ND-17-2039, Vogtie Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 - ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.3.11.02.i (Index Number 450)

Vogtie Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 - ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.3.11.02.i (Index Number 450)

ML17362A017
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/18/2017
From:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors
References
ITAAC 2.3.11.02.i, ND-17-2039
Download: ML17362A017 (8)

Text

Southern Nuclear DEC 18 2017 Docket No.:

52-025 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Michael J. Yox Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtie 3 & 4 7825 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 706-848-6459 tei 410-474-8587 ceii myox@southernco.com ND-17-2039 10CFR 52.99(c)(1)

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtie Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.3.11.02.i [Index Number 4501 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notifythe Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ofthe completion of Vogtie Electric Generating Plant (VEGP)

Unit 3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.3.11.02.i [Index Number 450] which confirms Gaseous Radwaste System (WGS) activated carbon delay bed location and seismic analysis. The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-01, "Industry Guidelinefor the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation ofthis determination and publication ofthe required notice inthe Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Tom Petrak at 706-848-1575.

Respectfully submitted, L

Michael J. Yox Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtie 3 &4

Enclosure:

Vogtie Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit3 Completion of ITAAC 2.3.11.02.1 [Index Number 450]

MJY/LBP/amw

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-17-2039 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company I Georgia Power Company M

M M

M M

M M

M M

D. A. Bost (w/o enclosures)

M. D. Rauckhorst (w/o enclosures)

M. D. Meier D. H. Jones (w/o enclosures)

D. L. McKinney M. J. Yox D. L. Fulton J. D. Williams F. H. Willis Ms. A. L. Pugh Mr. A. 8. Parton Mr. W. A. Sparkman Mr. 0. E. Morrow Ms. K. M. Stacy Mr. M. K. Washington Mr. J. P. Redd Ms. A. 0. Chamberlain Mr. D. R. Culver Mr. R. L. Beiike Mr. T. G. Petrak Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Requlatorv Commission Mr. W. Jones (w/o enclosures)

Ms. J. M. Heisserer Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. M. E. Ernstes Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. T. E. Chandler Ms. S. E. Temple Ms. P. Braxton Mr. T. C. Brimfield Mr. A. J. Lerch Mr. C. J. Even Ms. V. L. Ordaz Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. A. E. Rivera-Varona Qqlethorpe Power Corporation Mr. K. T. Haynes Mr. R. B. Brinkman Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-17-2039 Page 3 of 3 Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinqhouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. 0. Durham (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. M. Corletti Ms. L. G. Iller Mr. D. Hawkins Ms. 8. DITommaso Mr. J. L. Coward Ms. N. E. Deangells Other Mr. J. E. Hosier, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., CDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Ms. 8. W. Kernlzan, Georgia Public Sen/ice Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Balch Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-17-2039 Enclosure Page 1 of 5 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-17-2039 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.3.11.02.1 [Index Number 450]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-17-2039 Enclosure Page 2 of 5 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment:

2.

The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

Inspections. Tests. Analyses:

i)

Inspection will be performedto verify that the equipment identified as havingseismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

ii)

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismically designed equipment will be performed.

ill)

Inspection will be performed forthe existence ofa report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage isseismically bounded bythe tested or analyzed conditions.

Acceptance Criteria:

i)

Theequipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11 -1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

ii)

Areport exists andconcludes thattheseismically designed equipment can withstand appropriate seismic design basis loads without lossofitsstructural integrity function.

iii)

Areport exists and concludes thatthe as-built equipment including anchorage is seismicallybounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

ITAAC Determination Basis This ITAAC requires thatinspections, tests, and analysesbe performed and documented to ensure the Gaseous RadwasteSystem (WGS) equipment identified as having seismicdesign requirements in theCombined License (COL) Appendix CTable 2.3.11-1 (Table) can withstand seismic design basis loads without the lossofitsstructural integrity function. Thesubject ITAAC required:

An inspection be performed to verify that the WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bedsare located on the Nuclear Island.

Type tests, analyses, ora combination of type tests andanalyses be performed onthe WGS Activated Carbon Delay Beds.

An inspection be performed for the existence of a report thatconcludes thattheas-built equipment, theWGS Activated Carbon Delay Beds, including anchorage isseismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

Toassure thatthe equipment identified in the Table can withstand the appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function, an inspection was conducted ofthe WGSto confirm the satisfactory installation ofthe equipmentwith seismic design requirements identified in Attachment A. Theinspection included verification of equipment

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-17-2039 Enclosure Page 3 of 5 number and location. The inspections to verify installed component locations are documented in Quality Assurance (OA) inspection reports (References 1 and 2). The results of the inspections conclude that each component identified in Attachment A is located on the Nuclear Island.

Seismic loads for the equipment were established using one-half of the AP1000 Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) floor response spectra. Seismic analyses of the equipment identifiedin the Table were performed to demonstrate structural integrity in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section VIII, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels (Reference 3). The analyses are documented inthe WGS delay bed design report (Reference

4) and conclude that the equipment identified inthe Table as having seismic design requirements can withstand appropriate seismicdesign basis loads without loss of itsstructural integrity function.

In accordance with the fabrication and construction installation work packages, inspections were performed onthe WGS Activated Carbon Delay Beds and anchorage to confirm the satisfactory installation ofthe seismically designed equipment. The inspection included verification of equipment fabrication, equipment mounting, equipment anchorage, and critical attributes from the seismicanalyses. In accordance with NEI 08-01, Section 9.5, inspection ofWGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed equipment mounting and verification ofcritical attributes from the seismic analyseswere performed at otherthanthe final installed location, dueto inaccessibility ofthe equipment after installation. Non-conformances and design changes issued during fabrication and installation against the equipment and anchorage were analyzedagainst the seismic analyses toensureinspection results performed at other thantheequipment's final location remained valid forsupporting ITAAC acceptance criteria. Non-conformances and design changesissued upthrough installation of the equipment including attachment tothe seismic Category 1structure were analyzed against the seismic analysis toverify that the analyzed conditions were still bounding whenconsidering the cumulative effectsofany deviating conditions.

The results of the verifications were documented in the as-built seismic reconciliation report (Reference 5). The verifications demonstrated that the as-built equipment in COL Appendix C, Table2.3.11-1, including anchorage, is seismically bounded bythe analyzedconditions.

Together, these reports (References 1,2,4, and5) provide evidence thatthe ITAAC Acceptance Criteria requirements are met:

The equipment identified as having seismicdesign requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

Areport existsand concludesthat the seismically designed equipment can withstand appropriate seismic designbasis loadswithout lossof itsstructural integrity function.

Areport exists and concludes thatthe as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-17-2039 Enclosure Page 4 of 5 ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of ITAAC Findings and associated corrective actions. This review which included now-consolidated ITAAC Indexes 450, 451, and 452 found no relevant ITAAC Findings associated with this ITAAC. The ITAAC finding review is referenced in the Vogtle Unit 3 ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC 2.3.11.02.1 (Reference 6) and is available for NRC review.

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.3.11.02.i [Index Number 450] was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria are met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References (available for NRC inspection) 1.

132175-QA-M315-004-14-0025 Rev. 1, Quality Assurance Type "A" Inspection Report -

Mechanical: Fixed Equipment, Vessels and Tanks

2. M315-15-10044 Rev. 1, QualityAssurance Type "A" Inspection Report - Mechanical: Fixed Equipment, Vessels and Tanks

3. American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV)

Code,Section VIII, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels, 2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda 4.

APP-MV6H-VDR-001 Rev. 2, API 000 MV6H WGS Delay Bed Design Report

5. SV3-MV6H-VFR-001 Rev. 1, Vogtle Unit 3 ITAAC 2.3.11.02.1 As-Built Seismic Reconciliation Report 6.

2.3.11.02.i-U3-CP-Rev 0, Completion Package for Unit 3 ITAAC 2.3.11.02.1 [COL Index Number 450] (WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed Location and Seismic Analysis)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-17-2039 Enclosure Page 5 of 5 Attachment A ITAAC Number: 2.3.11.02.1 Excerpt from VEGP Unit 3 COL Appendix 0 Table 2.3.11-1 Equipment Name Tag ID Seismic Category 1 Type of Qualification Design Report Number As-Bullt Reconciliation Document WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed A WGS-MV-02A No Analysis APP-MV6H-VDR-001 Rev.2 SV3-MV6H-VFR-001 Rev.1 WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed B WGS-MV-02B No Analysis APP-MV6H-VDR-001 Rev.2 SV3-MV6H-VFR-001 Rev.1 The WGS activated carbon delay beds (WGS-MV-02A and WGS-MV-02B) are designed to one-half Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).