resolved by analyses addressing conditions response procedure have not yet been completion of the detailed analyses for the associated with a specific fire assessed in detail due to the current status important operator actions modeled in the scenario) of the fire HRA, and a screening assessment fire PRA.
| |
| only has been performed. (This F&O was HRA-C1 not met The 2010 peer review concluded that generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| SR HRA-C1 is met at Capability Category II with a new finding F&O HRA-C1-01 (201 0).
| |
| HRA-C1 HRA-C1-01 (2010- HRA F Closed The final check for dependent operator This F&O has been resolved by dependency analysis) actions has not been completed. (This F&O completion of the fire PRA HRA was generated during the December 2010 dependency analysis.
| |
| HRA-C1 met at Capability Category review.)
| |
| II HRA-01 HRA-01-01 (2008- Recovery F Closed No recovery analysis beyond the HFEs This F&O has been resolved by a model actions for risk significant fire included initially in the model has yet been update. A review of the dominant scenarios) performed based on the status of the fire scenarios and areas was conducted, and PRA. (This F&O was generated during the appropriate recovery actions were added HRA-01 not met January 2008 review.) to the model. Screening analyses were initially incorporated followed by detailed analyses for the important operator actions modeled.
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR HRA-01 is met at Capability Category II.
| |
| 72
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AG-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level HRA-E1 HRA-E1-01 (2008- Open F&Os F Closed See F&O HRA-C1-01 (2008) above. See F&O HRA-C1-01 (2008) above.
| |
| from the focused peer review of HRA in 2007)
| |
| HRA-E1 not met HRA-E1 HRA-E1-02 (2008- Uncertainty F Closed Detailed HRA assessments are not yet This F&O has been resolved by analysis) performed and documented. Documentation completion of the detailed HRA analyses of assumptions and sources of uncertainty and documentation of uncertainty HRA-E1 not met has also not yet been done. (This F&O was considerations generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR HRA-E1 is met.
| |
| SF-A1 SF-A1-01 (2010- Clarify which F Closed The seismic-fire interaction review relies in This F&O has been resolved by a areas were considered in the part on the IPEEE conclusions based on documentation update. The Individual Plant Examination for previously conducted walkdowns. While the documentation was revised to External Events (IPEEE) walkdown) analysis appears to be adequate, the IPEEE demonstrate the areas considered in the does not provide sufficient documentation to IPEEE walkdown were consistent with the SF-A1 met determine areas considered and areas global plant analysis boundary (GPAB) screened. (This F&O was generated during considered in the current fire PRA, and the December 2010 review.) that the conclusions adequately support the seismic-fire interaction analysis.
| |
| SF-A3 SF-A3-01 (201 0- Clear conclusion F Closed The assessment of the potential for CCF of This F&O has been resolved by a on CCF of suppression systems) multiple fire suppression systems due to the documentation update. The seismically-induced failure of supporting documentation was revised to disposition SF-A3 met systems is not conclusive. This was CCF of fire protection systems due to a characterized by the peer review team as a seismic event as not credible.
| |
| documentation issue. (This F&O was generated during the December 201 0 73
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AS-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level review.)
| |
| SF-A5 SF-A5-01 (2010- Document F Open The seismic-fire interaction analysis This F&O has no impact on the RICT needed to be revised) identified a recommendation to include fire Program. Update to training programs is brigade training to cope with a seismically- being tracked by a plant action item, and SF-A5 met induced fires and associated system, will be closed when SAP Notification equipment, communications, and brigade 50294777, Task #23 is implemented fully.
| |
| access logistics. This update to training has The status of training has no impact on not yet been implemented. (This F&O was calculations of risk changes associated generated during the December 201 0 with the RICT Program.
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| review.)
| |
| SF-81 SF-81-01 (2010- Editorial changes s Closed The documentation of the seismic-fire This suggestion F&O has been resolved to documentation) interaction can benefit from a technical by a documentation update to correct editing. A number of typographical errors editorial errors in the seismic-fire were noted, and examples provided. (This interaction documentation.
| |
| F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
| |
| FQ-A1 FQ-A 1-01 (2008 - Mapping s Closed It is difficult to verify the circuit failure This suggestion F&O has been closed between circuit failure analysis and analysis impact vs. the fire PRA component . with no action taken. A review of the the basic events) without the PRA basic event in the fire documentation confirmed that a complete impact matrix. (This F&O was generated mapping from cables to raceways to fire Associated SRs: PRM-A1-01.
| |
| during the January 2008 review.) PRA components to PRA basic events is provided.
| |
| FQ-81 FQ-81-01 (2008- Complete F Closed The sequence quantification and This F&O has been resolved by quantification and document the documentation is in process, but is not yet completion of quantification of the fire completed. (This F&O was generated during PRA model and the associated 74
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition*
| |
| Level results) the January 2008 review.) documentation.
| |
| FQ-81 not met The 2010 peer review concluded that SR FQ-81 is met with one new F&O FQ Associated SRs: FQ-C1, FQ-D1, 01 (201 0).
| |
| FQ-E1, and FQ-F1.
| |
| FQ-81 FQ-81-01 (2010- Truncation F Closed The fire PRA does not achieve convergence This F&O has been resolved by a model analysis) at the current truncation level. Establishing a update. The truncation level in the fire proper truncation level is required by QU-82 PRA model is documented to FQ-81 met and QU-83, referenced in FQ-81. A proper demonstrate convergence.
| |
| Associated F&Os: FQ-F1 truncation level is required to ensure that quantification results properly reflect the risk contributors, and that significant sequences and/or contributors are not eliminated. The increases in CDF and LERF by lowering the truncation frequency by one order of magnitude are greater than 5% (QU-83 requirement.) (This F&O was generated during the December 2010 review.)
| |
| FQ-E1 FQ-E1-01 (2010- Reasonableness s Closed The peer review team identified This suggestion F&O has been resolved and consistency check of modeling, recommendations to address additional by a documentation update. A discussion sequences, and importance items not apparent in the fire modeling of the review of non-risk significant core measures) document. (This F&O was generated during damage sequences and of the the December 201 0 review.) reasonableness of the results of the importance measures was added to the documentation.
| |
| FQ-F1 FQ-F1-01 (201 0- Documentation of s Closed The peer review team identified This suggestion F&O has resolved by a asymmetries modeling, mutually recommendations to address additional documentation update. The items 75
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level exclusive events, and modeling items not apparent in the quantification identified have been included in the convergence) document. (This F&O was generated during documentation.
| |
| the December 2010 review.)
| |
| UNC-A1 UNC-A1-01 (2008- Uncertainty F Closed The uncertainty and sensitivity analyses This F&O has been resolved by analysis not done) have not yet been completed. (This F&O completion of the uncertainty and was generated during the January 2008 sensitivity analyses and documentation.
| |
| UNC-A 1 not met review.)
| |
| The 2010 peer review concluded that SR Associated SRs: UNC-A2, UNC-A3 UNC-A1 is met with one new F&O UNC-A1-01(2010).
| |
| UNC-A1 UNC-A1-01 (2010- Editorial s Closed A more specific identification of the physical This suggestion F&O has been closed changes) modeling aspect related to each source of with no action taken. A review of the uncertainty could be identified. (This F&O uncertainty documentation identified that was generated during the December 201 0 the impact of uncertainties on modeling review.) assumptions are addressed.
| |
| MU-A1 MU-A1-01 (2008- Update PRA F Closed Administrative procedures for control of the This F&O has been resolved by updating administrative procedures to include PRA model should be modified to address the administrative procedures to address fire considerations) fire-specific issues. (This F&O was fire PRA issues.
| |
| generated during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| MU-A1 met The 2010 peer review concluded that SR MU-A1 is met.
| |
| Associated SRs: MU-A2, MU-81 through MU-84, MU-C1, MU-E1, MU-F1 MU-A2 MU-A2-01 (2008 -Include F Closed Administrative procedures for control of the This F&O has been resolved by updating monitoring, reviewing changes in PRA model do not explicitly require the administrative procedures to address PRA technology and industry monitoring changes in PRA technology and changes in PRA technology and industry 76
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table A6-4 Diablo Canyon Fire PRA Peer Review F&Os and Disposition SR Topic F&O Status Finding Disposition Level operating experience (OE)) industry OE. (This F&O was generated OE.
| |
| during the January 2008 review.)
| |
| MU-A2 not met The 2010 peer review concluded that SR MU-A2 is met.
| |
| MU-83 MU-83-01 (2008 - PRA staff s Closed There are no formal PRA training This suggestion F&O has been closed training) documents, but formal PRA training and a with no action taken. Diablo Canyon qualification program that involves on-the-job Power Plant's (DCPP's) PRA staff training for new PRA engineers under the participate various in-house and industry guidance of qualified, experienced PRA sponsored (e.g., EPRI, NEI, vendors) engineers does exist. Fire PRA seminar and training program including qualifications are not yet included in the fire modeling, circuit analysis, FPRA formal process. (This F&O was generated modeling. DCPP PRA also uses the during the January 2008 review.) mentoring program to train its new PRA.
| |
| MU-C1 MU-C1-01 (2008- Cumulative s Closed The update process does not ensure a This suggestion F&O has been resolved effect of outstanding model review of the significance of all outstanding by updating the administrative procedures changes) changes. (This F&O was generated during to consider the significance of outstanding the January 2008 review.) changes.
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| 77
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 References
| |
| : 1. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Industry Guidance Document, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0, November 2006.
| |
| : 2. Regulatory Guide 1.200, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, Revision 0, February 2004.
| |
| : 3. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
| |
| : 4. Westinghouse Letter LTR-RAM-11-13-002, "RG 1.200 PRA Peer Review Against the ASME/ANS PRA Standard Requirements for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment," March 20, 2013.
| |
| : 5. ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Levei1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Addendum A to RA-S-2008, ASME, New York, NY, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, February 2009.
| |
| : 6. Westinghouse Letter LTR-RAM-13-04, "Peer Review of Diablo Canyon Power Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment Against the Seismic PRA Standard SRs of the ASME/ANS Standard for Levei1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plant Applications," May 1, 2013.
| |
| : 7. Westinghouse Letter LTR-RAM-11-08-019, "Pilot Application of the Fire PRA Peer Review Process for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment," October 17, 2008.
| |
| : 8. American Nuclear Society (ANS) Standard, FPRA Methodology, ANSI/ANS-58.23-2007.
| |
| : 9. Westinghouse Letter LTR-RAM-11-11-004, "Fire PRA Peer Review Against the Fire PRA Standard SRs From Section 4 of the ASME/ANS Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plant Applications for the Diablo Canyon Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment," May 24, 2011.
| |
| 78
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 6 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106
| |
| : 10. Rood, H., et. al., "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2," NUREG-0675, Supplement No. 34, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, June 1991.
| |
| : 11. U.S. NRC to G. M. Rueger, "Transmittal of Safety Evaluation Closing Out Diablo Canyon Long-Term Seismic Program (TAC Nos. M80670 and M80671)," April17, 1992.
| |
| : 12. Regulatory Guide 1.200, "An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities," Revision 2, March 2009.
| |
| 79
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 7 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 7 Information Supporting Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
| |
| Models without PRA Standards Endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200, Revision 2 1
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 7 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Information Supporting Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
| |
| Models without PRA Standards Endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2 This attachment is not applicable to the Diablo Canyon submittal. PG&E is not proposing to use any PRA models in its Risk-Informed Completion Time Program for which a PRA standard, endorsed by the NRC in RG 1.200, does not exist.
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| 2
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 8 Information Supporting Justification of Excluding Sources of Risk Not Addressed by the Diablo Canyon Probabilistic Risk Assessment Models 1
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DC L-13-1 06 Information Supporting Justification of Excluding Sources of Risk Not Addressed by the Diablo Canyon Probabilistic Risk Assessment Models Introduction Section 4.0, Item 5 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
| |
| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide a justification for excluding any risk sources determined to be insignificant to the calculation of configuration-specific risk, and will provide a discussion of any conservative or bounding analyses to be applied to the calculation of risk-informed completion times (RICTs) for sources of risk not addressed by the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models.
| |
| Scope NEI 06-09 and the associated Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Owners Group (PWROG) guidance (Reference 3) do not provide a specific list of hazards to be considered in an RICT Program. However, NUREG-1855 (Reference 4) provides regulatory guidance on risk-informed decision-making relative to hazards that are not considered in the PRA model. Specifically, Section 6 of NUREG-1855 provides the following list of external hazards that should be addressed either via a bounding analysis or included in a PRA calculation:
| |
| * Aircraft Impacts
| |
| * External Flooding
| |
| * Extreme Winds and Tornados (including generated missiles)
| |
| * External Fires
| |
| * Accidents From Nearby Facilities
| |
| * Pipeline Accidents (e.g., natural gas)
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| * Release of Chemicals Stored at the Site
| |
| * Seismic Events
| |
| * Transportation Accidents
| |
| * Turbine-Generated Missiles The scope of this enclosure is consideration of the above hazards for Diablo Canyon, except for seismic events which are addressed by a PRA model.
| |
| Technical Approach The guidance contained in NEI 06-09 states that all hazards that contribute significantly to incremental risk of a configuration must be quantitatively addressed in the implementation of RMTS. Consistent with NUREG-1855, the process includes the ability to address external hazards by:
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| 2
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
| |
| * Screening the hazard based on a low frequency of occurrence,
| |
| * Bounding the potential impact and including it in the decision-making, or
| |
| * Developing a PRA model to be used in the risk management action time (RMAT)/RICT calculation.
| |
| The ASME/ANS PRA Standard (Reference 5) has endorsed the following set of five external hazard screening criteria:
| |
| (1) The hazard would result in equal or lesser damage than the events for which the plant has been designed. This requires an evaluation of plant design bases to estimate the resistance of plant structures and systems to a particular external hazard.
| |
| (2) The hazard has a significantly lower mean frequency of occurrence than another event (taking into account the uncertainties in the estimates of both frequencies},
| |
| and the hazard could not result in worse consequences than the other event.
| |
| (3) The hazard cannot occur close enough to the plant to affect it. Application of this criterion needs to take into account the range of magnitudes of the hazard for the recurrence frequencies of interest.
| |
| (4) The hazard is included in the definition of another event.
| |
| (5) The hazard is slow in developing, and it can be demonstrated that sufficient time exists to eliminate the source of the threat or to provide an adequate response.
| |
| The review of external hazards considers two aspects of the contribution to risk. The first is the contribution from the occurrence of beyond design basis conditions (i.e.,
| |
| winds greater than design). These beyond design basis conditions challenge the functionality of the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) to support safe shutdown of the plant. The second aspect addressed are the challenges caused by external conditions that are within the design basis, but still require some plant response to assure safe shutdown (i.e., high winds causing loss of offsite power). While the plant design basis assures that the safety-related equipment necessary to respond to these challenges are protected, the occurrence of these conditions nevertheless cause a demand on these systems and can impact configuration risk.
| |
| Note that when the effect of a particular hazard is not mitigatable using the plant SSCs, then there is no impact on the changes in risk calculated to support the RICT Program, and so these hazards can be screened as well. Only events which create a demand for mitigation equipment are potentially relev~nt to the RICT Program.
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| 3
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 The review and disposition of each external hazard is addressed in Table A8-1. Unless otherwise specified, all information is based on the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) (Reference 6).
| |
| 4
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A8-1 Evaluation of Risks from External Hazards External Hazard Evaluation Disposition for RICT Program Aircraft Impacts There is one airport at San Luis Obispo and there Projected air traffic from the small airport and airways are several airways in the vicinity of Diablo Canyon. does not pose a significant safety impact to Diablo The airport is located approximately 12.5 miles Canyon based on the design of the facility and the east-northeast of the plant. The airport is a general low frequency of core damage due to such events.
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| aviation county airport with some scheduled Impacts which were evaluated to cause structural commercial service. The airways include low-level failures result in direct core damage, and therefore federal airways used by small general aviation type have no impact on the RICT Program calculations.
| |
| aircraft, high level jet routes used by large air The consequences of a lesser impact are bounded by carriers, and military training routes used by fighter- a LOOP, are the same as any LOOP initiating event.
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| type aircraft. Impacts which were evaluated to It is therefore concluded that no unique PRA model cause structural failures result in direct core for aircraft impacts is required in order to assess damage; the bounding core damage frequency configuration risk for the RICT Program.
| |
| (CDF) is less than 1E-6 per year. Other effects of impacts which do not result in direct core damage would be bounded by a loss of offsite power (LOOP).
| |
| External Flooding The external flooding hazard is discussed in the External flooding scenarios do not pose a significant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Sections 2.4 safety impact to Diablo Canyon based on the design and 3.4, and includes flooding from a maximum of the facility and conformance to the SRP. A loss of probable hurricane, tsunami, high tide, storm all ASW pumps due to external flooding can be waves, probable maximum precipitation, and a screened based on bounding analysis that shows a severely degraded breakwater. A review of these CDF of less than 1E-6 per year. It is therefore hazards concluded that Diablo Canyon conforms to concluded that no unique PRA model for external the Standard Review Plan (SRP), (NUREG 800) flooding scenarios is required in order to assess criteria (Reference 7); therefore, there are no configuration risk for the RICT Program.
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| vulnerabilities.
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| Another possible flooding source considered in Reference 6 is the raw water reservoirs located on 5
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A8-1 Evaluation of Risks from External Hazards External Hazard Evaluation Disposition for RICT Program the hill behind the plant at elevation 31 0 feet. There are two reservoirs, each holding about 2.25 million gallons. It is unlikely that the reservoirs can fail in such a way to pose a threat to the plant. However, a worst case scenario was evaluated in and the study concluded that the depth of flooding is not expected to cause serious damage to the plant. In addition, the flood will only be temporary and not sustained.
| |
| The Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) pumps are subject to damage due to external flooding. An evaluation in Reference 6 concluded that the total frequency of losing all four ASW pumps was 5. 7E-5 per year, and the CDF was 7 .2E-7 per year. However, this evaluation does not consider the currently installed reactor coolant pump (RCP) high temperature seals, or the planned installation of passive shutdown seals. These modifications would significantly reduce the CDF such that this event would not be quantitatively significant.
| |
| Extreme Winds and A review of the analysis in the FSAR shows that the Extreme winds and tornadoes within the design basis Tornados (including critical concrete structures at Diablo Canyon can do not pose a significant safety impact to Diablo generated missiles) withstand at least a 200-mph wind without major Canyon based on the design of the structures, low damage (such as collapse of a wall or overturning of frequency of occurrence of the events, and a structure). The annual frequency of excessive conformance to the SRP. Beyond design basis tornado wind (greater than or equal to 200 mph) on events have extremely low frequencies, and can be the structures was calculated to be less than 3.2E-7 screened. It is therefore concluded that no unique per year. The annual frequency of excessive PRA model for extreme winds and tornadoes is
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| ------------~--------~---*****--*-*******-******--*********-------
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| 6
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AS-1 Evaluation of Risks from External Hazards External Hazard Evaluation Disposition for RICT Program hurricane wind (greater than or equal to 150 mph) required in order to assess configuration risk for the !
| |
| on the structures was calculated to be 3.2E-12 per RICT Program.
| |
| year.
| |
| The site design basis for high winds and tornadoes was reviewed, and conform to the appropriate SRP criteria for high winds and tornadoes.
| |
| External Fires A review of the plant layout shows that the hazard The impact of an external fire is bounded by the to the plant from external fires is not significant existing LOOP initiating event. It is therefore except for the hillside area to the east of the plant concluded that no unique PRA model for external .
| |
| (Reference 6). There was one instance in 1982 fires is required in order to assess configuration risk (prior to commercial operation) where nearby brush for the RICT Program.
| |
| fire caused a partial LOOP. If an external fire of the 1982 type and magnitude were to reoccur at the site, the most likely impact would be limited to a partial or total LOOP.
| |
| Accidents From Industry in the vicinity of the plant site is mainly light Nearby facility accidents do not pose a significant Nearby Facilities and of a local nature serving the needs of safety impact to Diablo Canyon based on agriculture in the area. The largest industrial conformance to the SRP. It is therefore concluded complex is Vandenberg Air Force Base, located that no unique PRA model for facility accidents is about 35 miles south-southeast of the site. The required in order to assess configuration risk for the Point San Luis lighthouse and Coast Guard RICT Program.
| |
| Reservation are approximately 6-1/2 miles east-southeast of the site.
| |
| A review of nearby facilities was conducted and concluded that Diablo Canyon conformed to the appropriate SRP criteria.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Table AB-1 Evaluation of Risks from External Hazards External Hazard Evaluation Disposition for RICT Program Pipeline Accidents No natural gas or other pipelines pass within five There are no pipelines in sufficient proximity to the (e.g., natural gas) miles of Diablo Canyon. plant site to cause a significant hazard. It is therefore concluded that no unique PRA model for pipeline accidents is required in order to assess configuration risk for the RICT Program.
| |
| i Release of Chemicals The hazard from chemicals stored onsite is There are no chemicals on site which can cause a Stored at the Site dominated by the potential effect of a spill on control significant safety hazard. It is therefore concluded room habitability. The initiating event would be a that no unique PRA model for chemical releases is chemical spill or tank rupture caused, for example, required in order to assess configuration risk for the by a handling accident, container failure, or some RICT Program.
| |
| other accident. After the material is released, to contribute significantly to risk, it must be carried by some mechanism to the control room air intake.
| |
| The only hazardous chemical on site that may pose a hazard to the control room operators is ammonium hydroxide. This chemical has since been replaced by ethanolamine (ETA); analysis of the effects of an ETA spill on site demonstrated that it does not create any hazard to the control room operators under either normal or emergency control room ventilation operation. !
| |
| Transportation The plant intake structure, which houses the safety- Transportation accidents involving ships cannot Accidents related ASW pumps, is located on the coastline. cause damage to the plant under normal conditions, The potential hazard to the intake structure and the and are shown to have a bounding CDF of less than ASW system from maritime vessels was analyzed, 1E-6 per year for degraded conditions. It is therefore and scenarios involving ship breakthrough of the concluded that no unique PRA model for breakwater in its norma! s!a!_e_(nQt__QE3_grad~dj:>y___ Jr(!n~pqrtation accidents is required in order to assess 8
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table AB-1 Evaluation of Risks from External Hazards External Hazard Evaluation Disposition for RICT Program heavy wave action) were shown to be not possible configuration risk for the RICT Program.
| |
| due to the speed required to generate the kinetic energy needed to physically force a passage.
| |
| Scenarios involving oil spills and other floating debris were also concluded to have no consequence. Analysis scenarios involving a degraded breakwater, therefore increasing the possibility of a ship arriving in the intake cove, resulted in a core damage frequency of 2E-8 per year. Scenarios involving a ship blocking the flow of water into the intake cove result in a core damage frequency of 5E-9 per year.
| |
| Turbine-Generated A plant-specific evaluation (Reference 8) of turbine Turbine missile damage to the Containment or Fuel Missiles missile generation, targets, and potential effects Handling buildings is not mitigatable and therefore concluded that there is a low frequency of core has no impact to configuration risk calculations. The damage due to these events. The Containment and frequency of missile damage to the Auxiliary and Fuel Handling buildings are the most significant Turbine buildings or outdoor storage tanks is very targets; a hypothetical turbine missile penetration is small compared to the failure probabilities of assumed to cause direct fuel damage. The CDF equipment from other modeled failure modes, and due to turbine missile damage to the Auxiliary or would have negligible impact on the RICT Program Turbine buildings (which house mitigation calculations. It is therefore concluded that no unique equipment) or outdoor water storage tanks are less PRA model for turbine missile accidents is required in than 1E-6 per year. order to assess configuration risk for the RICT Program.
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 8 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI}, May 17, 2007.
| |
| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Revision 0, November 2006.
| |
| : 3. WCAP-16952-NP, Supplemental Implementation Guidance for the Calculation of Risk Informed Completion Time and Risk Managed Action Time for RITSTF Initiative 48, August 2010.
| |
| : 4. NUREG-1855, Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making, Volume 1, March 2009.
| |
| : 5. American Society of Mechanical Engineers and American Nuclear Society, Addenda to ASMEIANS RA-S-2008 Standard for Levei1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, New York (NY}, February 2009.
| |
| : 6. PG&E Letter DCL-94-133, "Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,"
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| June 27, 1994.
| |
| : 7. NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition, 1975.
| |
| : 8. U.S. NRC to G. M. Rueger, "Transmittal of Safety Evaluation Closing Out Diablo Canyon Long-Term Seismic Program (TAC Nos. M80670 and M80671)," April17, 1992.
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| 10
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| Enclosure Attachment 9 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 9 Baseline Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) 1
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 9 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Baseline Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF)
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| Section 4.0, Item 6 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
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| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide the plant-specific total CDF and LERF to confirm applicability of the limits of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, Revision 1 (Reference 3). (Note that RG 1.174, Revision 2 (Reference 6},
| |
| issued by the NRC in May 2011, did not revise these limits.)
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| This attachment demonstrates that the total CDF and total LERF are below the guidance of RG 1.174, specifically, 1E-4/year CDF and 1E-5/year LERF, such that the risk metrics of NEI 06-09 may be applied to Diablo Canyon Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program.
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| Table A9-1 provides the CDF and LERF values that resulted from a quantification of the baseline average annual models (References 4 and 5), which include contributions from internal events (including internal flooding}, fire, and seismic hazards. Other external hazards are below accepted screening criteria and therefore do not contribute significantly to the totals.
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| Table A9-1: Total Baseline Average Annual CDF/ LERF Unit 1 Unit 2 Hazard CDF (per rx-yr) LERF (per rx-yr) CDF (per rx-yr) LERF (per rx-yr)
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| Internal Events 1.35E-05 1.59E-06 1.35E-05 1.59E-06 Internal Flooding 1.42E-06 8.85E-08 6. 79E-07 4~.38E-08 Seismic 2. 74E-05 1.58E-06 2.74E-05 1.58E-06 Fire 5.24E-05 4.73E-06 4.90E-05 5.62E-06 Total 9.47E-05 7.99E-06 9.06E-05 8.83E-06 (Note that these values reflect the anticipated configuration of the plant upon full implementation of NFPA 805 and related plant modifications to resolve fire protection issues. At the time of implementation of the RICT Program, the PRA model used will reflect the existing configuration of the plant.)
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| As demonstrated in the table, the total CDF and total LERF are within the guidance of RG 1.174 to permit small changes in risk which may occur during RICT Program implementation of extended Completion Times. Therefore, the Diablo Canyon RICT Program is consistent with NEI 06-09 guidance.
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| 2
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 9 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4B, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
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| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Revision 0, November 2006.
| |
| : 3. Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach For Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 1, November 2002.
| |
| : 4. PRA Calculation File C.9, Quantification of CDF and LERF for the DCPP PRA Model, Revision 11 a.
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| : 5. PRA Calculation File F.3.5, Development of Fire-Induced Risk Model, Revision 1.
| |
| : 6. Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach For Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 2, May 2011.
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| 3
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 10 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Attachment 10 Justification of Application of At-Power Probabilistic Risk Assessment Models to Shutdown Modes 1
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 10 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Justification of Application of At-Power Probabilistic Risk Assessment Models to Shutdown Modes This attachment is not applicable to the Diablo Canyon submittal. PG&E is not proposing to apply the Risk-Informed Completion Time Program in shutdown modes, but only in Modes 1 and 2.
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| 2
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| Enclosure Attachment 11 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 11 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model Update Process 1
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 11 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model Update Process Summary Section 4.0, Item 8 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
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| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide a discussion of the licensee's programs and procedures which assure the PRA models which support the RMTS are maintained consistent with the as-built/as-operated plant.
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| This attachment describes the administrative controls and procedural processes applicable to the configuration control of PRA models used to support the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program, which will be in place to ensure that these models reflect the as-built/as-operated plant. Plant changes, including physical modifications and procedure revisions, will be identified and rev.iewed prior to implementation to determine if they could impact the PRA models per TS3.NR1, Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Departmental Administrative Procedure, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Reference 3), and AWP E-028, Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Administrative Work Procedure, PRA Maintenance and Upgrades (Reference 4). The configuration control program will ensure these plant changes are incorporated into the PRA models as.
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| appropriate. The process will include discovered conditions associated with the PRA models, which will be addressed by the Diablo Canyon Corrective Action Program.
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| Should a plant change or a discovered condition be identified that has a significant impact to the RICT Program calculations as defined by the Configuration Control Program, an interim update of the PRA model will be implemented. Otherwise, the PRA model change is incorporated into a subsequent periodic model update. Such pending changes are considered when evaluating other changes until they are fully implemented into the PRA models. Periodic updates are performed no less frequently than every two refueling cycles, consistent with the guidance of NEI 06-09.
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| PRA Model Update Process Internal Event, Internal Flood, Fire, and Seismic Event PRA Maintenance and Update The Diablo Canyon risk management process ensures that the applicable PRA model used for the RICT Program reflects the as-built/as-operated plant for each of the two Diablo Canyon units. The PRA configuration control process delineates the responsibilities and guidelines for updating the full power internal event, internal flood, fire, and seismic PRA models, and includes both periodic and interim PRA model updates. The process includes provisions for monitoring potential impact areas affecting the technical elements of the Diablo Canyon PRA models (e.g., due to plant 2
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 11 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 changes, plant/industry operational experience, or errors or limitations identified in the model), assessing the individual and cumulative risk impact of unincorporated changes, and controlling the model and necessary computer files, including those associated with the configuration risk management program (CRMP) model.
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| Review of Plant Changes for Incorporation into the PRA Model (1) Plant changes or discovered conditions, as defined in the PRA Configuration Control Program, are reviewed for potential impact to the PRA models and including the CRMP model and the subsequent risk calculations which support the RICT Program (Section 2.3.4, Items 7.2 and 7.3, and 2.3.5, Items 9.2 and 9.3).
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| (2) Plant changes that meet the criteria defined in the PRA configuration control program (including consideration of the cumulative impact of other pending changes) will be immediately incorporated in the applicable PRA model(s), consistent with the NEI 06-09 guidance. Otherwise, the change is assigned a priority and is incorporated at a subsequent periodic update consistent with procedural requirements. (Section 2.3.5, Item 9.2)
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| (3) PRA updates for plant changes are performed at least once every two refueling cycles, consistent with the guidance of NEI 06-09 (Section 2.3.4, Item 7.1, and 2.3.5, Item 9.1).
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| (4) If a PRA model change is required for the CRMP model, but cannot be immediately implemented for a significant plant change or discovered condition, either:
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| A. Alternative analyses to conservatively bound the expected risk impact of the change will be performed. In such a case, these alternative analyses become part of the RICT Program calculation process until the plant changes are incorporated into the PRA model during the next update. The use of such bounding analyses is consistent with the guidance of NEI 06-09.
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| B. Appropriate administrative restrictions on the use of the RICT Program for extended Completion Times are put in place until the model changes are completed, consistent with the guidance of NEI 06-09.
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| These actions satisfy NEI 06-09 Section 2.3.5, Item 9.3.
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| References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
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| 3
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 11 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
| |
| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48: Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0-A, November 2006.
| |
| : 3. TS3.NR1, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Departmental Administrative Procedure, Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
| |
| : 4. AWP E-028, Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Administrative Work Procedure, PRA Maintenance and Upgrades.
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| 4
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 12 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Attachment 12 Attributes of the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) Model 1
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 12 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Attributes of the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) Model
| |
| | |
| ==
| |
| Introduction:==
| |
| | |
| Section 4.0, Item 9 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
| |
| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide a description of PRA models and tools, including identification of how the baseline probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model is modified for use in the CRMP tools, quality requirements applied to the PRA models and CRMP tools, consistency of calculated results from the PRA model and the CRMP tools, and training and qualification programs applicable to personnel responsible for development and use of the CRMP tools. The scope of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) within the CRMP will be provided. This item should also confirm that the CRMP tools can be readily applied for each Technical Specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) within the scope of the plant-specific submittal.
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| This attachment describes the necessary changes to the peer-reviewed baseline PRA models for use in the CRMP software to support the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program. The process employed to adapt the baseline models for CRMP use is demonstrated: (1) to preserve the core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) quantitative results; (2) to maintain the quality of the peer-reviewed PRA models; and (3) to correctly accommodate changes in risk due to time-of-year, time-of-cycle, and configuration-specific considerations. Quality controls and training programs applicable for the CRMP are also discussed in this enclosure.
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| Additional considerations regarding the fire PRA model to address implementation of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)..;805 as the licensing basis for the fire protection program is also discussed at the end of this attachment.
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| Translation of Baseline PRA Model for Use in CRMP:
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| The baseline PRA models for internal events including: internal floods, internal fires, and seismic events, are the peer-reviewed models, updated when necessary to incorporate plant changes to reflect the as-buiiUas-operated plant. These models are modified to include changes which are needed to facilitate configuration-specific risk calculations to support the RICT Program implementation. The baseline models, and the changes made to create the CRMP model used in the RICT Program, are controlled using plant calculations, which include all necessary quality controls and reviews.
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| The changes which are currently needed for the existing baseline PRA models to provide a complete scope for RICT Program calculations are described in Table A12-1.
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| 2
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 12 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 TABLE A12-1 CRMP MODEL CHANGES FOR ADDITIONAL RICT PROGRAM SSCs DESCRIPTION BASIS FOR CHANGE Reactor Trip System The reactor trip system (RTS) instrumentation for automactic (RTS) Instrumentation reactor trip is addressed by LCO 3.3.1. A surrogate model, which assesses the failure probability of two generic RTS functions, is incorporated into the CRMP to permit assessing risk changes in a bounding manner, as permitted by NEI 06-09, when one or more RTS functions have inoperable channels. The model is bounding because each function is considered unavailable if any one or more associated instrument channels are inoperable, and only two RTS functions are modeled for automatic reactor trip for all initiating events. This conservatively bounds the failure probability of the automatic reactor trip function for any initiating event.
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| Pressurizer Heaters The pressurizer heaters are addressed by LCO 3.4.9. The heaters are not included in the baseline PRA models, but are added to the CRMP to permit assessing risk changes in a bounding manner, as permitted by NEI 06-09, when one or more pressurizer heaters are inoperable. The model is bounding because it is assumed that without pressurizer heaters, secondary cooling will be unavailable.
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| The changes to the models to account for variations in system success criteria based on time of year or time in operating cycle, and other specific changes needed to properly account for configuration-specific issues, which are either not evaluated in the baseline average annual model or are evaluated based on average conditions encountered during a typical operating cycle, are described in Table A12-2.
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| TABLE A12-2 CHANGES MADE FOR CONFIGURATION-SPECIFIC RISK DESCRIPTION BASIS FOR CHANGE Plant Availability The baseline PRA models account for the time the reactor operates at power by using a plant availability factor. This is appropriate for determining the average annual (time based) risk, but the factor is not applicable to configuration-specific risk calculated for the RICT Program.
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| In order to account for the assumption that the plant is always operating in the RICT Program, the frequency of initiating events which include an availability factor are adjusted. This change is necessary to adjust the modeled initiating event frequencies from a per year to per reactor year basis for use in the CRMP.
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| 3
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| Enclosure Attachment 12 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 TABLE A12-2 CHANGES MADE FOR CONFIGURATION-SPECIFIC RISK DESCRIPTION BASIS FOR CHANGE Maintenance Maintenance alignment probabilities in the baseline PRA models have Alignment probabilities based on the fraction of the year the equipment is Probabilities unavailable. For the CRMP model, the actual configuration of equipment is evaluated, so the maintenance alignment probabilities are set to zero.
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| This is also done for the system initiating events which include maintenance contributions.
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| Excluded The PRA models do not remove excluded maintenance combinations Maintenance (i.e., both trains of single safety system being simultaneoulsy Combinations unavailable), therefore no change to the CRMP model is required.
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| Room Cooling The baseline PRA models include conservative success criteria for room Success Criteria cooling and do not use average annual criteria; therefore, no changes to the CRMP model for room cooling success criteria are required.
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| Unfavorable The current Diablo Canyon core design reflected in the baseline PRA Exposure Time model for ATWT events includes a UET for variable success criteria (UET) for anticipated based on time of core life (i.e., moderator temperature coefficient early in transient without trip cycle life). The event is set to the fraction of the year for which the UET (ATWT) Events applies, and will be changed to a probability of 1 or 0 based on operator input using the CRMP tool, depending on the actual time in the operating cycle.
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| Scope of Systems, Structures, and Components within the CRMP In addition to the SSCs modeled for each TS LCO in the scope of the RICT Program (described in Attachment 5}, the additional SSCs and/or corresponding functions which are in the PRA models but not in plant TS are listed in Table A 12-3.
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| TABLE A12-3 SSC FUNCTIONS NOT IN TS THAT IMPACT RICT CALCULATIONS
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| * Third centrifugal charging pump providing seal cooling
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| * Feed and bleed using emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps and power operated oelief oalves (PORVs)
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| * Backup firewater cooling to the charging pumps
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| * Instrument air system
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| * Main feedwater and condensate systems pumps and valves
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| * Class I vital switchgear ventilation
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| * Firewater storage tank and raw water reservoir as alternate sources to AFW supply 4
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 12 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
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| * Class II power-operated relief vavle providing pressure relief and feed-and-bleed
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| * Auxiliary Saltwater Unit Crosstie Valve FCV-601 Quality Requirements and Consistency of PRA Model and CRMP Tools The approach for establishing and maintaining the quality of the PRA models, including the CRMP model, includes both a PRA maintenance and update process (described in 1 ), and the use of self-assessments and independent peer reviews (described in Attachment 6).
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| The information provided in Attachment 6 demonstrates that the Diablo Canyon internal event, internal flood, fire, and seismic PRA models reasonably conform to the associated industry standards endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.200. This information provides a robust basis for concluding that the PRA models are of sufficient quality for use in risk-informed licensing actions.
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| For maintenance of an existing CRMP model, changes made to the baseline PRA model in translation to the CRMP model will be controlled and documented. An acceptance test is performed after every CRMP model update to verify proper translation of the baseline PRA models and acceptance of all changes made to the baseline PRA models pursuant to translation to the CRMP model. This testing also verifies correct mapping of plant components to the basic events in the CRMP model.
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| Training and Qualification Diablo Canyon PRA staff is responsible for development and maintenance of the CRMP model. The PRA staff is trained in accordance with the site Engineering personnel training program. Operations and Work Control staffs will use the CRMP tool under the RICT Program and staffs are trained in accordance with a program using National Academy for Nuclear Training (ACAD) documents, which is also accredited by IN PO.
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| Application of the CRMP Tool to the RICT Program Scope Diablo Canyon will use the EPRI software program Phoenix as its CRMP platform. This program is specifically designed by EPRI to support implementation of RMTS, and is compatible with the PRA model software used at Diablo Canyon. Phoenix will permit the user to evaluate all configurations within the scope of the RICT Program at Diablo Canyon using appropriate mapping of equipment to PRA model elements.
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| Additional Considerations for NFPA-805 Modifications The existing fire PRA model includes credit for committed plant modifications to be implemented as part of the transition of the fire protection licensing basis to NFPA-805 (as described in commitment 3 contained in Enclosure 5 of Reference 6). At the 5
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 12 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 expected time of implementation of the RICT Program, not all of these committed modifications will be implemented. PG&E proposes to use the risk insights from the post-transition fire PRA model and commits as part of the RICT Program implementation to maintain compensatory measures in place until the associated plant modifications are implemented, as follows:
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| * At any time when a RICT is in effect, a continuous fire watch will be established in the Cable Spreading and solid state protection system (SSPS) rooms until incipient detection and hot shutdown panel modifications, described in Reference 6, are implemented.
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| * At any time when a RICT is in effect, welding and cutting activities will be prohibited in the following fire areas until fire wrap and circuit rerouting modifications in these areas are implemented:
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| - Unit 1 Fire Area 3-BB, Elevation 115
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| - Unit 2 Fire Area 5-B-4 In addition, the fire and internal events PRA models include credit for a committed plant modification (described in Reference 6), to install a passive shutdown seal for each of the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). For RICT Program calculations, the PRA models will reflect the actual configuration of the RCP seals.
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| References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, ((Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
| |
| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48: Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0-A, November 2006.
| |
| : 3. TS3: NR 1, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Departmental Administrative Procedure, Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
| |
| : 4. Regulatory Guide 1.200, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, Revision 2, March 2009.
| |
| : 5. ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Levei1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Addendum A to RA-S-2008, ASME, New York, NY, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, February 2009.
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| 6
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 12 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106
| |
| : 6. PG&E Letter DCL-13-065, "License Amendment Request 13-03, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (2001 Edition),"
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| June 26, 2013.
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| 7
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| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 13 Key Assumptions and Sources of Uncertainty 1
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Key Assumptions and Sources of Uncertainty
| |
| | |
| ==
| |
| Introduction:==
| |
| | |
| Section 4.0, Item 10 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
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| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide a discussion of how the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty were identified, and how their impact was assessed and dispositioned.
| |
| This attachment provides a discussion of how the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty were identified, and how their impact on the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program was assessed and dispositioned.
| |
| Process for Identification of Key Assumptions and Sources of Uncertainty:
| |
| Sources of model uncertainty and related assumptions, defined consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2, (Reference 3) and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard (Reference 4), have been identified for the Diablo Canyon baseline PRA models using the guidance of NUREG-1855 (Reference 5) and EPRI TR-1016737 Treatment of Parameter and Model Uncerlainty for Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Reference 6).
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| The detailed process of identifying, characterizing and qualitative screening of model uncertainties is found in Section 5.3 of NUREG-1855 and Section 3.1.1 of EPRI TR-1016737. The process in these references was mostly developed to evaluate the uncertainties associated with the internal events PRA model; however, the approach can be applied to other types of hazard groups.
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| Disposition of Key Assumptions and Sources of Uncertainty The list of assumptions and sources of uncertainty were reviewed to identify those which would be significant for the evaluation of configuration-specific changes in risk. If the Diablo Canyon model uses a non conservative treatment, or methods which are not commonly accepted, the underlying assumption or source of uncertainty was reviewed to determine the impact on RICT Program calculations. Only those assumptions or sources of uncertainty which could significantly impact the configuration risk calculations were considered key for this application.
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| The internal events PRA models are used to support the fire and seismic PRA, and so the assumptions and uncertainties evaluated would apply to these PRA models as well.
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| 2
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Key assumptions and sources of uncertainty for the RICT Program application are identified and dis positioned in Table A 13-1.
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| 3
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| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A13-1 Disposition of Key Assumptions/Sources of Uncertainty Impacting Configuration Risk Calculations Assumption/Uncertainty Discussion Disposition for RICT Program Dual unit trips are not considered in the The effects of dual unit trips and events Shared systems and equipment between the single unit model and cross-tie to the may not be considered in accident units will be identified in procedures for RICT other unit's resources may be sequences. This approach is Program implementation so that consideration unavailable. nonconservative because the plant of additional risk management actions will be equipment credited may be required by made.
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| the second unit and be unavailable for cross-tie.
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| The pressure setpoint for Containment This is a reasonable assumption and There was a modeling error discovered in the Spray actuation is assumed to be possibly conservative for very small PRA model for swap over to the recirculation reached for all small loss-of-coolant breaks in which the containment sump. Containment Spray actuation is never accident (LOCA) events unless the fan pressure never exceeds the considered to impact the time window for swap coolers operate successfully. This Containment Spray actuation pressure over to the containment sump for recirculation.
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| decreases the time window for swap setpoint, regardless of the success of This results in using the longer time window over to the containment sump for the fan coolers. and shorter failure probability for swap over recirculation and thus increases the when the Contain Fan Cooler Unit system fails.
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| failure probability. The error in the PRA model related to not modeling shorter containment sump recirculation time window for small LOCAs when the containment fan cooling system fails will be corrected in the CRMP model before the RICT Program is implemented.
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| 4
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A13-1 Disposition of Key Assumptions/Sources of Uncertainty Impacting Configuration Risk Calculations Assumption/Uncertainty Discussion Disposition for RICT Program The RHR pumps are assumed to be The assumption that the residual heat It is a realistic assumption that the RHR pumps unavailable and unrecoverable for an removal (RHR) pumps would be would be unavailable for interfacing system interfacing system LOCA because of unavailable during all interfacing system LOCAs involving the RHR system. The exposure to temperature and pressure LOCA sequences is overly conservative interfacing system LOCA initiating events in the conditions well beyond the design basis. compared to the modeling at similar PRA model involve the suction and discharge power plants in the industry. RHR piping, which would most likely fail the system itself. In addition, water quality and pressure conditions at both the suction and discharge of the RHR pumps are beyond the design basis and difficult to predict. This would not have a significant impact on the RICT Program.
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| 5
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A13-1 Disposition of Key Assumptions/Sources of Uncertainty Impacting Configuration Risk Calculations Assumption/Uncertainty Discussion Disposition for RICT Program Charging and Safety Injection (SI) The impact should be minimal for the This is a conservative approach and should not pumps are credited for inventory make- baseline PRA model as the have a significant impact on the baseline PRA up in case of a medium LOCA. It is conservatism in the scenario of 1 out of model. However, whenever a charging pump assumed that 2 out of 4 high pressure 1 pump available is compensated with a is unavailable and the Sl system fails this injection pumps (charging or Sl) are factor of 2 when 2 out of 2 pumps are recovery factor becomes nonconservative required for success; this was required. since the required 2 out of 2 high head conservatively modeled as 1 out of 2 injection pump criteria is not met. Accordingly, charging pumps and 1 out of 2 Sl the emergency core cooling system charging pumps. To eliminate this modeling pump recovery factor will not be credited in the conservatism when all support is RICT Program whenever an emergency core available and when 2 out of 2 charging cooling system charging pump is made pumps are required, a conservative unavailable.
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| estimate of the charging system failure fraction is to multiply the split fraction value for 1 of 1 pump train unavailability (CH2) by a factor of 2. Thus, the recovery factor (or conservatism reduction factor) for these conditions is 2*CH2.
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| 6
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A13-1 Disposition of Key Assumptions/Sources of Uncertainty Impacting Configuration Risk Calculations Assumption/Uncertainty Discussion Disposition for RICT Program A 6-hour mission time for emergency An EDG mission time of 6 hours is used The 6-hour mission time of the EDGs does not diesel generators (EDGs) and fuel oil for initiating events for which the have a significant impact on the baseline PRA transfer pumps is assumed sufficient for probability of non-recovery of offsite model. However, whenever the 230 kV offsite non-seismic initiators rather than the power after 6 hours is sufficiently small. power system is unavailable and cannot standard 24-hour mission time. The probability of non-recovery values reasonably be recovered within the mission are much larger than the fail to run time, the 6-hour mission time of the EDGs in values of the EDGs and fuel oil transfer nonconservative. Accordingly, the 24-hour pumps for the remaining 18 hours of the mission time will be applied to the EDGs and mission time, and definitely not fuel oil transfer pumps in the RICT Program negligible. whenever the offsite power 230 kV system is made unavailable.
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| Containment penetrations which would Lines that require failure of three or Screening these penetrations from the baseline require failure of three or more valves more valves to cause failure of model is conservative for RICT calculations.
| |
| are screened from the containment containment isolation have a negligible The CRMP model used for the RICT Program isolation analysis. contribution to containment isolation will include the capability to evaluate such failure frequency. screened penetrations using a bounding surrogate model which assumes the containment boundary is failed, even when redundant isolation valves are available.
| |
| Vacuum breakers cannot fail in a The magnitude of the uncertainty There are two vacuum relief valves per ASW manner to impact the Auxiliary Salt attributable to this nonconservative header. These are mechanical components Water (ASW) function within the mission assumption is not known. Although the with a relatively high reliability, thus the random time. magnitude of the nonconservatism is failure of an ASW header due to failing both expected to be small, this has not been vacuum relief valves should not be significant.
| |
| demonstrated. The RICT Program will assume inoperability of the ASW train if one or more vacuum breakers are nonfunctional.
| |
| 7
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| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A13-1 Disposition of Key Assumptions/Sources of Uncertainty Impacting Configuration Risk Calculations Assumption/Uncertainty Discussion Disposition for RICT Program Common cause failures (CCFs) in the The model assumes that common Given that failure of one function fails the entire Solid State Protection System (SSPS) cause between parameter signal SSPS system and CCFs are modeled for across separate functions are not sensing channels is limited to common single functions, there is not any additional modeled. cause events between bi-stables and significant impact from modeling CCFs across input relays for a particular function. functions. The additional failure probability This is a nonconservative assumption. from CCFs across functions is dominated by the SSPS logic and power supply failure basic events.
| |
| Sl minimum flow valves are not Failure of the minimum flow valves Sl Recirculation Valves 897 4A and 897 48 are modeled. could result in flow diversion and impact in series, thus both valves must be impacted, success criteria nonconservatively. which has a low probability. The operator action to close these valves is also evaluated in the human reliability analysis (HRA) for switchover to cold leg recirculation.
| |
| Accordingly, no significant impact is expected to the RICT Program.
| |
| Automatic or manual reactor trip is Failure of reactor scram coincident with Fire-induced failures will almost certainly assumed successful such that no a fire is considered to present an remove power from the control rods (resulting anticipated transient without trip (ATWT) insignificant risk. in a trip), rather than cause a "failure-to-scram" event occurs for fire initiating events. condition. Also, the low frequency of a fire occurring together with the low probability of independent failure to scram makes a negligible contribution to the risk.
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Table A13-1 Disposition of Key Assumptions/Sources of Uncertainty Impacting Configuration Risk Calculations Assumption/Uncertainty Discussion Disposition for RICT Program Designation of systems/components as Assuming certain systems and This conservative assumption is acceptable for guaranteed failure in the fire PRA model. components are guaranteed failed for the RICT Program. Those systems that are all fires is conservative. within the RICT Program and guaranteed failed in the fire model are assumed 100%> successful in the baseline PRA model used to calculate the RICT.
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 13 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17,2007.
| |
| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Industry Guidance Document, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0, November 2006.
| |
| : 3. Regulatory Guide 1.200, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, Revision 2, March 2009.
| |
| : 4. ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Levei1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Addendum A to RA-S-2008, ASME, New York, NY, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, February 2009.
| |
| : 5. NUREG-1855, Volume 1, Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making.
| |
| : 6. EPRI TR-1 016737, Treatment of Parameter and Model Uncertainty for Probabilistic Risk Assessments, December 2008.
| |
| 10
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 14 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 14 Program Implementation 1
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 14 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Program Implementation Introduction Section 4.0, Item 11 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
| |
| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide a description of the implementing programs and procedures regarding the plant staff responsibilities for the RMTS implementation, and specifically discuss the decision process for risk management action (RMA) implementation.
| |
| This attachment provides a description of the implementing programs and procedures regarding the plant staff responsibilities for the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT)
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| Program including training of the personnel required for implementation of the RICT Program.
| |
| RICT Program Procedures A procedure will be developed to outline the requirements and responsibilities for the RICT Program. It will provide guidance on departmental responsibilities and management authority for RICT Program application, and for required training, implementation, and monitoring of the RICT Program, including development and maintenance of the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) software tool and model.
| |
| The RICT Program will be implemented by site procedures which will fully address all aspects of the guidance of NEI 06-09. Operations, specifically the control room staff, are responsible for compliance with Te.chnical Specification (TS) requirements, and will be responsible for implementation of a RICT and any RMAs determined to be appropriate for the plant configuration. Any use of a RICT and associated RMAs will be approved by the Operations Manager prior to entering an extended completion time (CT) for pre-planned activities, and as soon as practicable for an emergent extended CT.
| |
| PG&E Procedure OP1.DC17, "Control of Equip Required by Technical Specifications or Designated Programs," (Reference 3) addresses existing site controls forTS entry and exit and risk management during equipment outages. This procedure will be supplemented to address the additional guidance of NEI 06-09 for detailed implementation of the RICT Program. It will provide guidance to the appropriate Diablo Canyon personnel on the following topics:
| |
| * Plant conditions for which the RICT Program is applicable 2
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 14 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106
| |
| * Conditions under which a RICT may not be used, or may not be voluntarily
| |
| . entered
| |
| * Implementation of the RICT Program 30-day back stop limit
| |
| * Guidance on plant configuration changes, i.e., recalculating the RICT and risk management action time (RMAT) within 12 hours of any change
| |
| * Conditions for exiting a RICT
| |
| * Requirements to identify and implement RMAs when the RMAT is exceeded or is anticipated to be exceeded
| |
| * Guidance on the use of RMAs, including the conditions under which they may be credited in RICT calculations
| |
| * Guidance on crediting PRA functionality
| |
| * Plant management approval for use of a RICT RICT Program Training The scope of the training for the RICT Program will include training on rules for the new TS program, CRMP software, TS Actions included in the program, and procedures.
| |
| This training will be conducted for the following Diablo Canyon personnel:
| |
| * Operations Manager
| |
| * Operations Planning Managers
| |
| * Operations Personnel (Licensed and Non-Licensed)
| |
| * Work Control Manager
| |
| * Work Control Personnel
| |
| * Work Week Managers
| |
| * Operations Training
| |
| * Nuclear Licensing Personnel
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| * Selected Maintenance Personnel
| |
| * Site Engineering
| |
| * Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Engineers
| |
| * Other Management Training will be carried out in accordance with Diablo Canyon training procedures and processes. These procedures were written based on the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (IN PO) Accreditation (ACAD) requirements, as developed and maintained by the National Academy for Nuclear Training. PG&E has planned three levels of training for implementation of the RICT Program. They are described below:
| |
| Level 1 Training This is the most detailed training. It is intended for the individuals who will be directly involved in the implementation of the RICT Program. This level of training includes the following attributes:
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 14 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
| |
| * Specific training on the revised TS
| |
| * Record Keeping Requirements
| |
| * Case Studies
| |
| * Hands-on time with the CRMP tool calculating a RMAT and RICT
| |
| * Identifying appropriate RMAs
| |
| * Determining PRA Functionality
| |
| * Common Cause Failure Considerations
| |
| * Other detailed aspects of the RICT Program Level 2 Training This training is applicable for supervisors, managers, and other personnel who need a broad understanding of the RICT Program. It is significantly more detailed than Level 3 Training (described below), but it is different from Level1 Training in that hands-on time with the CRMP tool and case studies are not included. The concepts of the RICT Program will be taught, but this group of personnel will not be qualified to perform the tasks for actual implementation of the RICT Program.
| |
| Level 3 Training This training is intended for the remaining personnel who require an awareness of the RICT Program. These employees need basic knowledge of RICT Program requirements and procedures. This training will cover RICT Program concepts that are important to disseminate throughout the organization.
| |
| References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995), Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
| |
| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk"'lnformed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Industry Guidance Document, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0, November 2006.
| |
| : 3. PG&E Procedure OP1.DC17, "Control of Equip Required by Technical Specifications or Designated Programs."
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 15 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Attachment 15 Monitoring Program 1
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 15 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Monitoring Program Section 4.0, Item 12 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
| |
| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide a description of the implementation and monitoring program as described in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, "An Approach For Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 1," (Reference 3) and NEI 06-09. (Note that RG 1.174, Revision 2 (Reference 5), issued by the NRC in May 2011, made editorial changes to the applicable section referenced in the NRC safety evaluation for Item 12.)
| |
| This attachment provides a description of the process applied to monitor the cumulative risk impact of implementation of the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program, specifically the calculation of cumulative risk of extended Completion Times (CTs).
| |
| Calculation of the cumulative risk for the RICT Program is discussed in Step 14 of Section 2.3.1 and Step 7.1 of Section 2.3.2 of NEI 06-09, "Risk Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b" (Reference 1). General requirements for a Performance Monitoring Program for risk-informed applications are discussed in RG 1.174, Element 3.
| |
| The calculation of cumulative risk impact is required by the RICT Program at least every refueling cycle, not to exceed 24 months, consistent with the guidance in NEI 06-09, Revision 0. For the assessment period evaluated, data is collected for the risk increases associated with each application of an extended* CT for both core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), and the total risk calculated by summing all risk associated with each RICT application. This is the change in CDF or LERF above the zero maintenance baseline levels during the time of operation in the extended CT (i.e., beyond the front-stop CT). The change in risk is converted lo average annual values.
| |
| The total average annual change in risk for extended CTs is compared to the guidance of RG 1.174, Figures 4 and 5 for CDF and LERF changes, respectively. If the actual annual risk increase is acceptable (i.e., not in Region I of the figures), then RICT Program implementation is acceptable for the assessment period. Otherwise, further assessment of the cause of exceeding the RG 1.174 guidance and implementation of any necessary corrective actions to ensure future plant operation is within the guidance is conducted under the site Corrective Action Program.
| |
| The assessment will identify areas for consideration during the evaluation, including as examples:
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 15 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106
| |
| * RICT applications which dominated the risk increase
| |
| * Contributions from planned vs. emergent RICT applications
| |
| * Risk management actions (RMAs) implemented but not credited in the risk calculations
| |
| * Offset risk due to RICT application by avoiding multiple shorter outages Based on the evaluation, any necessary corrective actions are developed and approved by the Operations Manager. These may include:
| |
| * Administrative restrictions on the use of RICTs for specific high-risk configurations
| |
| * Additional RMAs for specific high-risk configurations
| |
| * Rescheduling planned maintenance activities
| |
| * Deferring planned maintenance to shutdown conditions
| |
| * Use of temporary equipment to replace out-of-service systems, structures or components (SSCs)
| |
| * Plant modifications to reduce risk impact of expected future maintenance configurations In addition to the cumulative impact of RICT Program implementation, the unavailability of SSCs is also potentially impacted. The existing Maintenance Rule (MR) monitoring programs under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) and (a)(2) provide for evaluation and disposition of unavailability impacts which may be incurred by implementation of the RICT Program.
| |
| The SSCs in the scope of the RICT Program are also in the scope of the MR, which allows the use of the MR Program. Using the existing MR monitoring for this program is explicitly discussed in RG 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications," (Reference 4), Section 3.2, "Maintenance Rule Control."
| |
| The monitoring program for the MR, along with the specific assessment of cumulative risk impact described above, serves as the "Implementation and Monitoring Program,"
| |
| defined as Element 3 of RG 1.174 for the RICT Program.
| |
| References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI 06-09, ({Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
| |
| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Industry Guidance Document, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0, November 2006.
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 15 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06
| |
| : 3. Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach For Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 1, November 2002.
| |
| : 4. Regulatory Guide 1.177, An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, Revision 1, May 2011.
| |
| : 5. Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach For Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 2, May 2011.
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 16 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Attachment 16 Risk Management Action Examples 1
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 16 PG&E Letter DCL-13-1 06 Risk Management Action Examples Introduction Section 4.0, Item 13 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Final Safety Evaluation (Reference 1) for NEI 06-09, Revision 0, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines,"
| |
| (Reference 2) requires that the license amendment request (LAR) provide a description of the process to identify and provide compensatory measures and risk management actions (RMAs) during extended Completion Times (CTs), including specific examples.
| |
| This attachment describes the process for identification of RMAs applicable during extended CTs and provides examples of RMAs. RMAs will be governed by plant procedures for planning and scheduling maintenance activities. This procedure will provide guidance for the determination and implementation of RMAs when entering the Risk-Informed Completion Time (RICT) Program and is consistent with the guidance provided in NEI 06-09, Revision 0 (Reference 1).
| |
| Responsibilities Work Control is responsible for developing the RMAs with assistance from Operations.
| |
| Operations is responsible for the approval and implementation of approved RMAs. For emergent entry into extended CTs, Operations is also responsible for developing RMAs.
| |
| Procedural Guidance For planned maintenance activities, implementation of RMAs will be required if it is anticipated that the risk management action time (RMAT) will be exceeded. The RMAs are implemented at the earliest possible time, without waiting for the actual RMAT to be exceeded. For emergent activities, RMAs must be implemented if the RMAT is reached. Also, if an emergent event occurs requiring recalculation of a RMAT already in place, the procedure requires a re-evaluation of the existing RMAs for the new plant configuration to see if new RMAs are appropriate. These requirements of the RICT Program are consistent with the guidance of NEI 06-09, Revision 0.
| |
| RMAs are put in place no later than the point at which an incremental core damage probability (I COP) of 1E-6 is reached, or no later than the point at which an incremental large early release probability (ILERP) of 1E-7 is reached. If as the result of an emergent event the instantaneous core damage frequency (CDF) or the instantaneous large early release frequency (LERF) exceeds 1E-3 or 1E-4 per year, respectively, RMAs are also required to be implemented. These requirements are consistent with the guidelines of NEI 06-09, Revision 0.
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 16 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 By determining which structures, systems, or components (SSCs) are most important from a CDF and/or LERF perspective for a specific plant configuration, RMAs may be created to protect these SSCs. Similarly, knowledge of the initiating event or sequence contribution to the configuration-specific CDF and/or LERF allows development of RMAs which enhance the capability to mitigate such events.
| |
| It is possible to credit RMAs in the RICT calculations. However, such quantification of RMAs is not required by NEI 06-09, Revision 0. Crediting RMAs in the RICT calculations is only done consistent with the guidance of NEI 06-09, Revision 0.
| |
| NEI 06-09 classifies RMAs into three categories, described below:
| |
| : 1) Actions to increase awareness and control.
| |
| * Shift brief
| |
| * Pre-job brief
| |
| * Training (formal or informal)
| |
| * Presence of system engineer or other expertise related to maintenance activity
| |
| * Special purpose procedure to identify risk sources and contingency plans
| |
| : 2) Actions to reduce the duration of maintenance activities.
| |
| * Pre-staging materials
| |
| * Conducting training on mock-ups
| |
| * Performing the activity around the clock
| |
| * Performing walk-downs on the actual system(s) to be worked on prior to beginning work
| |
| : 3) Actions to minimize the magnitude of the risk increase.
| |
| * Suspend/minimize activities on redundant systems
| |
| * Suspend/minimize activities on other systems that adversely affect the CDF and/or LERF
| |
| * Suspend/minimize activities on systems that may cause a trip or transient to minimize the likelihood of an initiating event that the out-of-service component is meant to mitigate
| |
| * Use temporary equipment for backup power
| |
| * Use temporary equipment for backup ventilation
| |
| * Reschedule other maintenance activities 3
| |
| | |
| Enclosure Attachment 16 PG&E Letter DCL-13-106 Examples Example RMAs that may be considered during a RICT Program entry for a diesel generator (DG) or a battery to reduce the risk impact and ensure adequate defense-in-depth are:
| |
| A. Diesel Generator:
| |
| (1) The condition of the offsite power supply, switchyard, and the grid is evaluated prior to entering a RICT, and RMAs as identified below are implemented, particularly during times of high grid stress conditions, such as during high demand conditions.
| |
| (2) Deferral of switchyard maintenance, such as deferral of discretionary maintenance on the main, auxiliary, or startup transformers associated with the unit.
| |
| (3) Deferral of maintenance that affects the reliability of the trains associated with the operable DGs.
| |
| (4) Deferral of planned maintenance activities on station blackout mitigating systems, and treating those systems as protected equipment.
| |
| (5) Contacting the dispatcher on a periodic basis to provide information on the DG status and the power needs of the facility.
| |
| B. Battery:
| |
| (1) Limit the immediate discharge of the affected battery, if possible.
| |
| (2) Recharge the affected battery to float voltage conditions using a spare battery charger, if possible.
| |
| (3) Evaluate the remaining battery capacity and protect its ability to perform its safety function.
| |
| (4) Periodically verify battery float voltage is equal to or greater than the minimum required float voltage for remaining batteries.
| |
| References
| |
| : 1. ML071200238, Final Safety Evaluation for Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) NEI D6-09, "Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 48, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines (TAG No. MD4995)," Letter from Jennifer M. Golder (NRR) to Biff Bradley (NEI), May 17, 2007.
| |
| : 2. NEI 06-09, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines, Industry Guidance Document, Nuclear Energy Institute, Revision 0, November 2006.
| |
| 4}}
| |
