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| | number = ML17334B048 | | | number = ML17334B048 |
| | issue date = 12/31/1987 | | | issue date = 12/31/1987 |
| | title = Draft Rev 1 to Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment,Proposed Mods & Evaluations,10CFR50,App R,Section Iii.G. | | | title = Draft Rev 1 to Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment,Proposed Mods & Evaluations,10CFR50,App R,Section Iii.G |
| | author name = | | | author name = |
| | author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG | | | author affiliation = INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section I'II.G TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE INTRODUCTION ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 1 1.1 Purpose of Report ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l-l 1-2 1:2 Executive Summary ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| 1.2.1 Results of Analysis 1-6 1.3 Scope of Report ~ ~
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| 1-6 1.4 Definitions, Acronyms and Abbrevi at lons ~ ~ ~ ~ oo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1-10 1.4.1 Deflnltlons ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .1-10 1.4.2 Acronyms and Abbreviations ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1-14 TABLE Appendix R'Summary Compliance Table
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| : 2. IDENTIFICATION OF FIRE AREAS ...........;....;........ 2-1 2.1 B ackground 2.2 Identification of Fire Zones 2-3 2.3 Identification of Fire Areas 2-5 2.4 Procedure for Updating Combustible'Loading 2-11 2.5 Supplemental Information to Support the Contention that Cables in Conduit Embedded'n Concrete are not Part of the Fire Area 2-13 2.6 Identification of Maximum Allowable Combustible Loading ~ ~ ~ ~
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| ~ ~ ~ 2 17 TABLES K Combustible'oading'-1 1
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| 2-1 Fire Zone Identification Table 2-2 Fire Protection Features for Fire Areas 2-3 Maximum Allowable FIGURES 2.1 2.11 Fire Area and Zone Identification 2.0-a Embedded Conduit 2.0.b Embedded Conduit 21'7021~ 12 87021902CK 05000 8 pDR F
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued).
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| SECTION PAGE
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| : 3. DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION .SYSTEMS 3-1 3.1 Fire Detect,ion Systems ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-1 3.1.1 General System Information ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-1 3.1.2 System Descriptions 3-2 3.2 Fire Suppression Systems ......;... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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| 3-4 3-4 3.2.1 General System Information 3.2 2.~ Systems Description 3-5 3.2.2.1 Water'uppression Systems ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-5 3.2.2.2 Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems 3-9
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| .,3 ' ':3 3.2.2.4 Halon Suppression Systems Partial Zone or Area Coverage
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| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3-10 3-11
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| -FIGURES 3-1. Detection and Suppression Below Bas ement 3-2 Detection and Suppression Basement Plan El. and 3-3 591'etection Suppression 587'nd Mezzanine Floo El. 609' 3-4 Detection and, Suppression Plan El. 601', 60 650'lan
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| ~
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| and -6" to 625'-10" 3-5 620'etection and Suppression El.
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| Detection and Suppression 633'l.
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| 3-,6 4 ~ SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS'OMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS METHOD" OF INVESTIGATION 4.1 Introduction 4-1 4.1.1 Design Basis Events ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4-1 4.2 Safety Functions,................ '4-2 4-2 4.2.1 , Reactivity Control 4.2.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up Control ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4-3 4.2.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4-3 4.2.4 Reactor Heat Removal 4-3 4.2.5 Process Monitoring ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4-4 4.2.6 Miscellaneous. Supporting..Function 4-4 4.2.7 Discussion 4-4 11
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT,"
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| PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS tr ~
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| r r, (continued)
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| SECTION "PAGE "4.3 Analysis of Safe Shutdown.S)8ttemS,.",,...'.."...I+,.... .. ".;,.4-5 4.3.1 4 5 4.3.2 Initial Assumptions ~ e ~
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| .'....4-7 4.3.3 D ~ r
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| ~ ~
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| 'e
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| ~ 4 7 4.3.4 Safe Shutdown Functions ~ a ~
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| 4.3.4.1 Reactivity Control Function'..'...,".,> .'.'...',',.'...... :;. 4-7 4.3.4.2 Reactor Coolant Make-up Con'tr61 .',:4-8 4.3.4.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Coqftrgl..'",.:.'...'.",
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| 4.3.4.4 Reactor Heat Removal Fuhctibn,'..".'...,.',;.".',."...'.'. ;..:'4-10 Process Monitoring Functioh .';.;*.......
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| ~ ~ ~
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| 4.3.4.5 : '4-11 4.3.4.6 Supporting Functions ,~ e ~,e 4 14 4' Safe Shutdown Systems 4-14 4.4.1 Chemical and Volume Control.,gyytem..(CVCS) 4-14 4.4.2 Reactor Coolant System 4.4.3 Main Steam Systems .... '4-22 4.4.4 4.4.5 Auxiliary Feedwater System "...J-.
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| Residual Heat Removal Syl'tern.'."."..',..
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| "-" ~
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| ~ .'
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| . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ....,.4-24 4-27 4.4.6 ,Component Cooling Water SySteih" >.'.'....;.;~",,...... ...."4-30 4.4.7 Essential Service Water System@ .'..;."..'...'<...,..... ....,..4-32 4.4.8 Emergency Power System ~ ~ ~ ~ r4 33 4.5 Identification of Safe Shutdo&'h"SPA'Rein" 4.6 Components .........................................
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| Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits 4-40 and Cables .................,............,<...,...-,.........4-43 4.7 Associated Circuits of ConceI'n;..'.,'>,'...'..'"...',.',>........''4-44 4.7.1 IntrOductlon e..eeee... ~ ~ ~ e ~ eeee.e ~ ~ eeeee"eeeee', ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ e 4-44 4.7.2 Identification of Associated Circuits, of, Common Power Supply and Comfnbn, En'eloSQr'6:;;;... .'4-45 Spurious Operation Analysis .';".'.", ...,....'.',, ,...
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| ~ ~ ~ ~
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| 4.7.3 ~ ~ ~ ~
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| .''4-47 4.7.4 Supplementary Information'elat'ed." ",
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| ...."..',4 t 0 Table 4-3 ': ...... .. r ..-.'-
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| ~ ~ ~
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| t, '.'.'..: 53 4.8 Identification of Safe dhutddvn'Equi)neat-"Q'ag]ea and Raceways within Fi'ze; Zone"9ovnd)rie's-".':,.......':"4-56 4.9 Evaluation of the'eparation 'of'"Saf'e'',-
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| Shutdown Sys'em (SSS) CofnpO'negtS an'6 Cab''e0;... ~ e ~ ~
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| ':"4-57 4.10 Physical Inspections ...'....';.";.";..".".',,';."..",,'...'.... ;:.'.4-59 4.11 Identification of Areas'f C'onformanca/'""'"
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| Nonconformance with Appendix R, S ection III.G 4-59
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPAB I L I TY ASSESSMENT g PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE TABLES 4-1 Safe Shutdown Components, Unit 1 4-2 Safe Shutdown Components, Unit 2 4-3 Potential Spurious Malfunctions That Could Affect Safe Shutdown FIGURES Safe Shutdown Functions (SSF)
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| RCS Reactivity Control 4.2 Safe Shutdown Functions RCS Makeup Control 4.3 Safe Shutdown Functions RCS Pressure Control 4' Safe Shutdown Functions Reactor Heat Removal 4.5 Safe Shutdown Functions Supporting System'nteraction Diagram 4.6 Unit 1 Main. Steam Safe Shutdown Flow Path (SSFP) 4.7 Unit 1 Main St'earn Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.8 Unit 1 Feedwater Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.9 Unit 1 Feedwater Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.10 Unit 1 Essential Service Water Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.11 Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.12 Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.13 Unit 1 .Chemical and Volume Control System (SSFP) 4.14 Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System "(SSFP) 4.15 Intentionally Deleted 4.16 Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.17 Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.18 Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.19.1. Unit 1 Emergency Power Source Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.19.2 Unit 1 Emergency Power Source Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.20 Unit 1 Emergency Power System Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One Line Diagram)
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE 4.21 Unit 1 Emergency Power System Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.22 Unit 1 Emergency Power System Safe Shutdown Flow Path 4.23 Unit 1 Emergency Power System Safe Shutdown Flow Path (One Line Diagram) 4.24 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Main Steam 4.25 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater 4.26 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Essential Service Water 4.27 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Reactor Coolant System 4.28 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System 4.29 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Component Cooling Water 4.30 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Reactor Heat Removal 4.31 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Emergency Power System (1/3) 4.32 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Emergency Power System (2/3) 4.33 Safe Shutdown Functional Block Diagram Emergency Power System (3/3) 4.34 Pressurizer PORV Electrical Schematic ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN .................,................ 5-1 5.1 Introduction o ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ o ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5-1 5.2 Alternative Shutdown System Description 5-3 5.2.1 Chemical and Volume Control System 5-7 5.2.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System 5-8 5.2.3 Essential .Service Water System 5-8 5.2.4 Component Cooling Water System 5-10 5.2.5 Main Steam 5-11 5.2.6 Reactor Coolant System ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5-12 5.2.7 Emergency Power System 5-12 5.2.8 Residual Heat Removal 5-14
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE 5.3 Alternative Shutdown Methods 5-14 5.3.1 M ethod ASl 5-14 5.3.2 M ethod AS2 5-16 5.3.3 M ethod AS3 5-17 5.3.4 M ethod AS4 5-17 5.3.5 M ethod AS5 5-18 5.4 Detailed Response to the NRC Clarifications of Generic Letter 81-12 5-19 5.5 Alternative Shutdown Modifications 5-27 5.5.1 C VCS Cross-txe 5-28 5.5.2 Alternate Power to LSI Panels 5-28 5.5.3 ESW Pump Circuit Modifications 5-28 5.5.4 ESW Strainer and Valve Circuit Modifications ~ ~ ~ ~ 5-29 5.5.5 CCW Pump Circuit Modifications ~ le ~ 5.-30 5.5.6 New Th and Tc for LSI Panels 5-30 5.5.7 New SG Pressure for LSI Panels 5-30 5.5.8 New SRM for LSI Panels 5-31 5.5.9 New Centralized Control Panels LSI-4 5-31 5.5.10 Permanent Cable for Pressurizer Backup Heater Repowering 5-32 5.6 Summary of Procedures Used for Alternative S hutdown 5-32 5.6.1 Initial Hot Standby 5-32 5.6.2 Long-Term Hot Standby 5-34 5.6.3 H ot Shutdown 5-35 5.6.4 C old Shutdown 5-35 5.6.5 Alternative Shutdown System Technical Specxficatlons o,o.,oo ooooooooo,o o..woo...a
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| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .....5-35 TABLES 5-1 Alternative Shutdown Methods/Fire Zone Matrix 5-~-7 Normal Shutdown Equipment Affected by a Fire Which Requires'Operation Post-Fire to Support Methods ASl through AS5 5-8 ESW and CCW Pump SSS Cables to be Isolated 5-9 ESW System SSS Cables to be Removed
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE FIGURES Safe Shutdown Functions Alternative Shutdown Figures 5.1-5.4 5.1 RCS Reactivity Control
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| . 5.2 RCS Makeup Control 5.3 RCS Pressure Control 5' Reactor Heat Removal Use of Unit 2 Systems as Alternate Shutdown System for Unit 1 Operation Figures 5.5-5.8 5.5 Use of Unit 2 CVCS and Proposed Cross-Tie 5.6.1 Use of Unit 2 Motor-Driven AFW as Alternate Shutdown System 5.6.2 Use of Unit 2 Motor-Driven AFW as Alternate Shutdown System 5.7.1 Use of Unit 2 ESW as Alternate Shutdown System for Unit 1 5.7.2 Use of Unit 2 ESW as Alternate Shutdown System for Unit 1 5.8 Unit 2 RHR Component Cooling Water Cross-Tie as Alternative Shutdown System During Unit 1 RHR Operation 5.9 N2 Supply for Emergency Operation of S.G. PORVs 5.10.1 Location of Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinets: 1-LSI-3, 1-LSI-4, 2-LSI-3, 2-LSI-4 5.10.2 Location of Existing Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinet 1-LSI-1 and Proposed Local Shutdown Cabinet 1-LSI-5 5.10.3 Location of Existing Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinet 1-LSI-2 and Proposed Local Shutdown Cabinet 1-LSI-6 5.10.4 Location of Existing Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinet 2-LSI-1 and Proposed Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinet 2- LSI-5 5.10.5 Location of Existing Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinet 2-LSI-2 and Proposed Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinet 2- LSI-6 5.11 CVCS Cross-Tie Piping Diagram 5.12.1 One-Line Diagram for Proposed Power Sources to Unit 1 LSI Panels 5.12.2 One-Line Diagram for Proposed Power Sources to Unit 2~LE Panels 5.13 LSI .Panel Power Supply Schematic (Typical) 5.14.1 Unit 2 Pump Circuit Shown (Typical for all ESW
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| 'umps)
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE 5.14.2 Unit,l ESW Pump. Circuit Shown (Typical for all ESW Pumps) 5.14.3 Unit 1 ESW Pump ESW Pumps)
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| Circuit Shown (Typical for all 5.15 ESW Pump Schematic (Typical) 5.16 ESW Pump Discharge Valve Schematic (Typical) 5.17 ESW Pump Strainer Schematic (Typical) 5.18 ESW Cross-Tie Valve (Typical) 5.19.1 LSI Instrumentation 5.19.2 LSI Instrumentation 5.19.3 LSI Instrumentation 5.20 Proposed Unit 1 SRM Instrumentation 5.21.1 Existing Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinets 5.21.2 Existing Local Shutdown Ind. Cabinet 5.21.3 1-LSI-4 (Unit 1) 2-LSI-4 (Unit 2) 5.22 Alternate Power Source for Unit 1 Pressurizer Heaters
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| : 6. REPAIRS AND COLD SHUTDOWN OPERABILITY ...................... 6-1 6.1 Introduction 6-1 6.2 Pressurizer Heaters ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6-3 6.2.1 Repowering of Pressurizer Heaters ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6-3 6.2.2 Procedures and Material for Pressur izer Heater Repowering 6-6 6.3 Repowering of RHR Pumps 6-7 6.3.1 Procedures and Materials for Repowe ring of RHR P ump 6-8 6.4 Conclusions ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6-9
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| : 7. EXEMPTION REQUESTS AND ANALYSES 7-1 7.1 Introduction ~ ~ ~ 7-1 Area, Auxiliary Bu ilding
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| ~
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| 7.2 RHR/CTS Pump Elevation 573 ft 7-7 7.2.1 Area Description 7-7 7.2.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment 7-9 7.2.3 Fire Protection Systems 7-9 7.2.4 Fire Hazards Analysis 7-10
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE 7.2.5 Proposed Modifications 7-12 .
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| 7.2.5.1 Ventilation Ducts ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-12 7.2.5.2 Penetrations 7-13 7.2.5.3 Area Detection 7-13 7.2.5.4 RHR Pump Power Cables 7-13 7.2.5.5 Stairway 7-14 7.2.6 Conclusion o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-14 TABLE 7.2-1 Summary Evaluation Table 7-16 7.3 Fire Area 14 Transformer Room Unit 1 7-19 7.3.1 Area Descr'iption ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ 7-19 7.3.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ 7-19 7.3.3 Fire Protection System 7-20 7.3.4 Fire Hazards Analysis 7-20 7.3.5 Proposed Modifications 7-21
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| ....,o.....
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| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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| 7.3.6 Conclusion ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-21 TABLE 7.3-1 Summary Evaluation Table 7-22 7.4 Fire Area 20 Transformer Room Elevation 591 'ft Unit 2 7-24 7.4.1 Area Description ~ ~ 7-24 7.4.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment 7-24 7.4.3 Fire Protection, System 7-25 7.4.4 Fire Hazards Analysis 7-25 7.4.5 Proposed Modifications 7-26 7.4.6 Conclusion ,,i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-26 TABLE 7.4-1 Summary Evaluation Table 7-27 7.5 Fire Zone 29(A,B,E) Unit 1 Esse ntial Service Water Pumps and Motor Control Cente rs o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-29 7.5.1 Area Description 7-29 7.5.2 Safe Shutdown Systems 7-30 7.5.3 Fire Protection Systems 7-30
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPAB I L I TY ASSESSMENT ~
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| PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PA'GE 7.5.4 Fire Hazards Analysis ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-31 7.5.5 Proposed Modifications 7-32 7.5.6 Conclusion ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-32 TABLE 7.5-1 Summary Evaluation Table 7-34 7.6 Fire Zone 29(C,D,F) Uni t 2 Ess en tial Service Water Pumps and Motor Contro 1 Centers............... 7-36 7.6.1 Area Description ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-36 7.6.2 Safe Shutdown Systems ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-37 7.6.3 Fire Protection Systems ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-37 7.6.4 Fire Hazards Analysis ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-38 7.6.5 Proposed Modifications ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-39 7.6.5. 1 Detection System ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-39 7.6.5. 2 Ladder Hatch ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-39 7.6.5. 3 Ventilation Ducts ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ 7-39 7.6.6 Conclusion o ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-40 TABLE 7.6-1 Summary Evaluation Table.............................. 7-41 7.7 Fire Zone 29G Screenhouse Auxi liary 'MCC Room Elevation 575 ft, Both Units ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-43 7.7.1 Area Description ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-43 7.7.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-44 7.7.3 Fire Protection Systems ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-44 7.7.4 Fire Hazards Analysis ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ 7-44 7.7.5 Proposed Modifications ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-47 7.7.5. 1 Fire Detection ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-47 7.7.5. 2 H atch ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ 7-47 7.7.5. 3 C ondu 1 ts ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-48 7.7.5. 4 Pump Power and Discharge Valve Condui ts 7-48 7.7.6 Conclusion ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-48 TABLE 7.7-1 Summary Evaluation Table 7-50
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED'MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE 7.8 Fire Area 33, 33A, 33B and 105 Unit 1 East Main Steam Valve Enclosure and Contractor Access Control Building 7-52 7.8.1 Fire Area Description 7-52 7.8.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment 7-52 7.8.3 Fire Protection Systems 7-53 7.8.4 Fire Hazards Analysis 7-53 7.8.5 Proposed Modifications 7-54 7.8.5.1 F loor Grate 7-54 7.8.5.2 Penetrations 7-54 7.8.5.3 Fire Detection 7-54 7.8.6 Conclusion 7-55
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| 'TABLE 7.8-1 Summary Evaluation Table 7-56 7.9 Fire Area 34, 34A, 34B Un it 2 East Main Steam Valve Enclosure 7-58 7.9.1 Fire Area Description 7-58 7.9.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment 7-58 7.9.3 Fire Protection Systems 7-59 7.9.4 Fire Hazards Analysis 7-59 7.9.5 Proposed Modifications 7-60 7.9.5.1 Floor Grate 7-60 7.9.5.2 Penetrations 7-60 7.9.5.3 Fire Detection .7-60 7.9.6 Conclusion 7-60 TABLE 7.9-1 Summary Evaluation Table 7-62 7.10 Fire Zone .44S Auxiliary Building South, Elevation 609 ft, Both Units 7-64 7.10.1 Fire Zone Description 7-64 7.10.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment 7-66 7.10.3 Fire Protection Systems 7-66 7.10.4 Fire Hazards Analysis ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-67 7.10.5 Proposed Modifications 7-68 7.10.5.1 Water Suppression System 7-68 7.10.5.2 Fire Barrier 7-70 7.10.5.3 Fire Detection 7-70 7.10.5.4 Fire Dampers 7-71 7.10.6 Conclusion ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-71 xi
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| SAFE SHUTDOWN"CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
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| SECTION PAGE TABLE 7.10-1 Evaluation =-Table ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7 73 J i 7,11 Fire Area 53 Unit 1 Control Room ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-7 5 7.11.1 Fire Area Description ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-75 7.11.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-75 7.11.3 Fire Prcrt'ection'Systems ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-76 7.11.4 Fire Hazards Analysis 7-76 7.11.5 "'ummary
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| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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| Proposed Modifications ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-77 7.11.5.1 Floor and Ceiling Hatches l 7-78 7.'11.5.2 Connecting'- Dobr':..........
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| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-78 7;-11.5.3 Hot Shutdown Panel 7-78 7 <11.6 Conclusion"" i-'a .' 'i .4 . '... ~ ~
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| ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-78 TABLE 7 ~ 11 1 Summary Evaluation Table ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-80 7.12 Fire Area 5'4 'Unit 2 Control R oom 7-82 7.'-12.1 Fi:re Ai e'a 'Di scVipti6n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ 7-82
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| 7.12.2 Sa f e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-82 7.12.3 Fire Protection Systems 7-83 7.12.4 7.12'.5 Fire~ Hazards Analys.is-Proposed. Mo'di f iCations
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| ..... ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~
| |
| ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~
| |
| ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~
| |
| ~
| |
| ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-83
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-85 7.12.5.1 Floor-''nd Ceili'ng HÃtches
| |
| ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-85 7.12.5.2 Connecting Door t .7-85 7.12.5.3 Ventilation" GUct'-; ..'.......
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-85
| |
| ~Hot 'Shutdo'wn. iRa'hei ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-85
| |
| '.....:A=..........
| |
| 7.12;5'.4'.12.6 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| Conc lus i on S,.r
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-86 TABLE
| |
| : 7. 12-1 @Ummar..y,804:lUaMo.'n Table ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 7-87
| |
| \
| |
| 7.13 P'util.iargi Buli,Ming .HVAC Duct Pene trations 7-89 TABLES 7.13-1~6 Air Register Location 7.14 Containment Seismic Gaps 7-107
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| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
| |
| SECTION PAGE TABLES 7.14-1-1 Unit 1 Fire Areas/Zones Protected by Automatic C02 Suppression 7.14-1-2 Unit 2 Fire Areas/Zones Protected by Automatic C02 Suppression 7.14-2-1 Unit 1 Fire Areas/Zones of Concern 7.14-2-2 Unit 2 Fire Areas/Zones of Concern FIGURES 7.2 RHR/CTS Pump Area Auxiliary Building Fire Zone 1, lA-H 7.3 Transformer Room Unit 1 Fire Zone. 14.
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| 7.4 Transformer Room Unit 2 Fire Zone 20 7.5.1 ESW Pump Areas Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fire Zones 29, 29A, 29B, 29C, 29D, 29E, 29F 7.5.2 ESW Pump Area Unit 1 Fire Zone 29A & 29B 7.5.3 ESW MCC Area Unit 1 Fire Zone 29E 7.6.1 ESW Pump Area Unit 2 Fire Zone 29C,D 7.6.2 ESW MCC Area Unit 2 Fire Zone 29F 7.7.1 Plan View of Fire Zone 29G 7.7.2 Manual Firefighting Equipment Available for Zone 29G 7.7.3 Firefighting Equipment Located in Zone 29G 7.8 East Main Steam Enclosure Main Steam Piping and West NESW Piping Area Unit 1 Fire Zones 33, 33A, 33B 7.9 East Main Steam Enclosure Main Steam Piping and West NESW Piping Area Unit 2 Fire Zones 34, 34A, 34B 7.10.1 Auxiliary Building General Outline of Fire Zones 44N, 44S 7.10.2 Zone 44S South End Auxiliary Building 7.10.3 CCW Pumps Proposed Fire Barrier Location Fire Zone 44S 7.10.4 Plan and Elevation of Ceiling Ledge in Fire Zone 44S 7.10.5 Proposed Plan Layout of Suppression and Detection Systems 7.10.6 Schematic Elevation View of Detection and Suppression Systems 7.10.7 Fire Barrier Between Component Cooling Water Pumps 7.10.8 Elevation of CCW Pump Fire Barrier 7.10.9 Fire Barrier Between Component Cooling Water Pumps 7.11 Control RoO'm Unit 1 Zone 53 7.12 Control Room Unit 2 Zone. 54 7.13-1~8 Air Register Locations
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| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS
| |
| ,(continued)
| |
| 'SECTION PAGE
| |
| : 8. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS ............................... 8-1 8.1 Fire Area 1 (Fire Zones 1, lA through lH, 136, 137 138A, 138B and 138C) RHR and CTS Pump Area.. 8-4 8.1.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-4 8.1.2 Suppression and Detection 8-5 8.1.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-5 8.2 Fire Zone 5 East End of the Auxiliary Building Between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Charging Pump C ubicles.................................... 8-7 8-7 8.2.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8.2.2 Suppression and Detection 8-8 8.2.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-8 8.3 Fire Zones 6A, 6N, 6M, 6S, 61, 64A,,64B, 65A and 65B Auxiliary Building Elevations 587 ft and 601 ft 8-9 8-9 8.3.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8.3.2 Suppression and Detection 8-10 8.3..3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-10 8.4 Fire Area 12.Unit 1 Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel 8-11 8.4.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-11 8.4.2 Suppression and Detection 8-11 8.4.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-11 8.5 Fire Area 14 Unit 1 Transformer Room ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-12
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| : 8. 5;-1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-12 8.5.2 Suppression and Detection 8-12 8.5.3 Boundary Evaluations 8-12 8.5A Fire Area 15 Unit 1-Diesel Generator Room 8-12A 8.5A.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-12A, 8.5A.2 Suppression and Detection 8-12A 8.5A.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-12A 8.6 Fire Area 17C Auxiliary Feedwater Vestibule 8-13
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| '.6.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-13 8.6.2 Suppression .and Detection 8-13 8.6A Fire 'Area 19-Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room 8-13 8.6A.1 Conduit and'able Tray Protection 8-13 8.6A.2 Suppression and Detection 8-14 8.6A.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-14 8.7 Fire Area 20 .Unit 2 Transformer Room 8-14 8.7.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection . 8-14 8.7.2 Suppression and Detection 8-14 8.7.3 Boundary Evaluations 8-14 xiv
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| | |
| ~ ~
| |
| II SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued')
| |
| SECTION PAGE I 0 8.8 Fire Area 22 Unit 2 Quadrant 2 Piping'Tunnef-'.... ~ ~ ~ 8-15 8.8.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection'..."'..'-"...:<."..~... 8-15 Suppression and Detection ......;".'-;..!.'.:.-...."...
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| ~ ~ ~
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| 8.8.2 ~ ~ ~ 8-15 8.8.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluati'ons';';..;..';-.!."'... ~ ~ ~ 8-15 8.9 Fire Zone 29(A,B,E) Unit 1 ESW.Pump Area': I
| |
| .Including the MCCs 8-15 8.9.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-15 8.9.2 Suppression and Detection ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-16 8.9.3 , Boundary Modifications/Evaluations '-..".'..:-..".'...... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-16 8.10 Fire Zone 29 (C,'D,F) Unit 2 ESW Pump 'Area:
| |
| Including the MCCs 8'-16 8.10.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-16 8.10.2 Suppression and Detection 8-17 8.10.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluati'ons ~
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| I
| |
| ~ 8-17 S.ll
| |
| ~
| |
| Fire Zone 29G Unit 1 and Unit 2 Screen'houS'e Auxiliary MCC Room ~ ~ ~ 8-18
| |
| '8.11.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection"......'.'.'.;.:.'.".. ~ ~ ~ 8-18 8.11.2 Suppression and Detection 8'-19 8.11.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations'.;.;; ~ ~ ~ &-19 8.12 Fire Area 33,33A,33B and 105 Unit:1 -Ea'st. Ma'in'-."
| |
| Steam Valve Enclosure, Main Steam"Piping A'r'ea, West NESW Valve Area, and Contractor"-Access Control Building 8-19 8.12.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-19 8.12.2 Suppression and Detection ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-19 8.12.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-19 8.13 Fire Area 34, 34A, 34B Unit 2 'East 'Maioli Steam' I
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| -Valve Enclosure, Main Stea'm Piping Area, -'and:
| |
| West NESW Valve Area ~ ~ ~ 8-20 8.13.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protecti'on" ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 5-20 8.13.2 Suppression and Detection ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-20 8.13.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluati:one ~
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| 8-20 8.14 Fire Area 40(A andIB) Unit 1 4kV 'Switcfigear''
| |
| and Fire Area 41 Unit 1 ESS aid 'ooms MCC Rooms L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ L ~ 8'-2 1 8.14.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection'.';..~;";A..::.~.. 8'-21 8.14.2 Suppression and Detection ~ ~ ~ 8-21 8.14.3 Boundary Evaluations ~ ~ ~ 8-21 8.15 Fire Zone 43 Access Control Area~.;i.'-."...: ~ ~ ~ ~ 8-21 8.15.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-21 8.15.2 Suppression and Detection 8-21 8.15.3 Boundary Evaluations 8-21 XV
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| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
| |
| SECTION PAGE 8.16 Fire Zones 44N and 44S Auxiliary Building Componen Cooling Water System Area Elevation 609 ft 8-22 8.16.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-22 8.16.2 Suppression and Detection 8-23 8.16.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-24 8.17 Fire Area 47(A and B) Unit 2 4kV Switchgear Rooms and Fire Area 45 Unit 2 ESS and MCC Rooms 8-25 8.17.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-25 8.17.2 Suppression and Detection 8-25 8.17.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-25 8.18 Fire Zones 49 and 50 Unit 1 and Unit 2 HVAC V estxbule 8-25 8.18.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-25 8.18.2 Suppression and Detection 8-25 8.18.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-26 8.19 Fire Zones 51 and 52 East and West End of Auxiliary Building Elevation 633 ft 8-26 8.19.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-26 8.19.2 Suppression and Detection 8-26 8.19.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-26 8.20 Fire Area 53 Unit 1 Control Room 8-27 8.20.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-27 8.20.2 Suppression and Detection 8-27 8.20.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-27 8.21 Fire Area 54 Unit 2 Control Room 8-28 8.21.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-28 8.21.2 Suppression and Detection 8-28 8.21.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-28 8.22 Fire'Zone 57 Unit 1 Control Room Cable Vault 8-29 8.22.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-29 8.22.2 Suppression and 'Detection 8-29 8.22.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-29 8.23 Fire Zone 58 Unit 2 Control Room Cable Vault 8-29 8.23.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-29 8.23.2 Suppression and Detection 8-29 8.23.3 Boundary Modifications/Evaluations 8-29 8.24 Fire Area 62(A,B,C) Unit 1 Charging Pump Area and Fire Area 63(A,B,C) Unit 2 Charging Pump Area 8-29 8.24.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-29 8.24.2 Suppression and Detection 8-29 8.24.3 Boundary Modifications 8-30 0
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| xv1
| |
| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued).
| |
| SECTION PA'GE 8.25 Fire Zone 79 Unit 1 Turbine Room Between the Unit 1 Emergency Diesels 8-30 8.25.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-30 8.25.2 Suppression and Detection 8-31 8.25.3 Boundary Modifications 8-31 8'. 26 Fire Zone 85 Unit 2 Turbine Room Between Unit 2 Emergency Diesels 8-31 8.26.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-31 8.26.2 Suppression and Detection 8-32 8.26.3 Boundary Modifications 8-32 8.27 Fire Zone 122 Unit 1 Containment Instrument R oom 8-32 8.27.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-32 8.27.2 Suppression and Detection 8-32 8.27.3 Boundary Modifications 8-32 8.28 Fire Zone 123 Unit 2 Containment Instrument R oom 8-32 8.29 Fire Zones 66, 74 Units 1 and 2 Containment Piping Annulus; Fire Zones 67, 75 Units 1 and Lower Volume; Fire Zones 120, 121 Units 1 and Containment Accumulator Enclosure 8-33 8.29.1 Conduit and Cable Tray Protection 8-33 8.29.2 Suppression and Detection 8-33
| |
| ~
| |
| 8.29.3 Boundary Modifications 8-33 8.30 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) 8-33 8.31 Process Monitoring System 8-34 8.31.1 Repowering of Existing LSI Panels 8-34 8.31.2 Steam Generator Pr'essure for LSI Panels .8-34 8.31.3 Source Range Monitoring at LSI Panels 8-34 8.31.4 Centralized Control Room Panel LSI-4 8-34 8.31.5 Th and Tc for LSI Panels 8-35 8.32 E SW System 8-35 8.32.1 ESW Pump Circuit Modifications 8-35 8.32.2 ESW Strainer and Valve Circuit Modifications 8-36 8.32.3 CCW Pump Circuit Modifications 8-36 8.32.4 Emergency Power System (EPS) 8-36 TABLE 8-1 Wrapped Raceways/Cables by Fire Zone xv11
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| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
| |
| SECTION PAGE
| |
| : 9. BOUNDARY EVALUATIONS 9-1 9.1 Fire Zone 43 and Fire Zone 91 Duct Evaluation 9-6 9.2 Fire Area 54 and Fire Zone 73 Duct Evaluation 9-10 9.3 CCW Pump Air Supply Duct Evaluation (Fire Zone 4 4S ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 9-15 9~4 Auxiliary Building Vertical Air Shafts Evaluation (Fire Areas 12 and 22) 9-21 9.5 Fire Zones 70 and 73 Hatch Evaluation 9-45 9.6 601 ft Pipe Tunnel Evaluation (Fire Zone 6A) 9-48 9.7 Fire .Area 13 and Fire Area 14 Boundary Evaluation 9-62 9.8 Fire Area 21 and Fire Area 20 Boundary Evaluation 9-67 9.9 Fire Area Containing Fire Zones 3, 32, 36, 48, and 69 and Fire Area Containing Fire Zones 49, 50, 51, and 52 Boundary Evaluation 9-72 9.10 Fire Area 43 and Fire Zone 44N Boundary Evaluation 9-76 9.11 Units 1 and 2 Turbine Building, Main Steam Pipe Tunnels and Service/Office Building Evaluation 9-80 9.12 Turbine Building and Screen House Boundary Evaluation 9-85 9.13 Fire Area 53 and Fire Area 57 Hatch Evaluation 9-88 9.14 Fire Zone 43 and Fire Area 56 Hatch Evaluation 9-93 9.15 Fire Zone 40B and Fire Area 55 Hatch Evaluation 9-98 9.16 Fire Area 41 and Fire Area 55 Hatch Evaluation 9-103 9.17 Fire Area 54 and Fire Area 58 Hatch Evaluation 9-108 9.18 Fire Zone 52 and Fire Area 59 Hatch Evaluation 9-113 9.19 Fire Area 45 and Fire Area 60 Hatch Evaluation 9-119 9.20 Fire Zone 47B and Fire Area 60 Hatch Evaluation 9-124 9.21 Fire Zone 110 and Fire Zone 43 Door Evaluation 9-129 9.22 9.23 Fire Zone ill and Fire Zone 44S Door Evaluation Fire Area 116 Boundary Evaluation 9-134 9-140 9.24 Fire Area 117 Boundary Evaluation 9-145 9.25 Essential Service Water Pump House Hatch and Fire Damper Evaluation 9-151 9.26 Fire Area 9 and Fire Area 10 Boundary Evaluation 9-164 9.27 Fire Area 24 and Fire Area 25 Boundary Evaluation 9-168 9.28 Fire Area 61 and Fire Zone 5 Boundary Evaluation 9-172 9.29 Fire Area 105 and Fire Areas 33, 33A, 33B Boundary Evaluation 9-176
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| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS, AND EVALUATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
| |
| SECTION PAGE 9.30 Fire Zones 3, 32, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 69 and Fire Areas 106, 107, 31, 35, 146 Boundary 9.31 E valuation .........................................
| |
| Boundary Evaluation of Fire Zones 62A, 62B, and 62C...
| |
| 9-181 9-185
| |
| -9. 32 Boundary Evaluation of Fire Zones 63A, 63B and 63C.... 9-192 9.33 Fire Zone 6A to Fire Zone 138B Boundary Evaluation.... 9-199 9.34 Fire Zone 36 to Fire Zone 5 Boundary Evaluation....... 9-204 9.35 Fire Zone 108 to Fire Zone 33A Boundary Evaluation.... 9-210 9.36 Fire Zone 109 and Fire Zone 34A Boundary Evaluation... 9-217 9.37 Fire Zone 32 to Fire Zone 5 Boundary Evaluation....... 9-224 9.38 Fire Zone 69 to Fire Zones 108 and 109 Boundary E valuation.......................................... 9-231 9.39 Fire Zone 70 to Fire Zone 129 Boundary Evaluation..... 9-238 9.40 Fire Zone 7 to Fire Zone 61 Boundary Evaluation ...... 9-241 9.41 Fire Zones 37 and 51 HVAC Duct Penetrations .......... 9-246 FIGURES 9.3-1 Plan and Elevation of Ceiling Ledge in Fire Zone 44S 9.3-2 Fire Barrier between CCW Pumps 9.3-3 Elevation of CCW Pump Fire Barrier 9.6-1 587 ft Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-2 609 ft Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-3 Location of Pipe Tunnel 9.6-4 Section A-A Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-5 609 ft Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-6 601 ft Ceiling Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-7 601 ft Floor Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-8 601 ft Wall No. 1 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-9 601 ft Wall No. 2 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-10 601 ft Wall No. 3 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-11 601 ft Wall No. 4 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-12 601 ft Wall No. 5 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-13 601 ft Wall No. 6 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-14 601 ft Wall No. 7 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation 9.6-15 601 ft Wall No. 8 Pipe Tunnel Evaluation X1X
| |
| : 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Pur ose of Re ort The purpose of this report is to identify the safe shutdown system requirements of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, relative to the fire protection guidelines of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. For those plant areas where fire protection of the safe shutdown systems and their associated circuits are not in
| |
| ,compliance, analyses are presented and modifications are proposed for the purpose of meeting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) requirements. In a few areas, exemptions are requested from the specific requirements of Section III.G where compliance with the regulation would not significantly enhance fire protection above that of present commitments.
| |
| The NRC management has established that the reporting process regarding Appendix R is one of "Management by Exception".
| |
| 0 This process suggests that the contents of this Appendix R submittal need not exhaustively address every instance of compliance by including the details of the supporting analyses.
| |
| Rather, it should focus on the methods by which Indiana and Michigan Electric Company has determined that either:
| |
| (1) The Donald C. Cook design complies with or will comply with the specific requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G; or (2) Exemptions are requested from the specific requirements of Appendix R Section III.G. By analysis and implementation of proposed modifications, the level of fire protection will provide assurance that at least one train of redundant safe shutdown systems would be free of fire damage.
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| Page l-l
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| | |
| R/AEP/1 I P 188 1.2 Executive Summar In accordance with the guidance given in Appendix R,
| |
| "...that licensees should re-examine those previously .approved configurations of fire protection that do not meet the requirements as specified in Section III.G to Appendix =R...", a detailed, re-examination and re-analysis of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant's safe shutdown capability has been performed. The results of that re-examination and re-analysis, included in this report, build upon the previous fire protection activities performed under the guidelines of Branch Technical Position -(BTP)
| |
| 'APCSB 9.5-1, the response to which was submitted in 1977. The re-analysis also considers other subsequent fire protection
| |
| .improvements, incorporated into the D.C. Cook facility.
| |
| This report reviews Indiana and Michigan Electric Company's
| |
| \
| |
| Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316) safe shutdown systems and their associated circuits for compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G. This report also includes the descriptions of proposed alternative shutdown systems and provides sufficient technical information to W
| |
| permit NRC Staff review and approval of proposed plant modifications. Finally, those areas of noncompliance with the P
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| provisions of Appendix R are identified, and a subsequent, substantive basis for equivalent protection to the public health P
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| and safety is demonstrated through detailed analysis.
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| Page 1-2
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| R/AEP/1, P18 8 This report was prepared in the following manner. First, a process of selection and documentation of limiting safety consequences and safe shutdown system performance goals was conducted for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. An analysis was then performed to identify a minimal set of primary and auxiliary safe shutdown systems necessary to support safe shutdown in the event of a postulated exposure fire. After the requisite systems were identified, the related components and circuits (including associated circuits) were reviewed for compliance with the specific separation criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2. For those areas not in compliance, studies were completed to determine whether:
| |
| (1) Modifications or changes to plant fire protection or safe shutdown system features were required to bring the zone into compliance; or (2) Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability was required to bring the zone into compliance; or *
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| (3) An exemption was j.ustified for the specific fire zone
| |
| 'in question.
| |
| Subsequent to issuance of the Appendix R March 1983 submittal, the design and implementation of the proposed modifications was begun. Some of the proposed fire protection modifications were reviewed and in some instances it was identified that the modifications could not physically be implemented (e.g., upgrading the access hatches to three-hour fire-rated). During this period, the fire area boundaries had also undergone a reevaluation process. This reevaluation identified additional areas of concern. These concerns were evaluated and other options were identified in order to bring the Page 1-3
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| R/AEP/1, P188 D.C. Cook power plant into compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
| |
| The following approaches were taken to resolve the identified areas of concern:
| |
| (1), Propose .additional modifications (see Section 8).
| |
| (2) Provide justifications for existance of unrated barriers, HVAC ducts, doors, hatches and/or openings (see Section 9).
| |
| (3) Combine -fire areas into a larger fire area. In these cases, systems analyses were performed to ensure one train of safe shutdown systems remains unaffected (see Sections 2 and 9).
| |
| (4) Request exemption and provide justification for the exemption (see Section 7).
| |
| Portions of D.C. Cook power plant were not identified as
| |
| .fire zones=in the March 1983 submittal. These areas do not contain safe 'shutdown cables or components and were not included in any identified fire areas. During the reevaluation process, these areas were given a fire zone designation and included in the previously identified fire areas.
| |
| The results of these activities, are listed in Summary Table 1-.1. The table identifies the fire areas and fire zones at the D.C. Cook Plant, the applicable Appendix R provisions, and the technical approaches selected to achieve the appropriate levels of protection. Table l-l includes the unidentified fire zones 4
| |
| and presents the condition/status of each fire zone at the time of the Mar'ch 1983 submittal. Table l-l of this report correlates to Table l-l of the March 1983 submittal, but has been reformatted and includes additional information.
| |
| Page 1-4
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| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 The results of this re-analysis and re-examination can be summarized as follows:
| |
| Separation between required safe shutdown circuits, which meets the specific requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, exists or will exist in 147 of the fire zones reviewed.
| |
| (2) Alternative shutdown, which meets the requirements of Section III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, will exist for 51 fire zones.
| |
| (3) Two technical exemption requests were submitted subsequent to the March 1983 submittal. The exemptions were (a) Auxiliary Building HVAC ducts and (b)
| |
| Containment Building seismic gaps.
| |
| (4) Three exemption requests from the specific requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R are requested in fire zones where zone features provide equivalent protec-tion.
| |
| (5) Eight exemption requests from the specific requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R are requested in fire zones where zone features provide equivalent protec-tion.
| |
| (6) All associated circuits of concern having a separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and having a common power source with the shutdown equipment, will be electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuit of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices.
| |
| (7) All associated circuits of concern having a separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R and having a common enclosure, e.g., raceway, panel, junction box, have 'een adequately resolved by being electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown" circuits of concern by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices.
| |
| (8) All associated circuits of 'less concern that have a separation from the fire area than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R and have a connection to circuits of equipment whose'purious operation could adversely affect the shutdown capability have been adequately resolved by appropriate action pre- or post-fire.
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| Page 1-5
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 1.2.1 Results of Anal sis The results of the analysis confirm the adequacy of the existing fire protection features in 13 of 57 fire areas when compared against the specific criteria of Appendix R, Section III.G.
| |
| For 18 of the 57 fi're areas, proposed modifications including upgrading of fire barriers, installation of suppression and detection systems, circuit modifications, cable rerouting, tray and conduit wrapping, and piping modifications will achieve fire zone and area compliance with the specific criteria of Appendix R,'ection III.G.
| |
| For the remaining 26 fire areas, similar modifications are proposed but verbatim compliance with Appendix R is not achieved.
| |
| For these areas, exemptions are requested. The exemption requests are made on the basis of detailed fire hazards analyses which conclude that existing features, when combined with additional proposed fire protection modifications, provide functionally equivalent protection of the public health and safety. The exemption requests are contained in Section 7.0 of this report.
| |
| 1.3 Sco e of Re ort This report contains nine sections. Section 2.0 identifies the fire areas and fire zones developed to support the Appendix R analyses. This includes a detailed discussion of the detection Page 1-6
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 and suppression systems and identifies the features provided on a zone-by-zone basis. Criteria for establishing fire areas and zones are discussed as well as the process used to determine fire hazard severity. The information contained in the'ssociated Section 2 generally presents the D.C. Cook plant configuration of each fire zone and fire area at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage. In addition, the fire protection features include modifications required for compliance with Appendix R Section III.G, and general plant improvements initiated at the time of issue of this report.
| |
| Section 3.0 provides a description of- the active fire protection features including detection and suppression systems 1
| |
| ,at D.C.. Cook. The ,information, contained in Section. 3 generally presents the D.C. Cook plant configuration of each fire zone's active fire, protection features at, the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage. In addition, the fire protection features include modifications required for compliance with Appendix R Section III.G, and general plant improvements initiated at the time of issue of this report.
| |
| Section 4.0 describes the investigatory process used to identify safety functions, safe- shutdown systems,'omponents and circuits, and associated circuits of concern. Related assump-
| |
| ,tions and considerations are also discussed. The information, contained in this section presents the D.C. Cook plant. status/
| |
| condition of the safe shutdown systems and components at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage.
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| Page 1-7
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 Section 5.0 provides a discussion of the alternative shutdown systems provided by use of the unaffected unit's safe shutdown systems. In addition, Section 5.0 provides detailed'esponses to the relevant questions contained in Generic Letter 81-12 as clarified by the NRC Staff's clarifications dated March 22, 1982. The information contained in this section presents the D.C. Cook plant status/condition of the safe shutdown systems, components, and alternative shutdown methods identified at the time of the March 1983 submittal; however, the system flow diagrams included in this section present the D.C. Cook plant
| |
| .;piping configuration at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage.
| |
| Section 6.0 addresses the cold shutdown repairs necessary to
| |
| . achieve long-term safe shutdown. The levels of damage which may
| |
| ~occur as a result .of hypothesized Appendix R fires, the normal actions and repairs required to assure, that cold shutdown can be achieved and maintained within 72 hours, are identified. The information contained in this section presents the D.C. Cook plant status/condition of the safe shutdown systems and components at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage.
| |
| Section 7.0, contains exempti,on requests .for each
| |
| . fire area/zone identified as not being in compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R, and for areas/zones where a modification would not enhance fire protection safety. Each of the fire areas/zones is described in detail and a fire hazards analysis, Page 1-8
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, F188 including results, is provided. Exemptions for each zone are also formally requested in this section and the detailed technical bases for each request are identified at the conclusion of each analysis. Tables and sketches summarizing significant fire area information are also provided at the end of each subsection. Exemptions requested in Subsections 7.2 through 7.12 utilize the D.C.- Cook plant condition/configuration at the time of the March 1983 submittal. The remaining two subsections (7.13 and 7.14) are based on the D.C. Cook plan't condition/configura-tion at the time of June 1984. In some instances, evaluations were performed, to justify not implementing proposed modifica-tions. These evaluations are presented in Section 9 of this report and are based on the configuration of the D.C. Cook plant at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage; In addition, due to on-going efforts to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and subsequent generic NRC clarifications, various modi'fications in conjunction with the performance of engineering evaluations have resulted in revisions to various requested exemptions. These revisions are based on the existing configuration of the D.C.
| |
| Cook plant at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling .outage.
| |
| Section 8.0 describes those modifications proposed at D.C.
| |
| Cook Nuclear Plant which are considered necessary to:
| |
| (1) Bring each identified fire zone into compliance with the specific criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G; or, (2). Satisfy certain assumptions made in Section 7.0 (e.g.,
| |
| installation of barriers, thermal shields, conduit wrappings, etc.).
| |
| Page 1-9
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 The information contained in this section presents the D.C.
| |
| Cook plant configuration/status at the time of the March 1983 submittal.
| |
| Section 9.0 provides a compilation of fire area boundary evaluations which have been performed since .the issuance of the March 1983 report. The information contained in this section presents the D.C. Cook plant configuration/status at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage.
| |
| 1.4 Definitions, Acron ms and Abbreviations 1.4.1 Definitions Active Com onent a component used to directly control (start, regulate or stop) a shutdown or support function, e.g., a flow control valve, 'a pump, or a normally closed isolation or stop valve.
| |
| Affected Unit as used in discussions of alternative shutdown, the unit with one or more of its normal safe shutdown systems rendered inoperable, without considering the cross connects in the fire zone under investigation.
| |
| Associated Circuit of Concern safety-related and non-safety-re'lated cables that are associated with equipment which is required for shutdown and which have a separation from the fire area less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, and which have either:
| |
| (1) A common power source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the
| |
| . post-fire shutdown circuit of concern by coordinated circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices; or Page 1-10
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 N
| |
| (2) A connection of circuits of equipment whose spurious operation will adversely affect the shutdown capability, e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves; or (3) A common enclosure, e.g., raceway, panel, junction'box, with shutdown cables and are not electrically protected from the post-fire shutdown circuits of concern by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices or will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.
| |
| Automatic Detection a device located (usually at the ceiling) in a zone or area that transmits a signal to a remote location (usually the Control Room) indicating an excess presence of combustion products. Several types of detection devices are commonly utilized, such as smoke (photoelectric and ionization), heat (fixed temperature, rate of rise, or a combination of both) and flame detectors (ultraviolet,
| |
| )
| |
| visible, or infrared).
| |
| Automatic Su ression a fixed piping system of water or other fire extinguishing agent automatically actuated when the presence of combustion products or heat exceeds the set point established for the system in the area in which it is installed.
| |
| Cold Shutdown reactor at zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and RCS temperature at or below 200 F.
| |
| Fire Area that portion of a building or plant separated from other areas by boundary fire barriers with the fire hazard in each area evaluated to determine barrier fire rating requirements.
| |
| Page l-ll
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 Fire Barrier a continuous membrane either vertical or horizontal, such as a wall or floor/ceiling assembly, that has a specified fire resistance rating to limit the spread'f fire between fire areas or safe shutdown components. The fire barriers are defined to be rated commensurate with the hazard to which the barrier is exposed.
| |
| fire-fighting and who are equipped for and trained in the fighting of fires.
| |
| assemblies have withstood a fire exposure as established in accordance with test procedures of nationally recognized testing organizations.
| |
| propagation along the length of cables or prevents spreading of fire to nearby combustibles within a given fire area or fire zone.
| |
| Fire Zone a subdivision of a fire area designated as a potential fire hazard zone for convenience of analysis and design of fire suppression systems.
| |
| Fixed Su ression , any water or gaseous suppression system activated either automatically or manually, but excluding manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers.
| |
| Hot Shutdown reactor at zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and RCS temperature between 350 F and 200 F.
| |
| Page 1-12
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 d
| |
| ,zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and RCS average temperature greater than or equal to 350 F.
| |
| Manual Su ression a fixed or portable means of controlling or extinguishing a fire requiring manual actuation and/or application.
| |
| Safe Shutdown S stem a safe shutdown system includes all components, panels, cables, raceways, conduits, etc.,
| |
| necessary for the system to perform a safe shutdown function. A safe shutdown system is any of the systems (e.g., Auxiliary Feedwater) which are required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. Necessary supporting auxiliary systems are included.
| |
| S rinkler S stem a network of piping connected to a reliable water supply that will distribute the water throughout the area protected and will discharge the water through sprinklers in sufficient quantity to either control or extinguish a fire. The system, usually activated by heat, includes a controlling valve and a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation.
| |
| Stand i e and Hose S stem a fixed piping system with hose outlets, nozzle and hose connected to reliable water supply to provide effective fire hose streams to specific areas inside the building.
| |
| Page 1-13
| |
| | |
| R/AEP/1, P188 Unaffected Unit as used in the discussions of alternative shutdown, the unit whose normal safe shutdown systems will be used to provide alternative shutdown in the affected unit.
| |
| Water S ra S stem a network of piping similar to a sprinkler I
| |
| that it utilizes open-head spray nozzles
| |
| ~
| |
| system except and protects a specific hazard.
| |
| 1.4.2 Acron ms and Abbreviations AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AOV Air-Operated Valve BIT Boron Injection Tank CCW Component Cooling Water CST Condensate Storage Tank CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Systems EPS Emergency Power System ESW Essential Service Water LSI Local Shutdown Indication MCC Motor Control Center MOV Motor-Operated Valve MS Main Steam PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SV Safety Valve Page 1-14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE I
| |
| I SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS I
| |
| l I FIRE AREA: RHR AND CTS PUMPS AREA ELEV. 573'-: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY I
| |
| I 1 182 EXISTING NONE ER (c) (1). (2). (6).
| |
| I (9)
| |
| I 1A NONE NONE NONE EC (~) (3). (5)
| |
| I 18 NONE NONE NONE EC (~) (3). (5)
| |
| I 1C NONE NONE ER (a.b) (2). (3). (5)
| |
| I I
| |
| 1D NONE NONE ER (a,b) (2) (3),
| |
| ~ (5)
| |
| I I 1E NONE NONE NONE EC (*) (3), (5)
| |
| I i 1F NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (3). (5)
| |
| I 1G NONE NONE ER (a.b) (2). (3). (5) 1 1H NONE NONE ER (a,b) (2). (3) ~ (5) 136 NONE NONE NONE EC (*) NONE 137 NONE NONE NONE EC (~) NONE 13BA NONE NONE NONE EC (+) NONE 138B I NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 138C ! NONE NONE NONE -EC (1 ) NONE PAGE 1 OF 16
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECT ION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS
| |
| =FIRE AREA TURBINE BUILDING 5 CREENHOUSE SERVICE/OFFICE BUILDINGS AND UNITS 1 AND 2 WEST MAIN STEAM VALVE EN CLOSURES: 1.5 HOUR BO UNDARY NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 28 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (+) (5) 30 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (4) (5) 77 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (*) (5) 78 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (*) (5) 79 NONE EXISTING PC (b,c) (1). (3). (4). (5) 80 NONE EXISTING EC (b) (5) 81 NONE HONE EXISTING EC (*) (5) 82 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (~) (5) 83 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (') (5) 84 NONE EXISTING EC (b) (5) 85 NONE EXISTING PC (b,c) (1), (3). (4). (5) 86 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (*) (5) 87 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (4) (5) 88 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (*) (5) 89 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (4) (5) 90 NONE, NONE EXISTING EC (4) (5) 91 NONE EXISTING EC (b) (5) 92 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (*) (5) 93 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (4) (5)
| |
| NONE NONE EXISTING EC (4) (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE PAGE 2 OF 16
| |
| | |
| I ~1 4~
| |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION ~ SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS 95 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (+) (5) 96 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (*) (5) 97 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (*) (5) 98 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (4) (5) 99 NONE NONE EXI STING EC (4) (5) 100 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (~) (5) 108 NONE NONE ER (b) (5), (6) 109 NONE NONE ER (b) (5), (6) 110 NONE NONE EC (b) (5)
| |
| NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 112 NONE NONE EC (b) (5) 113 NONE NONE EC (b) (5) 114 NONE NONE EC (b) (5) 115 NONE NONE EC (b) (5) 124 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4) (5) 125 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4) (5) 126 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4) (5) 127 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4) (5) 128 NONE NONE NONE FC (i) (5) 129 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4). (5) 130 NONE EXISTING EXI STING EC (*) (5) 131 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (~') (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE PAGE 3 OF 16
| |
| | |
| 0 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| CATIONSS SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS 139 NONE NONE NONE EC (*) (5) 140 NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 141 NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 142 NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 143 NONE NONE NONE EC (+) (5)
| |
| I I FIRE AREA: AUXILIARY BUILDING ELEV. 633'ND 650'ND FUEL HANDLING BUI LDING: 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY I 3 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (~) (5)
| |
| I 31 NONE
| |
| 'ONE NONE EC (4) (5)
| |
| I 32 EXISTING EXISTING EC (g) (5) 35 NONE NONE NONE EC (+) (5) 36 NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 46 NONE EXISTING NONE EC (4) (5) 49 OP EX1 STING NONE ER (4) (5). (6) 50 EXISTING NONE= ER (g) (5). (6) 51 EXISTING NONE PC (g) (2), (4) (5)
| |
| ~
| |
| 52 182 EXISTING NONE PC. ER I (2), (4), (5). (6)l 69 182 EXISTING NONE ER (g) (5), (6) 106 EXISTING NONE EC (9) (5) 107 EXISTING NONE EC (0) (5) 146 NONE NONE NONE EC (~) (5)
| |
| PAGE 4 OF 16
| |
| | |
| I TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| CATIONSS APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE ZONE ZONE 'ETECT SSS EQPT OR CABLE WITHIN I ON AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION III.G.2 PROVISIONS III.G.3 EVALUATIONS OR FIRE AREA: SAMPLING ROOM ELEV. 587'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 4 1 EXISTING NONE EC (0) NONE FIRE AREA: AUXILIARY BUILDING EAST AND WEST ELEV. 587'": 1.5 HOUR 80 UNDARY 182 EXISTING EX I STING PC (c) (1), (2) ~ (4). (5)
| |
| (9) 6A NONE NONE NONE EC (*) (5)
| |
| EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (1) . (2), .(4) . (5)
| |
| (6). (7) (9)
| |
| ~
| |
| lil 2 EXISTING EXISTING PCS ER (c) (1), (2), (5), (6) 6S EXISTING EXISTING PC. ER (1). (2). (4). (5)
| |
| (6). (7) (9)
| |
| ~
| |
| 61 NONE EXISTING NONE EC (4) (5) 64A NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4) (5) 648 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4) (5) 65A EXISTING EXISTING EC (0) (5) 658 EXISTING EXISTING FC (g) (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 QUADRANT 1 CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 7 1 EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (g) (5), (6), (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 QUADRANT 4 CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 8 1 EXISTING EXISTING I PC. ER (0) (2). (6)
| |
| PAGE 5 OF 16
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| CATIONSS SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 QUADRANT 3N AND 3M CABLE TUNNELS ELEV. 596'.5": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY EXISTING EXISTING EC (g) (5) 10 EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (g) (5). (6). (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 0 UADRANT 35 CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": I.s HOUR BOUNDARY 1 EXISTING EXISTING ER (9) (6)
| |
| I I FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 QUADRANT 2 PIPING TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY I
| |
| 12 1 NONE NONE PC, ER (g) (2), (5). (6)
| |
| I I FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 DIESEL OIL PUMP ROOM ELEV. 587'": 3 HOUR BOUNDARY I
| |
| 13 182 EXISTING EXISTING EC (g) (5)
| |
| I FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 TRANSFORMER ROOM ELEV. 591'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 14 NONE NONE PC, ER (3). (5). (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 CD DIESEL ROOM ELEV. 587'-: 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 15 1 EXISTING EXISTING PC (a) (1) . (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 AB DIESEL ROOM ELEV. 587'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 16 EXISTING EXISTING EC (9) NONE FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 WEST AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 17A NONE NONE EC (9) NONE PAGE 6 OF 16
| |
| | |
| J TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| IC SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 WEST AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 178 NONE NONE EC (g) NONE FIRE AREA: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP CORRIDOR: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 17C IL2 NONE NONE PC (g) (1) ~ (3) . (4)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 EAST AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 170 NONE NONE EC (g) NONE FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 TURBINE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 17E 1 NONE EXISTING EC (g) NONE FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 TURBINE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 17F NONE EXISTING EC (9) NONE .
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 EAST AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 17G NONE NONE EC (g) NONE FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 CD DIESEL ROOM ELEV. 587'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 18 EXISTING EXISTING PC (g) (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 AB DIESEL ROOM ELEV. 587'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 19 2 EXISTING EXISTING PC (a)
| |
| PAGE 7 OF 16
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| CATIONSNS SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 TRANSFORMER ROOM ELEV. 591'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 20 NONE NONE PC, ER (3), (5). (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 DIESEL OIL PUMP ROOM ELEV. 587'": 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 21 182 EXISTING EXISTING EC (9) (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 QUADRANT 2 PIPING TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 22 NONE NONE PC, ER (g) (2). (5), (6)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 QUADRANT 3N CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 23 EXISTING EXISTING ER (g) (6)
| |
| ! FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 QUADRANT 3M AND 3S CABLE TUNNELS ELEV. 596'.5-: 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 24 EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (g) (5), (6), (7) 25 EXISTING EXISTING EG (9) (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 QUADRANT 4 CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 26 EXISTING EXISTING PC ER (9) (2), (6)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 QUADRANT 1 CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 596'.5": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 27 EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (g) (6) ~ (7)
| |
| PAGE 8 OF 16
| |
| | |
| 5 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA ESSENTIAL SERVICE W ATER PUMPS AREA: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 29A NONE NONE ER (3). (5) 29B NONE NONE (3), (5) 29E NONE NONE ER (3), (5) 29C NONE NONE ER (2). (3), (5) 290 NONE NONE ER (2). (3). (5) 29F NONE NONE ER (2), (3). (5) 29G'82 NONE NONE ER (c) (1). (2). (3). (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 EAST MAIN STEAM VALVE ENCLOSURE AND CONTRACTOR ACCESS CONTROL AREA 1.5 HOUR BOUNDAR 33 NONE NONE ER (2). (3) (5)
| |
| ~
| |
| 33A NONE NONE ER (3), (5). (6) 33B NONE NONE ER (3). (5), (6) 105 NONE NONE EXISTING EC (*) (5)
| |
| I FIRE AREA UNIT 2 EAST MAIN ST EAM VALVE ENCLOSURE AREA: 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 34 NONE NONE ER (2). (3) 34A NONE NONE FR (3), (5), (6) 34B NONE NONE (3), (6)
| |
| PAGE 9 OF 16
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA: AUXILIARY BUILDING NORTH AND SOUTH ELEV. 609'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 37 NONE EXISTING NONE EC (*) (5) 43 EXISTING NONE EC (5) 44N 182 EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (1), (2) . (3) .
| |
| (4). (5), (6) ~
| |
| (7). (9) 44S 182 EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (1). (2) ~ (3).
| |
| (4). (5) ~ (6) ~
| |
| (7), (8). (9) 44A NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 44B NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5) 44C NONE NONE EC (H) (5) 44D NONE NONE EC (H) (5) 44E SP NONE NONE EC (9) (5) 44F NONE NONE EC (0) (5)
| |
| -44G NONE NONE EC (O) (5) 44H NONE NONE EC (H) (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 QUADRANT 2 CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 612'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 38 1 EXISTING EXISTING PC. ER (6). (7)
| |
| I FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 QUADRANT 2 CABLE TUNNEL ELEV. 612'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 39 EXISTING EXISTING PC, ER (6), (7)
| |
| PAGE 10 OF 16
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS I FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOMS ELEV. 609'-: 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY EXISTING EXISTING EC NONE 40A 40B EXISTING EXISTING PC (5), (7)
| |
| FI SAFETY SYSTEMS AND MCC ROOM ELEV. 609'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY
| |
| .41 1 EXISTING EXISTING PC FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEMS AREA ELEV. 609'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 42A EXISTING EXISTING PC (7) 428 EXISTING EXISTING PC (7) 42C EXISTING EXISTING PC (7)
| |
| .42D EXISTING EXISTING PC (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS AND MCC ROOM ELEV. 609'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 45 EXISTING EXISTING PC (5). (7)
| |
| -FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEMS AREA ELEV. 609'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 46A EXISTING EXISTING PC (7) 46B NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (4) 46C EXISTING EXISTING PC (7) 46D EXISTING EXISTING PC (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOMS ELEV. 609'": 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY EXISTING EXISTING EC NONE 47A 47B ~ EXISTING EXISTING PC (5), (7)
| |
| PAGE 11 OF 16
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| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE
| |
| ~ 'CONTINUED)
| |
| SSS'QPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REQUIRED MODI F I-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 53 EXISTING NONE PC, ER (2), (5), (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 54 EXISTING NONE PC; ER (2). (5), (7)
| |
| I I FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM CABLE VAULT: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY I
| |
| 55 1 EXISTING EXISTING PC (5), (7) i'6 I
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY CABLE VAULT: 1. 5 HOUR BOUNDARY I
| |
| 1 EXISTING EXISTING PC (5) (7)
| |
| I FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM CABLE VAULT AND HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL AREA: 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 57 EXISTING EXISTING PC (5), (7) 144 EXISTING NONE PC. ER (2), ('7)
| |
| FIRE AREA UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM CABLE VAULT AND HO T SHUTDOWN PANEL AREA 3 HOUR BOUNDAR 58 EX I S(I NG EXISTING PC (5). ('7) 145 EXISTING NONE PC. ER (2). (7)
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| I FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 AUXILIARY CABLE VAULT: 1.5 HOUR BOUNDARY 59 2 EXISTING EXISTING PC (5). (7)
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| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOM. CABLE VAULT: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 60 2 EXISTING EXISTING PC (5). (7)
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| PAGE 12 OF 16
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| CATIONSS SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REOUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 CHARGING PUMPS AREA ELEV. 587'": 1 HOUR BOUNDARY 62A EXISTING EXISTING PC (2) ~ (5), (7) 628 EXISTING EXISTING PC (5), (7) '2),
| |
| 62C EXISTING EXISTING PC (2). (5), (7)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 CHARGING PUMPS AREA ELEV. 587'": 1 HOUR BOUNDARY 63A EXISTING EXISTING PC (2), (5), (7) 63B EXISTING EXISTING PC (2). (5). (7) 63C EXISTING EXISTING PC (2). (5) (7)
| |
| ~
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 66 NONE NONE PC (d) (7) 67 NONE NONE PC (<j) (7)
| |
| NONE NONE EC (d) NONE 101 NONE NONE EC (d) NONE 103 NONE NONE EC (<j ) NONE 118 SP NONE NONE EC (0) NONE 120 NONE NONE PC (<j) (7) 122 NONE NONE PC ( j') (7) 132 NONE NONE NONE EC (*) NONE 134 NONE NONE NONE EC (*) NONE PAGE 13 OF 16
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| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| SSS EQPT OR APPLICABLE APPENDIX R REOUIRED MODIFI-FIRE CABLE WITHIN AUTOMATIC PROVISIONS CATIONS OR ZONE ZONE DETECTION SUPPRESSION III.G.2 III.G.3 EVALUATIONS FIRE AREA: CONTROL ROOM HVAC AND COMPUTER AREA: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 70 NONE EXISTING NONE EC (*) (5) 71 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (+) NONE 72 NONE EXISTING EXISTING EC (*) NONE 73 NONE EXISTING NONE EC (*) (5)
| |
| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 74 NONE NONE PC (d) (7) 75 NONE NONE PC (d) (7) 76 NONE NONE EC (d) NONE 102 NONE NONES EC (d) NONE 104. NONE NONE EC (d) NONE 119 SP NONE NONE EC (9) NONE 121 NONE NONE PC (d) (7) 123 NONE NONE PC (f) (7) 133 NONE NONE NONE EC (4) NONE 135 NONE- NONE NONE EC (~) NONE FIRE AREA: UNIT 1 TANK AREA PIPE TUNNEL: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 116 NONE NONE NONE EC (4) (5)
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| FIRE AREA: UNIT 2 TANK AREA PIPE TUNNEL: 3 HOUR BOUNDARY 117 NONE NONE NONE EC (*) (5)
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| PAGE 14 OF 16
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| | |
| 0 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| LEGEND:
| |
| NONE ,NO SSS COMPONENTS OR CABLES IN THE ZONE/NO MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED FOR COMPLIANCE UNIT 1 SSS COMPONENTS OR CABLES IN THE ZONE UNIT 2 SSS COMPONENTS OR CABLES IN THE ZONE 182 BOTH UNITS SSS COMPONENTS OR CABLES IN THE ZONE OP OPTIONAL SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AND/OR CABLES ONLY IN THE ZONE EC EXISTING COMPLIANCE PC PROPOSEO COMPLIANCE ER EXEMPTION REQUEST SP SPURIOUS CABLES ONLY. SEE TABLE 4-3 TYPE OF III.G.2'OMPLIANCE STRATEGY (a) III.G.2 -(a) COMPLIANCE SEPARATION OF CABLES AND EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED NONSAFETY-RELATED CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS BY A FIRE BARRIER HAVING A THREE-HOUR RATING.
| |
| (b) III.G.2 (b) COMPLIANCE SEPARATION OF CABLES ANO EQUIPMENT ANO ASSOCIATEO NONSAFETY-RELATED CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS BY A HORIZONTAL DISTANCE OF MORE THAN 20 FEET WITH NO INTERVENING COMBUSTIBLES OR FIRE HAZARDS. IN ADDITION, FIRE DETECTORS AND AN AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SHALL BE INSTALLED IN THE FIRE AREA.
| |
| (c) III.G.2 -
| |
| (c) COMPLIANCE ENCLOSURE OF CABLE AND EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED NONSAFETY-RELATED CIRCUITS OF ONE REDUNDANT TRAIN IN A FIRE BARRIER HAVING A ONE-HOUR RATING. IN ADDITION, FIRE DETECTORS AND AN AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SHALL BE INSTALLED IN THE FIRE AREA.
| |
| (d) -
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| III.G.2 -
| |
| (d) COMPLIANCE SEPARATION OF CABLES AND EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATED NONSAFETY-RELATED CIRCUITS, OF REDUNDANT TRAINS BY A HORIZONTAL DISTANCE OF MORE THAN 20 FEET WITH NO INTERVENING COMBUSTIBLES OR FIRE HAZARDS.
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| (e) III.G.2 (e) COMPLIANCE INSTALLATION OE FIRE DETECTORS AND AN AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM IN THE FIRE AREA.
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| (f) III.G.2 (f) COMPLIANCE - SEPARATION'OF CABLES AND EQUIPMENT AND ASSOCIATEO NONSAFETY"RELATED CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS BY A NON-COMBUSTIBLE RADIANT ENERGY SHIELD.
| |
| (g) III.G. 1 COMPLIANCE IS PROVIDED SINCE NO REDUNDANT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT IS IN THE AREA (b) III.G COMPLIANCE IS PROVIDED SINCE THE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT IN THE AREA IS PASSIVE AND IS NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATF.
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| (~') III.G COMPLIANCE IS PROVIDED SINCE NO SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES OR COMPONENTS ARE IN THE FIRE ZONE.
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| PAGE 15 OF 16
| |
| | |
| TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R
| |
| | |
| ==SUMMARY==
| |
| COMPLIANCE TABLE (CONTINUED)
| |
| TYPE OF MODIFICATION REQUIRED FOR COMPLIANCE (1) RACEWAY PROTECTION (I.e., WRAPPING OF CABLE TRAY OR CONDUIT)
| |
| (2) AREA BOUNDARY MODIFICATION (3) . DETECTION MODIFICATION SUPPRESSION MODIFICATION AREA BOUNDARY EVALUATION (6) AREA BOUNDARY EXEMPTION (7) ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT AND/OR MECHANICAL PIPING MODIFICATION (8) RATED BARRIER ADDITION WITHIN A FiRE ZONE BOUNDARY MODIFICATION (STAIRWAY SUPPRESSION)
| |
| ~
| |
| PAGE 16 OF 16
| |
| : 2. IDENTIFICATION OF FIRE AREAS This section provides detailed information on the criteria and methodologies used to develop fire area and zone definitions for D.C. Cook. In addition, the methodology utilized to develop equivalent fire severities for each fire area are discussed. The results of these activities are presented as Tables 2-1 and 2-2 and Figures 2.1 through 2.11.
| |
| The information contained in this section generally presents the D.C. Cook plant configuration of each fire zone and fire area at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage. The fire protection features include modifications required for compliance with Appendix R Section III.G, as well as general plant improvements initiated at the time of issue of this report.
| |
| On January 31, 1977, the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company (IBM) responded to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 for Units 1 and 2 at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant. The general guidelines used for the plant layout of fire zones were:
| |
| (1) 'Identify safety-related systems or equipment; (2) Isolate safety-related systems or equipment from unacceptable fire hazards by spatial separation or by the provision of fire barriers or enclosures; (3) Provide fire detection and/or suppression equipment to minimize the effects of a fire; and (4) Employ combinations of the above, acting to complement or back up one another.
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| Page 2-1
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| These general criteria were incorporated into the March 31, 1977, Fire Hazards Analysis for Units 1 and 2 of the D.C. Cook Plant. A total of 104 fires zones were identified in the 1977 Fire Hazards Analysis for D.C. Cook. In that response, rooms or areas were identified as separate fire zones if they contained combustible materials, safety-related equipment or cables and/or were adjacent to zones containing such equipment.
| |
| For each of the 104 fire zones identified in the 1977 Fire Hazards Analysis, the combustible/fuel loading in terms of Btu's per square foot of floor area was determined. The combustible materials considered in the analysis were cable insulation, plastic, liquid hydrocarbons, flammable gases, and carbonaceous products such as wood, paper and charcoal.
| |
| The physical barriers separating fire zones identified in the 1977 Fire Hazards Analysis were constructed of heavy reinforced concrete construction h'aving a minimum fire rating of three hours. The only exceptions to this construction are concrete block walls with the minimum rating of 1-1/2 hours, which had been added for compartmentalization. Artificial U
| |
| boundaries, such as open walkways varying from six feet in width to the entire length or width of the zone, separated a number of zones in both the Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings. In the Turbine Building, the boundaries were determined by the location of suppression and/or detection systems. In the Auxiliary Page 2-2
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| Building, the location was dependent on the physical characteristics of the elevation. The artificial boundaries typically were located where elevator shafts or walls reduced size of the openings between zones to large open walkways.
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| 2.2 Identification of Fire Zones The general guidelines used for establishing fire zones in the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company's response to Appendix A formed the basis for the fire zone and area activities performed in response to Appendix R. In responding to the separation criteria of Appendix R, Section III.G.2, a study was performed to identify locations within the plant that, if required, could be defined as fire areas or could be used as b arriers during the III.G;2(a) separat'ion analysis. The study r resulted in subdivisions of certain previously defined zones.
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| These were identified in the subsequent analysis by a letter following the previous zone definition (e.g., 40A). In some cases, these subdivided zones were subsequently found to constitute a valid fire area (e.g., l7A). In other cases, the subzones were combined during the cable separation analysis for analytical convenience (e.g., 62A,B,C).
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| In general, those Appendix A fire zones that would qualify as a fire area under the criteria of Appendix R without modifications were designated as fire areas. Systems analyses were performed on the fire areas to identify potential conflicts with the separation criteria of Appendix R. Where no conflicts Page 2-3
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| arose, and where no safe shutdown equipment was identified in the area, compliance with Appendix R was identified. No attempts were made to combine the fire areas that do comply with Appendix' with adjacent fire areas or zones in Revision 0 to the March 1983 submittal. However, during the reevaluation effort, some fire areas originally in compliance were combined and evaluated for impact to safe shutdown.
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| Another study was performed that ide'ntified additional plant locations not previously tabulated in the 1977 analysis. These plant areas were incorporated into the fire zone listing in Revision 0 to the March 1983 submittal and are numbered as Fire Zones 105 through 128. Many of these zones were subsequently found to contain no safe shutdown equipment or cables.
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| Since the previous study did not identify all plant areas, an additional study was performed for this report per the criteria of Generic Letter 83-33 to accurately identify all plant locations. As 'a ,result, Fire Zones 129 through 146 were identified, some of which were subdivided by letters into multiple zones (e.g., 138A). These plant areas were also incorporated into the fire zone listing.
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| The newly identi.fied fire zones, with the exception of Fire Zones 144 and 145, contain no safe shutdown cables or components.
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| These new fire zones were combined with adjacent fire areas to form larger fire areas. Fire hazards analyses and safe shutdown system evaluations were performed to ensure that there would be Page 2-4
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| no impact on compliance for these fire areas (see Sections 7 and 9). Only Fire Zones 144 and 145, which were originally included as part of Fire Zones 54 and 53, respectively, contain safe equipment or cables. However, these two zones are the 'hutdown Unit 1 and Unit 2 hot shutdown panels, which were proposed to be enclosed by three-hour barriers in Revision 0 to the March 1983 Appendix R submittal.
| |
| An artificial fire zone was also identified during the course of this study. This zone, ELSH, is made up of the two elevator shafts (passenger and freight) connecting levels of the Auxiliary Building. The door openings to the shafts are protected by 'B'abel fire doors. This artificial zone was created due to the difficulties, associated with identifying a vertical shaft in horizontal fire area boundaries. It exists for convenience purposes only and is not identified elsewhere in this report.
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| Based on these studies, a total of 198 individual and I
| |
| subdivided fire'ones (e.g., 40A) have been identified. Table 2-1 is a compilation of all the fire zones identified in this analysis.
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| 2.3 Identification of Fire Areas A fire area is defined as that portion of a plant, separated from other areas by rated boundary fire barriers. The rating of t the barriers is determined by the fire. hazard within each area and is required to be commensurate with the fire hazard to which Page 2-5
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| the barrier is exposed. Fire barriers, doors, dampers, and penetration seals are not necessarily required to be three-hour-rated. The rating is dependent upon the fire hazards to which'hey could be exposed. At D. C. Cook, the construction of walls, floors, and ceilings is typically of heavy, reinforced concrete with an inherent fire rating of at least three hours. In addition to this construction, the definition of the fire area boundaries must also address the protection provided for the doors, dampers, stairways, hatches, and other penetrations in the fire area boundary construction.
| |
| Doors and dampers at D.C. Cook .are typically either l-l/2 or three-hour fire-rated when. they form part of a barrier separating fire areas. Evaluations and/or exemption requests are provided where fire'-rated protection does not exist. Ratings also may exist for doors that form zone boundaries within an area or are part of exterior walls. At D.C. Cook, no external fire hazards exist along exterior plant walls that contain unrated doors.
| |
| Some conditions exist where ventilation systems exit into rated enclosures and proceed through other areas in the plant to the exterior. Rated dampers do not exist in these situations.
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| These types of ventilation systems exist in Zones 40A, 40B, 4l, 42A, 42D, 45, 46A, 46D, 47A and 47B (Emergency Power Systems Area). Section -
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| 3 discusses further the acceptable impact of these openings on these zone's gaseous suppression systems.
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| Page 2-6
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| Stairways connecting fire areas within the Auxiliary Building will be provided with automatic water suppression systems around the perimeter of the stair openings. These systems form water curtains that inhibit the passage of hot gases, flames and products of combustion to the areas above.
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| Based on the low area combustible loading of each level of the Auxiliary Building (less than ten minutes for any fire area),
| |
| this type of water suppression protection provides an adequate barrier that prevents fire propagation to adjoining levels. This protection permits each level of the Auxiliary Building to be treated as a separate fire area.
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| Unrated metal hatches, where they form part of a fire area boundary, have been evaluated and found to provide a level of protection appropriate to the area hazard, in conjunction with the existing fire pr'otection features for that area. Large concrete plugs are provided in the floor/ceiling assemblies between fire areas of the Auxiliary'uilding for equipment removal. When in place, these plugs provide an equivalent level of protection to that requi.red for the barrier.
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| Other penetrations and openings in barriers separating fire areas that contain safe-shutdown equipment are either sealed to provide a level of fire protection commensurate with the fire hazard in the fire area or evaluations are performed to justify the existing configuration.
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| Page '2-7
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| Penetrations and openings may not be sealed where area walls form a natural division between plant buildings, the areas do not contain safe shutdown equipment, and the combustibl'e loading in vicinity of the wall is extremely low. Such unsealed
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| 'he penetrations and openings in barriers typically exist either as natural ventilation flowpaths or to facilitate other aspects of plant and building design (water drainage paths, room pressure relief for hypothesized pipe breaks, seismic gaps, etc.).
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| In general, artificial boundaries (i.e., large open spaces) do not exist between defined fire areas.. However, this is not always the case. For example, an evaluation is performed to justify the ladder opening connecting each unit's main steam valve enclosure (Fire Zones 33 and 34 for Units 1 and 2, respectively) with the RW, CS and PW tank area pipe tunnel (Fire, Areas 116 and 117 for Units 1 and 2, respectively), which then connects with the quadrant 2 piping tunnel (Fire Areas 12 and 22 for Units 1 and 2, respectively) via an open walkway. Artificial boundaries do exist between fire zones or sub-zones within a fire area.'hese boundaries occur in some cases as a result of the combination of previously defined zones into larger fire areas.
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| In other cases, they were created to facilitate the, cable and equipment separation, analysis. In all instances, these artificial boundaries were recognized as such,. and the separation analysis performed between such zones used the III.G.2 20-ft and/or one-hour barrier provisions.
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| Page 2-8
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| An inherent 'feature of the D.C. Cook electrical system design is'he extensive, use of embedded co'nduit. Although such embedded conduit principally contains power cabling, some control and instrument circuits may also be routed within embedded conduits. Embedded conduit typically is located in concrete floor fill slabs. These fill slabs, of varying thickness, are poured directly on the floor's structural concrete pads.
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| Embedded conduits also exist in certain vertical wall sections.
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| Such floor and wall conduits are embedded with a minimum of four inches of concrete cover. In some cases, the conduit may exist under two to three feet of concrete. In all cases, due to the inherent fire ratings associated with such construction and the separation available between redundant division conduits within theslabs, cables so embedded are not considered as part of any identified fire zone until they exit the concrete.
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| Based on these criteria, the March 1983 submittal identified 80 fire areas at D.C. Cook. As a result of identifying previously unidentified plant locations, fire area boundaries have changed. In some cases, fire areas identified separately in the March 1983 submittal were combined into larger fire areas.
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| In other cases, the newly identified fire zones were combined with adjacent fire areas forming larger fire areas. Where penetrations in fire area boundaries were identified as having no impact on redundant safe shutdown capabilities, technical evaluations were performed justifying the configurations (see Page 2-9
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| Section 9). These fire areas, which may consist of individual fire zones or a consolidation of zones, are listed in'able 2-2 and are shown graphically in Figures 2.1 through 2.11 on a floor-'y-floor (plan and sectional views) basis. A total of 57 fire areas have been identified in this manner. The automatic detection and suppression systems, which are described in Section 3, are also listed in Table 2-2. Table 2-2 also identifies floor areas and combustible loadings on a fire zone by fire zone basis, with total floor areas and combustible loadings provided for each fire area. Each solid horizontal line in Table 2-2 delineates one of the 57: fire areas utilized in this analysis. Where zones and sub-zones have been combined into a single fire area, the zones are grouped together in this table and are separated from other fire areas by solid horizontal lines. Unless specifically indicated; the rating of the boundary fire barriers for each fire area indicated in this table describes the minimum fire rating of the components that form the boundaries of the area.
| |
| Figures 2.1 through 2.11 identify the location of fire area and fire zone boundaries as they exist at D.C. Cook. Blue lines in these figures identify fire area boundaries, while orange lines identify fire zone boundaries that do not form a portion of fire area boundaries. Figures 2.1 through 2.11 identify the entirety of fire area boundaries; they do not solely identify those barriers that separate interior fire areas. As such, exterior walls 'and walls below grade that do not abut adjacent Page 2-10
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| interior fire areas have also been identified with blue lines as fire area boundaries. These fire areas are identified for the performance of Appendix R separation analysis. Where only one train of safe shutdown systems is located within a fire area with justifiable barriers, then the criteria of Appendix R Section III.G.l are met.
| |
| Although not specifically identified in either Table 2-2 or Figures 2.1 through 2.11, three-hour-rated barriers separating redundant safe shutdown components located in the same fire area have been identified. These barriers, while not resulting in the creation of separate fire areas, have been utilized to achieve compliance with Section III.G.2(a) of Appendix R. The III.G.2(a) barriers at D.C. Cook that have been utilized are identified as follows:
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| (1) The T-shaped wall separating the Unit 1 RHR pumps in Fire Zone 1C and Fire Zone 1D on the 573 ft elevation of the Auxiliary Building; (2) The T-shaped wall separating the Unit 2 RHR pumps in Fire Zone 1G and Fire Zone lH on the 573 ft elevation of the Auxiliary Building; (3) The wall separating Unit 1 ESW pumps in Fire Zone 29A and Fire Zone 29B from the Unit 2 ESW pumps in Fire Zone 29C and Fire Zone 29D; and (4) The barrier separating the Unit 1 CCW pumps from the Unit 2 CCW pumps and the spare CCW pump from the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CCW pumps.
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| 2.4 Procedure for U datin Combustible Loadin Since th'e submittal of the 1977 Fire Hazards Analysis, additional cabling has been installed at D.C. Cook. In order to Page 2-11
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| address this increase in combustible loading due to additional cable insulation, previously developed zone cable combustible loadings were increased by an average value based on the total'mount of additional cable installed at D.C..- Cook. A review of documentation revealed that the total number of feet of cable at D.C. Cook increased by" approximately 25~ between 1977 and 1982.
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| A 25~ increase in combustible 'loading associated with cable insulation was therefore applied to the fire zones identified in the 1977 Fire Hazards Analysis for D.C. Cook. In order t'o account for additional amounts of cable installed since 1982, an additional 10% increase in total feet of installed cable has,'been applied to those fire zones containing cable insulation.
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| Between 1982 and the end of 1985, the actual increase has been less than 5%. The 254 and 10< increases are conservative in nature because the increases include all cables used in the plant, whether in cable trays or conduit.
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| Since 1977,'ables in conduit and trays in some fire areas/zones have been wrapped with a one-hour fire barrier to achieve the appropriate separation criteria. Pilasters in the diesel generator rooms have been protected with a three-hour wrap. As a conservative measure, the wrapped cables have not been deleted from the cable combustible loading in the fire areas/zones where they exist. Area surveys were conducted in 1982 and again in 1986 to determine if any additional substantial combustibles had been added to the various zones.
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| Page 2-12
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| The equivalent fire severity then was estimated through a strict interpretation of the criteria presented in Table 6-8A of the 14th Edition of the Fire Protection Handbook. This table, which was also utilized to estimate the fire severity in the 1977 Fire Hazards Analysis, relates the Btu/ft of combustible material with the estimated minutes of fire severity based on the area under the standard time-temperature curve. The values contained within this table are based on materials with an average heat of combustion of 8000 Btu/lb. To obtain an accurate equivalent fire severity for materials with heats of combustion greater or less than 8000 Btu/lb, th'e Btu/ft referenced in Table 6-8A must be multiplied by the ratio of the heat of combustion of the actual materials within the zone (cable insulation, liquid hydrocarbons, plastics, etc.) divided by the heat of combustion (8000 Btu/lb) utilized in the table. This analysis has been performed for ea'ch fire area contained within this report with the equivalent fire severities referenced in Table 2-2. Table 2-2 of this report correlates to Table 2-2 of the March 1983 submittal, but has been reformatted and includes additional information.
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| 2.5 Su lemental Information to Su ort the Contention that Cables in Conduit Embedded in Concrete are not Part of the Fire Area Section 2.3 states that cables located in conduit embedded in concrete walls, floors, or ceilings were not considered as part of any fire zone until they exited the concrete. The Page 2-13
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| supplemental information contained in this section provides the basis for this technical determination.
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| The technical basis substantiating that four inches of cover provides adequate protection for embedded cables 'oncrete considers the following:
| |
| (1) The fire hazard and ,level of fire detection .and suppression that exist for each of the various areas of concern; (2) The NFPA ratings for concrete fire barriers; (3) The difference between the NFPA fire barrier, configuration and the wall, floor, ceiling configurations at Donald C. Cook that contain embedded cable; (4) The difference between the NFPA fire barrier cold side temperature criteria and the temperature failure criteria for typical nuclear plant cables.
| |
| In accordance with the NFPA's 14th Edition of the Fire Protection Handbook, Table 6-7G of Section 6 concerning building construction and design criteria indicates that for normal weight concrete, which is the predominant type of concrete at D.C. Cook, J
| |
| a minimum solid thickness of 4.2 to 4.5 inches results in a two-hour fire rating, while a one-hour fire rating requires only 2.8 to 3 inches of concrete. The range of these ratings is based on the two types of concrete aggregate that could potentially be used.
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| Although this would indicate that a l-l/2 to 2-hour rating is achieved by a simple four-inch concrete section, direct use of these ratings for the actual configuration of the concrete Page 2-14
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| sections containing embedded cable at D.C. Cook should not be made.
| |
| Figure 2.0-a depicts the typical construction for which the NFPA ratings directly apply, while Figure 2.0-b indicates the typical construction of concrete at D.C. Cook containing embedded cables. It immediately becomes apparent, recognizing the typical values for thermal conductivity and heat capacity of concrete, that the additional barrier mass between the embedded cables and the cold side will function as a heat sink, lowering the actual in-wall temperature at the embedded cable to a number substantially lower than the 322 F used for the standard NFPA barrier rating. The 322 F value in the NFPA ratings is based on a limiting factor of 250 F plus an assumed ambient temperature of 72 F on the cold side of the concrete section.
| |
| In order to quantify this comparison, a Finite Difference Thermal Computer Model was used that assumed a constant fire side heat flux of three-hour duration and measured the temperature variations at the four-inch embedment for various section thicknesses. As a base case, a four-inch concrete section was used with incident heat fluxes varied until a 322 F cold side temperature was achieved. Once determined, this base case heat flux was applied for 6.0, 8.0 and 12.0 inch concrete sections for a three-hour duration. In all cases, the cold side wall was Page 2-15
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| assumed adiabatic. The model results listed below indicate that, at a distance from the hot side of four inches, the concrete temperatures decrease dramatically as wall thickness increases.
| |
| Total Section Thickness (in.) Tem . at 4 in. at 3 hours ( F) 4.0 322 6.0 216 8.0 197 12.0 196 Further support for the conclusion that embedded cable does not degrade is contained in a report entitled, "A Study of Damageability 'of'lectrical
| |
| - Cable in'. Simulated Fire Environments," prepared by Factory Mutual Research Corporation ip March 1981 for the Electric Power Research Institute. The report "indicates that the surface temperature for 11 cable samples (varying from PE/PVC to EPR/Hypalon), at the point where insulation degradation begins, ranges from 567 F to 993 F. The temperature at which insulation degradation begins is higher than the temperatures associated with the failure criteria of 322 F for NFPA-rated fire'barriers. When a comparison is made between the onset of insulation degradation (567 F to 993 F) and the likely thermal profiles for concrete sections typical for D.C.
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| Cook barriers, it is evident that no cable insulation degradation should occur for embedded cables.
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| Page 2-16
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| Indiana and Michigan Electric Company's technical conclusion is that a minimum concrete cover of four inches protecting embedded conduit and cable provides sufficient protection to justify the exclusion of embedded conduit and cable in any fire area until it exits the concrete section.
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| 2.6 Identification of Maximum Allowable Combustible Loadin Justification for some of the exemptions and evaluations is based on the quantity of combustible loading present in the area.
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| For the purpose of controlling the increase of fixed and/or tran-sient combustible loading due to maintenance or future plant modifications, a maximum allowable 'ombustible loading value is identified only for those areas involved in an exemption or eval-uation. These values are listed in Table 2-3. The plant loca-tions (areas) identified on this table may consist of a single fire zone, a single fire, area, or a group of fire zones that do not make a fire area. Unless specifically listed, the values in, Table 2-3 are tot'als of fixed and transient corhbustible loadings in the areas. The fire zones in Table 2-'3 are grouped together by fire area, similar to those listed in Tables l-l and 2-2.
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| Page 2-17
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| TABLE 2-1 FIRE ZONE IDENTIFICATION TABLE Fire Zone Identification Auxiliary Building El 573 ft 0 in. both units 1A Containment Spray Pump East, Auxiliary Building El 573 ft 0 in. Unit 1 1B Containment Spray Pump West, Auxiliary Building El 573 ft' in. Unit 1 lC Residual Heat Removal Pump East, Auxiliary Building-El 573 ft 0 in. Unit 1 1D Residual Heat Removal Pump West, Auxiliary Building-El 573 ft 0 in. Unit 1 lE Containment Spray Pump East, Auxiliary Building El 573 ft 0 in. Unit 2 1F Containment Spray Pump West, Auxiliary Building El 573 ft 0 in. Unit 2 1G Residual Heat Removal East, Auxiliary Building El 573 ft 0 in. Unit 2 1H Residual Heat Removal West, Auxiliary Building El 573 ft 0 in. Unit 2 Pump Bay Turbine Building El 569 ft 6 in. both units Drumming/Drum Storage El 587 ft 0 in.
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| Sampling Room Auxiliary Building El 587 ft 0 in.
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| Auxiliary Building El 587 ft 0 in. (East End) both units 6A* Auxiliary Building Pipe Tunnel El 601 ft 0 in. and El 609 ft 0 in. both units 6N Auxiliary Building El 587 ft 0 in. (North section of the West End) Unit 1 Page 1 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Fire Zone Identification 6M Auxiliary Building El 587 ft 0 in. (Middle section of the West End) both units 6S Auxiliary Building El 587 ft 0 in. (South section of the West End) Unit 2 Quadrant 1 Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 1 Quadrant 4 Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 1 Quadrant 3N Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 1 10 Quadrant 3M Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 1 Quadrant 3S Cable Tunnel - El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 1 12 Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 1 13 Diesel Oil Pump Room El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 1 Transformer Room El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 1 15 lCD Diesel Generator Room El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 1 16 lAB Diesel Generator Room El 587 ft 0 in. - Unit 1 17A West Aux. Feed Pump Room El 591 ft 0 in'. Unit 1 17B West Aux. Feed Pump Room - El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 2 17C Corridor to Aux. Feed Pump Rooms El 591 ft 0 in.
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| both units 17D East Aux. Feed Pump Room El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 1 17E Turbine Aux. Feed Pump Room El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 1 17F Turbine Aux. Feed Pump Room El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 2 17G East Aux. Feed Pump Room El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 2 18 2CD Diesel Generator Room El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 2 2AB Diesel Generator Room El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 2 20 Transformer Room El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 2 21 Diesel Oil Pump Room El 587 ft 0 in Unit 2 Page 2 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Fire Zone Identification 22 Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 2 23 Quadrant 3N Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 24 3M Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 2 2'uadrant 25 Quadrant 3S Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 2 26 Quadrant 4 Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 2 27 Quadrant 1 Cable Tunnel El 596 ft 3-1/2 in. Unit 2 28 Diesel Fire Pump Room El 591 ft 0 in. Unit 1 29A Essential Service Water Pump PP-lE El 591 ft 0 in.
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| Unit 1 29B Essential Service Water Pump Unit 1 PP-1W El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 29C Essential Service Water Pump Unit 2 PP-2E El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 29D Essential Service Water Pump Unit 2 PP-2W El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 29E Motor Control Center For ESW Unit 1 Pumps El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 29F Motor Control Center For ESW Unit 2 Pumps El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 29G Screen House both units Auxiliary MCC Room El 575 ft 0 in.
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| 30 Unit 2 Diesel Fire Pump Room El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 31 Concrete Mixing Building/Drumming Area El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 32 Cask Handling Area El 609 ft 0 in. both units 33 Main Steam Valve Enclosure, Unit 1 East El 612 ft 0 in.
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| 33A Main Steam Line Area, East El 612 ft 0 in. Unit 1 33B Non Essential Service Water Valve Area, West El 612 ft 0 in. Unit 1 Page 3 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Fire Zone Identification 34 Main Steam Valve Enclosure, East El 612 ft 0 in.
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| Unit 2 34A Main Steam Line Area, East El 612 ft 0 in. Unit 2 34B Non Essential Service Water Valve Area, West-El 612 ft 0 in. Unit 2 35 Instrument Calibration Room El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 36 Spent Fuel Heat Exchanger Pit Pump Room-El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 37 Valve Gallery El 617 ft 0 in. both units 38 Quadrant 2 Penetration Cable Tunnel El 612 ft 0 in.
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| Unit 1 39 Quadrant 2 Penetration Cable Tunnel El 612 ft 0 in.
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| Unit 2 40A 4kV AB Switchgear Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 1 40B 4kV CD Switchgear Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 1 41 Engineered Safety System 6 MCC Room El 609 ft 6 in (6 Underfloor) Unit 1 42A EPS Transformer Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 1 42B EPS Control Rod Drive Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 1 42C EPS Motor Control Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 1 42D EPS (AB) Battery Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 1 43 Access Control Area El 609 ft 0 in. both units 44N Auxiliary Building North El 609 ft 0 in. both units Auxiliary Building South El 609 ft 0 in. both units 44A Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Room 518E, Auxilia'ry Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 1 44B Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Room 518W, Auxiliary Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 1 Page 4 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Fire Zone Identification 44C Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Room 517E, Auxiliary Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Room gl7W, Auxiliary Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 1 44E Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Room 518E, Auxiliary Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 2 44F Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Room 518W, Auxiliary Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 2 44G Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Room gl7E, Auxiliary Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 2 44H Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Room gl7W, Auxiliary Building El 609 ft 0 in. Unit 2 Engineered Safety System & MCC Room El 609 ft 6 in.
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| (6 Underfloor) Unit 2 46A EPS Transformer Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 2 46B EPS Control Rod Drive Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 2 46C EPS Motor Control Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 2 46D EPS (AB) Battery Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 2 47A 4kV AB Switchgear Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 2 47B 4kV CD Switchgear Room El 609 ft 6 in. Unit 2 New Fuel Storage Room El 633 ft 0 in.
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| 49 HVAC Vestibule El 633 ft 0 in. Unit 1 50 HVAC Vestibule El 633 ft 0 in. Unit 2 51 Auxiliary Building El 633 ft 0 in. (East End) both units 52 Auxiliary Building El 633 ft 0 in. (West End) both units 53 Unit 1 Control Room El 633 ft 0 in.
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| 54 Unit 2 Control Room El 633 ft 0 in.
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| Page 5 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Zone Identification 55 Switchgear Room Cable Vault El 625 ft 10 in. Unit 1 56 Auxiliary Cable Vault El 620 ft 6 in. Unit 1 57 Control Room Cable Vault El 624 ft 0 in. Unit 1 58 Control Room Cable Vault El 624 ft 0 in. Unit 2 59 Auxiliary Cable Vault El 622 ft 6 in. Unit 2 60 Switchgear Room Cable Vault El 625 ft 10 in. Unit 2 61 Spray Additive Tank Room El 587 ft 0 in. both units 62A Reciprocating Charging Pump El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 1 62B Centrifugal Charging Pump El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 1 62C Centrifugal Charging Pump El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 1 63A Reciprocating Charging Pump El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 2 63B Centrifugal Charging Pump El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 2 63C Centrifugal Charging Pump El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 2 64A Safety Injection Pump North El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 1 64B Safety Injection Pump South El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 1 65A Safety Injection Pump South El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 2 65B Safety Injection Pump North El 587 ft 0 in. Unit 2 66 Containment Piping Annulus El 598 ft 9-3/8 in.
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| Unit 1 67 Containment Lower Volume El 598 ft 9-3/8 in. Unit 1 68 Containment Upper Volume El 650 ft 0 in. Unit 1 69 Auxiliary Building El 633 ft 0 in. and 650 ft 0 in.
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| both units 70 Control Room HVAC Equipment El 650 ft 0 in. Unit 1 71 Unit 1 Computer Room El 650 ft 0 i n.
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| 72 Unit 2 Computer Room El 650 ft 0 in.
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| Page 6 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Fire Zone Identification 73 Control Room HVAC Equipment El 650 ft 0 in. Unit 2 74 Unit 2 Piping Annulus El 598 ft 9-3/8 in. 'ontainment Containment Lower Volume El 598 ft 9-3/8 in. Unit 2 76 Containment Upper Volume El 650 ft 0 in. Unit 2 77 Welding Shop Unit Building 1 El 591 ft 0 in. Turbine 78 Heating Boiler Building Room Unit 1 El 591 ft 0 in. Turbine 79 Turbine Room Unit 1 (N.E. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 80 Turbine Room Unit 1 (S.E. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 81 Turbine Room Unit 1 (S.W. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 82 Turbine Room Unit 1 (N.W. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 83 Turbine Room Unit 1 Lube Oil Room El 591 ft 0 in.
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| Turbine Room Unit 2 (N.E. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 85 Turbine Room Unit 2 (S.E. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 86 Turbine Room Unit 2 (S.W. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 87 Turbine Room Unit 2 (N.W. Portion) El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 88 Turbine Room Unit 2 Lube Oil Room El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 89 Turbine Room Unit 2 Misc. Oil Room El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 90 Turbine Room Unit 1 (N.E. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 91 Turbine Room Unit 1 (S.E. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 92 Turbine Room Unit 1 (S.W. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 93 Turbine Room Unit 1 (N.W. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| Turbine Room Unit 1 Aux. Heating Boiler El 609 ft 0 in.
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| Page 7 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| .Fire Zone Identification 95 Turbine Room Unit Turbine Oil Tank Room-El 605 ft ll in.
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| 1 96 Turbine Room Unit 2 (N.E. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 97 Turbine Room Unit 2 (S.E. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 98 Turbine Room Unit 2 (S.W. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 99 Turbine Room Unit 2 (N.W. Portion) El 609 ft 0 in.
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| 100 Turbine in.
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| Room Unit 2 Turbine Oil Tank Room El 609 ft 0 101 Containment in.
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| * 1 Accumulator Enclosure West El 612 ft 0 102 Containment in.
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| 2 Accumulator Enclosure West El 612 ft 0 103 Reactor Head Enclosure Unit 1 El 567 ft 2 in.
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| 104 Reactor Head Enclosure Unit 2 El 567 ft 2 in.
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| 105 Contractor Access Control Building El 612 ft 0 in.
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| 106 Aux. F.W. Battery Room gl Auxiliary Building-El 633 ft 0 in. Unit 1 107 Aux. F.W. Battery Room g2 El 633 ft 0 in. Unit 2 108 West Steam Valve Enclosure Unit 1 El 635 ft 109 West Steam Valve Enclosure Unit 2 El 635 ft 110 Main Steam Accessway Unit 1 El 587 ft 0 in.
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| Main Steam Accessway Unit 2 El 587 ft 0 in.
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| 112 Essential Service Water Pipe Tunnel Unit 1 El 570 ft 6 in.
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| 113 Essential Service Water Pipe Tunnel Unit 2 El 570 ft 6 in.
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| 114 Essential Service Water Pipe Tunnel Unit 1 El 587 ft 0 in.
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| 115 Essential Service Water Pipe Tunnel Unit 2 El 587 ft 0 in.
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| Page 8 of 10
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| | |
| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Fire Zone Identification 116 RW, CS, PW Tank Area Pipe Tunnel Unit 1 El 593 ft 0 in.
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| 117 RW, CS, PW Tank Area Pipe Tunnel Unit 2 El 593 ft 0 in.
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| 118 Containment Regen Heat Exchanger Room Unit 1 El 612 ft 0 in.
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| I 119 Containment Regen Heat Exchanger Room Unit 2 El 612 ft 0 in.
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| 120 Containment 1 Accumulator Enclosure East-El 612 ft 0 in.
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| 121 Containment 2 Accumulator Enclosure East-El 612 ft 0 in.
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| 122 Containment 1 Instrumentation Room Unit 1 El 612 ft 0 in.
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| 123 Containment 2 Instrumentation Room Unit 2 El 612 ft 0 in.
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| 124 UPS Inverter Room Security El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 125 CAS Security El 633 ft 0 in.
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| 126 Tech Support Center El 633 ft 0 in. both units 127 TSC, UPS Inverter and Battery Rooms El 650 ft 0 in.
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| both units 128 UPS Battery Room Security El 591 ft 0 in.
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| 129* Unit 1 Turbine Deck El 633 ft 0 in.
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| 130* Unit 2 Turbine Deck El 633 ft 0 in.
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| 131* Service and Office Buildings 132* Unit 1 Ice Condenser El 640 ft 0 in.
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| 133* Unit 2 Ice Condenser El 640 ft 6 in.
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| 134* Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Pit El 567 ft 0 in.
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| 135* Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Pit El 567 ft 0 in.
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| Page 9 of 10
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| TABLE 2-1 (continued)
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| Fire Zone Identification 136* Unit 1 Pipe Tunnel El 573 ft 0 in.
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| 137* Unit 2 Pipe Tunnel El 573 ft 0 in.
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| 138A* CVCS Hold-up Tank Area North El 562 ft 0 in.
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| 138B* CVCS Hold-up Tank Area Middle El 562 ft 0 in.
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| 138C* CVCS Hold-up Tank Area South El 562 ft 0 in.
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| 139* Turbine Room Sump El 570 ft 9 in.
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| 140* Turbine Caustic Pump and Tank Area El 569 ft 0 in.
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| 141* Turbine Pump Pit El 571 ft 0 in.
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| 142* Screenhouse El 591 ft 0 in. '- both units 143* Water Intake and Discharge System El 546 ft 0 in.
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| both units 144* Unit 1 Hot Shutdown Panel Enclosure El 633 ft 0 in.
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| 145* Unit 2 Hot Shutdown Panel Enclosure El 633 ft 0 in.
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| 146* Auxiliary Building Loading Platform El 609 ft 0 in.
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| *Areas of the plant that were previously not identified as fire zones in the 1983 Appendix R submittal Page 10 of 10
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| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS~
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| I MI NI MUM I RATING I
| |
| I OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT2 NUMBER RHR AND CTS PUMPS
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| ~ AREA I E . 573'-0" (SEE NOTE 26) 1 7 IONIZATION DRY PILOT PREACTION 1-1/2 (SEE NOTES 1, 8, 172 5,309 2 ' '.5, 2.6 SPR INKLERS 2, 25, 38, 6.0'.3 (SEE NOTES 1 39, 53 AND AND 42) 56) 1A 2 IONIZATION NONE 1, 790 324 2.5, 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42) 18 2 IONIZATION NONE 3.6 4, 815 324 2.5, 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42) 1C 2 IONI ZA>ION NONE 5.1 6,877 284 2.5, 2.6 I (SEE NOTE 42)I I I 10 2 I ON I ZATION I NONE I 9.2 12. 309 284 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 I (SEE NOTE 42)I I I 1E 2 IONIZATION I NONE I 4,774 324 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42)I I
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| (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONT INUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 1 OF 35
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| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS'IRE MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT2 NUMBCR 1F 2 IONIZATION NONE 3.7 4,913 324 (SEE NOTE 42) 1G 2 IONIZATION NONE 7,303 284 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42) 1H 2 I ON I ZATION NONE 5.6 7,593 284 2.2, 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42) 136 I NONE NONE 0.6 804 317 2.2, 2.6 I (SEE NOTE 42)
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| I 137 I NONE NONE 0.9 1, 154 317 2.2, 2.6 I (SEE NOTE 42)
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| I 138A I NONE NONE 2,025 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42) 138B NONE NONE 2,025 2.2, 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42) 138C I NONE NONE 2,025 2.2, 2.6 (SEE NOTE 42)
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| TOTAL 2.9 4,079 14,450 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 2 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS>>
| |
| I I MINIMUM RATING I OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE j EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA~ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT2 NUMBER i
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| 1 TURBINE BUILDING, SCREENHOUSE, SERVICE/OFFICE a BUILDINGS AND UNITS 1 AND 2 r'EST MAIN STEAM j VALVE ENCLOSURES j(SEE NOTE S 26 8 27)j 2 j NONE NONE 1-1/2 2.2 2,913 9,342 2.1, 2.4. 2.5, 2.6 l (SEE NOTES I 9, 11, 12, 28, 33, 34, 40, 41, 58, 59, 61 AND 62) 28 NONE WET PIPE 90.2 119,922 400 2.7 SPRINKLERS 30 NONE WET PIPE 90.2 119,922 400 2.7 SPR INKLERS 77 NONE WET PIPE 4.1 5,454 2,088 2.1, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 78 I NONE WET PIPE 4.0 5,419 2,160 2. 1, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 79 4 IONI ZATION WET PIPE 5.9 7,983 11,140 2.1, 2.4, 2.7 I FOR D.G. SPRINKLERS I RAMP/CORRIDOR 80 NONE WET PIPE 3.0 3,980 14,4'18 2. 1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 81 NONE WET PIPE 2.3 3, 174 12,812 2.1, 2.4. 2.5, 2.7 SPRINKLERS (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED 0 N NEXT PA GE)
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| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 3 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS>>
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA' DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT2 NUMBER 82 NONE WET PIPE 8.0 10,651 11,212 2.1, 2.4, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 83 1 THERMISTOR AUTOMATIC 3 HR 2,687,458 897 2. 1, 2.4, 2.7 C02, WET PIPE SPRINKLERS 84 NONE WET PIPE 2.4 3,257 14,824 2.1, 2.5, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 85 4 IONI ZA ION WET PIPE 4.1 5,599 .12,549 2. 1, 2.7 I FOR D.G. SPRINKLERS t RAMP/CORRIDOR I
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| 86 NONE WET PIPE 20.0 26,632 12,833 2.1, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 87 NONE WET PIPE 6.4 8,645 12,834 2.1, 2.5, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 88 1 THERMISTOR AUTOMATIC 3 HR 4,252,164 1,072 2. 1, 2.5, 2.7 C02, WET PIPE SPRINKLERS 89 NONE WET PIPE 3 HR 602,662 800 2. 1, 2.7 SPRINKLERS 90 NONE WET PIPE 5.3 7,038 10,998 2.1, 2.4, 2.8 SPRINKLERS 91 NONE WET PIPE 19. 4 25,875 15,400 2.1, 2.4. 2.5, 2.8 SPR INKLERS 92 I NONE WET PIPE 12.2 16,386 13,825 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.8 SPRINKLERS (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) 4 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 4 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS~
| |
| I MINIMUM I
| |
| RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE I
| |
| s FIRE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT NUMBER I
| |
| 93 NONE WET PIPE 4.9 6,627 12,705 2. 1, 2.8 SPRINKLERS 94 NONE WET PIPE 2.3 3,091 890 2. 1, 2.8 SPRINKLERS 95 1 THERMISTOR AUTOMATIC >> 3 HR 2,600,084 590 2. 1, 2.8 C02, WET PIPE SPRINKLERS 96 NONE WET PIPE 23.7 31,547 15,300 2.1, 2.5, 2.8 SPR INKLERS 97 NONE WET PIPE 2.4 3,207 12,524 2.1, 2.8 SPRINKLERS 98 NONE WET PIPE 8.7 11,572 14,080 2.1, 2.8 SPRINKLERS 99 I NONE WET PIPE 28. 4 37,713 13,139 2.1, 2.5, 2.8 I SPRINKLERS 100 1 THERMISTOR AUTOMATIC 3 HR 3,314,428 1, 102 2. 1, 2.5, 2.8 C02, WET PIPE SPRINKLERS 108 I NONE NONE 7.6 10,187 897 2.2, 2.4, 2. 10, 2. 11 I
| |
| 109 I NONE NONE 11.8 15,872 897 2.2, 2. 10, 2. 11 110 I
| |
| I NONE NONE 0.6 803 1,776 2.2, 2.4, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 NONE NONE 0.6 838 1,776 2.2, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
| |
| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 5 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS' MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD ARE) FIGURE FIRE AREA~ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT NUMBER I
| |
| 112 NONE NONE 0.2 329 1,229 2.4. 2.5. 2.6 113 NONE NONE 3,250 1,229 2.5, 2.6 114 NONE NONE 0.1 142 539 2 ', 2.7 115 NONE NONE 539 . 2.2, 2.7 124 2 IONI ZATION AUTOMATIC 400 2.7 HALON 1301 125 4 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 225 2. 10 (2 UNDER HALON 1301 FLOOR) 126 COMPUTER ROOM AUTOMATIC 68.0 90,400 2,450 2.1, 2.10 4 IONIZATION HALON 1301 CONSOLE ROOM AUTOMATIC 4 IONIZATION HALON 1301 (2 UNDER FLOOR)
| |
| CONSULTATION WET PIPE ROOMS SPRINKLER 4 IONIZATION SYSTEM (2 PER RM)
| |
| I REMAINING TECH NONE SUPPORT CENTER 3 IONIZATION 127 UPS, INVERTER AUTOMATIC 9.8 13,051 1,035 2.2, 2.4, 2.11 ROOM I HALON 1301 2 I ON I ZATION UPS BATTERY NONE ROOM 2 IONIZATION (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
| |
| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 6 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS''
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA>> DETECTION SUPPRESSION I BOUNDARIES (MI NUTES) BTU/FT2 FT2 NUMBER 128 NONE NONE 31.4 41,837 440 2.7 129 THERMISTORS MANUAL WATER 3.5 4,963 53,279 2. 1, 2.4, 2. 10, 2. 11 I FOR TURBINE SPRAY FOR TURBINE I UNDER LAG-GING AND MAN-UAL DRY CHEM" ICAL FOR TUR-BINE BEARING CHEM LAB NONE 4 IONIZATION 130 THERMI STD RS MANUAL WATER 1.7 2.528 53,135 2.5, 2.10. 2.11 FOR TURBINE SPRAY FOR TURBINE UNDER LAG-GING AND MAN-UAL DRY CHEM-ICAL FOR TUR-BINE BEARING 131 2. 1, 2.7, 2.8, 2. 10 EL. 649'-6" QC VAULT AUTOMATIC 128 170.302 83,328 (EXTENSION) 2 IONIZATION HALON 1301 REMAINING I NONE FLOOR AREA 51 IONIZATION EL. 636'-6" 44 IONIZATION WET PIPE (EXTENSION) SPR I NKLERS FOR MECH.
| |
| EQUIP. RM.
| |
| ONLY (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) 4 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 7 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS~
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE I EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA+ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER j
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| I I
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| EL.'33'-0" 11 IONIZATION WET PIPE SPR INKLERS FOR SERVICE I BLDG I
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| EL. 623' 26 IONIZATION WET PIPE (EXTENSION) 5PRINKLERS FOR LOCKER ROOM EL. 621'-0" QA RECORD AUTOMATIC VAULT C02 1 IONIZATION TELEPHONE AUTOMATIC EQUIP. ROOM C02 1 IONIZATION OTHER WET PIPE FLOOR AREAS SPR INKLERS 10 IONIZATION FOR SERVICE BLDG AND OFFICE BLDG HVAC EQUIP.
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| ROOM EL. 609'-0" 12 IONIZATION WET PIPE (EXTENSION) 10 HEAT SPR INKLERS EL. 609'-0" 19 IONIZATION WET PIPE 14 HEAT SPR INKLERS FOR SERVICE BLDG, MISC OFFICE BLDG AREAS EL. 595' FILE ROOM, AUTOMATIC CHART AND C02 RECORDS 3 IONIZATION (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 8 OF 35
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| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS'IRE MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE AREAS DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTUIFT FT NUMBER I
| |
| EL. 595'-0" SECURITY AUTOMATIC EQUIP. ROOM HALON 1301 2 IONIZATION REMAINING WET PIPE FLOOR AREAS SPRINKLERS 10 IONIZATION FOR SERVICE 3 HEAT BLDG 8 "OFFICE BLDG MECH. EQUIP.
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| ROOMS.
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| DELUGE SYSTEM FOR OFFICE BLDG GAS 8 BOTTLE STOR AGE, 8 ROAD-WAY OVERHANG I
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| ELEVATOR LOBBY 3 IONIZATION NONE
| |
| ~ (EXTENSION) 139 NONE NONE 1,164 2. 1, 2.5, 2.6 140 NONE NONE 2.6 3,698 888 2.1, 2.4, 2.6 141 NONE NONE 1.5 2, 196 1,611 2.1, 2.5, 2.6 142 NONE NONE 19. 0 25,652 18, 608 2.4, 2.5. 2.7, 2.8 143 NONE NONE 99.800 2.1, 2.4. 2.5 ~ 2.6 TOTAL 41.8 55,776 555,579 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 9 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS>>
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE I EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA~ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I
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| I AUXILIARY BLDG EL. 633' 650' AND FUEL HANDLING
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| ! BUILDING f(SEE NOTES 26 8 27)
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| I 3 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 1-1/2 4,861 2, 657 2.3, 2.5, 2.7 I (SEE NOTE 18) PREACTION (SEE NOTES 1, I SPRINKLER 2, 19, 30, I SYSTEM (SEE 31, 37, 39, NOTE 18) 40, 53, 57, 60, 61 AND 64) 31 NONE NONE 18. 0 24,019 986 2.3, 2.8 32 6 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 17.4 23,311 5,523 2.3, 2.5, 2.8, PREACTION 2. 10, 2. 11 SPRINKLERS 35 NONE NONE 38.2 50,792 323 2.8 36 NONE NONE 2.7 3,719 1,624 2.3, 2.8 48 4 IONIZATION NONE 1,650 2.3, 2.10 49 7 IONIZATION, MANUAL WATER 65.2 86,725 3,200 2.2, 2.3, 2. 10 THERMI STORS SPRAY FOR FOR CHARCOAL CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS FILTER UNITS 12-HV-AFX-1 1-HV-AES-1 1-HV-AES-2 50 7 IONIZATION, MANUAL WATER 33.2 44,309 3,200 2.2, 2.3, 2. 10 THERMISTORS SPRAY FOR I FOR CHARCOAL CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS FILTER UNITS 2-HV-AES-1 2-HV-AES-2 (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 10 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA F IGURE FIRE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT2 NUMBER 51 I 9 I ONI ZAT I ON DRY PILOT 16. 2 21, 650 5.386 2.2, 2.3 ~ 2.5, 2.10 (SEE NOTE 55) PREACTION SPRINKLERS (SEE NOTES 1 ~ 3) 52 17 IONIZATION DRY PILOT PREACTI ON 7.9 10, 717 11,085 222425210 SPRINKLER S (SEE NOTES 1, 3) 69 28 IONIZATION, MANUAL WATER 2.2 2,998 17 914
| |
| ~ 2.2. 2.3. 2.5, 2.8, THERMISTORS SPRAY FOR 2.9, 2. 10, 2. 11 FOR CHARCOAL CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS FILTER UNITS 1-HV-CPR-1 2-HV-CPR-1 106 1 HEAT (FIXED NONE 12.6 16,770 192 2 2, 2. 10 TEMP/RATE OF RISE) 107 1 HEAT (FIXED NONE 10.8 14,375 224 2.3, 2.10 TEMP/RATE OF RISE) 146 I NONE NONE 49.1 65,356 626 2.8 TOTAL 12.9 17,283 54,590 I
| |
| SAMPLING ROOM EL. 587'-0" 3 IONIZATION NONE 1-1/2 12.5 16,753 1,025 2.5, 2.7 4 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 11 OF 35
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| | |
| ES)
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| I FIRE AREA*
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| AUXILIARY BUILDINGI EAST AND WEST EL. 587' (SEE NOTES 26 8 27) 5 EXISTING DETECTION 14 IONIZATION, 1 THERMISTOR EXISTING SUPPRESSION DRY PILOT PREACTION MINIMUM RATI NG OF FIRE AREA BOUNDARIES 1-1/2 TABLE (SEE NOTES 1, 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS>>
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| NUT EQUIVALENT FIRE SEVERITY (MI 8.5 FIRE LOAD BTU/FT2 11 '29 AREA FT2 8,635 FIGURE NUMBER 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.7 2.9 FOR CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT 12-HV-SATFUF SPRINKLERS (SEE NOTES 1, 3)
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| : 39. 53 '6, 2, 4, 35,
| |
| : 57. 60 AND (SEE NOTE 55) MANUAL WATER 63)
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| SPRAY FOR CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT 6A I NONE NONE 0.1 143 10,890 2.2, 2.3. 2.5, 2.9 I
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| 6M I 6 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 8.2 11,022 6,095 2.2, 2.7, 2.9 (SEE NOTE 55) P REACTION SPRINKLERS (SEE NOTE 3) 6N 4 IONIZATION I DRY PILOT 16.4 21,892 4,212 2.2, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 (SEE NOTE 55) PREACTION SPRINKLERS (SEE NOTES 1,3) 6S 4 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 6.7 9,034 6,095 2.2. 2.7, 2.9 (SEE NOTE 55) PREACTION SPRINKLERS (SEE NOTES 1,3) 61 2 IONIZATION I NONE 10.4 13,846 1,000 2.3, 2.5, 2.7 64A 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 9.4 12 '42 309 2.2, 2.7 PREACTI ON SPRINKLERS (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)
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| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 12 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE. PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
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| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD ARE) FIGURE FIRE AREA~ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT NUMBER 648 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 8.0 10, 739 288 2.2. 2.5 ~ 2.7 PREACT ION SPR INKLERS 65A 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 8.6 11,518 309 2.2, 2.7 PREACTION SPRINKLERS 658 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 9.7 13, 008 288 2 ' 2-7 PREACTI ON SPRINKLERS TOTAL 8,947 38, 121 i UNIT 1 QUADRANT 1 i CABLE TUNNEL I EL'96'3.5" /
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| I 7 4 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 3 87.5 116,629 960 2.3 ~ 2.7, 2.8 3 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTES 40 AND 63)
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| I I UNIT 1 QUADRANT 4 I CABLE TUNNEL I EL. 596'"3.5" 8 6 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 23. 1 30,841 2,050 2.3, 2.4. 2.7 5 INFRARED COZ (SEE NOTE 40)
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| UNIT 1 QUADRANT 3N AND 3M CABLE TUNNELS (SEE NOTE 27) 9 4 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 54.8 72,856 539 2-2. 2- I 3 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTES 23 AND 40) 10 4 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 78.3 104,250 800 2.2, 2.7 3 INFRARED COZ TOTAL 68.9 91,612 1,339 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 13 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA~ DETECTION SUPPRESSION I BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I
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| I I UNIT 1 QUADRANT 3S I CABLE TUNNEL I
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| 11 3 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 19. 7 26,344 840 2.2, 2.7 3 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTE 40)
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| ! UNIT 1 QUADRANT 2 I PIPING TUNNEL I
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| 12 NONE NONE 1-1/2 1.2 1,722 7,812 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, (SEE NOTES 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 2, 5 AND 40)I UNIT 1 DIESEL OIL I PUMP ROOM I
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| I I
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| I 13 1 THERMISTOR AUTOMATIC 3 19. 1 25,469 621 2.2, 2.7 C02 (SEE NOTE 6)
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| I I
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| UNIT 1 TRANSFORMER ROOM I
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| 14 12 IONIZATION NONE (SEE NOTE 43)I(SEE 1-1/2 NOTE 6) 0.8 1,056 2,072 2 '. 2.7 I UNIT 1 CD DIESEL ROOM EL. 587'-0" 15 2 THERMISTORS AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 127. 0 169, 014 2,156 2.2, 2.4, 2.7 C02 UNIT 1 AB DIESEL ROOM EL. 587'-0" 16 2 THERMISTORS AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 124.0 165,028 2.233 2.2, 2.4, 2.7 COZ EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 14 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS>>
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| RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREAS DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I
| |
| UNIT 1 WEST AFW PUMP ROOM 17A NONE NONE 0.6 887 252 2.5, 2.7 I
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| UNIT 2 WEST AFW PUMP ROOM m
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| I 178 NONE NONE 0.6 893 252 2.5, 2.7 I
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| I AFW PUMP CORRIDOR 17C 2 IONIZATION WET PIPE 4.9 6,697 328 2.5, 2.7 SPRINKLERS'INIMUM SPR INKLERS I
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| s UNIT 1 EAST AFW PUMP ROOM 17D I NONE NONE 0.8 1,004 219 2.1, 2:5, 2.7 I
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| I UNIT 1 TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM 17E NONE WET PIPE 0.8 1,034 219 2. 1, 2.7 UNIT 2 TURBINE-DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM 17F NONE WET PIPE SPRINKLER S 3
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| (SEE NOTE 41) 0.8 1,034 219 2.1, 2.5,'.7 I UNIT 2 EAST AFW 1 PUMP ROOM I
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| I 17G NONE NONE 0.8 1,004 219 2. 1, 2.5, 2.7 I
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| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 15 OF 35
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| | |
| TA-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA F IGURE FIRE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I
| |
| I I UNIT 2 CD DIESEL i ROOM EL. 587'-0" 18 2 THERMISTORS AUTOMATIC 1- 1/2 122. 2 162,647 2,250 2.2, 2.5, 2.7 C02 UNIT 2 AB DIESEL ROOM EL. 587'-0" 19 2 THERMISTORS AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 122.2 162,656 2,250 2.2, 2.7 C02 I
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| UNIT 2 TRANSFORMER ROOM I
| |
| I 20 12 IONIZATION NONE 1-1/2 1.0 1,503 2,072 2 ' ' '
| |
| I (SEE NOTE 44) (SEE NOTE 7)
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| I I
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| I UNIT 2 DIESEL OIL PUMP ROOM l
| |
| 21 1 THERMISTOR AUTOMATIC COZ 3
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| (SEE NOTE 7)
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| : 21. 0 28,063 561 2 ', 2 '
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| I I
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| UNIT 2 QUADRANT 2 PIPING TUNNEL 22 I NONE NONE 1-1/2 0.6 1,022 8,460 2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 2,7, (SEE NOTES 2, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 8 AND 40)
| |
| UNIT 2 QUADRANT 3N CABLE TUNNEL 23 3 IONIZATION 3 INFRARED AUTOMATIC C02 1-1/2 (SEE NOTE 40) 21.5 28 '16 840 2 ', 2.7 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRF ZPNFS.
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| PAGE 16 OF 35
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| | |
| TAB -2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
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| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA I FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE C
| |
| FIRE AREA~ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT NUMBER UNIT 2 QUADRANT I 3M AND 3S CABLE j TUNNELS (SEE NOTE 27) 24 4 IONIZATION 3 INFRARED AUTOMATIC C02 1-1/2 (SEE NOTES 58.7 78,083 800 2 '. 2.7 24 AND 40) 25 4 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 45.9 61,132 567 2 ' ' '
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| 3 INFRARED I C02 TOTAL 53.3 71,051 1,367 UNIT 2 QUADRANT 4 CABLE TUNNEL EL. 596'-3.5" 26 6 IONIZATION 5 INFRARED AUTOMATIC C02 1-1/2 (SEE NOTE 40)
| |
| : 15. 9 21,086 2, 746 2 ' '.7 UNIT 2 QUADRANT 1 CABLE TUNNEL EL. 596'-3.5" 27 4 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 3 63.9 85,009 1,056 2.3, 2.7. 2.8 3 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTE 40)I EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 17 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| I I MINIMUM RATING I OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE I EXI STING EXISTING AREA I FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREAi DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT NUMBER ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMPS AREA I
| |
| 29A 4 IONIZATION NONE 3 9.7 12,921 332 2.5, 2.7 (SEE NOTE 45) (SEE NOTES 9 AND 54) 298 4 IONIZATION NONE 2,'117 402 2.5, 2.7 (SEE NOTE 45) 29C 4 IONIZATION NONE 8.4 11,267 332 2.7 (SEE NOTE 46)l 290 4 IONIZATION NONE 2.2 2,890 402 2. 7=
| |
| (SEE NOTE 46) 29E 1 IONIZATION NONE 3.0 3,974 92 2.7 (SEE NOTE 45) 29F 1 IONIZATION NONE 3.0 3,974 92 2.7 (SEE NOTE 46) 29G 4 IONIZATION NONE 8.8 11,858 1,544 2.5, 2.6 (SEE NOTE 47)
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| TOTAL 6.7 9,098 3, 196
| |
| 'EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 18 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUiVALENT FIRE EXISTING FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA%'XISTING DETECTION SUPPRESSION I AREA BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I UNIT 1 EAST MAIN STEAM VALVE ENCLOSURE AND CONTRACTORS ACCESS CONTROL
| |
| ~ AREA (SEE NOTE 27) 2.4, 2.8. 2. 10, 33 24 IONI ZAT ION NONE 1-1/2 12.0 16, 118 1,040 4 INFRARED (SEE NOTE 48) (SEE NOTES 5, 2. 11 36, 40 AND 58) 33A 3 IONIZATION, MANUAL WATER 6.7 9,129 3,216 2.2, 2.3, 2.8 10 INFRARED, SPRAY FOR 1 THERMISTOR CHARCOAL FOR CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT FILTER UNIT (SEE NOTE 48) 1 HV-CIPX-1 338 2 IONIZATION I NONE 0.2 236 600 2.2, 2.8 (SEE NOTE 48) 105 NONE WETPIPE 11.7 15. 619 2,380 2.2, 2.4. 2.8 SPR INKLERS TOTAL 8.5 11,530 7,236 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 19 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE MINIMUM AREAS'IRE RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER AREA* i UNI - 2 EAST MAIN STEAM VALVE ENCLOSURE 34 24 IONIZATION NONE 1-1/2 8.3 11,287 1,040 2.8. 2. 10, 2. 11 4 INFRARED (SEE NOTE 49) (SEE NOTES B,I 40 AND 59) 34A 3 IONIZATION ~ MANUAL 'LVATER 3.1 4,204 3,216 2.2. 2.3. 2.8 10 INFRARED, SPRAY 1 THERMISTOR FOR CHARCOAL FOR CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT FILTER UNIT (SEE NOTE 49) 2-HV-CI PX-1 348 2 IONIZATION NONE 4.3 5.735 600 2.2. 2.8 (SEE NOTE 49)
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| TOTAL 4.3 5,909 4,856 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE YIITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 20 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS%
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF F IRE EQUIVALENT FIRE F IRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREAR'XISTING DETECTION EXISTING SUPPRESSION AREA BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT NUMBER AUXILIARY BUILDINGI
| |
| * NORTH AND SOUTH EL. 609'-0" (SEE NOTE 27) 37 3 IONIZATION NONE 1-1/2 2,730 2.3, 2.5. 2.8 (SEE NOTE 55) (SEE NOTES 1, 2. 4, "11, 12, 13, 25 30, 32.'8, 38, 39, 50, 53 AND 64) 43 24 IONIZATION NONE 55.8 74,361 4,630 2.2. 2.4. 2.8 44A I NONE I NONE 4.4 5,854 220 2.5, 2.8. 2. 10 I
| |
| 448 I NONE NONE 4.7 6,269 220 2.5 2.8. 2.10
| |
| ~
| |
| 44C NONE NONE 4.3 5,742 270 2.5, 2.8. 2.10 I
| |
| 440 NONE I NONE 3.4 4,603 270 2. 2, 2.8. 2. 10 44E NONE NONE 4.7 6,269 220 2.8. 2.10 44F NONE NONE 5.2 6,999 220 2.8, 2. 10 44G NONE NONE 10. 9 14,571 270 2.8 ~ 2. 10 44H NONE NONE 1.8 2,360 270 2.8, 2. 10 44N 19 IONIZATION I DRY PILOT 36.6 48,650 F 580 2.2. 2.5, 2.8, 2.9 (SEE NOTE 55) PREACTION SPRINKLERS (SEE NOTES
| |
| : 1. 3) 44S 20 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 14. 2 19, 192 9,360 2.2. 2.8 (SEE NOTE 55) PREACTION SPRINKLERS (SEE NOTES
| |
| : 1. 3, 10)
| |
| TOTAL 25.8 34,482 26,261 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 21 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE FIRE AREA 4'XISTING DETECTION EXISTING SUPPRESSION AREA BOUNDARIES FIRE SEVERITY (MINUTES)
| |
| LOAD BTU/FT AREA FT2 F IGURE NUMBER UNIT 1 QUADRANT 2 CABLE TUNNEL EL. 612'-0" I 38 7 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1- 1/2 31.0 41, 288 2,650 2.2, 2.3, 2.8 ~ 2.9 4 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTE 40)
| |
| I UNIT 2 QUADRANT 2 CABLE TUNNEL EL. 612'-0"
| |
| ! 39 7 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 23.0 30; 622 2,667 2.2, 2.3, 2.8, 2.9 4 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTE 40)
| |
| I UNIT 1 4Icv SWITCHGEAR ROOMS I EL. 609'-0" I 40A 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 15. 5 20, 616 1, 476 2.2 ~ 2.8 I 3 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTE 14) 408 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 13. 6 18,144 1,440 2.2, 2.8 3 INFRARED C02 TOTAL 14. 6 19,394 2,916 I UNIT 1 ENGINEERED I SAFETY SYSTEMS
| |
| ! AND MCC ROOM EL. 609'-0" 41 9 I ON I ZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 20.7 27, 614 3. 096 2.2, 2.4, 2.8 I (3 UNDER FLOOR) C02 (SEE NOTE 15)
| |
| I 5 INFRARED (2 UNDER FLOOR)
| |
| EACH FIRE AREA IS" SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE VIITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 22 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS''
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREAR' DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT NUMBER UNIT 1 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEMS
| |
| )
| |
| AREA EL. 609'-0" I
| |
| I 42A 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 3.7 5,080 .-1,209 2.2, 2.4, 2.8 2 INFRARED C02 428 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 7.3 9,712 922 2.4, 2.8 1 INFRARED C02 42C 3 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1.8 2,392 530 2.2, 2.4, 2.8 2 INFRARED C02 420 2 IONIZATION NONE 33.5 44,583 503 2.2. 2.4. 2.8 TOTAL 9.2 12, 258 3,164 I
| |
| I UNIT 2 ENGINEERED i SAFETY SYSTEMS
| |
| ! AND MCC*ROOM
| |
| ! EL. 609 -0" g 45 9 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 23,443 2,884 2.2, 2.5, 2.6, 2.8 (3 UNDER FLOOR) C02 (SEE NOTE 16) 5 INFRARED (2 UNDER FLOOR)
| |
| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 23 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF F I RE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE I
| |
| FIRE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT NUMBER I
| |
| I I
| |
| I UNIT 2 EMERGENCY I POWER SYSTEMS I AREA EL. 609'-0" I
| |
| I 46A 2 IONIZATION AUTOMAT1C 1-1/2 3.5 4,793 1,209 2.2, 2.6, 2.8 2 INFRARED C02 468 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 8.3 11,150 922 2.5, 2.8 INFRARED COZ 46C 3 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 4.0 5.502 530 2.2, 2.5, 2.8 2 INFRARED C02 460 2 IONIZATION NONE 30.0 39,973 503 2.2, 2.5, 2.8 TOTAL 9.2 12,356 3, 164 I
| |
| I UNIT 2 4RV I SWITCHGEAR ROOMS EL. 609'-0" 47A 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1- 1/2 14. 4 19, 158 1,476 2.2. 2.8 3 INFRARED C02 (SEE NOTE 17) 478 2 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 12.9 17. 136 1,440 2.2, 2.8 3 INFRARED C02 TOTAL 13. 6 18,159 2,916 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 24 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT F IRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE
| |
| ! FIRE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I
| |
| I i UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM 53 45 IONIZATION NONE 3 21. 2 28,225 4,410 2.2, 2.5. 2.10 (20 ABOVE (SEE NOTE 51) (SEE NOTES CEILING) 20 AND 21)
| |
| I UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM 54 41 IONIZATION NONE 3 22.6 30,069 4,410 2.2, 2.10 (17 ABOVE (SEE NOTE 52) "(SEE NOTES CEILING) 21. 22 AND 29)
| |
| UNIT 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM CABLE VAULT 55 13 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 3 25.1 33,536 9,086 2.2, 2.4, 2.9 10 INFRARED CO2 (NOT IN (SEE NOTES BATTERY ROOM) 14 AND 15)
| |
| UNIT 1 AUXILIARY I CABLE VAULT I 6 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 51. 1 68, 120 1,783 2.2 ~ 2.4. 2.9 I C02 I(SEE NOTE 13)
| |
| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 25 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS~
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER
| |
| ~
| |
| FIRE AREA*
| |
| I UNI T 1 CONTROL I ROOM CABLE VAULT I AND HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL AREA (SEE NOTE 26) 103,590 4,410 2.2, 2.5, 2.9 I
| |
| I 57 65 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 77.8 HALON 1301, (SEE NOTE 20)
| |
| I MANUAL C02 I
| |
| 144 1 IONIZATION NONE 89 2. 10 TOTAL 76.3 101,541 4.499 I
| |
| UNIT 2 CONTROL I ROOM CABLE VAULT AND HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL AREA I (SEE NOTE 26) 4,410 2.2, 2.9 58 76 IONIZATION AUTOMATIC 3 74.7 99,344 HALON 1301, (SEE NOTE 22)
| |
| MANUAL C02 145 1 IONIZATION NONE 89 2. 10 TOTAL 73.2 97.379 4,4gg EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
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| PAGE 26 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| I MINIMUM I RATING I OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE I EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE I FIRE AREA* DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER I
| |
| I I
| |
| UNIT 2 AUXILIARY CABLE VAULT 59 6 IONIZATION I AUTOMATIC 1-1/2 40. 7 54.237 1,701 2.2, 2.9 I C02 (SEE NOTE 19)
| |
| UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOM CABLE VAULT 60 13 IONIZATION I AUTOMATIC 10 INFRARED C02 (NOT IN 3
| |
| (SEE NOTES
| |
| : 19. 0 25,487 9, 163 2 ', 2.5. 2.9 BATTERY ROOM) 16 ANO 17)
| |
| I UNIT 1 CHARGING PUMP ROOMS I
| |
| I 62A 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 3 26. 2 35,034 436 2.5, 2.7 PREACTI ON (SEE NOTES SPRINKLER S 2, 4 AND 25) 62B 2 IGNI ZAT I ON DRY PILOT 22.3 29,790 416 2.5, 2.7 PREACTION SPRINKLERS 62C 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 24.5 32,656 416 2.2, 2.5, 2.7 PREACTION SPRINKLERS TOTAL 24.4 32,538 1,270 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 27 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE I FIRE AREAi'XISTING DETECTION EXISTING SUPPRESSION AREA BOUNDARIES FIRE SEVERITY (MINUTES)
| |
| LOAD BTU/FT AREA FT2 FIGURE NUMBER l UNIT 2 CHARGING
| |
| ! PUMP ROOMS I
| |
| 63A 2 IONIZATION I DRY PILOT 3 25. 1 33,426 438 2.7 PREACTION (SEE NOTES SPRINKLERS 2, 4 AND 3B) 63B 2 IONIZATION ( DRY PILOT 24.1 32,149 416 2.7 PREACT ION SPRINKLERS 63C 2 IONIZATION DRY PILOT 23.2 31,022 416 2 2, 2 '
| |
| PREACTION SPRINKLERS TOTAL 24.1 32,217 1, 270 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 28 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2"2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS~
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE FIRE AREAR'XISTING DETECTION EXISTING SUPPRESSION AREA BOUNDARIES FIRE SEVERITY (MINUTES)
| |
| LOAD BTU/FT2, ARE)
| |
| FT F IGURE NUMBER I UNIT 1 I CONTAINMENT (SEE NOTE 26) 66 THERMISTORS FOR CABLE NONE 19. 2 25,593 4 '66 2.3, 2.4, 2.7 TRAYS 67 THERMISTORS AUTOMATIC 58.4 77,639 3,648 2.3, 2.4. 2.7. 2.8.
| |
| I FOR REACTOR WATER SPRAY 2. 10. 2. 11 COOLANT PUMPS, SYSTEM FOR FOR CABLE BOTH CHARCOAL TRAYS, AND FILTER UNITS, FOR CHARCOAL MANUAL WATER I FILTER UNITS SPRAY SYSTEM 1-HV-CFT-1 FOR RCPs 1-HV-CFT-2 68 THERMISTORS NONE 3.5 4,611 6,316 2.2, 2.3. 2.4 ~ 2.10 FOR CABLE 2.11 TRAYS 101 THERMI STORS NONE 28.9 38,483 1,230 2.4, 2.8 I FOR CABLE TRAYS 103 THERMISTORS NONE 4.9 6,529 615 2.3, 2.4. 2.7. 2.8 FOR CABLE TRAYS 118 NONE NONE 7.4 9,922 230 2.8 I
| |
| 120 NONE f NONE 5, 751 2,580 2.3. 2.4. 2.8 122 NONE NONF 16.3 21, 710 580 2.3, 2.8 132 NONE NONE 6.8 9,160 3,506 2.3. 2.4, 2.10, 2.11 134 NONE NONE 665 2.3. 2.4 ~ 2.6. 2.7 TOTAL 16.8 22,608 23,536 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 29 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS*
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA F IRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA% DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER
| |
| ! HVAC EQUIPMENT AND COMPUTER I ROOMS 70 12 IONIZATION MANUAL WATER 3 8.2 11,187 1,715 2.2, 2.5. 2.11 (6 IN DUCTS) SPRAY FOR (SEE NOTES THERMISTOR CHARCOAL 21, 29 AND FOR CHARCOAL I FILTER UNIT 62)
| |
| FILTER UNIT 1-HV-ACRF-1 TIONN 71 ALARM ONLY AUTOMATIC 87.5 116,545 430 2.2, 2.5, 2.11 (HIGH VOLTAGE) HALON 1301 4 IONIZATION (2 UNDER FLOOR)
| |
| HALON ACTUA-(LOW VOLTAGE) 6 IONIZATION (3 UNDER FLOOR)l 72 ALARM ONLY AUTOMATIC (HIGH VOLTAGE) KALON 1301 4 IONIZATION (2 UNDER FLOOR)
| |
| HALON ACTUA- 106. 4 141,607 430 2.2, 2.11 TION (LOW VOLTAGE) 6 IONIZATION (3 UNDER FLOOR) 73 12 IONIZATION MANUAL WATER 7.1 9.469 1,770 2.2, 2.11 (6 IN DUCTS) SPRAY FOR 1 THERMISTOR CHARCOAL FOR CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT FILTER UNI~
| |
| 2-HV-ACRF-1 TOTAL 25.3 33,820 '4, 345 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 30 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS+
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA I FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE FIRE AREA~ DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT FT2 NUMBER
| |
| ! UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT (SEE NOTE 26)
| |
| I 74 THERMISTORS I NONE 23. 1 30,739 4, 166 2-3. 2.7 FOR CABLE TRAYS 75 THERMISTORS AUTOMATIC 62. 1 82,562 3,648 2.3, 2.7. 2.8.
| |
| FOR REACTOR I WATER SPRAY 2.10. 2.11 COOLANT PUMPS, SYSTEM FOR FOR CABLE BOTH CHARCOAL TRAYS, AND FILTER UNITS, FOR CHARCOAL MANUAL WATER FILTER UNITS SPRAY SYSTEM 2-HV-CF 7- I FOR RCPs 2-HV-CFT-2 I
| |
| 76 THERMISTORS I NONE 4,467 6,316 2. 2, 2. 3. 2. 10, 2. I I I FOR CABLE"'RAYS 102 THERMISTORS NONE 20.6 27,414 1,230 FOR CABLE TRAYS 104 THERMISTORS I NONE 5.5 7,328 615 2.3, 2.7. 2.8 I FOR CABLE TRAYS 119 NONE I NONE 4.9 6,481 230 121 NONE I NONE 2.2 2,993 2,580 2.3, 2.8 123 NONE NONE 9.0 12,027 580 2.3. 2.8 133 NONE 6.8 9,160 3,506 2. 3. 2. 10, 2. 11 135 I NONE NONE 665 2.3, 2.6-TOTAL 17. 2 23, 112 23,536 EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 31 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS~
| |
| MINIMUM RATING OF FIRE EQUIVALENT FIRE EXISTING EXISTING AREA FIRE SEVERITY LOAD AREA FIGURE '"
| |
| FIRE AREAR'' DETECTION SUPPRESSION BOUNDARIES (MINUTES) BTU/FT2 FT NUMBER UNIT 1 TANK AREA PIPE TUNNEL 116 NONE NONE 3 0.2 437 1,724 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.7 (SEE NOTE 5)
| |
| I UNI T 2 TANK AREA IPIPE I TUNNEL 117 NONE NONE 3 0.4 515 1,724 2.2, 2.3, 2.7 (SEE NOTE 8)
| |
| EACH FIRE AREA IS SEPARATED BY A SOLID HORIZONTAL LINE WITH SOME FIRE AREAS CONSISTING OF MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES.
| |
| PAGE 32 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS NOTES (1) CLOSE-SPACED DRY PILOT PREACTION SPRINKLERS AROUND PERIMETER OF STAIR(S) AT CEILING LEVEL (2) SEE SECTION 9.4 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF VERTICAL AIR SHAFTS (FIRE AREAS 12 AND 22)
| |
| (3) DRY PILOT PREACTION SPRINKLERS IN NORMALLY ACCESSIBLE PORTIONS OF THE FIRE ZONE (4) SEE SECTION 9.6 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF 6A PIPE TUNNEL (5) SEE SECTION 9.23 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE AREA 116 (6) SEE SECTION 9.7 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE AREAS 13 AND 14 (7) SEE SECTION 9.8 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE AREAS 20 AND 21 (8) SEE SECTION 9.24 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE AREA 117 (9) SEE SECTION 9.25 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF ESW PUMPS FIRE AREA AND HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 29C AND FIRE ZONE 29G (10) CCW PUMP COVERAGE TO PROTECT BEARINGS (11) SEE SECTION 9.21 FOR DOOR EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 43 AND FIRE ZONE 110 (12) SEE SECTION 9.22 FOR DOOR EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 44S AND FIRE ZONE 111 (13) SEE SECTION 9. 14 fOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 43 AND FIRE AREA 56 (14) SEE SECTION 9. 15 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 408 AND FIRE AREA 55 (15) SEE SECTION 9.16 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA 41 AND FIRE AREA 55 (16) SEE SECTION 9.19 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA 45 AND FIRE AREA 60 (17) SEE SECTION 9.20 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 478 AND FIRE AREA 6D (18) NOT IN DRUM STORAGE (19) SEE SECTION 9.18 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 52 AND FIRE AREA 59 (20) SEE SECTION 9. 13 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA 53 AND FIRE AREA 57 PAGE 33 OF 35
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS (21) SEE SECTION 9.5 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREAS 53 AND 54 AND FIRE ZONES 70 AND 73 (22) SEE SECTION 9.17 FOR HATCH EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA 54 AND FIRE AREA 58 (23) SEE SECTION 9.26 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE AREA 9 AND FIRE AREA 10 (24) SEE SECTION 9.27 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE AREA 24 AND FIRE AREA 25 (25) SEE SECTION 9.31 FOR UNIT 1 LEAKAGE DETECTION BOX EVALUATION (26) THIS FIRE AREA CONTAINS ADDITIONAL FIRE ZONES WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY UNIDENTIFIED (27) THIS FIRE AREA CONTAINS ADDITIONAL FIRE ZONES WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED AS SEPARATE FIRE AREA (28) SEE SECTION 9.1 FOR DUCT EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 43 AND FIRE ZONE 91 (29) SEE SECTION 9.2 FOR DUCT EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA 54 AND FIRE ZONE 73 (30) SEE SECTION 9.3 FOR DUCT EVALUATION OF CCW PUMPS SEE SECTION 9.9 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE AREA CONTAINING FIRE ZONES 3, 32, 36, 48 AND 69 WITH FIRE AREA CONTAINING (31)
| |
| FIRE ZONES 49, 50, 51 AND 52 (32) SEE SECTION 9.10 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE ZONE 43 AND FIRE ZONE 44N (33) SEE SECTION 9.11 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION BETWEEN TURBINE BUILDING, SERVICE BUILDING AND MAIN STEAM PIPE TUNNELS (34) SEE SECTION 9. 12 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION BETWEEN TURBINE BUILDING AND SCREEN HOUSE (35) SEE SECTION 9.28 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA 61 AND FIRE ZONE 5 (36) SEE SECTION 9.29 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA 105 AND FIRE ZONE 33A SEE SECTION 9.30 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION BETWEEN FIRE AREA CONTAINING FIRE ZONES 3, 32, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51. 52. 69 AND FIRE (37)
| |
| AREAS 31, 35. 106, 107 AND 146 (38) SEE SECTION 9.32 FOR UNIT 2 LEAKAGE DETECTION BOX EVALUATION (39) SEE SECTION 7.13 FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC DUCT PENETRATION EXEMPTION (40) SEE SECTION 7.14 FOR SEISMIC GAP EXEMPTION (41) FLOOR DRAINAGE OPENING FROM FIRE AREA 17F TO FIRE ZONE 2 BELOW (42) SEE SECTION 7.2 FOR FUlL AREA SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (43) SEE SECTION 7.3 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (44) SEE SECTION 7.4 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION PAGE 34 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-2 FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES FOR FIRE AREAS (45) SEE SECTION 7.5 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (46) SEE SECTION 7.6 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (47) SEE SECTION 7.7 FOR FULL AREA SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (48) SEE SECTION 7.8 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (49) SEE SECTION 7.9 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (50) SEE SECTION 7.10 FOR ONE-HOUR BARRIER EXEMPTION (51) SEE SECTION 7.11 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (52) SEE SECTION 7. 12 FOR FIXED SUPPRESSION EXEMPTION (53) AUXILIARY BUILDING PASSENGER AND FREIGHT ELEVATOR DOORS ARE CLASS 8 (54) CONTROLLED ACCESS TO EACH FIRE ZONE IS VIA LOCKED SCREEN MESH GATE (55) DETECTION COVERAGE DOES NOT EXTEND INTO ZONE CUBICLES CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE EQUIPMENT LOCATED BEHIND SHIELD "!A'S WITH CONTROLLED-ACCESS SCREEN MESH GATES (56) SEE SECTION 9.33 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 6A TO FIRE ZONE 1388 (57) SEE SECTION 9.34 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 36 TO FIRE ZONE 5 (58) SEE SECTION 9.35 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 33A TO FIRE ZONE 108 (59) SEE SECTION 9.36 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 34A TO FIRE ZONE 109 (60) SEE SECTION 9.37 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 5 TO FIRE ZONE 32 (61) SEE SECTION 9.38 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 69 TO FIRE ZONES 108 AND 109 (62) SEE SECTION 9.39 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 70 TO FIRE ZONE 129 (63) SEE SECTION 9.40 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONE 7 TO FIRE ZONE 61 (64) SEE SECTION 9.41 FOR BOUNDARY EVALUATION OF FIRE ZONES 44N AND 37 TO FIRE ZONE 51 PAGE 35 OF 35
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| | |
| TABLE 2-3 MAXIMUM ALLIABLE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING FOR FIRE ZONES INVOLVED IN EXEMPTION AND/OR EVALUATION Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute lA 1,790 1. 3. 20,000 15 1B 4,815 3.6 20,000 15 lE 4,774 3.6 ,20,000 15 1F 4', 913 3.7 20,000 15 138B 13,000 10 lA;1B,lC and 1D 6,242 20,000 15 lE,lF,1G and 1H 6,063 4.5 20,000 15 138A,138B and 138C 13,000 10 l,lA ~ 1H, 136,137,138A, 4,079 2.9 20,000 15 138B and 138C END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 1 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 91 ~
| |
| 25,875 19.4 53,000 40 108 Fixed 10,187 7.6 27,000 20 108 Transient 13, 000 10 109 Fixed. 15,872 11.8 33,000 25 109 Transient 13,000 10 110 Fixed 803 0.6 27,000 20 110 Transient 13,000 10 ill Fixed 838 0.6 27,000 20 ill Transient 13,000 10 139 13,000 10 140 3,698 2.6 33,000 25 141 2,196 1.5 33,000 25 142 25,652 19 53,000 40 143 13,000 10 END OF FIRE'REA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 2 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allovable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 32 23,311 17.4 40,000 30 36 3,719 2.7 20,000 15 86,725 65.2 100,'000 75 50 44,309 33.2 60,000 ~ 45 52 10,717 7.9 27,000 20 69 2,998 2.2 20,000 15 3,32,36, 48 and 69 6,600 20,000 15 49,50 and 52 30,778 23 47,000 35 49,50,51 and 52 28,629 21.4 47,000 35 3,32,36, 48,49,50, 15,000 12 33,000 25 51 and 52 3,31,32,35, 36,48,49,50, 17,283 12.9 33,000 25 51,52,69, 106,107 and 146 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 3 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft2 Minute Btu/ft Minute 11,299 8.5 27,000 20 6A 143 0.1 13,000 10 61 13,846 10.4 27,000 20 64A 12,642 9.4 27,000 20 64B 10,739 27,000 20 65A- 11,518 8.6 27,000 20 65B 13,008 9.7 27,000 20 5,6N,6M, 6S, 61, 64A, 12, 420 9.3 27,000 20 64B,65A and 65B 5,6A,6N, 6M,6S,61, 8,947 6.5 27,000 20 64A,64B, 65A and 65B END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 4 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Fire Loadin'tu/ft Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Minute 116, 629 87.5 133,000 100 END OF FIRE AREA 30,841 23. 1 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA 10 104,250 78.3 120,000 90 END OF FIRE AREA 26,344 19.7 40,000 30 END OF FIRE AREA 12 1 722 1.2 20,000 15 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables 1-1 and 2-2 Page 5 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft2 Minute Btu/ft Minute 13 25,469 19.1 40,000 30 END OF FIRE AREA 14 1,056 0.8 13,000. 10 END OF FIRE AREA 20 1, 503 20,000 END OF FIRE AREA 21 28,063 21 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA 22 1,022 0.6 13,000 10 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables 1-1 and 2-2 Page 6 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued) v Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 23 28,716 21. 5 47,000 35 END 'OF FIRE AREA 24 78,083 58. 7 93)000 7.0 END OF FIRE AREA 26 21,086 15.9 33,000 25 END OF FIRE AREA 27 85,009 63.9 100,000 75 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables 1-1 and 2-2 Page 7 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin
| |
| . Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 29A and 6,842 5.1 20,000 15 29B 29A,29B 6,667 20,000 15 and 29E 29C and 6,842 5.1 20,000 15 29D 29C,29D and 29F 6,379 4.8 20,000 15 29G 11,858 8.8 13,000 10 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables 1-1 and 2-2 Page 8 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued).
| |
| Maximum Allovable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 33A 9,129 6.7 27,000 20 33B 236 0.2 13,000 10 105 15,619 11.7 33,000 25 33 and 33A 10,840 8 27,000 20 33,33A and 33B 9,530 27,000. 20 33,33A, 33B and 11,530 8.5 27,000 20 105 END OF FIRE AREA 34A 4,204 3.1 20,000 15 34B 5,735 4.3 20,000 15 34'nd 34A 5,937 4.5 20,000 15 34,34A and 34B 5,909 4.3 20,000 15 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 9 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft ,
| |
| Minute Btu/ft Minute 74,361 55.8 80,000 60 19,192 14.2 33,000 25 44A,44B,44C and 44D 5,573 20,000 15 44E,44F,44G and 44H 7, 645 5.7 20,000 15 37,44A 44H, 44N and 44S 25,853 19 40,000 30 37,43, 44A 44H, 44N and 44S 34,482 25.8 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together .by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 10 'of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft2 Minute Btu/ft Minute 38 41,288 31 60,000 END OF FIRE AREA 39 30,622 23 47,000 ,35 END OF FIRE AREA 40B 18,144 13.6 33,000 25.
| |
| END OF FIRE AREA 41 27,614 20.7 40,000 30 END OF FIRE AREA 45 23,443 17. 6 .40,000 30 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page ll of 14,
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued).
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 47B 17,136 12.9 33,000 25 END OF FIRE AREA 53 28,225 21.2 47,000 35 END OF. FIRE AREA 30,069 22.6 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA 55 33,536 25.1 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA 56 68,120 "51. 1 80,000 60 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 12 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 57 103,590 77.8 120,000 90 END OF FiRE AREA 58 99,344 74.7 113,000 85 END OF FIRE AREA 54,237 40.7 67,000 50 END OF FIRE AREA 60 25,487 19 40,000 30 END OF FIRE AREA 62A,62B and 62C 32,538 24.4 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s).are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 13 of 14
| |
| | |
| TABLE 2-3 (continued)
| |
| Maximum Allowable Existin Combustible Loadin Combustible Loadin Fire Zone(s)* Btu/ft Minute Btu/ft Minute 63A,63B and 63C 32/217 24.1 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA 73 9,469 7.1 27,000 20 70,71,72 and 73 33,820 25.3 47,000 35 END OF FIRE AREA 116 437 0.2 13,000 10 END OF FIRE AREA 117 515 0.4 13,000 10 END OF FIRE AREA
| |
| *Fire Zone(s) are grouped together by fire area similar to Tables l-l and 2-2 Page 14 of 14
| |
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| 44 MINIMUM EMBEDDMENT 12 TO 36 TOTAL WALL THICKNESS FIGURE 2.0-b FIGURES 2;0-a AND 2.0-b EMBEDDED CONDUIT
| |
| : 3. DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS Section 3 provides detailed information on the detection and suppression systems installed at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
| |
| The information contained in this secti'on generally presents the D.C. Cook plant configuration of each fire zone's fire protection features at the end of the 1986 Unit 2 refueling outage. The fire protection features include modifications required for compliance with Appendix R Section III.G, as well as general plant improvements initiated at the time of i'ssue of this report.
| |
| These active fire protection measures complement the passive protection provided by the area and zone boundaries discussed in Section 2. In conjunction with other complementary features, they provide additional defense-in-depth that ensure that exposure 'fires will be promptly detected and extinguished. In conjunction with adequate physical separation, they also provide a means of compliance with the provisions of Appendix R Section III.G.2. A tabulation by fire zone of the information contained in this section is provided in Section 2, Table 2-2.
| |
| 3.1 Fire Detection S stems 3.1.1 General S stem Information The Control Rooms of the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant, which are staffed 24 hours a day by trained personnel, function as the required central supervising station for each unit at the plant.
| |
| Page 3-1
| |
| | |
| The Control Rooms are contained within three-hour fire-rated construction with appropriate doors and dampers, thereby meeting the location and separation requirements for the central supervising stations. See Sections 9.2, 9.5, 9.13, and 9.17 for technical evaluations with respect to unrated and/or unprotected boundary openings for the Control Rooms.
| |
| Supervisory capability is provided for the detection systems to indicate when maintenance of the system is required for circuit breaks or grounds. All fire detection systems provide both audible and visual alarms on the fire alarm control panel in the respective Control Room. Alarms also sound in areas where either Halon or Carbon Dioxide suppression systems are utilized.
| |
| 3.1.2 S stem Descri tions Three modes of fire detection are provided at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant. They are ionization smoke detection, thermistor heat detection, and infrared flame detection. In addition, there are spot locations protected by heat detectors which are electrically connected into the ionization smoke detection systems in specific fire areas.
| |
| 4 Table 2-2 and Figures 3-1 through 3-6 identify the locations of the detection systems at D.C. Cook.
| |
| The ionization smoke detection systems are the primary form of fire detection in the plant. Infrared flame detectors are crossed zoned with the smoke detection systems in some fire zones Page 3-2
| |
| | |
| fire zones, activation of both the smoke detection system and the flame detection system are required before actuation of the suppression system. The auxiliary cable vaults have only one zone of fire detection, which also automatically actuates the C02 gaseous suppression systems located therein.
| |
| Thermistor detection systems are provided in a number of a
| |
| fire zones in the plant. Single zones of detection are provided for alarm purposes only around the turbine generators, reactor coolant pumps, and the in-containment cable trays. Thermistor detection and alarm is used in and around some parts of the main turbines where manual initiation of water spray suppression systems protect the turbines above the operating floor.
| |
| Thermistor detection and alarm, with manual initiation of water spray suppression, also protect the reactor coolant pumps located inside containment.
| |
| Several Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems are automatically actuated by one zone of thermistor detection. Single zone thermistor detection is provided for alarm and automatic actuation of C02 suppression systems for the Diesel Fuel Pump Rooms, Lube Oil Rooms, and Turbine Oil Tank Rooms. Two zones of thermistor detection are provided for alarm and automatic activation of C02 suppression systems for the Diesel Generator Rooms of both units.
| |
| Page 3-3
| |
| | |
| The charcoal filter units are provided with a single zone thermistor detection system. Each detection system has two high temperature alarms. Upon receipt of the higher temperature fire alarm, the system valve will be automatically opened. However, for those systems located outside of containment, the shut-off valve upstream of the system valve must be manually opened before water will discharge into the water spray system piping.
| |
| 3.2 Fire Su ression S stems 3.2.1 General S stem Information All automatic suppression systems alarm both audibly and visually on the fire alarm control panel in the respective Control Room. Supervisory capacity is built into the water suppression systems in the form of position-indicating tamper switches on all shut-off valves for individual systems. When these valves change from their normal position beyond a specified limit, an alarm sounds both audibly and visually in the respective Control Room. Supervisory capability is provided on relays, isolation switches, and high or low tank pressure for the Carbon Dioxide systems. The, solenoid valves for release of the main Halon tanks protecting the Cable Spreading Rooms are also supervised.
| |
| Page 3-4
| |
| | |
| 3.2.2
| |
| ~ ~ S stems Descri tion Three basic modes of fire suppression are provided at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant. They are water, Halon, and carbon dioxide suppression systems. Each is described in detail below,,
| |
| with system locations indicated in Table 2-2 and identified on Figures 3-1 through 3-6.
| |
| 3.2.2.1 Water Su ression S stems Water can be applied to any potential fire in protected areas by one or more of four types of water suppression systems.
| |
| These are:
| |
| (1) Automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems (2) Dry pilot preaction sprinkler systems (3) Water spray suppression systems (manual and automatic)
| |
| (4) Manual hose stations The water supply for these suppression systems for both units of the plant is through a common supply header. This interior supply header is also interconnected with the yard main by sealed-open sectionalizing valves. I'eader Each interior suppression system, with the exception of the charcoal filter suppression systems outside of containment, is equipped with normally open, manual shut-off valves and is instrumented with water flow indicators to provide audible and visual annunciation in the respective Control Room. Each unit is equipped with a 2000-gpm electric motor-driven fire pump and a 2000-gpm diesel Page 3-5
| |
| | |
| motor-driven fire pump. In addition, a single 500-gpm electric motor-driven fire pump is provided to handle water flow requirements of less than 500-gpm in both units. All five pumps are electrically independent to ensure that failure of any pump will not impair the reliability of the water suppression'ystems.
| |
| With regard to fire pump sequencing, when a high demand system operates, the fire pumps are started through the high demand logic system. The first pump to start will be the high demand electric motor-driven pump in the unit requiring water suppression. If the electric motor-driven pump fails to operate, or if additional capacity is needed, the header pressure will fall below a set point and the diesel-driven pump in the same unit will start through the logic system. If more capacity is still needed, as sensed by header pressure, the electric motor-driven fire pump in the other unit will start. If still more capacity is needed to maintain header pressure, the remaining diesel-driven pump of the other unit will start. If adequate header pressure is still not maintained by the four high demand fire pumps, the electric motor-driven low demand fire pump k will start.
| |
| Low pressure sensing devices are installed in the main interior supply header to ensure that, if fire-fighting water flows greater than 2000-gpm are required, (the maximum single demand is 3700-gpm for the Unit l main transformer and Turbine Building wall), additional pumping capacity will automatically be provided to maintain header pressure.
| |
| Page 3-6
| |
| | |
| Pump connections to the interior and yard loop headers are widely separated. The =diesel-driven pumps are on opposite ends of the intake screenhouse (Fire Zones 28 and 30) and the electric motor-driven pumps are on opposite ends of the pump pit within Fire Zone 2 of the Turbine Building. Power supplies for the pumps are from several sources. The electric pumps are supplied from metal clad switchgear and motor control centers which are supplied from alternate sources. Each diesel-driven pump has two independent starting battery sources, each with its own charging equipment and with automatic and/or manual throwover. Each diesel-driven pump is located in its own three-hour-rated room.
| |
| Similar isolation of the electric motor-driven pumps is not necessary, due to the lack of fire exposure and spatial separation in the pump pit area.
| |
| Both the electric and diesel-driven pumps have available running, electric power, and strainer condition indication alarms in their respective Control Rooms. The diesel-driven pumps, in addition, have engine supervisory information such as coolant over-temperature, failure to start, engine overspeed, and low oil pressure alarm in the respective Control Room.
| |
| The wet pipe, preaction and water spray sprinkler systems are the primary forms of automatically applying water on a fire.
| |
| A dry pilot, preaction sprinkler system differs from a wet pipe
| |
| 'system only in that automatic detection by the pilot system is required before water will enter the pipe network in the area.
| |
| Page 3-7
| |
| | |
| Both the pilot piping and sprinkler piping heads are normally closed; however, the pilot piping heads require a lower temperature to operate. 'This will cause the operation of the pneumatically-operated system deluge valve, allowing water to enter sprinkler piping. At this point, the dry pilot sprinkler system functions just like a wet pipe sprinkler system. Upon detection of a higher temperature by sprinkler piping heads, the system discharges water onto the fire through the sprinkler piping heads that have now operated. In addition, specific areas and/or equipment are protected by automatic and/or manual fixed-P water spray systems. The outside containment charcoal filter units'ixed-water suppression system has been modified to be equipped with a normally upstream of the system valve.
| |
| closed manual shut-off valve, located This modification has been
| |
| ~
| |
| initiated at the time of issue of this report. Each automatic preaction sprinkler and fixed-water spray system also can be operated manually.
| |
| Manual fire-fighting hose stations are the primary backup to the automatic and/or manual water suppression systems. Hose 're stations are located in plant areas outside containment (such as I the Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings). Additional hose stations located at access areas to the Control Rooms, Control Room cable vaults, the auxiliary cable vaults, the containment cable tunnels (with hose stations also located within the tunnels),
| |
| upper and lower access to the containments, the diesel generators and the emergency power system areas.
| |
| Page 3-8
| |
| | |
| 3.2.2.2 Carbon Dioxide Su ression S stems Areas indicated in Table 2-2 that are protected by carbon dioxide systems have boundary penetrations (i.e., dampers, seismic gaps, and openings around cables, conduits and pipes) sealed to ensure retention of the carbon dioxide concentrations.
| |
| In some fire areas, however, dampers have not been provided for duct work that communicates directly with the plant exterior or pass through other areas within rated construction boundaries to the plant exterior. For the C02 systems in these fire areas, concentration tests have .been performed which demonstrate that the required concentration levels can be maintained without dampers. The affected fire zones in which this situation exists are 40A, 40B, 41, 42A, 45, 46A, 47A and 47B.
| |
| A discharge delay time with audible alarm (for automatic system actuation only) is incorporated into each system design to allow personnel time to leave the area. This is necessary due to the health hazards associated with achieving the concentration levels of carbon dioxide required to extinguish the fire.
| |
| Carbon dioxide suppression systems can be activated both automatically and manually. The C02 suppression systems can be activated automatically by one of the following:
| |
| (1) Single zone ionization smoke detection (2) Single zone thermistor detection (3) Two zones of thermistor detection (4) One zone of ionization and one zone of infrared flame detection Page 3-9
| |
| | |
| Should a loss of power prevent the system from automatically discharging, the four master valves on the 17-ton carbon dioxide storage tank, located in Fire Zone 44N, will fail in the open position, thereby charging the supply headers up to the hazard area selector valves. It is then possible for personnel to go to the specific pilot valve cabinet controlling the operation of these selector valves and manually open them, allowing C02 to enter the hazard area. Each of the Control Room cable vaults is provided with a manual CO2 system back-up to the automatic Halon di system.
| |
| 3.2.2.3 Halon Su ression S stems The D.C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant has been equipped with Halon 1301 in a number of areas: the Control Room cable vaults (Fire Areas 57 and 58), computer. areas, TSC areas, security areas, and guard house areas. Each system has its own set of Halon 1301 cylinders. Penetration seals have been provided to of the agent is ensure that the required maintained. Although the'oncentrations concentration
| |
| 'f Halon required for extinguishment are generally low and would not result -in serious health haiards, personnel are advised to leave any area in which.
| |
| Halon has been, or. is about to be, discharged.
| |
| The Halon suppression systems can be operated both automatically and manually. Both zones of detection provided in Page 3-10
| |
| | |
| these areas must sense a fire before the agent will discharge automatically. Each system can be manually actuated from the appropriate control cabinet or cylinder bank.
| |
| 3.2.2.4 Partial Zone or Area Covera e Certain areas or zones in the Auxiliary Building are identified in Table 2-2 as containing partial suppression coverage. The criteria developed to determine the acceptability of partial coverage for these selected zones and areas is as follows:
| |
| Automatic fire suppression may not have been provided 44N, 44S, '1 in those portions of Fire and'2 following criteria:
| |
| Zones 1, 3, 5, 6N, 6M, 6S, based on one or more of the (a) High or extremely high radiation areas; (b) Radioactive processing equipment and storage 1 tanks; (c) Low combustible loads; (d) Controlled and locked personnel access; (e) Areas shielded by walls separating equipment from the remainder of the fire area or zone; (f) Fire rated wall construction; (g) Containing process piping and heat exchangers; (h) Presence of detection systems; I
| |
| (i) Suppression over concentrated combustible loads.
| |
| The substantial ALARA considerations associated with the installation of systems in these areas, combined with the extremely low probability of fires i'n these regions, formed the criteria which justified the entire zone for exclusion of automatic suppression systems Page- 3-11
| |
| | |
| from these rooms. In addition, a suppression system is not provided in Fire Zones lA through 1H, 44A through 44H, and containment for the same reason as stated in a-h.
| |
| (2) Automatic fire suppression systems have been excluded from Fire Zones 49 and 50 based on the following criteria:
| |
| (a) The existing barrier construction provides adequate isolation and containment of a potential fire; (b) Full zone detection is already provided with additional detection and suppression provided for the principal combustibles source in the zone (charcoal filters);
| |
| (c) Redundant safe shutdown cables and/or equipment exist outside the zone; therefore, the zone boundary is not required to function as a III'.G.2 separation barrier; and (d) The newly installed preaction sprinkler systems located in Fire Zone 52 adjacent to these zones will inhibit fire spread out of the zone to fire zones of adjacent fire areas.
| |
| (3) Automatic fire suppression systems have been excluded from Fire Zones 144 and 145 based on the following criteria:
| |
| (a) The existing barrier. construction provides adequate isolation and containment of potential fire; (b) Full zone detection is already provided.
| |
| Page 3-12
| |
| | |
| LEGEND 29G-FIRE ZONE NUMBER 9 - IONIZATION DETECTOR 1A Immmmmwq 134 135 STAIRWAY UPPRES ION SYSTEM s
| |
| I W W &% m lal 18 1E g I I J 1C 12 8 8 822 1G 136 8 137 1 D 1 1H 138A 138B 138C 112 113 143 139 143 143 140 141 29G 6 8 143 PLANT ARRANGEMENT PLAN BELOW BASEMENT UNITS1 8 2 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS ~P 47&a$4 Qa FIGURE 3-1
| |
| ~perture Car8 QV 02, 19 02 15-Z
| |
| | |
| I 1
| |
| | |
| LEGEND 80-FIRE ZONE NUMBER I
| |
| 3 I
| |
| S - IONIZATION DETECTOR I Zl .'-
| |
| INFRARED DETECTOR I
| |
| ~;THERMISTOR DETECTOR Q "HEAT DETECTOR 116 8,::. 9::: ('..
| |
| ~ .::..:::.
| |
| 8.:.:Q'S:": ..
| |
| 8:Q 117
| |
| -WET PIPE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 66 61 74
| |
| -HALON SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
| |
| :26
| |
| ':@.q y.O.'2Z
| |
| ~
| |
| FILE ROOM, CHART AND RECORDS (3) 8 AND .8:: -CO2 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SECURITY EQUIPMENT ROOM (2) 8 AND Q:8. 103 75 104 REMAINING FLOOR AREAS (IO) 8 -PREACTION SPRINKLER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM REMAINING FLOOR AREAS(3) 9 S. W%ww\w%
| |
| 134 Q 1 35I1eaaaaa I I STAIRWAYSUPPRESSION SYSTEM SERVICE/OFFICE BLDG MEGA EQUIP. ROOMS IIIII OFFICE BLDG. GAS 6 BOTTLE STCRAGE, AND 9 10 62 63~ 25 ROADWAY OVERHANG DELUGE SYSTEM g.Q 62 63B- 4~"24 22 23@'.." NOTE 1) CABLE TRAY THERMISTOR DETEC-62C 630- TION IS PROVIDED IN FIRE ZONES 66, 67, 74, 75, 103 AND 104
| |
| ::13::
| |
| I 64 A
| |
| ~es B~B 65 A I 2f 2) MANUALWATER SPRAY SYSTEM'S PROVIDED FOR THE CHARCOAL I II 8
| |
| 8 FILTER UNITS IN FIRE ZONE 5 8 15 110 8 8I8 814 r 6N I
| |
| 8 I r 6S
| |
| -I 8 20I 8,8 I
| |
| I I I
| |
| 8 8 I I
| |
| I I
| |
| I II I
| |
| I 6M I I I
| |
| I I
| |
| I 8 8I8 I
| |
| 17 17 D G 17A 17B 79 0 128 131 77 t
| |
| I 1 24I I8 29 PLANT ARRANGEMENT 29C 30 29B 290 TI BASEMENT PLAN EL 591' APKRTQEE L2 587'NITS1 29E 142 29F CAEB Also XvaQahle 05 FIGURE 3-2 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS Aperture Carl Sv oa >9 oa z g-lg
| |
| | |
| y n
| |
| | |
| SS LEGEND S4 '4N.FIRE ZONE NUMBER 8 8 EL 621 "6" eee 8 EL 621'.6" 88 888 32 SS ISI - IONIZATION DETECTOR Z) - INFRARED DETECTOR
| |
| - INFRARED DETECTOR, UNDER FLOOR 146 8 See 8 888 8 -IONIZATION DETECTOR, UNDER FLOOR 33 34 35 8 8 8834A 0; 0 -THERMISTOR DETECTOR SSA EL 609'-0" f (19) 8 ANP 9 -HEAT DETECTOR
| |
| ) (14) 9 II II I 120 121 -WET PIPE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM EL 609' (EXTENSION) f
| |
| )
| |
| (12)
| |
| "(10)
| |
| G 9 AN IIIII OA RECORD VAULT(1) 8 AND:::::::.
| |
| 118 :- 7 69
| |
| -'1 36 : 27::
| |
| 75 RCP 119:::::::::: -CO2 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
| |
| -MANUALWATER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM EL 621'N" TELE. EQUIP. ROOM(1) 8 AND - .. I 122 RCP 103 104 123 OTHER FLOOR AREAS (10)
| |
| ~ ~ ~ ~
| |
| 8ANP IIIII Ie I II geaammw\I
| |
| -STAIRWAYSUPPRESSION SYSTEM F
| |
| RCP ) 1 1
| |
| :)7 le e a a a a eJ e I
| |
| -PREACTION SPRINKLER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM EL.623-6" RCP RCP (26) @ AMP I IIIII FOR LOCKER ROOM RCP (EXTENSION) 10 he .'8 44A 44E 101 44B 44F 102 22 NOTE 1) THERMISTOR DETECTION AND I
| |
| 33B ::: 3809 44C 44G Q: 39:S: 34B DELUGE WATER SPRAY PROVIDED 110 8 44D <1 44H '111 FOR YARD TRANSFORMERS AND 1 PORTION OF TURBINE BUILDING EXTERIOR WALL
| |
| : 40A::: 8 8 8 8 8 @8::: 8:::'8'45 .'.'.'.
| |
| gi::8:- 8 8 2) CABLE TRAY THERMISTOR DE-
| |
| ~ .-P:8::5:
| |
| --e TECTION IS PROVIDED IN FIRE ZONES 42 8::: 43 44N 888
| |
| ~ ~
| |
| P.::8..- P 8 67,75,101,102,103, and 104 44S
| |
| :: 40B:: : @42C:M 8 8 8 47B
| |
| ; 42A;:: :: 46A:::: 3) MANUALWATER SPRAY SYSTEM IS 8 9.
| |
| ':::8:~: 8 42D8 110 8 8 ~
| |
| (y PROVIDED FOR THE CHARCOAL 111 46D :5: FILTER UNITS IN FIRE ZONES 33A 46 AND 34A
| |
| : 4) AUTOMATICWATER SPRAY SYSTEM IS 91 96 PROVIDED FOR THE CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS IN FIRE ZONES 67 AND 75 131 99 92 I
| |
| PLANT ARRANGEMENT MEZZANINE FLOOR 142 APKRVO)N EL 609'NITS1 Im 2 CARD v~o~~e FIGURE 3-3 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS ~P ~~ <~ SV02 1902 15 /g I
| |
| | |
| 0 38 44N 39 ll 12 PART PLAN EL 609'.
| |
| LEGEND 58-FIRE ZONE NUMBER 6S 9 -IONIZATIONDETECTOR X3 -INFRARED DETECTOR il PIPE TUNNEL PLAN EL 601'5 -PREACTION SPRINKLER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SYSTEM 41 ~gggg+ -HALON SUPPRESSION
| |
| -CO2 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
| |
| ::D,"-::::~ e "."- '. "e'-" -e:: : io;:.::.:.::D:.::::- =:::L e.':: ~::
| |
| e::::::e:: 60-.-.....Zt::::e
| |
| ::.:: i:::::::~5::-::::-e~::::9::
| |
| 56 59::::
| |
| Tl 110 APKRVOa8'ARB PLAN EL 620'-6" to 625'-10" PART PLANT ARRANGEMENT Aho XvaHab1e On PLAN EL 601', 609'I 620'-6" to 625'-10" Apertare Card UNITS1 8 2 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FIGURE 3-4
| |
| ,8VQ8190815.i
| |
| | |
| 1 A
| |
| | |
| E-LEGEND 130 - FIRE ZONE NUMBER 8 - IONIZATION DETECTOR 32 - HEAT DETECTOR e -IONIZATIONDETECTOR, ABOVE CEILING
| |
| -INFRARED DETECTOR
| |
| -THERMISTOR DETECTOR SI -IONIZATIONDETECTOR UNDER FLOOR 8 107 133 .HALON SUPPRESSION SYSTEM EI- 633'<" (~ I) 8 ANDI II FOR SERVICE BLDG. 132 69 48 I
| |
| RCP jgP":,
| |
| 8 8 75 I RCP -MANUALDELUGE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM C) L EXTENSION
| |
| : 44) 9A Ollll FOR MECH. EQUIPRM RGP 1 20 8 121 RCP STAIRWAYSUPPRESSION SYSTEM ONLY I I 44A 51 44E -PREACTION SPRINKLER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM EI-64'9 6 6 5 QC VAULT(2) A RCP RCP RCP RCP (EXTENSION)
| |
| ) REMAININGFLOOR AREA(51) 9 8 49 50 -WET PIPE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 4F 12 4 22 108 109 5L~ ! NOTE: 1) CABLE TRAY THERMISTOR DETEC-
| |
| .6 I 44Dm 106 TION IS PROVIDED IN FIRE ZONES 44H 67 AND 75 ye ~ 8 ~ 888 ~ 888 ~ '8 4 ~ 0 ~ ~ 52 2) MANUALWATER SPRAY SYSTEM IS 8 ~ 0 ~ 8 ~ ~ ~ eee 8 88 PROVIDED FOR THE CHARCOAL
| |
| ~ 53 ~4 8 ~ ~ 54 FILTER UNITS IN FIRE ZONES 49, 50 8ee 85 e 8
| |
| ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 8 8 AND 129 eeeeee Oeee o o oe+ +8 88 88 888 ~
| |
| 144 COMPUTER ROOM.(4) 8 126 COMPUTER ROOM-1 5 CONSOLE ROOM/2) e 145 QQ CONSOLE ROOM (2) 8 CONSOLE ROOM.
| |
| CONSULTATION ROOMi2) 8 Qg 129 REMAININGAREA/9) 8 130 CONSULTATION ROOM-
| |
| ) ( ( (
| |
| YL 131 APERTURE TURBINE TURBINE
| |
| '" PA CAR9 RBQ P~ggaM6 0~
| |
| DRY CHEMICAL FOR TURBINE BEARING DRY CHEMICAL FOR TURBINE BEARING AP@>Nre Card PLANT ARRANGEMENT TURBINE BUILDING MAIN FLOOR EL 633'NITS1 8 2 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FIGURE 3-5 6
| |
| P ~
| |
| | |
| rt LEGEND 130-.FIRE ZONE NUMBER 8;,IONIZATIONDETECTOR 8 -IONIZATION DETECTOR, UNDER FLOOR 32 X3 ~ INFRARED DETECTOR C>l;AIR DUCT IONIZATION DETECTOR S 338 8348 -PREACTION SPRINKLER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 8 8 133 -HALON SUPPRESSION SYSTEM 132 67 75 S S S 67 I I 75 L, 8 8 I 76 68 69 NOTE: 1) MANUALWATER SPRAY SYSTEM IS PROVIDED FOR THE CHARCOAL FILTER UNITS IN FIRE ZONES69,70 67 75 AND 73
| |
| : 2) CABLE TRAY THERMISTOR DE-109 TECTION IS PROVIDED IN FIRE ZONES 108 67, 68,75 and 76 g Sg @ST 8 8 8 8
| |
| @70 g @73 E]
| |
| 8 8 S Im 8 Q Im S I5I
| |
| )P,T+cq 1
| |
| gag~ pAE9
| |
| %iso Available ~+
| |
| '<parture C>r~
| |
| 129 130 (SEE FIGURE 3-5) (SEE FIGURE 3-5)
| |
| PLANT ARRANGEMENT REACTOR BUILDING MAIN FLOOR EL 650'NITS 1 5 2 DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS FIGURE 3-6
| |
| | |
| tlI
| |
| : 4. SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
| |
| : 4. 1 I ntroduct ion Paragraph 50.48 of 10 CFR 50, which became effective on February 17, 1981, requires all nuclear .plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, to comply with the requirements of Section III of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 regardless of any previous approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of other design features. Section III.G.1 requires that fire protection features be provided for those systems, structures and components important to safe shutdown. These features must be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
| |
| (1) One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) is free of fire damage; and, (2) Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the Control Room or the Emergency Control Station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours.
| |
| Section III.L of Appendix R and Generic Letter 81-12 (February 20, 1981) Enclosure 1 "Staff Position," provides additional guidance on the NRC Staff's requirements for this safe shutdown capability.
| |
| 4.1.1 Desi n Basis Events For the purpose of this review and report for which safe shutdown capability will be demonstrated for D.C. Cook, the spectrum of postulated exposure fires in a given plant area will Page 4-1
| |
| | |
| be analyzed involving either in-situ or transient combustibles which are external to any systems, structures or components located in or adjacent to that area. The effects of such fires may adversely affect those systems, structures or components essential to safe plant shutdown. The most limiting assumption (i.e., worst-case scenario) with respect to the availability of off-site power will be assumed. No concurrent or sequential design basis accidents or transients are assumed to exist. In addition, no random single failures are assumed to occur other than those which occur as a direct result of fire analysis assumptions.
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| 4.2 Safet Functions The specific safe shutdown functions necessary to satisfy Appendix R acceptance criteria are as follows:
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| (1) Reactivity Control Function (2) Reactor Coolant Makeup Control Function (3) Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Function (4) Reactor Heat Removal Function (5) Process Monitoring Function (6) Miscellaneous Supporting Functions 4.2.1 Reactivit Control After a reactor trip, .the reactivity control function must be capable of achieving and maintaining at least a lw reactivity shutdown margin from zero power hot standby to cold shutdown.
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| The function must be capable of compensating for any reactivity Page 4-2
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| changes associated with xenon decay and the reactor coolant temperature decrease which occurs during cooldown to cold shutdown conditions.
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| 4.2.2 Reactor Coolant Make-u Control The reactor coolant make-up control function shall be capable of assuring that sufficient make-up inventory is provided to compensate for Reactor Coolant System fluid losses due to identified leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary and shrinkage of the Reactor Coolant System water volume during cooldown from hot standby to cold shutdown conditions. Adequate performance of this, function is demonstrated by the maintenance of reactor coolant level within the pressurizer.
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| 4.2.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor coolant pressure control is required to assure that the Reactor Coolant System is operated:
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| (1) Within the technical specifications for Reactor Coolant System pressure-temperature requirements; (2) To prevent peak Reactor Coolant System pressure from exceeding 110. of system design pressure; and (3) With a sufficient subcooling margin to minimize void formation within the reactor vessel.
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| 4.2.4 Reactor Heat Removal The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of transferring fission product decay heat from the reactor core at a rate such that specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are Page 4-3
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| not exceeded. The function shall be capable of achieving cold shutdown within a 72-hour period and maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
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| 4.2.5 Process Monitorin When information on process variables is required by operators to modify safe shutdown system alignments or control safe shutdown equipment, such monitoring information must be available. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing, if possible, direct readings of those plant process variables necessary for plant operators to perform and/or control the previously ident'ified functions.
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| 4.2.6 Miscellaneous Su ort,in Functions The system and equipment used to perform the previous functions may require miscellaneous supporting functions such as process cooling, lubrication and ac/dc power. These supporting functions shall be available and capable of providing the support necessary to assure acceptable performance of the previously identified safe shutdown functions.
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| 4.2.7 Discussion The selection of safety functions is principally based on those identified in Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-l Section C.5.c. Other subfunctions may exist under each of these broad headings. Examples of, such subfunctions are steam generator level control and steam generator pressure control which exist as a part of reactor heat removal. Steam generator Page 4-4
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| level and pressure control are required during hot standby. But during certain portions of hot shutdown and all of cold shutdown, the Residual Heat Removal System is operable and these subfunctions are not required. Other subfunctions like emergency power, process cooling, etc., are embraced by the miscellaneous supporting function definition.
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| In addition to the functions identified in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, a reactor coolant pressure control function has been included.
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| Although this function could be placed within the reactor coolant make-up function and reactor heat removal function, the specific goals achieved by the performance of this function are unique enough to warrant a separate safety function classification.
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| The safety functions identified adequately assure that the containment pressure boundary will not be threatened.
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| Uncontrolled mass and energy releases to the containment from the primary systems are limited by the achievement of these safety functions and will assure that no rupture of the reactor coolant or containment pressure boundaries will occur.
| |
| 4.3 Anal sis of Safe Shutdown S stems 4.3.1 Introduction Various analytical approaches could be taken to assure that sufficient plant systems are available to perform the previously identified plant safety functions. Numerous plant systems are available, alone and in combination with other systems, to provide these required functions. Furthermore, the exact Page 4-5
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| location and specific effects of exposure fires cannot be precisely determined. In general, recognizing the confined physical location of such fires and the operational flexibility and physical diversity of systems available to achieve safe, shutdown, one can assume that appropriate plant fire protection features will limit fire damage to the extent that unaffected plant systems will be able to attain safe shutdown. An extensive effort would be required to identify the effects of postulated fires in all potential plant locations on all the plant systems which are normally available to support safe shutdown. As a conservative alternative to this approach, a minimum set of plant response to the requirements of Appendix R which can achieve and maintain safe shutdown in spite of the location of the fire event and the most limiting assumed concurrent loss of off-site power.
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| Demonstration of adequate protection of this minimum system set from the effects of postulated fires constitutes an'adequate and conservative demonstration of the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for the purpose of fire protection.
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| The safe shutdown systems selected for D.C. Cook will be capable of achieving and maintaining subcritical conditions in the reactor, maintaining reactor coolant inventory, achieving and maintaining hot conditions for an extended period of time, achieving cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours, and maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter.
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| Page 4-6
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| 4.3.2 Initial Assum tions (1) The unit is operating at 100~ power upon the occurrence of a fire and concurrent loss of off-site power.
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| (2) The reactor is tripped either manually or automatically.
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| (3) No additional single failures are considered other than the loss of off-site power and those directly attributable to the fire.
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| (4) No piece of equipment required for safe shutdown is assumed to be out of service.
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| 4.3.3 Definitions Hot Standby The initial safe shutdown state with the reactor at zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and RCS average temperature greater than or equal to 350 F.
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| Hot Shutdown Reactor at zero power Keff less than 0.99 and RCS temperature between 350 F and 200oF.
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| Cold Shutdown Reactor at zero power, Keff less than 0.99 and RCS temperature below or equal to 200oF.
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| 4.3.4 Safe Shutdown Functions 4.3.4.1 Reactivit Control Function Initial reactivity control will result from an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip or from operator initiation of a manual trip upon notification of a major fire. This action will deenergize the normally energized RPS to actuate a reactor trip. The effects of fires on the RPS are not considered to preclude the initiation of an automatic trip or control rod insertion.
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| Page 4-7
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| Following rod insertion, hot subcritical conditions are achieved for approximately 35 hours with no addition of boron, assuming all rods are inserted into the core and the reactor 6rip occurs at end of life and at 100~ power, with xenon at steady-state level. As xenon decays, however, positive reactivity is added, requiring the addition of borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to maintain the required margin of shutdown reactivity. The cooldown transition from hot standby to hot shutdown, and ultimately to cold shutdown, requires additional boration to compensate for the negative moderator temperature coefficient. The total quantity of borated 'water from the RWST (a minimum of 1950 ppm) which must be injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to achieve the required cold shutdown margin is less than the quantity of borated water from the same source required to maintain a constant pressurizer level during cooldown (Reactor Coolant System volume shrinkage compensation). The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is capable of injecting this quantity of borated water into the Reactor Coolant System and maintaining the required shutdown reactivity margin throughout safe shutdown. Figure 4.1 depicts the RCS Reactivity Control function.
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| 4.3.4.2 Reactor Coolant Make-u Control For the assumed fire scenario, reactor coolant make-up control can be achieved by isolation of the normal and excess letdown CVCS paths and operation of the charging portion of the Page 4-8
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| CVCS through the RCP seal injection path. The boron injection tank (BIT) injection path may also be used for added operational flexibility. Reactor coolant make-up will be available within the first 30 minutes post-reactor trip.
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| Successful maintenance of RCS integrity is also necessary to achieve adequate inventory and pressure control. Inadvertent opening of boundary isolation valves such as the reactor head or pressurizer vent valves, pressurizer power-operated relief valves, and RHR suction isolation valves have been precluded and adequate maintenance of reactor coolant pump seal integrity achieved to assure safe shutdown.
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| Control of pressurizer water level achieved manually is by controlling CVCS charging flow based on pressurizer level information. Figure 4.2 depicts the RCS makeup control function.
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| 4.3.4.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Overpressure protection of the RCS prior to a controlled cooldown and depressurization is provided by the pressurizer safety valves. After alignment of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR), at approximately 350 F and 400 psig, overpressure protection is provided by, the RHR safety valves. The pressurizer safety valves and RHR safety valves, in conjunction with a controlled cooldown and a timely transfer to RHR cooling at or around a Reactor Coolant System temperature of 350 F, should ensure that the RCS pressure-temperature limits are not exceeded.
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| For adequate pressure control, isolation of the pressurizer auxiliary spray will occur as the result of operator action.
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| Page 4-9
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| The establishment and maintenance of a sufficient subcooling margin within the Reactor Coolant System is essential to successful achievement and maintenance of safe shutdown. In order to provide operational flexibility and to enhance the safe shutdown capabilities of the plant, repair provisions will be developed to provide the availability of at least one backup pressurizer heater group. As discussed in Section 6, the pressurizer heaters are not considered necessary for plant safe shutdown. However, the availability of one group of heaters enhances the capability of maintaining sufficient subcooling margin. Figure 4.3 depicts the RCS pressure control function.
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| J 4.3.4.4 Reactor Heat Removal Function Following a reactor trip with an assumed loss of off-site power, decay heat is initially removed by natural circulation within the Reactor Coolant System,- heat transfer to the Main Steam System via the steam generators, and operation of the power-operated atmospheric relief valves (PORVs) or the Main Steam System code safety valves. With the steam generator safety valves alone, the RCS,maintains itself close to the nominal no-load condition.
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| For decay heat removal via natural circulation a minimum of two steam generators will be available. This decay heat removal requires the ability to supply sufficient auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators to make up for the inventory discharged as steam by the safety or relief valves. For maintenance of initial Page 4-10
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| hot standby conditions, the secondary make-up flow required to the steam generators is less than 450 gpm and is supplied by the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW). Auxiliary feedwater sources are available from the condensate storage tanks, and alternatively, from the Essential Service Water System (ESW).
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| Auxiliary feedwater may be supplied to the steam generators by the auxiliary motor-driven feedwater pumps or by the auxiliary steam turbine-driven feedwater pump.
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| The further removal of additional heat is achieved by the controlled operation of the steam generator power-operated atmospheric relief valve (PORV) and continued operation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. During this cooldown phase, an auxiliary feedwater flow of up to 450 gpm is required and can be supplied with an individual motor- or turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. After reduction of Reactor Coolant System temperature below 350 F, the Residual Heat Removal System is used to establish long-term core cooling through the removal of decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System to the environment via the Residual Heat Removal System, Component Cooling Water System, and the Essential Service Water System. Figure 4.4 depicts the reactor heat removal function.
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| 4.3.4.5 Process Monitorin Function The operator requires knowledge of various plant parameters to perform required system transitions and essential operator actions. A discussion, by safe shutdown function, of the necessary instrumentation is provided below.
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| Page 4-11
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| For the fire scenarios assumed in this analysis, inventory make-up to the Reactor Coolant System will be from the refueling water storage tank through the reactor coolant pumps'eal injection lines. An alternative path via the BIT injection path, has been analyzed for operational flexibility; however, it is not required for safe shutdown. As previously discussed, sufficient negative reactivity exists in the Reactor Coolant System (after rod insertion) for 35 hours without the need for additional boron addition. Furthermore, the negative reactivity inserted by the control rods and the RWST water injected by the CVCS (to compensate for the RCS volume decrease) will maintain the core subcritical while cooling down from hot full power to a cold shutdown condition, assuming no letdown is available.
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| Administrative and operational procedures for D.C. Cook will ensure that sufficient boron is added in a timely manner to the primary system to achieve the necessary cold shutdown reactivity margin. With boron addition under procedural 'control, no operator actions are expected or anticipated based on direct-reading neutron monitoring to ensure an adequate safe shutdown negative reactivity margin. However, core source range detectors will be available for core activity monitoring in the Control Room. An additional source range channel will also be added to a local station, LSI-4, to provide this information for areas requiring alternative shutdown.
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| Page 4-l2
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| Various process monitoring functions must be available to adequately achieve and maintain the reactor coolant makeup, pressure control and decay heat removal functions. For the assumed fire scenario, maintenance of hot standby requires that, pressurizer level and RCS pressure instrumentation be available.
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| Reactor Coolant System temperature is maintained during hot standby by proper decay heat removal via steam generators and self-actuation of the main steam code safety valves or controlled operation of the steam generator PORVs. In the natural circulation mode of operation, the difference between the hot-leg and cold-leg wide r'ange temperatures (Th-Tc) provides a direct indication of the existence of a natural circulation condition.
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| Operating personnel, by monitoring of RCS pressure and hot leg temperature (Th) instrumentation and, if available, manual control of the pressurizer heaters (not required for safe shutdown), will maintain RCS pressure to assure that appropriate subcooling margin is achieved. Maintenance of pressurizer level control is achieved by monitoring pressurizer level instrumentation and manual control of CVCS charging flow.
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| Maintenance of hot standby also requires the control of the secondary system to compensate for variations in the primary system performance. Monitoring of steam generator level and pressure are avai.lable to assure adequate and controlled decay heat removal. The level control is achieved by operator manipulation of AFW system flow, based on steam generator level Page 4-13
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| indication. Secondary system pressure will be monitored by steam generator pressure indication.
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| The plant operators will utilize the instrumentation discussed above for monitoring of natural circulation conditions, subcooling margin, heat removal and compliance with the plant's pressure/temperature limits as it pertains to the low temperature overpressure protection of the Reactor Coolant System (cold leg temperature in conjunction with RCS pressure).
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| 4.3.4.6 Su ortin Functions Various systems are required to provide support to safe shutdown equipment or systems. These support systems are:
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| (1) Emergency Power System (2) Essential Service Water System (3) Component Cooling Water System Figure 4.5 depicts the supporting system interactions with safe shutdown systems.
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| The following sections discuss each of the required safe shutdown systems and the support systems.
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| IIt 4.4 Safe Shutdown S stems 4.4.1 Chemical and Volume Control S stem (CVCS)
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| The charging portion of the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) accomplishes the following safety functions:
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| (1) Reactivity control by control of soluble chemical neutron absorber (boron) concentration in the RCS, reactor coolant makeup control by maintaining water inventory in the RCS (2) Maintenance of reactor coolant pump seal integrity Page 4-14
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| Reactivity control capability for plant shutdown is provided by the control rods, with boric acid injection used to compensate for the xenon transients. Insertion of the control and shutdown rod groups make the reactor at least 1% subcritical (keff < 0.99) following trip from any credible operation condition to the hot zero power condition, assuming the most reactive rod remains in the fully withdrawn position. For the assumed fire scenario, no struck-rod condition need be assumed.
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| When either unit is at power, the quantity of boric acid retained in its refueling water storage tank, ready for injection to the RCS, always exceeds that quantity required to bring the reactor from a full power condition to hot shutdown and then to cold shutdown.
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| For the assumed post-fire scenario, make-up water to the Reactor Coolant System will be provided by the Chemical and Volume Control System from the refueling water storage tank (borated at a minimum of 1950 ppm).
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| Numerous CVCS flow paths are normally available for charging to the RCS. Two separate and independent flow paths will provide reactor coolant makeup and boration:
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| (1) The charging line to the reactor coolant pumps'eals will always be available if at least one of the charging pumps is operational.
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| (2) Injection via the boron injection tank is an alternative flow path which is not required for safe shutdown; however, it provides plant operational flexibility.
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| Page 4-15
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| For the assumed event, charging and boration will be accomplished by operating a minimum of one centrifugal charging pump taking suction -
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| from the refueling water storage tank and injecting borated water through the RCP seal injection, line to the RCS or as an option borated water may be injected via the boron injection tank. Suction to the charging pump can be delivered from the RWST by opening either one of two normally closed motor-operated valves.
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| Controlled leakage (letdown) from the Reactor Coolant System normally occurs via the seal leak-off return path and the normal and excess letdown paths. For the post-fire operational sequence, the normal and excess letdown paths will be isolated.
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| Isolation of the normal and excess letdown, lines will occur as a result of loss of instrument air or will be achieved by operator action to assure adequate inventory control. Furthermore, procedural control for isolation of all potentially spurious RCS boundary paths, including pressurizer PORVs, reactor and pressurizer post-accident vents and auxiliary spray, will be achieved.
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| Seal leak-off flow 'eed not be available to achieve safe shutdown. The reactor coolant pump No. 1 seal leak-off air-operated valves fail open. In that condition, seal return flow will be available at the suction of the charging t
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| pumps (through Page 4-16
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| the seal water heat exchanger) or it may be locally or remotely isolated by a containment isolation motor-operated valve or by the seal water return filters manual valves.
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| The injection path from the charging pumps to the reactor coolant pump seals contains only one air-operated valve (normally open, fail-open) which is provided with a minimum flow (50 gpm) mechanical stop. Thus, operation of one charging pump will ensure a minimum RCS charging flow of approximately 20 gpm, irrespective of the availability of the BIT injection path.
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| The injection path through the BIT (containing 900 gallons of 20,000 ppm borated water) is available for operational flexibility. It requires remote or manual opening of two motor-operated valves in series (total of four motor-operated valves arranged in two redundant sets in series), since the RCS cold leg isolation valves are normally open. Inclusion of the BIT injection path as an alternate charging and boration path, although not essential for safe shutdown, will provide added operational flexibility in the post-fire scenario defined for this analysis.
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| Isolation of the volume control tank (by closure of either one of two motor-operated valves) during emergency makeup from the RWST and isolation of the seal return line to the seal water heat exchanger can be performed by local manual operation.
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| Pressurizer water level is maintained by operation of one centrifugal charging pump using pressurizer level instrumentation information.
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| Page 4-l7
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| Centrifu al Char in Pum s The two high-head centrifugal charging pumps per unit are normally aligned for the CVCS charging function. During design basis accidents they are part of the ECCS system.t The centrifugal charging pumps are of'he horizontal type with a design flow rate of 150 gpm and a discharge pressure at shutoff of 2749 psig. Each pump is designed to provide rated flow against a pressure equal to the sum of the RCS normal maximum pressure (existing when the pressurizer power-operated relief valve is operating) and the piping, valve and equipment pressure losses at the design charging flows. Each of the centrifugal charging pumps has a minimum recirculation flow motor-operated valve to prevent damage to the pump when it is operating at shut-off pressure. The pumps require cooling water (from the CCW) to their mechanical-seal heat exchangers, gear oil coolers, bearing oil coolers and seal housings. The pumps also require operation of external oil pressure pumps in idle conditions.
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| Boron In'ection Tank The boron injection tank (BIT) is designed to hold sufficient concentrated boric acid solution to shut down the reactor during a worst-case accident (steam line rupture).
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| Design concentration of boric acid is 12% by weight (equivalent to 20,000 ppm) with a usable, volume of 900 gallons. Redundant tank heaters and line heat tracing are provided to assure that the solution is maintained during normal operation at a Page 4-18
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| temperature (>145 F) which is in excess of the solubility limit (approximately 133 F). Recirculation of the contents of the BIT during normal plant operation is accomplished by using the boric acid transfer pumps.
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| Should the BIT path be utilized, isolation of the BIT recirculation lines'. air-operated valves (fail-closed) will occur either as a consequence of the loss of off-site power or by operator procedural control for the post-fire scenario.
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| Refuelin Water Stora e Tank In addition to its normal duty to supply borated water to the refueling cavity for refueling operations, the RWST provides borated water to ECCS pumps.
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| The capacity of the refueling water storage tank is based on the requirement for filling the refueling cavity. This quantity is in excess of that required for safe shutdown. Technical specification volume of the RWST is 350,000 gallons of borated water at a minimum of 1950 ppm boron. The maximum boric acid concentration is approximately 1.4 weight percent boric acid.
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| 4.4.2 Reactor Coolant S stem The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) consists of four similar heat transfer loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel.
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| Each loop contains a reactor coolant pump and a steam generator.
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| Page 4-19
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| In addition, the system includes a pressurizer with associated code safety and relief valves (PORVs). Reactor Coolant System instrumentation includes cold-leg, hot-leg temperatures (wide'ange),
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| pressure (wide range) and pressurizer water level.
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| The natural circulation capability of the plant provides a means of decay heat removal when the reactor coolant pumps are unavailable. Natural circulation flow rates are governed by the amount of decay heat, component elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer, loop flow resistance and voiding. The conditions during natural circulation relate to maintaining adequate primary to secondary heat transfer, subcooling and inventory.
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| For this analysis of safe shutdown capability, two of the four RCS loops will be monitored to ensure that natural circulation is established and maintained.
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| While in natural circulation, adequate heat transfer and coolant flow are dependent on adequate inventory in both the primary and secondary systems. Maintaining water level above the "U" tubes on the secondary side of the steam generators and adequate level within the pressurizer are required for natural circulation. Confirmation of flow while in natural circulation is accomplished through the use of temperature indications.
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| Those indications are cold-leg temperature (Tc) and hot-leg temperature (Th). Tc should attain a value which is a few degrees higher than the saturation temperature of the secondary inventory. Th should attain a value which is less than at full Page 4-20
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| power and higher than Tc. When Tc and Th attain the values described above, flow and heat transfer have been achieved in the associated RCS loops.
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| Reactor Coolant System inventory control is based on the operation of CVCS charging paths. High pressure seal water from the CVCS system is injected into the reactor coolant pumps lower radial bearing chamber to prevent leakage of high temperature reactor coolant along the pump shaft. The injection flow splits in the bearing chamber with a portion flowing up through the radial bearing and into the shaft seal chamber. The remaining portion flows down the shaft, through the RCP thermal barrier end into the Reactor Coolant System. For added operation flexibility in a post-fire scenario, the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier cooling path from the Component Cooling Water System can be made available for safe shutdown. Maintenance of either seal injection or thermal barrier cooling provides adequate protection of the reactor coolant pump seals. However, components associated with the CCW thermal barrier cooling flow path are not required for safe shutdown.
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| Pressurizer Heaters Subcooling within the RCS can be maintained by controlled operation of the pressurizer heaters and monitoring of RCS pressure and loop hot-leg temperature (Th). However, the pressurizer heaters are not required for safe shutdown. As an optional operator action to enhance the capability of maintaining Page 4-21
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| sufficient subcooling margin, a minimum heater power of 150 kW will be available from any of the back-up heater groups. This additional heat will conservatively cover heat losses from the pressurizer at or below normal operating temperature/pressure with no allowance for continuous spray. Under loss of off-site power conditions, a backup heater group can be repowered from the opposite unit.
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| Pressurizer Safet Valves Overpressurization protection of the RCS is assured by three spring-loaded, self-activated pressurizer code safety valves set at a pressure of 2485 psig. The combined capacity of the valves is equal to or greater than the maximum pressure surge resulting from a complete loss of load without reactor trip.
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| 4.4.3 Main Steam S stems For the post-,fire scenario, maintenance of the steam generator inventory and control of steam generator pressure are required for both hot standby and subsequent primary system
| |
| .cooldown to support the decay and sensible heat removal function within the applicable operational limits.
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| The Main Steam (MS) System consists of four parallel flow paths, one from each steam generator to the main turbine of the k
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| unit. The MS system will be isolated either by operation of the turbine stop valve or by the steam generator main steam stop valves.
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| Page 4-22
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| In accordance with supporting FSAR analysis, inventory control of two steam generators is sufficient to p'rovide the reactor heat removal function during natural circulation conditions.
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| Maintenance of the steam generator water level during the period of auxiliary feedwater operation (hot standby) involves remote or local manual positioning of the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves and operation of the motor-driven or turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps based on steam generator level information. Steam generator water level and pressure indication are available in the Control Room, on the hot shutdown panels and at the Local Shutdown Indication (LSI) stations (located at the auxiliary feedwater flow control valve stations).
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| The MS system is also designed to deliver motive steam to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Steam to these turbines is supplied by branch connections upstream of the steam generator stop valves on two steam lines in each unit (corresponding to steam generators No. 2 and 3). Either line is sufficient to supply steam for the auxiliary 'feedwater pump turbine, but two are provided for redundancy. These lines are tied together with a normally open motor-operated shut-off valve and a check valve in each line before the cross-tie.
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| In the main steam enclosures outside of the containment, a bank of five code safety valves are installed on each steam line.
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| Page 4-23
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| The five safety valves (two set at 1065 psig, two at 1075 psig, one at 1085 psig) on each line are installed to protect the MS system against overpressure and to provide a combined relieving capacity greater than the maximum steam flow rate.
| |
| Power-0 crated Relief Valves A power-operated relief valve (PORV) is provided on each steam line which is capable of releasing the sensible and decay heat to the atmosphere. The PORVs are used for plant cooldown by steam discharge to the atmosphere since the steam dump system is assumed not available. The PORVs have a total combined capacity of approximately 10< of the maximum steam flow. For the assumed fire scenario, a minimum of two PORVs, will be used to provide the Reactor Coolant System controlled cooldown.
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| Controls for the steam generator PORVs are provided in the Control Room, in the hot shutdown panels, and locally at the shutdown stations. During hot standby conditions, the steam generator PORVs will be used in manual steam pressure control mode. Thus, the RCS temperature is controlled by maintaining the steam generator at the corresponding saturation pressure.
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| 4.4.4 Auxiliar Feedwater S stem The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System is required during hot standby to support RCS decay heat removal. For hot standby, secondary system (steam generator) inventory control is provided by the AFW system. Each unit contains two motor-driven pumps and one turbine-driven pump which are dedicated to each unit. In Page 4-24
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| addition, any motor-driven pump can be cross tied to the opposite unit by the opening of one manual cross-connect valve. Thus, each unit has the capability of receiving auxiliary feedwater from five separate pump sources (four motor-driven and one turbine-driven). Each motor-driven pump is rated at 450 gpm and each turbine-driven pump is rated at 900 gpm, with both flow capacities being at 1175 psig discharge pressure. The pumps have the design capability of providing the rated flow against a steam generator pressure of 1065 psig (the lowest steam generator safety valve setpoint).
| |
| The AFW system is designed to deliver enough water to maintain sufficient heat transfer in the steam generators in order to prevent loss of -primary water through the RCS pressurizer safety or relief valves.
| |
| Turbine-Driven Auxiliar Feedwater Pum s The turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump (TDFP) is designed to deliver a sufficient flow to all four steam generators of the unit with which it is associated and maintain steam generator water levels above the lower limit of the wide range level indicator. Each is a horizontal, six-stage, centrifugal pump driven by a single-stage atmospheric exhaust turbine. On automatic operation mode, the turbine will function as a single speed machine. However, manual speed control is available in the Control Room, on the hot shutdown panels and locally. Loss of control air to the turbine governor will result in the governor Page 4-25
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| reverting to the maximum speed setpoint; however, speed can subsequently be controlled locally. Two overspeed trip devices are provided. The electrical overspeed trip, set at 115% speed, resets automatically after a trip. The mechanical overspeed trip, device, set at 125~ speed, must be reset manually.
| |
| Each auxiliary feedwater pump turbine has its own self-contained lube oil system utilizing sleeve bearings lubricated by a shaft-rotary-type pump driven from the turbine shaft. Water for the cooler is supplied from the auxiliary feed pump discharge "
| |
| line, thus ensuring a cooling water supply whenever the auxiliary feed pump turbine is 'operating.
| |
| Steam generators No. 2 and/or 3 provide motive steam to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The TDFP is capable of operating down to a steam pressure of 125 psia, at which time the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed in service.
| |
| Motor-Driven Auxiliar Feedwater Pum s Each unit is supplied with two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDFP) with only one required for safe shutdown.
| |
| The other unit's MDFPs are also available by opening cross-tie discharge valves.
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| Each pump is a horizontal, eight-stage centrifugal pump.
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| The pumps require no external lube oil cooling or other support services other than ac power.
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| Page 4-26
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| Condensate Stora e Tanks At hot standby, the minimum volume of water required by the plant technical specification for the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) is 175,000 gallons. Should the CST supply become exhausted, the alternate unit's CST is made available through a single cross-tie, normally closed, air-operated valve (fail-closed). As a backup to both these sources of makeup water, cross-ties to the Essential Service- Water System (ESW) are provided. Ample time is assumed available post-fire for a local manual realignment of the normally closed valves that isolate ESW from -.the suction of'he auxi.liary feedwater pumps.
| |
| 4.4.5 Residual Heat Removal S stem Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is designed to remove
| |
| 'he residual and sensible heat from the core by reducing the temperature of the RCS during the hot and cold shutdown phases of safe shutdown.
| |
| The RHR system consists of two RHR heat exchangers, two RHR pumps and the associated piping, valving and instrumentation necessary for operational control. The design residual heat load is based on the residual heat fraction of the full core MW (thermal) power level that exists 20 hours following reactor shutdown from an extended power run near full power.
| |
| During cold shutdown operations, reactor coolant flows from the RCS to the RHR pumps through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers and back to the RCS. , The heat load is transferred by Page 4-27
| |
| | |
| the RHR heat exchangers to the Component Cooling Water System which is circulating on the shell side of the heat exchangers.
| |
| The inlet line to the RHR system is located in the hot leg of the reactor coolant loop No. 2 while the return line is connected to the cold legs of reactor coolant loops Nos. 2 and 3.
| |
| Two motor-operated valves in series "isolate the inlet line to the Residual Heat Removal System from the Reactor Coolant System. 'The return lines are isolated by check-valves in series in each line and a common motor-operated valve. To avoid potential RCS boundary leakage at this high/low pressure interface, one of the motor-operated valves in the RHR suction line will be kept closed (pre-fire condition) with the corresponding motor control center breaker in. the open position.
| |
| A minimum flow return line from the downstream side of each residual heat exchanger to the corresponding pump' suction line is provided to assure that the RHR pumps do not overheat under low flow conditions. A motor-operated valve located in each minimum flow line will be opened if RHR pump flow falls below 500 gpm and will be closed when the flow increases above 1000 gpm.
| |
| The cooldown rate of the reactor coolant is controlled by regulating the flow through the tube side of the RHR heat exchangers. A bypass line, which serves both residual heat exchangers, is used to regulate the temperature of the return flow to the RCS as well as to maintain a constant flow through the RHR system.
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| Page 4-28
| |
| | |
| The RHR system can be placed in operation when the pressure and temperature of the RCS are less than 400 psig and 350 F, respectively. If one of the pumps and/or one of the heat exchangers is not operative, safe operation of the plant is not affected; however, the time for cooldown is extended.
| |
| Residual Heat Removal Pum s Two identical pumps are installed in the Residual Heat Removal System. Each pump is sized to deliver sufficient reactor coolant flow through the residual heat exchangers to meet the plant cooldown requirements.
| |
| A seal heat exchanger for each pump is supported by operation of the Component Cooling Water System.
| |
| RHR Safet Valves The RHR system safety valves provide RCS cold overpressure protection whenever the RHR system is in operation. The valves are located inside containment, one each on the RHR system suction and discharge path, and discharge to the pressurizer relief tank. The valves are set at 450 psig and 600 psig, respectively.
| |
| Accumulators The manual isolation of the accumulators is assumed as a post-fire activity. The isolation valve at each accumulator is closed only when the RCS is intentionally depressurized below l000 psig. If these valves'ssociated cables were damaged by fires, the isolation is assumed to be performed locally, governed by adequate plant procedures (post-fire).
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| Page 4-29
| |
| | |
| 4.4.6 -Com onent Coolin Water S stem The Component Cooling Water (CCW) System is a supporting system to other safe shutdown systems. Two redundant trains are available, each consisting of one pump and heat exchanger and associated valves, piping and local instrumentation.
| |
| The CCW system for each unit serves as an intermediate heat transfer loop between the various safe shutdown components and the Essential Service Water System (ultimate heat sink).
| |
| 1 The CCW system provides cooling ,for the following safe shutdown equipment in each unit:
| |
| (1) Residual heat removal exchangers (2) Centrifugal charging pumps (a) Mechanical-seal heat exchangers (b) Gear oil coolers (c) Bearing oil coolers (d) Seal housing (3) Residual heat removal pumps mechanical-seal heat exchangers (4) Reactor coolant pump thermal'arrier heat exchanger Each unit is served by two component cooling pumps, two component cooling heat exchangers, a surge tank and associated piping and valves. A spare swing pump is available as a replacement for any pump on either units CCW system by valving it into the appropriate CCW headers and by connecting it into the other pump's power supply and control circuitry.
| |
| One pump and one component cooling heat exchanger per unit fulfill the heat removal function during normal full load Page 4-30
| |
| | |
| operation for various components located in the Auxiliary and Containment Buildings. During plant cooldown in RHR mode, two pumps and two heat exchangers per'nit are normally utilized to remove the residual heat. If one of the loops is not operative, only one RHR loop is effective and cooldown then is at a slower rate.
| |
| The two component cooling loops associated with one unit are interconnected downstream from the heat exchangers to effectively form an open loop supply header both for loads which are essential and those that are nonessential. For the present analysis of safe shutdown, no isolation of nonessential loads is assumed to be required. However, in anticipation of a potentially large cooling demand, the operator can isolate the component cooling inlet to nonessential loads or shift to the other units component cooling system by remotely and/or manually operated valves.
| |
| The essential loads, other than the residual heat exchangers, are normally valved open to the supply header and they discharge to the suction of the component cooling pump with which they are normally associated, so that component cooling water is circulated continuously through the essential loads during normal operation.
| |
| Each of the component cooling outlet lines from the residual heat exchangers has a normally closed motor-operated valve which must be opened during RHR cooldown. The motor-operated valves Page 4-31
| |
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| that isolate the CCW system from the reactor coolant pump thermal barrier coolers are included as safe shutdown components for operational flexibility in a post-fire scenario, since the thermal barriers perform a redundant function to the seal water injection cooling.
| |
| By appropriate realignment of pump suction and discharge header cross-tie valves, one of the opposite units CCW pumps may be dedicated to providing flow to the fire-affected unit.
| |
| A surge tank is connected to the suction side of the pumps, and makeup to the system is supplied to the surge tank from the demineralized water system.
| |
| 4.4.7 Essential Service Water S stem The Essential Service Water (ESW) System provides cooling for the following safe shutdown heat transfer equipment:
| |
| (l) Component cooling heat exchangers (2) Emergency diesel generator heat exchangers The system also provides a back-up supply of water to the AFW system in the 'event that the condensate storage tanks are depleted.
| |
| This system, shared by both units, consists of four pumps, each with its associated duplex discharge strainer, and two main headers. Each redundant header is served by two pumps (one for each unit) and each header, in turn, serves the corresponding essential loads in both units. These components, together with the associated heat exchangers, valving, piping local instrumentation, complete the Essential Service Water System.
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| Page 4-32
| |
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| During normal operation, water is supplied through the circulating water intake pipes from the lake to the pumps suction well located in the screenhouse.
| |
| The Essential Service Water System can remove the heat transferred to the Component Cooling Water System from both.
| |
| units, plus the heat loads of the emergency diesel generator engine coolers (i.e., the air aftercoolers, lubricating oil cooler, and jacket water cooler), " the Control Room air conditioner condensers, and provide make-up flow to the turbine-and motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
| |
| Essential Service Water Pum s Four pumps are installed in the center portion of the screenhouse. The pumps are vertical turbine pumps with enclosed shafts. Grease-lubricated line bearings eliminate the need for external water lubrication. Two pumps serve each one of the two main supply headers. No more than three of these pumps are required in any given circumstances to provide necessary flexibility of operation for both units. Two operable pumps are sufficient to carry the heat removal duties of two units at hot or cold shutdown simultaneously (at minimum cooldown rate).
| |
| Local manual operation of motor-operated valves is credited post-fire.
| |
| 4.4.8 Emer enc Power S stem The plant Emergency Power System (EPS) includes an on-site, independent, automatically or manually starting emergency power source that supplies power to essential safe shutdown equipment if the normal off-site power sources are unavailable.
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| Page 4-33
| |
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| The emergency power source for each unit consists of two 4l60V, 3500 kW diesel generators. Each diesel engine is equipped with it4 own auxiliaries. These include starting air, fuel oil, lube oil, cooling water, intake and exhaust system, speed (RPM) regulator and controls. Cooling water is provided from the Essential Service Water Systems while electric power for each engine's auxiliaries is provided by its own generator.
| |
| Cranking power for each diesel is supplied from its respective high pressure starting air system. Energy for starting a diesel is derived from two air receivers each containing enough high pressure compressed air to provide for multiple starting sequences.
| |
| There are two diesel fuel oil storage tanks on site, physically separated from each other. The piping is arranged so that each storage tank supplies fuel to one emergency diesel generator in each unit while the other storage tank supplies fuel to the other emergency diesel generator in each uni't. Two fuel oil transfer pumps per diesel generator provide transfer capability from the storage tanks to the individual diesel generator day tanks.
| |
| The emergency power sources for the two units are similar and are electrically and physically isolated from one another, as are the diesel generator sets for each unit. Each diesel generator is capable of supplying ac power to one path of safe shutdown equipment with one supplying power to 4kV buses TllA and Page 4-34
| |
| | |
| TllB (T21A and T21B for Unit 2) and the other supplying power to T11C and T11D (T21C and T21D for Unit 2). The diesel generators supply power to 600V buses llA, llB, 11C, and llD through the 4160V buses T11A, TllB, TllC, and T11D, respectively.
| |
| Loss of voltage to the 4160V diesel buses above is sensed by undervoltage relays. Upon sensing, master relays automatically start the emergency generators, trip the normal feed circuit breakers for the 4160V diesel buses and trip all motor feeder breakers on the diesel buses, the 600V bus tie breaker, and all nonessential 600V motor feeder breakers. The emergency generator circuit breaker which connects the diesel generator output to the 4160/600V bus system is closed when rated voltage is obtained.
| |
| HVAC equipment is available to provide cooling for the rooms containing the diesel generators and other EPS support equipment.
| |
| Since the HVAC equipment and all associated power and control cabling is contained within these rooms, separation analysis of the HVAC system was not required.
| |
| 4160V Emer enc Power S stem Each 4160V diesel bus (T11A and TllB, TllC and T11D) is fed from a 4.16kV diesel generator to supply power to the engineered safety features and other necessary equipment in the event of a loss of off-site power. There are two diesel generators associated with each unit. Each diesel generator is connected to two 4160V buses, one to buses TllA and TllB and one to buses TllC and TllD. Upon loss of power to a 4160V diesel bus, the Page 4-35
| |
| | |
| associated diesel generator starts automatically or manually by operator action. The circuit breaker which normally'upplies power to that diesel bus from the main 4160V bus is tripped. A 4.16kV circuit breaker in each bus is automatically closed when its diesel generator is at speed and rated voltage and
| |
| .reenergizes the bus. The diesel generators will then supply all equipment which must operate under emergency conditions for the respective safeguard train.
| |
| Low Volta e Power S stem The 600V auxiliary system distributes power for all low voltage station service demands other than the pressurizer heaters. The normal source of power for the 600V system is the 4160V system buses via the 4160/600V transformers. The pressurizer heaters are fed from the 4160V system buses via their 4160/480V transformers and individual load centers and motor control centers. The pressurizers heaters can be connected to the diesels.
| |
| The switchgear is metal-clad with 250V dc operated air circuit breakers. The 4160/600V transformers are filled with nonflammable liquid. The 600V system is divided into six bus sections, four of which (llA, llB, 11C and llD) are safety buses, llA and 11B for one safety train and llC and 11D for the other.
| |
| The power source for each of these buses is 1500kVA, 4160/600V transformer whose primary is connected to buses TllA, TllB, TllC and TllD, respectively. Bus tie-breakers between buses llA and Page 4-36
| |
| | |
| llC and buses llB and llD are provided so that a 1500kVA transformer can feed two adjacent 600V buses, should 'one of the transformers fail. Upon signal to start the diesel generators, the 600V bus tie breakers are opened automatically. The bus tie breakers and 600V source breakers are interlocked to eliminate the possibility of inadvertent parallel operation of diesels. A similar 600V system is provided for Unit 2.
| |
| Two 480V buses, llPHA and llPHC, are fed from two of the 4.16kV buses, TllA and TllD respectively, via two 1000kVA, 4160/480V transformers. These buses supply power to the pressurizer heater loads. An identical 480V system is provided for Unit 2.
| |
| 120V AC Vital Instrument Bus S stem The 120V ac Vital Instrument Bus System consists of four separate vital buses per unit which are supplied by four independent 5.0kVa, single-phase static inverters. Two of the inverters are connected to one of the unit batteries, the other two are connected to the second battery in the same unit. The input to each inverter is from a 600V motor control center, or a D
| |
| 250V unit battery.
| |
| The output of each inverter is connected to a distribution C
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| cabinet through a normally closed circuit breaker. The distribution cabinets supply all of the required normal safe shutdown instrument channels. Alternative shutdown (LSI)
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| Page 4-37
| |
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| instrumentation is fed directly from 120V ac distribution cabinets in either the fire-affected or unaffected unit.
| |
| 250V DC S stem The 250V dc system supplies power for operation of switchgear, vital bus inverters, power-operated valves and Control Room emergency lighting. The battery system for each unit consists of two separately located sets of lead acid cells.
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| Each cell battery has its own active normal charger and a wired standby charger. Following a loss of unit normal power, the battery chargers are energized from the emergency diesel generators.
| |
| The battery distribution switchboard consists of several metal-clad structures, each with a 250V dc, two-wire ungrounded main bus, and two-pole manually-operated fused disconnecting switches.
| |
| During normal operation the 250V dc load is fed from the battery chargers, with the batteries floating on the system.
| |
| Upon loss of ac power, the entire dc load is drawn from the batteries. The loads powered from the battery include the diesel generator circuits, 4kV switchgear, 600V and 480V load centers, electrically-operated valves, Control Room emergency lighting and 3
| |
| vital bus inverters. The batteries are sized for three hours of operation after a loss of ac power, predicated upon the Page 4-38
| |
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| continuous operation of all dc emergency equipment. However, upon start-up of the emergency diesel generator, the battery chargers are energized to take over the load and recharge their associated battery.
| |
| All direct current loads associated with engineered safeguards equipment are fully redundant. These loads are arranged so that one battery supplies each redundant function.
| |
| A circuit is provided to cross-tie the AB a'nd CD train plant batteries and loads on each unit. This circuit has redundant isolating switches, one at each point of connection to the two battery systems. Under normal conditions, both of these switches are kept open and the circuit deenergized.
| |
| The trip and close coils for the 4kV, 600V and 480V breakers are electrically independent of one another and must be energized to operate. The breakers will not change position if control power is lost.
| |
| 250V DC Batter N S stem The 250V dc N train battery supplies power for the operation of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDFP). This battery system (per unit) consists of one battery (one set of lead acid cells) and two battery chargers, each supplied from a separate safety train ac bus. This N battery is physically and electrically isolated from the other unit batteries.
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| The battery distribution switchboard consists of one metal-clad structure with a 250V dc, two-wire ungrounded main bus, and two-pole manually-operated fused disconnecting switches.
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| Page 4-39
| |
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| During normal operation, the 250V dc load is fed from one of the battery chargers, with the .battery floating on the system.
| |
| Upon loss of station ac power, the entire dc load is drawn from the battery. The majority of the load consists of the electrically-operated auxiliary feedwater valves serving the steam generators from the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump system, and the steam .admission valve to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The auxiliary feedwater to steam generator valves are normally open and the TDFP trip and throttle valve is energized to open. The remaining load consists of the auxiliary feedwater turbine control bus. The AFW turbine control bus encompasses the AFW turbine start and trip circuits, the overspeed monitor, the test valve, and the emergency leak-off valve. The battery is sized to allow anticipated operation of the valves and their control circuits with the battery chargers and backup feed circuits deenergized. The battery is capable of serving the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump for as long as the steam supply to the turbine is available.
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| 4.5 Identification of Safe Shutdown S stem Com onents Subsection 4.4 described the specific systems which will be used to achieve safe shutdown. This subsection discusses the method of selection of safe shutdown components at D.C. Cook.
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| For each system, plant flow diagram (hereafter referred to as PEIDs, also refer to Figures 4.6 through 4.19.2) system descriptions, and one-line diagrams (refer to Figures 4.20 Page 4-40
| |
| | |
| through 4.23) were used to identify the precise primary flow paths and operational characteristics that must be established to accomplish the desired safe shutdown function. From this information, a list was compiled of the components which participate in the system's performance of its safe shutdown function. These components are:
| |
| (1) Active components that need to be powered to establish, or assist in establishing, the primary flow path and/or the system's operation.
| |
| 4 (2) Active components in the primary flow path that normally are in the proper position whose power loss will not result in a change of position, but may be affected by open, short or ground faults in control or power cabling.
| |
| (3) Power-operated components that need to change position to establish or assist in establishing the primary flow path, whose loss of electrical or air supplies result in the component adopting the required safe shutdown position but which may be affected by open, short or ground faults in control or power cabling.
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| (4) Major mechanical components that support safe shutdown (heat exchangers and storage tanks).
| |
| From the analysis of the safe shutdown system flow paths, those components whose spurious operation would threaten safe shutdown system operability were also identified (see Table 4-3).
| |
| This identification included those branch flow paths that must be isolated and remain isolated to assure that flow will not be substantially diverted from the primary flow path. See Subsection 4.7 for the detailed discussion of spurious operations.
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| Page 4-41
| |
| | |
| A list was generated for safe shutdown devices including device identification, normal operating status, operating requirements for the various shutdown stages (hot standby, hot shutdown and cold shutdown), required supporting services, and plant locat'ion.
| |
| This safe shutdown equipment list for D.C. Cook contains the minimum amount of equipment necessary to safely shut down the units. For reasons of operational flexibility and to further l1 enhance the conservatisms of this analysis, paths such as injection through the boron injection tank (BIT) and thermal barrier coolers for the reactor coolant pumps were identified in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Optional components are not considered safe shutdown. and, therefore, are not included in the safe shutdown component list of this report or in the computerized Safe Shutdown System Analysis report. However, the optional components associated with the BIT flow path are, included as safe shutdown components.
| |
| The final safe shutdown component list developed for D.C.
| |
| Cook Units l and 2 includes the minimum components required to protect the safe shutdown capability from the exposure fire damage postulated in Appendix R. These lists are provided as Table 4-l for Unit l equipment and Table 4-2 for Unit 2 equipment.
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| Page 4-42
| |
| | |
| 4.6 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables The computer database developed during the D.C. Cook safe shutdown system analysis (see previous section) was the basic input for the identification of electrical circuits essential to ensure an adequate equipment performance. All the electrically-dependent devices in Table 4-'1 were used to identify the corresponding safe shutdown electrical circuits, except for those motor-operated valves for which manual operation was assumed during long-term cooldown (RHR, etc.). The circuits identified included. power (4160V ac, 600V ac, 480V ac and 250V dc), control (220V ac, 120V ac and 250V dc) and instrumentation.
| |
| The identification and analysis of the above essential electrical circuits were based on one-line diagrams, elementary circuit drawings, and cable block diagrams from which the necessary circuit cables were selected for the later phase of cable routing and separation analysis.
| |
| For each electrical circuit, all circuit cables that ensure operability with no detrimental failure of each component were identified as required for safe shutdown. The exceptions to the above criteria included annunciator, computer, motor stator
| |
| , heaters and external monitoring circuits that are electrically isolated form the electrical circuits of concern.
| |
| The D.C. Cook conduit and'able raceway schedules were then used to identify the individual cable physical routings. A computer data was developed to contain all essential cables and Page 4-43
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| their associated routings. For each safe shutdown system, a package was also developed that contained the following information:
| |
| (1) Safe shutdown component datasheet (2) Mark-up of cable block diagrams with identified essential cables (3) Database output with cable routing information This routing information was extracted and used to color-code and identify the approximate location of these cables on electrical cable tray and conduit layout drawings, by system and by fire areas (see Section 4.8).
| |
| 4.7 Associated Circuits of Concern 4.7.1 Introduction The separation of protection requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R apply not only to safe shutdown circuits but also to "associated" circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation of shutdown systems and equipment. The identification of these associated circuits of concern was ih performed for D.C. Cook in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 81-12 and the Staff's Clarification to the Generic Letter. The latter further defined these associated circuits of concern as those which have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, and have one of the following:
| |
| (1) A common power source with the shutdown equipment and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices; Page 4-44
| |
| | |
| (2) A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability; (3) A common enclosure with the shutdown cables, and, (a) are. not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (b) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.
| |
| 4.7.2 Identification of Associated Circuits of Common Power Su 1 and Common Enclosures The electrical distribution system was reviewed to assure that acceptable coordination and selective tripping is provided for all circuits on the Emergency Power System. The review was limited to the EPS since there is no equipment powered from the balance of plant distribution systems which is required for, or whose loss of power could prevent, safe shutdown.
| |
| The Emergency Power System consists of:
| |
| (1) 4160V ac switchgear.
| |
| (2) 600V ac load centers and motor control centers (3) 480V ac load centers and motor control centers for the pressurizer backup heaters (4) 120V ac vital instrumentation buses (5) 250V dc distribution buses.
| |
| Electrical circuit fault protection was originally designed to provide protection for plant electric circuits via protective relaying, circuit breakers and fuses. This protective equipment was designed and applied to ensure adequate protection of all electrical distribution equipment, including cables, from Page 4-45
| |
| | |
| electric faults and overload conditions in the circuits. The selection and application of these devices was in accordance with the American Electric Power design practices. The use of these design practices assures that, for electric fault and overloads, cables have a level of protection which prevents degradation beyond that which would be experienced by continuous operation of these cables at their rated current value. The operation of these protective devices, by limiting cable damage, also prevents the occurrence of cable faults which could cause ignition of 4
| |
| these cables.
| |
| An integral p'art of the original electrical system protection was the proper coordination of all these devices.
| |
| Such coordination assures that the protective device nearest (in an elec'trical sense) to the fault operates prior to the operation of any "upstream" protective devices, and provides interr'uption of electrical service to a minimum amount of equipment. The original electrical protection design at D.C. Cook required coordination of such electrical protective devices.
| |
| These original D.C. Cook electrical design practices provided confidence that no associated circuits of concern by common power supply or by common enclosure Type l exist at D.C.
| |
| Cook. As an additional check, a review was conducted of the existing electrical protection and coordination at D.C. Cook for the safe shutdown power supplies. As expected, most of the circuit protective devices reviewed had been properly selected Page 4-46
| |
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| and were coordinated. Design changes have been initiated to correct the few remaining deficiencies identified during the review.
| |
| For associated circuits of concern by common enclosure Type 2, the design of the fire pro'tection features at D.C. Cook ensures that no such circuits exist. Associated circuits of concern that occur as intervening combustibles are resolved by one or both of the following methods:
| |
| (1) Use of nonpropagating cable jacket materials (2) Use of fire stops at appropriate cable tray sections to prevent damage to hot shutdown system cables 4.7.3 S urious 0 eration Anal sis Cables that are not part of safe shutdown circuits may be damaged by the effects of postulated fires. This cable damage may consequently prevent the correct operation of safe shutdown components, or result in the maloperation of equipment which would directly prevent the proper performance of the safe shutdown systems.
| |
| The effects of spurious operations may be conceptually divided into two subclasses as follows:
| |
| (1) Maloperation of safe shutdown equipment due to control circuit electrical interlocks between safe shutdown circuits and other circuits; for example, the numerous pressurizer heater automatic operation interlocks from process control and instrument circuits (2) Maloperation of equipment that is not defined as part of the safe shutdown systems, but that could prevent the accomplishment of a shutdown safety function; for example, inadvertent depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System or the Main Steam System by spurious opening of boundary valves Page 4-47
| |
| | |
| For Subclass I, a detailed review of all safe shutdown circuit elementaries was performed and all interlocks to other circuits were identified. A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was performed to determine if maloperation of these interlocks (inadvertent opening of closed contacts or closing of open contacts) would prevent the proper operation of the safe shutdown equipment. If such a condition could occur, the safe shutdown circuit and the maloperating interlock were identified.
| |
| For Subclass 2, a system engineering review was performed on.
| |
| plant system and equipment that were not part of safe shutdown systems to determine which of these components had the potential to defeat safety functions by their spurious operation. These components, their normal and their unacceptable operating states, along with their associated control circuits, were identified and tabulated. A FMEA was performed for cables of these circuits to determine if conductor-to-conductor shorts, conductor open circuits or conductor grounds could result in 'a component transition to an unacceptable state. If such a condition could not occur, the component was removed from the potential list.
| |
| The above exercise results in a list of potential spurious operation candidates for which a resolution was required to protect safe shutdown capability.
| |
| For the purpose of conducting these analyses, the loss of instrument air or off-site power was assumed only for those cases where such a loss could cause unacceptable consequences.
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| Page 4-48
| |
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| Alternatively, if the existence of instrument air or off-site power resulted in unacceptable consequences, then these were assumed available.
| |
| The results of these analyses were tabulated and resolution was achieved by:
| |
| (1) Providing a means to isolate the equipment when not normally needed (e.g., remove power cables, open circuit breakers), or (2) Providing a means to detect spurious operations and then undertaking procedures to defeat the maloperation of equipment (e.g., opening of breakers to remove spurious operation, actuation of a master switch, etc.).
| |
| For these potential spurious circuits or components, resolutions are shown in Table 4-3 and, to the extent necessary, will be incorporated into operating procedures.
| |
| For the purpose of conducting these spurious operation analyses, the loss of instrument air or off-site power was assumed where such a loss could cause unacceptable consequences.
| |
| Alternatively, if the existence of instrument air or off-site power results in unacceptable consequences, then they were assumed available.
| |
| In order for cable faults that generate spurious operation to occur, various conditions must exist synergistically at the cable fault location:
| |
| (l) Sufficient energy must exist due to the fire to create failure of the cable jacket and insulating material.
| |
| (2) The failure of the jacket and insulating material must occur in a way that directly exposes the cable conductors.
| |
| Page 4-49
| |
| | |
| (3) For each short, two or more specific conductors must come into direct contact causing low impedence conductor-to-conductor connections.
| |
| (4) For certain types of spurious operation, multiple electrically independent shorts must occur.
| |
| (5) No additional conductors that would cause circuit fault currents and operation of circuit protective devices may participate in the short condition.
| |
| (6) No ground faults that would cause operation of circuit protective devices must occur.
| |
| The spurious operation analysis performed for Donald C. Cook recognized the extremely low probability of certain types of these faulted conditions. The following cable short conditions causing spurious operation were considered of sufficiently low likelihood that they were assumed not to require additional analysis or modification:
| |
| CASE l) Three phase-ac power circuit cable-to-cable faults (4 kV, 600V and 480V)
| |
| CASE 2) Two wire ungrounded-dc power circuit cable-to-cable faults (250V)
| |
| CASE 3) Two wire ungrounded-dc control circuit cable-to-cable faults (250V)
| |
| CASE 4) Single phase ungrounded-ac control circuit cable-to-cable faults (220V)
| |
| With respect to Cases 1) and 2), no conductor-to-conductor faults within the same power cable can cause spurious powering of the associated device. Only power cable-to-cable connections between one deenergized and one energized power circuit could permit operation. For the 'ase of the three-phase-ac circuit, Page 4-50
| |
| | |
| three electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts must occur without grounds in order to power the associated device.
| |
| Similarly, for the two-wire ungrounded dc power circuit, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur. The likelihood of such occurrences has been acknowledged by the NRC Staff to be sufficiently low to permit excluding such faulted conditions from consideration (Federal Register Vol. 48, No. 86 at 19963).
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| The fundamental basis for excluding such shorts from consideration is based on the need to provide multiple cable-to-cable electrically independent faults in order for spurious operation to occur. With respect to Cases 3) and 4), Indiana and Michigan Electric Company has excluded such cable-to-cable faults causing spurious operation based on similar technical considerations.
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| Concerning Case 3), all dc control circuits at D.C. Cook are ungrounded. In order for spurious operation to occur, due to circuit-to-circuit faults between dc, circuits supplied from different sources, at a minimum, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts without grounds must occur. This is identical to the type of shorted conditions discussed in Case 2).
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| Furthermore, the same condition, two independent cable-to-cable shorts, must occur even for those dc circuits supplied from the same source. This is due to the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company design standard that, in general, requires that Page .4-51
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| the control switch and relay contacts "double break" the positive and negative control leads for components whose spurious operation could affect safe shutdown (e.g., solenoid and motor-operated valves) (see Figure 4.34). The implementation of this.
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| design standard for these control circuits (250V dc and 220V ac) at Donald C. Cook prevents single cable-to-cable faults from initiating spurious operation.
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| For the ungrounded ac control circuits in Case 4), the identical consideration exists. MCC transformer secondary 220V ac control circuits are ungrounded. Therefore, at a minimum, two cable-to-cable shorts must simultaneously occur in order for spurious operation to result for circuits supplied from different sources. In addition, for circuits supplied from the same source', the "double break" Indiana and Michigan Electric Company design standard would require two cable-to-cable independent shorts to occur prior to device spurious operation.
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| The control circuit cable construction at D.C. Cook further decreases the probability of any cable-to-cable faults due to the extensive use of asbestos-jacketed control cable. Asbestos-braided cable jacketing prevents the intimate conductor-to-conductor contact required for hot shorts because the jacketing retains its physical integrity for the full spectrum of exposure fires postulated. In those installations where asbestos jacketed cable is not used, only IEEE-383 qualified cable exists. These cabling jacket compounds, although not as structurally impervious Page, 4-52
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| to fire effects as asbestos, have extremely high softening temperatures and are not prone to the conductor breakthrough phenomena that occur with lower temperature jacket materials such as PVC.
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| 4.7.4 Su lementar Information Related to Table 4-3 This section provides supplementary information related to Table 4-3, "Potential Spurious Malfunctions That Could Affect Safe Shutdown Resolution Statements Concerning Procedural Detection and Termination."
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| The concepts of procedural detection and isolation were used in the Resolution column of Table 4-3 to represent the fact that safe shutdown procedures would contain sufficient information to permit plant operating personnel to:
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| (1) Assess the performance of safe shutdown functions using the safe shutdown instrumentation available (2) Identify on a component basis those components whose spurious operation could be causing the safe shutdown instrumentation off-normal indications (3) Identify on a component basis the specific operator actions, that could be taken to mitigate the consequences of the component's spurious operation The components in Table 4-3 whose resolution requires post-fire operator action can be segregated into five general categories. These are listed below.
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| Category 1: Potential S urious 0 erations That Must Be Resolved for Cold Shutdown Onl The components in this category are ILS-950, ILS-951, IM0-330,'M0-331, IM0-340, IM0-350, ICM-305, and ICM-306. For these components, operator .verification of appropriate system Page 4-53
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| alignment and component availability will be procedurally required prior to cold shutdown initiations.
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| Category 2: Com onents That Permit Letdown from the Reactor Coolant S stem These components include QRV-ill, QRV-112, QRV-160, QRV-161, QRV 162 g QRV 1 13 / QRV 1 14 QRV 170 'RV 151 NRV 152/ NRV 153 NSO-021 through NS0-064. Spurious operation of selected combinations of these components may cause sufficient uncontrolled letdown to impact the ability of the CVCS charging pumps (150 gpm each) to provide adequate makeup to the Reactor Coolant System. Monitoring of pressurizer level instrumentation will provide the operator with sufficient primary information to determine that spurious operation is causing uncontrolled letdown in excess of available charging flow. Based on this and other backup information that will likely be available, operators will be procedurally directed to initiate certain actions including systematically verifying and isolating all potential letdown paths.
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| Category 3: Corn onents That Ma Im act CVCS Makeu The only components in this category when the BIT injection line is utilized are IRV-251 and IRV-252. The instrumentation to be used and the actions to be taken for these valves are identical to those discussed in Category 2.
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| Page 4-54
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| Category 4: Com onents That Affect Maintenance of RCS Pressure Components in this category are QRV-51, LV-459C and LV-460D. 1 Spurious operation of these components will be detected by monitoring pressurizer presure, pressurizer level and reactor 0
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| coolant system temperature instrumentation. This instrumentation will provide information to indicate that, via spurious operation of the auxiliary spray line valve or lack of pressurizer heaters, reactor coolant system pressure control may be impacted.
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| Procedures will identify the specific actions to be taken to ensure that, should pressure control be impacted, isolation of the auxiliary spray line or appropriate reenergization of the pressurizer heaters will occur.
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| 1LV-459C and D are the low pressurizer level interlocks in the heater control circuits. Pressurizer heaters are not required for safe shutdown. Heaters are considered only for operational flexibility.
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| 2Indiana and Michigan Electric Company wishes to note that spurious operation of the auxiliary spray line valve may impact safe shutdown only when the normal charging path is utilized to provide reactor coolant system makeup. This path is not credited as providing reactor coolant system makeup to achieve safe shutdown.
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| Page 4-55
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| Category 5: Com onents That Affect Heat Removal via the Steam Generators Components in this category are MRV-213, MRV-223, MRV-233 and MRV-243. Spurious opening of these components may result in an uncontrolled cooldown. Instrumentation available to detect excess cooldown includes steam generator pressure and level and reactor coolant system temperature and pressure. Should such excess cooldown occur, procedures will identify specific methods of isolating and controlling the operation of these valves.
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| 4.8 Identification of Safe Shutdown E ui ment, Cables and Racewa s within Fire Zone Boundaries The components and cables required for safe shutdown were identified by the processes described in the preceding sections.
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| The location of all SSS components by fire zone was identified and added to the Safe Shutdown Component List (Table 4-1).
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| The routing of each SSS cable was obtained from the D.C.
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| Cook Cable and Conduit Schedules. This information was programmed into a database concurrently with the fire zone location of every safe shutdown cable trough in the plant.
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| Individual cable routings were outputted with the fire zone location of all troughs that were applicable for each particular cable. The routing of all conduits was also identified by fire zone. The complete route of each SSS cable and all the fire zones each cable is in were thereby identified. Table 4-4 is an example of the type of printout developed.
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| Page 4-56
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| This database information was also sorted and printed out by system by fire zone, giving a complete listing of all SSS cables II and their raceways'ithin all plant fire zones.
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| An additional database was generated, identifying by division the equipment, troughs and conduit in each fire zone for every safe shutdown system. This list was the basis for determining which fire zones for each system required a detailed physical separation analysis.
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| The fire zones for each system which contain cables or equipment of different redundant divisions had all components and raceways (troughs and conduits) identified and were marked on the plant physical location drawings. Any zones that contain cables for both Unit l and Unit 2 had the components and raceways marked on the same set of physical location drawings so that the common effects of a single fire on both units would be readily apparent.
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| These marked-up physical location drawings were used to support the separation evaluation described in the subsequent section 4.9 Evaluation of the Se aration of Safe Shutdown S stem (SSS)
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| Com onents and Cables In order to complete an evaluation of the separation of SSS components and cables, safe shutdown functional block diagrams were developed. These diagrams are a functional representation of the P&ID for each of the safe shutdown systems and depicts all of the safe shutdown components. Typical block diagrams are provided as Figures 4.24 through 4.33.
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| Page 4-57
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| For each system and each fire zone, a functional block dia'gram was prepared. The location of SSS equipment was identified for every fire zone by a check in the proper box on the block diagram. The locations by fire zone of every cable for
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| .each component was also identified by a check on the appropriate block diagram for each fire zone.
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| In order to ensure that the loss of supporting systems would be properly identified (such as a loss of portions of the electrical power system affecting the required function provided by a component of another system), a third check was indicated for each component on the functional block diagram whenever a support system (e.g., power supply) for a component is unavailable due to a fire in that particular fire zone.
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| Using the functional block diagrams, the marked-up physical location drawings, the printouts of the components and cables in each fire zone, the fire detection and suppression by fire zone data, and various other plant documents, a detailed fire separation evaluation of each fire area and zone was completed.
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| Using the functional block diagrams, it was determined whether both redundant divisions were unavailable due to a fire within each fire area. If both redundant divisions are affected, the marked-up physical location drawings were used to determine the separation between the redundant components and/or cables.
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| This was done by fire area and zone for all safe shutdown systems.
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| Page 4-58
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| With the amount of separation identified and the existence (if any) of detection and suppression in the area, a method of compliance with Appendix R, Section III.G criteria was developed.
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| Any modifications that were required were documented.
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| 4.10 Ph sical Ins ections Physical inspections were done at the D.C. Cook site to verify the basis for the analysis performed. During these inspections, the safe shutdown component locations were verified to agree with the plant drawings and the component by fire zone list. The location of walls, wall openings and doors and the fire ratings of walls, penetrations, doors, dampers, etc., were noted. The presence of intervening combustible materials or fire t
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| hazards was determined. The location, type and quantity of fire detectors in each fire zone were recorded. The existence and type of fire suppression systems were noted.
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| A survey was made of the actual plant routings for raceway and was compared to the marked-up physical location'rawings and any discrepancies were corrected to the as-built arrangement.
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| The feasibility of any pr'oposed modifications was also checked and noted.
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| 4.11 Identification of Areas of Conformance/Nonconformance with A endix R, Section III.G The results of the detailed separation analyses described in the preceding sections indicate:
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| (1) The fire zones that meet the criteria of Appendix R, Section III.G, Page 4-59
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| (2) The fire zones requiring modifications to meet the criteria (3) The fire zones that incorporate equivalent protection and for which exemptions are requested A summary of the results of that analysis are documented in Table 1-1 of Section l.
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| Page 4-60
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK ,UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES REFUELING WATER STORAGE -YARD TK-33'CM-250 TANK BIT OUTLET ISOLATION MOV 38 AM-D ICM-251 BIT OUTLET ISOLATION MOV 38 AZV-A IMO-255 BIT INLET ISOLATION MOV 38 AM-D IMO-256 BIT INLET ISOLATION MOV 38 AZV-A TK-ll BORON INJECTION TANK 38 IMO-910 RWST TO CC PUMPS ISO MOV 62A AM-D QRV-251 CHARGING FLOW CONTROL AOV 62A CRID-III IMO-911 RWST TO CC PUMPS ISO MOV 62B AZV-A PP-50E CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP E 62B TllD MCCD'P-50E(LO)
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| CC PUMP E LUBE OIL PUMP 62B AB-D PP-50W CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP W 62C TllA MCAB PP-50W(LO) CC PUMP W LUBE OIL PUMP 62C AB-A IMO-51 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 66 EZC-C IMO-52 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 66 EZC-B IMO-53 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 66 EZC-D IMO-54 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 66 EZC-A CS-534 BIT INJ FROM CHG PUMP 62C CROSS-TIE HEADER PAGE 1 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *"* CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES CS-535 SEAL INJECTION FROM CHG 62C PUMP CROSS-TIE HEADER CS-536 CHG PUMP DISCHG TO 62C CROSS-TIE HEADER QMO-200 NORMAL CHARGING ISO 62A AM-D QMO-201 NORMAL CHARGING ISO 62A AZV-A QMO-451 VCT TO CHG PUMP ISO 44N AM-D QMO-452 VCT TO CHG PUMP ISO 44N AZV-A PAGE 2 OF 17
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| ~ i AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES N31 SOURCE RANGE MONITORING 103 CRID-I CHANNEL N32 SOURCE RANGE MONITORING 103 CRID-II CHANNEL NLI-151 PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL 122 CRID-IV ELSC NLP-151 PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL 122 CRID-I NLP-152 PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL 122 CRID-II NLP-153 PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL 122 CRID-III LSI-3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION ELSC NPS-121 RCS PRESSURE (W. RANGE) 66 CRID-II NPS-122 RCS PRESSURE (W. RANGE) 66 CRID-III ELSC NTR-110 LOOP 1 TH TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-III NTR-120 LOOP 2 TH TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-I NTR-130 LOOP 3 TH TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-II NTR-140 LOOP 4 TH TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-I PAGE 3 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES NTR-210 LOOP 1 TC TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-II NTR-220 LOOP 2 TC TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-II NTR-230 LOOP 3 TC TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-II NTR-240 LOOP 4 TC TEMPERATURE 67 CRID-II SV-45A PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE 67 SV-45B PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE 67 SV-45C PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE 67 LSI-5 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 33 ELSC LSI-6 LOCAL-SHUTDOWN STATION 12 ELSC PAGE 4 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** MAIN STEAM SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES MCM-221 STEAM SUPPLY (SG 2) TO PP-4 108 AM-A MCM-231 STEAM SUPPLY (SG 3) TO PP-4 108 AM-D MPP-220 SG2 PRESSURE 108 CRID-I MPP-221 SG2 PRESSURE 108 CRID-II MPP-222 SG2 PRESSURE 108 CRID-III MPP-230 SG3 PRESSURE 108 CRID-I MPP-231 SG3 PRESSURE 108 CRID-II MPP-232 SG3 PRESSURE 108 CRID-III MRV-223 SG 2 POWER OPERATED 108 CRID-II ATMOSPH RELIEF VALVE MRV-233 SG 3 POWER OPERATED 108 CRID-II ATMOSPH RELIEF VALVE SV-1 SG 2&3 SAFETY VALVES 108 SV-2 SG 263 SAFETY VALVES 108 SV-3 SG 263 SAFETY VALVES 108 MPP-210 SG1 PRESSURE 33 CRID-I MPP-211 SG1 PRESSURE 33 CRID-II MPP-212 SG1 PRESSURE 33 CRID-IV MPP-240 SG4 PRESSURE 33 CRID-I MPP-241 SG4 PRESSURE 33 CRID-II MPP-242 SG4 PRESSURE 33 CRID-IV PAGE 5 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** MAIN STEAM SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES MRV-213 SG 1 POWER OPERATED ATMOSPH 33 CRID-I RELIEF VALVE MRV-243 SG 4 POWER OPERATED ATMOSPH 33 CRID-I RELIEF VALVE SV-1 SG 1,4 SAFETY VALVES 33 SV-2 SG 1 i 4 SAFETY VALVES 33 SV-3 SG 1,4 SAFETY VALVES 33 MRV-210 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 33 MRV-220 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 108 MRV-230 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 108 MRV-240 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 33 MRV-211 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 33 CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-212 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 33 CCV-AB DUMP VALVE MRV-221 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 108 CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-222 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 108 CCV-AB DUMP VALVE MRV-231 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 108 CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-232 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 108 CCV-AB DUMP VALVE MRV-241 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 33 CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-242 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 33 CCV-AB DUMP VALVE PAGE 6 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES BLP-122 SG 2 WATER LEVEL 101 CRID-III (N. RANGE)
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| BLP-132 SG 3 WATER LEVEL 101 CRID-III (N. RANGE)
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| FMO-221 SG 2 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) 12 ABN FMO-222 SG 2 SUPLY MOV (PP-3E) 12 EZC-D FMO-231 SG 3 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) 12 ABN FMO-232 SG 3 SUPPLY MOV (PP-3E) 12 EZC-D LSI-2 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 12 ELSC BLP-112 SG 1 WATER LEVEL 120 CRID-III (N. RANGE)
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| BLP-142 SG 4 WATER LEVEL 120 CRID-III (N. RANGE)
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| FRV-247 EMERGENCY LEAK-OFF AOV 17A ELSC (PP-3W)
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| PP-3W MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY 17A TllA MCAB FEED PUMP W FRV-257 EMERGENCY LEAK-OFF AOV 17D AFW (PP-3E)
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| PP-3E MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY 17D TllD MCCD FEED PUMP E FRV-258 EMERGENCY LEAK-OFF AOV 17E DCN (PP-4)
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| PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY 17E DCN FEED PUMP PAGE 7 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS "** AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES PP-4/T-T PP-4-TRIP 6 THROTTLE MOV 17E ABN FMO-211 SG 1 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) 33 ABN FMO-212 SG 1 SUPPLY MOV FROM (PP-3W) 33 AZV-A FMO-241 SG 4 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) 33 ABN FMO-242 SG 4 SUPPLY MOV (PP-3W) 33 AZV-A LSI-1 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 33 ELSC TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK YARD BLI-110 SG 1 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV ELSC BLI-120 SG 2 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV ELSC BLI-130 SG 3 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV ELSC BLI-140 SG 4 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV ELSC BLP-110 SG 1 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV BLP-111 SG 1 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRID-II BLP-120 SG 2 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV BLP-121 SG 2 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRI D- I BLP-130 SG 3 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV BLP-131 SG 3 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRID-I BLP-140 SG 4 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRID-IV BLP-141 SG 4 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 66 CRID-II F
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| CRV-51 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK 17C CROSS-TIE .
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| PAGE 8 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS "** AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES ESW-109 SW SUPPLY TO MOTOR DRIVEN 17D AFW PUMP 1E ESW-115 SW SUPPLY TO TURBINE DRIVEN 17E AFW PUMP TD ESW-243 SW SUPPLY TO MOTOR DRIVEN 17A AFW PUMP 1W FW-129 AFW CROSS-TIE 17D LSI-4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 5 ELSC PAGE 9 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS **" COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES CMO-410 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET 44N AM-D MOV CMO-415 CCW COMMON SERVICE HEADER 44N AM-D ISO MOV CMO-416 CCW COMON SERVICE HEADER 44N AM-A ISO MOV CMO-419 CCW TO RHR HX ISO MOV 44N AM-D CMO-420 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET 44N AM-A MOV HE-15E CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 44S HE-15W CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 44S PP-10E COMPONENT COOLING PUMP E T11D MCCD PP-10W COMPONENT COOLING PUMP W 44S T11A MCAB CMO-429 CCW TO RHR HX ISO MOV 52 CCW-167 WEST CCW SUCTION CROSS-TIE 44S CCW-172 EAST CCW SUCTION CROSS-TIE 44S 1-CCW-173 WEST, CCW DISCHARGE 44S CROSS-TIE 1-CCW-214 WEST SURGE TANK,ISOLATION 69 VALVE 1-CCW-220 EAST SURGE TANK ISOLATION 69 VALVE 1-CCW-256 WEST CCW SUCTION CROSS-TIE 44S PAGE 10 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES WMO-705 ESW HEADER CROSS-TIE MOV 112 ABD-A WMO-707 ESW HEADER CROSS-TIE MOV 112 ABD-D WMO-721 ESW SUPPLY TO DGAB 114 ABD-A WMO-725 ESW SUPPLY TO DGCD 114 ABD-D WMO-744 ALTER MAKEUP TO PP-3W 17A MAN OPER WMO-754 ALTER MAKEUP TO PP-3E 17D MAN OPER WMO-753 ALTER MAKEUP TO PP-4 17E MAN OPER ESWSE ESW PUMP 1E STRAINER 29A PS-D PP-7E ESW PUMP 29A TllD MCCD WMO-701 ESW PUMP DISCHARGE ISO MOV 29A PS-D ESWSW ESW PUMP 1W STRAINER 29B PS-A PP-7W ESW PUMP 29B T11A MCAB WMO-702 ESW PUMP DISCHARGE ISO MOV 29B PS-A WMO-731 ESW TO CCW HX INLET MOV 44N AM-D WMO-733 ESW TO CCW HX OUTLET MOV 44N AM-D WMO-735 ESW TO CCW HX INLET MOV 44N AZV-A WMO-737 ESW TO CCW HX OUTLET MOV 44N AZV-A PAGE 11 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES IMO-310 RHR PUMP SUCTION ISO MOV 1C ABV-D PP-35E RHR PUMP E 1C TllD MCCD IMO-320 RHR PUMP SUCTION ISO MOV 1D ABV-A PP-35W RHR PUMP W lD TllA MCAB IMO-312 RHR PUMP MINIMUM FLOW MOV 44C AM-D IMO-314 RHR PUMPS CROSS-TIE MOV 44C ABV-D IRV-310 RHR HX FLOW CONTROL AOV 44C CRID-II IRV-311 RHR HX BYPASS FLOW 44C CRID-II CONTROL AOV HE-17E RHR HEAT EXCHANGER RH-117 ,
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| RHR ISO MANUAL VALVE (LC) 44C MAN OPER RH-128E RHR ISO MANUAL VALVE (LC) 44C MAN OPER IMO-322 RHR PUMP MINIMUM FLOW MOV 44D AM-A IMO-324 RHR PUMPS CROSS-TIE MOV 44D AZV-A IRV-320 RHR HX FLOW CONTROL AOV 44D CRID-III HE-17W RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 44D RH-128W RHR ISO MANUAL VALVE (LC) 44D MAN OPER ICM-111 RHR OUTLET ISO MOV 66 EZC-C ICM-129 RHR INLET ISO MOV 66 EZC-C IMO-128 RHR INLET ISO MOV 67 EZC-B PAGE 12 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS **" RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES IMO-110 SI ACCUMULATOR ISO MOV 66 EZC-C IMO-120 SI ACCUMULATOR ISO MOV 66 EZC-B IMO-130 SI ACCUMULATOR ISO MOV 66 EZC-D IMO-140 SI ACCUMULATOR ISO MOV 66 EZC-A PAGE 13 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES'/A TK-47 DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE YARD TANK CD 6 AB BN 250 VDC TRN BATTERY 106 1CD1 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER 13 ABD-C PUMP 1CD2 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER 13 ABD-D PUMP ABD-C MCC 1-ABD-C 15 11C ABD-D MCC 1-ABD-D 15 11D CDl JACKET WATER PUMP 15 ABD-D CD2 JACKET WATER PUMP 15, ABD-C DGCD DIESEL GENERATOR CD 15 TDCD MCCD ABl JACKET WATER PUMP 16 ABD-A AB2 JACKET WATER PUMP 16 ABD-B ABD-A MCC 1-ABD-A 16 11A ABD-B MCC 1-ABD-B 16 11B DGAB DIESEL GENERATOR AB TDAB MCAB PAGE 14 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES ELSC 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION 16 ABD-B PNL 1-ELSC 1ABl DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER 21 ABD-B PUMP lAB2 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER 21 ABD-A PUMP PS-A MCC 1-PS-A 29E AB-A PS-D MCC 1-PS-D 29E AB-D TllA 4KV BUS T11A 40A DGAB MCAB T11B 4KV BUS T11B 40A DGAB MCAB Tllc 4KV BUS Tllc 40B DGCD MCCD TllD 4KV BUS T11D 40B DGCD MCCD 11B 600V BUS 11B 41 TRllB MCAB llD 600V BUS 11D 41 TR11D MCCD BCHAB1 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER 41 EZC-A 1-AB1 BCHAB2 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER 41 EZC-B 1-AB2 EZC-A MCC 1-EZC-A 11A EZC-B MCC 1-EZC-B 41 11B EZC-C MCC 1-EZC-C 41 11C EZC-D MCC 1-EZC-D 11D PAGE 15 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK , UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM .
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| COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES TRllB 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER 11B 41 TllB TRllD 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER llD TllD MCCD 11A 600V BUS 11A 42A TRllA MCAB
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| '1C 600V BUS 11C 42A TR11C MCCD CRID-I 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 53 EZC-C MCCD CRID-II 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 53 EZC-D MCCD CRID-III 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 53 EZC-A MCAB CRID-IV 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 53 EZC-B MCAB MCAB TRAIN B 250 VDC 42C TDAB DISTRIBUTION CABINET TDAB TRAIN B 250 VDC TRANSFER 42C AB,BCHAB1 BCHAB2 CABINET AB 250 VDC BATTERY AB 42D N/A AZV-A MCC 1-AZV-A 44N AB-A AM-A MCC 1-AM-A 52 llA AM-D MCC 1-AM-D llD DCN 250 VDC TRN BATTERY BN DISTR CAB 11AC BUS TIE BREAKER 42A MCAB 11BD BUS TIE BREAKER, 41 MCAB TRllA 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER 11A 42A TllA MCAB TR11C 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER llC 42A Tllc PAGE 16 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 1 TABLE 4-1 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES BCHCD1 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER EZC-D 1-CD1 BCHCD2 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER 55 EZC-C 1-CD2 CD 250 VDC BATTERY 1-CD N/A MCCD TRAIN A 250 VDC 55 TDCD DISTRIBUTION CABINET TDCD TRAIN A 250 VDC TRANSFER CD,BCHCD1 BCHCD2 I
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| CABINET AB-A MCC 1-AB-A 6N llA AB-D MCC 1-AB-D 6N llD ABN 250 VDC TRN BATTERY 6N DCN DISTR CAB PAGE 17 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES TK-33 REFUELING WATER STORAGE YARD TANK IMO-256 BIT INLET ISOLATION MOV 39 AZV-A IMO-255 BIT INLET ISOLATION MOV 39 AM-D ICM-250 BIT OUTLET ISOLATION MOV 39 AM-D ICM-251 BIT OUTLET ISOLATION MOV 39 AZV-A TK-ll BORON INJECTION TANK 39 QRV-251 CHARGING FLOW CONTROL AOV CRID-111 IMO-910 RWST TO CC PUMPS ISO MOV 63A AM-D PP-50E CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP E 63B T21D MCCD IMO-911 RWST TO CC PUMPS ISO MOV 63B AZV-A PP-50E(LO) CC PUMP E LUBE OIL PUMP 63B AB-D PP-50W CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP W 63C T21A MCAB PP-50W(LO) CC PUMP W LUBE OIL PUMP 63C AB-A IMO-51 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 74 EZC-C IMO-52 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 74 EZC-B IMO-53 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 74 EZC-D IMO-54 BIT INJECTION LINE MOV 74 EZC-A CS-534 BIT INJECTION FROM CHG 63C PUMP CROSS-TIE HEADER PAGE 1 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS """ CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES CS-535 SEAL INJECTION FROM CHG 63C PUMP CROSS-TIE HEADER CS-536 CHG PUMP DISCHG TO 63C CROSS-TIE HEADER QMO-200 NORMAL CHARGING ISO 63A AM-D QMO-201 NORMAL CHARGING ISO 63A AZV-A QMO-451 VCT TO CHG PUMP ISO 44S AM-D QMO-452 VCT TO CHG PUMP ISO 44S AZV-A PAGE 2 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES N31 SOURCE RANGE MONITORING 104 CRID-I CHANNEL N32 SOURCE RANGE MONITORING 104 CRID- I I CHANNEL NLP-151 PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL 123 CRID-I NLP-152 PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL 123 CRID-II NLP.-153 PRESSURIZER'WATER LEVEL 123 CRID-III NLI-151 PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL 123 CRID-IV ELSC LSI-3 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION ELSC NPS-121 RCS PRESSURE (W. RANGE) CRID-II NPS-122 RCS PRESSURE (W. RANGE) 74 CRID-III ELSC NTR-210 LOOP 1 TC TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-II NTR-220 LOOP 2 TC TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-II NTR-120 LOOP 2 TH TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-I NTR-130 LOOP 3 TH TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-II NTR-230 LOOP 3 TC TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-'II NTR-140 LOOP 4 TH TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-I NTR-240 LOOP 4 TC TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-II NTR-110 LOOP 1 TH TEMPERATURE 75 CRID-III PAGE 3 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES SV-45A PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE. 75 SV-45B PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE 75 SV-45C PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE 75 LSI-5 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 34 ELSC LSI-6 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 22 ELSC PAGE 4 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** MAIN STEAM SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES MRV-223 SG 2 POWER OPERATED 109 CRID-II ATMOSPH RELIEF VALVE MRV-233 SG 3 POWER OPERATED 109 CRID-II ATMOSPH RELIEF VALVE MCM-221 STEAM SUPPLY (SG 2) TO PP-4 109 AM-A MCM-231 STEAM SUPPLY (SG 3) TO PP-4 109 AM-D MPP-220 SG2 PRESSURE 109 CRID-I MPP-230 SG3 PRESSURE 109 CRID-I MPP-231 SG3 PRESSURE 109 CRID-II MPP-221 SG2 PRESSURE 109 CRID-II MPP-222 SG2 PRESSURE 109 CRID-III MPP-232 SG3 PRESSURE 109 CRID-III SV-1 SG 263 SAFETY VALVES 109 SV-2 SG 263 SAFETY VALVES 109 SV-3 SG 263 SAFETY VALVES 109 MPP-210 SG1 PRESSURE CRID-I MPP-240 SG4 PRESSURE CRID-I MPP-211 SG1 PRESSURE CRID-II MPP-241 SG4 PRESSURE 34 CRID-II MPP-212 SG1 PRESSURE 34 CRID-IV MPP-242 SG4 PRESSURE CRID-IV PAGE 5 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** MAIN STEAM SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES SV-1 SG 1,4 SAFETY VALVES 34 SV-2 SG 1,4 SAFETY VALVES 34 SV-3 SG 1,4 SAFETY VALVES 34 MRV-213 SG 1 POWER OPERATED ATMOSPH 34 CRID-I RELIEF VALVE MRV-243 SG 4 POWER OPERATED ATMOSPH 34 CRID-I RELIEF VALVE MRV-210 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE MRV-220 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 109 MRV-230 , MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 109 MRV-240 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE MRV-211 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 34 CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-212 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE CCV-AB DUMP VALVE MRV-221 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 109 CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-222 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 109 "CCV-AB DUMP VALVE MRV-231 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 109 CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-232 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE 109 CCV-AB DUMP VALVE MRV-241 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE CCV-CD DUMP VALVE MRV-242 MAIN STEAM STOP VALVE CCV-AB DUMP VALVE PAGE 6 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES TK-32 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK YARD BLP-122 SG 2 WATER LEVEL 102 CRID-III (N. RANGE)
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| BLP-132 SG 3 WATER LEVEL 102 CRID-III (N. RANGE)
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| BLP-112 SG 1 WATER LEVEL 121 (N. RANGE) CRID-III'RID-III BLP-142 SG 4 WATER LEVEL 121 (N. RANGE)
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| PP-3W MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY 17B T21A MCAB FEED PUMP W FRV-247 EMERGENCY LEAK-OFF AOV 17B ELSC (PP-3W)
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| PP-4 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY 17F DCN FEED PUMP PP-4/T-T PP-4-TRIP 6 THROTTLE MOV 17F ABN FRV-258 EMERGENCY LEAK-OFF AOV 17F DCN (PP-4) .
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| PP-3E MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY 17G T21D MCCD FEED PUMP E FRV-257 EMERGENCY LEAK-OFF AOV 17G AFW (PP-.3E)
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| LSI-2 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 22 ELSC FMO-221 SG 2 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) 22 ABN FMO-231 SG 3 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) 22 ABN PAGE 7 OF 17
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| AMERICAN .ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES FMO-222 SG 2 SUPPLY MOV (PP-3E) 22 EZC-D FMO-232 SG 3 SUPPLY MOV (PP-3E) 22 EZC-D LSI-1 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 34 ELSC FMO-211 SG 1 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) ABN FMO-241 SG 4 SUPPLY MOV (PP-4) 34 ABN FMO-212 SG 1 SUPPLY MOV FROM (PP-3W) 34 AZV-A FMO-242 SG 4 SUPPLY MOV (PP-3W) 34 AZV-A BLI-110 SG 1 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV ELSC BLI-120 SG 2 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV ELSC BLI-130 SG 2 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV ELSC BLI-140 SG 4 WATER LEVEL (W. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV ELSC BLP-110 SG 1 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV BLP-120 SG 2 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV BLP-130 SG 3 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV BLP-140 SG 4 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-IV BLP-141 SG 4 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-II BLP-131 SG 3 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-I BLP-121 SG 2 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-I BLP-111 SG 1 WATER LEVEL (N. RANGE) 74 CRID-II ESW-145 SW SUPPLY TO MOTOR DRIVEN 17G AFW PUMP 1E PAGE 8 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS "** AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES ESW-240 SW SUPPLY TO TURBINE DRIVEN 17F AFW PUMP ESW-243 SW SUPPL'Y TO MOTOR DRIVEN 17B AFW PUMP 1W FW-129 AFW CROSS-TIE 17G LSI-4 LOCAL SHUTDOWN STATION 5 ELSC PAGE 9 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES COMPONENT'MO-419 CCW TO'HR HX ISO MOV 44N AM-D PP-10E COMPONENT COOLING PUMP E 44S T21D MCCD PP-10W COMPONENT COOLING PUMP W 44S T21A MCAB CMO-410 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET 44S AM-D MOV CMO-420 CCW HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET 44S MOV CMO-415 CCW COMMON SERVICE HEADER 44S AM-D ISO MOV CMO-416 CCW COMON SERVICE HEADER ISO MOV HE-15E CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 44S HE-15W CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 44S CMO-429 CCW TO RHR HX ISO MOV 52 CCW-167 WEST CCW SUCTION CROSS-TIE 44S CCW-172 EAST CCW SUCTION CROSS-TIE 44S CCW-173 WEST CCW DISCHARGE 44S CROSS-TIE CCW-214 WEST SURGE TANK ISOLATION 69 VALVE CCW-220 EAST SURGE TANK ISOLATION 69 VALVE CCW-256 WEST CCW SUCTION CROSS"TIE 44S PAGE 10 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES WMO-706 ESW HEADER CROSS-TIE MOV 113 ABD-A WMO-708 ESW HEADER CROSS-TIE MOV 113 ABD-D WMO-722 ESW SUPPLY TO DGAB 115 ABD-A WMO-726 ESW SUPPLY TO DGCD 115 ABD-D WMO-744 ALTER MAKEUP TO PP-3W 17B MAN OPER WMO-753 ALTER MAKEUP TO PP-4 17F MAN OPER WMO-754 ALTER MAKEUP TO PP-3E 17G MAN OPER PP-7E ESW PUMP 29C T21D MCCD WMO-703 ESW PUMP DISCHARGE ISO 'MOV 29C PS-D ESWSE ESW PUMP 2E STRAINER 29C PS-D PP-7W ESW PUMP 29D T21A MCAB WMO-704 ESW PUMP DISCHARGE ISO MOV 29D PS-A ESWSW ESW PUMP 2W STRAINER 29D PS-A WMO-736 ESW TO CCW HX INLET MOV 44S AZV-A WMO-738 ESW TO CCW HX OUTLET MOV 44S AZV-A WMO-732 ESW TO CCW HX INLET MOV 44S AM-D WMO-734 ESW TO CCW HX OUTLET MOV 44S AM-D PAGE 11 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM COMPONENT FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES t'ESCRIPTION IMO-310 RHR PUMP SUCTION ISO MOV 1G ABV-D PP-35E RHR PUMP E lG T21D MCCD IMO-320 RHR PUMP SUCTION ISO MOV 1H ABV-A PP-35W RHR PUMP W 1H T21A MCAB IMO-312 RHR PUMP MINIMUM FLOW MOV 44G AM-D IRV-310 RHR HX FLOW CONTROL AOV 44G CRID-II IRV-311 RHR HX BYPASS FLOW 44G CRID-II CONTROL AOV IMO-314 RHR PUMPS CROSS-TIE MOV 44,G ABV-D RH-117 RHR ISO MANUAL VALVE (LC) 44G MAN OPER RH-128E RHR ISO MANUAL VALVE (LC) 44G MAN OPER HE-17E RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 44G IMO-322 RHR PUMP MINIMUM FLOW MOV 44H AM-A IRV-320 RHR HX FLOW CONTROL AOV 44H CRID-III IMO-324 RHR PUMPS CROSS-TIE MOV 44H AZV-A RH-128W RHR ISO MANUAL VALVE (LC) 44H MAN OPER HE-17W RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 44H ICM-129 RHR INLET ISO MOV 74 EZC-C ICM-111 RHR OUTLET ISO MOV 74 EZC-C IMO-128 RHR INLET ISO MOV 75 EZC-B PAGE 12 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS ~** RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES IMO-110 SI ACCUMULATOR, ISO MOV 74 EZC-C IMO-120 SI ACCUMULATOR ISO MOV EZC-B IMO-130 SI ACCUMULATOR ISO MOV 74 EZC-D IMO-140 SI ACCUMULATOR ISO MOV 74 EZC-A PAGE 13 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES BN 250 VDC TRN BATTERY 107 N/A 2CD1 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER 13 ABD-C PUMP 2CD2 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER 13 ABD-D PUMP DGCD DIESEL GENERATOR CD TDCD MCCD ABD-D MCC 2-ABD-D 18 21D CD1 JACKET WATER PUMP 18 ABD-C 0 cD2 JACKET WATER PUMP 18 ABD-D ABD-C MCC 2-ABD-C 21C DGAB DIESEL GENERATOR AB 19 TDAB MCAB ABD-A MCC 2-ABD-A 19 21A ELSC 120 VAC DISTRIBUTION 19 ABD-B PNL 2-ELSC AB1 JACKET WATER PUMP 19 ABD-A AB2 JACKET WATER PUMP 19 ABD-B ABD-B MCC 2-ABD-B 19 21B 2AB2 DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER 21 ABD-A PUMP PAGE 14 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION" D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS *** EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES
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| ~"
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| 2ABl DIESEL FUEL OIL TRANSFER'UMP 21 ABD-B PS-A MCC 2-PS-A 29F AB-A PS-D MCC 2-PS-D 29F AB-D AZV-A MCC 2-AZV-A 44S AB-A EZC-A MCC 2-EZC-A 45 21A TR21B 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER 21B 45 T21B 21B 600V BUS 21B TR21B MCAB EZC-B MCC 2-EZC-B 45 21B EZC-C MCC 2-EZC-C 45 21C TR21D 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER 21D 45 T21D MCCD 21D 600V BUS 21D 45 TR21D MCCD EZC-D MCC 2-EZC-D, 21D BCHAB1 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER EZC-A 2-ABl PAGE 15 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 "TABIE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS **" EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES BCHAB2 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER . 45 EZC-B 2-AB2 21A 600V BUS 21A 46A TR21A MCAB 21C 600V BUS 21C 46A TR21C MCCD CRID-I 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 54 EZC-C MCCD CRID-II 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 54 EZC-D MCCD CRID-III 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 54 EZC-A MCAB CRID-IV 120 VAC INSTR DISTR PNL 54 EZC-B MCAB TDAB TRAIN B 250 VDC TRANSFER 46C AB,BCHAB1 BCHAB2 CABINET MCAB TRAIN B 250 VDC 46C TDAB
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| ,DISTRIBUTION CABINET AB 250 VDC BATTERY AB 46D N/A T21A 4KV BUS T21A 47A DGAB MCAB T21B 4KV BUS T21B 47A DGAB MCAB T21C 4KV BUS T21C 47B DGCD MCCD T21D 4KV BUS T21D 47B DGCD MCCD DCN 250 VDC TRN BATTERY 50 BN DISTR CAB AM-A MCC 2-AM-A 52 21A AM-D MCC 2-AM-D 52 21D PAGE 16 OF 17
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| AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORPORATION D.C. COOK UNIT 2 TABLE 4-2 CONTINUED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS **" EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT DESCRIPTION FIRE ZONE POWER SUPPLIES BCHCD1 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER 60 EZC-D 2-CD1 CD 250 VDC BATTERY 2-CD 60 N/A BCHCD2 250 VDC BATTERY CHARGER 60 EZC-C 2-CD2 TDCD TRAIN A 250 VDC TRANSFER 60 CD,BCHCDl BCHCD2 CABINET MCCD TRAIN A 250 VDC 60 TDCD DISTRIBUTION CABINET TK-47 DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE YARD TANK CD & AB AB-A MCC 2-AB-A 6S 21A AB-D MCC 2'-AB-D 6S 21D ABN 250 VDC TRN BATTERY 6S DCN DISTR CAB 21AC BUS TIE BREAKER 46A MCAB 21BD BUS TIE BREAKER 45 MCAB TR21A 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER 46A TllA MCAB TR21C 4KV/600V TRANSFORMER 46A Tllc PAGE 17 OF 17
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| INDIANA 8 MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY D. C. COOK UNITS 1 AND 2 TABLE 4-3 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS MALFUNCTIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT SYSTEM EFFECT OF MALFUNCTION RESOLUTION FRV-245 AF SPURIOUS OPENING WILL DIVERT AFW FLOW CIRCUIT BREAKERS AT DC DISTRIBUTION PANELS FRV-255 TO THE CST. CCV-AB AND CCV-CD (CONTROL ROOM) TO BE KEPT OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS (PRE-FIRE)
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| (EXCEPT DURING TEST), ENSURING NO SPURIOUS VALVE OPENING. (AIR-OPERATED VALVES FAIL CLOSED WITH LOSS OF AIR OR LOSS OF POWER.)
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| FRV-256 AF SAME AS ABOVE. COMMON POWER SUPPLY PROVIDE SEPARATE CIRCUIT PROTECTION (FUSE/
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| WITH TOFP CONTROL CIRCUITRY. MAY DISCONNECT SWITCH) AT DC DISTRIBUTION RESULT IN LOSS OF COMMON PROTECTION. PANEL OCN. DISCONNECT SWITCH TO BE KEPT OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION (PRE-FIRE)
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| (EXCEPT DURING TEST), ENSURING NO SPURIOUS VALVE OPENING. (A'IR-OPERATED VALVES FAIL CLOSED WITH LOSS OF AIR OR LOSS OF POWER. )
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| QMO-200 CVCS SPURIOUS OPENING OF BOTH NORMAL OPERATOR VALVE ISOLATION AT THE PRESSURIZER QMO-201 CHARGING VALVES QMO-200 AND QMO-201 PANEL OR BY LOCAL CLOSURE OF CVCS VALVES QRV-51 AND THE PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY QMO-200 OR -201 WILL ENSURE VALVE CLOSURE.
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| AIR-OPERATED VALVE QRV-51 (WITH CVCS (AIR-OPERATED VALVE FAILS CLOSED ON LOSS OF PUMPS RUNNING) WILL RESULT IN UN- AIR OR ELECTRICAL POWER.)
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| CONTROLLED RCS PRESSURE REDUCTION.
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| QRV-111 CVCS SPURIOUS OPENING OF QRV-111 AND QRV-112 PROCEDURAL ISOLATION OF THE LETDOWN PATH BY QRV-112 AND EITHER ONE OF THE ORIFICE ISO- OPENING CIRCUIT BREAKER AT CONTROL ROOM QRV-160 LATION VALVES WILL RESULT IN UNCON- PANELS CCV-AB OR CCV-CD OR AT DC DISTRI-QRV-161 TROLLED LETDOWN. BUTION PANELS MCAB OR MCCD WILL ENSURE QRV-162 LETDOWN ISOLATION. (AIR-OPERATED VALVES FAIL CLOSED WITH LOSS OF AIR OR LOSS OF POWER.)
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| QRV-113 CVCS SPURIOUS OPENING OF ALL VALVES IN (SEE ABOVE)
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| QRV-114 SERIES WILL RESULT IN UNCONTROLLED QRV-170 EXCESS LETDOWN.
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| LB459C RCS SPURIOUS OPERATION OF LOW-LOW PRESSUR- HEATERS NOT REQUIRED DURING THE FIRST 3-4 LB4600 IZER LEVEL SWITCHES WILL TRIP PRESSUR- HOURS AFTER TRIP (AT STABLE HOT STANDBY).
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| IZER HEATER'S SUPPLY BREAKERS AT 480V PROCEDURAL DETECTION AND DEENERGIZATION OF LOAD CENTER 11 PHA OR 11 PHC. CONTROL GROUP LOGIC CABINETS 1 AND 2 (CONTROL ROOMS).
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| PAGE 1 OF 3
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| INDIANA 8 MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY D. C. COOK UNITS 1 AND 2 TABLE 4 CONTINUED POTENTIAL SPURIOUS MALFUNCTIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN POTENTIAL SPURIOUS RESOLUTION COMPONENT SYSTEM EFFECT OF MALFUNCTION NRV-151 RCS SPURIOUS OPENING OF ANY OF THE PRESSUR- PROCEDURAL DETECTION AND CLOSURE OF RESPEC-NRV-152 IZER PORVs WILL RESULT IN RCS BOUNDARY TIVE BLOCK VALVES (NM0-151, NMO-152, NMO-NRV-153 BREACH. 153) OR OPENING OF PORV CIRCUIT BREAKERS AT CONTROL ROOM PANELS CCV-AB AND CCV-CD, OR OPENING OF DC DISTRIBUTION PANELS BREAKERS AT MCAB OR MCCD. (AIR-OPERATED PORVs FAIL CLOSED WITH LOSS OF POWER OR LOSS OF AIR.)
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| NSO-021 RCS SPURIOUS OPENING OF PRESSURIZER OR PROCEDURAL DETECTION AND OPENING OF RESPEC-NSO-022 REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVES WILL RESULT TIVE SUPPLY BREAKERS AT CONTROL ROOM NSO-023 IN BREACH OF RCS BOUNDARY. PANELS CCV-AB AND SSV-A1. (SOLENOID-NSO-024 OPERATED VENT VALVES FAIL CLOSED WITH LOSS NSO-061 OF POWER.)
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| NSO-062 NSO-063 NSO-064 I CM-129 RHR SPURIOUS OPENING OF BOTH RHR/RCS MOTOR CONTROL CENTER SUPPLY BREAKER FOR I MO-128 BOUNDARY ISOLATION VALVES DURING EITHER ICM-129 OR IMO-128 WILL BE KEPT OPEN REACTOR MODES 1, 2, AND 3 WILL RESULT DURING REACTOR MODES 1, 2 AND 3 (PRE-FIRE)
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| IN BREACH OF THE RCS BOUNDARY. WITH VALVE CLOSED.
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| ILS-950 RHR SPURIOUS OPERATION OF RWST LOW LEVEL OPENING OF TEST SWITCHES AT CONTROL PANEL I LS-951 SWITCHES TRIP RHR PUMPS. RHR ISOLATES THE LOW LEVEL TRIP LOGIC (RHR OPERATION ONLY).
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| IMO-330 RHR SPURIOUS OPENING OF ANY OF THE CON- OPEN MOTOR CONTROL CENTER BREAKERS FOR IMO-331 TAINMENT SPRAY HEADER ISOLATION VALVES THESE VALVES (AT AM-A AND AM-0) AND VERIFY DURING REACTOR MODES 4 AND 5 WILL LOCAL VALVE ALIGNMENT BEFORE OPERATION OF DIVERT RCS WATER TO THE CONTAINMENT. RHR.
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| IMO-340 RHR SPURIOUS OPENING OF ANY OF THE RHR/ OPEN MOTOR CONTROL CENTER BREAKERS FOR IMO-350 CVCS AND PUMP SUCTION TIE LINES WILL THESE VALVES (AT AM-A AND AM-0) AND VERIFY DIVERT RCS WATER TO THE PRT THROUGH LOCAL VALVE ALIGNMENT BEFORE OPERATION OF SAFETY VALVE SV-56. RHR.
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| ICM-305 RHR SPURIOUS OPENING OF THE CONTAINMENT CLOSE LOCAL MANUAL VALVES AT THE SUCTION ICM-306 SUMP ISOLATION VALVES DURING REACTOR OF THE RHR PUMPS (RH 104 E AND W) BEFORE MODES 4 AND 5 (RHR) WILL DIVERT OPERATION OF RHR.
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| RCS WATER TO THE CONTAINMENT.
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| PAGE 2 OF 3
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| INDIANA 8 MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY D. C. COOK UNITS 1 AND 2 TABLE 4 CONTINUED POTENTIAL SPURIOUS MALFUNCTIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN POTENTIAL SPURIOUS RESOLUTION COMPONENT SYSTEM EFFECT OF MALFUNCTION IRV-251 SIS SPURIOUS OPENING OF BOTH VALVES DURING PROCEDURAL DETECTION AND TERMINATION BY IRV"252 CVCS CHARGING THROUGH THE BIT PATH OPENING CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR EITHER VALVE WILL PRESSURIZE THE BAT SYSTEM AND AT DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL CCV-AB OR CCV-CD DIVERT CVCS CHARGING. (CONTROL ROOM) OR AT DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL MCAB OR MCCD (FIRE ZONES 42C OR 55). (AIR-OPERATED VALVES FAIL CLOSED WITH LOSS OF AIR OF LOSS OF POWER. )
| |
| 1DGTAB EPS SPURIOUS CLOSING OF ANY OF THESE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AT DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD 1DGTCD BREAKERS WILL RESULT IN LOADING THE TEST PANELS TO BE KEPT LOCKED-OPEN DURING 2DGTAB DIESEL GENERATOR WITH TEST LOAD BANK. NORMAL PLANT OPERATION (PRE-FIRE) (EXCEPT 2DGTCD DURING DIESEL TEST).
| |
| MRV-213 SPURIOUS OPENING OF THE STEAM GENER- PROCEDURAL DETECTION AND ISOLATION BY MRV-223 ATOR PORVs (AS A RESULT OF, FIRE- PLACING THE AUTO/MANUAL CONTROLLER IN MRV-233 INDUCED CONTROL CIRCUIT FAILURES) MANUAL (AT THE CONTROL ROOM OR HSD PANEL MRV"243 WILL RESULT IN UNCONTROLLED COOLDOWN. CONTROLLERS) OR IN THE LOCAL CONTROL IN THE RESPECTIVE LSI SHUTDOWN STATIONS. (AIR-OPERATED PORVs FAIL CLOSED WITH LOSS OF AIR OR LOSS OF CURRENT SIGNAL.)
| |
| PAGE 3 OF 3
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| | |
| STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN FIRF PLUS LOSS FUNCTIONS OF OFF-SITE POWER REACTOR PRO-TECTION AND CONTROL ROD REACTOR TRIP INSERTION SWITCKGEAR INITIAL REACTIVITY CONTROL BORATED WATER RWST SOURCE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMPING PUMPS CAPACITY (1 OF 2)
| |
| ~TE RC PUMP INJECTION THE BIT INJ ECTION SEAL OR BIT PATH PATH IS OPTIONAI.
| |
| INJECTION AND NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN.
| |
| SOURCE RANGE INSTRUMENTATION MONITORING LONG-TERM REACTIVITY CONTROL RCS REACTIVITYCONTROL FIGURE 4.1
| |
| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS STATION FIRE PLUS LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER WATER RSWT SOURCE CENTRIFUGAL PUMPING CHARGING
| |
| . CAPACITY PUMPS (1 OF 2)
| |
| RC PUMP ~OTE'HE BIT INJECTION INJECTION SEAL OR BIT PATH IS OPTIONAL PATH AND NOT REQUIRED INJECTION FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN.
| |
| CONTROL RCS INVENTORY RCS LOSS CONTROL LEAKAGE PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION MONITORING REACTOR COOLANT MAKEUP CONTROL RCS MAKEUP CONTROL FlGURE 4.2
| |
| | |
| STATION SAFE SHUTDOWN FIRE PLUS LOSS FUNCTIONS OF OFF-SITE POWER PRESSURIZER OVERPRESSURE SAFETY PROTECTION VALVES HI.LO PRESSURE DEPRESSURIZATION INTERFACE PROTECTION ISOLATION AUXILIARY LINE
| |
| 'PRAY ISOLATION SUBCOOLING MARGIN CONTROL
| |
| /VOTE:
| |
| PRESSURIZER THE PRESSURIZER HEATERS HEATERS ARE OPTIONAL AND NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN.
| |
| RCS PRESSURE MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RCS T~
| |
| MONITORING INITIAL RCS PRESSURE CONTROL RHR OVERPRESSURE SAFETY PROTECTION VALVES LONG-TERM PRESSURE CONTROL RCS PRESSURE CONTROL FIGURE 4.3
| |
| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS STATION FIRE PLUS LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER STEAM AUXILIARY HEAT TRANSFER PUMPING GENERATORS FEEDWATER PATH CAPACITY (2 OF 4) (1 OF 3)
| |
| STEAM STEAM GENERATOR GENERATOR INJECTION HEAT RELEASE SAFETY VALVE INLET PATH PATH.
| |
| AND PORV MOV's INITIAL RCS NATURAL REACTOR T~ AND Tc CIRCULATION HEAT MONITORING REMOVAL STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE AND STEAM GENERATOR RHR LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION (1 OF 2)
| |
| MONITORING CONDENSATE LONG-STORAGE TANK SECONDARY TERM WITH ESSENTIAL WATER SOURCE HEAT SERVICE WATER REMOVAL BACKUP REACTOR HEAT REMOVAL FlGURE 4.4
| |
| | |
| 0 0
| |
| | |
| SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS CVCS AFW EPS CCW ESW EPS EPS EPS ESW EPS (MDFP's ONLY)
| |
| MS ESW CCW (TDFP ONLY)
| |
| ESW ESW (BACKUP)
| |
| RCS MS RHR EPS EPS EPS CCW ESW SUPPORTING SYSTEM INTERACTION DIAGRAM FIGURE 4.6
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| sa.ti .4 I I S4 Z <<at ~ sa.'1 5SPFKff COWMRLKD 10 FKOVIDK MN.j ca qrf 40 FVHF Nst us(~v fr/sTf2 Sfht ON KILIKF VALVES.
| |
| 4\ala 45444.3 I v~oas I
| |
| sass I s ovfo<<sass<<tao ft NOIK ~ 6/T, J/9 sal ~ I CFMH It ts)skt Mat 1
| |
| tails+ I
| |
| $ $ 444as 1445 4
| |
| $ 44$ ~ ~R O"- CS424 REACTOR ~ Sa t.afkOarr 4vD sfka SY. sass IM SOCOO4 CLS 21 I 5K'ETCH L 4 ARRG'T FOR ONE REACTOR COOLANT
| |
| ~ Ntaataaarkfataa Saoaaas SiOCOst IIO Cosa f4 IIOCOsa 52 aSCssl NIC2N Vl C/H 31 fl Irk~lhttt DXIMATELT M IDt/AY bfrttttM LOOP AMD ttt55obtfR.
| |
| I ~)
| |
| CFN 4544< 2 ok Mdf2 8, 4/T s 4/2 s 3/9 CtM 13 tSMtM43 45445 I fvr toa ksa rsksks I LOOP IN CONTAINMEHT CFM 14 FVIltMa4 "$ ILOOP HR3 SHOWN) FO~MITTKD SAMPLE aff faaas.a 4144 4. 1 KMLL. SLKKI\2 <<M tf ~'s,a".4<<klsf 5141.
| |
| 'CC444 44 LOCA
| |
| + IC 6 Y C H scj-5" 4 ON D<<4 2 $ sto ~TS K/3 ltosi cstktcIMG tuMFS 'SCHEMAT/C h)DERANGEMENT OF CKFACTO12 COOLANT PUMP VALVE 80MNE'T AMD INTERNALS ff DMC, Sift 5 T SEAL WATEff SYSTEM /~f22 TY OR HI ARE TV SE AKI40VED AHD bsJND Tfsf COMM 1501LIIOM VLtvf TEST CONN. HEAD INSTALLKD 'EXCEPT WHEN 134 ~s ad TKSTINCI VALVE 5?13'1 RK5IDVAL HEAT REMOVAL rtoM tfTDDMM'VC RKLRf. PRESSURIZER Ir 4 HKAT KXCIL SAFETY VALVE Yktvf Stf,DWC.SU9tf/t REUEF LINE MOTE S,C/4 153 DISCH. SE'K DWG. 5145,L/5,6/3 ~HLssD o R4~fvk v~ =
| |
| Nlffi(/ Tf5;C/4 IDRHCHII Af AN Hvostsss 7l EMERG. CORK COOLING SYS RKLI'EF VA. DISCH.
| |
| SEE DWGvSI42kC/8k3/8 0/St f/0 CHARG)HG PUMP SUCTION SAFE'TY VALVK DISCH- GEE 3' 20M $ EAL RLILK RKIVKM tfUff YLIK tff 52:1.3 H/3 Rta5)
| |
| Id'TO 24 STRAIGI4T SECTION (TYPICAL)
| |
| SV 45C LOOP V<51 6'Y-45A Ir 151 rVRHI IOAIaass FOR uttra CO<<I aAL 5 Ski sta/5 v Z LONNY'aooquK YLLVK HUMDKHS'tfKLR CW IHS5 DIILWSHC. SKK 5KPARAIK YALYK IDKHItfSCLISDH
| |
| 'l.ssr FOR KOUIVLLCHI DKSICH
| |
| ~@ggIN DWG. 5129k L/C<< ~ISI ffDM 245153AL MM KIMOVLL lOOP tff DjaL 5143,2/5, f/3 RONI 2 AUX. 51'RAY Sf f OWGSI29sb/3
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| ~ SEAL MKY.I MNO 253 3 IIICRI Huusttts.
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| : 2. Iksr NIMDKRS jatxxfIKD FDR
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| ~$
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| I f SONaa Ssttaaa I
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| 2 0
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| ttkafotq USK 45 FOLLDWS:
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| TAG Ma 2-lasw-vos.w Icggg 1 I 5 3
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| : 5) tOa~ st+'f I'~ 'sl, ~
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| STSI4 I SAXI)CF Nqlf 2, 4 MOlfC,+4 2 a) 0 aJ AttKARS 43:I N5WNSW 3 wsfoaostNI ROOT YLLVK Hkttsi Ha'5 ssof Sssa)IIH Otl oslkwoK(SKK
| |
| $ 1 ISO 0/3 Si 'CII ra 4/-.
| |
| s I'
| |
| ALP 0/
| |
| 0 VALVE IDKHItflCAItosf Usrl s <<s I ~clla M LC. SKE HOT f 5.0/5 Ct 3'UO'1st s aj DKRSVKS DY LDDSHC oaSIRUMKHI MUMSKR:
| |
| IO Os Sff 'Malt 3 + li S . 5XETKH '1554 I F0R ssstoLKvafsASK.VI hhoAvaQable 1
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| KI Ssatsoiasa sasSI kauatss fOR CaMLK OOsuLIK.VStjs5ffttkkd ttsSS~ MKY.IC) 2 433
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| /2 EW-)OZ PRAY "oft3, CI4 VOTE trl afwo.H RV.I52 5 Cs1 d /0 3/
| |
| Aperhire H51 ROSTATlg VALVES Nsx /IF
| |
| )30RATIDM V41VK EVENT ST FLANGE I <<I 51 I T0 VKNT TEST CDMMKCf sqjl 23213 S/ MSIO.NI rC a RIVSIsO<<ilfCOO IORINSOSVC.
| |
| F.C: 104 HRV I 5 I I II)SIDE )HSTRUMEHTATIOH ROOM s/3 /2 HKLDfR Slt MKY 154
| |
| "'MT FRcsa Afkc)DR T RCK.IOI KCK KO DHGSI3tt, '301 ~2 5SQ. HK40 VKMT 1 MOIK 8 5 Sa(IIR) s 3Z/FS 54 Hjl Goo jill
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| ~s SKK Dajt 9 VOTE I, sIIL 0 25CRLTIDM VLLVS /4 "0/4 MIM. WAlft FOR RKVISIDH DKSDIIFTCMI SKK rtsr cost<<RCT ION~ LSOILICMaA) Ha os 5 jrt Stfautkff RKVISOM RECORD TKST COMIL tfVft ft. CSYOg 159 PRAY LINES y )iu)
| |
| PAESSURIKER Hljss52VI 44 3/0' CPN 30 fDR Tais DIILWJICs I <<M a<<iw <<M sss<<sss ss 'M HNasfka FROM NITROGEN X 3/4 GCD301 2 jj 3/4'SILMD tiff CM softocca I IJIDDAs-24SSFSI C80F I St sss sol isa ISI 1 lsaasaN ra<<aa aaa<<aa soar, ssa ~ sassN
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| ~ <<a a<<<<aaa << ~ st <<sH% H sa<<s<<ata si s<<<<4 <<<<<<st aa <<<<H. ti Ma <<a w SUPPLY MANCOLD SEE DWG Sildb.C/3 W3 +5s tf C U.?4 CFM 53 I 2"4 MAKE Vt LINKS Sff SKETCH
| |
| 'D-5;6/2 HYPROSTATI 0 TEST CLAMGE FROM REACTOR COOLANT LOOP y Ht.tlstf2 HIOSSlV 5 25 I ko<<ss <<Ns ss<<s sa sss sss<<s ~ Ill%lit M '
| |
| ~ <<s<<>> aws s as M a l ~ saassaa aaar aa N M ssas<<s Hsws<<<<s<<M<<
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| <<<<<<sa H sass<<H a<<s NMH
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| ~ I FROM PRIllAQY WATER
| |
| )lwtoll C 3 CROM REaCtOR -
| |
| COOLANT LOOP Ha4 SKE CA4 51243M/3 / 151 151 I asoÃkraa ~ sascHI 422OIHsc sjaA SEE OWCi SIISA.J/5 iJ 5
| |
| LPs M . )IAHWLTLMO RUPTURE HG3 SEE DWG.SI24)sG/d
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| : I DONALD C. COOK f%121 L.O. 3 tot IC
| |
| /4 DSC.BURST DAKSSVRK 100 PSI 2-M fsk ftfV. Gt519' ~
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| aaa 5
| |
| 1
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| |
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| MCR 252 4 HRV KSI 51 Cl DEAD WEICIIT FLOW DIAGRAM 2411$
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| FHMl to 124 NI' at 2
| |
| S C3)5 tg (TY . FOR 3VALVES)
| |
| CALIBtfksTOR REACTOR COQLAN I I lSI 1501ATIOM YL,LVK TEST COMI4~ 4 ~I 5s
| |
| ~
| |
| MEATER NOTE I0/4 102
| |
| , CONT ROL PIPING BYQ Stt HOTt 8,0/3 ftfV539 0~
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| 0 MIA rsl so aaaacal gjfds Ma SM Dtv I s FRKftsa DKSIGMLTIOIIWR KaCsf Ss
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| |
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| |
| ~HS INSIDE REALTOR CC.
| |
| ~O REACTOR COOLANT c~l ~
| |
| 5245" ls 'I'Asadss oIHcosfssb aacaTKcs.
| |
| 1KITEs FIGURE 4.11 ssssslassslst CONTA))454 ENT DRAIH LINE SCHF MATIC A$2RAHGEME14T OF Fa)PING AT CsRES'bS)RIED. Tfss~sa ssacc UMCL/R ffjRloafs I Sff DWG. S)57A,DCG A14D PRE.SSVIEIZER RE.LIE.F TAHIC 4422SUOKRSKC)ES l-t.sltdh REaf~
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| A F ~
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| I 43 K s LI M I
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| SV02190815-gQ
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| |
| ~S Mffa Lo 20AL cs>> PIP(HG ((4)) (
| |
| 2 ulkkplD a ll a<<at>>
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| <<tU I>> >>J>>C\ l<< AUX. PIP(NG 010 IN JTR. PIP(NCI
| |
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| ~ I 015 NTP 240 alp Utl's a
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| all Df>>CYQR aasatc rl>> VA all wft
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| |
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| |
| .$ (a. SA'0 3 04 AC Dao 5IJS IIJ SMIELD WALL. ONE VALVE DvG SI25>>) FROI>>t )NHLR (3'RINGs OHE atpcaUL DIRC>> C LINC lo't 10 (PfaNC at Ig) Cf >>of(IR VALVE 'CROM OUTER 0 RING.
| |
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| |
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| (
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| |
| Leaf 5<<f 0 ~ <<JTCI lC(PCPI UIJ(CTCII TN4 050MRCC 11 Rw Sffu LIII QCI ASLC INSVLATION UF 'fo LOOP Sat psc<<SI2 ROOT VALYES.
| |
| ~ PC Sac'L tJ Jg 1st S, C/T, f/), (/5 4 51(>> Lt>>J.QII (DCATE ROOT VA. ASOYE CLCV. OF t(tlfslfICI20 45 REACTOR VESSEL MOEZLES.
| |
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| |
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| CICING CCSKII TQ CCL QW CflTCRM tlDC>>te0 su(>>D RECOMMENDAT(ON TO MEET
| |
| 'TtMFERATURE TINE LAC Of I(w LESS TRAM I 0 SEC. FOR RTO N (0 '(MS 4~
| |
| I 34 (
| |
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| |
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| |
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| )to 4
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| 10 RLICTDA s>>caA>> N aa Uter.lftco A L ONLY 'IC<<OVC VALVE cool>>aal 04444 S >Usa>>Y Clsauaa YSC<<C NVNSKRS'PPEAR Qtl THiS DRAWUIIL SKK .
| |
| RAC Dwo 5UIS I/aa Rtf TAN>> SLC D>>C IS',IM'~l(f~ 1 N')TI. Sxtl SEPARATE VALVE ICKNTSFICATIQN
| |
| ~ 4C P 4'444 g>>t LIST FOR EQUIVALENT DESIGN
| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| 2.'TAC'VM<<flt5 IC00FICD VSK AS FOLUIW5(
| |
| FOR
| |
| 'RAWCIC CAt U (, DUG 5'C3, NL TAC NS R.NSWRIKCPW
| |
| /LPEILTURE taaSRSLY
| |
| \0>>(R ftlfvaC 5>>OC AI0>>L St>>P>>a r
| |
| >> 4, 4~
| |
| aat si Qw Rf ICYQR I APPCAlt5 A5: N5WIQSW 3DISTRVUKNT RDQT VALVC MARK Nt'5 NQT SSIQWH ON CRAWPIC(SCK Vf54<<CL I tI:ARB ~ arsv Lt tt>>RtaQ f MlH LP>>f R 3I'(0 (tt. L42-0$
| |
| 'tl15 DS(. (SOC v'3(0 lfp YALYK IDKIITIFIcATIONUST)
| |
| DCRIVCO OY ADONIO To Ctp JC 011
| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| '430 CIIH N'I 430
| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| $ 1 Rlacaaf CQR(la CR>>rsa)
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| pate I 2 5420 stet. ca
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| | |
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| f CBT BZ,IS- I ALT HAACJNCa LINE TO LOOP(COLD LEG SEE ORG.GIZB,C/3
| |
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| |
| AUX SPRAY 10 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FROM \.OOP 4.SEE DWG NO 5<28,u/6.
| |
| C$ $ NLI
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| PAESSUA/ZEA. SEC SK 6.9 uofCA c/5/
| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
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| |
| ~~NF~ATL ~a F.O.
| |
| C$ $ 21
| |
| .F.O.
| |
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| |
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| |
| >EA 2
| |
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| |
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| |
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