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| {{#Wiki_filter:NRC RO Admin Job Performance Measure a | | {{#Wiki_filter: |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-09023
| |
| Task Title: Determine Boration Requirements with the Boric Acid Storage Tank Out of Service
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13009-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: G2.1.43 RO 4.1
| |
| Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: _____________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _________________ Actual Performance ______________________
| |
| Classroom ________________ Simulator ___________________ Plant _________________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
| |
| CCP A is tagged out for maintenance.
| |
| The Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) is NOT available due to a high
| |
| boron concentration.
| |
| RWST boron concentration is 2526 ppm.
| |
| A boration of the RCS is required to be performed.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to use the information
| |
| provided and 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System,
| |
| Section 4.11, to determine the following:
| |
| (1) What volume of boric acid is required to raise the RCS boron
| |
| concentration to 1606 ppm?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| (2) How much time is required to charge the calculated volume of
| |
| boric acid into the RCS?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Using 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, the applicant
| |
| determines that 1968.5 gallons of boric acid are required to be added to
| |
| the RCS and that 19.9 minutes of charging time are required to charge
| |
| the calculated volume into the RCS.
| |
| Required Materials: 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, pages 1 - 9, 57 -59
| |
| (rev. 51.1)
| |
| Integrated Plant Computer screenshots
| |
| Calculator
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 12 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| *JPM 1. 4.11 Boration from the RWST with BAST out of service
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x A stopwatch will be required for timing requirements in this section.
| |
| x This section should only be used when the BAST is out of service.
| |
| 1. Record the following data:
| |
| RWST C b (C RWST ) __2526__ ppm
| |
| Initial RCS C b (C int ) __1576__ ppm
| |
| Desired final RCS C b (C fin ) __1606__ ppm
| |
| Flow rate from RWST to RCS (gpm)
| |
| (Charging - Seal leak-off) ___99___ gpm
| |
| Volume of RCS (V RCS ) 61346 gallons
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: From the given IPC data, total charging flow rate is
| |
| 101 gpm and RCP seal leak-offs are 0.49 gpm, 0.51 gpm, 0.48 gpm, and
| |
| 0.54 gpm for a total seal leak-off of 2.02 gpm, which is rounded to 2.0 gpm.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews the NOTES, determines that the flow rate from the RWST
| |
| to the RCS is 101 gpm - 2.0 gpm = 99 gpm, and records RWST and RCS
| |
| boron concentrations.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. 2. Calculate the volume of boric acid (V ba ) to change C int to C fin .
| |
| C RWST C int
| |
| Vba VRCS u ln = _______ gal
| |
| C RWST C fin
| |
| 2526 1576
| |
| Vba 61346 u ln = __1968.5__ gal
| |
| 2526 1606
| |
| CUE: IV request noted.
| |
| Standard: Applicant calculates that 1968.5 gallons of boric acid are required to raise
| |
| RCS boron concentration from 1576 ppm to 1606 ppm.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. 3. Calculate time (T) required to charge volume determined in Section 4.11,
| |
| Step 2.
| |
| Vba
| |
| T = ________ minutes
| |
| Flow
| |
| 1968.5
| |
| T = __19.9__ minutes
| |
| 99
| |
| CUE: IV request noted.
| |
| Standard: Applicant calculates that 19.9 minutes are required to charge the amount of
| |
| boric acid calculated in Step 2 into the RCS.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
| |
| 1) What volume of boric acid is required to raise the RCS boron concentration
| |
| to 1606 ppm?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| 1968.5 gallons of boric acid
| |
| 2) How much time is required to charge the calculated volume of boric acid
| |
| into the RCS?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| 19.9 minutes of charging time
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13009-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: __________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: ______________________________ ______________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
| |
| CCP A is tagged out for maintenance.
| |
| The Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) is NOT available due to
| |
| a high boron concentration.
| |
| RWST boron concentration is 2526 ppm.
| |
| A boration of the RCS is required to be performed.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to use the information
| |
| provided and 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control
| |
| System, Section 4.11, to determine the following:
| |
| (1) What volume of boric acid is required to raise the RCS
| |
| boron concentration to 1606 ppm?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| (2) How much time is required to charge the calculated
| |
| volume of boric acid into the RCS?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| NRC RO Admin Job Performance Measure c
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-17008
| |
| Task Title: Perform Power Level Monitoring with IPC Calorimetric, UQ1118, Non-Functional
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-14915-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: G2.2.38 RO 3.6
| |
| Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in Mode 1.
| |
| IPC Calorimetric, UQ1118, is NOT functional based on an
| |
| Engineering determination 1.5 hours ago.
| |
| Reduced power limitation of TR 13.3.7, Ultrasonic Mode
| |
| Calorimetric, is in effect.
| |
| Excess letdown is NOT in service.
| |
| Initiating Cue: With UQ1118 non-functional, the Shift Supervisor has directed you
| |
| to use the Control Room indications provided and initiate power
| |
| level monitoring by performing 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode
| |
| 1), Section 4.3.3.3.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant performs power level monitoring using 12004-C, Power
| |
| Operation (Mode 1), and 14915-1, Special Conditions Surveillance
| |
| Logs, determines that the average hourly reactor power exceeds the TR
| |
| 13.3.7 reduced power limit, and initiates eight hour average reactor power
| |
| monitoring.
| |
| Required Materials: 14915-1, Special Conditions Surveillance Logs (rev. 50)
| |
| 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1), pages 1 - 3, 89 (rev. 118)
| |
| TR 13.3.7, Ultrasonic Mode Calorimetric
| |
| Red pens
| |
| Calculator
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 15 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1)
| |
| JPM 1. 4.3.3.3 Operation With UQ1118 Non-Functional
| |
| NOTE
| |
| While operating at reduced power per TR 13.3.7, maximum allowed power level
| |
| is 98.3% (3565 MWt) or 98.2% (3562 MWt if excess letdown is in service).
| |
| Reference 14915-1, "Special Conditions Surveillance Logs," Data Sheet 11.
| |
| a. Monitor Delta-T and Power Range Nuclear Instruments to verify the
| |
| highest average (Delta-T or NIS) is less than or equal to 100.0%.
| |
| b. Record hourly values of Reactor Power from RCS Delta-T and Power
| |
| Range Nuclear Instruments per 14915-1, "Special Conditions
| |
| Surveillance Logs," Data Sheet 11, "Power Level Monitoring, Section 2."
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines from NOTE that 98.3% (3565 MWt) is the maximum
| |
| allowed power level and selects 14915-1, Data Sheet 11, to record Delta-T and
| |
| Power Range NI values.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 14915-1, Special Conditions Surveillance Logs
| |
| *JPM 2. Record Delta-T readings and determine Delta-T average power level.
| |
| DATA SHEET 11 (Sheet 3 of 4)
| |
| SECTION 2
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x Both Delta-T and NIS readings must be recorded.
| |
| x Round % power from Delta-T to the nearest 0.1%.
| |
| x DELTA-T AVG is obtained from Plant Computer Point UV0485 or the average of
| |
| the readings from the RCS Delta-T meters on the Main Control Board. If the
| |
| computer point is utilized, then mark 1TDI-411A through 1TDI-441A blanks N/A.
| |
| x If either DELTA-T AVG or NIS AVG exceeds 100.0%, then initiate Section 1.
| |
| Transcribe the highest hourly average value to Section 1.
| |
| DATE _current date_
| |
| DELTA-T
| |
| TIME 1TDI-411A (%) 1TDI-421A (%) 1TDI-431A (%) 1TDI-441A (%) AVG (%)
| |
| Current time 98.0 98.0 97.9 98.2 98.0
| |
| Standard: Applicant records Delta-T readings and determines the average is 98.0%
| |
| [no range since recording to nearest 0.1% is required]. NOTE: The
| |
| applicant may also use computer point UV0485, which is on the IPC data
| |
| sheet as the average.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. Record NIS readings and determine NIS average power level.
| |
| DATA SHEET 11 (Sheet 4 of 4)
| |
| SECTION 2
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x Both Delta-T and NIS readings must be recorded.
| |
| x Round % power from NIS to the nearest 0.1%.
| |
| x NIS AVG is obtained from Plant Computer Point UV0049 or the average of
| |
| the readings from the NIS drawers or NR-45 recorder. If the Computer Point
| |
| is used, then mark N41 through N44 blanks NA.
| |
| x If either DELTA-T AVG or NIS AVG exceeds 100.0%, then initiate Section 1.
| |
| Transcribe the highest hourly average value to Section 1.
| |
| DATE _current date_
| |
| TIME N41 (%) N42 (%) N43 (%) N44 (%) NIS AVG (%)
| |
| Current time 98.5 [98.4 or
| |
| (NR-45) 98.7 98.2 98.3 98.6 98.5 is
| |
| acceptable]
| |
| Standard: Applicant records the NR-45 control board readings and determines the
| |
| NR-45 average is 98.5% [98.4 or 98.5 is acceptable].
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. 4.3.3.3 Operation With UQ1118 Non-Functional
| |
| c. If the hourly average reactor power is greater than 100.0% per Step
| |
| 4.3.3.3b, then calculate the eight hour average reactor power per 14915-
| |
| 1, "Special Conditions Surveillance Logs," Data Sheet 11, "Eight-Hour
| |
| Average Reactor Power Calculation," and evaluate the overpower to
| |
| determine if any reportability requirements exist.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that Data Sheet 11, Section 1, is required based on the
| |
| results of Data Sheet 11, Section 2, or Step 4.3.3.3.c.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 5. Record highest hourly average power and initiate Section 1 for eight-hour
| |
| average power calculation.
| |
| DATA SHEET 11 (Page 2 of 4)
| |
| SECTION 1
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x The initial value is at the time when power first exceeded 100.0% (3625.6
| |
| MWt or 3565 MWt if at reduced power level).
| |
| x Use 3622.6 MWt (or 3562 MWt if at reduced power level) if excess letdown is in
| |
| service. The subsequent 7 values represent the next 7 hours.
| |
| x Use UQ1129 if available.
| |
| x Use highest hourly average from Section 2 if UQ1129 is not available.
| |
| x Mark the unused column N/A.
| |
| x Round MWt to the nearest whole megawatt. Round % power to the nearest 0.1%.
| |
| Date _current date__
| |
| Excess Letdown in service (circle one) Yes No
| |
| REACTOR POWER (MWt) REACTOR POWER (%)
| |
| TIME
| |
| UQ1129 SECTION 2
| |
| Current time N/A 98.5 [98.4 or 98.5 is
| |
| acceptable]
| |
| AVG POWER
| |
| Completed By: __applicant_____/____date____/____time____
| |
| SS Review: ______________/____________/____________
| |
| Initial Date Time
| |
| CUE: An extra operator will record future power levels.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The Completed By line may not be filled in by the
| |
| applicant since the data sheet is not complete. This is acceptable.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that the current average reactor power exceeds the
| |
| maximum allowed power level of 3565 MWt (98.3%) and initiates Section 1
| |
| of Data Sheet 11 for eight-hour average power calculations.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
| |
| SECTION 2, Sheet 3 of 4
| |
| DELTA-T
| |
| TIME 1TDI-411A (%) 1TDI-421A (%) 1TDI-431A (%) 1TDI-441A (%) AVG (%)
| |
| Current time 98.0 98.0 97.9 98.2 98.0
| |
| SECTION 2, Sheet 4 of 4
| |
| TIME N41 (%) N42 (%) N43 (%) N44 (%) NIS AVG (%)
| |
| Current time 98.5 [98.4 or 98.5 is
| |
| 98.7 98.2 98.3 98.6
| |
| (NR-45) acceptable]
| |
| SECTION 1, Sheet 2 of 4
| |
| REACTOR POWER (MWt) REACTOR POWER (%)
| |
| TIME
| |
| UQ1129 SECTION 2
| |
| Current time N/A 98.5 [98.4 or 98.5 is
| |
| acceptable]
| |
| AVG POWER
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-14915-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: __________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _____________
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in Mode 1.
| |
| IPC Calorimetric, UQ1118, is NOT functional based on an
| |
| Engineering determination 1.5 hours ago.
| |
| Reduced power limitation of TR 13.3.7, Ultrasonic Mode
| |
| Calorimetric, is in effect.
| |
| Excess letdown is NOT in service.
| |
| Initiating Cue: With UQ1118 non-functional, the Shift Supervisor has
| |
| directed you to use the Control Room indications provided
| |
| and initiate power level monitoring by performing 12004-C,
| |
| Power Operation (Mode 1), Section 4.3.3.3.
| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| NRC RO/SRO Admin Job Performance Measure b
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: N/A
| |
| Task Title: Determine Active or Inactive Licensed Operator Status
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-NMP-TR-406-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: G2.1.4 RO 3.3 SRO 3.8
| |
| Examinee: _________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Three Reactor Operators have the following history:
| |
| - All three normally work off-shift assignments.
| |
| - All are current in License Operator Continuing Training, have
| |
| dosimetry, meet all medical and vision requirements, and are
| |
| current in respirator and SCBA training.
| |
| - None of the three has worked any shift since 03/31/17.
| |
| - The active / inactive status and time on shift since 01/01/17, for
| |
| each of the Reactor Operators is as follows:
| |
| - Operator Thomas: License was ACTIVE on 01/01/17
| |
| Dates Worked Hours Worked Position Filled
| |
| 01/02/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 2 OATC
| |
| 01/03/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 01/04/17 0700 - 1500 Unit 1 UO
| |
| 01/14/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 2 OATC
| |
| 02/17/17 1900 - 0300 Unit 1 UO
| |
| - Operator Smith: License was ACTIVE on 01/01/17
| |
| Dates Worked Hours Worked Position Filled
| |
| 01/28/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 02/03/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 2 UO
| |
| 02/05/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 EXTRA RO
| |
| 02/14/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 03/02/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| - Operator Lewis: License was INACTIVE on 01/01/17
| |
| Dates Worked Hours Worked Position Filled
| |
| worked 40 hours under
| |
| the direction of the Unit 1
| |
| 02/12/17 through
| |
| OATC and completed all Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 02/16/17
| |
| requirements for license
| |
| reactivation
| |
| 03/10/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 03/12/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 2 UO
| |
| 03/31/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Operations Department management requests that Operators
| |
| Thomas, Smith, and Lewis work on-shift as board operators (OATC
| |
| or UO) during the week of 04/06/17 to cover for vacation.
| |
| Initiating Cue: You have been directed to use the information given and NMP-TR-
| |
| 406, License Administration, to answer the following questions:
| |
| 1) Does Operator Thomas currently meet the requirements for an
| |
| active operator license?
| |
| 2) Does Operator Smith currently meet the requirements for an
| |
| active operator license?
| |
| 3) Does Operator Lewis currently meet the requirements for an
| |
| active operator license?
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant uses NMP-TR-406, License Administration, to determine that
| |
| Operators Thomas and Smith do NOT meet the requirements for an
| |
| active license and that Operator Lewis does meet the requirement for an
| |
| active license.
| |
| Required Materials: NMP-TR-406, License Administration (rev. 6.3)
| |
| Calculators
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 15 minutes
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. Applicant refers to NMP-TR-406, License Administration, for the requirements
| |
| necessary to maintain an active operator license.
| |
| Standard: Applicant refers to NMP-TR-406 to determine the requirements to maintain an
| |
| active operator license.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. Determine the active / inactive license status of Operator Thomas.
| |
| For active license maintenance, per NMP-TR-406, Step 4.5.2.a, Maintenance of
| |
| an active license requires that an individual spend seven (7) eight-hour shifts or
| |
| five (5) twelve-hour shifts in a position that requires the license. Also, per Step
| |
| 4.5.2.b, If an individual stands a combination of complete 12 or eight-hour shifts
| |
| that total 56 hours in the quarter, then this requirement is satisfied. Operator
| |
| Thomas does NOT meet the requirements for an active license because the
| |
| operator worked three 12-hour shifts and two 8-hour shifts in a position that
| |
| requires the license per the Tech Specs (i.e. OATC, UO) in a calendar quarter.
| |
| This does NOT meet the minimum of 56 hours in the quarter.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that Operator Thomas does NOT meet the
| |
| requirements for an active operator license.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. Determine the active / inactive license status of Operator Smith.
| |
| For active license maintenance, per NMP-TR-406, Step 4.5.2.b, If an individual
| |
| stands a combination of complete 12 or eight-hour shifts that total 56 hours in the
| |
| quarter, then this requirement is satisfied. However, per Step 4.5.2.a, the
| |
| operator must be on shift in a position that requires the license per the Tech
| |
| Specs (i.e. OATC, UO). Operator Smith does NOT meet the requirements for
| |
| an active license because the operator worked only four 12-hour shifts in a
| |
| position that requires the license per the Tech Specs (i.e. OATC, UO) in a
| |
| calendar quarter. One 12-hour shift was worked as the Extra RO.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that Operator Smith does NOT meet the requirements
| |
| for an active operator license.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 4. Determine the active / inactive license status of Operator Lewis.
| |
| For license re-activation, per NMP-TR-406, Step 4.6.1, the operator must
| |
| complete a minimum of 40 hours of shift functions (i.e. UO or OATC for RO)
| |
| under the direction of an operator as appropriate and in the position to which the
| |
| individual will be assigned. Once the re-activation requirements are met, per
| |
| Step 4.6.8, The Licensed Operator does NOT have to stand any more shifts
| |
| through the end of the calendar quarter in which they re-activated. Operator
| |
| Lewis meets the requirements for an active license because the operator
| |
| completed a minimum of 40 hours of shift functions (i.e. UO or OATC for RO)
| |
| under the direction of an operator and in the position to which the individual will
| |
| be assigned. The operator does not have to stand any more shifts through the
| |
| end of the quarter to reach the 56 hour minimum maintenance requirement.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that Operator Lewis meets the requirements for an
| |
| active operator license.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating Cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
| |
| 1) Does Operator Thomas currently meet the requirements for an active
| |
| operator license?
| |
| NO
| |
| 2) Does Operator Smith currently meet the requirements for an active
| |
| operator license?
| |
| NO
| |
| 3) Does Operator Lewis currently meet the requirements for an active
| |
| operator license?
| |
| YES
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-NMP-TR-406-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: __________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ____________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Three Reactor Operators have the following history:
| |
| - All three normally work off-shift assignments.
| |
| - All are current in License Operator Continuing Training,
| |
| have dosimetry, meet all medical and vision requirements,
| |
| and are current in respirator and SCBA training.
| |
| - None of the three has worked any shift since 03/31/17.
| |
| - The active / inactive status and time on shift since 01/01/17,
| |
| for each of the Reactor Operators is as follows:
| |
| - Operator Thomas: License was ACTIVE on 01/01/17
| |
| Dates Worked Hours Worked Position Filled
| |
| 01/02/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 2 OATC
| |
| 01/03/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 01/04/17 0700 - 1500 Unit 1 UO
| |
| 01/14/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 2 OATC
| |
| 02/17/17 1900 - 0300 Unit 1 UO
| |
| - Operator Smith: License was ACTIVE on 01/01/17
| |
| Dates Worked Hours Worked Position Filled
| |
| 01/28/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 02/03/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 2 UO
| |
| 02/05/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 EXTRA RO
| |
| 02/14/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 03/02/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| - Operator Lewis: License was INACTIVE on 01/01/17
| |
| Dates Worked Hours Worked Position Filled
| |
| worked 40 hours under
| |
| the direction of the Unit 1
| |
| 02/12/17 through
| |
| OATC and completed all Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 02/16/17
| |
| requirements for license
| |
| reactivation
| |
| 03/10/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| 03/12/17 0700 - 1900 Unit 2 UO
| |
| 03/31/17 1900 - 0700 Unit 1 OATC
| |
| | |
| Operations Department management requests that Operators
| |
| Thomas, Smith, and Lewis work on-shift as board operators
| |
| (OATC or UO) during the week of 04/06/17 to cover for
| |
| vacation.
| |
| Initiating Cue: You have been directed to use the information given and
| |
| NMP-TR-406, License Administration, to answer the
| |
| following questions:
| |
| 1) Does Operator Thomas currently meet the requirements
| |
| for an active operator license?
| |
| 2) Does Operator Smith currently meet the requirements for
| |
| an active operator license?
| |
| 3) Does Operator Lewis currently meet the requirements for
| |
| an active operator license?
| |
| | |
| NRC RO/SRO Admin Job Performance Measure d
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: N/A
| |
| Task Title: Assess Radiological Conditions, Select Emergency Exposure Limit, and Calculate
| |
| Projected Dose to Determine if Task Can be Performed
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-91301-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: G2.3.4 RO 3.2 SRO 3.7
| |
| Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in a Site Area Emergency.
| |
| CCP A and CCP B are injecting into the RCS.
| |
| 1HV-8116, Safety Grade Charging to Regen Heat Exchanger, is open
| |
| and will NOT close from the Control Room.
| |
| The TSC determined that 1HV-8116 is required to be manually
| |
| closed to protect the integrity of vital downstream charging system
| |
| components.
| |
| You have been assigned to manually close 1HV-8116.
| |
| The TOTAL round-trip TRANSIT dose will be 40 mrem.
| |
| The TOTAL time at the job site will be 8 minutes.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Initiating Cue: Based on the given conditions, the radiological information
| |
| provided, and Table 1 of 91301-C, Emergency Exposure
| |
| Guidelines, answer the following questions:
| |
| (1) What is the correct Emergency Exposure Limit for you to
| |
| perform the assigned task?
| |
| (2) What is your projected total gamma dose for the task?
| |
| (3) Can you perform the task without exceeding the correct
| |
| Emergency Exposure Limit?
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Using 91301-C, Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Table 1, and the
| |
| information given, the applicant determines:
| |
| 1. The Emergency Exposure Limit for the task is 10 rem.
| |
| 2. The projected total gamma dose for the task is 9.24 rem or 9240
| |
| mrem.
| |
| 3. The task can be performed without exceeding the 10 rem
| |
| Emergency Exposure Limit.
| |
| Required Materials: 91301-C, Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Table 1 (rev. 13)
| |
| 1-AB-A-09 survey map
| |
| Calculator
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 12 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| *JPM 1. Determine applicable Emergency Exposure Limit.
| |
| Given a General Emergency, 1HV-8116 would be used for safety grade charging
| |
| if instrument air is lost to the CVCS system. Repairing 1HV-8116 will protect
| |
| valuable equipment by ensuring a discharge path for CCP A is available if
| |
| needed for safety grade charging. Based on the need to protect valuable
| |
| equipment, the Emergency Exposure Limit is 10 rem.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that the applicable Emergency Exposure Limit for the
| |
| task is 10 rem.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. Calculate the projected total gamma dose to close 1HV-8116.
| |
| Using the radiological conditions on the survey map provided, a dose rate of 69
| |
| rem/hour at the valve is determined.
| |
| The valve manipulation will take 8 minutes.
| |
| 69 rem/hour (1 hour / 60 minutes) (8 minutes) = 9.2 rem or 9200 mrem
| |
| 9.2 rem (9200 mrem) + 40 mrem (transit dose) = 9.24 rem or 9240 mrem
| |
| Standard: Applicant calculates the projected total gamma dose to close 1HV-8116 will
| |
| be 9.24 rem or 9240 mrem [no range on calculated value].
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. Determine if the task can be performed without exceeding the Emergency
| |
| Exposure Limit.
| |
| Total projected gamma dose would be:
| |
| 9.2 rem (9200 mrem) + 40 mrem (transit dose) = 9.24 rem or 9240 mrem
| |
| With a dose limit of 10 rem, the task can be performed.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The operators year-to-date dose is NOT added to
| |
| the emergency exposure. If it is added, the total dose will exceed the
| |
| Emergency Exposure Limit of 10 rem (total would be 10.2 rem).
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that the projected total dose received (9.24 rem) will
| |
| NOT exceed the Emergency Exposure Limit (10 rem) for the task to be
| |
| performed.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
| |
| 1) What is the correct Emergency Exposure Limit for you to perform the
| |
| assigned task?
| |
| 10 rem
| |
| 2) What is your projected total gamma dose for the task?
| |
| 9.24 rem or 9240 mrem [no range on calculated value]
| |
| 3) Can you perform the task without exceeding the correct Emergency
| |
| Exposure Limit?
| |
| Yes
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-91301-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ______________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in a Site Area Emergency.
| |
| CCP A and CCP B are injecting into the RCS.
| |
| 1HV-8116, Safety Grade Charging to Regen Heat Exchanger,
| |
| is open and will NOT close from the Control Room.
| |
| The TSC determined that 1HV-8116 is required to be
| |
| manually closed to protect the integrity of the downstream
| |
| charging system components.
| |
| You have been assigned to manually close 1HV-8116.
| |
| The TOTAL round-trip TRANSIT dose will be 40 mrem.
| |
| The TOTAL time at the job site will be 8 minutes.
| |
| Initiating Cue: Based on the given conditions, the radiological information
| |
| provided, and Table 1 of 91301-C, Emergency Exposure
| |
| Guidelines, answer the following questions:
| |
| (1) What is the correct Emergency Exposure Limit for you
| |
| to perform the assigned task?
| |
| (2) What is your projected total gamma dose for the task?
| |
| (3) Can you perform the task without exceeding the correct
| |
| Emergency Exposure Limit?
| |
| | |
| | |
| NRC SRO Admin Job Performance Measure a
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-09023
| |
| Task Title: Determine Boration Requirements with the Boric Acid Storage Tank Out of Service
| |
| and Evaluate Tech Spec / TRM Required Actions
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13009-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: G2.1.43 SRO 4.3
| |
| Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: _____________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _________________ Actual Performance ______________________
| |
| Classroom ________________ Simulator ___________________ Plant _________________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
| |
| CCP A is tagged out for maintenance.
| |
| The Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) is NOT available due to a high
| |
| boron concentration.
| |
| RWST boron concentration is 2526 ppm.
| |
| A boration of the RCS is required to be performed.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to use the information
| |
| provided and 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System,
| |
| Section 4.11, to determine the following:
| |
| (1) What volume of boric acid is required to raise the RCS boron
| |
| concentration to 1606 ppm?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| (2) How much time is required to charge the calculated volume of
| |
| boric acid into the RCS?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| (3) Based on the given conditions, what Tech Spec / TRM LCO(s), if
| |
| any, is(are) NOT met?
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Using 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, the applicant
| |
| determines that 1968.5 gallons of boric acid are required to be added to
| |
| the RCS and that 19.9 minutes of charging time are required to charge
| |
| the calculated volume into the RCS. The applicant then evaluates the
| |
| current plant conditions and determines that all Tech Spec / TRM LCOs
| |
| are met.
| |
| Required Materials: 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, pages 1 - 9, 57 -59
| |
| (rev. 51.1)
| |
| Integrated Plant Computer screenshots
| |
| 14406-2, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification - Shutdown, Figure 1
| |
| (completed surveillance indicating CCP A is not available)
| |
| Tech Specs / TRM
| |
| Tech Spec Bases
| |
| Calculator
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 16 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| *JPM 1. 4.11 Boration from the RWST with BAST out of service
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x A stopwatch will be required for timing requirements in this section.
| |
| x This section should only be used when the BAST is out of service.
| |
| 1. Record the following data:
| |
| RWST C b (C RWST ) __2526__ ppm
| |
| Initial RCS C b (C int ) __1576__ ppm
| |
| Desired final RCS C b (C fin ) __1606__ ppm
| |
| Flow rate from RWST to RCS (gpm)
| |
| (Charging - Seal leak-off) ___99___ gpm
| |
| Volume of RCS (V RCS ) 61346 gallons
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: From the given IPC data, total charging flow rate is
| |
| 101 gpm and RCP seal leak-offs are 0.49 gpm, 0.51 gpm, 0.48 gpm, and
| |
| 0.54 gpm for a total seal leak-off of 2.02 gpm, which is rounded to 2.0 gpm.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews the NOTES, determines that the flow rate from the RWST
| |
| to the RCS is 101 gpm - 2.0 gpm = 99 gpm, and records RWST and RCS
| |
| boron concentrations.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. 2. Calculate the volume of boric acid (V ba ) to change C int to C fin .
| |
| C RWST C int
| |
| Vba VRCS u ln = _______ gal
| |
| C RWST C fin
| |
| 2526 1576
| |
| Vba 61346 u ln = __1968.5__ gal
| |
| 2526 1606
| |
| CUE: IV request noted.
| |
| Standard: Applicant calculates that 1968.5 gallons of boric acid are required to raise
| |
| RCS boron concentration from 1576 ppm to 1606 ppm.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. 3. Calculate time (T) required to charge volume determined in Section 4.11,
| |
| Step 2.
| |
| Vba
| |
| T = ________ minutes
| |
| Flow
| |
| 1968.5
| |
| T = __19.9__ minutes
| |
| 99
| |
| CUE: IV request noted.
| |
| Standard: Applicant calculates that 19.9 minutes are required to charge the amount of
| |
| boric acid calculated in Step 2 into the RCS.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 4. Evaluate conditions to determine Tech Spec / TRM impacts.
| |
| Though CCP A and the BAST are tagged out, it can be determined from the
| |
| completed 14406-2, Figure 1, surveillance that a flow path from the RWST
| |
| through CCP B or the NCP to the RCS is available. Therefore, TR LCOs 13.1.2
| |
| and 13.1.4 are met (one boration flow path and one charging pump).
| |
| Though the BAST is not functional, the RWST is functional and meets the
| |
| requirements of TR 13.1.6 (one borated water source is functional).
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: A copy of 14406-2, Figure 1, showing one
| |
| available highlighted flow path is on the next page of this JPM.
| |
| Standard: Applicant evaluates the given plant conditions and determines that all
| |
| applicable Tech Spec / TRM LCOs are met.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| 8
| |
| KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
| |
| 1) What volume of boric acid is required to raise the RCS boron concentration
| |
| to 1606 ppm?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| 1968.5 gallons of boric acid
| |
| 2) How much time is required to charge the calculated volume of boric acid
| |
| into the RCS?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| 19.9 minutes of charging time
| |
| 3) Based on the given conditions, what Tech Spec / TRM LCO(s), if any, is(are)
| |
| NOT met?
| |
| All applicable Tech Spec / TRM LCOs are met.
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13009-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: __________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: ______________________________ ______________
| |
| 10
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
| |
| CCP A is tagged out for maintenance.
| |
| The Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) is NOT available due to
| |
| a high boron concentration.
| |
| RWST boron concentration is 2526 ppm.
| |
| A boration of the RCS is required to be performed.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to use the information
| |
| provided and 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control
| |
| System, Section 4.11, to determine the following:
| |
| (1) What volume of boric acid is required to raise the RCS
| |
| boron concentration to 1606 ppm?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| (2) How much time is required to charge the calculated
| |
| volume of boric acid into the RCS?
| |
| [Perform calculations to one decimal place.]
| |
| (3) Based on the given conditions, what Tech Spec / TRM
| |
| LCO(s), if any, is (are) NOT met?
| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| NRC SRO Admin Job Performance Measure c
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-63013
| |
| Task Title: Perform a Loss of Safety Function Evaluation and Determine Tech Spec / TRM
| |
| Required Actions
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-10008-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: G2.2.40 SRO 4.7
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _________________ Actual Performance __________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant ____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| CCP 1A is tagged out for corrective maintenance.
| |
| Tech Spec LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, Condition A, is in effect
| |
| and has been recorded on an LCO Status Sheet.
| |
| Essential Chiller 1B tripped on overcurrent during surveillance
| |
| testing.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to use 10008-C, Recording
| |
| Limiting Conditions for Operation, to determine the following:
| |
| (1) Does a Loss of Safety Function (LOSF) exist?
| |
| (2) What additional Tech Spec LCOs and/or Conditions, if any, are
| |
| required to be entered?
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant determines that a Loss of Safety Function exists per 10008-C,
| |
| Recording Limiting Conditions for Operation, and that Tech Spec LCO
| |
| 3.0.3 is required to be entered since no Tech Spec condition addresses
| |
| the current configuration.
| |
| Required Materials: 10008-C, Recording Limiting Conditions for Operation (rev. 30)
| |
| Tech Specs
| |
| Tech Spec Bases
| |
| FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15, if requested
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 15 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| 10008-C, Section 4.5, Loss of Safety Function (LOSF) Evaluation
| |
| JPM 1. 4.5.1. Review Precautions and Limitations PRIOR to performing next step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews Precautions and Limitations.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. 4.5.2. Identify the applicable Technical Specification conditions and
| |
| required actions for the inoperable SSCs PRIOR to entering the LCO, IF
| |
| possible.
| |
| CUE: If requested, Another SRO will complete the LCO
| |
| Form.
| |
| Standard: Applicant identifies Tech Spec LCO 3.7.14, ESF Room Cooler and Safety-
| |
| Related Chiller System, Condition A, applies for Essential Chiller 1B.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTE
| |
| A flow chart of the LOSF Evaluation process is shown in Figure 5.
| |
| JPM 3. 4.5.3. Generate a list of impacted SUPPORT/SUPPORTED Systems.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE and determines Essential Chiller 1B is a support
| |
| system for ECCS.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. 4.5.3.1. Considering the conditions identified in Step 4.5.2 as well any LCO
| |
| condition(s) previously in effect, determine if required SUPPORT or
| |
| SUPPORTED SYSTEM(s) are rendered inoperable on redundant safety related
| |
| trains.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines Essential Chiller 1B supports CCP 1B.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 5. 4.5.4. Procedure 10005-C SHALL be used to manually ILLUMINATE SSMP for
| |
| the systems/components identified in Steps 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.
| |
| CUE: The Shift Supervisor will initiate 10005-C.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines 10005-C is used to illuminate affected SSMP components.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 6. 4.5.5. Using flow chart (Figure 5), determine if a Loss of Safety Function will
| |
| exist if the component/system is rendered inoperable. A method of place
| |
| keeping should be used ensuring correct flow path is used. An SRO SHALL
| |
| conduct an independent peer check of flowchart.
| |
| CUE: Peer check request noted.
| |
| Standard: Applicant uses flow chart and determines a Loss of Safety Function evaluation is
| |
| required. NOTE: The following step will determine that the Loss of Safety
| |
| Function exists.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 7. 4.5.6. Determine if concurrent inoperable SUPPORT or SUPPORTED
| |
| systems on required redundant train, results in the loss of a credited safety
| |
| function.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines a Loss of Safety Function exists due to an inoperable
| |
| CCP 1A and an inoperable CCP 1B (Essential Chiller 1B is support
| |
| system).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Steps 4.5.6.1 through 4.5.6.4 are informational and
| |
| do not include any actions for the applicant.
| |
| JPM 8. 4.5.6.1. Equipment supported by an inoperable Offsite Source OR Diesel
| |
| Generator should NOT be considered inoperable for the purpose of this
| |
| evaluation, UNLESS required by LCO 3.8.1 Required Action A.2 or B.3. IF LCO
| |
| 3.8.1 Condition A OR Condition B is in effect AND implementation of Required
| |
| Action A.2 or B.3 subsequently results in the inoperability of a required supported
| |
| system, THEN a LOSF Evaluation MUST be re performed.
| |
| 4.5.6.2. The TS related systems that SHOULD be evaluated when determining if
| |
| a potential loss of safety function exists are:
| |
| 4.5.6.3. A credited safety function is a function required to mitigate the
| |
| consequences of a design basis event as described in the FSAR (reference
| |
| FSAR Chapters 6 and 15), including all assumptions of the initiating event such
| |
| as loss of offsite power.
| |
| 4.5.6.4. A LOSF exists when, assuming that with no additional concurrent failure
| |
| during a design basis event, a required safety function assumed in the accident
| |
| analysis CANNOT be performed.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reads Steps 4.5.6.1 through 4.5.6.4.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 9. 4.5.6.5. If a LOSF is determined to exist, the appropriate Conditions and
| |
| Required Actions of the LCO in which the LOSF exists SHALL be entered.
| |
| If no Condition within the LCO addresses the LOSF, then LCO 3.0.3 shall be
| |
| entered. Results of the LOSF evaluation should be entered in the Unit
| |
| Control Log and/or by initiation of an LCO tracking sheet documenting the
| |
| LCO in which the LOSF exists.
| |
| CUE: The Shift Supervisor will make the log entry and
| |
| complete the LCO tracking sheet.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines no applicable condition exists in Tech Spec LCO
| |
| 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, for less than 100% flow equivalent and enters
| |
| Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
| |
| 1) Does a Loss of Safety Function exist?
| |
| YES
| |
| 2) What additional Tech Spec LCOs and/or Conditions, if any, are required to
| |
| be entered?
| |
| Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3.
| |
| Tech Spec LCO 3.7.14, ESF Room Cooler and Safety-Related Chiller
| |
| System, was initially entered when Essential Chiller 1B tripped (prior
| |
| to LCO 3.0.3 entry).
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-10008-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: __________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: ____________________________ ________________
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| CCP 1A is tagged out for corrective maintenance.
| |
| Tech Spec LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, Condition A, is
| |
| in effect and has been recorded on an LCO Status Sheet.
| |
| Essential Chiller 1B tripped on overcurrent during
| |
| surveillance testing.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to use 10008-C,
| |
| Recording Limiting Conditions for Operation, to
| |
| determine the following:
| |
| (1) Does a Loss of Safety Function (LOSF) exist?
| |
| (2) What additional Tech Spec LCOs and/or Conditions, if
| |
| any, are required to be entered?
| |
| | |
| NRC SRO Admin Job Performance Measure e
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-40005
| |
| Task Title: Assess Plant Conditions and Determine Offsite Protective Action Recommendations
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-112-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: G2.4.44 SRO 4.4
| |
| Examinee: _______________________ NRC Examiner: __________________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: __________________ Date: __________________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance ________________________
| |
| Classroom ____________ Simulator ______________ Plant ______________________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM
| |
| Initial Conditions: A General Emergency has just been declared.
| |
| Current conditions are as follows:
| |
| 1RE-005, Containment High Range, indicates 8.5E +6 mr/hour.
| |
| 1RE-006, Containment High Range, indicates 1.1E +7 mr/hour.
| |
| Containment pressure is 24.3 psig.
| |
| Containment hydrogen concentration is 4.2%.
| |
| Containment Spray Train B is in service.
| |
| Containment Fan Coolers #3, #4, #7, and #8 are in service.
| |
| A release is occurring and Dose Assessment has projected the
| |
| highest off-site dose to be as follows:
| |
| DISTANCE TEDE (mrem) Thyroid CDE (mrem)
| |
| Site Boundary 850 2000
| |
| Wind direction (10 meter, 15 minute avg.) is 75 degrees with no
| |
| precipitation.
| |
| Initiating Cue: You are the Emergency Director and based on the information given,
| |
| determine the required Offsite Protective Action Recommendations
| |
| (PAR) and document your recommendations on NMP-EP-112-F01,
| |
| PAR Worksheet.
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant determines the correct PAR and documents the
| |
| recommendations on NMP-EP-112-F01, PAR Worksheet.
| |
| Required Materials: NMP-EP-110, VEGP EALs - ICs, Threshold Values, and Basis, Figure 1
| |
| (rev. 9.0)
| |
| NMP-EP-112, Protective Action Recommendations (rev. 5.1)
| |
| NMP-EP-112-003, Vogtle Site Specific PAR Instruction (rev. 2.2)
| |
| NMP-EP-112-F01, PAR Worksheet (rev. 1.2)
| |
| Calculator
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: Yes. Per NMP-EP-112, PARs shall be developed and approved within
| |
| 15 minutes of the availability of data indicating conditions requiring an
| |
| initial PAR or a change to an existing PAR.
| |
| Validation Time: 12 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| BEGIN TIME CRITICAL PAR DETERMINATION: __________
| |
| NMP-EP-112, Attachment 1, Action Checklist for PAR Development
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x PARs shall be developed and approved within 15 minutes of the availability of data
| |
| indicating conditions requiring an initial PAR or a change to an existing PAR.
| |
| x ED approved PARs shall be communicated to appropriate agencies, as required,
| |
| within 15 minutes of PAR approval.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The procedures are Reference Use, so the
| |
| applicant may refer to the steps as needed.
| |
| JPM 1. 1. Determine the initial PAR required using the Initial PAR Flowchart and site
| |
| specific instruction:
| |
| NMP-EP-112-003, Vogtle Site Specific PAR Instruction
| |
| Standard: Applicant reads NOTES and initiates NMP-EP-112-003, Vogtle Site Specific
| |
| PAR Instruction, to determine initial PAR.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NMP-EP-112-003, Vogtle Site Specific PAR Instruction
| |
| JPM 2. 4.0.1. Evaluate initial PAR determination using Figure 1, Plant Vogtle Initial PAR
| |
| Flow Chart.
| |
| Standard: Applicant selects Figure 1, Plant Vogtle Initial PAR Flow Chart, to determine
| |
| initial PAR.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 3. Determine initial PAR using Figure 1 flow chart.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Figure 4 Radiological Fastbreaker determination is
| |
| on the next page of the JPM.
| |
| Standard: Applicant refers to Figure 4 to determine if the event is a Radiological
| |
| Fastbreaker.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. Determine if the event is a Radiological Fastbreaker using Figure 4.
| |
| To determine if a Loss of Containment Barrier exists, NMP-EP-110, Figure 1, is used as shown:
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines the event is NOT a Radiological Fastbreaker using Figure 4
| |
| of NMP-EP-112-003 and Figure 1 of NMP-EP-110-GL03.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 5. Determine initial PAR using Figure 1 flow chart.
| |
| Given conditions
| |
| indicate no impediments
| |
| to evacuation.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The Figure 3 affected zones are shown on the next
| |
| page of the JPM.
| |
| Standard: Applicant completes Figure 1 flow chart as shown above to determine that
| |
| evacuation of a 2 mile radius and 5 miles downwind is required for the
| |
| initial PAR.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 6. Determine affected zones using Figure 3.
| |
| Given conditions
| |
| indicate wind is
| |
| from 75 degrees.
| |
| Standard: Applicant references Figure 3 and determines affected zones are A, SRS to
| |
| 2 miles, C5, D5, and E5 (other affected zones are to monitor only).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 7. Complete NMP-EP-112-F01, PAR Worksheet.
| |
| Applicant
| |
| Standard: Applicant completes NMP-EP-112-F01 with current PAR information as
| |
| shown above. NOTE: The areas highlighted in YELLOW are critical. Since the
| |
| applicant is the Emergency Director and the information is to be communicated
| |
| to the off-site agencies, the Worksheet is required to be signed.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| END TIME CRITICAL PAR DETERMINATION: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns cue sheet and NMP-EP-112-F01.
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-112-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _________________
| |
| 10
| |
| | |
| THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM
| |
| Initial Conditions: A General Emergency has just been declared.
| |
| Current conditions are as follows:
| |
| 1RE-005, Containment High Range, indicates 8.5E +6 mr/hour.
| |
| 1RE-006, Containment High Range, indicates 1.1E +7 mr/hour.
| |
| Containment pressure is 24.3 psig.
| |
| Containment hydrogen concentration is 4.2%.
| |
| Containment Spray Train B is in service.
| |
| Containment Fan Coolers #3, #4, #7, and #8 are in service.
| |
| A release is occurring and Dose Assessment has projected
| |
| the highest off-site dose to be as follows:
| |
| DISTANCE TEDE (mrem) Thyroid CDE (mrem)
| |
| Site Boundary 850 2000
| |
| Wind direction (10 meter, 15 minute avg.) is 75 degrees with
| |
| no precipitation.
| |
| Initiating Cue: You are the Emergency Director and based on the
| |
| information given, determine the required Offsite Protective
| |
| Action Recommendations (PAR) and document your
| |
| recommendations on NMP-EP-112-F01, PAR Worksheet.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure i
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-60017
| |
| Task Title: Locally Control Charging Flow
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-18007-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 022AA1.01 RO 3.4 SRO 3.3
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| The recommended starting point for this JPM is adjacent to the main RP Control Point. The
| |
| applicants can be sequestered in the TSC, OEC, or OSC.
| |
| Initial Conditions: On Unit 1, the Charging Flow Controller, 1FIC-121, has
| |
| malfunctioned. The crew is performing the actions of 18007-C,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of
| |
| charging.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to establish local control of
| |
| 1FHC-121, Charging Flow Control, and establish 75 gpm charging
| |
| flow using Attachment 2 of 18007-C.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: The applicant uses 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System
| |
| Malfunction, Attachment 2, to establish local control of 1FHC-121 and
| |
| then adjusts charging flow rate to 75 gpm as read on 1FI-121B.
| |
| Required Materials: 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction (rev. 26.1)
| |
| RWP and proper dosimetry for an RCA entry
| |
| Hearing protection and PPE
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 8 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: ___________
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x Communication equipment is to be found on the wall inside communication storage
| |
| cabinet labeled 1FV-121 (AB C113). A flat bladed screwdriver will be needed to open
| |
| this box.
| |
| x Sound powered phone jacks may be found next door in room C109 (1ABD room).
| |
| JPM 1. To establish control of 1FV-121, perform the following:
| |
| 1. Establish communication with operator at local controller 1FHC-121 (AB
| |
| C113).
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may identify locations of the
| |
| communication storage cabinet and sound powered phone jacks, but
| |
| equipment should not be removed from the cabinet.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews NOTES and establishes communication using sound powered
| |
| phones. NOTE: Other communication systems are acceptable to meet this step
| |
| (ASCOM phones, radios, etc.).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 2. 2. Note charging flow on 1FI-121B (AB C113).
| |
| CUE: Indicate 40 gpm on 1FI-121B.
| |
| Standard: Applicant notes 40 gpm charging flow on 1FI-121B (gauge on wall).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 3. 3. Note pressurizer level on 1LI-460B (AB C113).
| |
| CUE: Indicate 55% pressurizer level on 1LI-460B.
| |
| Standard: Applicant notes 55% pressurizer level on 1LI-460B (gauge on wall).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. 4. Note pressure of Auto gauge on left side of 1FHC-121 (if no pressure is
| |
| indicated, skip the next step).
| |
| CUE: Indicate 80% on Auto gauge on 1FHC-121. If
| |
| checked, indicate the Manual gauge is 0%.
| |
| Standard: Applicant notes 80% on Auto gauge on 1FHC-121.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTES
| |
| x Rotating the control knob clockwise raises air pressure and decreases charging flow.
| |
| x Rotating control knob counter-clockwise lowers air pressure and raises charging flow.
| |
| *JPM 5. 5. Rotate control knob on right side of control box 1FHC-121 as required to
| |
| increase or decrease pressure on right hand gauge until both pressure
| |
| gauges are reading approximately the same.
| |
| CUE: If requested before manipulation, indicate 0% on
| |
| Manual gauge on 1FHC-121.
| |
| CUE: After applicant rotates the control knob clockwise,
| |
| indicate 80% on Manual gauge on 1FHC-121.
| |
| Standard: Applicant rotates the control knob clockwise on the right side of the 1FHC-
| |
| 121 control box until the Manual gauge indicates 80%.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ALB11-F02 CHG FCV-121 IN LOCAL CONTROL
| |
| *JPM 6. 6. Place switch on left side of control box 1FHC-121 to Manual position.
| |
| CUE: If requested, Control room acknowledges
| |
| incoming ALB11-F02 CHG FCV-121 IN LOCAL
| |
| CONTROL alarm.
| |
| Standard: Applicant places switch on left side of control box 1FHC-121 to Manual by
| |
| turning the switch clockwise.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 7. 7. Adjust charging flow as directed by control room/shutdown panel
| |
| operator. (Increasing controller output decreases charging. Lowering
| |
| controller output increases charging.)
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant will rotate the control knob and check
| |
| 1FI-121B to determine charging flow rate, and may make minor
| |
| adjustments as necessary to establish 75 gpm.
| |
| CUE: If applicant requests desired flow rate, See initial
| |
| conditions.
| |
| CUE: After applicant rotates the control knob
| |
| counterclockwise to raise charging flow, indicate 75
| |
| gpm on 1FI-121B and, if requested, 30% on Manual
| |
| gauge on 1FHC-121.
| |
| Standard: Applicant rotates control knob counterclockwise on 1FHC-121 until
| |
| charging flow indicates 75 gpm on 1FI-121B.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 8. 8. When directed by operator, maintain pressurizer level (1LI-460B) by slightly
| |
| increasing or decreasing controller flow (in approximately 5 gpm increments) as
| |
| read on 1FI-121B.
| |
| CUE: An extra operator will monitor and maintain
| |
| pressurizer level.
| |
| Standard: N/A
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-18007-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ___________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: On Unit 1, the Charging Flow Controller, 1FIC-121, has
| |
| malfunctioned. The crew is performing the actions of
| |
| 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System
| |
| Malfunction, for a loss of charging.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to establish local
| |
| control of 1FHC-121, Charging Flow Control, and establish
| |
| 75 gpm charging flow using Attachment 2 of 18007-C.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure j
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-43003
| |
| Task Title: Locally Start Diesel Fire Pump #2 Using the Emergency Start Contactor
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13903-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 086A2.02 RO 3.0 SRO 3.3
| |
| Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _______________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom _____________ Simulator _____________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| The recommended starting point for this JPM is adjacent to the main RP Control Point. The
| |
| applicants can be sequestered in the TSC, OEC, or OSC.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Diesel Fire Pump #1 is tagged out for repair.
| |
| The fire brigade is fighting a large fire at the warehouse.
| |
| The Motor-Driven Fire Pump is running.
| |
| As fire header pressure continued to lower, Diesel Fire Pump #2
| |
| failed to automatically start.
| |
| A local, manual start of Diesel Fire Pump #2 was NOT successful.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform an emergency
| |
| start of Diesel Fire Pump #2 beginning with Step B4.1.3.4 of 13903-C,
| |
| Fire Protection System Operation.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant manually starts Diesel Fire Pump #2 by operating the
| |
| emergency start contactors using 13903-C, Fire Protection System
| |
| Operation.
| |
| Required Materials: 13903-C, Fire Protection System Operation, (rev. 44.5) with Steps
| |
| B4.1.3.1 through B4.1.3.3 signed off by Exam Team
| |
| Hearing protection and PPE
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 12 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| *JPM 1. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| a. Place Control Switch CHS-7907B to AUTO.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: CHS-7907B would have been left in the MANUAL
| |
| 2 position from the previous start attempts.
| |
| CUE: If current position of CHS-7907B is requested,
| |
| indicate switch is in the MANUAL 2 position.
| |
| Standard: Applicant places CHS-7907B in AUTO by turning switch counterclockwise
| |
| to the AUTO position.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| b. Open Fuel Solenoid Bypass.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Fuel solenoid bypass is opened using a knob
| |
| found on the west side of the engine.
| |
| Standard: Applicant opens the Fuel Solenoid Bypass by turning the knob
| |
| counterclockwise until it stops.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| c. Open DIESEL FP#2 CLG WTR PCV BYPASS C-2301-U4-740 and C-
| |
| 2301-U4-743.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Valves are locked with fire locks. Applicant can
| |
| explain how to get a key from Clearance and Tagging or can explain how to
| |
| break the lock.
| |
| Standard: Applicant gets key or breaks locks and opens cooling water valves C-2301-
| |
| U4-740 and C-2301-U4-743 by rotating their handwheels counterclockwise
| |
| until they stop.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Begin Alternate Path
| |
| JPM 4. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| d. Start the diesel by pulling up on either of the two levers on the Emergency
| |
| Start Contactor (east side of engine).
| |
| CUE: Diesel Fire Pump did NOT start.
| |
| Standard: Applicant attempts to start the diesel by pulling up on one of the levers on the
| |
| Emergency Start Contactor.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 5. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| e. If the battery is too weak to start the diesel, then attempt diesel start
| |
| with the other Emergency Start Contactor.
| |
| CUE: Diesel Fire Pump started.
| |
| Standard: Applicant starts the diesel by pulling up on the other Emergency Start
| |
| Contactor lever.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 6. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| f. If the diesel starts, monitor parameters per Step B4.1.1.5.
| |
| CUE: The Outside Area Operator will monitor
| |
| parameters per Step B4.1.1.5.
| |
| Standard: Applicant initiates diesel parameter monitoring.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 7. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| g. If the diesel does NOT start, then:
| |
| (1) Close the Fuel Solenoid Bypass.
| |
| (2) Close DIESEL FP#2 CLG WTR PCV BYPASS C-2301-U4-740
| |
| and C-2301-U4-743.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines step is N/A. NOTE: If applicant closes the valves, then the
| |
| step becomes critical.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 8. B4.1.3.4 To emergency start a Diesel Fire Pump, perform the following:
| |
| h. Notify the SS.
| |
| CUE: The Shift Supervisor has been notified.
| |
| Standard: Applicant notifies the Shift Supervisor that Diesel Fire Pump #2 is running.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13903-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _____________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Diesel Fire Pump #1 is tagged out for repair.
| |
| The fire brigade is fighting a large fire at the warehouse.
| |
| The Motor-Driven Fire Pump is running.
| |
| As fire header pressure continued to lower, Diesel Fire
| |
| Pump #2 failed to automatically start.
| |
| A local, manual start of Diesel Fire Pump #2 was NOT
| |
| successful.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform an
| |
| emergency start of Diesel Fire Pump #2 beginning with
| |
| Step B4.1.3.4 of 13903-C, Fire Protection System
| |
| Operation.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure k
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-11016
| |
| Task Title: Perform a Local Normal Start of Diesel Generator
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13145-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 064A1.01 RO 3.0 SRO 3.1
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _______________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom _______________ Simulator ________________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| The recommended starting point for this JPM is adjacent to the main RP Control Point. The
| |
| applicants can be sequestered in the TSC, OEC, or OSC.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Maintenance has tightened a fitting to repair a fuel oil leak on a DG2B
| |
| fuel injector.
| |
| Maintenance has requested DG2B be locally started and run for 30
| |
| minutes unloaded to conduct a leak inspection.
| |
| Cylinder moisture checks were performed 2 hours ago.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform a local normal
| |
| start of DG2B beginning with Step 4.1.2.5 of 13145B-2, Diesel
| |
| Generator Train B.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant performs a local normal start of DG2B using 13145B-2, Diesel
| |
| Generator Train B, and then stops DG2B within two minutes due to
| |
| inadequate turbo oil pressure.
| |
| Required Materials: 13145B-2, Diesel Generator Train B (rev. 9.0) with Steps 4.1.2.1
| |
| through 4.1.2.4 signed off by the Exam Team
| |
| Hearing protection and PPE
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 12 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| *JPM 1. 4.1.2.5 At Generator Control Panel PDG3, perform the following:
| |
| ALB38-E05 DG2B DISABLED ENGINE CONTROL IN LOCAL
| |
| a. Place LOCAL-REMOTE switch 2HS-4517 in LOCAL.
| |
| CUE: Shift Supervisor acknowledges incoming ALB38-
| |
| E05 DG2B DISABLED ENGINE CONTROL IN
| |
| LOCAL alarm.
| |
| Standard: Applicant transfers DG2B to local control by placing 2HS-4517 to LOCAL.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 2. 4.1.2.5 At Generator Control Panel PDG3, perform the following:
| |
| b. At Engine Control Panel PDG4, check the DG2B DISABLED ENGINE
| |
| CONTROL IN LOCAL annunciator illuminates.
| |
| Cue: When applicant checks annunciator windows,
| |
| indicate window ALB38-E05 is lit.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that annunciator window E05 DG2B DISABLED ENGINE
| |
| CONTROL IN LOCAL is lit.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 3. 4.1.2.6 If the DG is NOT to be paralleled to the offsite grid, place DG2B
| |
| OUTPUT BRKR 2HS-2BA0319 on QEAB in the PULL-TO-LOCK position.
| |
| Cue: If asked about parallel operations, See initial
| |
| conditions.
| |
| Cue: UO has placed 2HS-2BA0319 in PULL-TO-LOCK.
| |
| Standard: Applicant requests control room place 2HS-2BA0319 in PULL-TO-LOCK.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. 4.1.2.7 Alert personnel in the vicinity of the Train B Diesel Generator Building
| |
| that engine startup is beginning.
| |
| Standard: Applicant alerts any personnel in the area. NOTE: Applicant may also make a
| |
| page announcement.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 5. 4.1.2.8 Start DG2B as follows:
| |
| NOTE
| |
| Documentation of a start on Completion Sheet 1 in the Diesel Generator Logbook is
| |
| required for each start.
| |
| CAUTIONS
| |
| x If DG is being returned to service following major engine maintenance, jacket water and
| |
| lube oil temperatures should be at least (135 °F) prior to starting the diesel generator to
| |
| ensure the diesel engine and its components do not incur any unnecessary wear.
| |
| x The Turbo Lube Oil Orifice Bypass Valve should be opened NOT more than 2 minutes
| |
| prior to diesel start, and promptly closed after the start. Excess pre-lubrication may
| |
| result in oil accumulation in the exhaust piping or an exhaust fire upon engine start.
| |
| x The following steps, 4.1.2.8.b and 4.1.2.8.c, need to be performed concurrently to
| |
| prevent damage to Diesel. Locating the Turbo Oil Pressure gauges and Stop
| |
| pushbutton that step 4.1.2.8.c references should be done prior to performing step.
| |
| a. Open the Turbo Lube Oil Orifice Bypass, 2-2403-U4-131, one to two
| |
| (1-2) minutes prior to the Diesel Generator start.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The valve, 2-2403-U4-131, is on the backside of
| |
| the diesel engine.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reads NOTE and CAUTIONS and opens Turbo Lube Oil Orifice
| |
| Bypass by turning 2-2403-U4-131 handwheel counterclockwise until it
| |
| stops.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 6. 4.1.2.8 Start DG2B as follows:
| |
| ALB38-E01 DG2B GENERATOR TROUBLE
| |
| b. Depress START pushbutton 2HS-4570A.
| |
| CUE: Shift Supervisor acknowledges incoming ALB38-
| |
| E01 DG2B GENERATOR TROUBLE alarm.
| |
| CUE: If confirmation is requested, Engine is starting.
| |
| Standard: Applicant starts DG2B by depressing 2HS-4570A.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Begin Alternate Path
| |
| *JPM 7. 4.1.2.8 Start DG2B as follows:
| |
| c. Monitor TURBO OIL PRESSURE gauges 2PI-19171 and 2PI-19171A
| |
| as follows:
| |
| (1) Check oil pressure rising within 15 seconds of the DG start.
| |
| (2) If oil pressure does NOT increase, stop the DG by depressing
| |
| STOP pushbutton 2HS-4572A.
| |
| CUE: When 2PI-19171 and 2PI-19171A are checked,
| |
| indicate approximately 8 psig and stable.
| |
| CUE: If requested, provide picture of alarms.
| |
| CUE: If confirmation of stop is requested after pushing
| |
| button, DG2B is shutting down.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks 2PI-19171 and 2PI-19171A, determines Turbo Oil Pressure
| |
| is NOT rising adequately, and stops DG2B by depressing 2HS-4572A within
| |
| two minutes of depressing the START pushbutton.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 8. 4.1.2.8 Start DG2B as follows:
| |
| d. Close 2-2403-U4-131 (IV REQUIRED).
| |
| CUE: IV request noted.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes 2-2403-U4-131 by turning the handwheel clockwise until it
| |
| stops. NOTE: Applicant may suspend the procedure after tripping the diesel to
| |
| await further guidance.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13145-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _____________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Maintenance has tightened a fitting to repair a fuel oil leak on a
| |
| DG2B fuel injector.
| |
| Maintenance has requested DG2B be locally started and run
| |
| for 30 minutes unloaded to conduct a leak inspection.
| |
| Cylinder moisture checks were performed 2 hours ago.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform a local
| |
| normal start of DG2B beginning with Step 4.1.2.5 of 13145B-2,
| |
| Diesel Generator Train B.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure a
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-37002
| |
| Task Title: Control RCS Temperature Following Reactor Trip
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-19001-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 007EA1.03 RO 4.2 SRO 4.1
| |
| Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom _______________ Simulator ____________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor tripped due to a grid disturbance.
| |
| The control room crew is transitioning to 19001-1, Reactor Trip
| |
| Response.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform 19001-1, Reactor
| |
| Trip Response.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: After determining that RCS temperature is not trending to 557 °F, the
| |
| applicant checks that steam is not dumping, checks MFPs tripped,
| |
| throttles AFW, shuts the MSIVs and BSIVs, and recognizes that boration
| |
| is necessary to ensure adequate shutdown margin.
| |
| Required Materials: 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response (rev. 1)
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 8 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC375 for HL21 NRC Exam
| |
| Simulator Setup from Scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC14
| |
| 2. Override ALB15-F01 and ALB61-C01 to OFF
| |
| 3. Manually trip the reactor
| |
| 4. Trip all RCPs
| |
| 5. Insert malfunctions MS06A through D at 15% severity
| |
| 6. Reduce TDAFW pump speed to minimum
| |
| 7. Throttle AFW to ~ 200 gpm per SG
| |
| 8. Verify RCS WR Tcold < 557 °F and lowering
| |
| 9. If SI occurs during initial simulator set-up, then reset SI, cycle RTBs, and reset RWST SI
| |
| 10. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 11. Freeze simulator
| |
| Setup time from scratch: 15 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR: To minimize transients, leave
| |
| simulator in FREEZE until applicant begins.
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. 1. Initiate the following:
| |
| x Continuous Actions and Foldout Page
| |
| Standard: Applicant initiates Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 2. 1. Initiate the following:
| |
| x Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-1, Critical Safety
| |
| Function Status Tree
| |
| x NMP-EP-110, Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action
| |
| CUE: The STA will initiate 19200-1, Critical Safety
| |
| Function Status Tree.
| |
| CUE: The Shift Manager will initiate NMP-EP-110,
| |
| Emergency Classification Determination and Initial
| |
| Action.
| |
| Standard: Applicant initiates 19200-1 and NMP-EP-110.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 3. 2. If SI actuation occurs during this procedure, then go to 19000-1, Reactor Trip
| |
| or Safety Injection.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews step.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Begin Alternate Path
| |
| *JPM 4. 3. Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 °F.
| |
| With RCP(s) running - RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE
| |
| -OR-
| |
| Without RCP(s) running - RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that RCS WR Cold Leg temperatures are NOT
| |
| trending to 557 °F. NOTE: This step is critical because incorrect performance
| |
| would preclude successful completion of the task and the uncontrolled cooldown
| |
| would not be arrested (mitigation would be more complicated).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 5. 3. RNO If temperature is less than 557 °F and lowering, then perform the
| |
| following as necessary:
| |
| a. Trip both MFPs.
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies both MFPs are tripped by observing MFP discharge pressure
| |
| and flow or by checking annunciators ALB15-D03 MFPT A TRIPPED and
| |
| ALB16-D01 MFPT B TRIPPED are lit.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 6. 3. RNO If temperature is less than 557 °F and lowering, then perform the
| |
| following as necessary:
| |
| b. Verify SG Blowdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED WITH
| |
| HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Though the Blowdown Isolation Valves are closed,
| |
| the handswitches must be placed in CLOSE to prevent re-opening if the
| |
| auto-close signal resets.
| |
| Standard: Applicant places the SG Blowdown Isolation Valve handswitches, 1HS-
| |
| 7603A, 1HS-7603B, 1HS-7603C, and 1HS-7603D to CLOSE (green lights ON,
| |
| red lights OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 7. 3. RNO If temperature is less than 557 °F and lowering, then perform the
| |
| following as necessary:
| |
| c. Stop dumping steam.
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies steam is not being dumped by checking that the steam dumps
| |
| and ARVs are closed (steam dump green lights ON, red lights OFF on ZLB-2;
| |
| ARV green lights ON, red lights OFF on ZLB-4).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 8. 3. RNO If temperature is less than 557 °F and lowering, then perform the
| |
| following as necessary:
| |
| d. Perform the following as appropriate:
| |
| If at least one SG NR level greater than 9%, then lower total feed
| |
| flow.
| |
| -OR-
| |
| If all SG NR levels less than 9%, then lower total feed flow to NOT less
| |
| than 535 gpm.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow rates are currently
| |
| higher than necessary for the plant conditions (~200 gpm per SG), so
| |
| lowering of flow is required. As long as total AFW flow rate is lowered to
| |
| less than the initial value, then the critical step is met.
| |
| Standard: Applicant lowers total AFW flow to limit cooldown by jogging closed
| |
| MDAFW pump discharge throttle valves, 1HS-5139A, 1HS-5132A, 1HS-
| |
| 5134A, and 1HS-5137A. NOTE: With SG NR levels greater than 9% there is no
| |
| minimum flow rate, so reducing flow to 0 gpm is also acceptable.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 9. 3. RNO If temperature is less than 557 °F and lowering, then perform the
| |
| following as necessary:
| |
| e. If cooldown continues, then close MSIVs and BSIVs.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant could close the MSIVs and BSIVs by
| |
| closing each individual valve. This is not expected, but it would meet the
| |
| critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes MSIVs and BSIVs by placing an SLI handswitch, 1HS-
| |
| 3007A or 1HS-3007B, to ACTUATE.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 10. 3. RNO If temperature is less than 557 °F and lowering, then perform the
| |
| following as necessary:
| |
| f. If temperature is less than 557 °F and NOT trending to 557 °F, then
| |
| borate as necessary to maintain shutdown margin by initiating 13009-1,
| |
| CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System.
| |
| CUE: When applicant determines that boration is
| |
| necessary, provide, Extra operators will initiate
| |
| 13009-1 and complete 19001-1.
| |
| Standard: Applicant initiates boration of the RCS.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-19001-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _________________
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor tripped due to a grid disturbance.
| |
| The control room crew is transitioning to 19001-1, Reactor
| |
| Trip Response.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform 19001-1,
| |
| Reactor Trip Response.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure b
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-16009
| |
| Task Title: Respond to RCP Seal Failure at Low Power
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13003-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 015AA1.22 RO 4.0 SRO 4.2
| |
| Examinee: _________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: For time considerations, the applicants may
| |
| pre-brief and review 13003-1 prior to starting the JPM.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in Mode 3 at NOPT following an outage.
| |
| RCPs #1, #2, and #4 are running.
| |
| RCP #3 was stopped for minor maintenance.
| |
| RCP #3 standby alignment has been verified, it has been hand-
| |
| rotated, and a visual inspection has been performed.
| |
| All personnel are out of containment.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to start RCP #3 beginning
| |
| with Step 4.1.2.4 of 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation. All
| |
| precautions and limitations have been verified.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant responds to indications of an RCP #1 seal failure, determines
| |
| the RCP shutdown criteria of 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump
| |
| Operation, Figures 1 and 2, are met, and stops RCP #1. Applicant also
| |
| closes loop #1 spray valve, closes RCP #1 seal leak-off isolation valve,
| |
| and operates the oil lift pump for RCP #1.
| |
| Required Materials: 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation (rev. 52), signed off to Step
| |
| 4.1.2.4 by Exam Team
| |
| 17008-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB08 on Panel 1A2 on
| |
| MCB (rev. 20)
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 10 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC377 for HL21 NRC Exam
| |
| Simulator Setup from Scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC4 (Mode 3)
| |
| 2. Trip reactor to drop shutdown bank rods
| |
| 3. Stop RCP #3
| |
| 4. Insert malfunction RP06A at a Final Value of 19% and a ramp time of 10 seconds on
| |
| Trigger #1 (~ 5.8 gpm seal leak-off for RCP #1)
| |
| 5. Allow conditions to stabilize
| |
| 6. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 7. Freeze simulator
| |
| Setup time: 10 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. 4.1.2.4 If in Mode 3 (Tavg greater than or equal to 350 °F), go to Step 4.1.2.8.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reads step and goes to Step 4.1.2.8 based on current conditions.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. 4.1.2.8 Start the RCP Oil Lift Pump for the associated RCP to be started.
| |
| Standard: Applicant starts the RCP #3 Oil Lift Pump by momentarily placing 1HS-557
| |
| to START (green light OFF, red light ON, blue light ON after a few seconds).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Insert Trigger 1 at this point.
| |
| Begin Alternate Path
| |
| JPM 3. ALB08-A05 RCP 1 CONTROLLED LKG HI/LO FLOW is received.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may go directly to 13003-1, Reactor
| |
| Coolant Pump Operation, Section 4.2.1, for an RCP seal abnormality if
| |
| correctly diagnosed (13003-1 steps are on next page of JPM).
| |
| Standard: Applicant acknowledges alarm and enters 17008-1, Annunciator Response
| |
| Procedures for ALB08 on Panel 1A2 on MCB, for Window A05.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. 17008-1, Window A05
| |
| 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS
| |
| 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| NOTE
| |
| RCP 1, No. 1 seal water leak-off high range flow may be monitored using computer
| |
| point F0161.
| |
| 1. Observe seal injection flow and seal leak-off flow, as well as excess
| |
| letdown temperature and pressure for indication of an actual seal
| |
| anomaly.
| |
| 2. If a seal problem is indicated, go to 13003-1, "Reactor Coolant
| |
| Pump Operation."
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks seal injection and seal leak-off flow indications on the IPC or
| |
| QMCB (1FI-160A will indicate near top of scale) and determines a seal problem
| |
| is indicated by high #1 seal leak-off flow rate and goes to 13003-1, Reactor
| |
| Coolant Pump Operation.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 5. 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, Section 4.2.1, Pump Operation
| |
| With a Seal Abnormality.
| |
| 4.2.1.1 If the Plant Computer is available, trend the computer data points listed in
| |
| Table 2.
| |
| CUE: When applicant checks IPC for RCP parameters,
| |
| An extra operator will continue trending data
| |
| points in Table 2.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines IPC is available and trends points for RCP parameters.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 6. 4.2.1.2 If the Plant Computer is NOT available, perform the following:
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines the step is N/A since the IPC is available.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 7. 4.2.1.3 Monitor the No. 1 seal for further degradation using Figure 1 and RCP
| |
| Trip Criteria as follows:
| |
| a. Evaluate the monitored indications using Figure 1, RCP Seal
| |
| Abnormalities Tree.
| |
| Standard: Applicant uses Figure 1 and evaluates RCP seal degradation (answer keys
| |
| follow on next two pages). NOTE: Figure 2 indicates the approximate point
| |
| where seal leak-off is determined for a decision on Figure 1.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| FIGURE 1
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| NO. 1 SEAL NORMAL OPERATING RANGE
| |
| 6
| |
| Non-operating Range
| |
| No. 1 Seal Leakoff (GPM) Note 4
| |
| 5
| |
| Abnormal Operating
| |
| Non-operating Range
| |
| Range
| |
| 4
| |
| 3
| |
| NORMAL
| |
| OPERATING RANGE
| |
| 2
| |
| NOTE 1
| |
| 1 0.8
| |
| NOTE 2
| |
| 0.2 Non-operating Range
| |
| 0
| |
| 0 200 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
| |
| 2,250
| |
| No. 1 Seal Differential Pressure (PSI) NOTE 3
| |
| FIGURE 2
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 8. 4.2.1.3 Monitor the No. 1 seal for further degradation using Figure 1 and
| |
| RCP Trip Criteria as follows:
| |
| b. If evaluation of the monitored indications using Figure 1 requires
| |
| immediate pump shutdown, go to Step 4.2.1.4.
| |
| Standard: Applicant evaluates the monitored indications using Figures 1 and 2 and
| |
| determines that immediate RCP shutdown is required. Applicant then goes
| |
| to Step 4.2.1.4. Note: Step is critical because if not performed correctly, the
| |
| RCP would run longer than required with a failed seal, which would risk
| |
| additional damage.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 9. 4.2.1.4 When directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
| |
| NOTE
| |
| If RCP Oil Lift Pump is not available, shutdown of RCP may still proceed.
| |
| CAUTION
| |
| The Oil Lift pump should NOT be started for any RCP that is being stopped due to loss
| |
| of thermal barrier cooling.
| |
| a. Start the RCP Oil Lift Pump for the affected RCP, if available.
| |
| CUE: If Shift Supervisor direction requested, Continue
| |
| performing 13003-1.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE and CAUTION and starts the RCP #1 Oil Lift Pump by
| |
| momentarily placing 1HS-555 to START (green light OFF, red light ON, blue light
| |
| ON after a few seconds).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 10. 4.2.1.4 When directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
| |
| b. If Reactor Power is greater than 15% Rated Thermal Power:
| |
| (1) Trip the Reactor and initiate 19000-1, "Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection.
| |
| (2) When the immediate operator actions of 19000-1 are complete, go
| |
| to Step 4.2.1.4.d.
| |
| c. If Reactor Power is less than 15% Rated Thermal Power, initiate 18005-
| |
| C, Partial Loss of Flow.
| |
| CUE: An extra operator will initiate 18005-C, Partial
| |
| Loss of Flow.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines power is less than 15% and initiates 18005-C, Partial Loss
| |
| of Flow.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 11. 4.2.1.4 When directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
| |
| d. Stop the RCP by placing the RCP Non-1E Control Switch in STOP
| |
| and then placing the RCP 1E Control Switch in STOP:
| |
| RCP Non-1E Control Switch 1E Control Switch
| |
| Loop 1 1HS-495B 1HS-495A
| |
| Standard: Applicant stops RCP #1 by first placing 1HS-495B to STOP and then
| |
| placing 1HS-495A to STOP (red lights OFF, green lights ON). NOTE:
| |
| Opening either breaker stops the RCP; however, it is also critical that 1HS-495B
| |
| is opened before 1HS-495A to minimize the risk of damage to the 1E breaker if it
| |
| were opened under load.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 12. 4.2.1.4 When directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
| |
| CAUTION
| |
| If RCP #1 or #4 is stopped, the associated Spray Valve is placed in manual and
| |
| closed to prevent spray short cycling.
| |
| e. If RCP #1 or #4 is stopped, verify its associated spray valve is
| |
| placed in MANUAL and closed.
| |
| RCP 1: 1PIC-455C
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes the loop #1 spray valve by placing 1PIC-455C in MANUAL
| |
| by depressing the DOWN arrow until demand is 0% (controller MAN light
| |
| ON, DOWN arrow light ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 10
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 13. 4.2.1.4 When directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
| |
| CAUTION
| |
| If RCP was stopped only due to loss of total seal cooling (ACCW and Seal Injection)
| |
| and other RCPs are still running, the individual RCP Seal Leak-off isolation valve
| |
| should not be closed.
| |
| f. When the RCP comes to a complete stop (as indicated by reverse
| |
| flow), close the RCP Seal Leak-off Isolation valve for the affected
| |
| pump:
| |
| RCP 1: 1HV-8141A
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that Loop 1 RCS flow meters 1FI-414, 1FI-415, and 1FI-416
| |
| on QMCB or Loop 1 flow on the IPC indicate approximately 15%, and then
| |
| closes the RCP #1 Seal Leak-off Isolation valve by placing 1HS-8141A to
| |
| CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ___________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 14. 4.2.1.4 When directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
| |
| g. Secure the associated RCP Oil Lift Pump.
| |
| Standard: Applicant stops the RCP #1 Oil Lift Pump by momentarily placing 1HS-555 to
| |
| STOP (green light ON, red light OFF, blue light OFF after a few seconds).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 11
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 15. 4.2.1.4 When directed by the SS, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:
| |
| h. If RCP shutdown was due to loss of RCP seal cooling, review Limitation
| |
| 2.2.11 for recovery action.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines this step is N/A.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 12
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13003-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ___________
| |
| 13
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in Mode 3 at NOPT following an outage.
| |
| RCPs #1, #2, and #4 are running.
| |
| RCP #3 was stopped for minor maintenance.
| |
| RCP #3 standby alignment has been verified, it has been
| |
| hand-rotated, and a visual inspection has been performed.
| |
| All personnel are out of containment.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to start RCP #3
| |
| beginning with Step 4.1.2.4 of 13003-1, Reactor Coolant
| |
| Pump Operation. All precautions and limitations have been
| |
| verified.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure c
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-29013
| |
| Task Title: Dilute Containment Hydrogen Using the Service Air System
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13130-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 028A2.03 RO 3.4 SRO 4.0
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _________________ Actual Performance __________________
| |
| Classroom _______________ Simulator ______________ Plant __________________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 tripped due to a LOCA.
| |
| 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
| |
| The TSC has requested that the hydrogen concentration in the
| |
| containment atmosphere be reduced.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to dilute the containment
| |
| hydrogen concentration using service air per 13130-1, Post-
| |
| Accident Hydrogen Control.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant initiates dilution of containment hydrogen concentration using
| |
| the service air system per 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control.
| |
| Required Materials: 13130-1, Post Accident Hydrogen Control (rev. 21)
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 6 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC370 for HL21 NRC Exam
| |
| Simulator Setup from Scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC14
| |
| 2. Insert malfunction RC05C at 50% (hot leg break)
| |
| 3. Throttle AFW flow to ~ 150 gpm for each SG
| |
| 4. Use RF ED08 to set containment hydrogen to 4.5%
| |
| 5. Use RF ED07 to override containment hydrogen
| |
| 6. Trip RCPs
| |
| 7. Verify RCS pressure rising
| |
| 8. Reset SI
| |
| 9. Stop RHR pumps
| |
| 10. Place both containment hydrogen monitors in service per 13130-1
| |
| 11. Allow time for hydrogen concentration to rise above 4% on QMCB
| |
| 12. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 13. Freeze simulator
| |
| Setup time from scratch: 15 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| *JPM 1. 4.4.2 Diluting Containment Hydrogen Concentration Using The Service Air
| |
| System
| |
| NOTE
| |
| Containment design pressure is 52 psig.
| |
| CAUTION
| |
| Do not perform this section if containment pressure is greater than 40 psig unless so
| |
| directed by the Emergency Director.
| |
| 4.4.2.1 Reset CIA by taking the following handswitches to RESET and
| |
| observe ALB06-E06 extinguished:
| |
| x 1HS-40120
| |
| x 1HS-40122
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may check that containment pressure is
| |
| less than 40 psig on containment pressure channels, 1PI-934, 1PI-935,
| |
| 1PI-936, or 1PI-937, or on recorder 1PR-934 (middle of QMCB panel A),
| |
| or on the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC).
| |
| CUE: If performed in Control Room and containment
| |
| pressure is checked, indicate 12.5 psig.
| |
| CUE: If performed in Control Room and CIA is reset,
| |
| ALB06-E06 CNMT ISO PHASE A ACTUATION has
| |
| reset.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reads NOTE and CAUTION, resets CIA by momentarily placing
| |
| 1HS-40120 and 1HS-40122 to RESET (on QMCB), and observes ALB06-E06
| |
| CNMT ISO PHASE A ACTUATION clears.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 2. 4.4.2.2 Open SERVICE AIR CNMT HDR ISOL 1HV-9385 as follows:
| |
| a. Place 1HS-9385A on Main Control Room Panel QPCP to OPEN.
| |
| b. Hold 1HS-9385B on Panel QPCP in OPEN until 1HV-9385 is fully
| |
| open.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The applicant must manipulate the handswitches
| |
| in the proper sequence stated above or the valve will not open. It is a
| |
| single valve with dual handswitches.
| |
| Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-9385 by momentarily placing 1HS-9385A to OPEN.
| |
| Applicant then places 1HS-9385B to OPEN and holds until the valve opens
| |
| (red light ON, green light OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. 4.4.2.3 Open one SERVICE AIR CNMT POST LOCA PURGE valve using its
| |
| Control Switch on QPCP:
| |
| 1HV-9380A
| |
| OR
| |
| 1HV-9380B
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Valves are in parallel, so opening either valve will
| |
| meet the critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant opens either 1HV-9380A or 1HV-9380B by placing 1HS-9380A or
| |
| 1HS-9380B to OPEN (for the opened valve, red light ON, green light OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. 4.4.2.4 Check Service Air Header, 1PI-9377, and Instrument Air Dryer to SCS
| |
| Equipment, 1PI-9361, pressures on Main Control Room Panel QMCB.
| |
| CUE: If performed in Control Room and 1PI-9377 and 1PI-
| |
| 9361 are checked, indicate ~105 psig and stable.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that the Service and Instrument air pressures on 1PI-9377 and
| |
| 1PI-9361 (QMCB panel A) are not lowering uncontrollably (see next step).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 5. 4.4.2.5 If air pressures fall to 80 psig or less, SERVICE AIR DRYER SUPPLY
| |
| OUTLET ISO 1PV-9375 isolates service air to dryers; restore purge air flow as
| |
| follows:
| |
| a. Reset 1PV-9375 per 13710-1 to restore Service Air Supply.
| |
| b. Throttle Service Air Dryer Bypass Valve, 1-2401-U4-551, as necessary to
| |
| maintain air pressure 1PI-9377 and 1PI-9361 greater than 85 psig.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines air pressures on 1PI-9377 and 1PI-9361 are stable and no
| |
| further action is required.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 6. 4.4.2.6 Monitor containment hydrogen concentration through sampling and per
| |
| Section 4.2.1 and/or 4.2.2 of this procedure.
| |
| CUE: An extra operator will initiate monitoring and
| |
| complete the procedure.
| |
| Standard: N/A
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13130-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _________________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 tripped due to a LOCA.
| |
| 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in
| |
| progress.
| |
| The TSC has requested that the hydrogen concentration in
| |
| the containment atmosphere be reduced.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to dilute the
| |
| containment hydrogen concentration using service air per
| |
| 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure d
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-15003
| |
| Task Title: Respond to Inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-17006-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 013A2.06 RO 3.7* SRO 4.0
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _______________ Actual Performance __________________
| |
| Classroom _____________ Simulator _____________ Plant ____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to assume the duties of the
| |
| OATC. Correctly diagnose plant conditions and complete any
| |
| required corrective actions.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant acknowledges incoming alarm, determines containment spray
| |
| actuation is not required, and responds using Annunciator Response
| |
| Procedure 17006-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB06 on
| |
| Panel 1A2 on MCB, to terminate containment spray.
| |
| Required Materials: 17006-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB06 on Panel 1A2 on
| |
| MCB (rev. 33.1)
| |
| 17005-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB05 on Panel 1A2 on
| |
| MCB, (rev. 34.2), if requested
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 5 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC371 for HL21 NRC Exam
| |
| Simulator Setup from Scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC14
| |
| 2. Insert malfunction ES12 (inadvertent CS actuation) on Trigger 1
| |
| 3. Override ALB61-B03 and ALB61-C03 to OFF (containment sump levels)
| |
| 4. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 5. Freeze simulator
| |
| Setup time: 5 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Do NOT insert Trigger 1 until
| |
| requested by examiner.
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. Acknowledge incoming alarms.
| |
| ALB06-D06 CNMT SPRAY ACTUATION is received.
| |
| ALB05-D05 GROUP 4 MONITOR LIGHT COMP OFF NORM is received.
| |
| CUE: If announced, Shift Supervisor acknowledges
| |
| ALB06-D06 CNMT SPRAY ACTUATION and ALB05-
| |
| D05 GROUP 4 MONITOR LIGHT COMP OFF NORM
| |
| alarms.
| |
| Standard: Applicant acknowledges incoming alarms.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 2. Enter Annunciator Response Procedure for ALB06-D06.
| |
| NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Remove malfunction ES12 at this
| |
| time.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may also reference 17005-1 for the
| |
| ALB05-D05 alarm, but it is not required for successful completion of the
| |
| JPM.
| |
| Standard: Applicant enters 17006-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB06 on
| |
| Panel 1A2 on MCB, in response to ALB06-D06 alarm.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 3. 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE
| |
| 1. Manual actuation of the Containment Spray System.
| |
| 2. Containment HI-3 setpoint reached on 2 or more Containment pressure
| |
| channels.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may also check Containment Spray
| |
| bistable lights on TSLB-4 (far right on QMCB) for confirmation that
| |
| Containment HI-3 setpoint has not been reached.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks containment pressure channels, 1PI-934, 1PI-935, 1PI-936,
| |
| and 1PI-937, or recorder 1PR-934 (middle of QMCB panel A), or Integrated
| |
| Plant Computer (IPC) to determine containment HI-3 setpoint (21.5 psig) has
| |
| NOT been exceeded.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 4. 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS
| |
| 1. Containment Spray Pumps start.
| |
| 2. Containment Spray Isolation Valves, 1HV-9001A and 1HV-9001B, open.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: There are no indications for Containment Spray
| |
| flow or pump discharge pressure in the control room. The red lights on the
| |
| pump and valve handswitches are used to verify operation.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that Containment Spray Pump A is running on 1HS-10940 and
| |
| Isolation Valve, 1HV-9001A, is open on 1HS-9001A (red lights ON, green lights
| |
| OFF). NOTE: Only Containment Spray Train A actuated.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 5. 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| NOTE
| |
| Actions for a containment spray actuation are contained in Emergency Operating
| |
| Procedures.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may refer to the EOPs, but they should
| |
| NOT be entered.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 6. 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| If a spurious Containment Spray actuation has occurred:
| |
| 1. Reset CS signal.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: ALB06-D06 CNMT SPRAY ACTUATION will clear
| |
| when Containment Spray signal is reset.
| |
| Standard: Applicant resets the Containment Spray signal by momentarily placing
| |
| handswitches 1HS-40058 and 1HS-40059 to RESET.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 7. 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| If a spurious Containment Spray actuation has occurred:
| |
| 2. Stop CS pumps.
| |
| Standard: Applicant stops Containment Spray pump A by momentarily placing 1HS-
| |
| 10940 to STOP (green light ON, red light OFF). Applicant checks 1HS-10941
| |
| to verify that Containment Spray pump B is stopped (green light ON, red light
| |
| OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 8. 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| If a spurious Containment Spray actuation has occurred:
| |
| 3. Shut CNMT SPRAY ISO VLVS:
| |
| a. 1HV-9001A
| |
| b. 1HV-9001B
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes Containment Spray pump A isolation valve, 1HV-9001A,
| |
| by momentarily placing 1HS-9001A to CLOSE (green light ON, red light
| |
| OFF). Applicant checks 1HS-9001B to verify that Containment Spray pump B
| |
| isolation valve, 1HV-9001B, is closed (green light ON, red light OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 9. 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| If a spurious Containment Spray actuation has occurred:
| |
| 4. If Containment Spray is actuated and terminated prior to recirculation, a
| |
| controlled cleanup and inspection of equipment in containment should begin
| |
| within five days of the event.
| |
| CUE: The Shift Supervisor has been notified of the
| |
| controlled cleanup and inspection requirement.
| |
| Standard: Applicant notifies Shift Supervisor of requirement to begin a controlled cleanup
| |
| and inspection of equipment in containment within five days of the event.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 10. 5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| None
| |
| CUE: If requested, The Shift Supervisor has been
| |
| notified that no compensatory actions are
| |
| required.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that compensatory operator actions are not required.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No: V-NRC-JP-17006-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _____________
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to assume the duties
| |
| of the OATC. Correctly diagnose plant conditions and
| |
| complete any required corrective actions.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure e
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-37005
| |
| Task Title: Re-Establish CCP Cold Leg Injection
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-19011-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: WE02EA1.3 RO 3.8 SRO 4.0
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: _______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: _______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _______________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom _____________ Simulator _____________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor tripped due to a small break LOCA.
| |
| The control room crew is transitioning to 19011-1, SI Termination.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform 19011-1, SI
| |
| Termination.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant will place normal charging in service and then determine that
| |
| pressurizer level cannot be maintained, so CCP cold leg injection through
| |
| the BIT will be re-established using Attachment 3 of 19011-1, SI
| |
| Termination.
| |
| Required Materials: 19011-1, SI Termination (rev. 1)
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 14 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC376 for HL21 NRC exam
| |
| Simulator Setup from Scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC14
| |
| 2. Insert malfunction CV06B (CCP B trip)
| |
| 3. Insert malfunction RC04A at 70% (LOCA is sized so RCS pressure will be rising slowly, but
| |
| when normal charging is established pressurizer level will lower)
| |
| 4. Trip the reactor
| |
| 5. Actuate SI
| |
| 6. Throttle AFW flow to ~100 gpm per SG
| |
| 7. Perform applicable steps of 19000-1 and 19010-1 through transition to 19011-1
| |
| 8. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 9. Freeze simulator
| |
| Set up time from scratch: 15 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR: To minimize transients, leave
| |
| simulator in FREEZE until applicant begins.
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. 1. Initiate the following:
| |
| x Continuous Actions and Foldout Page
| |
| Standard: Applicant initiates Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 2. 1. Initiate the following:
| |
| x Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-1, Critical Safety Function
| |
| Status Tree
| |
| x NMP-EP-110, Emergency Classification Determination and Initial Action
| |
| CUE: The STA will initiate 19200-1, Critical Safety
| |
| Function Status Tree.
| |
| CUE: The Shift Manager will initiate NMP-EP-110,
| |
| Emergency Classification Determination and Initial
| |
| Action.
| |
| Standard: Applicant initiates 19200-1 and NMP-EP-110.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| CAUTIONS
| |
| x If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF
| |
| equipment if plant conditions require their operation:
| |
| x RHR Pumps
| |
| x SI Pumps
| |
| x Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units
| |
| x Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).
| |
| x ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CRI is reset).
| |
| *JPM 3. 2. Reset SI
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may check the BPLB for the SI
| |
| ACTUATED light off and the AUTO SI BLOCKED light on to verify SI reset.
| |
| Applicant may also check that the SI indicator clears at the top of the IPC
| |
| screen.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews CAUTIONS and resets SI by momentarily placing 1HS-
| |
| 40066 and 1HS-40067 to RESET.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| CAUTION
| |
| Repositioning Phase A Isolation Valves may cause radiation problems throughout the plant.
| |
| *JPM 4. 3. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may make a page announcement or notify
| |
| the Shift Supervisor of the CAUTION statement.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may check that ALB06-E6 CNMT ISO
| |
| PHASE A ACTUATION clears to verify CIA reset or that the CI indicator
| |
| clears at the top of the IPC screen.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews CAUTION and resets CIA by momentarily placing HS-40120
| |
| and 1HS-40122 to RESET.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 5. 4. Establish Instrument Air to Containment:
| |
| a. Instrument air pressure - GREATER THAN 100 psig.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that instrument air pressure is greater than 100 psig on 1PI-9361
| |
| (far left of QMCB) or on the IPC.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 6. 4. Establish Instrument Air to Containment:
| |
| b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV 1HV-9378.
| |
| Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-9378 by momentarily placing 1HS-9378A to OPEN then
| |
| placing 1HS-9378B to OPEN and holding until valve is fully open (green light
| |
| OFF, red light ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 7. 4. Establish Instrument Air to Containment:
| |
| c. Verify Pressurizer Spray Valves operating as required.
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies pressurizer spray valves are operating as required by
| |
| determining they should be closed for the current pressurizer pressure (green
| |
| lights ON, red lights OFF). NOTE: Based on the current conditions, the spray
| |
| valves should be closed.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 8. 5. Verify only one CCP-RUNNING.
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies that CCP A is the only running CCP (1HS-273A green light OFF,
| |
| red light ON; 1HS-274A green light ON, amber light ON, red light OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 9. 6. Check RCS Pressure - STABLE OR RISING.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that RCS pressure is stable or rising on the IPC or on QMCB
| |
| indications (meters or recorders).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 10. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| a. Check Instrument Air - AVAILABLE.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that instrument air pressure is greater than 100 psig on 1PI-9361
| |
| (far left of QMCB) or on the IPC.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 11. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| b. Open CCP normal mini-flow isolation valves:
| |
| x 1HV-8111A - CCP-A MINIFLOW
| |
| x 1HV-8111B - CCP-B MINIFLOW
| |
| x 1HV-8110 - CCP A&B COMMON MINIFLOW
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: A bulleted valve list means the valves can be
| |
| operated in any order.
| |
| Standard: Applicant opens the CCP normal mini-flow valves by placing 1HS-8111A,
| |
| 1HS-8111B, and 1HS-8110 to OPEN (green lights OFF, red lights ON). NOTE:
| |
| CCP B is tripped.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 12. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| c. Close CCP alternate mini-flow valves:
| |
| x 1HV-8508A - CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION
| |
| x 1HV-8508B - CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes the CCP alternate mini-flow valves by placing 1HS-8508A
| |
| and 1HS-8508B to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 13. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| d. Verify white Pressure Control Mode light - NOT lit:
| |
| x 1HV-8508A - CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION
| |
| x 1HV-8508B - CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies white Pressure Control Mode lights are NOT lit by momentarily
| |
| placing 1HS-8508A and 1HS-8508B to CLOSE, if required, to extinguish the lights
| |
| (white lights OFF). NOTE: This may have been done in the previous step.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 14. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| e. Close BIT DISCH ISOLATION valves:
| |
| x 1HV-8801A
| |
| x 1HV-8801B
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes the BIT discharge isolation valves by placing 1HS-8801A
| |
| and 1HS-8801B to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 15. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| f. Set SEAL FLOW CONTROL 1HC-182 to maximum seal flow (1HV-182
| |
| closed)
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes the seal flow control valve, 1HV-182, by depressing the UP
| |
| arrow on 1HC-182 until the UP arrow remains ON (1HV-182 is closed).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Raise malfunction RC04A severity
| |
| to 82% during this step to slightly increase leak rate.
| |
| *JPM 16. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| g. Open CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION valves:
| |
| x 1HV-8105
| |
| x 1HV-8106
| |
| Standard: Applicant opens the charging to RCS isolation valves by placing 1HS-8105
| |
| and 1HS-8106 to OPEN (green lights OFF, red lights ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 17. 7. Establish charging flow:
| |
| h. Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs - 8 to 13 gpm.
| |
| Standard: Applicant establishes 8 to 13 gpm seal injection flow to all RCPs by depressing the
| |
| UP and DOWN arrows, as required, on 1HC-182 (seal flow rates are checked on
| |
| 1FI-145A, 1FI-144A, 1FI-143A, and 1FI-142A on the QMCB).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Begin Alternate Path
| |
| JPM 18. 8. Control charging flow to maintain pressurizer level.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The applicant may also initiate Attachment 3 at this
| |
| point based on the Foldout Page (pressurizer level cannot be maintained
| |
| greater than 5% [34% adverse]).
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies maximum charging flow to the RCS is established (UP arrow on
| |
| 1FIC-121, Charging Line Control, is lit), but is NOT able to maintain level in the
| |
| pressurizer. Applicant may also adjust 1HC-182 as required to control RCP seal
| |
| flow as charging flow rises.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 19. 8. RNO If pressurizer level continues to lower, then realign charging flow path
| |
| through BIT using Attachment 3.
| |
| Standard: Applicant initiates Attachment 3 to realign charging flow path through the BIT.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 10
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Begin Attachment 3
| |
| JPM 20. 1. Terminate Safety Grade Charging using 13006-1, Chemical and Volume
| |
| Control System, if in service.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines this step is N/A since Safety Grade Charging is not in
| |
| service.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 21. 2. Open RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION valves:
| |
| x 1LV-112D
| |
| x 1LV-112E
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies that 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E are open by checking 1HS-112D
| |
| and 1HS-112E (green lights OFF, red lights ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 22. 3. Close VCT OUTLET ISOLATION valves:
| |
| x 1LV-112B
| |
| x 1LV-112C
| |
| Standard: Applicant verifies that 1LV-112B and 1LV-112C are closed by checking 1HS-112B
| |
| and 1HS-112C (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 11
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 23. 4. Align CCP alternate mini-flow valves:
| |
| TRAIN A
| |
| x 1HS-8508A - ENABLE PTL
| |
| x 1HV-8509B - OPEN
| |
| Standard: Applicant places 1HS-8508A in ENABLE PTL (white light ON) and verifies
| |
| 1HV-8509B is open (green light OFF, red light ON).
| |
| Comments:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 24. 4. Align CCP alternate mini-flow valves:
| |
| TRAIN B
| |
| x 1HS-8508B - ENABLE PTL
| |
| x 1HV-8509A - OPEN
| |
| Standard: Applicant places 1HS-8508B in ENABLE PTL (white light ON) and verifies 1HV-
| |
| 8509A is open (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE: Since CCP B is tripped,
| |
| the applicant may not do this.
| |
| Comments:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 25. 5. Close CCP normal mini-flow isolation valves:
| |
| x 1HV-8111A - CCP-A MINIFLOW
| |
| x 1HV-8111B - CCP-B MINIFLOW
| |
| x 1HV-8110 - CCP-A&B COMMON MINIFLOW
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-8110 is in series, so closing 1HV-8110 or both
| |
| 1HV-8111A and 1HV-8111B (valves in parallel) meets the critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes the CCP normal mini-flow valves by placing 1HS-8111A,
| |
| 1HS-8111B, and 1HS-8110 to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
| |
| Comments:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 12
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 26. 6. Close CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION valves:
| |
| x 1HV-8105
| |
| x 1HV-8106
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Valves are in series, so closing either valve meets
| |
| the critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes the charging to RCS isolation valves by placing 1HS-8105
| |
| and 1HS-8106 to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 27. 7. Open BIT DISCH ISOLATION valves:
| |
| x 1HV-8801A
| |
| x 1HV-8801B
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: Valves are in parallel, so opening either valve meets
| |
| the critical step. This is the last step of Attachment 3.
| |
| Standard: Applicant opens the BIT discharge isolation valves by placing 1HS-8801A
| |
| and 1HS-8801B to OPEN (green lights OFF, red lights ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 13
| |
| | |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 28. 8. RNO Go to 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: If the applicant initiated Attachment 3 from the
| |
| Foldout Page, then the transition will be 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or
| |
| Secondary Coolant.
| |
| CUE: Another operator will complete 19012-1 [or 19010-1
| |
| from the Foldout Page].
| |
| Standard: N/A.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 14
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-19011-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: _____________________________________________________________________
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| _____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ ______________
| |
| 15
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor tripped due to a small break LOCA.
| |
| The control room is transitioning to 19011-1, SI Termination.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform 19011-1,
| |
| SI Termination.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure f
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-60020
| |
| Task Title: Transfer Steam Dumps to the Steam Pressure Mode
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-18009-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 039A2.04 RO 3.4 SRO 3.7
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 has been shut down due to a tube leak on SG #1.
| |
| The operating crew is performing 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube
| |
| Leak.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to continue performing 18009-
| |
| C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, beginning with Step 14.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant transfers the steam dumps to the Steam Pressure Mode and
| |
| determines that they are not controlling RCS temperature, so RCS
| |
| temperature will be controlled using the unaffected SG ARVs.
| |
| Required Materials: 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, initialed by Exam Team through
| |
| Step 13 (rev. 31)
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 6 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC372 for HL21 NRC Exam
| |
| Simulator setup from scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC14
| |
| 2. Insert malfunction SG01A at 10% (SG #1 tube leak)
| |
| 3. Override 1HS-500A to OFF on Trigger 1
| |
| 4. Trip the reactor
| |
| 5. Throttle AFW flow to ~ 50 gpm per SG
| |
| 6. Perform first 13 steps of 18009-C
| |
| 7. Ensure RCS is heating-up with steam dumps open
| |
| 8. Allow conditions to stabilize
| |
| 9. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 10. Freeze simulator
| |
| Setup time: 10 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. 14. Check reactor - SHUTDOWN.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that reactor is shutdown based on indications.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| CAUTION
| |
| Use of SG ARVs should be avoided to preclude an unmonitored radioactive
| |
| release to the environment.
| |
| JPM 2. 15. Maintain RCS temperature - AT 557 °F:
| |
| a. Check Steam Dumps in Steam Pressure Mode.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reads CAUTION and determines that the Steam Dumps are NOT in
| |
| Steam Pressure Mode by checking the position of 1HS-500C, Steam Dump
| |
| Control Mode Select.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 3. 15.a. RNO Transfer steam dumps to STEAM PRESSURE mode:
| |
| (1) Check Condenser - AVAILABLE.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that the CONDENSER AVAILABLE C-9 status light is lit on the
| |
| BPLB.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 4. 15.a. RNO Transfer steam dumps to STEAM PRESSURE mode:
| |
| (2) Place PIC-507 STEAM DUMP CONTROL in MAN.
| |
| Standard: Applicant transfers 1PIC-507 to manual by depressing the controllers UP
| |
| or DOWN arrow (AUTO light is OFF, MAN light is ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 5. 15.a. RNO Transfer steam dumps to STEAM PRESSURE mode:
| |
| (3) Match demand on PIC-507 and UI-500 STEAM DUMP DEMAND.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: There will be a small demand on the steam dumps
| |
| since the reactor was recently shutdown.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks demand on 1UI-500, Steam Dump Demand, and
| |
| depresses the UP or DOWN arrows on 1PIC-507, as necessary, to match
| |
| the demand from 1UI-500 [+/-2%]. NOTE: The percent demand allowance is
| |
| based on the sensitivity of manual adjustment of 1PIC-507 demand (depressing
| |
| the UP and DOWN arrows) and the meter increments.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Begin Alternate Path
| |
| *JPM 6. 15.a. RNO Transfer steam dumps to STEAM PRESSURE mode:
| |
| (4) Place HS-500C STEAM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT in STM
| |
| PRESS.
| |
| NOTE TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR: When applicant places 1HS-500C
| |
| to STM PRESS, actuate Trigger 1 (overrides 1HS-500A to OFF).
| |
| Standard: Applicant transfers the steam dumps to Steam Pressure Mode by placing
| |
| 1HS-500C to STM PRESS. NOTE: Steam dumps will go closed at this time.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 7. 15. Maintain RCS temperature - at 557 °F:
| |
| b. Maintain RCS temperature using Steam Dumps:
| |
| Manual control.
| |
| -OR-
| |
| Place PIC-507 in AUTO at desired setpoint.
| |
| Standard: Applicant determines that the steam dumps will NOT operate in manual or
| |
| automatic mode to maintain RCS temperature.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 8. 15.b. RNO Maintain RCS temperature using SG ARVs on the UNAFFECTED
| |
| SGs.
| |
| Standard: Applicant HVWDEOLVKHVDFRROGRZQUDWHRI°F/hour to control RCS
| |
| temperature by opening at least one ARV on SG #2, 3, or 4 using the UP
| |
| and DOWN arrows, as required, on 1PIC-3010A, 1PIC-3020A, or 1PIC-3030A.
| |
| NOTE: SG #1 is the affected SG.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 9. 16. Initiate emergency boration using 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control
| |
| System.
| |
| CUE: An extra operator will initiate emergency boration
| |
| and complete 18009-C.
| |
| Standard: N/A
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-18009-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ______________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 has been shut down due to a tube leak on SG #1.
| |
| The operating crew is performing 18009-C, Steam
| |
| Generator Tube Leak.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to continue
| |
| performing 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak,
| |
| beginning with Step 14.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure g
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-61010
| |
| Task Title: Transfer 1NAB from the UAT 1B to the RAT 1B
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13420-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 062A4.01 RO 3.3 SRO 3.1
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
| |
| Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| High winding temperatures are present on UAT 1B due to cooling
| |
| equipment failure.
| |
| To minimize risk of winding damage, the electrical load on UAT 1B
| |
| will be reduced.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to transfer 13.8 kV bus 1NAB
| |
| from the UAT 1B to the RAT 1B using 13420-1, 13.8 kV AC
| |
| Electrical Distribution System.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant transfers 13.8 kV bus 1NAB from the UAT 1B to the RAT 1B
| |
| using 13420-1, 13.8 kV AC Electrical Distribution System
| |
| Required Materials: 13420-1, 13.8 kV AC Electrical Distribution System (rev. 11.1)
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 8 minutes
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC373 for HL21 NRC Exam
| |
| Simulator Setup from Scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC14
| |
| 2. Override ALB32-C06 UNIT AUX XFMR 1NXAB WINDING TEMP HIGH to ON
| |
| 3. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 4. Freeze simulator
| |
| Setup time: 5 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. 4.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus from UAT to RAT
| |
| CAUTIONS
| |
| x Energizing a Group voltmeter from more than one voltmeter handswitch will blow
| |
| PT fuses.
| |
| x Only the associated Groups voltmeter switch removable handle should be used to
| |
| operate the voltmeter switches.
| |
| 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| a. Verify alternate incoming source voltage across all three phases is
| |
| approximately 13.8 kV on Bus 1NAB Alternate Incoming Voltmeter.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: A handswitch handle is required to operate the
| |
| voltmeter and synchronizing switches in the following steps (in wooden tray
| |
| on desk).
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks all three phases of voltage are approximately 13.8 kV on 13.8
| |
| kV SYSTEM VOLTMETER by rotating selector switch BUS 1NAB ALT INCM VM
| |
| SW through positions A-B, B-C, and C-A.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 2. 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| b. Verify 1NAB bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 13.8 kV
| |
| on Bus 1NAB Voltmeter.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks all three phases of voltage are approximately 13.8 kV on 13.8
| |
| kV SYSTEM VOLTMETER by rotating selector switch BUS 1NAB VM SW
| |
| through positions A-B, B-C, and C-A.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| CAUTION
| |
| Placing two sync switches to ON position at the same time will blow PT fuses. A sync
| |
| scope meter indication of 12 oclock may indicate a sync switch is ON.
| |
| c. Place BRKR 1NAB01 SYNCHRONIZING SWITCH to ON.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews CAUTION and places BRKR 1NAB01 SYNCHRONIZING
| |
| SWITCH to the ON position.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 4. 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| NOTE
| |
| Synchronization can be observed by dimming of the sync lights and no motion of the
| |
| sync scope.
| |
| ALB33-A02 13.8 KV SWGR 1NAB TROUBLE
| |
| CUE: Shift Supervisor acknowledges incoming ALB33-
| |
| A02 13.8 KV SWGR 1NAB TROUBLE alarm.
| |
| d. Close ALT INCM BRKR 1NAB01.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE and incoming alarm and closes ALT INCM BRKR
| |
| 1NAB01 by placing 1HS-1NAB01 to CLOSE (red light ON, green light OFF,
| |
| flag RED).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 5. 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| e. Verify NORM INCM BRKR 1NAB03 tripped.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that NORM INCM BRKR 1NAB03 is tripped by observing lights
| |
| on 1HS-1NAB03 (red light OFF, green light ON, amber light ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 6. 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| f. Place 1HS-1NAB03 in NORMAL AFTER TRIP to match breaker target.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: ALB33-A02 13.8 KV SWGR 1NAB TROUBLE will
| |
| reset when the target flag is matched.
| |
| Standard: Applicant matches breaker target flag by momentarily placing 1HS-1NAB03
| |
| to TRIP (red light OFF, green light ON, amber light OFF). NOTE: Step is
| |
| critical because the action resets the amber light and allows re-flash of the
| |
| switchgear trouble alarm. If not performed, it would prevent the system from
| |
| functioning properly to warn the operator of switchgear trouble.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 7. 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| g. Verify 1NAB bus voltage across all three phases is approximately 13.8 kV
| |
| on Bus 1NAB Voltmeter.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks all three phases of voltage are approximately 13.8 kV on 13.8
| |
| kV SYSTEM VOLTMETER by rotating selector switch BUS 1NAB VM SW
| |
| through positions A-B, B-C, and C-A.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 8. 4.2.2.2 Transferring 13.8 kV Bus 1NAB from UAT to RAT
| |
| h. Place BRKR 1NAB01 SYNCHRONIZING SWITCH to OFF.
| |
| Standard: Applicant places BRKR 1NAB01 SYNCHRONIZING SWITCH to the OFF
| |
| position. NOTE: Step is critical based on the previous CAUTION that ensures
| |
| protection of the PT fuses by minimizing the number of synchronizing switches in
| |
| the ON position.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13420-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _____________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| High winding temperatures are present on UAT 1B due to
| |
| cooling equipment failure.
| |
| To minimize risk of winding damage, the electrical load on
| |
| UAT 1B will be reduced.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to transfer 13.8 kV
| |
| bus 1NAB from the UAT 1B to the RAT 1B using 13420-1,
| |
| 13.8 kV AC Electrical Distribution System.
| |
| | |
| NRC Job Performance Measure h
| |
| Facility: Vogtle
| |
| Task No: V-LO-TA-60039
| |
| Task Title: Perform a Manual Startup of the FHB Post-Accident Filter Units
| |
| JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13320-HL21
| |
| K/A Reference: 036AA1.04 RO 3.1 SRO 3.7
| |
| Examinee: __________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
| |
| Facility Evaluator: ____________________ Date: ______________________________
| |
| Method of testing:
| |
| Simulated Performance _______________ Actual Performance __________________
| |
| Classroom _____________ Simulator _____________ Plant ____________
| |
| Read to the examinee:
| |
| I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues.
| |
| When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be
| |
| satisfied.
| |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| A spent fuel assembly was damaged in the Unit 1 SFP.
| |
| All SFP fuel handling and crane operations were suspended.
| |
| The FHB Post-Accident Filter Units did NOT start as required.
| |
| All FHB high radiation alarms have reset.
| |
| As part of the in-progress MWO, a manual start of both FHB Post-
| |
| Accident Filter Units is required.
| |
| Heat Trace Panel 1-1817-U3-007A is operating with all circuits
| |
| indicating greater than 87 °F.
| |
| The Shift Supervisor is reviewing TR 13.3.6, FHB Post-Accident
| |
| Actuation Instrumentation System.
| |
| 1
| |
| | |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform a manual start of
| |
| both FHB Post-Accident Filter Units using Section 4.8 of 13320-C,
| |
| Fuel Handling Building HVAC System.
| |
| 2
| |
| | |
| Task Standard: Applicant shuts down the FHB Normal Supply and FHB Normal Exhaust
| |
| Units and starts both FHB Post-Accident Filter Units using 13320-C, Fuel
| |
| Handling Building HVAC System.
| |
| Required Materials: 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System (rev. 35.1)
| |
| General References: None
| |
| Time Critical Task: No
| |
| Validation Time: 10 minutes
| |
| 3
| |
| | |
| SIMULATOR SETUP:
| |
| Reset to IC374 for HL21 NRC Exam
| |
| Simulator Setup from Scratch:
| |
| 1. Reset to IC14
| |
| 2. Verify FHB Normal Supply #1 and FHB Normal Exhaust #1 are in service per 13320-C
| |
| 3. Acknowledge / reset alarms
| |
| 4. Freeze simulator
| |
| Setup time: 5 minutes
| |
| 4
| |
| | |
| Performance Information
| |
| Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| START TIME: __________
| |
| JPM 1. Manual Startup of Post-Accident Filter Unit(s)
| |
| NOTE
| |
| Heat Trace Panel 1-1817-U3-007A temperature circuits C1-11, 13, 14; C2-1, 4, 6, 11
| |
| DQGVKRXOG$//EHYHULILHG °F for a non-emergency start of FHB Post-Accident
| |
| Filter Unit.
| |
| CAUTIONS
| |
| x Shutdown of all FHB HVAC will render the FHB Post-Accident Ventilation Radiation
| |
| Monitors inoperable per (TR 13.3.6).
| |
| x 1-RE-12444 and 1-RE-12442 minimum temperature for OPERABILITY is 87 °F if
| |
| Heat Trace Panel 1-1817-U3-007A is INOPERABLE and the FHB Post-Accident
| |
| Filter Units are in service.
| |
| x For 1/2RE-12442A, 1/2RE-12442B, 1/2RE-12444A and 1/2RE-12444B, If NOT
| |
| moving irradiated fuel in the Fuel Handling Building, a temperature above 79 °F is
| |
| acceptable when running a Post-Accident Filter Unit. (REA 97-VAA650)
| |
| 4.8.1 Check status of Heat Trace Panel 1-1817-U3-007A and refer to 17104-1,
| |
| Annunciator Response Procedures for Heat Tracing Panel 1NCQARHT, for
| |
| necessary actions if INOPERABLE.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reads NOTE and CAUTIONS and checks status of Heat Trace Panel 1-
| |
| 1817-U3-007A.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 5
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 2. Manual Startup of Post-Accident Filter Unit(s)
| |
| NOTE
| |
| Per Limitation 2.2.9, When the fuel is moved into a MPC/HI-TRAC and sealed, this
| |
| fuel is then governed by requirements of 10 CFR 72, and TR 13.9.5 no longer applies.
| |
| 4.8.2 Suspend all operations involving irradiated fuel or crane operation with
| |
| loads over irradiated fuel prior to stopping the running Normal FHB HVAC
| |
| Exhaust unit in the following steps. (TR 13.9.5 and TR 13.3.6) Other activities in
| |
| the FHB or either fuel pool NOT involving irradiated fuel may continue.
| |
| CUE: CV request noted.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE verifies that all operations in the SFP have been
| |
| suspended.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 3. 4.8.3 If running, stop the FHB Normal Supply Unit:
| |
| FHB NORM HVAC UNIT FAN-1 AHS-2520 (A52)
| |
| FHB NORM HVAC UNIT FAN-2 AHS-2521 (B52)
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The alphanumeric value in the parentheses by the
| |
| switch label is its grid location on the QHVC panel.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that FHB Normal Supply Unit #1 is running by observing red
| |
| light ON, green light OFF on AHS-2520 and then stops FHB Normal Supply
| |
| Unit #1 by placing AHS-2520 to STOP (red light OFF, green light ON).
| |
| NOTE: FHB Normal Supply Unit #2 is not running.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 6
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 4. 4.8.4 If running, stop the FHB Normal Exhaust Unit:
| |
| FHB NORM EXH UNIT FAN-1 AHS-12534 (A53)
| |
| FHB NORM EXH UNIT FAN-2 AHS-12536 (B53)
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that FHB Normal Exhaust Unit #1 is running by observing red
| |
| light ON, green light OFF on AHS-12534 and then stops FHB Normal Exhaust
| |
| Unit #1 by placing AHS-12534 to STOP (red light OFF, green light ON).
| |
| NOTE: FHB Normal Exhaust Unit #2 is not running.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 5. 4.8.5 Verify the Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers closed:
| |
| FHB NORM HVAC SPLY DMPR AHV-2528 AHS-2528 (A57)
| |
| FHB NORM HVAC SPLY DMPR AHV-2529 AHS-2529 (A56)
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: AHV-2528 and AHV-2529 are in series, so closing
| |
| either damper will meet the critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers AHV-2528 and
| |
| AHV-2529 by placing AHS-2528 and AHS-2529 to CLOSE (red lights OFF,
| |
| green lights ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 7
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 6. 4.8.5 Verify the Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers closed:
| |
| NORM HVAC UNIT SPLY HDR ISO DMPR AHV-2534 AHS-2534 (B57)
| |
| NORM HVAC UNIT SPLY HDR ISO DMPR AHV-2535 AHS-2535 (B56)
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: AHV-2534 and AHV-2535 are in series, so closing
| |
| either damper will meet the critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers AHV-2534 and
| |
| AHV-2535 by placing AHS-2534 and AHS-2535 to CLOSE (red lights OFF,
| |
| green lights ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 7. 4.8.5 Verify the Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers closed:
| |
| FHB ISO DMPR TO NORM EXH TRN-A AHV-12479 AHS-12479 (D56)
| |
| FHB ISO DMPR TO NORM EXH TRN-B AHV-12480 AHS-12480 (D57)
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: AHV-12479 and AHV-12480 are in series, so
| |
| closing either damper will meet the critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers AHV-12479 and
| |
| AHV-12480 by placing AHS-12479 and AHS-12480 to CLOSE (red lights
| |
| OFF, green lights ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 8
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 8. 4.8.5 Verify the Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers closed:
| |
| FHB ISO DMPR TO STACK TRN-A A-HV-12481 AHS-12481 (C56)
| |
| FHB ISO DMPR TO STACK TRN-B A-HV-12482 AHS-12482 (C57)
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: AHV-12481 and AHV-12482 are in series, so
| |
| closing either damper will meet the critical step.
| |
| Standard: Applicant closes Normal HVAC System Isolation Dampers AHV-12481 and
| |
| AHV-12482 by placing AHS-12481 and AHS-12482 to CLOSE (red lights
| |
| OFF, green lights ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 9. 4.8.6 Verify FHB RECIRC ISOL DMPR A-HV-12553 at AHS-12553 (E56) is
| |
| closed.
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks that damper A-HV-12553 is closed by observing lights on AHS-
| |
| 12553 (red light OFF, green light ON).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 9
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 10.
| |
| NOTE
| |
| Post-Accident Filter Units may be started and stopped as required.
| |
| 1ALB054-A01(A02) FHB POST ACCIDENT FLTR 1(2) TROUBLE
| |
| 4.8.7 Start desired Post-Accident Filter Unit(s):
| |
| POST ACCIDENT FLT/EXH UNIT FAN A-1542-N7-001 AHS-2540 (C54)
| |
| CUE: Shift Supervisor acknowledges incoming ALB54-
| |
| A01 FHB POST ACCIDENT FLTR 1 TROUBLE
| |
| alarm.
| |
| Standard: Applicant starts Post-Accident Filter Unit #1 by placing AHS-2540 to START
| |
| (red light ON, green light OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| *JPM 11. 4.8.7 Start desired Post-Accident Filter Unit(s):
| |
| POST ACCIDENT FLT/EXH UNIT FAN A-1542-N7-002 AHS-2541 (C55)
| |
| CUE: Shift Supervisor acknowledges incoming ALB54-
| |
| A02 FHB POST ACCIDENT FLTR 2 TROUBLE
| |
| alarm.
| |
| Standard: Applicant starts Post-Accident Filter Unit #2 by placing AHS-2541 to START
| |
| (red light ON, green light OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 10
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 12.
| |
| NOTE
| |
| If dampers do not open in following step, fan(s) should be stopped.
| |
| 4.8.8 Check associated Post-Accident FILT/EXH FAN dampers open for fan
| |
| started:
| |
| FAN-1 INLET AHV-12510 (AZLB-62)
| |
| FAN-1 EXH AHV-12512 (AZLB-62)
| |
| FAN-2 INLET AHV-12511 (AZLB-64)
| |
| FAN-2 EXH AHV-12513 (AZLB-64)
| |
| Standard: Applicant checks Post-Accident Fan Dampers AHV-12510, AHV-12512, AHV-
| |
| 12511, and AHV-12513 are open by observing lights on AZLB-62 and ALZB-64
| |
| (red lights ON, green lights OFF).
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 13.
| |
| NOTE
| |
| If the Normal FHB HVAC System is returned to service within 12 hours after
| |
| shutdown, FHB temperature monitoring per the following step need not be completed.
| |
| 4.8.9 Verify annunciator 1ALB54-A01 and/or 1ALB54-A02 has reset.
| |
| Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE and verifies that ALB54-A01 and ALB54-A02 have reset
| |
| since both Post-Accident Filter Units were started.
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| 11
| |
| | |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| JPM 14. Initiate area temperature monitoring for the fuel handling building Units 1 and 2
| |
| per 14915-1, Special Conditions Surveillance Logs.
| |
| CUE: Shift Supervisor will initiate area temperature
| |
| monitoring when required.
| |
| Standard: N/A
| |
| Comment:
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| STOP TIME: __________
| |
| Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
| |
| 12
| |
| | |
| Verification of Completion
| |
| Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13320-HL21
| |
| Examinees Name:
| |
| Examiners Name:
| |
| Date Performed:
| |
| Number of Attempts:
| |
| Time to Complete:
| |
| Question Documentation:
| |
| Question: ____________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Response: ___________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| ____________________________________________________________________________
| |
| Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory
| |
| Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _____________
| |
| 13
| |
| | |
| Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
| |
| A spent fuel assembly was damaged in the Unit 1 SFP.
| |
| All SFP fuel handling and crane operations were suspended.
| |
| The FHB Post-Accident Filter Units did NOT start as required.
| |
| All FHB high radiation alarms have reset.
| |
| As part of the in-progress MWO, a manual start of both FHB
| |
| Post-Accident Filter Units is required.
| |
| Heat Trace Panel 1-1817-U3-007A is operating with all circuits
| |
| indicating greater than 87 °F.
| |
| The Shift Supervisor is reviewing TR 13.3.6, FHB Post-
| |
| Accident Actuation Instrumentation System.
| |
| Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor has directed you to perform a manual
| |
| start of both FHB Post-Accident Filter Units using Section 4.8
| |
| of 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System.
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility: Vogtle 1 & 2__ Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2017-301
| |
| Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at approximately 2 x 10-3% reactor power and slowly rising, EOL, with a
| |
| reactor startup in progress.
| |
| Equipment OOS: CCW pump #5 is tagged out for motor repair - RTS in 7 hours.
| |
| Air Compressor #3 is tagged out for intercooler repair - RTS in 12 hours.
| |
| Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
| |
| Continue power ascension per 12003-C, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2), and
| |
| raise power to ~ 1% to 3%.
| |
| SNAP 360
| |
| Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
| |
| ES08 SI Train A Fails to Auto Actuate
| |
| ES16 SI Train B Fails to Auto Actuate
| |
| ES25A 1HV-2628B, Mini-Purge Damper, Fails to Auto Close
| |
| ES25B 1HV-2629B, Mini-Purge Damper, Fails to Auto Close
| |
| Triggered Malfunctions:
| |
| (2) RC10C 1TE 431B, RCS Cold Leg NR RTD, Fails High
| |
| (3) SG03B2 1PT-525, SG#2 Pressure Transmitter, Fails Low
| |
| (4) CC01A CCW Pump #1 Trip
| |
| (5) RC04A RCS Hot Leg Leak - Loop 1 [set at 25% for ~75 gpm]
| |
| (6) RC05A RCS Hot Leg Break - Loop 1 [ramp to 100% over 20 seconds]
| |
| Pre-loaded Overrides:
| |
| 1HS-9382 Air Compressor #3 to STOP
| |
| A-LO_HS9382_G 1HS-9382 GREEN A531P30-A6 to OFF
| |
| Remote Functions:
| |
| (21) SF01RF SFP Cooling Train-A OOS
| |
| (22) SF02RF SFP Cooling Train-B In-Service
| |
| Booth Operator Notes
| |
| After the IC reset, cycle N31 and N32 Shutdown monitors from OFF to ON, these are
| |
| NOT on the switch check (reset alarm setpoints).
| |
| Ensure all MFRV, BFRV, and MFP SLMS controllers are in MANUAL.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. No. Event Event
| |
| No. Type* Description
| |
| 1A N/A T-SS The Containment Mini-Purge is aligned incorrectly. The Mini-Purge
| |
| Supply fan is off causing containment pressure to lower below the
| |
| 10 min minimum Tech Spec Limit of -0.3 psig. This will require the crew to
| |
| enter Tech Spec LCO 3.6.4, Containment Pressure.
| |
| * 3.6.4, Containment Pressure, CONDITION A, 1 hour
| |
| 1 N/A R-OATC Raise power from approximately 2 x 10-3% to approximately 1% - 3%
| |
| R-SS per 12003-C, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2).
| |
| 15 min N-UO
| |
| The crew will start procedural actions in 12003-C at Step 31.
| |
| 2 Trigger 2 I-OATC RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, 1TE-431B, fails high causing
| |
| I-SS entry into 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section
| |
| 10 min TS-SS B, Failure of RCS Loop Narrow Range Temperature
| |
| Instrumentation.
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION
| |
| E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 7 (Overpower T), CONDITION E, 72
| |
| hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of
| |
| Condition A)
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 5b (Low RCS Tavg Coincident with
| |
| Reactor Trip, P-4), CONDITION I, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets the intent of
| |
| Condition A)
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. No. Event Event
| |
| No. Type* Description
| |
| 3 Trigger 3 I-UO SG Pressure Instrument, 1PI-525A, fails low causing entry into
| |
| I-SS 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section F, Failure
| |
| 10 min TS-SS of SG Pressure Instrumentation.
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 1e (Steam Line Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 4d(1) (Steam Line Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets the intent of
| |
| Condition A)
| |
| * 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System
| |
| FUNCTION 13 (Steam Generator Pressure),
| |
| CONDITION A, 30 days
| |
| 4 Trigger 4 C-UO CCW pump # 1 trips with standby pump tagged OOS causing entry
| |
| C-SS into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water.
| |
| 10 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System,
| |
| CONDITION A, 72 hours
| |
| 5 Trigger 5 C-OATC RCS leak (~75 gpm) on Loop 1 requires entry into 18004-C, Reactor
| |
| C-SS Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| 5 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4,
| |
| CONDITION A, 4 hours
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Trigger 6 should be inserted at
| |
| approximately Step 11 of 18004-C or when the crew trips the
| |
| reactor, if earlier.
| |
| 6 Trigger 6 M-ALL Large Break LOCA after entry into 18004-C.
| |
| 25 min Ramp malfunction to 100% over 20 seconds (~30000 gpm) when
| |
| NRC Chief Examiner directs.
| |
| The operating crew enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, then transitions to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant.
| |
| 7 N/A I-OATC SI will fail to automatically actuate (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| I-SS
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually actuate SI.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| 8 N/A C-UO Containment Mini-Purge Dampers, 1HV-2628B and 1HV-2629B, will
| |
| C-SS fail to automatically close (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually close Containment Mini-Purge Dampers, 1HV-2628B
| |
| and 1HV-2629B.
| |
| *(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 1A
| |
| The Containment Mini-Purge is aligned incorrectly. The Mini-Purge Supply fan is off causing containment
| |
| pressure to lower below the minimum Tech Spec Limit of -0.3 psig. This will require the crew to enter
| |
| Tech Spec LCO 3.6.4, Containment Pressure.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| None
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.6.4, Containment Pressure, CONDITION A, 1 hour
| |
| Event 1
| |
| Establish a positive SUR and raise reactor power to approximately 1% to 3% reactor power using 12003-
| |
| C, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2).
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs OATC and UO to raise reactor power and provides reactivity management oversight.
| |
| OATC - Withdraws control rods to establish a positive SUR and raises power to 1% to 3%, then
| |
| stabilizes reactor power using control rods.
| |
| UO - Adjusts AFW flow and steam dumps as necessary to control RCS temperature during the
| |
| power ascent.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 2
| |
| RCS NR Tcold Instrument, 1TE-431B, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation
| |
| Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation, and perform
| |
| the associated Immediate Operator Actions (IOAs). As a result of this failure, charging flow controller,
| |
| 1FV-121, will raise charging flow and pressurizer level.
| |
| Verifiable actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18001-C, Section B, and verifies IOAs for failure of an RCS loop narrow range
| |
| temperature instrument.
| |
| OATC - Takes manual control of charging by placing 1FIC-121 in MANUAL.
| |
| Defeats Tavg and Delta-T inputs by placing 1TS-412T and 1TS-411F to the affected
| |
| channel.
| |
| Manually adjusts charging flow to restore program level.
| |
| Returns charging to AUTO by placing 1FIC-121 in AUTO, when required.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 7 (Overpower T), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets
| |
| the intent of Condition A)
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 5b (Low RCS Tavg Coincident with Reactor Trip, P-4), CONDITION I, 72
| |
| hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets
| |
| the intent of Condition A)
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 3
| |
| SG Pressure Instrument, 1PI-525A, fails low. The crew will respond by performing IOAs of 18001-C,
| |
| Section F, for Failure of SG Pressure Instrumentation.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18001-C, Section F, and verifies IOAs of 18001-C, Section F, for failure of SG
| |
| pressure instrument.
| |
| UO - Performs IOAs of 18001-C.
| |
| Bypasses the affected channel on the affected loops graphical display at the Digital
| |
| Feedwater Operator Work Station (OWS).
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 1e (Steam Line Pressure - Low), CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 4d (Steam Line Pressure - Low), CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets
| |
| the intent of Condition A)
| |
| * 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System
| |
| FUNCTION 13 (Steam Generator Pressure), CONDITION A, 30 days
| |
| Event 4
| |
| CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling
| |
| Water, the crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water.
| |
| UO - Stops all CCW Train A pumps.
| |
| Places two CCW Train B pumps in service.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, CONDITION A, 72 hours
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 5
| |
| RCS leak of ~ 75 gpm develops that will require entry into 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Section A, RCS Leakage (Mode 1, 2,
| |
| and 3 with RCS Pressure >1000 psig).
| |
| OATC - Manually raises charging flow and isolates letdown.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, CONDITION A, 4 hours
| |
| Events 6, 7, 8
| |
| RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip and manual Safety Injection.
| |
| RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will be off-scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-
| |
| 1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transitions to 19010-1, Loss of
| |
| Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Verifies the IOAs of 19000-1.
| |
| OATC - Performs IOAs of 19000-1.
| |
| Actuates Safety Injection.
| |
| UO - Performs IOAs of 19000-1.
| |
| Closes Containment Mini-Purge Dampers 1HV-2628B and 1HV-2629B.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER:
| |
| The procedure flow path at this point will progress until Step 18 of 19010-1 to check if cold leg
| |
| recirculation is required. The crew will then return to Step 13 of 19010-1 to wait for cold leg recirculation
| |
| criteria to be met.
| |
| The scenario is complete after Step 3 of 19010-1 or at the
| |
| Chief Examiners discretion.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| CRITICAL TASKS:
| |
| 1) Manually actuate Safety Injection (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks, for the
| |
| scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to manually actuate SI results in the needless
| |
| continuation of a situation in which there has been no systematic and thorough actuation of even
| |
| one train of SI-actuated safeguards. Some safeguards components such as AFW and feedwater
| |
| isolation components may be running because of other actuation signals. However, safeguards
| |
| systems such as ECCS, Containment Isolation Phase A, CCW, and containment fan coolers will
| |
| not be operating in their safeguards mode. Although the completely degraded status is not due to
| |
| the crews action (was not initiated by operator error), continuation in the completely degraded
| |
| status is a result of the crews failure to manually actuate SI. The acceptable results obtained in
| |
| the FSAR analyses are predicated on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of
| |
| safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid.
| |
| Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition,
| |
| failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (under the postulated conditions and when it is
| |
| possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition. Per NMP-OS-014-003, VNP
| |
| Time Critical Operator Action Program, manual safety injection is required within 10
| |
| minutes after a valid SI injection signal is generated and failure to actuate within this time
| |
| frame constitutes a failure of this task.
| |
| 2) Manually close Containment Mini-Purge Isolation valves (after EOP entry)
| |
| Under the plant conditions postulated, failure to close at least one mini-purge isolation valve on
| |
| each containment purge penetration results in unnecessary degradation of a fission-product
| |
| barrier that is relied upon in the safety analysis for the specific accident in progress, that is, for a
| |
| LOCA. For the containment barrier to possess the degree of integrity assumed in the typical
| |
| FSAR analysis of the radiological consequences of a LOCA, at least one mini-purge isolation
| |
| valve on each containment purge penetration must be closed.
| |
| Aside from the issue of containment integrity, failure to close mini-purge isolation valves such that
| |
| at least one valve on each purge penetration is closed represents a failure by the crew to
| |
| demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF
| |
| system or component. In addition to the valve position indication lamps associated with the
| |
| control switches for the mini-purge isolation valves, annunciation of CVI actuation and ESF
| |
| system status lamps are also typically provided. The crew is specifically directed by the ERGs to
| |
| verify that containment ventilation is isolated and, if not, to manually isolate it. Failure to isolate
| |
| containment by closing either 1HV-2628B or 1HV-2629B indicates that the crew has failed
| |
| to prevent degradation of a barrier to fission product release. Isolation of the containment
| |
| mini-purge flow path is required to occur within 15 minutes of the initiating event to
| |
| preclude an upgrade to the Emergency Classification. Therefore, not closing 1HV-2628B
| |
| or 1HV-2629B within 15 minutes of the initiation of the LOCA constitutes a task failure.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
| |
| 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
| |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
| |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
| |
| 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
| |
| 5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
| |
| 6. EOP Based critical tasks (2-3) 2
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 1 of 1
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Establish a positive SUR and raise reactor power to approximately 1% to
| |
| 3% reactor power using 12003-C, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2).
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS/ 12003-C, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2)
| |
| OATC /
| |
| UO 31 -
| |
| The OATC and UO will coordinate during this evolution to raise
| |
| reactor power to 1% to 3%. This coordination will include peer
| |
| checks of any dilutions and/or control rod withdrawals.
| |
| UO 32 -
| |
| The UO will monitor steam dumps for proper operation
| |
| (currently operating in Steam Pressure Mode, maintaining Tavg
| |
| at 557 °F) and will control RCS cooldown/heat-up rate by
| |
| adjusting AFW flow. SG NR levels will also be maintained
| |
| between 60% and 70%. The manipulation of AFW flow will
| |
| affect the power ascension and coordination must exist
| |
| between the UO and OATC during the power ascension.
| |
| END OF EVENT 1 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 1 of 3
| |
| Event: 1a
| |
| Event Description: The Containment Mini-Purge is aligned incorrectly. The Mini-Purge Supply
| |
| fan is off causing containment pressure to lower below the minimum Tech
| |
| Spec Limit of -0.3 psig. The will require the crew to enter Tech Spec LCO
| |
| 3.6.4, Containment Pressure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of Containment Tech Spec Lower Limit being exceeded.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB06-F01 CSFST TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * IPC indication on narrow range containment pressure
| |
| channels.
| |
| * IPC CSFST indication for Containment - Containment
| |
| Pressure in Tech Spec Limits (NO)
| |
| * QHVC meter 1PI-10945 for CTB PRESS indicating negative
| |
| pressure and continuing to lower.
| |
| * The annunciator listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 2 of 3
| |
| Event: 1a
| |
| Event Description: The Containment Mini-Purge is aligned incorrectly. The Mini-Purge Supply
| |
| fan is off causing containment pressure to lower below the minimum Tech
| |
| Spec Limit of -0.3 psig. The will require the crew to enter Tech Spec LCO
| |
| 3.6.4, Containment Pressure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / ALB06-F01
| |
| UO / SS
| |
| 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 1 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 3 of 3
| |
| Event: 1a
| |
| Event Description: The Containment Mini-Purge is aligned incorrectly. The Mini-Purge Supply
| |
| fan is off causing containment pressure to lower below the minimum Tech
| |
| Spec Limit of -0.3 psig. The will require the crew to enter Tech Spec LCO
| |
| 3.6.4, Containment Pressure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| UO / SS
| |
| OATC / 5.0 COMPENSATORY ACTIONS -
| |
| UO / SS
| |
| * 3.6.4, Containment Pressure, CONDITION A, 1 hour
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| The crew may contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR),
| |
| a work order, and dispatch I&C to investigate as well as inform
| |
| the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| This completes the actions of 17006-1.
| |
| END OF EVENT 1A - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 1 3
| |
| | |
| Containment Pressure
| |
| 3.6.4
| |
| 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
| |
| 3.6.4 Containment Pressure
| |
| LCO 3.6.4 Containment pressure shall be -0.3 psig and +1.8 psig.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. Containment pressure A.1 Restore containment 1 hour
| |
| not within limits. pressure to within limits.
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time not met. AND
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
| |
| SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
| |
| SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
| |
| SR 3.6.4.1 Verify containment pressure is within limits. In accordance with
| |
| the Surveillance
| |
| Frequency Control
| |
| Program
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.6.4-1 Amendment No. 158 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 140 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 1 of 5
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: RCS Loop # 3 NR Tcold instrument fails HIGH. The crew enters 18001-C,
| |
| Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold instrument failing HIGH.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB10-E03 OVERTEMP T ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK
| |
| ALERT
| |
| * ALB11-D01 PRZR LO LEVEL DEVIATION
| |
| * ALB12-A03 RC LOOP T/AUCT T HI-LO DEV
| |
| * ALB12-A04 RC LOOP TAVG/AUCT TAVG HI-LO DEV
| |
| * ALB12-A05 TAVG/TREF DEVIATION
| |
| * ALB12-B04 AUCT TAVG HIGH
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Tavg, as indicated on 1TI-432, fails high
| |
| * T, as indicated on 1TDI-431A, fails low.
| |
| * OPT and OTT trip setpoints will lower to a value less than
| |
| their respective 100% power nominal trip values.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 2 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 2 of 5
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: RCS Loop # 3 NR Tcold instrument fails HIGH. The crew enters 18001-C,
| |
| Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 18001-C, Section B, Failure of RCS Loop Narrow Range
| |
| Temperature Instrumentation
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18001-C, Section B, Failure of RCS
| |
| Loop Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation. This
| |
| normally occurs following the board operators initial IOA
| |
| response.
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| B1 -
| |
| OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| B2 -
| |
| The operators may look at the operator aid on the C panel to
| |
| verify correct Tref.
| |
| OATC B3 -
| |
| OATC B4 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 2 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 3 of 5
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: RCS Loop # 3 NR Tcold instrument fails HIGH. The crew enters 18001-C,
| |
| Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B5 -
| |
| OATC B6 -
| |
| OATC / B7 -
| |
| SS
| |
| SS B8 -
| |
| The crew will contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a
| |
| work order, and dispatch I&C to investigate as well as inform
| |
| the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing to update the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 2 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 4 of 5
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: RCS Loop # 3 NR Tcold instrument fails HIGH. The crew enters 18001-C,
| |
| Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS B9 -
| |
| SS B10 -
| |
| SS B11 -
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72
| |
| hours
| |
| FUNCTION 7 (Overpower T), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 5b (Low RCS Tavg Coincident with Reactor
| |
| Trip, P-4), CONDITION I, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 2 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 5 of 5
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: RCS Loop # 3 NR Tcold instrument fails HIGH. The crew enters 18001-C,
| |
| Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B12 -
| |
| OATC B13 -
| |
| END OF EVENT 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 2 5
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more referenced in
| |
| required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the
| |
| inoperable. channel(s).
| |
| B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours
| |
| While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
| |
| for Functions 1, 17, 18,
| |
| or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR
| |
| or 5, closing the reactor
| |
| trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours
| |
| permitted.
| |
| --------------------------------
| |
| One channel or train
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| E. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE---------------------
| |
| A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| E.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| E.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours
| |
| > P-6 and < P-10, one POWER to < P-6.
| |
| Intermediate Range
| |
| Neutron Flux channel OR
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| F.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours
| |
| POWER to > P-10.
| |
| G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately
| |
| > P-6 and < P-10, two involving positive reactivity
| |
| Intermediate Range additions.
| |
| Neutron Flux channels
| |
| inoperable. AND
| |
| G.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours
| |
| POWER to < P-6.
| |
| H. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel(s) to Prior to increasing
| |
| < P-6, one or two OPERABLE status. THERMAL POWER
| |
| Intermediate Range to > P-6
| |
| Neutron Flux channels
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 I,J SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5
| |
| Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o) cps cps
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5
| |
| 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| cps
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| cps
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| 1 L SR 3.3.1.1
| |
| 3(e), 4(e), 5(e) SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| NA NA
| |
| 6. Overtemperature T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1 Refer to Note 1
| |
| SR 3.3.1.3 (Page 3.3.1-20) (Page 3.3.1-20)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.6
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| 7. Overpower T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 2 Refer to Note 2
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7 (Page 3.3.1-21) (Page 3.3.1-21)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (e) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide input to the High Flux
| |
| at Shutdown Alarm System (LCO 3.3.8) and indication.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that
| |
| it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more
| |
| conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint
| |
| implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to
| |
| determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology
| |
| and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2 1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more required referenced in Table
| |
| channels inoperable. 3.3.2-1 for the channel(s)
| |
| or train(s).
| |
| B. One channel inoperable. B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| B.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| I. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| I.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| I.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| J. One Main Feedwater J.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| Pumps trip channel OPERABLE status.
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| OR
| |
| J.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| K. One RWST Level - Low --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| Low channel inoperable. One additional channel may be
| |
| bypassed for up to 12 hours for
| |
| surveillance testing.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| K.1 Place channel in bypass. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| K.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| K.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 108 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-5 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 5. Turbine Trip and
| |
| Feedwater Isolation
| |
| a. Automatic 1,2(f) 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA
| |
| Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3
| |
| and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5
| |
| Relays
| |
| b. Low RCS T 1,2(f) 4 I SR 3.3.2.1 561.5 °F 564 °F
| |
| avg (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| Coincident with Refer to Function 8a for all P-4 requirements.
| |
| Reactor Trip,
| |
| P-4
| |
| c. SG Water 1,2(f) 4 per SG I SR 3.3.2.1 82.5% 82.0%
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Level-High High SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| (P-14) SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| d. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
| |
| 6. Auxiliary Feedwater
| |
| a. Automatic 1,2,3 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA
| |
| Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3
| |
| and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5
| |
| Relays
| |
| b. SG Water 1,2,3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 35.9% 37.8%
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Level-Low Low SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (f) Except when one MFIV or MFRV, and its associated bypass valve per feedwater line is closed and deactivated or isolated by a
| |
| closed manual valve.
| |
| (i) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is
| |
| functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (j) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP)
| |
| at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the
| |
| NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance
| |
| procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left
| |
| tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-13 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 1 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: SG #2 pressure instrument, 1PI-525A, fails LOW. The crew will enter
| |
| 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the failure of 1PI-525A LOW.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB13-B04 LO STEAMLINE PRESS ALERT
| |
| * ALB13-F04 STM GEN 2 DIGITAL FW SYS TROUBLE
| |
| * ALB14-B02 STM GEN 2 HI STM PRESS RATE ALERT
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * 1PI-525A reading downscale LOW.
| |
| * TSLB trip status light illuminated for LOW PRESS SI/SLI 585
| |
| PSIG for SG-2 LOW PRESS PB525A.
| |
| * TSLB trip status light illuminated for STM LINE ISO PRESS
| |
| RATE 100#/SEC for SG-2 NEG PRESS RATE PB525B.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| UO 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18001-C, Section F, Failure of
| |
| Steam Generator Pressure Instrumentation. This normally
| |
| occurs following the board operators initial IOA response
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| F1 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 3 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 2 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: SG #2 pressure instrument, 1PI-525A, fails LOW. The crew will enter
| |
| 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| F2 -
| |
| From the Feedwater Overview screen on the DFW computer
| |
| display, the operator will click on the large arrow button at the
| |
| bottom of the screen that states INDICATORS LOOP 2. This
| |
| will bring up a screen titled, STEAM GENERATOR LOOP 2 -
| |
| INPUTS. The operator will click and depress the BYPASS
| |
| button in the STEAM PRESSURE box for 1PT-0525.
| |
| OATC / F3 -
| |
| UO
| |
| UO F4 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 3 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 3 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: SG #2 pressure instrument, 1PI-525A, fails LOW. The crew will enter
| |
| 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS F5 -
| |
| The crew will contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a
| |
| work order, and dispatch I&C to investigate as well as inform
| |
| the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
| |
| SS F6 -
| |
| SS F7 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 3 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 4 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: SG #2 pressure instrument, 1PI-525A, fails LOW. The crew will enter
| |
| 18001-C, Section F, Failure of Steam Generator Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS F8 -
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 1e (Steam Line Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 4d(1) (Steam Line Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| * 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System
| |
| FUNCTION 13 (Steam Generator Pressure),
| |
| CONDITION A, 30 days
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| UO F9 -
| |
| The crew may conduct a briefing at this point detailing plant
| |
| status and affected equipment.
| |
| END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 3 4
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2 1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more required referenced in Table
| |
| channels inoperable. 3.3.2-1 for the channel(s)
| |
| or train(s).
| |
| B. One channel inoperable. B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| B.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| C. One train inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 4 hours for surveillance testing
| |
| provided the other train is
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| C.1 Restore train to 24 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| C.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| C.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 60 hours
| |
| D. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| D.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-2 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 1. Safety Injection
| |
| a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.6 NA NA
| |
| Initiation
| |
| b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA
| |
| Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3
| |
| and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5
| |
| Relays
| |
| c. Containment 1,2,3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 4.4 psig 3.8 psig
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Pressure - SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| High 1 SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(a) 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 1856 psig 1870 psig
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Pressure - Low SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| e. Steam Line 1,2,3(a) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 570(b) psig 585(b) psig
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Pressure - Low line SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
| |
| (b) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are t1 50 seconds and t2 5 seconds.
| |
| (i) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is
| |
| functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (j) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP)
| |
| at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the
| |
| NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance
| |
| procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left
| |
| tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-9 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1 (page 4 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 4. Steam Line
| |
| Isolation
| |
| (continued)
| |
| c. Containment 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 14.5 psig
| |
| 1,2(c), 15.4 psig
| |
| Pressure - SR 3.3.2.4(i)(j)
| |
| 3(c)
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| High 2 SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| d. Steam Line
| |
| Pressure
| |
| (1) Low 1,2(c), 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 570 (b) psig 585 (b) psig
| |
| line SR 3.3.2.4(i)(j)
| |
| 3(a)(c) (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| (2) Negative 3(d)(c) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 100 (e)
| |
| Rate - line (i)(j) 125 (e)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| High (i)(j) psi/sec psi/sec
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
| |
| (b) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are t1 50 seconds and t2 5 seconds.
| |
| (c) Except when one main steam isolation valve and associated bypass isolation valve per steam line is closed.
| |
| (d) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
| |
| (e) Time constant utilized in the rate/lag controller is 50 seconds.
| |
| (i) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is
| |
| functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (j) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP)
| |
| at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the
| |
| NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance
| |
| procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left
| |
| tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-12 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System
| |
| 3.3.4
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System
| |
| LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| -----------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more required A.1 Restore required Function 30 days
| |
| Functions inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time not met. AND
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.4-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System
| |
| 3.3.4
| |
| Table 3.3.4-1 (page 1 of 1)
| |
| Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls
| |
| FUNCTION/INSTRUMENT REQUIRED
| |
| OR CONTROL PARAMETER NUMBER OF CHANNELS
| |
| MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 1. Source Range Neutron Flux 1
| |
| 2. Extended Range Neutron Flux 1
| |
| 3. RCS Cold Leg Temperature 1/loop
| |
| 4. RCS Hot Leg Temperature 2
| |
| 5. Core Exit Thermocouples 2
| |
| 6. RCS Wide Range Pressure 2
| |
| 7. Steam Generator Level Wide Range 1/loop
| |
| 8. Pressurizer Level 2
| |
| 9. RWST Level 1(a)
| |
| 10. BAST level 1(a)
| |
| 11. CST Level 1/tank(a) (c)
| |
| 12. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow 1/loop
| |
| 13. Steam Generator Pressure 1/loop
| |
| TRANSFER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS
| |
| 1. Reactivity Control (b)
| |
| 2. RCS Pressure Control (b)
| |
| 3. Decay Heat Removal
| |
| a. Auxiliary Feedwater (b)
| |
| (d)
| |
| b. Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve (b)
| |
| 4. RCS Inventory/Charging System (b)
| |
| 5. Safety support systems required for the above functions (b)
| |
| (a) Alternate local level indication may be established to fulfill the required number of channels.
| |
| (b) The required channels include the transfer switches and control circuits necessary to place and maintain the unit in a safe
| |
| shutdown condition using safety grade components.
| |
| (c) Only required for the OPERABLE tank.
| |
| (d) Refer also to LCO 3.7.4.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.4-3 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System
| |
| B 3.3.4
| |
| BASES
| |
| TABLE B 3.3.4-1 (continued)
| |
| REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| READOUT1 CHANNELS
| |
| INSTRUMENT FUNCTION LOCATION AVAILABLE
| |
| 12. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow A, B 1/LOOP
| |
| (LOOP 1 FI-5152B, Panel A)
| |
| (LOOP 2 FI-5151B, Panel B)
| |
| (LOOP 3 FI-5153B, Panel B)
| |
| (LOOP 4 FI-5150B, Panel A)
| |
| 13. Steam Generator Pressure A, B 1/LOOP
| |
| (LOOP 1 PI-0514C, Panel A)
| |
| (LOOP 2 PI-0525B, Panel B)
| |
| (LOOP 3 PI-0535B, Panel B)
| |
| (LOOP 4 PI-0544C, Panel A)
| |
| 1
| |
| A - Remote Shutdown Panel PSDA
| |
| B - Remote Shutdown Panel PSDB
| |
| L - Local Indication
| |
| 2
| |
| Graph will be provided to determine level from pressure reading.
| |
| 3
| |
| An Operable channel is determined by an algorithm requiring a minimum of 4 B Train core
| |
| exit thermocouple inputs from the respective quadrant. The algorithm dismisses the high
| |
| and low, requiring a minimum of 2 Operable thermocouples to display the average quadrant
| |
| temperature.
| |
| 4
| |
| Also refer to Technical Specification 3.3.3 functions, 16 and 22-25 for Core Exit
| |
| Thermocouples.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.4-7 REVISION 30
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 1 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the loss of Component Cooling Water.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB02-A06 CCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS
| |
| * ALB02-B06 CCW TRAIN A LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB02-D06 CCW TRAIN A RHR HX LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB02-E05 CCW TRAIN A RHR PMP SEAL LO FLOW
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * CCW supply header pressure lowering as read on 1PI-1874.
| |
| * CCW supply header flow lowering as read on 1FI-1876.
| |
| * CCW Pump #1 amber trip light is lit.
| |
| * CCW Pump #3 red light lit with system parameters indicative
| |
| of single pump operation.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 2 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component
| |
| Cooling Water.
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 3 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| *THE ACTIONS OF 13715B-1 ARE REFERENCED STARTING ON
| |
| PAGE 7.
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 4 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 5 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| UO / SS 12 -
| |
| 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System,
| |
| CONDITION A, 72 hours
| |
| The crew will contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a
| |
| work order, and dispatch Maintenance to investigate as well as
| |
| inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 6 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO / SS 13 -
| |
| UO 14 -
| |
| OATC 15 -
| |
| END OF EVENT 4 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 7 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13715B-1, Section 4.1.2, CCW Train B Startup from Standby
| |
| 4.1.2.1 -
| |
| UO 4.1.2.2 -
| |
| UO 4.1.2.3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 8 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.1.2.4 -
| |
| Applicant can start any combination of CCW pumps - 2&4,
| |
| 2&6, or 4&6.
| |
| UO 4.1.2.5 -
| |
| UO 4.1.2.6 -
| |
| UO 4.1.2.7 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 9 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: CCW pump #1 trips with the standby pump tagged OOS. Per 18020-C,
| |
| Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew will be required to shutdown
| |
| CCW Train A an place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.1.2.8 -
| |
| UO 4.1.2.9 thru 4.1.2.10 -
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13715B-1, Section
| |
| 4.1.2, CCW Train B Startup From Standby.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 4 9
| |
| | |
| CCW System
| |
| 3.7.7
| |
| 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS
| |
| 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Note is not
| |
| applicable at this
| |
| time.
| |
| LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One CCW train A.1 -------------NOTE-------------
| |
| inoperable. Enter applicable
| |
| Conditions and Required
| |
| Actions of LCO 3.4.6,
| |
| "RCS Loops - MODE 4,"
| |
| for residual heat removal
| |
| loops made inoperable by
| |
| CCW.
| |
| ----------------------------------
| |
| Restore CCW train to 72 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time of Condition A not AND
| |
| met.
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.7.7-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 1 of 6
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: RCS leak of ~ 75 gpm develops that will require entry into 18004-C,
| |
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB01-E06 CNMT HI TEMP
| |
| * ALB01-F06 CNMT HI MSTR
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Lowering pressurizer level.
| |
| * Various primary plant radiation alarms.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 5 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 2 of 6
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: RCS leak of ~ 75 gpm develops that will require entry into 18004-C,
| |
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Section A, RCS
| |
| Leakage Mode 1, 2, and 3 With RCS Pressure >1000 PSIG
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System
| |
| Leakage.
| |
| A1 -
| |
| SS A2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 5 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 3 of 6
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: RCS leak of ~ 75 gpm develops that will require entry into 18004-C,
| |
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 5 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 4 of 6
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: RCS leak of ~ 75 gpm develops that will require entry into 18004-C,
| |
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A4 -
| |
| SS A5 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 5 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 5 of 6
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: RCS leak of ~ 75 gpm develops that will require entry into 18004-C,
| |
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A6 -
| |
| OATC A7 -
| |
| OATC / A8 -
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC A9 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 5 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 6 of 6
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: RCS leak of ~ 75 gpm develops that will require entry into 18004-C,
| |
| Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / A10 -
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC A11 -
| |
| * 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage - Modes 1, 2, 3, and
| |
| 4, CONDITION A, 4 hours
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| END OF EVENT 5 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Event 5 6
| |
| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE
| |
| 3.4.13
| |
| 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
| |
| 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE
| |
| LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
| |
| a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
| |
| b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
| |
| c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
| |
| d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any
| |
| one steam generator (SG).
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. RCS operational A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to 4 hours
| |
| LEAKAGE not within within limits.
| |
| limits for reasons other
| |
| than pressure boundary
| |
| LEAKAGE or primary to
| |
| secondary LEAKAGE.
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time of Condition A not AND
| |
| met.
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| Pressure boundary
| |
| LEAKAGE exists.
| |
| OR
| |
| Primary to secondary
| |
| LEAKAGE not within
| |
| limit.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.13-1 Amendment No. 144 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 124 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 1 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the large break LOCA.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB06-A06 CNMT HI-1 PRESS ALERT ADVERSE CNMT
| |
| * ALB06-B06 CNMT HI-2 PRESS ALERT
| |
| * ALB06-C06 CNMT HI-3 PRESS ALERT
| |
| * ALB09-A04 PRZR PRESS SI RX TRIP
| |
| * ALB09-D06 HI CNMT PRESS SI RX TRIP ADVERSE
| |
| CNMT
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * BPLB (Bypass Permissive Light Box) SI ACTUATED is lit.
| |
| * SI actuation indication on the IPC screen.
| |
| * Pressurizer and RCS pressure lowering rapidly.
| |
| * Multiple radiation alarms inside of containment.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 2 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
| |
| The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after
| |
| the Immediate Operator Actions.
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 3 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 4 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC/ SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| UO / SS
| |
| 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 5 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC/ 6 - CONTINUED
| |
| UO / SS
| |
| OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| *EVENT 7 (SAFETY INJECTION FAILS TO AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| ACTUATE) IS PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Critical task #1 - MANUALLY actuate Safety Injection within 10
| |
| minutes after a valid SI injection signal is generated is satisfied
| |
| by completion of this step.
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 6 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 7 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 8 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| *EVENT 8 (CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE DAMPERS, 1HV-2628B
| |
| AND 1HV-2629B, FAIL TO AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE) IS
| |
| PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Critical task #2 - MANUALLY close Containment Mini-Purge
| |
| Isolation valves within 15 minutes of the initiating event (LOCA)
| |
| is satisfied by completion of this step.
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 9 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| OATC 11 -
| |
| OATC 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 10 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| OATC 14 -
| |
| This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 11 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 12 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 13 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| This completes the UO Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 14 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
| |
| UO
| |
| 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 15 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 16 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 17 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 17
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 18 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 18
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 19 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
| |
| UO
| |
| Crew update for entry into 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or
| |
| Secondary Coolant.
| |
| 1-
| |
| *SEE PAGE 32 FOR 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status
| |
| Tree, ACTIONS.
| |
| *SEE PAGE 34 FOR 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen
| |
| Control, ACTIONS (the crew may request an extra operator to
| |
| place hydrogen monitors in service).
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 19
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 20 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| END OF SCENARIO 1 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH
| |
| CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER. THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE
| |
| FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 20
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 21 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 21
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 22 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 22
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 23 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 23
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 24 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 7-
| |
| UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 24
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 25 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 25
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 26 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| 9-
| |
| OATC
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 26
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 27 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 27
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 28 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 28
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 29 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 14 -
| |
| UO 15 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 29
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 30 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 16 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 30
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 31 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 17 -
| |
| OATC 18 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 31
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 32 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC
| |
| OATC 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 32
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 33 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 33
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 34 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13130-1, Post - Accident Hydrogen Control
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 34
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 1 Page 35 of 35
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: RCS LOCA will increase to ~ 30000 gpm, which will require a reactor trip
| |
| and SI. RCS pressure will rapidly lower and pressurizer level will go off-
| |
| scale low. Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection, and then transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant. SI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate and the containment
| |
| mini-purge dampers will fail to AUTOMATICALLY close.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13130-1, Post - Accident Hydrogen Control (CONTINUED)
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13130-1, Post -
| |
| Accident Hydrogen Control.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 1 - Events 6 - 8 35
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility: _Vogtle_1 & 2_______ Scenario No.: ___2___ Op-Test No.: 2017-301
| |
| Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power, MOL, steady state operations.
| |
| Equipment OOS: CCW pump # 5 is tagged out for motor repair - RTS in 7 hours.
| |
| Air Compressor #3 is tagged out for intercooler repair - RTS in 12 hours.
| |
| Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
| |
| SNAP 361
| |
| Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
| |
| AC03B ACCW Pump #2 Fails to Auto Start
| |
| ES01 Reactor Auto Trip Failure
| |
| ES02 Reactor Manual Trip Failure
| |
| TU18 Main Turbine Auto Trip Failure
| |
| Triggered Malfunctions:
| |
| (1) PR04 (60%) 1PORV-456 Fails Open (60%)
| |
| (2) AC02A ACCW Pump #1 Trips Due to Locked Rotor
| |
| (3) CV08 (25%) Letdown Line Break in Auxiliary Building
| |
| (5) RM13121 (100%) 1RE-13121, Main Steam Line #2, Fails High
| |
| (6) MS03D (100%) 1PV-3030, Loop #4 ARV Transmitter, Fails High
| |
| (7) RD07 Control Banks Fail to Move on Auto Demand
| |
| (7) MS04D (10%) Steam Line #4 Rupture Inside Containment (10% with 300 sec. ramp)
| |
| Pre-loaded Overrides:
| |
| 1HS-8104 1HV-8104, Emergency Borate Valve, Fails Shut
| |
| 1HS-9382 Air Compressor #3 to STOP
| |
| A-LO_HS9382_G 1HS-9382 GREEN A531P30-A6 to OFF
| |
| Remote Functions:
| |
| (21) PR02RF 1PORV-456 (de-energize)
| |
| (22) PR04RF 1HV-8000B (de-energize)
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 1 Trigger 1 C-OATC 1PORV-456 fails open causing entry into 18000-C, Pressurizer
| |
| C-SS Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction.
| |
| 15 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs),
| |
| CONDITION B, 2 hours
| |
| * 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow from Nucleate
| |
| Boiling (DNB), CONDITION A, 1 hour
| |
| 2 Trigger 2 C-UO ACCW pump #1 trips due to a locked rotor with ACCW pump #2
| |
| C-SS failing to automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction). Crew enters
| |
| 10 min 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
| |
| 3 Trigger 3 C-OATC CVCS letdown break outside containment that will be isolated
| |
| C-SS automatically by High Energy Line Break Actuation (HELBA). The
| |
| 10 min crew will respond to this as a loss of letdown.
| |
| 4 N/A N-OATC Normal letdown is not available, so the crew will be directed to place
| |
| N-SS Excess Letdown in service.
| |
| 10 min
| |
| 5 Trigger 5 TS-SS 1RE-13121, Main Steam Line #2 Radiation Monitor, fails high. The
| |
| crew will enter 17102-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for the
| |
| 5 min Safety Related Display Console QRM2.
| |
| * 3.3.3, Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 15, CONDITION F, 30 days
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.3-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| 6 Trigger 6 C-UO 1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew will enter 18008-
| |
| C-SS C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| 5 min
| |
| 6A N/A R-UO Reduce main turbine load in response to 1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop
| |
| R-SS #4, failing open.
| |
| 5 min
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 7 Trigger 7 M-ALL ATWT associated with a main steam line #4 rupture inside
| |
| containment (10% with 300 sec ramp). Initial entry will be into
| |
| 15 min 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a transition to 19211-
| |
| 1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Delete ES01 after 5 minutes have
| |
| elapsed from the time the Control Room dispatches an operator
| |
| to locally open the Reactor Trip Breakers.
| |
| Critical task:
| |
| Insert negative reactivity using control rods.
| |
| 8 N/A C-UO Main turbine fails to automatically trip, so it must be tripped manually.
| |
| C-SS
| |
| 9 N/A C-OATC 1HV-8104 will not open for emergency boration, so boration will be
| |
| C-SS established through the normal charging flow path (pre-loaded
| |
| malfunction).
| |
| 10 N/A M-ALL After returning to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, the crew
| |
| will isolate the faulted SG by transitioning to 19020-1, Faulted Steam
| |
| 15 min Generator Isolation.
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually isolate the faulted SG #4.
| |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 1:
| |
| 1PORV-456 will fail open due to an electrical fault within the control circuitry. This failure results in
| |
| lowering RCS pressure. The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve
| |
| Malfunction, and will stop the pressure reduction by shutting the PORV Block Valve, 1HV-8000B, and by
| |
| operating pressurizer heaters as necessary.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction, and verifies
| |
| Immediate Operator Actions (IOAs) for failure of 1PORV-456.
| |
| OATC - Attempts to close 1PORV-456 per 18000-C. 1PORV-456 will not close, which will require
| |
| manual closure of the associated Block Valve, 1HV-8000B.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), CONDITION B, 2 hours
| |
| * 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) [likely based on RCS
| |
| pressure trend], 1 hour
| |
| Event 2:
| |
| ACCW Pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail to automatically start resulting
| |
| in a complete loss of ACCW. The crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
| |
| UO - Diagnoses loss of ACCW and manually starts ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 3:
| |
| CVCS letdown line breaks in the Auxiliary Building that will be automatically isolated via High Energy Line
| |
| Break Actuation (HELBA). The automatic isolation of this leak aligns the RCS letdown flow path to the
| |
| PRT via its associated relief valve. Letdown flow rate on the QMCB will indicate 0 gpm; however, the
| |
| crew must identify that the letdown flow path is still aligned and relieving to the PRT. The operating crew
| |
| will be required to isolate the letdown flow path to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT by entering 18007-C,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section A, due to a
| |
| total loss of letdown.
| |
| OATC - Closes Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves, 1HV-8149A, B, and C.
| |
| Closes Letdown Isolation Valves, 1LV-459 and 1LV-460.
| |
| Adjusts 1HC-182 and 1FIC-121 to establish 8 to 13 gpm seal injection flow with charging
| |
| flow approximately 10 gpm greater than total seal injection flow.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 4:
| |
| Excess Letdown will be placed in service using 13008-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Excess
| |
| Letdown, as directed by 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs OATC to place excess letdown in service using 13008-1, Chemical and Volume
| |
| Control System Excess Letdown.
| |
| OATC - Sets 1HC-123 to close (0% demand).
| |
| Opens Excess Letdown Isolation Valves, 1HV-8153 and 1HV-8154.
| |
| Adjusts 1HC-123 to establish the maximum allowable excess letdown flow (~30 gpm).
| |
| Adjusts 1FIC-121 and 1HC-182 to control charging and seal injection flows.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 5:
| |
| 1RE-13121, Main Steam Line #2 Radiation Monitor, fails high. The crew will enter 17102-1, Annunciator
| |
| Response Procedures for the Safety Related Display Console QRM2, and determines the instrument
| |
| has failed.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| None
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.3.3, Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 15, CONDITION F, 30 days
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.3-1, then the crew meets
| |
| the intent of Condition A)
| |
| Event 6:
| |
| SG ARV Loop #4, 1PV-3030, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and
| |
| manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| UO - Isolates the secondary leak by manually closing 1PV-3030 using the M/A controller.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 6A:
| |
| Main Turbine load is reduced in response to SG ARV Loop #4, 1PV-3030, failing open. The crew enters
| |
| 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs main turbine load reduction until all power indications are less than 100%.
| |
| UO - Reduces turbine load to reduce reactor power to < 100% (this may not occur depending on
| |
| the response time of the crew and power level following ARV closure).
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Events 7, 8, 9:
| |
| An ATWT will occur that is associated with a main steam rupture inside containment. The crew will
| |
| initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a transition to 19211-1, Response to
| |
| Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT. The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which
| |
| will result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1, Reactor Trip
| |
| or Safety Injection.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT, from 19000-1, Reactor
| |
| Trip or Safety Injection, and verifies completion of IOAs.
| |
| OATC - Inserts control rods (automatic rod insertion will not work, so manual rod insertion will be
| |
| required).
| |
| Initiates boration of the RCS through the normal charging path due to a failure of 1HV-8104.
| |
| UO - Trips main turbine due to failure to trip automatically.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 10:
| |
| The main steam rupture on SG #4 will require the crew to transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam
| |
| Generator Isolation, from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| Injection.
| |
| UO - Isolates faulted SG #4 by closing AFW valves supplying SG #4 and verifying FWI has
| |
| occurred.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| The scenario may be stopped after the crew has completed
| |
| 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and
| |
| transitioned to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant, or at the Chief Examiners discretion.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| CRITICAL TASKS:
| |
| 1. Manually insert control rods (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per the FR-S.1 background document, the basic strategy of FR-S.1 is as follows:
| |
| * Perform manual actions to reduce core power (such as manually driving control rods
| |
| inward) and verify automatic actions such as turbine trip and AFW actuation
| |
| * Initiate emergency boration of the RCS
| |
| * Check for possible sources of positive reactivity and eliminate them
| |
| * Verify subcriticality
| |
| This strategy is based on making the reactor subcritical and providing shutdown margin as rapidly
| |
| as possible. Thus, the actions to reduce core power and provide shutdown margin are prioritized
| |
| according to how quickly they can be performed from the control room. Aside from the normal
| |
| method of reactor trip, de-energizing the rod drive MG sets is the fastest method to shut down the
| |
| reactor and provide shutdown margin (provided that it is feasible, on a plant-specific basis, to de-
| |
| energize the MG sets from the control room).
| |
| The second and third fastest methods are to insert control rods and to establish emergency
| |
| boration flow to the RCS, respectively. It is true that local operator actions might result in reactor
| |
| trip, which - if and when it occurs - would shut down the reactor faster than boration (and faster
| |
| than rod insertion). However, it is anticipated that effecting the local actions will be time-
| |
| consuming and that actions that can be implemented from the control room should be given
| |
| precedence.
| |
| Thus, before dispatching operators to perform local actions to trip the reactor, the crew should
| |
| perform or initiate performance of at least one of the three methods listed previously for shutting
| |
| down the reactor and providing shutdown margin.
| |
| Making the reactor subcritical is an essential part of the strategy of FR-S.1. To implement the
| |
| MAC of verifying subcriticality, FR-S.1 directs the crew to check for power range indication of less
| |
| than 5% and for negative SUR indication on the intermediate range. If either of these conditions
| |
| is not met, the crew is directed to continue boration (and repeat a loop in the procedure) until both
| |
| conditions are met. Additionally, a caution directs the crew to continue boration in order to obtain
| |
| adequate shutdown margin.
| |
| The analyses upon which FR-S.1 is based do not foresee critical operation in the power range for
| |
| an indefinite period of time. They assume that the operating crew will take action to shut down
| |
| the reactor, once the RCS stabilizes at some quasi-equilibrium condition. Furthermore, NMP-
| |
| OS-014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program, identifies the manual insertion
| |
| of control rods during an ATWT as a Time Critical Action. The time required is 1.1 minutes
| |
| from the implementation of 19211-1, Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT. Therefore,
| |
| failure to initiate manual control rod insertion within 1.1 minutes from the entry to 19211-1
| |
| constitutes task failure.
| |
| 2. Manually isolate faulted SG #4 (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks, failure to
| |
| isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably
| |
| introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could
| |
| constitute a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect
| |
| automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate the faulted SG such that
| |
| multiple SGs are allowed to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power
| |
| excursion. Similarly, failure to isolate all feedwater flow, including AFW, to the faulted SG such
| |
| that it continues to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power excursion.
| |
| Manipulation of controls are required to isolate the faulted SG. These include indication that
| |
| MSIVs are closed, indication that feedwater control and isolation valves are closed, indication that
| |
| the MFPs are tripped, and indication that AFW flow to the faulted SG is stopped (control valves
| |
| closed).
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| For this critical task, the faulted SG is considered to be isolated when both of the following
| |
| conditions are met:
| |
| * MSIV for the faulted SG is closed or MSIVs for all non-faulted SGs are closed
| |
| * All feedwater flow, including AFW flow, to the faulted SG is stopped
| |
| Isolating AFW flow to the faulted SG is always a part of this critical task. If AFW flow to the
| |
| faulted SG is isolated, the RCS cooldown imposed by the blowdown of the faulted SG stops when
| |
| that SG has blown dry. If AFW flow is not isolated, the RCS cooldown will continue (unless the
| |
| decay heat rate happens to exceed the combined heat removal rate of all SG effluents and
| |
| influents). Continued RCS cooldown contributes to thermal stresses in the reactor pressure
| |
| vessel and can constitute a challenge to the integrity CSF. Continued RCS cooldown also tends
| |
| to worsen any reactor power excursion. Therefore, failure to isolate all AFW flow to the
| |
| faulted SG before transition to 19241-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal
| |
| Shock Condition, due to excessive RCS cooldown constitutes task failure.
| |
| Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
| |
| 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
| |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
| |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) 2
| |
| 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
| |
| 5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
| |
| 6. EOP based critical tasks (2-3) 2
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 5
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: 1PORV-456 will fail open. This failure results in lowering RCS pressure.
| |
| The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve
| |
| Malfunction, and will stop the pressure reduction by shutting the PORV
| |
| Block Valve, 1HV-8000B, and by operating pressurizer heaters as
| |
| necessary.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the failed open, 1PORV-456.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB11-D02 PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS
| |
| ON
| |
| * ALB12-D03 PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK
| |
| * ALB12-F04 PV-0456A OPEN SIGNAL
| |
| * ALB12-F01 PRZR SAFETY RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP
| |
| * ALB12-E01 PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP
| |
| * ALB12-E02 PRZR REL TANK HI PRESS
| |
| * ALB12-E03 PRZR REL TANK HI TEMP
| |
| * ALB12-F02 PRZR REL TANK HI/LO LEVEL
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Lowering RCS pressure.
| |
| * Rising temperatures in discharge relief line.
| |
| * Pressurizer back-up heaters on.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| OATC 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve
| |
| Malfunction
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 5
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: 1PORV-456 will fail open. This failure results in lowering RCS pressure.
| |
| The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve
| |
| Malfunction, and will stop the pressure reduction by shutting the PORV
| |
| Block Valve, 1HV-8000B, and by operating pressurizer heaters as
| |
| necessary.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC Crew update for entry into 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety,
| |
| or Relief Valve Malfunction.
| |
| SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 1 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 5
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: 1PORV-456 will fail open. This failure results in lowering RCS pressure.
| |
| The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve
| |
| Malfunction, and will stop the pressure reduction by shutting the PORV
| |
| Block Valve, 1HV-8000B, and by operating pressurizer heaters as
| |
| necessary.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| OATC / 5-
| |
| SS
| |
| *SEE PAGE 5 FOR FIGURE 1.
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 1 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 5
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: 1PORV-456 will fail open. This failure results in lowering RCS pressure.
| |
| The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve
| |
| Malfunction, and will stop the pressure reduction by shutting the PORV
| |
| Block Valve, 1HV-8000B, and by operating pressurizer heaters as
| |
| necessary.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 7-
| |
| 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow from Nucleate
| |
| Boiling (DNB), CONDITION A, 2 hours
| |
| 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs),
| |
| CONDITION B, 1 hour
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| The crew will contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a
| |
| work order, and notify Maintenance to investigate as well as
| |
| inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| END OF EVENT 1 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 1 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 5
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: 1PORV-456 will fail open. This failure results in lowering RCS pressure.
| |
| The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve
| |
| Malfunction, and will stop the pressure reduction by shutting the PORV
| |
| Block Valve, 1HV-8000B, and by operating pressurizer heaters as
| |
| necessary.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS /
| |
| OATC
| |
| FIGURE 1
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 1 5
| |
| | |
| Pressurizer PORVs
| |
| 3.4.11
| |
| 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
| |
| 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)
| |
| LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| -----------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more PORVs A.1 Close and maintain power 1 hour
| |
| inoperable and capable to associated block valve.
| |
| of being manually
| |
| cycled.
| |
| B. One PORV inoperable B.1 Close associated block 1 hour
| |
| and not capable of being valve.
| |
| manually cycled.
| |
| AND
| |
| B.2 Remove power from 1 hour
| |
| associated block valve.
| |
| AND
| |
| B.3 Restore PORV to 72 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.11-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits
| |
| 3.4.1
| |
| 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
| |
| 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits
| |
| LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature,
| |
| and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:
| |
| a. Pressurizer pressure 2199 psig;
| |
| b. RCS average temperature 592.5°F; and
| |
| c. RCS total flow rate 384,509 gpm.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
| |
| ----------------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------------------
| |
| Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:
| |
| a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or
| |
| b. THERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.
| |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours
| |
| parameters not within parameter(s) to within
| |
| limits. limit.
| |
| B. RCS total flow rate B.1. Perform SR 3.4.1.4. 7 days
| |
| degraded.
| |
| C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time not met.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.1-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: ACCW pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start resulting in a complete loss of ACCW. The
| |
| crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the #1 ACCW Pump trip.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB04-A02 ACCW LO HDR PRESS
| |
| * ALB04-A03, B03, C03, D03 ACCW RCP 1, 2, 3, 4 CLR
| |
| LOW FLOW
| |
| * ALB04-A04(B04, C04, D04) ACCW RCP 1(2, 3, 4) CLR
| |
| OUTLET HI TEMP
| |
| * ALB04-B02 ACCW RX COOLANT DRN TK HX LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB04-C02 ACCW EXCESS LTDN HX LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB04-D02 ACCW RTN HDR FROM RCP LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB04-A01 ACCW SURGE TK HI/LO LVL
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * ACCW pump #1 handswitch amber light lit.
| |
| * Rising ACCW system temperatures.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| CREW 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary
| |
| Component Cooling Water.
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 2 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: ACCW pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start resulting in a complete loss of ACCW. The
| |
| crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| The crew may start ACCW pump #2 prior to the procedural
| |
| guidance of 18022-C. The guidance to perform this action is in
| |
| NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and
| |
| Expectations. The procedure states:
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 2 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: ACCW pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start resulting in a complete loss of ACCW. The
| |
| crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 2 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: ACCW pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start resulting in a complete loss of ACCW. The
| |
| crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 6-
| |
| UO
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 2 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: ACCW pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start resulting in a complete loss of ACCW. The
| |
| crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| OATC / 10 -
| |
| UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 2 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: ACCW pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start resulting in a complete loss of ACCW. The
| |
| crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| The crew will contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a
| |
| work order, and dispatch Maintenance to investigate as well as
| |
| inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| *SEE PAGE 7 FOR 17007-1, Annunciator Response
| |
| Procedures for ALB07 on Panel 1A2 on MCB, ACTIONS
| |
| related to ALB07-F04 LTDN HX HI TEMP DEMIN DIVERT, if
| |
| required.
| |
| END OF EVENT 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 2 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: ACCW pump #1 will trip due to a locked rotor, and ACCW pump #2 will fail
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start resulting in a complete loss of ACCW. The
| |
| crew will enter into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling
| |
| Water, and start ACCW pump #2.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO ALB07-F04
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| UO ALB07-F04
| |
| 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| UO ALB07-F04
| |
| 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| This completes the actions of ALB07-F04 from 17007-1.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 2 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the letdown line break and HELBA isolation.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB07-C05 LP LTDN RELIEF HI TEMP
| |
| * ALB61-E01 CVCS PIPE BREAK RM PROT ACTUATION
| |
| * ALB63-C06 LVL A LEAK DETECTED
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Letdown flow indicates 0 gpm on 1FI-132C.
| |
| * Rising PRT level and pressure.
| |
| * 1HV-15214 is shut as indicated by a green light on 1HS-
| |
| 15214.
| |
| * Charging flow AUTOMATICALLY reducing due to a rise in
| |
| pressurizer level from the loss of letdown flow.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 18007-C, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18007-C, Section A, Total Loss of
| |
| Letdown Flow.
| |
| A1 -
| |
| OATC A2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A3 -
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: If operator is dispatched to
| |
| Room A09, report that it cannot be entered due to large
| |
| quantities of steam present.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A4 -
| |
| UO A5 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A6 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A7 -
| |
| OATC A8 -
| |
| *SEE EVENT 4 FOR 13008-1, Chemical and Volume Control
| |
| System Excess Letdown, ACTIONS.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS / A10 -
| |
| OATC
| |
| SS A11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 8 of 8
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: CVCS letdown line break in the Auxiliary Building that will be
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY isolated by High Energy Line Break Actuation
| |
| (HELBA). The AUTOMATIC isolation of the normal letdown flow path re-
| |
| directs the letdown to the PRT through the letdown relief valve. Letdown
| |
| flow will indicate 0 gpm, but flow will be aligned to the PRT though the
| |
| relief. The operating crew will be required to isolate the letdown flow path
| |
| to stop the flow of RCS to the PRT be entering 18007-C, Section A,
| |
| Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction. The crew will place
| |
| Excess Letdown in service as described in Event 4.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A12 -
| |
| SS A13 -
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact
| |
| C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a work order, and
| |
| dispatch personnel to investigate the fault as well as inform the
| |
| Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
| |
| END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT (EVENT 5 SINCE EVENT 4 IS
| |
| PLACING EXCESS LETDOWN IN SERVICE) AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF
| |
| EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 5
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Excess Letdown is placed in service as a part of the restoration from the
| |
| loss of letdown in Event 3.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13008-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Excess
| |
| Letdown
| |
| 4.1.1 -
| |
| OATC 4.1.2 -
| |
| OATC 4.1.3 -
| |
| OATC 4.1.4 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 5
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Excess Letdown is placed in service as a part of the restoration from the
| |
| loss of letdown in Event 3.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.1.5 -
| |
| OATC 4.1.6 -
| |
| OATC 4.1.7-
| |
| OATC 4.1.8 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 5
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Excess Letdown is placed in service as a part of the restoration from the
| |
| loss of letdown in Event 3.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.1.9 -
| |
| OATC 4.1.10 -
| |
| OATC 4.1.11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 5
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Excess Letdown is placed in service as a part of the restoration from the
| |
| loss of letdown in Event 3.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.1.12 -
| |
| SS 4.1.13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 5
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Excess Letdown is placed in service as a part of the restoration from the
| |
| loss of letdown in Event 3.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.1.14 -
| |
| END OF EVENT 4 - CONTINUE WITH EVENT 3 AND THEN PROCEED TO EVENT 5
| |
| AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 4
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: 1RE-13121, Main Steam Line #2 Radiation, fails HIGH. The crew will
| |
| respond using the ARP guidance in 17005-1 for Intermediate and High
| |
| radiation alarms. This will direct them to take action per 17102-1,
| |
| Annunciator Response Procedures for the Safety Related Display
| |
| Console QRM2, which contains actions for responding to individual
| |
| radiation detector alarms.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of 1RE-13121 failing HIGH.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * The Safety Related Display Console (SRDC) will indicate
| |
| HIGH and INTERMEDIATE alarming conditions for 1RE-
| |
| 13121, while other radiation monitors indicate normal
| |
| background levels.
| |
| * IPC indication will display a step change in the radiation
| |
| level reading for 1RE-13121. This is indicative of a detector
| |
| failure.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 4
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: 1RE-13121, Main Steam Line #2 Radiation, fails HIGH. The crew will
| |
| respond using the ARP guidance in 17005-1 for Intermediate and High
| |
| radiation alarms. This will direct them to take action per 17102-1,
| |
| Annunciator Response Procedures for the Safety Related Display
| |
| Console QRM2, which contains actions for responding to individual
| |
| radiation detector alarms.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO / SS ALB05-C03
| |
| 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| This completes the actions of 17005-1.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 4
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: 1RE-13121, Main Steam Line #2 Radiation, fails HIGH. The crew will
| |
| respond using the ARP guidance in 17005-1 for Intermediate and High
| |
| radiation alarms. This will direct them to take action per 17102-1,
| |
| Annunciator Response Procedures for the Safety Related Display
| |
| Console QRM2, which contains actions for responding to individual
| |
| radiation detector alarms.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 17102-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for the Safety
| |
| Related Display Console QRM2
| |
| 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 4
| |
| Event: 5
| |
| Event Description: 1RE-13121, Main Steam Line #2 Radiation, fails HIGH. The crew will
| |
| respond using the ARP guidance in 17005-1 for Intermediate and High
| |
| radiation alarms. This will direct them to take action per 17102-1,
| |
| Annunciator Response Procedures for the Safety Related Display
| |
| Console QRM2, which contains actions for responding to individual
| |
| radiation detector alarms.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| * 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 15, CONDITION F, 30 days
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition A)
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| The crew will contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a
| |
| work order, and dispatch I&C to investigate as well as inform
| |
| the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| END OF EVENT 5 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 4
| |
| | |
| PAM Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.3
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more functions A.1 Enter the applicable Immediately
| |
| with one or more Condition referenced in
| |
| required channels Table 3.3.3-1 for the
| |
| inoperable. channels.
| |
| B. -----------NOTE------------ B.1 Restore the channel to 30 days
| |
| For containment OPERABLE status.
| |
| isolation valve position
| |
| indication, separate
| |
| Condition entry is
| |
| allowed for each
| |
| penetration flow path.
| |
| -------------------------------
| |
| One required channel
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.3-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| PAM Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.3
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| F. One Steam Line F.1 Restore the channel to 30 days
| |
| Radiation Monitor OPERABLE status.
| |
| channel inoperable.
| |
| AND
| |
| One channel of SG
| |
| Water Level (narrow
| |
| range) OPERABLE in
| |
| the affected loop.
| |
| G. Required Actions and G.1 Initiate action in accordance Immediately
| |
| associated Completion with Specification 5.6.8.
| |
| Times of Conditions B,
| |
| C, D, E, or F not met.
| |
| H. -----------NOTE------------ H.1 Restore at least one 7 days
| |
| For containment channel to OPERABLE
| |
| isolation valve position status.
| |
| indication, separate
| |
| Condition entry is
| |
| allowed for each
| |
| penetration flow path.
| |
| -------------------------------
| |
| Two channels
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| OR
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.3-3 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| PAM Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.3
| |
| Table 3.3.3-1 (page 1 of 1)
| |
| Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS
| |
| 1. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure (wide range) 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| 2. RCS Thot (wide range) 1/loop C,G,H,I
| |
| 3. RCS Tcold (wide range) 1/loop D,G,H,I
| |
| 4. Steam Generator (SG) Water Level (wide range) 1/SG E,G,H,I
| |
| 5. SG Water Level (narrow range) 2/SG B,G,H,I
| |
| 6. Pressurizer Level 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| 7. Containment Pressure 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| 8. Steam line Pressure 2/steam line B,G,H,I
| |
| 9. Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| 10. Containment Normal Sumps Level (narrow range) 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| 11. Containment Water Level (wide range) 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| (a)
| |
| 12. Condensate Storage Tank Level 2/tank B,G,H,I
| |
| 13. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow 2/SG B,G,H,I
| |
| 14. Containment Radiation Level (high range) 2 B,G,H,J
| |
| 15. Steam line Radiation Monitor 1/steam line F,G,H,I
| |
| 16. RCS Subcooling 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| 17. Neutron Flux (extended range) 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| 18. Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVLIS) 2 B,G,H,J
| |
| 19. Deleted
| |
| 20. Containment Pressure (extended range) 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| (b) (c)
| |
| 21. Containment Isolation Valve Position 2/penetration flow path B,G,H,I
| |
| (d)
| |
| 22. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 1 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| (d)
| |
| 23. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 2 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| (d)
| |
| 24. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 3 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| (d)
| |
| 25. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 4 2 B,G,H,I
| |
| (a) Only required for the OPERABLE tank.
| |
| (b) Not required for isolation valves whose associated penetration is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic
| |
| valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.
| |
| Applicable for containment isolation valve position indication designated as post-accident monitoring instrumentation
| |
| (containment isolation valves which receive containment isolation phase A or containment ventilation isolation signals).
| |
| (c) Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one installed control room indication
| |
| channel.
| |
| (d) A channel consists of two core exit thermocouples (CETs).
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.3-6 Amendment No. 134 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 113 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 6
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: The SG ARV for Loop #4, 1PV-3030, fails OPEN. The crew will respond
| |
| by entering 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the Loop #4 ARV, 1PV-3030, failing OPEN.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB15-F01 MN STM SFTY VLVS LEAKING
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * The operators may check the temperature indications the
| |
| QPCP to verify that the ARV is leaking.
| |
| * ZLB-4 status light for 1PV-3030 will indicate open.
| |
| * Rising reactor power.
| |
| * Rising Ts.
| |
| * Main turbine power lowering slightly.
| |
| * The annunciator listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 6
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: The SG ARV for Loop #4, 1PV-3030, fails OPEN. The crew will respond
| |
| by entering 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18008-C, Secondary Coolant
| |
| Leakage.
| |
| 1-
| |
| *13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, for power reduction, if
| |
| required, begins on page 6.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 6
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: The SG ARV for Loop #4, 1PV-3030, fails OPEN. The crew will respond
| |
| by entering 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 2-
| |
| UO
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 6
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: The SG ARV for Loop #4, 1PV-3030, fails OPEN. The crew will respond
| |
| by entering 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 6
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: The SG ARV for Loop #4, 1PV-3030, fails OPEN. The crew will respond
| |
| by entering 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| SS 9-
| |
| If not already complete, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant. The crew may contact C&T to
| |
| initiate a Condition Report (CR), a work order, and dispatch
| |
| personnel to investigate the cause of the fault as well as inform
| |
| the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
| |
| SS 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 6
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: The SG ARV for Loop #4, 1PV-3030, fails OPEN. The crew will respond
| |
| by entering 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.2, for Main
| |
| Turbine Unloading
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13800-1, Main
| |
| Turbine Operation.
| |
| END OF EVENT 6 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the Steam Line #4 Rupture Inside Containment.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB06-A06 CNMT HI-1 PRESS ALERT ADVERSE CNMT
| |
| * ALB13-D01 STM GEN 4 FLOW MISMATCH
| |
| * ALB13-D06 STM GEN 4 HI/LO LVL DEVIATION
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Unexplained rise in reactor power
| |
| * Lowering main generator power
| |
| * High containment pressure, temperature, moisture, and sump
| |
| levels without rising radiation.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT
| |
| The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after
| |
| the Immediate Operator Actions.
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| 1-
| |
| Critical Task #1 - MANUALLY inserting control rods within 1.1
| |
| minutes from the implementation of 19211-1 is satisfied by
| |
| completion of this step. NOTE: Automatic rod insertion will
| |
| NOT occur, so manual rod insertion is required.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 6-
| |
| OATC 7-
| |
| *ATTACHMENT 1 is on the next page.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO ATTACHMENT 1
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 8 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 9 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 10 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| UO 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 11 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13 -
| |
| *This completes the actions of ATTACHMENT 1.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 12 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT
| |
| (CONTINUED)
| |
| 8-
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: When requested, the Reactor
| |
| Trip Breakers will be opened following a 5-minute delay.
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| Step 22 is located on Page 17.
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 13 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| UO 12 -
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 14 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 14 -
| |
| UO
| |
| UO 15 -
| |
| UO 16 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 15 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 17 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 16 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 18 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 17 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 19 -
| |
| UO 20 -
| |
| UO 21 -
| |
| UO 22 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 17
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 18 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 23 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 18
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 19 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19000-1 , Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 19
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 20 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 20
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 21 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| UO
| |
| 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 21
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 22 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 6 - CONTINUED
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 22
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 23 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 3-
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 23
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 24 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| OATC 7-
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 24
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 25 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| OATC 11 -
| |
| OATC 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 25
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 26 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| OATC 14 -
| |
| This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 26
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 27 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 27
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 28 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 28
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 29 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| This completes the UO Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 29
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 30 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
| |
| UO
| |
| 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 30
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 31 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 31
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 32 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 32
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 33 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS / 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation
| |
| OATC
| |
| Crew update for entry into 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator
| |
| Isolation.
| |
| 1-
| |
| *SEE PAGE 45 FOR 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status
| |
| Tree, ACTIONS.
| |
| SS 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 33
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 34 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 34
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 35 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 35
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 36 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 36
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 37 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 37
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 38 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Critical Task #2 - MANUALLY isolate faulted SG #4 before
| |
| transition to 19241-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized
| |
| Thermal Shock Condition, is satisfied by completion of this
| |
| step. This is the last step in completing all required actions to
| |
| consider the SG isolated.
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 38
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 39 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 39
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 40 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 13 -
| |
| SS 14 -
| |
| END OF SCENARIO 2.
| |
| THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH CONCURRENCE FROM THE
| |
| CHIEF EXAMINER. THE FOLLOWING STEPS FROM 19010-1 ARE FOR
| |
| INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 40
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 41 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
| |
| Crew update for entry into 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or
| |
| Secondary Coolant.
| |
| 1-
| |
| *SEE PAGE 45 FOR 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status
| |
| Tree, ACTIONS.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 41
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 42 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 42
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 43 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 43
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 44 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 44
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 45 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 45
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 46 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 46
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 2 Page 47 of 47
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: A main steam rupture inside containment will lead to an ATWT. The crew
| |
| will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, with a
| |
| transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.
| |
| The reactor will not trip automatically nor by manual initiation, which will
| |
| result in an ATWT. When the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return
| |
| to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 10 47
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility: _Vogtle_1 & 2_______ Scenario No.: ___3___ Op-Test No.: 2017-301
| |
| Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power, MOL, steady state operations.
| |
| Equipment OOS: CCW pump #5 is tagged out for motor repair - RTS in 7 hours.
| |
| Air Compressor #3 is tagged out for intercooler repair - RTS in 12 hours.
| |
| Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
| |
| SNAP 362
| |
| Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
| |
| ES22A 1HV-8801A, BIT Discharge, Fails Closed
| |
| ES22B 1HV-8801B, BIT Discharge, Fails Closed
| |
| IA09B Instrument Air Compressor #2 Auto Start Failure
| |
| AF05A MDAFW Pump A Auto Start Failure
| |
| AF05B MDAFW Pump B Auto Start Failure
| |
| Triggered Malfunctions:
| |
| (2) NI10C N43, Power Range NI Detector, Fails High
| |
| (3) 1HS-2650 Override 1HS-2650 Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan #1 to STOP
| |
| (3) 1HS-2650 HV-LO_HS2650_Y 1HS-2650 YELLOW A534P29-B5 to ON
| |
| (3) 1HS-2650 HV-LO_HS2650_G 1HS-2650 GREEN A534P29-B6 to ON
| |
| (3) 1HS-2650 HV-LO_HS2650_R 1HS-2650 RED A534P29-B4 to OFF
| |
| (3) ALB52-E09 ALB-52-E09 CNMT CVTY F-A1 LO AIR LOW to ON
| |
| (3) ALB33-C03 ALB-C03 480 V SWGR NB01 TROUBLE to ON
| |
| (4) SG01A (3%) SG #1 Tube Rupture on Inlet (begins as leak)
| |
| (4) SG01A (45%) SG #1 Tube Rupture on Inlet (ramp over 3 minutes)
| |
| Pre-loaded Overrides:
| |
| 1HS-9382 Air Compressor #3 to STOP
| |
| A-LO_HS9382_G 1HS-9382 GREEN A531P30-A6 to OFF
| |
| Triggered Overrides:
| |
| (1) ALB33-A06 480 V SWGR 1NB03 TROUBLE
| |
| (1) ALB01-B05 SERVICE AIR CMPSR TROUBLE
| |
| (1) 1HS-19338 Air Compressor #1 STOP/NORMAL
| |
| (1) A-LO_HS19338_Y 1HS-19338 YELLOW A531P27-B15 to ON
| |
| (1) A-LO_HS19338_G 1HS-19338 GREEN A531P27-B16 to ON
| |
| (1) A-LO_HS19338_R 1HS-19338 RED A531P27-B14 to OFF
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 1 Trigger 1 C-UO Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| C-SS compressor #2 fails to start automatically (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| 10 min Crew may enter 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift
| |
| Supervisors discretion. Note: The event can be mitigated entirely
| |
| through ARP actions.
| |
| 2 Trigger 2 I-OATC Power Range NI lower detector, N43, fails high. The crew will enter
| |
| I-SS 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| 10 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 2a (Power Range Neutron Flux - High),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 3 (Power Range Neutron Flux High
| |
| Positive Rate), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION
| |
| E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 16c (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16d (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16e (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10
| |
| and input to P-7), CONDITION R, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of
| |
| Condition A)
| |
| 3 Trigger 3 C-UO Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan #1 trips. Annunciator Response
| |
| C-SS Procedure, 17052-1, actions are performed.
| |
| 10min
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: May need to remove overrides
| |
| on light and ALBs if HS is taken to PTL.
| |
| 4 Trigger 4 C-OATC SG #1 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm. Crew enters 18009-C,
| |
| C-SS Steam Generator Tube Leak.
| |
| 10 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, CONDITION B, 6 hours
| |
| * 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity, CONDITION
| |
| B, 6 hours
| |
| 5 N/A R-OATC SG#1 tube leak requires a rapid down power per 18009-C, Steam
| |
| R-SS Generator Tube Leak, and 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.
| |
| 15 min N-UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 6 Adjust M-ALL SGTR on SG #1 (~450 gpm). This event will cause an automatic
| |
| Trigger 4 reactor trip and SI; however, the crew may manually trip the reactor
| |
| 30 min severity first. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to
| |
| depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow.
| |
| Critical Tasks:
| |
| Isolate the ruptured SG #1.
| |
| Depressurize RCS to equalize SG and RCS pressure (minimize
| |
| break flow).
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Trigger 4 values must be
| |
| adjusted to 45% over 3 minutes for this event. Notify Examiners
| |
| when the 3 minute ramp completes (critical task start time).
| |
| 7 N/A C-OATC BIT Discharge Isolation Valves, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, fail to open
| |
| C-SS automatically, so they must be opened manually (pre-loaded
| |
| malfunction).
| |
| 8 N/A C-UO MDAFW pumps A and B fail to automatically start, so they must be
| |
| C-SS started manually (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 1:
| |
| Air compressor #1 trips with air compressor #3 tagged out and air compressor #2 fails to start
| |
| automatically. At 95 psig, ALB01-C06 will direct starting the standby air compressor. If air pressure
| |
| continues to lower, the crew will enter 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs starting air compressor #2 per the ARP or 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air.
| |
| UO - Starts air compressor #2 and monitors instrument air pressure.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 2:
| |
| Power Range N43 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction, Section B, and verifies
| |
| Immediate Operator Actions (IOAs) for a failed Power Range NI.
| |
| OATC - Performs IOAs of 18002-C by placing control rods in manual.
| |
| Withdraws control rods to restore Tavg to the program band.
| |
| Returns control rods to automatic when conditions are stable.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 2a (Power Range Neutron Flux - High), CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 3 (Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 16c (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8), CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16d (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9), CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16e (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 and input to P-7), CONDITION
| |
| R, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.1-1, then the crew
| |
| meets the intent of Condition A)
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 3:
| |
| Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan #1 trips. Annunciator Response Procedure, 17052-1, actions are performed
| |
| to restore cooling.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs actions of 17052-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB52 on HVAC Panel,
| |
| to restore reactor cavity cooling.
| |
| UO - Starts Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan #2 using 1HS-2651 on the QHVC and verifies NSCW is
| |
| available to the cooling unit.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 4:
| |
| SG #1 tube leak of 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and
| |
| determines leak rate.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
| |
| OATC - Adjusts charging flow to stabilize pressurizer level.
| |
| Calculates the estimated leak rate.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, CONDITION B, 6 hours
| |
| * 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity, CONDITION B, 6 hours
| |
| Event 5:
| |
| SG #1 tube leak requires a rapid down power per 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and 18013-C,
| |
| Rapid Power Reduction.
| |
| Verifiable actions:
| |
| SS - Directs a rapid power reduction per 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and 18013-C,
| |
| Rapid Power Reduction, upon report that the SGTL is greater than 5 gpm.
| |
| OATC - Borates as necessary during the rapid down power to maintain RCS temperature.
| |
| UO - Reduces main turbine load at less than 5% / minute.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Events 6, 7, 8:
| |
| SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip
| |
| or Safety Injection, and transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. During performance of
| |
| 19000-1, the BIT Discharge Isolation Valves, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not open automatically, so the
| |
| OATC will open them manually. Also, the MDAFW pumps will not start automatically, so the UO will start
| |
| them manually. The crew will be required to depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow between the
| |
| ruptured SG and the RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitions to 19030-1, Steam
| |
| Generator Tube Rupture.
| |
| Verifies completion of 19000-1 IOAs.
| |
| OATC - Performs IOAs of 19000-1.
| |
| Opens the BIT Discharge Isolation Valves, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, due to a failure to open
| |
| automatically.
| |
| Depressurizes RCS.
| |
| UO - Performs IOAs of 19000-1.
| |
| Starts MDAFW pumps A and B due to a failure to start automatically.
| |
| Isolates SG #1.
| |
| Operates steam dumps to control RCS cooldown.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| The scenario may be stopped after the crew has
| |
| depressurized the RCS in 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube
| |
| Rupture, or at the Chief Examiners discretion.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| CRITICAL TASKS:
| |
| 1. Isolate the ruptured SG #1 (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per NRC WOG Critical Task Documentation, isolating the ruptured SG maintains a differential
| |
| pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The differential pressure (250 psi)
| |
| ensures that minimum RCS subcooling remains after RCS depressurization.
| |
| Without steam isolation, the ruptured SG pressure decreases to less than 250 psi above the
| |
| intact SG as the cool down occurs. When the crew cannot maintain the 250 psi differential, the
| |
| ERGs require a transition to contingency ECA-3.1. This transition unnecessarily delays the
| |
| sequence of actions leading to RCS depressurization and SI termination.
| |
| For the feedwater, isolation must occur after the ruptured SG level exceeds minimum indication,
| |
| delaying isolation until after the SG tubes are covered. The feedwater coverage of the tubes
| |
| places a water barrier between the tubes and the steam in the upper portion of the SG. Failure to
| |
| maintain the water barrier allows the SG steam to contact the tubes. When the tube temperature
| |
| decreases during the subsequent RCS cool down, the tubes condense the hot steam, decreasing
| |
| the SG pressure. The decreasing SG pressure decreases the differential pressure between the
| |
| ruptured SG and the intact SGs to less than 250 psi. This forces the crew to transition to
| |
| contingency ECA-3.1, which delays RCS depressurization and SI termination.
| |
| Any delay in the feedwater isolation allows the ruptured SG level to increase as the feedwater
| |
| adds additional inventory along with the primary-to-secondary leakage. Too long a delay
| |
| prevents the crew from depressurizing the RCS and terminating SI before excessive inventory
| |
| seriously compromises the SG as a fission-product barrier, which complicates mitigation. The
| |
| delay in feedwater isolation cannot be measured in terms of SG water level. But the delay can be
| |
| measured in terms of the crews inability to complete the RCS depressurization or SI termination
| |
| before excessive SG inventory accumulates.
| |
| Thus, when the crew fails to isolate steam and feedwater when it is possible to do so (as in the
| |
| postulated conditions), it constitutes the following:
| |
| * An incorrect action that necessitates the crew to take compensating actions that would
| |
| complicate the event mitigation
| |
| AND
| |
| * A significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
| |
| Furthermore, based on NMP-OS-014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program,
| |
| failure to appropriately isolate the ruptured SG by securing AFW flow and verifying steam
| |
| lines are closed within 20 minutes from the start of the SGTR constitutes failure of this
| |
| task. Since a rapid down power is in progress when the SGTR initiates and primary
| |
| parameters are rapidly changing, the start of the SGTR is defined as the time at which
| |
| Event 6 completes the 3-minute leakage increase ramp.
| |
| 2. Depressurize the RCS to refill the pressurizer and to achieve ECCS termination criteria
| |
| (after EOP entry)
| |
| A SGTR allows radioactive RCS inventory to leak into the SG. As a result, the SG inventory,
| |
| radioactivity, and pressure increase. If the primary-to-secondary leakage is not stopped, the SG
| |
| pressure increases until either the SG PORV or the safety valve(s) opens, releasing radioactivity
| |
| to the environment. If the leakage continues, the SG inventory increase leads to water release
| |
| through the PORV or safety valve(s) or to SG overfill, which could cause an un-isolable fault in
| |
| the ruptured SG, greatly complicating mitigation. To stop the primary-to-secondary leakage, the
| |
| crew must intervene. To mitigate excessive inventory increase, the crew must take the following
| |
| actions:
| |
| * Identify and isolate the ruptured SG
| |
| * Cool down to establish RCS subcooling margin
| |
| * Depressurize RCS to restore inventory
| |
| * Terminate SI to stop primary-to-secondary leakage
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Assuming that the first two actions are successfully completed, the RCS depressurization
| |
| decreases the RCS leakage into the SG, helping to mitigate the inventory increase in the ruptured
| |
| SG. The RCS depressurization also helps the ECCS restore RCS inventory, which in turn allows
| |
| SI termination. SI termination eliminates the remaining cause of leakage from the RCS into the
| |
| SG.
| |
| Thus, when the crew fails to depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria when it is
| |
| possible to do so (as is possible in the postulated plant conditions), it needlessly complicates
| |
| event mitigation and unnecessarily reduces the margin of safety. Furthermore, in accordance
| |
| with NMP-OS-014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program, failure of the task
| |
| occurs if water relief from the ruptured SG occurs through the Main Steam Safety Valves
| |
| associated with a SG NR level of 100%.
| |
| Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
| |
| 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
| |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
| |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
| |
| 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
| |
| 5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
| |
| 6. EOP based critical tasks (2-3) 2
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 7
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| compressor #2 fails to start AUTOMATICALLY. The crew may enter
| |
| 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift Supervisors discretion.
| |
| Note: The event can be mitigated entirely through ARP actions.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the Air compressor #1 trip.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB01-B05 SERVICE AIR CMPSR TROUBLE
| |
| * ALB01-C06 SERVICE AIR HDR LO PRESS
| |
| * ALB32-F03 480V SWGR 1NB19 TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Tripped amber light indication on the air compressor #1
| |
| handswitch.
| |
| * Lowering service and instrument air header pressure as read
| |
| on the Main Control Board or IPC.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| UO ALB01-B05
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 7
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| compressor #2 fails to start AUTOMATICALLY. The crew may enter
| |
| 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift Supervisors discretion.
| |
| Note: The event can be mitigated entirely through ARP actions.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| The crew may start the standby air compressor based on the
| |
| guidance of NMP-OS-007-001:
| |
| This early action is further clarified by site specific procedure
| |
| NMP-OS-007-005, which includes guidance to start an Air
| |
| Compressor following a failure prior to being procedurally
| |
| directed.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 7
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| compressor #2 fails to start AUTOMATICALLY. The crew may enter
| |
| 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift Supervisors discretion.
| |
| Note: The event can be mitigated entirely through ARP actions.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| This completes the actions of 17001-1 for ALB01-B05.
| |
| UO ALB01-C06
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS
| |
| UO 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 7
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| compressor #2 fails to start AUTOMATICALLY. The crew may enter
| |
| 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift Supervisors discretion.
| |
| Note: The event can be mitigated entirely through ARP actions.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| This completes the actions of 17001-1 for ALB01-C06.
| |
| UO 13710-1, Service Air System
| |
| 4.1.3.2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 7
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| compressor #2 fails to start AUTOMATICALLY. The crew may enter
| |
| 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift Supervisors discretion.
| |
| Note: The event can be mitigated entirely through ARP actions.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.1.4.2 -
| |
| This completes the actions of 13710-1, Service Air System,
| |
| for starting the standby air compressor.
| |
| The crew may decide to brief plant conditions at this point and
| |
| contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a work order,
| |
| and dispatch Maintenance to investigate as well as inform the
| |
| Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
| |
| *THE FOLLOWING SET OF ACTIONS ARE INCLUDED IF THE
| |
| CREW ENTERS 18028-C, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 7
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| compressor #2 fails to start AUTOMATICALLY. The crew may enter
| |
| 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift Supervisors discretion.
| |
| Note: The event can be mitigated entirely through ARP actions.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air
| |
| SS
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air.
| |
| 1-
| |
| SS 2-
| |
| SS 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 7 of 7
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Air compressor #1 trips, air compressor #3 is tagged out, and air
| |
| compressor #2 fails to start AUTOMATICALLY. The crew may enter
| |
| 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air, at the Shift Supervisors discretion.
| |
| Note: The event can be mitigated entirely through ARP actions.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 4-
| |
| UO
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may brief plant conditions at
| |
| this point.
| |
| END OF EVENT 1 - ONCE THE CREW HAS MANUALLY STARTED THE AIR
| |
| COMPRESSOR AND AIR HEADER PRESSURE HAS RECOVERED, THE NEXT
| |
| EVENT MAY BE INITIATED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Power Range Lower Detector, N43, fails HIGH. Control rods will begin to
| |
| step in and the crew will enter 18002-C, Section B, Nuclear
| |
| Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the failure of Power Range N43.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB10-A03 POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX HI
| |
| SETPOINT ALERT
| |
| * ALB10-C02 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION
| |
| * ALB10-D03 OVERPOWER ROD STOP
| |
| * ALB10-F02 POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX RATE
| |
| ALERT
| |
| * ALB10-E06 RADIAL TILT
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Control rods stepping in.
| |
| * Power Range N43 indicates HIGH on the control board.
| |
| * Trip Status Light Box (TSLB) will be lit for N43, to include
| |
| high power of 109% and high power rate of 5% in 2 seconds.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| OATC 18002-C, Section B, Power Range Drawer, N41, N42, N43, N44
| |
| Malfunction
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18002-C, Section B, Power Range
| |
| Drawer, N41, N42, N43, N44 Malfunction. This normally occurs
| |
| following the board operators initial IOA response.
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| B1 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Power Range Lower Detector, N43, fails HIGH. Control rods will begin to
| |
| step in and the crew will enter 18002-C, Section B, Nuclear
| |
| Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| B2 -
| |
| OATC B3 -
| |
| SS B4 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Power Range Lower Detector, N43, fails HIGH. Control rods will begin to
| |
| step in and the crew will enter 18002-C, Section B, Nuclear
| |
| Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO B5 -
| |
| OATC B6 -
| |
| NOTE: The crew should return the control rods to the All Rods
| |
| Out position while restoring Tavg.
| |
| OATC / B7 -
| |
| SS
| |
| *PLACING CONTROL RODS IN AUTO IS PREFERRED, BUT
| |
| CREW MAY WAIT FOR TROUBLESHOOTING TO BE
| |
| PERFORMED.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Power Range Lower Detector, N43, fails HIGH. Control rods will begin to
| |
| step in and the crew will enter 18002-C, Section B, Nuclear
| |
| Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B8 -
| |
| SS B9 -
| |
| The crew will contact C&T to prepare a work order and
| |
| Condition Report (CR). This will also result in dispatching I&C
| |
| and informing the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may perform a briefing at
| |
| this point.
| |
| SS B10 -
| |
| *THIS STEP IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE PERFORMED BY THE
| |
| CREW. THE INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT NORMALLY BYPASSED
| |
| UNTIL I&C HAS INVESTIGATED.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Power Range Lower Detector, N43, fails HIGH. Control rods will begin to
| |
| step in and the crew will enter 18002-C, Section B, Nuclear
| |
| Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / B11 -
| |
| SS
| |
| OATC B12 -
| |
| OATC B13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Power Range Lower Detector, N43, fails HIGH. Control rods will begin to
| |
| step in and the crew will enter 18002-C, Section B, Nuclear
| |
| Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS B14 -
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 2a (Power Range Neutron Flux - High),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 3 (Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive
| |
| Rate), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72
| |
| hours
| |
| FUNCTION 16c (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16d (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16e (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 and
| |
| input to P-7), CONDITION R, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 7 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Power Range Lower Detector, N43, fails HIGH. Control rods will begin to
| |
| step in and the crew will enter 18002-C, Section B, Nuclear
| |
| Instrumentation System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS B15 thru B17 -
| |
| END OF EVENT 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 7
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more referenced in
| |
| required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the
| |
| inoperable. channel(s).
| |
| B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours
| |
| While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
| |
| for Functions 1, 17, 18,
| |
| or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR
| |
| or 5, closing the reactor
| |
| trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours
| |
| permitted.
| |
| --------------------------------
| |
| One channel or train
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| D. One Power Range ---------------------NOTES------------------
| |
| Neutron Flux High 1. A channel may be
| |
| channel inoperable. bypassed for up to 12 hours
| |
| for surveillance testing and
| |
| setpoint adjustment.
| |
| 2. Refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an
| |
| inoperable power range
| |
| channel.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| D.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| D.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-2 Amendment No. 143 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 123 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| E. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE---------------------
| |
| A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| E.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| E.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours
| |
| > P-6 and < P-10, one POWER to < P-6.
| |
| Intermediate Range
| |
| Neutron Flux channel OR
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| F.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours
| |
| POWER to > P-10.
| |
| G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately
| |
| > P-6 and < P-10, two involving positive reactivity
| |
| Intermediate Range additions.
| |
| Neutron Flux channels
| |
| inoperable. AND
| |
| G.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours
| |
| POWER to < P-6.
| |
| H. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel(s) to Prior to increasing
| |
| < P-6, one or two OPERABLE status. THERMAL POWER
| |
| Intermediate Range to > P-6
| |
| Neutron Flux channels
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| R. One or more channels R.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour
| |
| inoperable. required state for existing
| |
| unit conditions.
| |
| OR
| |
| R.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours
| |
| S. One or more channels S.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour
| |
| inoperable. required state for existing
| |
| unit conditions.
| |
| OR
| |
| S.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours
| |
| T. One RTB train -------------------NOTE--------------------
| |
| inoperable. One train may be bypassed for
| |
| up to 4 hours for surveillance
| |
| testing, provided the other train
| |
| is OPERABLE.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| T.1 Restore train to 24 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| T.2 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-7 Amendment No. 145 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 125 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 1. Manual Reactor 1,2 2 B SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA
| |
| Trip
| |
| 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) 2 C SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA
| |
| 2. Power Range
| |
| Neutron Flux
| |
| a. High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 111.3% RTP 109% RTP
| |
| SR 3.3.1.2
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| b. Low 1(b),2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 27.3% RTP 25% RTP
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.8
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| 3. Power Range 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o) 6.3% RTP 5% RTP
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| Neutron Flux High SR 3.3.1.11 with time with time
| |
| Positive Rate SR 3.3.1.15 constant constant
| |
| 2 sec 2 sec
| |
| 4. Intermediate 1(b), 2(c) 2 F,G SR 3.3.1.1 41.9% RTP 25% RTP
| |
| Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| Flux SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| 2 H SR 3.3.1.1 41.9% RTP 25% RTP
| |
| 2(d) SR 3.3.1.8
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (a) With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| (b) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (c) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that
| |
| it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more
| |
| conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint
| |
| implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to
| |
| determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology
| |
| and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-14 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 I,J SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5
| |
| Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o) cps cps
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5
| |
| 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| cps
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| cps
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| 1 L SR 3.3.1.1
| |
| 3(e), 4(e), 5(e) SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| NA NA
| |
| 6. Overtemperature T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1 Refer to Note 1
| |
| SR 3.3.1.3 (Page 3.3.1-20) (Page 3.3.1-20)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.6
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| 7. Overpower T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 2 Refer to Note 2
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7 (Page 3.3.1-21) (Page 3.3.1-21)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (e) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide input to the High Flux
| |
| at Shutdown Alarm System (LCO 3.3.8) and indication.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that
| |
| it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more
| |
| conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint
| |
| implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to
| |
| determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology
| |
| and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 14. Turbine Trip
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| a. Low Fluid Oil 1(j) 3 O SR 3.3.1.10 500 psig 580 psig
| |
| Pressure SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| b. Turbine Stop 1(j) 4 P SR 3.3.1.10 90% open 96.7% open
| |
| Valve Closure SR 3.3.1.14
| |
| 15. Safety Injection (SI) 1,2 2 trains Q SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA
| |
| Input from
| |
| Engineered Safety
| |
| Feature Actuation
| |
| System (ESFAS)
| |
| 16. Reactor Trip
| |
| System Interlocks
| |
| a. Intermediate 2(d) 2 R SR 3.3.1.11 1.2E-5% RTP 2.0E-5% RTP
| |
| Range SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| Neutron Flux,
| |
| P-6
| |
| b. Low Power 1 1 per train S SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA
| |
| Reactor Trips
| |
| Block, P-7
| |
| c. Power Range 1 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 50.3% RTP 48% RTP
| |
| Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| P-8
| |
| d. Power Range 1 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 40.6% RTP 40% RTP
| |
| Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| P-9
| |
| e. Power Range 1,2 4 R SR 3.3.1.11 (l,m) (l,m)
| |
| Neutron Flux,
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| P-10 and input
| |
| to P-7
| |
| f. Turbine 1 2 S SR 3.3.1.10 12.3% Impulse 10% Impulse
| |
| Impulse
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12 Pressure Pressure
| |
| Pressure,
| |
| Equivalent Equivalent
| |
| P-13
| |
| turbine turbine
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (j) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| (l) For the P-10 input to P-7, the Allowable Value is 12.3% RTP and the Nominal Trip Setpoint is 10% RTP.
| |
| (m) For the Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10, the Allowable Value is 7.7% RTP and the Nominal Trip Setpoint is 10% RTP.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is
| |
| functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative
| |
| than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the
| |
| Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and
| |
| the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-18 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan 1-1511-B7-001 trips due to a locked rotor.
| |
| The crew will respond per the ARP guidance of 17052-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan #1 tripping.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB052-E09 CNMT CVTY F-1 LO AIR FLOW
| |
| * ALB033-C03 480V SWGR 1NB01 TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Handswitch, 1HS-2650, amber light trip indication.
| |
| * The annunciators above.
| |
| UO ALB052-E09
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| The crew may contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR),
| |
| a work order, and to investigate the cause of the failure as well
| |
| as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not
| |
| already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating
| |
| the status of the plant.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan 1-1511-B7-001 trips due to a locked rotor.
| |
| The crew will respond per the ARP guidance of 17052-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO ALB033-C03
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan 1-1511-B7-001 trips due to a locked rotor.
| |
| The crew will respond per the ARP guidance of 17052-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 4
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan 1-1511-B7-001 trips due to a locked rotor.
| |
| The crew will respond per the ARP guidance of 17052-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS - CONTINUED
| |
| UO 5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the SGTL on SG #1.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Lowering pressurizer level.
| |
| * Small increase in SG #1 level followed by a return to
| |
| program.
| |
| * Various secondary radiation alarms (1RE-810, 1RE-724, and
| |
| 1RE-12839 are the most common monitors).
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak
| |
| UO
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube
| |
| Leak.
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| *THE ACTIONS OF 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction, BEGIN
| |
| ON THE NEXT PAGE (PAGE 6).
| |
| 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, CONDITION B, 6 hours
| |
| 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity, CONDITION
| |
| B, 6 hours
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| SS 12 -
| |
| This completes the actions for 18009-C, Steam Generator
| |
| Tube Leak, covered in this guide. The crew will continue in
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction, (next page) as the Events
| |
| continue associated with the Scenario.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 7 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 8 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| The crew may maintain a rate below 5% during the load
| |
| reduction.
| |
| *THE CHIEF EXAMINER MAY SIGNAL FOR EVENT 6 (SGTR) TO
| |
| OCCUR AT ANY POINT FOLLOWING THE INITIATION OF THE
| |
| LOAD REDUCTION.
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| The crew may use the reactivity briefing sheet or the Beacon
| |
| print-out to determine approximately 700 gallons of boric acid
| |
| are required. This assumes about half of the reactivity will
| |
| come from the control rods and half will come from the boron.
| |
| *THE ACTIONS OF 13009-1, Section 4.2, CVCS Reactor
| |
| Makeup Control System, for Boration BEGIN ON PAGE 13.
| |
| OATC / 5-
| |
| UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 9 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| OATC / 7-
| |
| UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 10 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 8-
| |
| UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 11 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| SS 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 12 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 13 -
| |
| UO 14 -
| |
| This completes the actions for 18013-C, Rapid Power
| |
| Reduction, covered in this guide. The crew is not expected to
| |
| perform any more meaningful actions from the remainder of
| |
| this procedure as the Events continue associated with
| |
| the Scenario.
| |
| END OF EVENTS 4 and 5 - AFTER THE CREW HAS REDUCED POWER TO THE
| |
| SATISFACTION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER, EVENT 6 (SGTR) MAY BE INSERTED.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 13 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System
| |
| Section 4.2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 14 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Section 4.2 CONTINUED -
| |
| CREW Section 4.2 CONTINUED -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 15 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Section 4.2 CONTINUED -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 16 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Section 4.2 CONTINUED -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 17 of 17
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: A 10 gpm SGTL will occur on SG #1 requiring a rapid down power per
| |
| 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction. This action is to preclude the tube
| |
| leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI guidelines.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Section 4.2 CONTINUED -
| |
| This completes the actions for 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup
| |
| Control System.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 17
| |
| | |
| RCS Operational LEAKAGE
| |
| 3.4.13
| |
| 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
| |
| 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE
| |
| LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
| |
| a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
| |
| b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
| |
| c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
| |
| d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any
| |
| one steam generator (SG).
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. RCS operational A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to 4 hours
| |
| LEAKAGE not within within limits.
| |
| limits for reasons other
| |
| than pressure boundary
| |
| LEAKAGE or primary to
| |
| secondary LEAKAGE.
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time of Condition A not AND
| |
| met.
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| Pressure boundary
| |
| LEAKAGE exists.
| |
| OR
| |
| Primary to secondary
| |
| LEAKAGE not within
| |
| limit.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.13-1 Amendment No. 144 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 124 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| SG Tube Integrity
| |
| 3.4.17
| |
| 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)
| |
| 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity
| |
| LCO 3.4.17 SG tube integrity shall be maintained.
| |
| AND
| |
| All SG tubes satisfying the tube plugging criteria shall be plugged in
| |
| accordance with the Steam Generator Program.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG tube.
| |
| -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more SG tubes A.1 Verify tube integrity of the 7 days
| |
| satisfying the tube affected tube(s) is maintained
| |
| plugging criteria and not until the next refueling outage
| |
| plugged in accordance or SG tube inspection.
| |
| with the Steam
| |
| Generator Program. AND
| |
| A.2 Plug the affected tube(s) in Prior to entering
| |
| accordance with the Steam MODE 4 following the
| |
| Generator Program. next refueling outage
| |
| or SG tube inspection
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time of Condition A not AND
| |
| met.
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| SG tube integrity not
| |
| maintained.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.17-1 Amendment No. 171 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 153 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the SGTR on SG #1.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB09-A04 PRZR PRESS SI RX TRIP
| |
| * ALB10-E03 OVERTEMP T ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK
| |
| ALERT (as the leak increases)
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Lowering pressurizer level.
| |
| * Lowering pressurizer pressure.
| |
| * A rise in SG #1 level.
| |
| * Various secondary radiation alarms.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
| |
| The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after
| |
| the Immediate Operator Actions.
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| UO
| |
| 6 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 6 - CONTINUED
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 7 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| OATC 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 8 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| *EVENT 7 (BIT DISCHARGE ISOLATION VALVES, 1HV-8801A
| |
| AND 1HV-8801B, FAIL TO AUTOMATICALLY OPEN) IS
| |
| PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 9 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC Attachment 2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 10 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| OATC 11 -
| |
| OATC 12 -
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| SS 14 -
| |
| This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 11 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| *EVENT 8 (MDAFW PUMPS A AND B FAIL TO
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY START) IS PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN
| |
| THIS STEP.
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 12 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 13 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 14 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| This completes the UO Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 15 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
| |
| UO
| |
| 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 16 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 17 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 17
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 18 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 11-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 18
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 19 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture
| |
| UO
| |
| Crew update for entry into 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube
| |
| Rupture.
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 19
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 20 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 1 - CONTINUED
| |
| UO
| |
| *SEE PAGE 39 FOR 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status
| |
| Tree, ACTIONS.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 20
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 21 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 21
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 22 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 22
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 23 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 23
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 24 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| Critical Task #1 - Isolation of ruptured SG #1 within 20 minutes
| |
| from the start of the SGTR is satisfied by completion of this
| |
| step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 24
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 25 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 25
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 26 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 26
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 27 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 27
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 28 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 12 - CONTINUED
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 28
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 29 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 12 - CONTINUED
| |
| UO 13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 29
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 30 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 14 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 30
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 31 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 15 -
| |
| OATC 16 -
| |
| UO 17-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 31
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 32 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 18 -
| |
| CREW 19 -
| |
| OATC 20 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 32
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 33 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 21 -
| |
| OATC 22-
| |
| OATC 23 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 33
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 34 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 24 -
| |
| OATC 25 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 34
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 35 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 28 -
| |
| Critical Task #2 - Depressurize the RCS to refill the pressurizer
| |
| and terminate ECCS prior to water relief from SG #1 through
| |
| the Main Steam Safety Valves associated with a SG NR level of
| |
| 100% is satisfied by completion of this step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 35
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 36 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 29 -
| |
| END OF SCENARIO 3 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH
| |
| CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 36
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 37 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 30 -
| |
| OATC 31 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 37
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 38 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 32 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 38
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 39 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 39
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 40 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 40
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 3 Page 41 of 41
| |
| Events: 6 - 8
| |
| Event Description: A SGTR occurs on SG #1, which requires a reactor trip and SI. The
| |
| crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and
| |
| transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Following
| |
| SI actuation, 1HV-8801A and 8801B, will not AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| open. In addition, both MDAFW pumps will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew will be required to depressurize
| |
| the RCS to minimize break flow between the ruptured SG and the
| |
| RCS using 19030-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 8 41
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility: Vogtle 1 & 2 ____ Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2017-301
| |
| Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power, MOL, steady state operations.
| |
| Equipment OOS: CCW pump # 5 is tagged out for motor repair - RTS in 7 hours.
| |
| Air Compressor #3 is tagged out for intercooler repair - RTS in 12 hours.
| |
| Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
| |
| SNAP 363
| |
| Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
| |
| SI06A SI Pump A Auto Start Failure
| |
| SI03B SI Pump B Trip (conditional trigger with SI + 60 sec)
| |
| TU10B EHC Pump B Auto Start Failure
| |
| NS07F NSCW Pump #6 Auto Start Failure
| |
| GE12A PCB 161710 Auto Trip Failure
| |
| GE12B PCB 161810 Auto Trip Failure
| |
| CV23 NCP Auto Trip Failure
| |
| Triggered Malfunctions:
| |
| (1) TU19A (0%) 1PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure, Fails Low
| |
| (2) TU11 EHC Pump A Trip
| |
| (3) NS02E NSCW Pump #4 Trip
| |
| (4) RD13D RCCA K14 Drop
| |
| (5) RC05C (17%) Loop 3 Small Break LOCA (ramp over 1 min)
| |
| Pre-loaded Overrides:
| |
| 1HS-9382 Air Compressor #3 to STOP
| |
| A-LO_HS9382_G 1HS-9382 GREEN A531P30-A6 to OFF
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 1 Trigger 1 I-OATC Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument, 1PT-505, fails low causing
| |
| I-SS entry into 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section
| |
| 10 min TS-SS H, Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrumentation.
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 16b (Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16f (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| 2 Trigger 2 C-UO EHC pump A trips with the standby EHC pump B failing to
| |
| C-SS automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| 5 min
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually start EHC pump B.
| |
| 3 Trigger 3 C-UO NSCW pump #4 trips with NSCW pump #6 failing to automatically
| |
| C-SS start (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| 10 min
| |
| 4 Trigger 4 R-OATC Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds
| |
| R-SS using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which
| |
| 30 min N-UO directs a power reduction to < 75% in 1 hour.
| |
| TS-SS
| |
| * 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, CONDITION B, 1 hour
| |
| 5 Trigger 5 M-ALL Loop #3 hot leg break occurs (small break LOCA large enough to
| |
| reach RCP trip criteria), which requires crew to enter 19000-1,
| |
| 20 min Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to 19010-1, Loss of
| |
| Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Trip RCPs with RCS pressure < 1400 psig with at least one CCP
| |
| or SI pump running.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 6 N/A C-OATC SI pump A fails to automatically start requiring manual start (pre-
| |
| C-SS loaded malfunction). SI pump B tripped when it automatically
| |
| started.
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually start SI pump A.
| |
| 7 N/A C-OATC NCP fails to trip automatically on SI (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| C-SS
| |
| 8 N/A C-UO Main generator output breakers fail to automatically open (pre-loaded
| |
| C-SS malfunction).
| |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 1:
| |
| Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-505, will fail low causing the control rods to automatically
| |
| insert. The crew will enter 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, and the OATC will place the
| |
| control rods in manual.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, and verifies Immediate Operator
| |
| Actions (IOAs) for failure of 1PT-505.
| |
| OATC - Places control rods in manual to stop uncontrolled inward rod motion.
| |
| Restores Tavg to program band to maintain Tavg and Tref matched.
| |
| UO - Verifies 1PIC-507, Steam Dump Control Potentiometer, set to 7.28 (1092 psig) and places
| |
| the controller in AUTO.
| |
| Steam Dumps are placed in the Steam Pressure Mode.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 16b (Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7), CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16f (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13), CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets
| |
| the intent of Condition A)
| |
| Event 2:
| |
| Main Turbine EHC pump A trips with a failure of the standby EHC pump to automatically start.
| |
| Prolonged operation with no EHC pump running will lead to EHC header pressure degrading, which will
| |
| cause a main turbine trip at EHC pressure of 1100 psig followed by a reactor trip when above 40% power.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs the start of the standby EHC pump.
| |
| UO - Starts the standby EHC pump.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 3:
| |
| NSCW pump # 4 trips due to a locked rotor. Standby NSCW pump #6 fails to automatically start. The
| |
| crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| UO - Starts NSCW pump #6 and verifies system parameters return to normal.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 4:
| |
| Control rod K-14 drops to the bottom of the core, which requires entry into 18003-C, Rod Control System
| |
| Malfunction. Tech Spec LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, directs a reduction of thermal power
| |
| to 75% RTP within 2 hours; however, 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, states
| |
| that for the purpose of reducing power as soon as practical to minimize local fuel power distribution
| |
| variances and the chances of fuel damage, the crew shall reduce power to 75% within one hour using
| |
| 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1).
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, for a dropped control rod in
| |
| Mode 1 and directs reactor power reduction using 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1).
| |
| OATC - Lowers power and controls power distribution and RCS temperature using control rods and
| |
| boron.
| |
| UO - Matches Tavg and Tref by performing manual main turbine adjustments.
| |
| Reduces main turbine load to <75% RTP.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, CONDITION B, 1 hour
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Events 5, 6, 7, 8:
| |
| RCS small break LOCA occurs on the Loop #3 hot leg. The crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or
| |
| Safety Injection. Once Foldout Page criteria for tripping the RCPs are met, the crew will trip the RCPs.
| |
| Transition to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, will then be required.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and verifies IOAs.
| |
| Transitions to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
| |
| OATC - Performs IOAs of 19000-1.
| |
| Starts SI pump A, which failed to automatically start on SI with SI pump B tripped.
| |
| Trips the NCP.
| |
| Trips the RCPs.
| |
| UO - Opens the Main Generator Output Breakers.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| The scenario may be stopped following Step 3 of 19010-1,
| |
| Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, or at the Chief
| |
| Examiners discretion.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| CRITICAL TASKS:
| |
| 1. Manually start the standby EHC pump
| |
| Failure to start the standby EHC pump will result in further reduction of EHC pressure. At 1100
| |
| psig the main turbine will automatically trip and, when the reactor is above 40% power, a
| |
| subsequent Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip will occur. Therefore, if the standby EHC pump is not
| |
| started to mitigate lowering EHC pressure before an automatic Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip
| |
| occurs, then the task is failed.
| |
| 2. Manually trip the RCPs per the RCP Trip Criteria (after EOP entry)
| |
| Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel
| |
| cladding temperatures in excess of 2200 F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance
| |
| criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents incorrect crew performance in which the
| |
| crew has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and
| |
| which leads to violation of the facility license condition. The analysis presented in the FSAR for a
| |
| SBLOCA typically assumes that the RCPs trip because of a loss of offsite power that coincides
| |
| with the reactor trip. However, during a SBLOCA, offsite power might remain available and RCPs
| |
| might continue to run for some period of time.
| |
| Following the accident at TMI-2, the NRC expressed concern about RCP operation during a
| |
| SBLOCA. In response, the WOG sponsored analyses to determine when the RCPs must be
| |
| tripped if power remains available. It was determined that manually tripping the RCPs before
| |
| RCS inventory is depleted to less than the critical inventory results in a peak cladding
| |
| temperature about the same as the PCT in the FSAR analysis. Manually tripping the RCPs
| |
| before depletion below the critical inventory conservatively ensures that PCT remains below 2200
| |
| F. As the crew transitions through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and into 19010-1,
| |
| Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, the crew will be presented with three separate
| |
| opportunities to procedurally secure RCPs if the trip criteria are met. Therefore, if the crew
| |
| does not secure RCPs, and have met the criteria to do so, by Step 3 of 19010-1, Loss of
| |
| Reactor or Secondary Coolant, then this constitutes task failure.
| |
| 3. Manually start SI pump A (after EOP entry)
| |
| Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions
| |
| constitutes incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency
| |
| core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be
| |
| manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump
| |
| also represents a failure by the crew to demonstrate the following abilities:
| |
| * Effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would
| |
| prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the
| |
| scenario
| |
| * Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component
| |
| Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump
| |
| when it is possible to do so is a violation of the facility license condition. The acceptable results
| |
| obtained in the FSAR analysis of a small-break LOCA are predicated on the assumption of
| |
| minimum ECCS pumped injection. The analysis assumes that a minimum pumped ECCS flow
| |
| rate, which varies with RCS pressure, is injected into the core. The flow rate values assumed for
| |
| minimum pumped injection are based on operation of one each of the following ECCS pumps:
| |
| Charging pump, high-head SI pump, and low-head SI pump. Operation of this minimum required
| |
| complement of ECCS injection pumps is consistent with the FSAR assumption that only minimum
| |
| safeguards are actuated.
| |
| For both the minimum and maximum cases specified in the critical task worksheet and for all
| |
| cases in between, failure to perform the critical task means that the plant is needlessly left in an
| |
| unanalyzed condition. Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for
| |
| which analysis shows acceptable results. Because compliance with the assumptions of the
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to perform the critical task under the
| |
| postulated plant conditions constitutes a violation of the license condition. In addition, NMP-OS-
| |
| 014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program, identifies manually starting
| |
| equipment on failure of an ESFAS signal as a Critical Action. Therefore, the time required
| |
| to manually start SI pump A is identified as 24 minutes from the failure to automatically
| |
| start. Failure to meet this time limit constitutes a task failure.
| |
| Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
| |
| 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3
| |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
| |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
| |
| 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
| |
| 5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
| |
| 6. EOP based critical tasks (2-3) 2
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Main Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-505, fails LOW. This
| |
| failure will cause control rods to insert continuously until mitigating actions
| |
| are taken per 18001-C, Section H, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction,
| |
| for Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrumentation.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of 1PT-505 failing LOW.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB05-E04 AMSAC TROUBLE
| |
| * ALB12-A05 TAVG/TREF DEVIATION
| |
| * ALB13-F03 - F06 STM GEN 1-4 DIGITAL FW CONTROL
| |
| SYSTEM TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Control rods driving inward AUTOMATICALLY.
| |
| * Turbine power indication failed LOW as shown on 1PI-505.
| |
| * Tavg lowering due to control rods inserting.
| |
| * Full steam dump demand indicated on 1UI-500.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| OATC 18001-C, Section H, Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18001-C, Section H, Failure of
| |
| Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrumentation. This normally
| |
| occurs following the board operators initial IOA response.
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| H1 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Main Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-505, fails LOW. This
| |
| failure will cause control rods to insert continuously until mitigating actions
| |
| are taken per 18001-C, Section H, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction,
| |
| for Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrumentation.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| H2 -
| |
| The OATC will return control rods to the All Rods Out position
| |
| to restore Tavg.
| |
| UO H3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Main Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-505, fails LOW. This
| |
| failure will cause control rods to insert continuously until mitigating actions
| |
| are taken per 18001-C, Section H, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction,
| |
| for Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrumentation.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO H4 -
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 16b (Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| FUNCTION 16f (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-13),
| |
| CONDITION S, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| *FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BREAKDOWN SEE
| |
| ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE*
| |
| SS H5 -
| |
| SS H6 -
| |
| The crew may contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR),
| |
| a work order, and dispatch personnel to investigate the failure
| |
| as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If
| |
| not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Main Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-505, fails LOW. This
| |
| failure will cause control rods to insert continuously until mitigating actions
| |
| are taken per 18001-C, Section H, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction,
| |
| for Failure of Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrumentation.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / H7 -
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC / H8 -
| |
| UO / SS
| |
| END OF EVENT 1 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 4
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more referenced in
| |
| required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the
| |
| inoperable. channel(s).
| |
| B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours
| |
| While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
| |
| for Functions 1, 17, 18,
| |
| or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR
| |
| or 5, closing the reactor
| |
| trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours
| |
| permitted.
| |
| --------------------------------
| |
| One channel or train
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| R. One or more channels R.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour
| |
| inoperable. required state for existing
| |
| unit conditions.
| |
| OR
| |
| R.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours
| |
| S. One or more channels S.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour
| |
| inoperable. required state for existing
| |
| unit conditions.
| |
| OR
| |
| S.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours
| |
| T. One RTB train -------------------NOTE--------------------
| |
| inoperable. One train may be bypassed for
| |
| up to 4 hours for surveillance
| |
| testing, provided the other train
| |
| is OPERABLE.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| T.1 Restore train to 24 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| T.2 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-7 Amendment No. 145 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 125 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 14. Turbine Trip
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| a. Low Fluid Oil 1(j) 3 O SR 3.3.1.10 500 psig 580 psig
| |
| Pressure SR 3.3.1.16
| |
| b. Turbine Stop 1(j) 4 P SR 3.3.1.10 90% open 96.7% open
| |
| Valve Closure SR 3.3.1.14
| |
| 15. Safety Injection (SI) 1,2 2 trains Q SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA
| |
| Input from
| |
| Engineered Safety
| |
| Feature Actuation
| |
| System (ESFAS)
| |
| 16. Reactor Trip
| |
| System Interlocks
| |
| a. Intermediate 2(d) 2 R SR 3.3.1.11 1.2E-5% RTP 2.0E-5% RTP
| |
| Range SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| Neutron Flux,
| |
| P-6
| |
| b. Low Power 1 1 per train S SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA
| |
| Reactor Trips
| |
| Block, P-7
| |
| c. Power Range 1 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 50.3% RTP 48% RTP
| |
| Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| P-8
| |
| d. Power Range 1 4 S SR 3.3.1.11 40.6% RTP 40% RTP
| |
| Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| P-9
| |
| e. Power Range 1,2 4 R SR 3.3.1.11 (l,m) (l,m)
| |
| Neutron Flux,
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12
| |
| P-10 and input
| |
| to P-7
| |
| f. Turbine 1 2 S SR 3.3.1.10 12.3% Impulse 10% Impulse
| |
| Impulse
| |
| SR 3.3.1.12 Pressure Pressure
| |
| Pressure,
| |
| Equivalent Equivalent
| |
| P-13
| |
| turbine turbine
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (j) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| (l) For the P-10 input to P-7, the Allowable Value is 12.3% RTP and the Nominal Trip Setpoint is 10% RTP.
| |
| (m) For the Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10, the Allowable Value is 7.7% RTP and the Nominal Trip Setpoint is 10% RTP.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is
| |
| functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative
| |
| than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the
| |
| Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and
| |
| the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-18 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 4
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: EHC pump A will trip due to a fault and EHC pump B will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The operating crew will be directed by 17020-1
| |
| for ALB20-C06 to start the standby pump. The standby EHC pump is
| |
| normally designed to AUTO start at a pressure of 1400 psig. If pressure
| |
| continues to lower, the Main Turbine will trip at an EHC pressure of 1100
| |
| psig (3 second time delay) leading to a reactor trip.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of EHC pump A tripping and EHC pump B failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB20-D05 HYD FLUID LO PRESS (at 1500 PSIG)
| |
| * ALB33-B07 480V SWGR 1NB02 TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * EHC pump A handswitch, 1HS-6539, amber light is lit
| |
| indicating a tripped condition.
| |
| * EHC pressure lowering as indicated on DTC panel.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 2 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 4
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: EHC pump A will trip due to a fault and EHC pump B will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The operating crew will be directed by 17020-1
| |
| for ALB20-C06 to start the standby pump. The standby EHC pump is
| |
| normally designed to AUTO start at a pressure of 1400 psig. If pressure
| |
| continues to lower, the Main Turbine will trip at an EHC pressure of 1100
| |
| psig (3 second time delay) leading to a reactor trip.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO ALB20-D05
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 2 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 4
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: EHC pump A will trip due to a fault and EHC pump B will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The operating crew will be directed by 17020-1
| |
| for ALB20-C06 to start the standby pump. The standby EHC pump is
| |
| normally designed to AUTO start at a pressure of 1400 psig. If pressure
| |
| continues to lower, the Main Turbine will trip at an EHC pressure of 1100
| |
| psig (3 second time delay) leading to a reactor trip.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| Critical task #1 - MANUALLY start the standby EHC pump
| |
| before an automatic Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip occurs is
| |
| satisfied by completion of this step.
| |
| The crew may start EHC pump B prior to specific procedural
| |
| guidance. The guidance to perform this action is in NMP-OS-
| |
| 007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations.
| |
| The procedure states:
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 2 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 4
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: EHC pump A will trip due to a fault and EHC pump B will fail to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The operating crew will be directed by 17020-1
| |
| for ALB20-C06 to start the standby pump. The standby EHC pump is
| |
| normally designed to AUTO start at a pressure of 1400 psig. If pressure
| |
| continues to lower, the Main Turbine will trip at an EHC pressure of 1100
| |
| psig (3 second time delay) leading to a reactor trip.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| The crew may contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR),
| |
| a work order, and dispatch operators to investigate the cause
| |
| of the fault as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty
| |
| Manager. If not already completed, the crew may conduct a
| |
| briefing, updating the status of the plant.
| |
| END OF EVENT 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 2 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Pump #4 trips and NSCW Pump #6 fails to AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| start. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling
| |
| Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of NSCW Pump #4 tripping with NSCW Pump #6 failing
| |
| to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB03-B01 NSCW TRAIN B LO HDR PRESS
| |
| * ALB03- NUMEROUS ALARMS ASSOCIATED WITH LOSS
| |
| OF NSCW COOLING FLOW
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Lowering NSCW Supply Header pressure.
| |
| * NSCW Pump #4 handswitch amber tripped light is lit.
| |
| * NSCW Pump #6 handswitch red light is not lit.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| UO 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service
| |
| Cooling Water System.
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 3 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Pump #4 trips and NSCW Pump #6 fails to AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| start. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling
| |
| Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 3 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Pump #4 trips and NSCW Pump #6 fails to AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| start. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling
| |
| Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 3 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Pump #4 trips and NSCW Pump #6 fails to AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| start. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling
| |
| Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 10 -
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| SS 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 3 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 5 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Pump #4 trips and NSCW Pump #6 fails to AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| start. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling
| |
| Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 22 -
| |
| SS 23 -
| |
| If not already complete, the crew may decide to conduct a
| |
| briefing at this point updating the status of the plant. The crew
| |
| may also contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a
| |
| work order, and dispatch personnel to investigate the cause of
| |
| the fault as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty
| |
| Manager.
| |
| END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 3 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the dropped control rod.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB10-C02 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION
| |
| * ALB10-D06 ROD DEV
| |
| * ALB10-E05 ROD AT BOTTOM
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Reactor power will initially lower.
| |
| * Tavg will lower.
| |
| * Pressurizer and RCS pressure will initially lower.
| |
| * DRPI displays the dropped rod LED light for control rod K-14.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| OATC / 18003-C, Section A, Dropped Rods in Mode 1
| |
| UO
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18003-C, Section A, Dropped Rods
| |
| in Mode 1.
| |
| A1 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A2 -
| |
| OATC A3 -
| |
| SS A4 -
| |
| 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, CONDITION B, 1 hour
| |
| SDM calculation will be requested from C&T.
| |
| *FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BREAKDOWN SEE
| |
| ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE*
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / A5 -
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC / A6 -
| |
| UO
| |
| *13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, covering
| |
| RCS dilution for temperature control begins on page 8.
| |
| *13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, for power reduction, if
| |
| required, begins on page 17.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A7 -
| |
| Tech Spec LCO 3.2.4 requires a MANUAL QPTR calculation to
| |
| verify if limits are met. The Shift Supervisor will contact C&T to
| |
| have this performed.
| |
| *FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BREAKDOWN SEE
| |
| ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE*
| |
| SS A8 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 5 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A9 -
| |
| OATC / A10 -
| |
| UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 6 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW A11 -
| |
| *12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1), covering the power
| |
| reduction begins on page 11.
| |
| *13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, covering
| |
| RCS boration during the power descent begins on page 13.
| |
| SS A12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 7 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A13 -
| |
| CREW A14 -
| |
| END OF EVENT 4 - ONCE THE CREW HAS INITIATED THE POWER REDUCTION,
| |
| PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 8 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.3,
| |
| for Dilutions
| |
| 4.3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 9 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 4.3 CONTINUED -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 10 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 4.3 CONTINUED -
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13009-C, CVCS
| |
| Reactor Makeup Control System.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 11 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1) for Power Reduction
| |
| 4.2.5 -
| |
| SS 4.2.6 -
| |
| SS 4.2.7 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 12 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO / SS 4.2.8 -
| |
| *13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, covering the power
| |
| reduction begins on page 17.
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 12004-C, Power
| |
| Operation (Mode 1).
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 13 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.8,
| |
| for Frequent Boration While Controlling Reactor Power
| |
| 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 14 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| OATC 7-
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 15 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| OATC 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 16 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 12 -
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13009-C, CVCS
| |
| Reactor Makeup Control System.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 17 of 17
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: Control rod, K-14, drops requiring a one hour power reduction to < 75%
| |
| RTP. The crew will respond to this failure by entering 18003-C, Section A,
| |
| Rod Control System Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.2, for Main
| |
| Turbine Unloading
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13800-1, Main
| |
| Turbine Operation.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 17
| |
| | |
| Rod Group Alignment Limits
| |
| 3.1.4
| |
| 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
| |
| 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits
| |
| LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual
| |
| indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand
| |
| position.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more rod(s) A.1.1 Verify SDM is the limit 1 hour
| |
| untrippable. specified in the COLR.
| |
| OR
| |
| A.1.2 Initiate boration to restore 1 hour
| |
| SDM to within limit.
| |
| AND
| |
| A.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| B. One rod not within B.1.1 Verify SDM is the limit 1 hour
| |
| alignment limits. specified in the COLR.
| |
| OR
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.1.4-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Rod Group Alignment Limits
| |
| 3.1.4
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| B. (continued) B.1.2 Initiate boration to restore 1 hour
| |
| SDM to within limit.
| |
| AND
| |
| B.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours
| |
| POWER
| |
| to 75% RTP.
| |
| AND
| |
| B.3 Verify SDM is the limit Once per
| |
| specified in the COLR. 12 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| B.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1. 72 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| B.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1. 72 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| B.6 Reevaluate safety 5 days
| |
| analyses and confirm
| |
| results remain valid for
| |
| duration of operation
| |
| under these conditions.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.1.4-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| QPTR
| |
| 3.2.4
| |
| 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS
| |
| 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)
| |
| LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be d 1.02.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. -----------NOTE------------- A.1 Limit THERMAL POWER 2 hours
| |
| Required Action A.6 to t 3% below RTP for
| |
| must be completed each 1% of QPTR > 1.00.
| |
| whenever Required
| |
| Action A.5 is AND
| |
| implemented.
| |
| -------------------------------- A.2.1 Perform SR 3.2.4.1. Once per 12 hours
| |
| QPTR not within limit. AND
| |
| A.2.2 Limit THERMAL POWER -----------NOTE----------
| |
| to t 3% below RTP for For performances of
| |
| each 1% QPTR > 1.00. Required Action A.2.2
| |
| the Completion Time
| |
| is measured from the
| |
| completion of SR
| |
| 3.2.4.1.
| |
| -----------------------------
| |
| 2 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and Within 24 hours after
| |
| SR 3.2.2.1. achieving equilibrium
| |
| conditions with
| |
| THERMAL POWER
| |
| limited by Required
| |
| Actions A.1 and A.2.2
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.2.4-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| QPTR
| |
| 3.2.4
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. (continued) AND
| |
| Once per 7 days
| |
| thereafter
| |
| AND
| |
| A.4 Reevaluate safety Prior to increasing
| |
| analyses and confirm THERMAL POWER
| |
| results remain valid for above the limit of
| |
| duration of operation Required Action
| |
| under this condition. A.1 and A.2.2
| |
| AND
| |
| A.5 -------------NOTE-------------
| |
| Perform Required Action
| |
| A.5 only after Required
| |
| Action A.4 is completed.
| |
| ----------------------------------
| |
| Calibrate excore detectors Prior to increasing
| |
| to show QPTR = 1.00. THERMAL POWER
| |
| above the limit of
| |
| Required Action A.1
| |
| and A.2.2
| |
| AND
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.2.4-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| QPTR
| |
| 3.2.4
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. (continued) A.6 -------------NOTE-------------
| |
| Perform Required
| |
| Action A.6 only after
| |
| Required Action A.5 is
| |
| completed.
| |
| ----------------------------------
| |
| Perform SR 3.2.1.1 and -----------NOTE----------
| |
| SR 3.2.2.1. Only one of the
| |
| following Completion
| |
| Times, whichever
| |
| becomes applicable
| |
| first, must be met.
| |
| -----------------------------
| |
| Within 24 hours after
| |
| reaching RTP
| |
| OR
| |
| Within 48 hours after
| |
| increasing THERMAL
| |
| POWER above the
| |
| limit of Required
| |
| Action A.1 and A.2.2
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours
| |
| associated Completion POWER to 50% RTP.
| |
| Time not met.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.2.4-3 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the RCS small-break LOCA.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM
| |
| * ALB06-A06 CNMT HI-1 PRESS ALERT ADVERSE CNMT
| |
| * ALB09-A04 PRZR PRESS SI RX TRIP
| |
| * ALB09-D06 HI CNMT PRESS SI RX TRIP ADVERSE CNMT
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Pressurizer and RCS pressure lowering.
| |
| * Pressurizer level lowering.
| |
| * A reactor trip and an SI occur as indicated by alarms and
| |
| BPLB (Bypass / Permissive Light Box) indication.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| OATC 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after
| |
| the Immediate Operator Actions.
| |
| 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| UO
| |
| 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 5 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 6 - CONTINUED
| |
| OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 6 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| *EVENT 8 (SI PUMP A FAILS TO AUTOMATICALLY START) IS
| |
| PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Critical task #3 - MANUALLY start SI Pump A within 24
| |
| minutes from the failure to automatically start is satisfied by
| |
| completion of this step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 7 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 8 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| OATC 7-
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 9 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| OATC 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 10 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 12 -
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| OATC 14 -
| |
| This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 11 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 12 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 13 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 14 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| *EVENT 9 (MAIN GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS FAIL TO
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY OPEN) IS PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN
| |
| THIS STEP.
| |
| This completes the UO Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 15 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
| |
| UO
| |
| 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 16 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 17 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| Critical task #2 - MANUALLY trip the Reactor Coolant Pumps
| |
| before Step 3 of 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary
| |
| Coolant, is satisfied by completion of this step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 17
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 18 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 18
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 19 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 19
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 20 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 20
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 21 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant
| |
| UO
| |
| Crew update for entry into 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or
| |
| Secondary Coolant.
| |
| 1-
| |
| *SEE PAGE 34 FOR 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status
| |
| Tree, ACTIONS.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 21
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 22 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 22
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 23 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| END OF SCENARIO 4 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH
| |
| CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER. THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE
| |
| FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES.
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 23
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 24 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 24
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 25 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 25
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 26 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 7-
| |
| UO
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 26
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 27 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 27
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 28 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 28
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 29 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 29
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 30 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 30
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 31 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| 14 -
| |
| OATC 15 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 31
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 32 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 16 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 32
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 33 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 17 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 33
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 34 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 34
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 35 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 35
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 4 Page 36 of 36
| |
| Events: 5 - 8
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of an RCS LOCA on the Loop #3 hot leg leading to an
| |
| AUTOMATIC reactor trip and SI with no action from the crew. The crew
| |
| will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 6 consists of
| |
| the crew MANUALLY starting SI Pump A, which fails to AUTO start.
| |
| Event 7 consists of the crew MANUALLY stopping the NCP, which fails to
| |
| AUTO trip upon SI actuation. Event 8 consists of the crew MANUALLY
| |
| opening the Main Generator output breakers, which fail to AUTO open.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 5 - 8 36
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility: _Vogtle_1 & 2_______ Scenario No.: ___5___ Op-Test No.: 2017-301
| |
| Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at 60% reactor power, BOL, with power ascension in progress.
| |
| Equipment OOS: CCW pump # 5 is tagged out for motor repair - RTS in 7 hours.
| |
| Air Compressor #3 is tagged out for intercooler repair - RTS in 12 hours.
| |
| Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
| |
| Continue raising power to 100% reactor power.
| |
| SNAP 364
| |
| Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
| |
| CO11C Condensate Pump #3 Auto Start Failure
| |
| SI08A 1HV-10958, RWST Sludge Mixing Valve, Fails to Auto Close
| |
| SI08B 1HV-10957, RWST Sludge Mixing Valve, Fails to Auto Close
| |
| ES10 Train A SLI Fails to Auto Actuate
| |
| ES11 Train B SLI Fails to Auto Actuate
| |
| ES20C Both Trains of CIA Fail to Auto Actuate
| |
| RH04A RHR Pump A Fails to Auto Start
| |
| RH04B RHR Pump B Fails to Auto Start
| |
| Triggered Malfunctions:
| |
| (2) PR02A 1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, Fails Low
| |
| (4) CV07 Normal Charging Pump Trip
| |
| (6) CO05A Condensate Pump #1 Trip
| |
| (7) FW08B Feedwater Line #2 Break Outside Containment
| |
| Pre-loaded Overrides:
| |
| 1HS-9382 Air Compressor #3 to STOP
| |
| A-LO_HS9382_G 1HS-9382 GREEN A531P30-A6 to OFF
| |
| Triggered Remote Function:
| |
| (3) TK02RF Percent Liquid Mass in RWST (95-88% - 1200 sec (20 min) ramp)
| |
| [Booth operator will set final value to current value following isolation
| |
| of the sludge mixing pump in order to show RWST is isolated]
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 1 N/A R-OATC Raise reactor power by increasing main turbine load. Control RCS
| |
| R-SS temperature with control rods or dilution.
| |
| 10 min N-UO
| |
| 2 Trigger 2 I-OATC 1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails low, which requires the crew to
| |
| I-SS enter 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C.
| |
| 10 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (OTT), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8a (Pressurizer Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION M, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8b (Pressurizer Pressure - High),
| |
| CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 1d (Pressurizer Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8b (Pressurizer Pressure, P-11),
| |
| CONDITION L, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| 3 Trigger 3 C-UO RWST sludge mixing pipe breaks with a failure of the RWST Sludge
| |
| C-SS Mixing Valves, 1HV-10958 and 10959, to automatically close.
| |
| 10 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION
| |
| B, 24 hours
| |
| * 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION
| |
| D, 1 hour (This applies if RWST level lowers to less than
| |
| 94%)
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Set final value of TK02RF to its
| |
| current value following isolation of the sludge mixing pump in
| |
| order to show RWST is isolated.
| |
| 4 Trigger 4 C-OATC Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips. The crew enters 18007-C,
| |
| C-SS Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B, for a
| |
| 15 min loss of charging flow. This will require isolation of letdown.
| |
| 5 N/A N-OATC Restore normal charging and letdown to service per 13006-1,
| |
| N-SS Chemical and Volume Control System.
| |
| 15 min
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 6 Trigger 6 C-UO Condensate pump #1 trips and the standby condensate pump fails to
| |
| C-SS automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| 10 min
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually start Condensate pump #3.
| |
| 7 Trigger 7 M-ALL Feedwater line #2 break outside of containment. A reactor trip occurs
| |
| automatically. The crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety
| |
| 20 min Injection.
| |
| 8 N/A C-UO Main Steam Line Isolation fails to actuate automatically.
| |
| C-SS
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually actuate Steam Line Isolation (SLI).
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Isolate the faulted SG #2.
| |
| 9 N/A C-OATC Containment Isolation (CI-A) fails to actuate automatically.
| |
| C-SS
| |
| 10 N/A C-OATC RHR pumps A and B fail to start automatically.
| |
| C-SS
| |
| * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 1:
| |
| Raise reactor power by increasing main turbine load using 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1).
| |
| Maintain RCS temperature as necessary using control rod withdrawal or RCS dilution.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs UO and OATC to raise reactor power and provides reactivity management oversight.
| |
| OATC - Maintains RCS temperature in the programmed band by withdrawing control rods or diluting
| |
| the RCS.
| |
| UO - Raises main turbine load using the Digital Turbine Control system.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 2:
| |
| 1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, fails low and the crew will respond by performing the
| |
| Immediate Operator Actions (IOAs) of 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, and verifies IOAs.
| |
| OATC - Operates heaters and sprays in manual to control RCS pressure between 2220 and 2250
| |
| psig.
| |
| Selects pressurizer pressure control and monitoring to an operating channel.
| |
| Restores pressurizer pressure control to automatic and verifies proper operation.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (OTT), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8a (Pressurizer Pressure - Low), CONDITION M, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8b (Pressurizer Pressure - High), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the
| |
| intent of Condition A)
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 1d (Pressurizer Pressure - Low), CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8b (Pressurizer Pressure, P-11), CONDITION L, 1 hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets the
| |
| intent of Condition A)
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 3:
| |
| The RWST sludge mixing line breaks resulting in an RWST low level alarm with an associated failure of
| |
| the RWST Sludge Mixing Valves, 1HV-10958 and 10959, to automatically close.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters ARP for RWST low level alarm and directs action to isolate the RWST sludge mixing
| |
| valves.
| |
| UO - Closes the RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves, 1HV-10957 and 10958, to isolate the leak
| |
| and preserve RWST inventory
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION B, 24 hours
| |
| * 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION D, 1 hour (This applies if RWST
| |
| level lowers to less than 94%)
| |
| Events 4, 5:
| |
| The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips. The crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B, due to the loss of charging. The crew then restores
| |
| normal charging and letdown using 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, and verifies
| |
| Immediate Operator Actions (IOAs) for total loss of charging.
| |
| OATC - Isolates letdown by closing Orifice Isolation Valves, 1HV-8149A, B, and C, and Letdown
| |
| Isolation Valves, 1LV-459 and 460.
| |
| Starts a CCP.
| |
| Adjusts RCP seal flow and total charging flow.
| |
| Restores pressurizer level to within 1% of program level and places 1FIC-121 in automatic.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 6:
| |
| Condensate pump #1 trips with Condensate pump #3 failing to automatically start. The crew may
| |
| immediately start Condensate pump #3 since it did not automatically start as expected, or the crew may
| |
| start it using AOP direction.
| |
| Verifiable actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18016-C, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunction, for a condensate pump trip.
| |
| UO - Starts Condensate pump #3.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 7:
| |
| Feedwater line #2 breaks outside of containment. A reactor trip occurs automatically. The crew will enter
| |
| 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator
| |
| Isolation.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and verifies IOAs.
| |
| OATC - Performs IOAs and OATC Initial Actions of 19000-1.
| |
| UO - Performs IOAs and OATC Initial Actions of 19000-1.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Events 8, 9, 10:
| |
| During the feedwater line #2 break, Both Trains of Containment Isolation (CI-A) and both Trains of SLI fail
| |
| to actuate automatically. Also, both RHR pumps fail to start automatically.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs the transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
| |
| OATC - Actuates CI-A.
| |
| Starts RHR pumps A and B.
| |
| UO - Actuates SLI.
| |
| Isolates all feedwater flow to SG #2.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| The scenario may be stopped after the crew has completed
| |
| 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and
| |
| transitioned to 19011-1, SI Termination, or at the Chief
| |
| Examiners discretion.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| CRITICAL TASKS:
| |
| 1. Manually start Condensate Pump #3
| |
| Failure to start the standby Condensate Pump that failed to automatically start will lead to a trip of
| |
| the MFPs on low suction pressure. This will lead to an automatic reactor trip on low SG water
| |
| level if a manual reactor trip is not first initiated. (Note: At approximately 50% turbine power, a
| |
| single Condensate Pump is capable of maintaining MFP suction pressure above the trip setpoint.
| |
| Therefore, this task is no longer critical with Turbine Power at or below this value.). Therefore, a
| |
| trip of the MFPs due to failure to start the standby Condensate Pump constitutes a failure
| |
| of this task.
| |
| 2. Manually actuate Steam Line Isolation (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks (Critical Task
| |
| 12), failure to close the MSIVs under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs
| |
| beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission
| |
| constitutes a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect
| |
| automatic actuation of an ESF system or component and to take one or more actions that would
| |
| prevent a challenge to plant safety. In the typical FSAR, the analysis for a large steam line break
| |
| assumes steam line isolation within a short time frame, on the order of seconds. The analysis
| |
| typically assumes a steam system piping failure in which a single SG blows down completely.
| |
| That is, the analysis assumes a fault that can be isolated from all but one SG. However, in the
| |
| plant conditions postulated for this critical task, the break is located downstream of the MSIVs.
| |
| Thus, closure of all MSIVs would terminate all uncontrolled blow down. In this case, there is no
| |
| reason for even a single SG to completely depressurize. If the crew allows all MSIVs to remain
| |
| open, then all SGs depressurize uncontrollably and unnecessarily. Uncontrolled depressurization
| |
| of all SGs causes an excessive rate of RCS cooldown, well beyond the conditions typically
| |
| analyzed in the FSAR. The excessive cooldown rate creates large thermal stresses in the reactor
| |
| pressure vessel and causes rapid insertion of a large amount of positive reactivity. Thus, failure
| |
| to close the MSIVs under the postulated conditions can result in challenges to the following
| |
| CSFs:
| |
| * Integrity
| |
| * Subcriticality
| |
| The LOFTRAN analyses for uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs presented in the ERG
| |
| Background Document for ECA-2.1 are based upon best-estimate assumptions rather than upon
| |
| conservative FSAR assumptions. They do not address subcriticality. However, they do show
| |
| that RCS cold leg temperature can drop by more than 250°F in less than 3 minutes for a large
| |
| steam line break involving uncontrolled depressurization of multiple SGs. Additionally, the ERG
| |
| Background Document for ECA-2.1 specifically states the following: It should be noted that this
| |
| event (with an extensive cooldown and subsequent repressurization) may result in a challenge to
| |
| the Integrity Critical Safety Function. In this case the Integrity Critical Safety Function Status Tree
| |
| may direct the operator to FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock
| |
| Condition, for further actions. Therefore, by failing to perform the critical task of closing the
| |
| Main Steam Lines, the crew members allow plant conditions to deteriorate to the point at
| |
| which transition to 19121-1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, is
| |
| necessary, then they have significantly and adversely altered the mitigation strategy, and
| |
| this will constitute task failure.
| |
| 3. Manually isolate faulted SG #2 (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks, failure to
| |
| isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably
| |
| introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could
| |
| constitute a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect
| |
| automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate the faulted SG such that
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| multiple SGs are allowed to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power
| |
| excursion. Similarly, failure to isolate all feedwater flow, including AFW, to the faulted SG such
| |
| that it continues to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power excursion.
| |
| Manipulation of controls is required to isolate the faulted SG. These include indication that MSIVs
| |
| are closed, indication that feedwater control and isolation valves are closed, indication that the
| |
| MFPs are tripped, and indication that AFW flow to the faulted SG is stopped (control valves
| |
| closed).
| |
| For this critical task, the faulted SG is considered to be isolated when both of the following
| |
| conditions are met:
| |
| * MSIV for the faulted SG is closed or MSIVs for all non-faulted SGs are closed
| |
| * All feedwater flow, including AFW flow, to the faulted SG is stopped
| |
| Isolating AFW flow to the faulted SG is always a part of this critical task. If AFW flow to the
| |
| faulted SG is isolated, the RCS cooldown imposed by the blow down of the faulted SG stops
| |
| when that SG has blown dry. If AFW flow is not isolated, the RCS cooldown will continue (unless
| |
| the decay heat rate happens to exceed the combined heat removal rate of all SG effluents and
| |
| influents). Continued RCS cooldown contributes to thermal stresses in the reactor pressure
| |
| vessel and can constitute a challenge to the integrity CSF. Continued RCS cooldown also tends
| |
| to worsen any reactor power excursion. Step 3 of 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation,
| |
| is the final backup check for main steam line isolation before the crew is directed to transition to
| |
| 19121-1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators. Therefore, transition to
| |
| 19241-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, due to excessive
| |
| continued cooldown constitutes task failure.
| |
| Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
| |
| 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3
| |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
| |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
| |
| 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
| |
| 5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
| |
| 6. EOP based critical tasks (2-3) 2
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Continue raising power from 60% per 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode
| |
| 1), Section 4.1, Step 59
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1)
| |
| 59 -
| |
| The crew may hold a briefing at this point prior to moving
| |
| forward with the power ascension.
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 12004-C, Power
| |
| Operation (Mode 1), for this event.
| |
| *13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, covering
| |
| RCS dilution during the power ascent begins on page 2.
| |
| *13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, covering the power ascent
| |
| begins on page 4.
| |
| END OF EVENT 1 - WHEN ADEQUATE REACTIVITY CONTROL HAS BEEN
| |
| DEMONSTRATED, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE
| |
| CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Continue raising power from 60% per 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode
| |
| 1), Section 4.1, Step 59
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.7,
| |
| for Frequent Dilutions While Controlling Reactor Power
| |
| 4.7 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Continue raising power from 60% per 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode
| |
| 1), Section 4.1, Step 59
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.7 - CONTINUED
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13009-1, CVCS
| |
| Reactor Makeup Control System.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: Continue raising power from 60% per 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode
| |
| 1), Section 4.1, Step 59
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.1, for Main
| |
| Turbine Loading
| |
| 4.2.1 -
| |
| This completes the applicable actions of 13800-1, Main
| |
| Turbine Operation.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: 1PT-455 fails LOW causing pressurizer heaters to energize and
| |
| AUTOMATIC pressurizer pressure control to not function correctly. The
| |
| crew will enter 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the failure of 1PT-455 LOW.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB11-A02 PRZR LO PRESS SI ALERT
| |
| * ALB11-B02 PRZR LO PRESS ALERT
| |
| * ALB11-D02 PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS
| |
| ON
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * 1PI-455A reading downscale LOW.
| |
| * All pressurizer heaters energized (red lights illuminated).
| |
| * 1PIC-455A, Pressurizer Pressure Control, demanding 0% (all
| |
| heaters demanded on).
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| OATC 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| C1 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: 1PT-455 fails LOW causing pressurizer heaters to energize and
| |
| AUTOMATIC pressurizer pressure control to not function correctly. The
| |
| crew will enter 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| C2 -
| |
| OATC / C3 -
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC C4 -
| |
| *The crew may take pressurizer heaters and spray to MANUAL
| |
| or OFF prior to the AOP step if they recognize pressure is
| |
| rising. This is based on the continuous actions from 12004-C,
| |
| Power Operation (Mode 1).
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: 1PT-455 fails LOW causing pressurizer heaters to energize and
| |
| AUTOMATIC pressurizer pressure control to not function correctly. The
| |
| crew will enter 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC C5 -
| |
| OATC C6 -
| |
| SS C7 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: 1PT-455 fails LOW causing pressurizer heaters to energize and
| |
| AUTOMATIC pressurizer pressure control to not function correctly. The
| |
| crew will enter 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC C8 -
| |
| The crew may contact C&T to request a Condition Report (CR),
| |
| a Work Order, and Maintenance for repairs. Also, the crew may
| |
| ask for permission from the Shift Manager for placing
| |
| controllers associated with this failure back in AUTOMATIC.
| |
| OATC C9 -
| |
| OATC C10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: 1PT-455 fails LOW causing pressurizer heaters to energize and
| |
| AUTOMATIC pressurizer pressure control to not function correctly. The
| |
| crew will enter 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC C11 -
| |
| OATC C12 -
| |
| SS C13 -
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant.
| |
| SS C14 -
| |
| SS C15 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 6 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: 1PT-455 fails LOW causing pressurizer heaters to energize and
| |
| AUTOMATIC pressurizer pressure control to not function correctly. The
| |
| crew will enter 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS C16 -
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 6 (OTT), CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8a (Pressurizer Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION M, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8b (Pressurizer Pressure - High),
| |
| CONDITION E, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| * 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
| |
| Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 1d (Pressurizer Pressure - Low),
| |
| CONDITION D, 72 hours
| |
| FUNCTION 8b (Pressurizer Pressure, P-11),
| |
| CONDITION L, 1hour
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.2-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| *FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BREAKDOWN SEE
| |
| ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE*
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 7 of 7
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: 1PT-455 fails LOW causing pressurizer heaters to energize and
| |
| AUTOMATIC pressurizer pressure control to not function correctly. The
| |
| crew will enter 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure
| |
| Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC C17 -
| |
| END OF EVENT 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 7
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more referenced in
| |
| required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the
| |
| inoperable. channel(s).
| |
| B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours
| |
| While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
| |
| for Functions 1, 17, 18,
| |
| or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR
| |
| or 5, closing the reactor
| |
| trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours
| |
| permitted.
| |
| --------------------------------
| |
| One channel or train
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| E. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE---------------------
| |
| A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| E.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| E.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours
| |
| > P-6 and < P-10, one POWER to < P-6.
| |
| Intermediate Range
| |
| Neutron Flux channel OR
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| F.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours
| |
| POWER to > P-10.
| |
| G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately
| |
| > P-6 and < P-10, two involving positive reactivity
| |
| Intermediate Range additions.
| |
| Neutron Flux channels
| |
| inoperable. AND
| |
| G.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours
| |
| POWER to < P-6.
| |
| H. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel(s) to Prior to increasing
| |
| < P-6, one or two OPERABLE status. THERMAL POWER
| |
| Intermediate Range to > P-6
| |
| Neutron Flux channels
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| M. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTES-------------------
| |
| 1. For RCP bus undervoltage or
| |
| underfrequency instrument
| |
| functions; the inoperable
| |
| channel may be bypassed for
| |
| up to 12 hours for surveillance
| |
| testing of other channels.
| |
| 2. For other instrument functions;
| |
| a channel may be bypassed for
| |
| up to 12 hours for surveillance
| |
| testing.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours
| |
| POWER to < P-7.
| |
| N. One Reactor Coolant ---------------------NOTE--------------------
| |
| Flow-Low (single loop) A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| channel inoperable. to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| N.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours
| |
| POWER to < P-8.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-5 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 I,J SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5
| |
| Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o) cps cps
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5
| |
| 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| cps
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| cps
| |
| SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| 1 L SR 3.3.1.1
| |
| 3(e), 4(e), 5(e) SR 3.3.1.11
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| NA NA
| |
| 6. Overtemperature T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1 Refer to Note 1
| |
| SR 3.3.1.3 (Page 3.3.1-20) (Page 3.3.1-20)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.6
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| 7. Overpower T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 2 Refer to Note 2
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7 (Page 3.3.1-21) (Page 3.3.1-21)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
| |
| (d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
| |
| (e) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide input to the High Flux
| |
| at Shutdown Alarm System (LCO 3.3.8) and indication.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that
| |
| it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more
| |
| conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint
| |
| implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to
| |
| determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology
| |
| and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 8. Pressurizer
| |
| Pressure
| |
| a. Low 1(f) 4 M SR 3.3.1.1 1950 psig 1960(g) psig
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| b. High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 2395 psig 2385 psig
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| 9. Pressurizer Water 1(f) 3 M SR 3.3.1.1 93.9% 92%
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| Level - High SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| 10. Reactor Coolant
| |
| Flow - Low
| |
| a. Single Loop 1(h) 3 per loop N SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| b. Two Loops 1(i) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| (g) Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure-Low are 10 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag.
| |
| (h) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| (i) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that
| |
| it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more
| |
| conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint
| |
| implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to
| |
| determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology
| |
| and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2 1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more required referenced in Table
| |
| channels inoperable. 3.3.2-1 for the channel(s)
| |
| or train(s).
| |
| B. One channel inoperable. B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| B.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| C. One train inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| One train may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 4 hours for surveillance testing
| |
| provided the other train is
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| C.1 Restore train to 24 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| C.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| C.2.2 Be in MODE 5. 60 hours
| |
| D. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| D.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-2 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| L. One or more Pressurizer L.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour
| |
| Pressure, P-11 channels required state for existing
| |
| inoperable. unit condition.
| |
| OR
| |
| L.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours
| |
| AND
| |
| L.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-6 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 1. Safety Injection
| |
| a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.6 NA NA
| |
| Initiation
| |
| b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA
| |
| Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3
| |
| and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5
| |
| Relays
| |
| c. Containment 1,2,3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 4.4 psig 3.8 psig
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Pressure - SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| High 1 SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(a) 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 1856 psig 1870 psig
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Pressure - Low SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| e. Steam Line 1,2,3(a) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 570(b) psig 585(b) psig
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| Pressure - Low line SR 3.3.2.4
| |
| (i)(j)
| |
| SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| SR 3.3.2.8
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
| |
| (b) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are t1 50 seconds and t2 5 seconds.
| |
| (i) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is
| |
| functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (j) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP)
| |
| at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the
| |
| NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance
| |
| procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left
| |
| tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-9 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| ESFAS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.2
| |
| Table 3.3.2-1 (page 7 of 7)
| |
| Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 8. ESFAS Interlocks
| |
| a. Reactor Trip, P-4 1,2,3 1 per train, 2 F SR 3.3.2.9 NA NA
| |
| trains
| |
| b. Pressurizer 1,2,3 3 L SR 3.3.2.4 2010 psig 2000 psig
| |
| Pressure, P-11 SR 3.3.2.7
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 2
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: The RWST sludge mixing line break results in an RWST low level alarm
| |
| with an associated failure of the RWST sludge mixing valves, 1HV-10958
| |
| and 10959, to automatically close. The crew will respond using ARP
| |
| 17006-1 for RWST LO LEVEL.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the line break.
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: LOW LEVEL ALARM WILL BE
| |
| RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY 3 MINUTES AFTER INSERTION
| |
| OF THE LEAK.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB06-E04 RWST LO LEVEL
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * IPC indication of RWST level lowering. Board indication can
| |
| be referenced as well; however, it may be difficult to discern
| |
| the level change from the meter.
| |
| * The annunciator listed above.
| |
| UO 17006-1 for ALB06-E04
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 3 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 2
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: The RWST sludge mixing line break results in an RWST low level alarm
| |
| with an associated failure of the RWST sludge mixing valves, 1HV-10958
| |
| and 10959, to automatically close. The crew will respond using ARP
| |
| 17006-1 for RWST LO LEVEL.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3.0 INTIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| * 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION
| |
| B, 24 hours
| |
| * 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION
| |
| D, 1 hour (This applies if RWST level lowers to less than
| |
| 94%)
| |
| *FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BREAKDOWN SEE
| |
| ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE*
| |
| The crew may contact C&T to request a Condition Report (CR),
| |
| a Work Order, and Maintenance for repairs. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 3 2
| |
| | |
| RWST
| |
| 3.5.4
| |
| 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
| |
| 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
| |
| LCO 3.5.4 The RWST shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. RWST boron A.1 Restore RWST to 8 hours
| |
| concentration not within OPERABLE status.
| |
| limits.
| |
| OR
| |
| RWST borated water
| |
| temperature not within
| |
| limits.
| |
| B. One or more sludge B.1 Restore the valve(s) to 24 hours
| |
| mixing pump isolation OPERABLE status.
| |
| valves inoperable.
| |
| C. Required Action and C.1 Isolate the sludge mixing 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion system.
| |
| Time of Condition B not
| |
| met.
| |
| D. RWST inoperable for D.1 Restore RWST to 1 hour
| |
| reasons other than OPERABLE status.
| |
| Condition A or B.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| This may apply if
| |
| RWST level drops
| |
| to below the Tech
| |
| Spec limit of 94%.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.5.4-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the NCP trip.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB07-A05 NC PUMP LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB07-B06 CHARGING LINE HI/LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB08-F08 RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW
| |
| * ALB33-A05 4160 SWGR 1NA05 TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Charging flow indicating downscale low as read on charging
| |
| flow indicators 1FI-132C and 1FI-121A.
| |
| * NCP handswitch has amber and green indicating lights
| |
| (indicative of a tripped condition).
| |
| * Flashing in the letdown line as indicated by fluctuating
| |
| letdown regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperatures as
| |
| well as fluctuating letdown flow.
| |
| * Rising letdown temperatures.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and Volume Control System
| |
| Malfunction
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18007-C, Section B, Chemical
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction. This normally occurs
| |
| following the board operators initial IOA response.
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| B1 -
| |
| OATC / SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| UO
| |
| B2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B4 -
| |
| CREW B5 -
| |
| UO B6 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B7 -
| |
| OATC B8 -
| |
| While the OATC is restoring normal charging and letdown to
| |
| service, the Shift Supervisor may contact C&T to initiate a work
| |
| order, Condition Report (CR), and dispatch Maintenance to
| |
| investigate the NCP and its breaker to determine the cause of
| |
| the trip. The crew will also inform the Shift Manager and Ops
| |
| Duty Manager.
| |
| Cue to the crew that the O/C relay flag is dropped for the NCP
| |
| breaker if personnel are dispatched to investigate.
| |
| *EVENT 4 (LOSS OF CHARGING) CONTINUES ON PAGE 17.
| |
| Pages 6-16 document the restoration of charging and letdown.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 6 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC *EVENT 5 (RESTORATION OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN)
| |
| BEGINS HERE
| |
| 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System
| |
| 4.4.2.1 - Returning Charging and Letdown to Service
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.1 - Restart of CCP or NCP following Loss of a Charging
| |
| Pump
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 7 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 4.4.13.2 -
| |
| Cue to the crew: Based on the charging pump requested,
| |
| report that pre-startup checks are complete.
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.3 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.4 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.5 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 8 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.6 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.7 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 9 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.8 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.9 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.10 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 10 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.12 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.13 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.14 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.15 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 11 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.16 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.13.17 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 12 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 13 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.4 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.5 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.6 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 14 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.7 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.8 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.9 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 15 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.10 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.11 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.12 -
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 16 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.4.2.14 thru 4.4.2.16 -
| |
| *EVENT 5 (RESTORATION OF NORMAL CHARGING AND
| |
| LETDOWN) CONCLUDES AT THIS POINT AND EVENT 4 (LOSS
| |
| OF CHARGING) RESUMES ON THE NEXT PAGE.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 17 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B10 -
| |
| OATC B11 -
| |
| OATC B12 -
| |
| OATC B13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 17
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 18 of 18
| |
| Events: 4 - 5
| |
| Event Description: The Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips resulting in letdown flashing. The
| |
| crew will isolate letdown and enter 18007-C, Section B, Chemical and
| |
| Volume Control System Malfunction, for a loss of charging flow.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B14 -
| |
| SS B15 -
| |
| SS B16 -
| |
| If not completed already, the crew may decide to conduct a
| |
| briefing at this point, updating the status of the plant.
| |
| END OF EVENTS 4 - 5 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 4 - 5 18
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 5
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: Condensate Pump #1 will trip with Condensate Pump #3 failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew may immediately start the standby
| |
| Condensate Pump since it did not AUTOMATICALLY start or they may
| |
| choose to address the starting of the standby pump once they initiate the
| |
| actions of 18016-C, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the Condensate Pump trip with AUTO start failure of
| |
| the standby pump.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB17-A02 COND P-1 MOTOR OVERLOAD
| |
| * ALB17-C02 COND PMP DISCH HDR LO PRESS
| |
| * ALB33-A01 13.8KV SWGR 1NAA TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Condensate Pump #1 handswitch amber trip light is lit.
| |
| * MFP - A&B suction pressure lowering as indicated by 1PI-
| |
| 4498.
| |
| * Condensate header pressure lowering as indicated by 1PI-
| |
| 4482.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 5
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: Condensate Pump #1 will trip with Condensate Pump #3 failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew may immediately start the standby
| |
| Condensate Pump since it did not AUTOMATICALLY start or they may
| |
| choose to address the starting of the standby pump once they initiate the
| |
| actions of 18016-C, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 18016-C, Section B, Condensate or Heater Drain Pump Trip
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18016-C, Section B, Condensate or
| |
| Heater Drain Pump Trip.
| |
| B1 -
| |
| The crew may start Condensate Pump #3 prior to addressing
| |
| the procedural guidance of 18016-C. The guidance to perform
| |
| this action is in NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations
| |
| Standards and Expectations. The procedure states:
| |
| Critical task #1 - MANUALLY start the standby Condensate
| |
| Pump prior to a trip of the MFPs is satisfied by the completion
| |
| of this step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 5
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: Condensate Pump #1 will trip with Condensate Pump #3 failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew may immediately start the standby
| |
| Condensate Pump since it did not AUTOMATICALLY start or they may
| |
| choose to address the starting of the standby pump once they initiate the
| |
| actions of 18016-C, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO B2 -
| |
| UO B3 -
| |
| OATC / B4 -
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC B5 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 5
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: Condensate Pump #1 will trip with Condensate Pump #3 failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew may immediately start the standby
| |
| Condensate Pump since it did not AUTOMATICALLY start or they may
| |
| choose to address the starting of the standby pump once they initiate the
| |
| actions of 18016-C, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B6 -
| |
| OATC B7 -
| |
| OATC B8 -
| |
| OATC B9 -
| |
| UO B10 -
| |
| SS B11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 5
| |
| Event: 6
| |
| Event Description: Condensate Pump #1 will trip with Condensate Pump #3 failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start. The crew may immediately start the standby
| |
| Condensate Pump since it did not AUTOMATICALLY start or they may
| |
| choose to address the starting of the standby pump once they initiate the
| |
| actions of 18016-C, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunction.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC B12 -
| |
| OATC B13 -
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact
| |
| C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR), a work order,
| |
| and dispatch maintenance to investigate the issue with the
| |
| Condensate Pump as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops
| |
| Duty Manager.
| |
| END OF EVENT 6 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the Feedwater Line #2 break ORC.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB09-F02 LO STM PRESS SLI SI - RX TRIP
| |
| * ALB13-A04 to D04 STM GEN 1-4 LO STEAMLINE PRESS
| |
| ALERT
| |
| * ALB13-F04 STM GEN 2 DIGITAL FW CONTROL SYSTEM
| |
| TROUBLE
| |
| * ALB14-A02 to D02 STM GEN 1-4 HI STM PRESS RATE
| |
| ALERT
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * All SG pressures lowering.
| |
| * Steam flow / feed flow mismatch as read on the QMCB;
| |
| specifically, an abnormally high steam flow indication on all
| |
| SGs prior to the SLI.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after
| |
| the Immediate Operator Actions.
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| UO
| |
| 6 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 6 - CONTINUED
| |
| UO
| |
| OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| *EVENT 9 (CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, PHASE A, FAILS TO
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY ACTUATE) IS PROCEDURALLY
| |
| ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 6 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 3 -
| |
| *EVENT 10 (RHR PUMPS A AND B FAIL TO
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY START) IS PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN
| |
| THIS STEP.
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 7 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| OATC 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 8 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| OATC 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 9 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 12 -
| |
| OATC 13 -
| |
| OATC 14 -
| |
| This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 10 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS -
| |
| 1-
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 11 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| *EVENT 8 (MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION FAILS TO
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY ACTUATE) IS PROCEDURALLY
| |
| ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Critical task #2 - MANUALLY actuate Steam Line Isolation prior
| |
| to transfer to 19121-1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All
| |
| Steam Generators, is satisfied by completion of this step.
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 12 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 13 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| This completes the UO Initial Actions.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 14 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
| |
| UO
| |
| 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 15 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 8-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 16 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 9-
| |
| UO 10 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 17 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS / 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation
| |
| OATC
| |
| Crew update for entry into 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator
| |
| Isolation.
| |
| 1-
| |
| *SEE PAGE 27 FOR 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status
| |
| Tree, ACTIONS.
| |
| SS 2-
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 17
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 18 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 18
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 19 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 19
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 20 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 6-
| |
| UO 7-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 20
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 21 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 8-
| |
| UO 9-
| |
| The crew may manually operate the remaining ARVs to control
| |
| RCS heat-up rate per 10020-C, EOP and AOP Rules of Usage.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 21
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 22 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 10 -
| |
| Critical task #3 - MANUALLY isolate faulted SG #2 prior to
| |
| transition to 19241-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized
| |
| Thermal Shock Condition, is satisfied by completion of this
| |
| step. This is the last step in completing all required actions to
| |
| consider the SG isolated.
| |
| UO 11 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 22
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 23 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 23
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 24 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 13 -
| |
| END OF SCENARIO 5 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE
| |
| FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF FAULT ISOLATION ACTIONS AND/OR ENTRY
| |
| INTO 19011-1 (SEE PAGE 25) WITH CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF
| |
| EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 24
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 25 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW 19011-1, SI Termination
| |
| Crew update for entry into 19011-1, SI Termination.
| |
| 1-
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 25
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 26 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| OATC 5-
| |
| OATC 6-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 26
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 27 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree
| |
| OATC 1-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 27
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 5 Page 28 of 28
| |
| Events: 7 - 10
| |
| Event Description: The crew will respond to a Feedwater Line #2 break OUTSIDE reactor
| |
| containment between the containment wall and the feed piping check
| |
| valve, which will result in an AUTOMATIC Safety Injection. The crew will
| |
| transition from 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, to 19020-1,
| |
| Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Train A of SI will fail to actuate and
| |
| both Trains of SLI will fail to AUTOMATICALLY actuate. In addition, both
| |
| RHR pumps will fail to AUTOMATICALLY start.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 2-
| |
| OATC 3-
| |
| OATC 4-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 7 - 10 28
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Facility: _Vogtle_1 & 2_______ Scenario No.: ___6___ Op-Test No.: 2017-301
| |
| Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| _________________________ _________________________
| |
| Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power, MOL, steady state operations.
| |
| Equipment OOS: CCW pump # 5 is tagged out for motor repair - RTS in 7 hours.
| |
| Air Compressor #3 is tagged out for intercooler repair - RTS in 12 hours.
| |
| Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
| |
| SNAP 365
| |
| Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
| |
| EL14B DG1B Fails to Start
| |
| EL19B DG1B Fails to Auto Start
| |
| AF05C TDAFW Pump Fails to Auto Start
| |
| NS07B NSCW Pump #2 Fails to Auto Start
| |
| NS07D NSCW Pump #4 Fails to Auto Start
| |
| NS07F NSCW Pump #6 Fails to Auto Start
| |
| Triggered Malfunctions:
| |
| (1) CV12 (100%) 1LT-185, VCT Level Transmitter, Fails High
| |
| (2) 1HS-12255 Auxiliary Cooling Fan #1 to STOP
| |
| (2) HV-LO_HS12255_Y 1HS-12255 YELLOW A535P28-B8 to ON
| |
| (2) HV-LO_HS12255_G 1HS-12255 GREEN A535P28-B9
| |
| (2) HV-LO_HS12255_R 1HS-12255 RED A535P28-B7 to OFF
| |
| (2) ALB32-F01 480 V SWGR 1NB08 TROUBLE to ON
| |
| (2) ALB52-F03 CNMT AUX CLG F-1 LO AIR FLOW to ON
| |
| (3) PR03B 1LT-460, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, Fails High
| |
| (4) NS03 NSCW Train A Pipe Break
| |
| (5) EL02 Loss of RAT 1A
| |
| (5) EL03 Loss of RAT 1B
| |
| Pre-loaded Overrides:
| |
| 1HS-9382 Air Compressor #3 to STOP
| |
| A-LO_HS9382_G 1HS-9382 GREEN A531P30-A6 to OFF
| |
| Triggered Overrides:
| |
| (21) DG07BRF DG1B Reset From LOCA/LOSP
| |
| (22) DG16RF DG1B Local Start - Start
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event Malf. Event Event
| |
| No. No. Type* Description
| |
| 1 Trigger 1 I-OATC VCT Level Transmitter, 1LT-185, fails high, which diverts letdown
| |
| I-SS flow to the Holdup Tank. Automatic makeup will occur. The crew will
| |
| 10 min respond to this event using ARP 17007-1, which includes actions for
| |
| VCT HI/LO LEVEL caused by instrumentation failures.
| |
| 2 Trigger 2 C-UO Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan #1 trips.
| |
| C-SS
| |
| 5 min
| |
| 3 Trigger 3 I-OATC Pressurizer Level Transmitter, 1LT-460, fails high causing entry into
| |
| I-SS 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
| |
| 10 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| Function 9, CONDITION M, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition A)
| |
| * 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, FUNCTION 8, CONDITION
| |
| A, 30 days
| |
| 4 Trigger 4 C-UO NSCW Train A pipe ruptures requiring entry into 18021-C, Loss of
| |
| C-SS Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| 10 min TS-SS
| |
| * 3.7.8, Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) System,
| |
| CONDITION A, 72 hours
| |
| * 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, CONDITION B, 1 hour
| |
| (other actions at various times)
| |
| 5 Trigger 5 M-ALL Loss of all AC power with DG1B failing to start and DG1A emergency
| |
| tripped due to NSCW pipe rupture.
| |
| 30 min
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Once dispatched to investigate,
| |
| operators will be able to locally start DG1B after 10 minutes have
| |
| elapsed. When requested, delete EL14B first, then use Trigger
| |
| 21 followed by Trigger 22 to locally start the DG1B.
| |
| 6 N/A C-UO TDAFW pump will fail to start automatically requiring manual start
| |
| C-SS (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually start the TDAFW pump to establish AFW flow.
| |
| 7 N/A C-UO NSCW Train B pumps will fail to start automatically when DG1B is
| |
| C-SS started (pre-loaded malfunction).
| |
| Critical Task:
| |
| Manually start two NSCW Train B pumps.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 1:
| |
| VCT Level Transmitter, 1LT-185, fails high, which results in letdown diverting to the Holdup Tank. This
| |
| failure will cause automatic makeup to the VCT. The crew will respond to this event using ARP 17007-1
| |
| for ALB07-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL, which includes actions for an instrumentation failure.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs ARP 17007-1 actions for failure of a VCT level instrument.
| |
| OATC - Determines that 1LT-185 is the failed instrument.
| |
| Places 1LV-112A from the RHUT to the VCT position.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 2:
| |
| Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan #1 trips due to a locked rotor. Manual start of Containment Auxiliary
| |
| Cooling Fan #2 is required per ARP 17052-1.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs ARP 17052-1 actions for failure of a Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan.
| |
| UO - Determines that Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan #1 has tripped.
| |
| Starts Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan #2 as required per ARP 17052-1.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 3:
| |
| Pressurizer Level Transmitter, 1LT-460, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Systems
| |
| Instrumentation Malfunction.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18001-C, Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, for failure of a pressurizer level
| |
| instrument.
| |
| OATC - Determines that 1LT-460 is the failed instrument.
| |
| Selects the unaffected channel on the Pressurizer Level Control Select, 1LS-459D.
| |
| Selects the unaffected channel on the Pressurizer Level Recorder Select, 1LS-459E.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| Function 9, CONDITION M, 72 hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets
| |
| the intent of Condition A)
| |
| * 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, FUNCTION 8, CONDITION A, 30 days
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| Event 4:
| |
| NSCW Train A pipe ruptures requiring entry into 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water.
| |
| While the crew is verifying that NSCW Train B components are operating as required, the next event,
| |
| loss of all AC, occurs.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water, for indications of lowering NSCW
| |
| header pressure.
| |
| UO - Places all NSCW Train A pumps in Pull-to-Lock.
| |
| Depresses the Emergency Stop pushbuttons for DG1A.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| * 3.7.8, Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) System, CONDITION A, 72 hours
| |
| * 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, CONDITION B, 1 hour (other actions at various times)
| |
| Events 5, 6:
| |
| Loss of all AC power occurs due to a loss of both RATs. DG1B will fail to automatically start with DG1A
| |
| emergency tripped due to the NSCW Train A pipe rupture. Crew will enter 19100-1, Loss of All AC
| |
| Power.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Enters 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, and verifies IOAs.
| |
| Directs the local start of DG1B.
| |
| OATC - Performs IOAs of 19100-1.
| |
| Isolates letdown.
| |
| Trips all RCPs (places handswitches to STOP).
| |
| Trips the NCP.
| |
| UO - Starts the TDAFW pump by opening 1HV-5106.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Event 7:
| |
| When DG1B is started, NSCW Train B pumps will fail to automatically start.
| |
| Verifiable Actions:
| |
| SS - Directs the manual start of two NSCW Train B pumps.
| |
| UO - Starts two NSCW Train B pumps.
| |
| Technical Specifications:
| |
| None
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| The scenario may be stopped when DG1B is started, the
| |
| crew has transitioned to Step A41 of 19100-1, Loss of All AC
| |
| Power, and two NSCW Train B pumps are started, or at the
| |
| Chief Examiners discretion.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| CRITICAL TASKS:
| |
| 1. Manually start the TDAFW pump to establish AFW flow (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per the PWR ERG-based critical tasks, establishing the minimum required AFW flow rate, under
| |
| the postulated plant conditions, constitutes a task that is essential to safety, because its improper
| |
| performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or significant
| |
| degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant.
| |
| The analyses in the ERG Background Document for ECA-0.0 and subsequent analyses state that
| |
| the major concerns of a station blackout are the duration of the AC power outage and the
| |
| behavior of the RCP seals. The analyses assume that a reactor trip occurs following the station
| |
| blackout. After the initial RCS cooldown, decay heat would increase the RCS temperature.
| |
| Without the steam dumps and possibly without the SG PORVs, decay heat raises the RCS
| |
| temperature until the SG safety valves open. Then the RCS temperature stabilizes as decay heat
| |
| transfers from the core to the SGs and out the SG safety valves.
| |
| The analyses also show that the crew could dramatically delay the adverse consequences of a
| |
| continued AC power outage by initiating a plant cooldown. Without AC power, the crew would
| |
| accomplish the cooldown through SG depressurization using the SG PORVs and the turbine-
| |
| driven AFW pump. The cooldown would decrease the RCS temperature and pressure, reducing
| |
| the RCP seal leakage rates. The decrease in RCS pressure would also allow the injection of the
| |
| accumulator water to help replenish the RCS inventory and to add negative reactivity with the
| |
| boron addition.
| |
| According to the ERG Background Document for ECA-0.0, the objective of the
| |
| recovery/restoration technique incorporated into guideline ECA-0.0 is to mitigate deterioration of
| |
| RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available. The guideline steps are structured
| |
| to address the loss of all AC power as an initiating event while including actions that address
| |
| possible coincident occurrences such as loss of reactor coolant, loss of secondary coolant or
| |
| SGTR.
| |
| Failure to establish minimum AFW flow under the postulated conditions is a violation of the basic
| |
| objective of ECA-0.0 and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-0.0 is based. Both
| |
| intend to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions while AC emergency power is not available.
| |
| Without AFW flow, the SGs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew
| |
| would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncovery. Also, without AFW
| |
| flow, decay heat would still open the SG safety valves and would rapidly deplete the SG
| |
| inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink, or SG dryout. Decay heat would then
| |
| increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger
| |
| LOCA than RCP seal leakage. Both of these examples violate the basic assumptions of the
| |
| analyses on which ECA-0.0 is based, complicating the mitigation actions.
| |
| Also, from the ERG Background Document for ECA-0.0, Following entry into guideline ECA-0.0,
| |
| certain actions are performed regardless of the duration of the ac power outage. These actions,
| |
| which are appropriate for all loss of AC power scenarios, include the immediate actions (i.e.,
| |
| verification of reactor trip and turbine trip) and actions to check RCS isolation and secondary heat
| |
| sink availability.
| |
| It is imperative that the crew establish minimum AFW flow. Sufficient AFW flow is the major
| |
| assumption of the analyses upon which ECA-0.0 is based. Failure to perform the critical task
| |
| reduces the effectiveness of subsequent actions in extending the time to core uncovery.
| |
| Therefore, failure to manually start the TDAFW pump and establish at least 535 gpm AFW
| |
| flow rate to the SGs before SG WR levels reach 28% constitutes task failure.
| |
| 2. Manually start two NSCW Train B pumps (after EOP entry)
| |
| Per the PWR ERG-based critical tasks, failure to manually start the NSCW pumps under the
| |
| postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without cooling. Running the EDG
| |
| without NSCW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to
| |
| damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG
| |
| is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
| |
| incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power
| |
| capacity.
| |
| The EDGs require NSCW cooling for all of the auxiliary support systems. These auxiliary support
| |
| systems are equipped with temperature monitoring devices from which high temperature alarms
| |
| are derived. Even if the crew does not start the NSCW pumps until receipt of engine high
| |
| temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the EDG does not
| |
| fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.
| |
| If the crew does not start the NSCW pumps upon receipt of EDG engine high temperature
| |
| alarms, then temperatures will continue to increase. Most plants have some protective feature(s)
| |
| that will automatically trip the EDG on engine overtemperature.
| |
| For plants in which the engine overtemperature protection is not locked out, failure to establish
| |
| cooling water flow after receipt of engine high temperature alarms results in loss of the only
| |
| running EDG. If the crew members allow this to happen, they have degraded the emergency
| |
| power capacity to the point of reinitiating the station blackout. Additionally, the crews failure to
| |
| perform the critical task has resulted in a challenge to an automatic protective feature (EDG trip
| |
| on engine overtemperature). In effect, the crew is relying on an automatic feature to prevent
| |
| engine damage and has not performed the critical task satisfactorily. Therefore, an automatic
| |
| trip of DG1B due to a lack of cooling water flow constitutes a task failure.
| |
| Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
| |
| 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
| |
| 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
| |
| 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
| |
| 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
| |
| 5. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
| |
| 6. EOP based critical tasks (2-3) 2
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 1 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: VCT level transmitter, 1LT-185, fails HIGH resulting in letdown diverting to
| |
| the Holdup Tank. This failure will lead to an AUTOMATIC VCT makeup
| |
| due to lowering VCT level. The crew will respond to the failure using ARP
| |
| 17007-1 for ALB07-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of 1LT-185 failing HIGH.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB07-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL (This is a silent failure, so
| |
| the operators may refer to the ARP for this alarm for
| |
| guidance though the alarm may not be in.)
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Lowering VCT level, as indicated by 1LT-112 on the IPC.
| |
| * 1LT-185 indicating HIGH.
| |
| * 1LV-112A in the HUT position with the amber light lit.
| |
| * More frequent AUTO makeup due to the lowering level in the
| |
| VCT.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 1 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 2 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: VCT level transmitter, 1LT-185, fails HIGH resulting in letdown diverting to
| |
| the Holdup Tank. This failure will lead to an AUTOMATIC VCT makeup
| |
| due to lowering VCT level. The crew will respond to the failure using ARP
| |
| 17007-1 for ALB07-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC ALB07-E05
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 1 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 3 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: VCT level transmitter, 1LT-185, fails HIGH resulting in letdown diverting to
| |
| the Holdup Tank. This failure will lead to an AUTOMATIC VCT makeup
| |
| due to lowering VCT level. The crew will respond to the failure using ARP
| |
| 17007-1 for ALB07-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 1 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 4 of 4
| |
| Event: 1
| |
| Event Description: VCT level transmitter, 1LT-185, fails HIGH resulting in letdown diverting to
| |
| the Holdup Tank. This failure will lead to an AUTOMATIC VCT makeup
| |
| due to lowering VCT level. The crew will respond to the failure using ARP
| |
| 17007-1 for ALB07-E05 VCT HI/LO LEVEL.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact
| |
| C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a work order, and
| |
| dispatch personnel to investigate the cause of the fault as well
| |
| as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
| |
| END OF EVENT 1 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 1 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 1 of 3
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan 1-1515-A7-001 trips due to a locked
| |
| rotor. The crew will respond per the ARP guidance of 17052-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan #1 tripping.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB052-F03 CNMT AUX CLG F-1 LO AIR FLOW
| |
| * ALB032-F01 480V SWGR 1NB08 TROUBLE
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Green and amber handswitch lights on 1HS-12255 (trip
| |
| indication).
| |
| * The annunciators above.
| |
| UO ALB052-F03
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 2 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 2 of 3
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan 1-1515-A7-001 trips due to a locked
| |
| rotor. The crew will respond per the ARP guidance of 17052-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO ALB032-F01
| |
| 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS -
| |
| UO 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| The crew may contact C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR),
| |
| a work order, and investigate the cause of the failure as well as
| |
| inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. If not already
| |
| completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the
| |
| status of the plant.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 2 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 3 of 3
| |
| Event: 2
| |
| Event Description: Containment Auxiliary Cooling Fan 1-1515-A7-001 trips due to a locked
| |
| rotor. The crew will respond per the ARP guidance of 17052-1.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS -
| |
| END OF EVENT 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 2 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 1 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: 1LT-460 fails HIGH resulting in a lit trip status light on TSLB-3 due to high
| |
| pressurizer level on one channel. The crew will enter 18001-C, Section D,
| |
| Failure of Pressurizer Level Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the failure of 1LT-460 HIGH.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB11-E01 PRZR HI LEVEL ALARM
| |
| * ALB11-F01 PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * 1LI-460A reading off-scale HIGH.
| |
| * TSLB-3 PRZR HI LEVEL LB460A trip status light lit.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 3 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 2 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: 1LT-460 fails HIGH resulting in a lit trip status light on TSLB-3 due to high
| |
| pressurizer level on one channel. The crew will enter 18001-C, Section D,
| |
| Failure of Pressurizer Level Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC / 18001-C, Section D, Failure of Pressurizer Level
| |
| SS Instrumentation
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18001-C, Section D, Failure of
| |
| Pressurizer Level Instrumentation.
| |
| D1 -
| |
| OATC D2 -
| |
| OATC D3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 3 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 3 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: 1LT-460 fails HIGH resulting in a lit trip status light on TSLB-3 due to high
| |
| pressurizer level on one channel. The crew will enter 18001-C, Section D,
| |
| Failure of Pressurizer Level Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC D4 -
| |
| OATC D5 -
| |
| OATC D6 -
| |
| OATC D7 -
| |
| OATC D9 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 3 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 4 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: 1LT-460 fails HIGH resulting in a lit trip status light on TSLB-3 due to high
| |
| pressurizer level on one channel. The crew will enter 18001-C, Section D,
| |
| Failure of Pressurizer Level Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC D10 -
| |
| SS D11 -
| |
| If not already complete, the crew may contact C&T to initiate a
| |
| Condition Report (CR), a work order, and dispatch I&C to
| |
| initiate repairs as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops
| |
| Duty Manager.
| |
| SS D12 -
| |
| SS D13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 3 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 5 of 5
| |
| Event: 3
| |
| Event Description: 1LT-460 fails HIGH resulting in a lit trip status light on TSLB-3 due to high
| |
| pressurizer level on one channel. The crew will enter 18001-C, Section D,
| |
| Failure of Pressurizer Level Instrumentation, to mitigate the failure.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS D14 -
| |
| 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| FUNCTION 9 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION M, 72
| |
| hours
| |
| CONDITION A, Immediately (if the crew enters Table
| |
| 3.3.1-1, then the crew meets the intent of Condition
| |
| A)
| |
| 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, FUNCTION 8, CONDITION
| |
| A, 30 days
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant.
| |
| SS D15 -
| |
| END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 3 5
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation
| |
| LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately
| |
| with one or more referenced in
| |
| required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the
| |
| inoperable. channel(s).
| |
| B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours
| |
| channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours
| |
| C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours
| |
| While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
| |
| for Functions 1, 17, 18,
| |
| or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR
| |
| or 5, closing the reactor
| |
| trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours
| |
| permitted.
| |
| --------------------------------
| |
| One channel or train
| |
| inoperable.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| M. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTES-------------------
| |
| 1. For RCP bus undervoltage or
| |
| underfrequency instrument
| |
| functions; the inoperable
| |
| channel may be bypassed for
| |
| up to 12 hours for surveillance
| |
| testing of other channels.
| |
| 2. For other instrument functions;
| |
| a channel may be bypassed for
| |
| up to 12 hours for surveillance
| |
| testing.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours
| |
| POWER to < P-7.
| |
| N. One Reactor Coolant ---------------------NOTE--------------------
| |
| Flow-Low (single loop) A channel may be bypassed for up
| |
| channel inoperable. to 12 hours for surveillance testing.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours
| |
| OR
| |
| N.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours
| |
| POWER to < P-8.
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-5 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| RTS Instrumentation
| |
| 3.3.1
| |
| Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 9)
| |
| Reactor Trip System Instrumentation
| |
| APPLICABLE
| |
| MODES OR
| |
| OTHER NOMINAL
| |
| SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP
| |
| FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
| |
| 8. Pressurizer
| |
| Pressure
| |
| a. Low 1(f) 4 M SR 3.3.1.1 1950 psig 1960(g) psig
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| b. High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 2395 psig 2385 psig
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| 9. Pressurizer Water 1(f) 3 M SR 3.3.1.1 93.9% 92%
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| Level - High SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| 10. Reactor Coolant
| |
| Flow - Low
| |
| a. Single Loop 1(h) 3 per loop N SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| b. Two Loops 1(i) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.7
| |
| (n)(o)
| |
| SR 3.3.1.10
| |
| SR 3.3.1.15
| |
| (continued)
| |
| (f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
| |
| (g) Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure-Low are 10 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag.
| |
| (h) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| (i) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
| |
| (n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that
| |
| it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
| |
| (o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint
| |
| (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more
| |
| conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint
| |
| implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to
| |
| determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology
| |
| and Scaling Instructions.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System
| |
| 3.3.4
| |
| 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System
| |
| LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| -----------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One or more required A.1 Restore required Function 30 days
| |
| Functions inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time not met. AND
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.4-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System
| |
| 3.3.4
| |
| Table 3.3.4-1 (page 1 of 1)
| |
| Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation and Controls
| |
| FUNCTION/INSTRUMENT REQUIRED
| |
| OR CONTROL PARAMETER NUMBER OF CHANNELS
| |
| MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| 1. Source Range Neutron Flux 1
| |
| 2. Extended Range Neutron Flux 1
| |
| 3. RCS Cold Leg Temperature 1/loop
| |
| 4. RCS Hot Leg Temperature 2
| |
| 5. Core Exit Thermocouples 2
| |
| 6. RCS Wide Range Pressure 2
| |
| 7. Steam Generator Level Wide Range 1/loop
| |
| 8. Pressurizer Level 2
| |
| 9. RWST Level 1(a)
| |
| 10. BAST level 1(a)
| |
| 11. CST Level 1/tank(a) (c)
| |
| 12. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow 1/loop
| |
| 13. Steam Generator Pressure 1/loop
| |
| TRANSFER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS
| |
| 1. Reactivity Control (b)
| |
| 2. RCS Pressure Control (b)
| |
| 3. Decay Heat Removal
| |
| a. Auxiliary Feedwater (b)
| |
| (d)
| |
| b. Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valve (b)
| |
| 4. RCS Inventory/Charging System (b)
| |
| 5. Safety support systems required for the above functions (b)
| |
| (a) Alternate local level indication may be established to fulfill the required number of channels.
| |
| (b) The required channels include the transfer switches and control circuits necessary to place and maintain the unit in a safe
| |
| shutdown condition using safety grade components.
| |
| (c) Only required for the OPERABLE tank.
| |
| (d) Refer also to LCO 3.7.4.
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.4-3 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Remote Shutdown System
| |
| B 3.3.4
| |
| BASES (continued)
| |
| TABLE B 3.3.4-1
| |
| REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
| |
| READOUT1 CHANNELS
| |
| INSTRUMENT FUNCTION LOCATION AVAILABLE
| |
| 1. Source Range Neutron Flux A 1 (NI-31E)
| |
| 2. Extended Range Neutron Flux B 1 (NI-13135 C&D)
| |
| 3. RCS Cold Leg Temperature A, B 1/Loop
| |
| (Loop 1 TI-0413D, Panel A)
| |
| (Loop 2 TI-0423D, Panel B)
| |
| (Loop 3 TI-0433D, Panel B)
| |
| (Loop 4 TI-0443D, Panel A)
| |
| 4. RCS Hot Leg Temperature A 2
| |
| (Loop 1 TI-0413C
| |
| Loop 4 TI-0443C)
| |
| 5. Core Exit Thermocouples B 2
| |
| (Loop 2 Core Quadrant 1TI-10055)3,4
| |
| (Loop 3 Core Quadrant 1TI-10056)3,4
| |
| (Loop 1 Core Quadrant 2TI-10055)3,4
| |
| (Loop 4 Core Quadrant 2TI-10056)3,4
| |
| 6. RCS Wide Range PressureDriven from A,LT-460
| |
| B 2
| |
| (PI-405A, Panel A)
| |
| (PI-403A, Panel B)
| |
| 7. Steam Generator Level Wide Range A, B 1/Loop
| |
| (Loop 1 LI-501B, Panel A)
| |
| (Loop 2 LI-502B, Panel B)
| |
| (Loop 3 LI-503B, Panel B)
| |
| (Loop 4 LI-504B, Panel A)
| |
| 8. Pressurizer Level A, B 2
| |
| (LI-459C, Panel A)
| |
| (LI-460C, Panel B)
| |
| 9. RWST Level L 1 (LI-0990C)
| |
| 10. BAST Level L 1 (PI-10115)2
| |
| 11. CST Level L 2
| |
| (Tank 1 LI-5100)
| |
| (Tank 2 LI-5115)
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.4-6 REVISION 25
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 1 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of rupture on Train A NSCW.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB02-B01 NSCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS
| |
| * ALB02- NUMEROUS ALARMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
| |
| LOSS OF NSCW COOLING FLOW TO NSCW COOLED
| |
| PLANT COMPONENTS
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Low NSCW Supply Header pressure.
| |
| * Low NSCW Return Header pressure.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| UO 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
| |
| Crew update for entry into 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service
| |
| Cooling Water System.
| |
| 1-
| |
| NOTE: With all NSCW pumps running, catastrophic leakage is
| |
| indicated by low system flows and pressures.
| |
| UO 2-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 2 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 3-
| |
| UO 4-
| |
| SS 5-
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 3 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 13 -
| |
| SS 14 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 4 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO / SS 15 -
| |
| If requested, this is done by the Booth Operator (field action).
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 5 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 16 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 6 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 16 - CONTINUED
| |
| SS 17 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 7 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO 18 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 8 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 19 -
| |
| SS 20 -
| |
| If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing,
| |
| updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact
| |
| C&T to initiate a Condition Report (CR), a work order, and
| |
| dispatch personnel to investigate the cause of the fault as well
| |
| as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 9 of 9
| |
| Event: 4
| |
| Event Description: NSCW Train A experiences a catastrophic pipe rupture upstream of the
| |
| supply flow element. The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear
| |
| Service Cooling Water System.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS 21 -
| |
| 3.7.8, Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) System,
| |
| CONDITION A, 72 hours
| |
| 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, CONDITION B, 1 hour
| |
| (other actions with various times)
| |
| *FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC
| |
| REFERENCE*
| |
| END OF EVENT 4 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF
| |
| THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Event 4 9
| |
| | |
| NSCW
| |
| 3.7.8
| |
| 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS
| |
| 3.7.8 Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) System
| |
| LCO 3.7.8 Two NSCW trains shall be OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One NSCW train --------------------NOTES-------------------
| |
| inoperable. 1. Enter applicable Conditions and
| |
| Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1,
| |
| "AC Sources - Operating," for
| |
| emergency diesel generator
| |
| made inoperable by NSCW
| |
| system.
| |
| 2. Enter applicable Conditions and
| |
| Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6,
| |
| "RCS Loops - MODE 4," for
| |
| residual heat removal loops
| |
| made inoperable by NSCW
| |
| system.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------
| |
| A.1 Restore NSCW system to 72 hours
| |
| OPERABLE status.
| |
| B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Time of Condition A not AND
| |
| met.
| |
| B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.7.8-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating
| |
| 3.8.1
| |
| 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
| |
| 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating
| |
| LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
| |
| a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network
| |
| and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution
| |
| System; and
| |
| b. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite
| |
| Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s).
| |
| Automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B ESF buses shall be
| |
| OPERABLE.
| |
| APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| --------------------------------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------------------------
| |
| LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable to DGs.
| |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| A. One required offsite A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour
| |
| circuit inoperable. required OPERABLE
| |
| offsite circuit. AND
| |
| Once per 8 hours
| |
| thereafter
| |
| AND
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating
| |
| 3.8.1
| |
| ACTIONS (continued)
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| B. One DG inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the 1 hour
| |
| required offsite circuit(s).
| |
| AND
| |
| Once per 8 hours
| |
| thereafter
| |
| AND
| |
| B.2 Verify SAT available. 1 hour
| |
| AND
| |
| Once per 12
| |
| hours thereafter
| |
| AND
| |
| B.3 Declare required feature(s) 4 hours from
| |
| supported by the discovery of
| |
| inoperable DG inoperable Condition B
| |
| when its required concurrent with
| |
| redundant feature(s) is inoperability of
| |
| inoperable. redundant required
| |
| feature(s)
| |
| AND
| |
| B.4.1 Determine OPERABLE DG 24 hours
| |
| is not inoperable due to
| |
| common cause failure.
| |
| OR
| |
| B.4.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours
| |
| OPERABLE DG.
| |
| AND
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-3 Amendment No. 100 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating
| |
| 3.8.1
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| B. (continued) --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| Required Action B.5.1 is only
| |
| applicable if the combined reliability
| |
| of the enhanced black-start
| |
| combustion turbine generators
| |
| (CTG) and the black-start diesel
| |
| generator is 95%. Otherwise,
| |
| Required Action B.5.2 applies.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| B.5.1 Verify an enhanced black- 72 hours
| |
| start CTG is functional by
| |
| verifying the CTG and the OR
| |
| black-start diesel
| |
| generator starts and Within 72 hours
| |
| achieves steady state prior to entry into
| |
| voltage and frequency. Condition B
| |
| OR
| |
| B.5.2 Start and run at least one 72 hours
| |
| CTG while in Condition B.
| |
| OR
| |
| Prior to entry into
| |
| Condition B for
| |
| preplanned
| |
| maintenance
| |
| AND
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-4 Amendment No. 100 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| AC Sources - Operating
| |
| 3.8.1
| |
| ACTIONS
| |
| CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
| |
| B. (continued) B.6 Restore DG to OPERABLE 14 days from
| |
| status. discovery of failure to
| |
| meet LCO
| |
| C. Required Actions B.2, C.1 Restore DG to OPERABLE 72 hours
| |
| B.5.1, or B.5.2 and status.
| |
| associated Completion
| |
| Times not met.
| |
| D. Two required offsite D.1 Declare required feature(s) 12 hours from
| |
| circuits inoperable. inoperable when its discovery of
| |
| redundant feature(s) is Condition D
| |
| inoperable. concurrent with
| |
| inoperability of
| |
| redundant required
| |
| AND features
| |
| D.2 Restore one required 24 hours
| |
| offsite circuit to
| |
| OPERABLE status
| |
| E. One required offsite --------------------NOTE-------------------
| |
| circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and
| |
| Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9,
| |
| AND "Distribution Systems - Operating,"
| |
| when Condition E is entered with no
| |
| One DG inoperable. AC power source to one or more
| |
| trains.
| |
| ------------------------------------------------
| |
| (continued)
| |
| Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-5 Amendment No. 100 (Unit 1)
| |
| Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 1 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW Diagnosis of the Loss of all AC Power.
| |
| Alarms:
| |
| * ALB36-A01 4160 V SWGR 1AA02 TROUBLE
| |
| * ALB37-A01 4160 V SWGR 1BA03 TROUBLE
| |
| * Multiple QEAB alarms
| |
| Indications:
| |
| * Main control room lights will dim significantly.
| |
| * Numerous QEAB annunciators indicating a major event.
| |
| * Various 480 VAC MCC-powered handswitch lights on the
| |
| control board will be dark.
| |
| * The annunciators listed above.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 1
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 2 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power
| |
| IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after
| |
| the Immediate Operator Actions.
| |
| A1 -
| |
| UO A2 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 2
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 3 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
| |
| A3 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 3
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 4 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A3 - CONTINUED
| |
| At some point early in the event, the crew will contact C&T to
| |
| dispatch Maintenance and Operations personnel to investigate
| |
| the cause of the power loss and to determine the reason DG1B
| |
| failed to start.
| |
| *10 minutes from the time that an operator is dispatched to
| |
| DG1B, the ability to locally start DG1B will become available.
| |
| The Booth Operator will contact the crew and let them know
| |
| that no problem was found with DG1B and that they are
| |
| standing by (the Booth Operator will NOT prompt the crew to
| |
| start DG1B).
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 4
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 5 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO A4 -
| |
| *EVENT 6 (TDAFW PUMP FAILS TO AUTOMATICALLY START)
| |
| IS PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Critical task #1 - MANUALLY start the TDAFW pump before SG
| |
| WR levels reach 28% is satisfied by completion of this step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 5
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 6 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO A4 - CONTINUED
| |
| OATC A5 -
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: The RCPs are de-energized with their
| |
| breakers closed (no UV trip), so the OATC will open the
| |
| breakers.
| |
| OATC A6 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 6
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 7 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW A7 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 7
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 8 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO A8 -
| |
| UO A9 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 8
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 9 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A10 -
| |
| *ATTACHMENT 1 is performed in the field. Crew will contact an
| |
| extra operator to initiate the load shed.
| |
| SS A11 -
| |
| SS A12 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 9
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 10 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO A13 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 10
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 11 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| OATC A14 -
| |
| UO / SS A15 -
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: When DG1B is locally started at a later
| |
| time, the crew will transition to Step A41 based on this
| |
| Continuous Action step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 11
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 12 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO A16 -
| |
| OATC / A17 -
| |
| UO
| |
| *10 minutes from the time that an operator is dispatched to
| |
| DG1B, the ability to locally start DG1B will become available.
| |
| The Booth Operator will contact the crew and let them know
| |
| that no problem was found with DG1B and that they are
| |
| standing by (the Booth Operator will NOT prompt the crew to
| |
| start DG1B).
| |
| NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: See scenario outline for
| |
| detailed instructions on simulator manipulations required for
| |
| local start of DG1B.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 12
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 13 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A18 -
| |
| SS A19 -
| |
| *ATTACHMENT 5 is performed in the field. Crew will contact an
| |
| extra operator to initiate isolations.
| |
| UO A20 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 13
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 14 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO A21 -
| |
| UO A22 -
| |
| NOTE TO EXAMINER: DG1B is expected to have been locally
| |
| started by now, so the crew will transition to Step A41 based
| |
| on Continuous Action Step A15.
| |
| SS A41 - (From Continuous Action Step A15)
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 14
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 15 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A43 -
| |
| *EVENT 7 (TRAIN B NSCW PUMPS FAIL TO AUTOMATICALLY
| |
| START) IS PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED IN THIS STEP.
| |
| Critical task #2 - MANUALLY start two Train B NSCW pumps
| |
| before an automatic trip of DG1B due to a lack of cooling water
| |
| flow is satisfied by completion of this step.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 15
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 16 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| SS A43 - CONTINUED
| |
| END OF SCENARIO 6 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH
| |
| CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER. THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE
| |
| FOR INFORMATIONAL USE IF THE SCENARIO IS EXTENDED.
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 16
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 17 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| UO / SS A44 -
| |
| SS A45 -
| |
| SS A46 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 17
| |
| | |
| Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2
| |
| Op-Test No.: 2017-301 Scenario: 6 Page 18 of 18
| |
| Events: 5 - 7
| |
| Event Description: Event 5 consists of the crew responding to a Loss of All AC due to a loss
| |
| of both RATs. 19100-1, Loss of All AC Power, is entered. Event 6
| |
| consists of the TDAFW pump failing to AUTOMATICALLY start. Event 7
| |
| consists of the crew responding to Train B NSCW pumps failing to
| |
| AUTOMATICALLY start following DG1B tying to 1E bus, 1BA03.
| |
| Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior
| |
| CREW A47 -
| |
| Southern Company l Scenario 6 - Events 5 - 7 18
| |
| }} | | }} |
